The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16866/biden-trump-middle-east

[Crafty_Dog]

    
The Kurdistan Regional Government: Divided and Dysfunctional
Recent protests are a sign of the growing anger in the region.
By: Hilal Khashan

In a 17th-century poem titled “Mem and Zin,” renowned Kurdish poet Ahmad Khani wrote: “If only there were harmony among us, if we were to obey a single one of us … we would perfect our religion, our state, and would educate ourselves in learning and wisdom.” Khani’s work, which inspired many modern-day Kurdish nationalist writers and activists, was often critical of the ever-present fractiousness within Kurdish communities. His warnings about the dangers of division are nowhere more applicable than the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Established in 1992, the autonomous region in northern Iraq was once a beacon of hope for Kurdish groups in other countries that had yet to achieve similar levels of self-governance. But tribal loyalties continue to dominate in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Kurds are increasingly frustrated by an ongoing economic crisis and their leaders’ lack of action.

Turbulent Path to Autonomy

The path to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was not an easy one. During the First World War, the British promised Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji independence for the Kurds in exchange for his cooperation against the Ottoman Empire. They reneged on their promise but instead appointed Barzanji governor of Sulaymaniyah province in 1921, hoping to use the Kurds as a buffer between Iraq and the Ottomans. He then took advantage of the 1920 Iraqi revolt and British preoccupation with pacifying the country, declaring himself the king of Kurdistan in 1922. The British unseated him in 1924, and his futile uprisings ended in 1931.

The center of the Kurdish movement shifted to Iran during the Second World War, especially after the Soviet army occupied northern Iran in 1941. In 1946, Qazi Muhammad announced the creation of the Mahabad Republic in Soviet-controlled Iran. Mustafa Barzani, who had become a prominent Iraqi Kurdish leader, relocated to Mahabad and became minister of defense. The Iranian army crushed the fledgling republic immediately after the Soviets pulled out of Iran – less than a year after its formation. Before fleeing to the Soviet Union, however, Barzani established the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

After a 1958 military coup overthrew the Hashemite monarchy, Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim invited Barzani to return to Baghdad. Qasim, who was unpopular among Iraq’s Sunnis, shortsightedly armed the KDP and dragged the Kurds into an intra-Arab rivalry. In 1959, Barzani allowed his militia to quell the anti-Qasim Mosul rebellion, which engendered an enduring perception among Sunni and Shiite Iraqi Arabs that the Kurds are undependable partners.

Realizing that Kurdish statehood was unattainable, the KDP started an insurgency that lasted from 1961 until 1970, when the Iraqi government and Barzani signed an autonomy agreement. The deal soon collapsed because the Iraqi government refused to include oil-rich Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Sinjar regions in the agreement. With Iranian encouragement and military assistance, the Kurds in 1974 resumed their attacks on the Iraqi army. However, a 1975 agreement between Iran and Iraq on the Shatt al-Arab waterway ended the shah’s support for the Kurds, which led to the end of the insurgency.

Its defeat led to the defection of Jalal Talabani, who then established the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Syria with like-minded, secular Kurdish intellectuals. Toward the end of the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, and in response to the PUK’s alliance with Iran, the Iraqi military launched the Halabja chemical attack, which killed 8,000 Kurdish civilians. Talabani traveled to Washington in 1990 and offered to join the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Fractured Government

The 1991 Gulf War once again gave Iraqi Kurds hope that independence was within reach. Iraq’s defeat in the war triggered two simultaneous uprisings: one led by Shiites in the south and another led by Kurds in the north. Regime forces crushed both within a month. Backed by the U.S., which imposed a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, PUK and KDP fighters joined forces in a rare show of unity and seized control of most Kurdish-populated areas. Aware that neither Turkey nor Iran would tolerate a Kurdish state next door, the U.S. urged the Kurds to limit their self-determination demands to autonomy.

In 1992, Iraqi Kurdistan held its first parliamentary elections. Both the PUK and KDP claimed they won a majority, and to avoid a conflict, they split the 100 seats reserved for Kurdish voters equally. The parliament then founded the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the official governing body in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is composed of four provinces. The PUK controls Sulaymaniyah province and is an urban party that leans toward social democracy; the KDP prevails in Dohuk and Irbil provinces and is mainly a rural and tribal party. Geography has influenced their regional affiliations: The KDP maintains close relations with Turkey, and the PUK is on good terms with Iran.

Kurdish Groups in Iraq
(click to enlarge)

Relations between two have been contentious and, until recently, even bloody. (They fought a civil war between 1994 and 1997.) Their leaders have continuously failed to cooperate, and their rank and file refuse to associate with each other.

In 2017, KRG President Masoud Barzani called a nonbinding independence referendum, despite warnings from Baghdad. After 93 percent of voters voted for independence, the Iraqi army launched an offensive that seized 40 percent of KRG territory, including Kirkuk, and nearly half its oil fields. Barzani resigned, and the presidency was left vacant for 18 months. In keeping with the KDP’s history, Barzani’s nephew, Nechirvan, became KRG president and his son, Masrour, became prime minister.

Financial Crisis

In addition to its other challenges, the KRG is in the midst of a financial crisis, which has left the government unable to pay public employees. Kurdish officials blame low oil prices and declining transfers from Baghdad, but there are also serious underlying causes for the region’s economic woes.

Despite the influx of vast amounts of oil money, the KRG failed to launch a single project aimed at employing Kurdish youth. (Estimates suggest that more than 1 million young people will enter the job market over the next few years.) Sulaymaniyah province saw a series of violent protests in December that targeted the KRG – but they echoed similar protests that have erupted in Baghdad, Basra and Nasiriyah. Ordinary Iraqis, irrespective of their ethnicity or ideology, are frustrated with the country’s economic condition and the lack of action from political parties claiming to represent them.

In the KRG, however, these frustrations have been directed at the KDP and PUK, which monopolize the regional government’s resources. They have failed to introduce political and administrative reforms that could modernize the KRG political system. They have also closely guarded their hold on power and failed to implement measures that would increase accountability and transparency. Kurds have viewed with indignation the lavish spending of government officials and the elite class in the capital, Irbil. The ostentatious lifestyles of the nouveau riche business class, who partnered in joint ventures with neo-tribal party officials, were a stark contrast to impoverished Kurds who were not paid their salaries.

Betrayed

The protests in Sulaymaniyah last month were a result of these long-simmering tensions. Protesters attacked the offices of all the parties active in the region – not just the PUK, which dominates Sulaymaniyah – sending a forceful message that politicians from every party had failed to defend the interests of their constituents.

In the 2018 KRG parliamentary elections, the PUK won 21 seats, three more than its 2013 total but 29 fewer than it had won in the KRG’s first elections in 1992. The Movement for Change, also known as Gorran, lost five seats in 2018 (for a total of 12) compared to 2013, while the Islamic parties gained two (also for a total of 12). The KDP, meanwhile, increased its total from 34 to 45.

It’s unlikely, however, that the KDP will hold on to its gains given the deep economic crisis facing the KRG. The party’s 2018 result was probably related to the referendum on independence, which is popular among the Kurds. As the recent protests show, the Kurds feel betrayed by the PUK and KDP after generations of suffering war, abuse, discrimination and ethnic cleansing. They see their politicians as reactionary feudal chiefs masquerading as Western-minded nation-builders.

Kurdish leaders, meanwhile, have accused the region’s enemies of stirring dissension to sabotage Kurdish prospects for statehood. The truth is that the leaders themselves have failed to set aside their own interests to build on the autonomy the region won in 1992. Some PUK representatives recently even called for creating a Kurdish political entity in Sulaymaniyah province separate from the KRG. While waging fratricidal wars, they have lost sight of centuries of struggle.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17032/trump-successes-middle-east

[DougMacG]

A recent United Nations Security Council report concluded that ISIS currently controls more than 10,000 fighters, organized in small cells in Syria and Iraq.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17023/isis-return-biden

After Trump, we barely have a thread anymore for Middle East war.

Here we go again...

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17023/isis-return-biden

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/02/exclusive-photos-deadly-rocket-attack-us-base-iraq/172095/

[Crafty_Dog]

By: Geopolitical Futures

Background: Russia’s strategy in the Middle East involves active balancing between actors including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel. It often uses the leader of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, as a mediator in relations with the Muslim world. Kadyrov is an ideal candidate because of his Muslim background and deep ties with the Kremlin.

What Happened: Kadyrov traveled on Thursday to the United Arab Emirates, where he met with the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and passed on a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin reportedly hailed the “productive and multifaceted” relations between Russia and the UAE, and thanked the Emirates for supplying the North Caucasus with personal protective equipment to deal with the pandemic. Kadyrov highlighted the role of Emirati projects in developing Chechnya and discussed other areas of cooperation.

Bottom Line: A visit of this nature between these two figures means Putin wants something from the Arab world. It’s notable that the visit came on the heels of a meeting between Russia, Turkey and Iran on the Syrian peace process. Essentially, Russia continues to engage multiple sides to strengthen its influence. As long as the basic structure of the nascent Israel-Arab coalition remains unstable, conditions will be favorable for Moscow to advance its diplomatic strategy.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://twitter.com/CNN/status/1362604595533533184?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2906&pnespid=i7l0pKdSHleN4r9WsX5AQ74Ca5TkM7rOkdsUBZE.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/02/troops-describe-night-fire-shadowy-iraqi-militants/172172/

[Crafty_Dog]

No Peace for the Middle East
The Arab-Israeli normalization deals are unlikely to bring stability to the fractured region.
By: Hilal Khashan

The Middle East’s location has long made it an arena for great power competition. Over the past few centuries, the region has seen conflict between the Ottoman and Iranian empires, and Russian and Western meddling in its affairs. The Anglo-French establishment of the Middle East state system in the 20th century failed to bring stability. Iran and Turkey went on to build the foundations of a modern state on their own, and the newly rising Arab states, divided as they are, have not managed to come to terms with the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties with Israel also failed to spread peace and stability throughout the region.

Today, the recent normalization deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco once again promise to open a new chapter in Middle East relations. But its complex problems and diverse political landscape mean peace is still out of reach for this fractious region.

Relying on the West

When former U.S. President Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia in May 2017 to attend the Riyadh summit, he announced the formation of the Middle East Strategic Alliance, a kind of security partnership that would help fill the power vacuum in the region. He wanted to create a unified defense mechanism and common economic and energy platform that would prevent China and Russia from filling the void. Both Turkey and Iran boycotted the summit, believing that it was part of an effort to undermine their influence. Either way, the MESA never materialized because Egypt, Jordan and Qatar did not see Iran as a security threat, and Kuwait and Oman preferred to mostly stay out of the region’s explosive conflicts.

In fact, most Arab countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, did not take the MESA seriously, believing it would turn them into pawns rather than allies. The project was never likely to stem the region’s chronic instability as it ignored the local issues – state repression and regime intolerance of peaceful opposition – that so often cause it.

But the U.S.-brokered plan was emblematic of a larger problem: Arab countries have been largely unable to cooperate with each other and often prefer to rely on a Western mediator. The Arab League’s 1950 Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty collapsed because Egypt and Saudi Arabia feared domination by Iraq’s Hashemites. The Joint Arab Command, established in 1964 as a platform from which to confront Israel, quickly became defunct, making Israel’s stunning victory in the 1967 Six-Day War even easier.

When Egypt made peace with Israel in 1978, the Arabs held a summit in Baghdad and decided to establish the Eastern Front between Syria and Iraq to make up for the loss of Egypt. But the project failed because of the personal rivalry between Hafez Assad and Saddam Hussein. In 1991, right after the end of Operation Desert Storm, the Gulf Cooperation Council states signed the Damascus Declaration with Syria and Egypt, both of which agreed to provide troops to help support Arab security, but the agreement was later scrapped because the Saudis preferred to rely on Washington’s support instead .

For many in the Middle East, the ideal scenario would be for Saudi Arabia to establish an alliance with Israel and Turkey as a countervailing force against Iranian regional ambitions. This makes sense: Israel is eager to partner with the larger Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Turkey has of late tried to befriend Arab countries. But such an alliance is still beyond reach. Ankara has had little success in wooing Arab states, with the exception of Qatar and Libya’s beleaguered Government of National Accord. And the Saudis are paranoid about trusting their fellow Arabs, believing they're only interested in Saudi money and in subverting Riyadh's rule. But with the Biden administration scaling back ties with Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will need to rethink its hesitancy.

Emerging Israel-UAE Alliance

For the UAE, its rapprochement with Israel is about more than just normalizing relations. It believes their relationship can evolve into an economic and military alliance. Abu Dhabi has strategic needs that it believes Israel can help meet in areas such as agricultural technology, food self-sufficiency, cybersecurity, tourism, high-tech and commerce. It sees itself and Israel as having modern economies and efficient armed forces that can change the shape of the region. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan wants to transform the UAE into an economic empire safeguarded by a strong military and a network of relations with strategic partners, chief among them the U.S. and Israel. (Notably, China had a mixed response to the Israeli-UAE peace accord. It issued a vague but measured response that warned against ignoring the Palestinian question and further radicalizing the region.)

Israel and the Arab League
(click to enlarge)

Israel and the UAE have different expectations of the normalization deal. Abu Dhabi’s crown prince has delusions of grandeur and thinks Israel needs him to legitimize its existence. As a hub for air transport, education, culture and media, the UAE believes it can link Israel to the region and thus to the rest of the world. Israel, on the other hand, wants to build an alliance against Iran. It’s unlikely that the UAE would go along with such a project, especially since the Biden administration is pursuing a diplomatic path to solving the Iran nuclear issue, and the UAE would not join an alliance that brings with it the risk of war without U.S. backing.

Their prospects for economic cooperation are also limited. The UAE’s economic development hinges on its ability to maintain domestic stability, which goes hand in hand with Sheikh Mohammed’s policy of fostering good relations with military dictators such as Egypt’s Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, Libya’s Khalifa Haftar and Sudan’s Abdel-Fattah Burhan, and ambitious leaders like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammad bin Salman. A potential armed conflict with Iran is therefore out of the question.

Indeed, in many ways, their economic interests don’t align. Israel plans to link its Haifa Port to the Maritime Silk Road component of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. The project bypasses the Persian Gulf, to avoid the volatile Strait of Hormuz, and will effectively reduce the significance of the UAE’s Jebel Ali Port, currently the largest in the Middle East.

China's Silk Road in the Middle East
(click to enlarge)

It’s therefore unlikely that the UAE-Israeli entente will go beyond security cooperation, which was already in the works between Israel and several Arab states for years, including with Jordan since 1948, Egypt since the Camp David agreement, and the Gulf countries since the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. In the Middle East, alliances with Israel are difficult to build because Israel inevitably emerges as the leading force and its Arab allies the junior partners. The balance of power tilts decisively in Israel’s favor.

Russo-Turkish-Iranian Triangle

The two major Middle East players left out of the emerging Arab-Israeli alliance are, of course, Turkey and Iran – both of which have complicated relationships with an external power that often looms over many regional conflicts, Russia. To some extent, Russia, Turkey and Iran seem to have more bringing them together than pulling them apart. Russia and Turkey’s total trade rose from $4.5 billion in 2000 to $25.7 billion in 2018. The balance of trade favors Russia because of Turkey’s import of Russian oil and gas. Turkey also has a negative trade balance with Iran because of its imports of Iranian energy. U.S. sanctions on Iran, however, have hurt trade between the two countries – which shrank from $25.7 billion in 2013 to $3.4 billion in 2020. Turkey hopes to increase trade with Russia to $100 billion and with Iran to $30 billion.

However, the ideological and historical differences among the three countries, as well as their rivalry as regional powers, rule out any chance of them becoming close allies. Russia and Turkey have different agendas in Syria, and Ankara’s intrusion into the South Caucasus, especially in support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, irritates Moscow.

Turkey’s relationship with Iran is also complex. The two countries need each other economically and are keen on keeping channels of communication open despite their sharp political divisions. In the absence of a unified Arab world, competition between Turkey and Iran is likely to eventually escalate as they seek to dislodge each other in their near abroad, especially in Syria and Iraq.

Syria gives Iran access to the Mediterranean, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Israeli border. For Turkey, Syria provides land access to Lebanon, Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. As for Iraq, it was for centuries a battleground between the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Saddam Hussein’s ouster in 2003 made Iran the dominant force in Iraq, but Turkey is also trying to establish a foothold there – which could revive their historical rivalry in the country. With proven oil reserves totaling 115 billion barrels, which could rise to 215 billion once the rest of the country is explored, Iraq will be a major focus for Turkey in the future.

For now, however, Turkey’s reliance on Iran (and Russia) for oil and gas is the main factor preventing tensions from escalating. But Ankara is also seeking alternative sources. It already has a stake in the Caspian Sea’s oil reserves through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the Trans Anatolian Pipeline and the land-based component of China’s BRI. It’s also drilling for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, though many countries have expressed concern about its operations there.

Real peace in the Middle East remains elusive. Trump’s MESA project did not take off, and the Israel-UAE alliance is unlikely to lead to any concrete changes. Turkey and Iran may find it challenging to get over their past disagreements and concentrate on potential economic cooperation.

The one remaining factor is China. It has succeeded in establishing economic ties with U.S. allies in the region, especially Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, without compromising its business links to Iran and Turkey. But its investments will not bring prosperity to the Middle East. The Chinese project requires regional stability and willingness to cooperate, both of which are woefully absent in the Middle East. What’s more, China has become increasingly authoritarian. Its Social Credit System is an attempt to control all aspects of people’s lives in China and could be spread to other parts of the world as part of the BRI. In a region that remains gripped by violence and factiousness, China’s rise will not bode well.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17148/lessons-middle-east

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif is in Azerbaijan to meet with President Ilham Aliyev. They will discuss bilateral relations and a host of regional and international issues, according to Iran’s diplomatic service. Zarif will visit Armenia next.

Israel, the U.S. and Azerbaijan. Not so coincidentally, the United States and Israel have also reached out to Azerbaijan in support of its government. President Joe Biden wrote a letter to Aliyev thanking him for his country’s contributions to energy diversification in Europe and his commitment to helping to negotiate a long-term political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Israeli media, meanwhile, has been trumpeting statements made by Aliyev highlighting cooperation in the defense industry. Israeli press also reported on Tuesday comments made by Aliyev late last week about cooperation in the defense industry and emphasized Azerbaijan’s “full access” to Israeli defense industry products. The comments were made during an event hosted by the Nizami Ganjavi International Center, which focused on prospective cooperation in the South Caucasus.

Russian bombers in Syria. Russia flew Tu-22m3 long-range bombers to its air base in Khmeimim, Syria, for the first time. From there, the aircraft will conduct training exercises over the Mediterranean Sea and will soon return to Russia. The true purpose of the deployment is to show that the air base is capable of

[Crafty_Dog]

https://thefederalistpapers.org/us/biden-sharply-reducing-patriot-missile-defense-systems-middle-east-despite-hard-line-leaders-election?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=brief-FP&utm_campaign=dailyam&utm_content=2021-06-21&ats_es=%5B-MD5-%5D

[DougMacG]

https://thefederalistpapers.org/us/biden-sharply-reducing-patriot-missile-defense-systems-middle-east-despite-hard-line-leaders-election?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=brief-FP&utm_campaign=dailyam&utm_content=2021-06-21&ats_es=%5B-MD5-%5D

I wonder if he should be tried for treason or just voted out in the next election.

[Crafty_Dog]

Yes.

[Crafty_Dog]

For Iraq, an Arab Alliance Remains Illusive
The latest attempt at building an Arab coalition is likely to suffer a similar fate as its predecessors.
By: Hilal Khashan

In August 2020, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi unveiled the New Sham project, an initiative aimed at fostering economic integration between Iraq, Egypt and Jordan, as a prelude to full-scale political, security and military cooperation. The endeavor follows in the footsteps of the short-lived Arab Cooperation Council, which was founded by Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and North Yemen in 1989 but collapsed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The two plans are nearly identical in their scope and substance and resemble the Arab League’s 1945 charter, which advocated the promotion of inter-Arab cooperation. However, al-Kadhimi’s project is unlikely to fare much better than its predecessors. The three signatories to the New Sham project lack the political will and resolve to seeing it through.

Arabs Search for Allies

In 1954, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser argued that Egypt’s economic development hinged on developing close ties with the Arab countries in West Asia. He believed merging Egypt’s skilled labor force with Arab oil was the key to the region’s modernization. Unfortunately, he failed to achieve his goal and ended up antagonizing nearly all Arab rulers.

In 1989, Iraq emerged victorious – though economically devastated – from its eight-year war with Iran. Shunned by the Gulf Cooperation Council, it looked to its war-time allies, namely Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen, for support. They had similar issues – regional isolation and denial of access to the GCC, especially Egypt, which wanted to reengage with the Arab world following a decade of ostracism after making peace with Israel.

The New Sham Project

(click to enlarge)

Today, the countries of the defunct ACC continue to grapple with their political and economic problems. Egypt, whose relations with the GCC countries are less than amicable, has failed to sway Ethiopia to agree to a deal over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and feels abandoned regionally and internationally. Jordan is coping with an existential split among the Hashemite royals and feels threatened by Israel’s West Bank policy. Iraq’s al-Kadhimi, meanwhile, hopes to use the New Sham project, which he developed with American prodding, to arrest Iran’s dominance of his country by strengthening ties with its Arab neighbors. His main rationale for the project is that it could help connect Egypt’s vast labor force, Iraq’s abundant oil wealth and Jordan’s strategic location.

An Unworkable Project

But al-Kadhimi’s broader goal is to transform Iraq into a mediator between regional powers instead of an arena for competition. Citing their shared Arab destiny, Baghdad is eager to promote an alliance that, in addition to Egypt and Jordan, includes Saudi Arabia and Syria. (Syria’s membership in the Arab League was suspended in 2011.) Over the weekend, however, Jordanian King Abdullah and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi attended a summit in Baghdad – the first visit to Iraq by an Egyptian president since 1990 – that produced few tangible results. The leaders released a weak declaration that failed to promote European Union-style economic cooperation, linkages between the Egyptian and Iraqi power grids and unrestricted cross-border movement of workers and tourists. The summit’s cliched closing statement also urged Israel to end its obstructionist measures and expressed solidarity with Egypt over its water dispute with Ethiopia.

Iraq's Increasing Energy Dependance

(click to enlarge)

Iraq says it is willing to provide oil-poor Egypt with oil supplies at low prices in exchange for some of its surplus electricity. El-Sissi is also interested in acquiring part of Iraq’s large and lucrative food market, which could be profitable for Egypt’s military-dominated food and nutrition sector. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq lost its status as a producer state, but there’s little chance that Egypt can compete with Turkish food and other products, which are cheaper and of better quality than similar goods from Egypt. Last year, Turkish goods exports to Iraq totaled $20 billion, the second-largest total after Germany.

Iraq cannot contain Turkey’s and Iran’s influence simply by opening up economically to Egypt and Jordan. According to 2017 figures, the Turkish economy is the world’s 17th largest, whereas Egypt ranks 44th and Jordan 88th. Even Iran’s sanctioned economy is well ahead of Egypt’s, ranking 26th worldwide. Many Egyptians would be skeptical of al-Kadhimi’s proposal to supply Egypt with oil in exchange for workers who could assist in Iraq’s reconstruction. Thousands of Egyptian workers were killed by discharged Iraqi soldiers looking for jobs after the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It’s also unlikely that Egyptian laborers would be interested in working in a country with very high unemployment, especially given the increased risk to their safety, even as skilled laborers.

Iraqi’s negotiations with GCC members to link their power grids have been ongoing for nine years. Baghdad has yet to accept a Saudi offer that would cost about 20 percent of what Iran is currently charging it. Iranian proxies in Iraq, particularly the Popular Mobilization Forces, have blocked the signing of any power deal with Riyadh. Connecting the Iraqi and Egyptian power grids, which has not yet begun, would take at least three years, provided pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians and the PMF do not obstruct the process. In all likelihood, however, the New Sham project will be added to the long list of ill-conceived and never-implemented Arab integration projects. The failure of the Arab League countries to deal with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to the destruction of Iraq as a regional power. It made Iran and Turkey, in addition to Israel, the dominant forces in the region. And since all three of these forces are not Arab, there’s no room for Iraq in the regional balance of power.

Al-Kadhimi’s Ambiguity

Given Iraq’s negotiations with the GCC, Iran and the U.S. on electricity, it’s hard to take al-Kadhimi’s interest in getting surplus power from Egypt seriously. Iran supplies more than 40 percent of Iraq’s power and has already signed deals to supply the country with electricity for the next two years. Iraq also signed an $8 billion deal with U.S. companies to build power stations and reduce its dependence on Iran.

Al-Kadhimi is an independent politician who has no base of popular or party support. Next October, Iraqi voters will head to the polls to elect a new legislature, and odds are that he will not be reelected as prime minister, which would shelve his New Sham project. Al-Kadhimi has expressed a lack of interest in running for parliament, which makes sense because even if he wins a seat, he will not be part of a parliamentary bloc. He would therefore have no chance of winning another term as prime minister. (Al-Kadhimi became prime minister last year as a part of a compromise deal because of his appeal among Iraqi Kurds, Sunni Arabs and secular Iraqis.) The upcoming elections are unlikely to end the political deadlock, so his chances of winning another term as prime minister are better from outside parliament. Given the political situation, it would serve his career better to maintain his favorable rating among Iraq’s minority groups and distance himself from Iran, even if he fails to effect real political change.

On the seventh anniversary of the PMF’s establishment, which coincided with the summit in Baghdad on Sunday, al-Kadhimi attended its most extensive military parade yet, which included artillery, tanks, troop carriers and thousands of foot soldiers. Iran will not abandon Iraq, no matter what, and even though the public generally backs al-Kadhimi’s attempt to move away from Iran, he won’t be able to accomplish such a colossal task. Iran can rely on the 120,000 PMF soldiers in Iraq and the majority of Iraq’s political elite to sustain its dominance over the country.

As for the Saudis, they are uneasy about Iran’s regional influence and its dominance over Iraqi politics. However, one could argue that, for Riyadh, having Iran in control of Iraq is a lesser evil than allowing the Iraqis to rebuild their country and possibly threaten Saudi stability, if not its existence, in the future. Moreover, al-Kadhimi’s pan-Arab orientation assures the GCC, Egypt and Jordan that, despite Iran’s control over Iraq, there is a man in Baghdad with whom they can communicate when the need arises.

[Crafty_Dog]

ASSESSMENTS
What to Make of Jordan, Egypt and Iraq’s New Alliance

undefined and Middle East and North Africa Analyst
Emily Hawthorne
Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor
6 MIN READJul 6, 2021 | 18:00 GMT







An emerging partnership between Jordan, Egypt and Iraq will yield security and commercial gains for each country, as well as provide an alternative Arab voice in the wider region. On June 27, the leaders of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt met in Baghdad for high-level talks on commercial, strategic and security matters. These three Arab middle powers’ dependence on external support will constrain the rapid formation of their new tripartite alliance. But shared economic and political interests will still fuel the pact's incremental creation, especially if the threat of Turkish and Iranian regional influence grows.

The talks followed months of preparations and a meeting between the countries’ foreign ministers in Baghdad in March, and also marked a historic return of an Egyptian head of state to Iraq after 30 years.

Iraq’s prime minister, the host of the June 27 meeting, specifically cited the existence of a “critical historic turning point” in both the global fight against COVID-19, as well as in the regional fight against terrorism, in allowing the creation of a new regional alliance, which seeks to achieve stronger ties in three areas: economic partnership, political cooperation, and security and intelligence coordination.

Iraq, for its part, is trying to broker better relationships with other Arab majority countries to bolster its ability to withstand growing pressure from Iran and, to a lesser extent, Turkey. Iraq’s government was the primary instigator in forming the new Arab alliance. Fortifying relations with other Arab nations is part of an effort by Sunni politicians to reduce Iraq’s heavy economic and energy dependence on Iran, which can be a liability due to sanctions and Western opposition to Tehran. The United States, for example, has repeatedly demanded that Iraq weaken its ties with neighboring Iran. Iraq is also dependent on Turkey for some of its water supply, as well as trade — especially in resource-rich northern Iraq, where the Kurdistan Regional Government works closely with Ankara to export oil.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi invited Jordan and Egypt’s leaders to the June 27 meeting.
Iraq is dependent on Iran for roughly a third of its energy and electricity supply, which has led to both disruptions in electricity service and tensions between Baghdad and Washington.

Less cooperation against common enemies like the Islamic State could enable Turkey and Iran to gain greater influence in the region, which some Arab states will view as a threat. The chaos of the 2011 Arab Spring and the militancy that reared its head in the following years brought a number of regional rivals together, including Iran and Turkey, as well as Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. The Islamic State threat also led to a deeper U.S. military presence in the region. While the global jihadist group is far from defeated, the Islamic State has lost its ability to rapidly grow and gain territory as Iraqi security forces and other regional military forces have better developed their counterterrorism abilities.

Egyptian, Jordanian and Iraqi leaders have all recently acknowledged a strong desire to reduce their focus on the Islamic State and the militancy that sprung from events like the Syrian civil war, which have characterized the last decade following the Arab Spring with instability.

Turkey and Iran’s governments, meanwhile, are both seeking to deepen their Middle Eastern partnerships. Closer Turkish and Iranian ties could work in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq’s economic favor, but at the risk of eroding broader Arab regional influence.

The United States has been clear about its desire to draw down some of the military presence in the region that increased due to the Islamic State threat, and is currently negotiating a withdrawal timeline with the Iraqi government.

Jordan, Egypt and Iraq’s dependence on external powers for some of their economic and security interests will not only slow the formation of their alliance, but limit its ultimate scope. These three Arab states are all reliant on foreign aid in some way and cannot afford to burn bridges with their wealthier patrons. For this reason, their new alliance is aimed at only diversifying their tie while still maintaining their existing aid and commercial relationships. Egypt and Jordan are just behind Israel in terms of receiving the most security aid from the United States, and there is no indication that that will change even as Washington tries to draw down its military presence in the region. Egypt, Jordan and Iraq share concerns about the regional dominance of Arab Gulf powers like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia seeking to cajole the Arab world to support their politics and priorities. But Cairo, Amman and Baghdad are also unlikely to turn down Arab Gulf investment money, giving Riyadh and Abu Dhabi some political influence in their respective governments. Oil-dependent and debt-ridden Iraq, in particular, is in no position to turn down foreign funding, as the country faces a deepening financial crisis.

An emerging middle-power alliance between the less wealthy Arab Gulf states will provide some pushback against the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, who have channeled their wealth into efforts to become leaders of the broader Arab world. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh will likely try to co-opt or at the least draw some benefit from any growing ties from some of their key Arab partners in the region, regardless of whether or not they are in control of the burgeoning relationships.

Better coordination between Jordan, Egypt and Iraq’s intelligence services could help circumvent the development of another transnational threat in the region like that once posed by the Islamic State. All three countries have capable intelligence and security forces that have undergone a significant amount of Western and U.S. training. Stronger ties between three of the United States’ closest security and diplomatic partners will also reassure Washington that a further withdrawal of U.S. forces in the future won’t greatly disrupt regional stability in line with U.S. goals.

There are some potential untapped commercial benefits in terms of energy and trade ties that could be mutually beneficial for all three countries as well. Jordan is eager to restore trade to neighboring Iraq that evaporated during the Islamic State fight. Egypt is also hoping to broker deeper ties between Egyptian energy companies and their Iraqi counterparts — especially with Egypt on the cusp of developing more Mediterranean oil and gas reserves, and Iraq eager to court regional investors into its own oil and gas assets.

[Crafty_Dog]

A series of clashes with Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq is increasing pressure on the United States to draw down from both countries, while raising the risk of a greater military escalation with Tehran. Iranian-backed militia launched a series of attacks on U.S. targets in Syria and Iraq on July 7, with at least 14 rockets striking the Ain al-Asad airbase in Western Iraq and lightly wounding two U.S. troops. Militia also fired two rockets at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, causing no damage. In neighboring Syria, a drone attacked near the U.S.-protected Al Omar oil field on the northern side of the Euphrates River. The day before, on July 6, a drone attacked the Erbil airport in Iraqi Kurdistan, which houses U.S. troops, causing no damage. These attacks come as Iranian-backed militias in Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada swore retaliation after the United States launched airstrikes near the Iraq-Syria border against infrastructure and storage facilities, killing four militiamen.

The exchanges are likely to continue as Iran-backed militias attempt to pressure the United States to draw down or withdraw, and as the White House attempts to establish a stronger deterrence against their attacks. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden signaled it will launch airstrikes in reaction to harassment that doesn’t necessarily result in U.S. casualties by striking targets after relatively harmless militia strikes. This is a shift from its predecessor’s posture, which tended to focus on retaliating against actions that caused harm to U.S. personnel. The Biden administration, however, will still seek to avoid a major military escalation by striking a limited set of targets in Iraq and/or eastern Syria. Meanwhile, Iranian-linked militias will likely continue their attacks on U.S. forces, as indicated on June 14 when the leader of Asaib Ahl al Haq said the militias had resumed their resistance against U.S. forces after a pause from April. These attacks, however, will be metered as well to avoid a major military escalation.

Continued fighting will produce criticism of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria in both Washington and Baghdad, while also leaving open the potential for an unintentional major escalation spurred by significant casualties on either side. The June 27 U.S. airstrikes attacks produced criticism from U.S. politicians over America’s long military presence in both countries. They also angered Iraqi politicians, who argued the attacks violated Iraqi sovereignty. Additionally, if the United States or militias cause substantial harm to one another, either by killing large numbers of opposing forces or by harming more senior officials, the two sides could be pulled into a more significant military escalation as they seek to enact revenge and establish deterrence.

The Biden administration is under public pressure to refrain from military involvement and even withdraw U.S. forces from the Middle East. During his 2020 presidential campaign, Biden pledged to reduce forces to a small number of troops in the region largely to focus on the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and to monitor the Persian Gulf.

[Crafty_Dog]

ASSESSMENTS
Qatar Grapples With a U.S. That Needs It Less and Less
5 MIN READSep 15, 2021 | 21:23 GMT





U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks with Qatari government officials before boarding an aircraft in Doha on Sept. 8, 2021.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks with Qatari government officials before boarding an aircraft in Doha on Sept. 8, 2021.

(OLIVIER DOULIERY/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

Qatar’s recent diplomatic maneuvers in Gaza and Afghanistan are designed to maintain close ties with the United States. But with Washington now working to reduce its presence in the Middle East, Qatar’s regional security will be anchored instead by how it manages its relationships with allies like Turkey, as well as rivals like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar’s diplomats have been at the center of several regional crises. After playing a key role in securing the Hamas-Israel truce in May 2021, the Arab Gulf country has also been facilitating evacuations and negotiations with the Taliban following the recent collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. These displays of Qatari soft power have been designed to both boost Doha’s regional role as a diplomatic facilitator and, more importantly, display the country’s value to the United States, its key strategic ally.

Qatari cash aid has long been a staple of Hamas-Israeli relations, with Doha offering Hamas financial support (through Israel) in exchange for the Palestinian militant group agreeing to hold off on rocket attacks. During the most recent war in May, Qatari aid and diplomatic influence once again played a major role in helping de-escalate the conflict.

Qatar hosted the negotiations that led to the U.S.-Taliban agreement in February 2020. In the wake of the Taliban’s Aug. 15 capture of Kabul, Doha also offered to host Afghan refugees fleeing to the United States. In addition, Qatar has continued to use its national carrier, Qatar Airways, to bring other refugees out of the country following the full withdrawal of U.S. troops and formal evacuations from Afghanistan.

Eroding U.S.-Qatar Relations

The United States and Qatar have had a close relationship for decades. Qatar was a major base for U.S. troops during the Gulf War in 1991. Then in 1996, Qatar and the United States opened the Al-Udeid Air Base that hosted U.S. forces involved in years of different operations, including those in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. However, Qatari-U.S. relations were tested during the Arab Gulf blockade of Qatar from 2017-21. While Washington initially appeared to back the blockade, deeper strategic interests quickly reasserted themselves, with the United States stepping in to prevent a potential military intervention in Doha in 2017. The election of a U.S. presidential administration helped bring an end to the blockade earlier this year.

Washington’s overarching interest in Qatar’s security, however, is poised to diminish as the U.S. military pivots out of the region and the U.S. government’s economic stake in hydrocarbons declines.

The steady U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East will give Qatar fewer opportunities to convince Washington of its strategic value. In Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Qatar will play a smaller role now that the United States has fully withdrawn from the country. Although Qatar can still facilitate U.S. humanitarian goals in Afghanistan, Doha will lack the deep diplomatic and political leverage with the Taliban the United States may later need to keep al Qaeda from resuming terrorist operations. The United States no longer needs Qatar’s basing for major military operations in Afghanistan. The value of Qatari military bases could also be further diminished as Washington negotiates its exit from Iraq and considers a future one from Syria. Finally, Qatar’s value to the U.S. in helping preserve Israel’s security also could diminish, if U.S. political opinion continues to shift against Israel.

Qatari-Taliban relations are likely to remain shallow, as Afghanistan is not yet developed enough to be a major Qatari trade partner. Doha is also wary of the Taliban’s potential influence on extremist groups like al Qaeda, which has previously targeted Qatar.

Critics of Qatar’s role in Israeli-Palestinian relations see Doha as enabling Israel’s intransigence against negotiating for a Palestinian state. This criticism was furthered during the May Gaza War.

To offset this diminished U.S. interest in Qatar, Doha’s security will be increasingly defined by its regional relationships. This will involve maintaining its close relationship with Turkey to avoiding antagonizing bigger rivals like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and potentially even pursuing deeper ties with Israel. To offset its diminished U.S. partnership, Qatar will be unable to bring in major powers like France, the United Kingdom, Russia or China, as these countries all largely lack the strategic interest to take on Washington’s security responsibilities in the Persian Gulf. Instead, Qatar’s external security will be increasingly guaranteed by how close it is with Turkey, a capable regional military power with aspirations to play a bigger role in the Arab world. Just how much Qatar’s external security is challenged will be defined by how Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates view Qatar’s foreign policies. If Doha returns to a more ideological and activist foreign policy, as it did after the Arab Spring in 2011, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are likely to once again impose pressure, including potential military action. But if Doha maintains its current pragmatic diplomatic approach to the region, the Saudis and Emiratis are likely to focus instead on their economic rather than strategic competition with Doha. Finally, closer cooperation with Israel could give Doha access to cutting-edge Israeli military and cyber warfare technologies. It could also help convince Washington to sell Qatar advanced U.S. military equipment, like the F-35 stealth fighter as evidenced by the U.S. arms deals signed after the United Arab Emirates moved to normalize ties with Israel last year.

Turkey has kept active troops in Qatar since the beginning of the blockade in 2017. Turkey’s ruling pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) also maintains that the country should have a more prominent military role in the Muslim world.

Since the end of the Arab Spring and the blockade, Qatar has largely stepped back from supporting Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood regionally, as both existing opportunities diminished in the wake of the political revolution. Blowback from the Saudis and Emiratis also made it riskier to back such parties.

[Crafty_Dog]

October 28, 2021
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Why Uprisings in the Middle East Fail
Governments in the region have devised a system to crush any serious calls for change.
By: Hilal Khashan

The uprisings in 2010-11 against autocratic Arab regimes stunned the world. The region’s ruling oligarchs were known for systematically suppressing even the slightest manifestations of public discontent. When the uprising in Tunisia occurred in December 2010, it spread almost instantaneously, from Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean to Bahrain on the Persian Gulf. Amazed political commentators talked about the rise of the dormant Sunni tiger and the dawn of democracy throughout the region. But the euphoria didn’t last long. The Arab deep state, with its machinery of coercion and network of local allies, cracked down on the protests and crushed any attempts to overthrow the regimes. Foreign meddling and a lack of shared vision from Arab activists also helped guarantee that the public unrest would not threaten regime survival.

Arab Spring
(click to enlarge)

Machinery of Coercion

Between the 1930s and 1960s, staging a successful coup in the Middle East was relatively easy. Even a small group of army officers could topple a regime; they just needed to command enough troops to seize the presidential or royal palace, ministry of defense and ministry of communication to control the joints of the political system. In Iraq, there were six coups in the 1930s, one (a failed pro-Nazi putsch) in 1941, and several more in the 1950s and 1960s. Syria saw three coups in 1949 and more in the 1950s through 1970. Egypt and Libya each had one coup in 1952 and 1969, respectively.

But in 1970, the era of government subversion came to an end – except in Sudan, which experienced a coup in 1989. Arab military rulers had finally learned how to prevent attempted overthrows by tightening their grip over the military and society. In Egypt, the officers who staged the 1952 coup established the Revolutionary Command Council under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. In subsequent years, it grew more sophisticated, adopting the title of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. In Syria, President Hafez Assad purged the military and placed in commanding positions fellow Alawite officers, who controlled the armed forces and appointed loyal officials to control the political system. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein, who came to power in a 1968 coup, brutally eliminated all opposition within the ruling Baath Party by the late 1970s and relied exclusively on the support of Sunni Arabs from his hometown of Tikrit to maintain control. Like other Arab rulers, Saddam created a special force, called the Republican Guard, that became the most potent and trusted component of the military. In Libya, Moammar Gadhafi, who toppled the monarchy in 1969, created the Gadhafi regiments to prevent countercoups and militant religious uprisings.

In Iran, after inspiring the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did not trust the military and ordered its top commanders executed and many others dismissed. Khomeini questioned the loyalty of the army, which had abandoned the shah after killing thousands of demonstrators in what became known as Black Friday in September 1978. Khomeini thus focused his attention on forming an elite unit of the armed forces called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as the Basij militia, a branch of the IRGC – both of which are responsible for defending the regime from foreign and internal threats.

The region’s rulers had struck a bargain with their people: The government would provide basic needs for the public in exchange for their willingness to stay out of political life. Citizens were essentially promised low-cost housing, subsidized staple food items, free medical care and education through college. Those who didn’t agree to the arrangement, however, faced severe punishment. In this way, they were coerced into allowing regimes to maintain ultimate power virtually unchallenged.

Arab republican regimes also established solid domestic alliances to help contain any potential unrest. In Syria, Hafez Assad coopted the Sunni business class in Damascus and Aleppo and gave them a free hand in running the economy. He placed Sunnis in prominent government positions, albeit under the watchful eye of Alawite loyalists. His son Bashar carried on his legacy, coopting the Sunni Arab tribes in the Jazeera region to keep the Kurds at bay and lend legitimacy to his regime. He also liberalized the Syrian economy and partnered with the Sunni business class. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak allowed the armed forces to get involved in the economy. The signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, the end of the war with Israel and President Anwar Sadat’s assassination by renegade army troops convinced Mubarak to preoccupy the army with economic matters to prevent it from scheming to overthrow him. Even in Saudi Arabia, the regime turned a blind eye to officers undertaking business opportunities and earning commissions. In Iran, the ayatollahs competed with the bazaar business class without evicting them from the market. They also introduced food subsidies, even as the economy suffered under U.S. sanctions.

Over the past few years, however, the region’s economic stagnation has reduced the range of government welfare systems for most Middle Eastern countries, often leading to public unrest. The regimes compensated for their reduced capacity to provide for their populations by increasing their use of coercion tactics to unprecedented levels.

Potentially Unstable Countries
(click to enlarge)

Divided Opposition

The region’s authoritarian leaders – be they republican, monarchical or Islamic revolutionaries – destroyed their countries’ civil societies, finding various justifications for their repression of the opposition. Arab and Iranian leaders accused dissenting voices of acting on behalf of Western imperialism and Zionism. After Egypt’s crushing defeat in 1967, Nasser clamped down on all criticism, saying that no individuals should distract from efforts to liberate occupied territory. In Iraq, Saddam portrayed Shiite dissenters as Iranian agents. Then, when pro-Iranian militias seized power following the U.S. invasion in 2003, they dismissed Sunnis’ demands for an equitable power-sharing arrangement, calling them agents of the U.S., Zionism and radical Islamic movements.

At the same time, the forces of opposition failed to present themselves as a united bloc. In Iran, reformists articulate different agendas. In Iraq, those calling for change cut across the political spectrum to include communists, nationalists, mainstream Sunni Arab groups and Sadrists, supporters of Iraq’s maverick Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr takes issue with the pro-Iranian militias but is also careful not to antagonize Tehran – suggesting that many Shiite movements are being supported by Iran.

Shortly after the beginning of the Syrian uprising, groups opposed to the regime began organizing in Europe and Turkey, holding numerous meetings there to try to agree on a new form of government to replace Assad’s regime, if it collapsed. In the end, they failed to agree on anything. In Egypt, the movements that participated in the uprising to overthrow Mubarak had little in common. This paved the way for the military to facilitate Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammad Morsi’s election, so that it could expedite his eventual ouster. The army was intent on getting rid of him, believing that his worldview was inconsistent with its vision for Egypt. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces rallied all civil society movements against Morsi in July 2013 and overthrew him. It then silenced these movements, turning against the liberals and secularists.

Initially, it seemed that the uprising in Tunisia was the only successful one in the Arab states. In due time, however, it too failed to spark any real change. The political forces that emerged in the country after the fall of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s government gained strength, taking political space away from Ennahda, the first party to form a government after the protests. Eventually, Tunisian politics hit an impasse, and the public grew disenchanted with party politics. Even the politically independent president, Kais Saied, pursued a path that resembled those of previous autocratic rulers.

Foreign Intervention

The final factor that led to the demise of the Arab uprisings was foreign meddling. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were alarmed by the fall of Mubarak and the rise of the Brotherhood. After Morsi was toppled, they gave Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi billions of dollars to shore up his regime. In Syria, the U.S., Israel and the UAE did not want to see the collapse of the Assad regime. In fact, their Syria policies differed little from those of Russia and Iran, whose support ensured that Assad’s government remained in power. In Libya, NATO airstrikes destroyed Gadhafi’s military machine, but foreign meddling by Russia, Egypt, the UAE and Turkey kept the country divided and in turmoil. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE helped defeat an uprising and then waged a war against the Houthi rebels, whom they initially enabled before turning against them. Odds are that Yemen would have slipped into anarchy even without foreign intervention, but its Arab neighbors certainly added fuel to the fire. In Bahrain, the oppressed Shiite majority led an uprising in February 2011, which was quelled by the Saudis. They distorted Bahrainis’ demands for fairness and justice by presenting them as part of an Iranian ploy to destabilize the country.

The region is far from ready for successful uprisings, and political communities with a sense of national vision have yet to emerge. Resolution of the region’s outstanding interstate problems, such as the Kurdish and Palestinian questions, must precede any domestic change. Understandably, countries aspire to use their economic and technological capabilities to wield influence. However, political ideology draped in religious determinism is a recipe for perpetuating conflict and stalling the prospects for economic and political development.

[Crafty_Dog]

Israel Is at the Center of a New International Security Order
An alliance that spans from the U.S. through Europe to India is emerging to combat belligerent actors in the Middle East.
By Seth J. Frantzman
Nov. 15, 2021 6:47 pm ET

Jerusalem

Iran couldn’t have been happy to see forces from Bahrain, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S. Navy training together for the first time in history. Last week’s five-day drill in the Red Sea was intended to enhance interoperability among the countries, but also sent a strong message to Tehran: There’s now a large, organized bloc of countries opposed to its ambitions of regional hegemony. The bloc’s nexus is Israel.

The Abraham Accords—which Israel, the U.A.E. and Bahrain signed in September 2020—smoothed the way for last week’s joint exercise. Since the Cold War, Israel has been a part of the U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility rather than that of Central Command, which stretches from Egypt to Kazakhstan. Though it makes more geographic sense for Israel to be included in Centcom, doing so would have upset the many countries in that area of responsibility that until recently didn’t recognize Israel. If the Centcom forces trained with Israel, many other regional allies would have refused to conduct joint exercises. The Abraham Accords altered the geopolitical landscape. In January the U.S. announced Israel would become a part of Centcom’s area of responsibility, making it easier for the U.S. to organize joint military drills in Israel.

Last week I spoke with Maj. Shai Shachar, 33, commander in charge of the warfare branch of Israel’s elite counterterror school. He was part of another recent joint training with roughly 500 U.S. Marines. After arriving in early November in Eilat, a southern Israeli city on the Red Sea, the American forces traveled to a place called “little Gaza” in the Negev Desert to train with Israel commandos. They practiced urban battlefield tactics and even underground combat—in which Israelis are experts, having fought Hamas terrorists in Gaza’s cities and tunnels.

For the Israelis who participated, swapping knowledge with U.S. Marines was a unique experience. Mr. Shachar said the American soldiers had a remarkably similar war-fighting methodology and problem-solving approach to Israel’s commandos. He expects to see more training in the future.


Troops from around the world have come to Israel this year to train. Last month, air force units from France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S. flew in the biennial Blue Flag drill over Israel. This year’s exercise included the largest number of countries since it began in 2013. In July Israel hosted American, British and German drone operators. The month before, Israel, the U.K. and the U.S. flew F-35s together as part of the Tri-Lightning exercise. In March, Cyprus and France joined the Israel-led Noble Dina naval drill for the first time off Cyprus’s west coast.

These exercises aren’t only to strengthen each country’s military expertise, but to build a new alliance system that stretches from India to Europe, with Israel as its linchpin. Israel faces daily threats from terrorists, from the fighting in Gaza in May to its frequent airstrikes in Syria against Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah. Military units that practice with Israeli forces gain real combat expertise and signal that Jerusalem has allies increasingly working to confront potential threats in the region. This military diplomacy is knitting together an alliance that connects further-flung countries like India or Germany through regional partners like the U.A.E. and Bahrain or Cyprus and Greece.

It’s also bridging a variety of foreign-policy controversies. This includes recent spats such as France’s frustration with its exclusion from a new submarine deal signed by Australia, the U.K. and the U.S., as well as Middle Eastern countries’ longstanding diplomatic distance from Israel. Even a few years ago, it would have been unthinkable for the U.A.E. air chief to visit Israel or Israeli companies to showcase new cooperation and technologies at the Dubai Air Show. The Abraham Accords changed all that.

These new collaborations have many potential uses, from fighting terrorist groups to checking Iran’s attempts at controlling the region. Where belligerent actors once faced a series of isolated countries, they’ll now have to tangle with an organized alliance that is intent on opposing them—even on the battlefield.

Mr. Frantzman is Middle East correspondent for the Jerusalem Post and author of “Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machines, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future” (Bombardier 2021).

[Crafty_Dog]

November 29, 2021
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For the UAE, Change Is an Existential Threat
Abu Dhabi doesn’t tolerate challenges to its agenda.
By: Hilal Khashan

The United Arab Emirates presents itself to the outside world as a liberal and tolerant Muslim country. This isn’t far from the truth. The Maliki doctrine, Sunni Islam’s most tolerant school of jurisprudence, is the UAE’s official religious denomination. And in terms of its economic structure and social discipline, it resembles many advanced countries of the world. But politically, the UAE is an incredibly repressive country, making moves to stamp out any movements, particularly Islamist ones, calling for change at home and abroad – which it considers an existential threat to its regime.

Since the 1960s, the country has had a particularly turbulent relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Banned in 1994, the Brotherhood vehemently opposed modernization, equating it with Western decadence. But the rise of the Arab uprisings a decade ago empowered Islamic political movements throughout the region, compelling the UAE to aggressively suppress those who challenge its agenda.

Muslim Brotherhood Links

The UAE’s battle against Islamist forces at home actually began in Egypt. In the 1950s and 1960s, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, jailed thousands of its members and executed its ranking leaders, including ideologue Sayyid Qutb. But eradicating Islamist movements like the Brotherhood proved more difficult than leaders like Nasser thought, as they simply went underground or migrated when challenged by governments of the region. Many Brotherhood members sought refuge in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, including the seven trucial emirates that established the UAE in 1971.


(click to enlarge)

Three years after the UAE’s founding, a group of Egyptian-educated men with pan-Arab worldviews formed the Reform and Social Guidance Association, also known as al-Islah, which had links to the Brotherhood. The UAE’s first leader, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, gave them jurisdiction over different Cabinet portfolios, including most importantly the education portfolio, in the late 1970s. During that period, al-Islah managed the school curriculum, focusing on Islamic teaching, gender segregation, and banning music learning and teaching English. Al-Islah’s popularity soared in the UAE’s conservative society, threatening Zayed’s ambitious modernization plan. Then, in 1994, he dissolved al-Islah’s executive committee ahead of launching economic projects that would change the shape of the country for decades to come.

These projects were funded in large part by Abu Dhabi, which financially supported the development of the entire country, especially the Emirate of Dubai. Abu Dhabi is the largest and wealthiest of the seven emirates, accounting for 80 percent of the UAE’s area and 60 percent of its gross domestic product. By comparison, Dubai’s service-oriented economy contributes 25 percent of the UAE’s GDP, while the five smaller emirates contribute only 15 percent.

Abu Dhabi is also an ultramodern city with many costly megaprojects. It recently launched al-Reem, the world’s first omnichannel retail mall, and an atmospheric water generation project to meet its increasing freshwater needs. Over the past half-century, Dubai has also made impressive advances as an international tourist and business destination. Its World Trade Center is a massive events venue, and Dubai Mall is one of the world’s best shopping centers. Jebel Ali is now the Middle East’s most prominent port and the world’s ninth-largest container port, providing goods and services to more than 2 billion people. Dubai’s airport is one of the world’s busiest, used by more than 140 carriers.

However, the UAE fears that the turbulence of the region could jeopardize these achievements. Fearing a domino effect, it rejects, often aggressively, any moves toward democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa. The UAE’s political system gives absolute power to its monarchial rulers, and though they’ve been eager to modernize the country’s economy, they object to any calls for political modernization – which explains the UAE’s aggressive response to the Arab uprisings that began 10 years ago. Those uprisings coincided with the rise of Islamic political movements, which gave hope to people who felt demoralized by the destruction of civil society at the hands of the region’s authoritarian leaders. This pattern of suppression was evident throughout the region, from Morocco in the west to Iraq in the east and from Syria in the north to Yemen in the south.

Suppression

The UAE thus actively supported efforts to suppress the uprisings. In Yemen, it formed secessionist militias in the southern provinces, built several secret prisons and consolidated its military presence in strategically located islands, especially Socotra. It also assassinated numerous members of Yemen’s Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah Party. In Tunisia, former President Moncef Marzouki and Speaker of the Parliament Rached Ghannouchi accused Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, commonly known as MBZ, of masterminding the coup led by President Kais Saied, who suspended parliament and most of the constitution last July. In 2013, the UAE backed protests against the Islamist Ennahda Party, and in 2014, it tried without success to sabotage a coalition government between Ennahda and the Nidaa Tounes secularist party. The UAE committed significant financial resources to support members of the old regime and their media network to demonize Ennahda and derail Tunisia’s democratic transition. In Syria, the UAE covered the expenses of Russia’s military intervention in Syria and used agents to kill many rebel leaders. It opposed Bashar Assad’s regime politically but maintained economic ties with Damascus and provided shelter for Assad’s family members and close associates.

Domestically, the UAE has also cracked down on those calling for reform. The mass trial of 94 activists in 2013 stands out as an example of gross injustice against peaceful dissidents who called for political changes, including the introduction of general elections. Of the 94 defendants, 69 were sentenced to years in prison for conspiracy to overthrow the government. The UAE is a police state driven by an overriding concern for security, order and maintaining the status quo. Political prisoners are held under gruesome conditions in distant desert prisons, including al-Razin, often referred to as the UAE’s Guantanamo.

The country is intensifying its efforts to construct a new regional order that prevents the rise of democracy and denies people freedom of expression. It views its peace treaty with Israel as not just a normalization deal but also a step toward establishing strong economic, cultural and military ties. MBZ is also open to restoring relations with Turkey as a countervail to Iran – after failing to dislodge the Turks in Libya despite providing massive military aid to rebel leader Khalifa Haftar. Abu Dhabi is also strengthening ties with the U.S., Russia, China and India to present itself as a credible regional power affiliated with the world’s most prominent countries.

But MBZ’s ambitious foreign policy pursuits exceed the UAE’s military and financial capabilities. From Yemen to Libya and beyond, Abu Dhabi has been working to counter any forces that oppose its agenda – namely, to topple political movements, whether reformist or Islamist-leaning, that call for change, which it sees as a potential existential threat. It views itself as the future leader of the region, and these movements are merely obstacles in its path.

[Crafty_Dog]

December 2, 2021
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In the Middle East, a New Era of Alliances Emerges
Pragmatism is increasingly more important than ideology.
By: Hilal Khashan

Middle Eastern relations as we’ve known them for decades are over. As ambitious states try to expand their influence throughout the region, interests, not ideology, are driving the creation of new alliances. Even ultra-religious movements are showing signs of pragmatism. In Israel, a tiny Islamist faction in the Knesset called the United Arab List joined a coalition led by ultra-nationalist Naftali Bennett, helping him secure the position of prime minister. Despite receiving criticism for cooperating with a politician who advocated annexing most of the West Bank, the United Arab List’s leader insisted that the move would improve the social conditions of Israeli Arabs. Indeed, Arabs in other parts of the region are also increasingly finding it easier to collaborate with Israel and Turkey than with other Arab countries. In setting aside ideologically based hostilities, they see an opportunity to advance their own interests.

Regional Rivalries

Throughout the Middle East, there is increasing apprehension about deteriorating relations between formerly close allies. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example, are in a deep rivalry over who will be the leader of the Middle East. Riyadh has already made moves to try to limit Abu Dhabi’s influence. In July, it changed its rules on imports from other Gulf Cooperation Council member states, excluding goods manufactured in free trade zones or with Israeli components from its preferential tariffs list – a move that specially targeted the UAE. Last week, Saudi Arabia tried (and failed) to block an energy agreement involving Jordan, Israel and the UAE. The plan calls for an Emirati company to construct a solar power facility in Jordan, which would provide Israel with 2 percent of its power needs. Riyadh fears that Abu Dhabi’s clean energy venture could undermine its own Middle East Green Initiative.

Middle East
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Egypt also has a contentious relationship with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In 2017, Egypt joined the Saudi-led blockade on Qatar, believing its goals – including closing down the al-Jazeera news network and stopping funding of the Muslim Brotherhood – would benefit Egypt. But in January 2021, Saudi King Salman lifted the blockade despite Qatar failing to meet any of the various preconditions. In 2020, Abu Dhabi signed a peace treaty with Israel without giving prior warning to Egypt, which was the first Arab country to make peace with Israel. The UAE also did not side with Egypt in its conflict with Ethiopia over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, refused to fund the building of Egypt’s new administrative capital and displaced Cairo as the dominant foreign power in Sudanese politics.

Egypt and Turkey, meanwhile, are also at odds. Though Turkey is considering selling drones to Ethiopia, it’s willing to terminate the deal if Egypt distances itself from Greece, with which Ankara has an ongoing dispute over resource rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cairo, however, seems unwilling to negotiate. It also refused to agree with Turkey to delineate their maritime exclusive economic zones. For Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, regime security is the priority, and he refuses to enable Turkey to expand its role in the region.

New Alliances

At the same time that relations between these countries are deteriorating, new alliances are beginning to form. For example, the UAE’s relations with Turkey are warming after years of hostility. The two countries had cordial relations until the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (commonly known as MBZ) sought to defeat. Though they have no underlying political problems blocking cooperation, third parties like Libya, Syria and Egypt helped create tensions between them, especially since the ouster of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in 2013. The successful defeat of the uprisings dashed Erdogan’s hopes of becoming the leader of the Sunni world, though Ankara remained a critical regional power with a strong military and a sizable economy. Erdogan now wants to restore Turkey’s relationships in the region to where they were prior to the uprisings.

For the UAE, Turkey is potentially a solid political and business partner. Though they emphasize the economic dimension of their relationship, it is at its core a strategic partnership. The decline in their political ties over the past few years had no tangible impact on their economic ties. Erdogan wants Abu Dhabi to become a principal partner in the Istanbul Canal connecting the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea. Last month, the UAE donated $10 million to help Turkey rehabilitate areas damaged by wildfires and floods. Last week, MBZ visited Ankara to meet with Erdogan, pledging to invest $10 billion in joint projects with Turkish firms. The volume of non-oil trade between the UAE and Turkey grew steadily during the past decade. In 2020, it reached $8.9 billion, compared to $7.3 billion in 2019, a 21 percent increase. Turkey is a key avenue for shipping UAE goods to Europe, and similarly, Dubai is an important location through which Turkish products are delivered to the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.

As for its relations with Israel, the UAE had high hopes that the peace deal would pay dividends. So far, however, the reality has fallen short. One year after the signing of the deal, their trade reached just $600 million. The UAE hopes to increase this figure to $1 trillion over the next decade, and the two countries have already signed 60 memorandums of understanding. Still, UAE citizens and private companies are reluctant to visit Israel or do business with Israeli firms. In addition, the market for Israel’s high-tech products is small in the geographic areas where the UAE is active. Ultimately, the UAE pushed too far and too fast in normalizing relations with Israel without heeding the complex reality of Middle Eastern politics in order to curry favor with the Trump administration.

Riyadh, meanwhile, is also open to closer relations with Ankara. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is preparing to succeed his ailing 86-year-old father, King Salman, and needs to defuse the conflicts involving Saudi Arabia in the larger Middle East, including Turkey. Turkish officials recently met with the Saudi commerce minister to explore cooperation possibilities in the growing halal food market, currently worth about $1 trillion. Last year, Saudi Arabia signed a $200 million contract with Turkish Vestel Savunma to manufacture Karayel-SU drones locally.

Riyadh would have also wanted Ankara’s help in defeating the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Though it sent several hundred Syrian militants to participate in the fighting there, Turkey is unlikely to get involved in any meaningful way, seeing it as an unwinnable war where Turkish troops could easily get bogged down.

Future Partnerships

Believing that the Saudis are more important allies than the UAE, Israel will be careful about further deepening relations with Abu Dhabi. In fact, many Israelis still believe that Turkey is the linchpin in Israel’s Middle Eastern relations. Eran Etzion, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser, argued that Israel’s interests in the Gulf countries are temporary and that Israel should instead focus on establishing an alliance with Iran and Turkey.

The Middle East’s history of short-term, ad hoc alliances has long kept the region unstable. Most countries in the region are new formations and lack the historical depth to appreciate the meaning of strategic relationships. Israel is the region’s most modern state, and Turkey has the largest economy. While Arabs increasingly value economic and security cooperation with Israel, they find it easier to communicate with Turkey because it is a Muslim country with which they identify culturally and share a common history. This will likely represent the future course of alliances in the region.

[Crafty_Dog]

December 29, 2021
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The Limits of Abu Dhabi’s Relations With the United States
The UAE’s flexible loyalties stem from its constant insecurity.
By: Hilal Khashan

The UAE maintained a low profile after its establishment in 1971. As the United Kingdom retreated as a world power, Abu Dhabi turned to the U.S. for protection and political affiliation. For nearly two decades, the UAE has emphasized its relations with the United States. Many politicians in Washington viewed Abu Dhabi as the most reliable Arab ally, citing its unwavering support for the war on global terrorism.

Groveling for recognition, the UAE ambassador in Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, once told U.S. officials that "we are your best friends in this part of the world [the Middle East]." He proudly reminded them that of all Arab countries, the UAE took part in all U.S. military coalitions since the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait. He never missed an opportunity to impress the U.S. government with his philanthropy and lavish spending on promoting community development. Abu Dhabi convinced itself of the uniqueness of its ties with the United States. The U.S. media contributed to the Emiratis' false consciousness by praising the UAE ambassador as Washington's most charming man. Time magazine named him as one of the 100 most influential people in 2020.

Throwing splendid parties and spending lots of money to gain acceptance can easily attract media attention. However, it has little impact on formulating America's foreign policy, a complex and plural political system. There is increasing evidence to suggest that relations between the U.S. and the UAE are not as strong as observers might have thought a few years ago. In fact, the two countries are drifting apart.

Fast Emerging Rift

After the UAE signed its peace accord with Israel in August 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to sell Abu Dhabi 50 F-35 jets and 18 drones. While expressing a commitment to proceed with the deal, the Biden administration last April required the Emirates to abide by specific obligations about deploying the jets and drones. Angered by what Abu Dhabi deemed unacceptable preconditions impinging on its national sovereignty, it suspended the discussions regarding the $23 billion arms deal a few weeks ago.

The U.S. opposed the UAE's close economic ties with China, mainly its deals on the Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei’s 5G technology. The Biden administration raised several other issues with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. Chief among its concerns is the Emirates' poor human rights record, which Dubai's and Abu Dhabi's extravagance and ostentatious way of life cannot hide. Also annoying for Washington is Abu Dhabi's collaboration with Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in Libya and its normalizing relations with Syria's Assad regime.

The U.S. supplied the F-35 to seven NATO states and trusted allies such as Japan, Israel, South Korea, Singapore and Australia. Still, it raised a red flag concerning Abu Dhabi's human rights abuses, especially in Yemen. The U.S. Congress demanded scrutiny of the arms deal to the UAE. During the past five years, the UAE, whose policy in Yemen is directed at partitioning the country, assassinated at least 100 members of the Yemeni national army who fought the Houthis and tried to assert the central government's authority over the south. The UAE hired a U.S. security company to assassinate 23 Al-Islah Party members in Yemen, mostly religious preachers associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Human rights groups accuse the UAE of administering secret prisons in Aden in close coordination with south Yemen's separatist movement.

Opportunistic Foreign Policy

Abu Dhabi pursues an unprincipled foreign policy. It invited foreign countries to establish bases in the UAE, giving them greater ability to project power quickly while also providing for the security and territorial integrity of the UAE. It gave the U.S. Air Force access to the Al Dhafra Air Base and a naval base on the Gulf of Oman. In 2009, the French opened Camp de la Paix, a military base in Abu Dhabi. Italy had its own presence in the Emirates until a few months ago, when Abu Dhabi told Italy to withdraw its jets and military personnel after Rome refused to supply the UAE with military hardware because of its military activities in Yemen. However, it is unlikely that Abu Dhabi would tell the U.S. to vacate its naval and air units just because Washington makes it difficult for the UAE to receive state-of-the-art military hardware.

Abu Dhabi backed Egypt's 2013 coup, which overthrew President Mohamed Morsi and installed the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces in his stead, pumping billions of dollars to stabilize the new regime. Once it ensured that the Brotherhood threat in Cairo was over, Abu Dhabi terminated its financial aid, did not support Egypt against Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and excluded Cairo from the UAE’s own negotiations over a peace treaty with Israel.

The Belt and Road Initiative will make the UAE the gateway for China's exports to the Middle East, Africa and possibly Europe. The increase in the UAE’s trade with China and India coincides with the U.S. exit from the Middle East. The U.S. decision to pull out from Iraq and Afghanistan and its general loss of interest in the Middle East date back to Barack Obama's presidency. With a trade volume of $25 billion, the U.S. is an important partner for the UAE. Still, it trails India and China. Last year, UAE-Indian trade exceeded $59 billion, and UAE-Chinese trade was worth $50 billion. In 2003, Abu Dhabi and New Delhi signed an agreement to coordinate security efforts in the Gulf-Indian Ocean region, and in 2015, they signed a strategic partnership deal. The UAE peace treaty with Israel, signed during the last month of Trump’s presidency, crowns 15 years of informal cooperation and did not happen simply because of U.S. pressure on Abu Dhabi's rulers. The UAE wants to secure its economic and security future with countries that matter. The U.S. does not feature prominently in Abu Dhabi's strategic thinking.

UAE Trade Trends With Select Countries
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The UAE did not condemn the Chinese detention of 1 million Uyghur Muslims in China’s western Xinjiang region. At the 2019 Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting held in Abu Dhabi, the participants – influenced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed – thanked China for "providing care to its Muslim citizens." To the astonishment of Pakistan, the UAE also failed to criticize India over its Kashmir policy, calling it a domestic issue.

In 2015, the UAE joined the Saudi-led Operation Firmness Storm against Yemen's Houthis. A few years later, Abu Dhabi switched sides. Its primary interest was to support south Yemen's irredentist movement to control its strategic Socotra Island and Bab el-Mandeb. In 2019, the UAE air force strafed Saudi-backed Yemeni forces in the south. It announced its intention to withdraw its troops from south Yemen, ostensibly complying with the 2018 Stockholm Agreement that deescalated the conflict.

Politics of Survival

The Gulf's tribal societies share a history of deeply ingrained distrust of one another. They have also endured invasion and control by superior foreign powers – the Portuguese, Ottomans, Persians and British – and had to manage their internal affairs under those powers’ grip. In the late 1970s, the UAE feared the rise of Iran's Islamic Revolution and Baathist Iraq's desire to fill the vacuum of Arab politics caused by Egypt's isolation after it signed the Camp David peace accord with Israel in 1978. The seven emirates of the UAE have deep-seated existential dilemmas. In the 19th century, they fought among themselves and sought British protection before London normalized their relations in 1952. Their greatest external threat came from the ambitious Saudi state from the 18th century onward. Tensions with Saudi Arabia did not cease even after forming the Gulf Cooperation Council. Often subtle and subdued, UAE-Saudi conflicts occasionally surface, attracting media attention before their rulers temporarily contain them.

United Arab Emirates
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A perennial fear of foreign conquests to seize the Persian Gulf's sea lanes shaped the UAE's worldview – especially Abu Dhabi, its most prominent and wealthiest emirate. The UAE’s vulnerability contributed to developing its leaders' flexible loyalties, as they constantly searched for allies to offset their insecurity. Ideology and blood ties do not feature significantly in their pursuit of security and trade partners. U.S.-UAE relations will continue. However, Abu Dhabi will not convince anyone that it is still a close strategic ally of Washington, especially if it fails to acquire the F-35s

[Crafty_Dog]

Syria’s Normalization Risks Continuing the Cycle of Conflict and Authoritarianism in the Middle East
A growing number of Arab countries have recently begun rekindling relations with the Syrian government after a decade of civil conflict and failed attempts to oust President Bashar al Assad’s regime. As Damascus slowly emerges from isolation, other undemocratic regimes and actors in the Middle East and North Africa risk seeing al Assad’s success as proof that force is a very valid option to quell threats to their control — and while it may spur a bloody and destructive war, it’s a war that can, with the right allies, be won. Indeed, in a region plagued with long-standing economic inequality, sectarian conflict, authoritarian regimes, deep corruption and ineffective governance, it’s only a matter of time before another state or actor uses the Syrian civil war not as a warning but as a model for when facing the next inevitable public rebellion.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 20, 2022
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The Middle East, a Vicious Cycle
There’s no end in sight to the region’s long-standing problems.
By: Hilal Khashan

The Middle East and North Africa is a region haunted by its past. Like many other places around the world, it was subjected to imperial rule under successive regimes and dynastic states, and saw more conflict than peace. But unlike other regions, it’s still waiting for its renaissance. For centuries, sedition, mutiny and poverty were commonplace, while industrialization and modernization were elusive. When Arab and Muslim intellectuals in the 19th century aspired for reform, European colonialism blocked any efforts at change. It forced them to retrench and adopt a pristine form of Islam as a vehicle to stop European intrusion into their lives. Islam thus became incompatible with the requirements of modernity. The following analysis will consider the origins of the region’s long-standing disorder and the failures that have led to its current state.

Underdevelopment

The 1967 Six-Day War was a major catalyst for change in the Middle East, altering power relations and introducing Israel as the region’s military tiger. Prior to the conflict, historic Arab cultural and political centers in Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus had begun to lose their significance when army officers staged military coups and displaced the ruling aristocracies. The officers destroyed their countries’ civil societies and economies and reverted to authoritarianism. They promised economic development but brought more poverty instead. They built large militaries ostensibly to fight Israel but lost every war with the Israelis. The Six-Day War revealed the extent of their weakness. Arab cultural and political hubs gradually shifted to Gulf cities – namely Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Riyadh and Kuwait City. As the thinly populated Gulf countries rose in wealth and significance, they schemed to keep other Arab states weak. Emerging as the counterrevolutionaries, their policy was to prevent political change throughout the region.

The Middle East’s major powers today – Israel, Turkey and Iran – are not equally powerful. Whereas Israel’s position as the region’s military and high-tech leader is secure, Turkey and Iran have serious problems relating to their economies, domestic unrest and foreign relations. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution did not bring prosperity to the people. Instead, it provoked Iraq and precipitated an eight-year war that left Iran economically devastated and internationally isolated. Unimpeded by the war’s consequences, Iran’s ayatollahs tried to spread their revolution throughout the region and established regional proxies in vulnerable countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Iran’s Islamic leaders revived the shah’s derelict nuclear program with the goal of winning international prestige and regional prominence. The country’s regional ambitions threatened its Arab neighbors, which saw Tehran expanding its influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. This compelled Saudi Arabia to launch a massive arms procurement program and establish an indigenous arms industry.

Iran's Sphere of Influence
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Turkey, meanwhile, was rocked by three military coups between 1960 and 1971. The 1960 coup was a stark reminder of the Middle East’s fragile democracy. The army toppled the government of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, a cofounder of the Islamist-leaning Democratic Party, and executed him in 1961. But the Democratic Party’s demise did not lead to political stability. In fact, each time the military banned one Islamist party, a new one emerged. After the DP collapsed, the Justice Party became increasingly prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Welfare Party emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, the military forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign, and in 1998, it banned the Welfare Party. In 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul established the Justice and Development Party (AKP). It dominated Turkish politics until 2015, when it lost the parliamentary majority and was forced to build a coalition government. The fact remains, however, that Islamist parties are a permanent presence in Turkish politics as most Turks still object to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s strict secularist and republican values. The future of Turkish politics remains uncertain as Erdogan faces increasing opposition. Even though he survived the protests that began in 2013 and allegations of corruption against his family members and senior government officials, the economic crisis could bring down his presidency and the AKP unless his controversial financial policies succeed.

Turkey's Falling Currency Value and Rising Inflation
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Politically, the Middle East has yet to come of age. The countries of the region are victims of their pasts and remain preoccupied with security, both internal and external. Despite its military superiority and nuclear arsenal, Israel has deep-seated security concerns that emanate from the Jewish people’s tragic history in Eastern and Central Europe. Its democratic political system has difficulty acting on important issues because of the divisiveness in Israeli politics. In Iran, the supreme leader presides over an anachronistic political system reminiscent of medieval Europe. Turkey is mired in an identity crisis over whether it’s a secular, European-oriented nation or an Islamic society rooted in the Middle East.

Democratic Failings

The 20th century saw the creation of new states in the Middle East and North Africa and the resurgence of the historical entities of Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Morocco. The demise of the Ottoman and Safavid empires ushered in the colonial era, which gradually led to the rise of political independence but failed to inspire democratization or economic development. Iran’s 1906 constitutional revolution failed, paving the way for the inauguration of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. The army’s abandonment of the shah and his escape from the country marked the triumph of the Islamic Revolution and the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to create a medieval-type theocracy, which did not sit well with secular-orientated Iranians. Meanwhile, Ataturk’s vision for Turkish society created a perennial state of political division and an inconclusive clash between secularism and religion.

With the rise of European influence, the region became torn between Islam, nationalism and secularism. The ruling elite and the intellectual class failed to win the people’s approval for their new political arrangements. Claims of rigged presidential elections triggered massive protests in Iran in 2009, demonstrating the unpopularity of the ruling conservatives’ stringent methods. The Revolutionary Guard’s Basij forces quickly subdued the demonstrations and restored calm.

Crises in the Middle East

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The 2010-11 Arab uprisings gave people hope that they could uproot the region’s endemic despotism and erect democratic political systems, but they soon confronted the dark reality of the well-entrenched deep state. None of the Arab uprisings led to a viable democracy. Even Tunisia’s once promising democratic reforms proved deceptive. The deep state, backed by generous Saudi and Emirati financial contributions, destroyed Egypt’s and Tunisia’s brief democratic interlude. In late 2018, the Sudanese people took to the streets to voice their opposition to President Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade rule. Eight months into the uprising, the army ousted al-Bashir, promising democratic reform. But fearing the ascendancy of civilian leadership, it staged another coup in November 2021 to reassert its political dominance, again with the prodding of Abu Dhabi. Even Lebanon’s confessional political system, erroneously labeled a democracy, crumbled due to widespread corruption.

The war in Yemen continues to rage as the Saudis fail to extricate themselves from the conflict. Saudi Arabia, which had interfered in Yemen’s internal affairs for decades, tolerated the Houthi rebels when they fought against the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah Party but then turned against them when they seized the capital city, Sanaa. In North Africa, Libya is disintegrating with little hope of bringing its warring factions together. Meanwhile, Morocco’s king remains in complete control of the country’s political system, and Algeria’s military continues to impose its will on the country and its resources.

Turkey and Iran ponder their future amid domestic uncertainty and tense relations with the West and their regional neighbors. Arab countries are in turmoil, having neither recovered from the consequences of the failed uprisings nor reformed their political systems. They seem to have accepted their weakness as many Arab heads of state welcome foreign intervention to shore up their regimes and prevent political change. The vicious cycle of authoritarianism and bogged down economic development afflict most, if not all, Middle Eastern countries, and there is no end in sight to end their travails

[Crafty_Dog]

What to Make of Qatar’s Designation as a U.S. Non-NATO Ally
6 MIN READFeb 8, 2022 | 21:32 GMT





U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani hold a joint press conference on the Afghanistan crisis in the Qatari capital of Doha on Sept. 7, 2021.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani discuss the Afghanistan crisis during a joint press conference in Doha on Sept. 7, 2021.

(OLIVIER DOULIERY/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

Qatar’s new designation as a U.S. non-NATO ally will help shield it from Saudi or Emirati pressure, as well as incentivize Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to adjust their own policies to earn the same designation. However, a new U.S. president could reverse this decision and make Doha vulnerable again. During a Jan. 31 state visit with Qatar’s emir, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that he would soon notify Congress that the United States would designate the Arab Gulf state as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), a diplomatic and legal classification that offers enhanced training, defense cooperation and military research. Biden said the announcement was long overdue following decades of U.S.-Qatari coordination and Qatar’s hosting of the region’s largest U.S. military base. But despite also being major U.S. defense partners and purchasers of U.S. military equipment, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not designated MNNAs due to both countries’ controversial human rights records and foreign policies in war-torn Yemen and Libya.

Beyond hosting troops, the United States has relied on Qatar for evacuations from Afghanistan, hosting negotiations with the Taliban, aiding Israeli security by providing aid to the Gaza Strip, and facilitating U.S.-Iran talks.
The other MNNA-designated countries in the Middle East include Kuwait, Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.
With the MNNA designation, Qatar has an extra layer of diplomatic protection from the United States should the United Arab Emirates and/or Saudi Arabia resume pressure campaigns against Doha. The Qatar blockade ended in January 2021 just as the Biden administration took office, but none of the drivers of the blockade were resolved as Qatar held out rather than changed policies. While a full resumption of the blockade appears unlikely in the near term, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi might resort to disinformation campaigns, tariffs, boycotts or visa processing slowdowns, as they did before the blockade, to try to rattle Qatar’s reputation and economy — particularly during the high profile World Cup games, which will be hosted in Doha at the end of this year. But if these pressure campaigns emerge, they will likely be modest following the U.S. move to upgrade its strategic view of Qatar. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the United Arab Emirates want to alienate the United States as they still seek its protection against Iran and cooperation against threats like Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates demanded Qatar break ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, close or control the coverage of its state-backed Al Jazeera media organization, expel Turkish troops in Qatar, reduce ties with Iran, align its strategic priorities with those of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and take other broad measures to prevent the country from hosting media or individuals critical of Saudi and Emirati policies. None of these demands were met, though Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still seek to prevent Qatari influence from undermining their political stability and contain Iranian influence in the Arab Gulf.
The blockade ended in part because of the election of a new administration in the United States. Former President Donald Trump tacitly backed the blockade initially and did not apply pressure to end it. But on the campaign trail, Biden was more broadly critical of Saudi and Emirati behavior and implied he would reframe relations with both countries upon taking office.
To earn the same designation, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia will be incentivized to further adjust their policies to meet U.S. expectations, such as keeping tensions with Qatar low, publicly supporting U.S. efforts to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal, avoiding deepening ties with Washington’s rival China, avoiding human rights outrages at both home and abroad, and supporting U.S. goals to de-escalate the civil war in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are likely to seek their own MNNA designation to both maintain diplomatic parity with rival Qatar, as well as strengthen their own security relationships with the United States (which is still their primary security guarantor). But both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s policies have come under sustained criticism from lawmakers in the U.S. Congress, which will need to be alleviated before the Arab Gulf states can nudge the Biden administration to consider them as MMNA designees. Both countries have already begun altering some of their more controversial policies and behaviors, in part as they try to avoid a major diplomatic split with the United States under Biden. But the desire to be seen as the same kind of reliable ally as Qatar will incentivize the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to make further concessions to appease U.S. politicians, especially those in Congress.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates lobbied against the original Iran nuclear deal signed in 2015, helping fuel the arguments that ultimately led to the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2019. After suffering attacks by Iran, both countries are now more amenable to a new nuclear deal and favor de-escalation with Tehran.
Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are actively pursuing new relations with China, even on the defense level, which has fed into U.S. concerns about Beijing’s growing global influence.
To ease these concerns, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could either slow their outreach to China, or shift their relationships with Beijing to focus more on the economic rather than military sphere. In November 2021, the United Arab Emirates reportedly shut down a site the United States claimed was a secret Chinese naval base.
Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates could release some of the numerous detained activists and dissidents in each country to curry favor with the United States. Saudi Arabia has already freed at least one prominent women’s rights activist, Loujain al-Hathloul, who was released from prison in February 2021 but remains under supervision.
A future U.S. president, especially if Trump returns for a second term, might be tempted to reverse Qatar’s designation, politicizing the MNNA category. Some U.S. politicians have criticized Qatar for its ties to Iran, Turkey and the Palestinian militant group Hamas. These same politicians pushed the Trump administration to support the Qatar blockade in 2017-21. And they could remain a force if Trump returns to the White House in 2024 or if another Republican president with a similar political base takes power.

Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2019 in part because some of his supporters wanted to see the United States increase pressure on Tehran and its allies. Many of these Iran hawks argue Qatar enables Iranian behavior by maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran.

[Crafty_Dog]

ISIS Resurrection a Cause for Alarm
by Hany Ghoraba
IPT News
February 24, 2022

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9146/isis-resurrection-a-cause-for-alarm

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18350/america-terrorist-allies

[Crafty_Dog]

June 9, 2022
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The Roots of Arab Turmoil
Modern nation-states have failed to develop as tribalism and poor governance have prevailed.
By: Hilal Khashan


The rise of the modern nation-state and established universal values has led to a reduction in political violence in many places across the globe. The Arab region, however, has failed to make this transition and to redefine the role of religion in politics. The region still lacks critical thinking and utilitarian nationalism that can help unify a population, while outdated modes of interaction and cultural stagnation persist, dooming Arab attempts to navigate economic and political challenges. The use of political violence as a means of gaining and keeping power continues as regimes apply excessive coercion to eliminate the opposition and intimidate their people into submission.

Persistent Tribalism

Massive tribal migrations accompanied the emergence of Islam in the Middle East and North Africa from the 7th century onward. These tribes maintained their own social structures and resisted interaction with the state beyond paying taxes and providing recruits for the military. Violence frequently broke out in pre-Islamic Arabia, wreaking havoc on social relations and pausing only briefly while the Prophet Muhammad was still alive. Arabs prohibited fighting during the four sacred months on the religious calendar, a practice that persisted under Islam.

Collective interests did not develop beyond the family, clan or tribe. Life in the desert gave rise to a narrow definition of identity rather than a nationalistic one. Arab tribes shunned intertribal marriages, relegating the descendants of mixed marriages to a lower social status. Those born to non-Arab women often ranked at the bottom of the social order. Seeking to safeguard tribal ethnic purity prevented national unification and the rise of political community.

Arab Christians particularly suffered. Their vassal states in Iraq and Syria came under the influence of the two dominant regional powers, the Byzantines and the Sassanians. The Lakhmid dynasty in southern Iraq fought with the Persians against the Ghassanids and their Byzantine feudal overlords. However, the Lakhmids fought against the Muslim army in the battle of Qadisiyya in 636. Similarly, the Ghassanids sided with the Byzantines against the Muslims in the Battle of Yarmouk that same year. The Umayyads and Abbasids depended heavily on Arab Christian tribespeople to run the administration and did not impose Islam on them. Even though Syria’s Christians joined the Muslim conquest of North Africa that started in 647, the lines of religious and tribal divisions became permanent, triggering spates of religious persecution in subsequent eras.

Tribal sheiks reigned supreme in their closed communities, without worrying about dissent. Leadership was usually passed down based on heredity, but when there was no eligible next of kin, violence could tarnish the transfer of power. Once the sheik title was secured, the tribe’s council gave him an irrevocable endorsement for life by acclamation. Revoking acceptance was comparable to sedition, which is punishable by death in Islam. Arab monarchies still practice this type of political leadership, while republican systems disguise their tribal leadership style with a thin democratic veneer.

History of Political Repression

The gruesome murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 gave the world a glimpse into how the Saudi political system works, but other Arab countries have shown similar tendencies. For example, in 1965, Morocco’s King Hassan II ordered his intelligence apparatus to abduct opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka. They killed him and dissolved his body in acid. It was part of the king’s Years of the Lead campaign, which lasted from the 1960s to the 1980s, to eliminate all democratic opposition and purge the army in an unprecedented wave of terror.

Arab societies have a long history of political repression. While Islam condemned tribal fanaticism, it failed to stop tribal infighting. Tribal wars in pre-Islamic Arabia were a way of life, totaling some 1,700 conflicts. Conventional wisdom has it that Islam unified the tribes and ended their hostilities, but the fact remains that immediately after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, the rejection of Islam by many Arab tribes led to the two-year Ridda War (or war of apostasy) in 632, in which the caliphal state prevailed. After three more brutal wars over the prophet’s successors, Muslims were split into Sunnis and Shiites. Political rivals assassinated three of the four Rashidun caliphs who succeeded the prophet between 632-661 while in office.

In 695, Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malak appointed al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf – who previously defeated the anti-government insurgency in Hejaz – as the governor of Iraq’s restive Kufa district near Najaf, the most important Shiite city. A ruthless and fearsome enforcer of order, al-Hajjaj became known as "The Exterminator." Upon assuming office in Kufa, he addressed Iraqi notables by saying, “I see heads that are ripe, and I am ready for the picking.” He mercilessly delivered on his threat, killing at least 130,000 Iraqis.

In 680, the first Umayyad caliph, Muawiya, passed away and was succeeded by his son, Yazid. As is common in Arab tradition, Yazid sought the support of a descendent of the prophet, Imam Husayn bin Ali, who felt the caliphate belonged to him instead. Fearing for his life, Husayn left Mecca for Karbala in Iraq. On his way, he met a sympathizer returning from Iraq who urged Husayn against going there, saying, “their hearts are with you, but their swords are against you.”

The Umayyad Empire (661-750) had 14 caliphs, four of whom were killed by rivals. The Abbasid Empire (750 to 1258) had 12 out of 57 caliphs killed while in office. Most of the others lacked real power; slave soldiers controlled the state, and many regions established separate dynasties, namely the Mamelukes in Egypt and Syria. The Mamelukes’ rule (1250 to 1517) saw 140 military coups and the assassination of 20 sultans as brazen power determined who would claim the throne.

In 711, the Umayyads conquered the Iberian Peninsula, and in 756, they established the Andalusian Umayyad dynasty, which dissolved in 1031. Tribal factions fought among themselves, dividing the Muslim-dominated areas of Spain and Portugal into 22 petty kingdoms. They paid tribute money to King Alfonso VI of Leon and Castile and sought his help against rival Muslim kings. Granada, the last Muslim kingdom, fell to the Aragon and Castile alliance in 1492.

In 1933, the pan-Arab Iraqi government ordered the army to attack the Assyrian Christians in northern Iraq, who were accused of affiliating with the British and harboring irredentist tendencies. The Simele massacre killed 3,000 Assyrians and destroyed more than 60 villages. In 1939, pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-Said reputedly ordered the assassination of 27-year-old King Ghazi, who planned on annexing Kuwait, then a British protectorate. In 1958, a military coup in Baghdad ended the monarchy and brutally killed 23-year-old King Faisal II, along with the crown prince, the prime minister and scores of their entourage. In 1980, Syrian President Hafez Assad responded to an attempt on his life by ordering the killing of 1,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood held in Palmyra’s notorious military prison. In 1982, in retaliation to the anti-Alawite Sunni insurgency in Hama, the army’s Defense Battalions laid siege to Hama before destroying the city center and killing more than 20,000 residents.

In 1991, Algerian Islamists seemed on the verge of dominating the Algerian parliament. A few days before the decisive second round of elections in January 1992, the army staged a coup that precipitated an 11-year civil war. More than 200,000 people lost their lives as the crackdown defeated the radical Islamists but failed to address the root causes of Algeria’s political crisis.

In Egypt, King Farouk could have stopped the 1952 junior officers’ coup with the help of the powerful Royal Guard, but he instead abdicated the throne to avoid bloodshed. His republican successors showed much less regard for human life and political freedom, locking up thousands of pro-democracy activists and failing to address basic needs. Current President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi took repression to new heights, imprisoning or marginalizing army officers and politicians who supported his 2013 military coup.

The violent fallout of the 2011 uprisings in Libya and Yemen and the rejection of public demands for political reform and democracy are more indications of the disintegration of the Arab regional order. These types of Arab divisions run so deep that they cannot be resolved on their own and present a real risk of protracted conflict.

Failure to Govern

Tribalism prevented the Arab state from establishing roots and fostering a strong sense of national identity. Arab regimes made no effort to involve the local populations in political affairs, not even to draft and implement public policy. States commissioned local functionaries to levy taxes and recruit conscripts, but average people feared the state and the succession of sprawling empires that dominated the region. Arab societies did not develop because of government repression, intimidation and exclusion from the market economy, into which they only recently entered as consumers, not producers.

In modern times, the Arab region has witnessed numerous regime changes, ostensibly aimed at eliminating corruption, ending repression, spreading freedom and bringing about prosperity. Incompetent and self-serving regimes were overthrown, but their successors fared no better, proving themselves morally deficient and equally detached from the people.

The West imposed the concept of the centralized nation-state on Arab societies, but it failed to take hold because it did not connect with the region’s cultural and social realities. Arab societies remain fragmented and bound by local bonds of association. For most Arabs, the nation-state is a vague idealization that does not relate to how they interact with their fellow citizens, let alone the political system. Poor governance has prevailed, undeterred by what goes on in politically developed countries.

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. Lawmakers Unveil a Plan to Shield Middle East Allies From Iranian Aggression
7 MIN READJun 15, 2022 | 21:29 GMT





Iranian-made satellite carriers (left) and missiles (right) are displayed in front of the Holy Defense Museum in Tehran, Iran, on Sept. 20, 2020.
Iranian-made satellite carriers (left) and missiles (right) are displayed in front of the Holy Defense Museum in Tehran, Iran, on Sept. 20, 2020.

(Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images)

A U.S. plan for integrated air and missile defenses across the Middle East could eventually help countries in the region deter and intercept attacks by Iran and its proxies — a prospect that might entice Saudi Arabia to deepen ties with Israel. On June 9, a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act. The DEFEND Act aims to create an integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) system across U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East, covering Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The legislation would require the U.S. Department of Defense to lead the effort to establish an IAMD system to defend against Iranian and Iranian-backed militia missile, rocket and drone attacks.

Many of the countries the legislation aims to integrate already have U.S. defense systems deployed. The United Arab Emirates owns an advanced THAAD system. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait also all either own or host U.S.-run Patriot missile batteries, with other countries in the region still using the older U.S.-built HAWK surface-to-air missile system.
The legislation comes as the prospects of a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal dim, possibly portending more Iranian missile, rocket and drone attacks across the region. Iran’s ballistic missile, rocket and drone strike capabilities extend out of Iran to Lebanon through Syria, Iraq and Yemen, giving Tehran the ability to target U.S., Israeli, and Arab Gulf forces from several sources.
The United States already takes part in NATO’s Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS), which was established in the 1950s. NATINADS aims to create another integrated air defense system in Asia-Pacific by 2028 among U.S. allies and partners there.

Though existing systems are already in place in most countries, local politics will prevent the full implementation of a regional air and missile defense system — especially in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Iraq — because Israel would be part of the network. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman have covert security, economic, or diplomatic relations with Israel, but are not yet willing to embrace full normalization with the country for varying domestic and ideological reasons. Iraq and Kuwait, which have elected legislatures and populations that are overwhelmingly opposed to relations with Israel, are even further from normalization. In part because of Iranian influence in Iraq, Baghdad is also far from owning an advanced U.S. air or missile defense system; the Patriot batteries in the country are under U.S. control at the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq’s Anbar province. Despite these challenges, covert integration is possible for countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have more advanced ties with Israel as well as deep defense ties with the United States. Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s centralized political systems also grant both kingdoms more room to implement the systems compared with countries like Iraq and Kuwait, where elected parliaments are more able to check executive power.

Officially, Saudi Arabia remains opposed to formally normalizing with Israel until there is a Palestinian state. But Riyadh’s normalization path is nonetheless relatively advanced. Last month, reports emerged that the United States had helped mediate the transfer of the Tiran and Sanafir islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia by convincing Israel to drop its objections (the strategic islands sit along the Strait of Aqaba, which Israel needs to access the Red Sea; Israel previously was able to block Tiran and Sanafir’s transfer to Saudi Arabia by pointing to stipulations in the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that the islands remain demilitarized). The recent breakthrough on the Tiran and Sanafir dispute also comes amid reports of Israeli businesses cutting deals in Saudi Arabia, as well as rumored meetings between Saudi and Israeli officials designed to boost trade ties.

Both Oman and Qatar officially oppose normalizing relations with Israel before the establishment of a Palestinian state. But they are also both eager to maintain their regional neutrality between the United States, Israel and Iran.

Anti-Israel sentiment remains high in Iraq, where an Israeli airstrike on Iranian-linked targets killed up to 47 people in 2019. Just last month, Iraq’s parliament strengthened the country’s anti-normalization laws.

Kuwait has also had its own anti-normalization law since 1964, which the country’s parliament expanded in 2018 to also include barring ties between Kuwaitis and Israelis online.

Even a partially implemented IAMD system would boost Israel and (to a lesser extent) other nearby countries’ ability to deter and intercept some Iranian and proxy attacks. But geographic distance and the point of origin of attacks will at least partially determine the effectiveness of such a system. Early warning systems that inform even a partial regional IAMD system would increase the likelihood that Iranian or proxy attacks are detected sooner and that air and missile defense systems are activated faster to block such strikes. Even if the DEFEND Act only covered Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan, it would still give Israel more advanced warning of some incoming Iranian strikes from Iraq and Iran. However, without Saudi Arabia as an IAMD system participant, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen would exploit the intelligence gap over the kingdom. An IAMD system would also do little to reduce the effectiveness of shorter-range missile attacks, as well as rocket and drone attacks, against regional targets. This is especially true when it comes to protecting Israel and Saudi Arabia from attacks launched from neighboring countries like Lebanon and Syria (in Israel’s case) and Yemen (in Saudi Arabia's case), as assailants may rely more often on short-range swarm attacks and shorter flight times to strike targets before air defenses could intercept them.

Israel has various anti-missile radar systems that are land, air and sea deployed. But until recently, the range of these systems has been limited to Israel’s own borders and bases. Israel’s EL/M-2080 Green Pine, the country’s primary anti-missile radar system, has a range of around 360-500 miles, making parts of Iraq, and all of Iran and Yemen, outside of its ability to detect. It’s not clear if the DEFEND Act would encourage Israel to send its systems to participant countries.

With the DEFEND Act, the United States could also use the benefit of closer integration with U.S.-led air defenses and possible access to Israeli military technologies to further incentivize Saudi Arabia — a frequent target of Houthi and Iranian attacks — to deepen normalization with Israel. U.S. legislators openly stated that the DEFEND Act was aimed at progressing the Arab-Israeli normalization push laid out in the 2020 Abraham Accords — a goal that would explain Israel’s inclusion. Saudi Arabia is rumored to be interested in Israel’s Iron Dome to help protect the kingdom’s southern border and oil infrastructure from attacks launched by Iran and Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis. The increasing pace of these Houthi and Iranian attacks could make Riyadh more interested in a U.S.-led IAMD program if it includes Israeli technologies, like the Iron Dome and Israel’s future Iron Beam laser defense system. In order to prevent domestic public opposition, Saudi Arabia could have the option to covertly participate in the program, similar to how the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain quietly held military drills alongside Israeli forces at U.S.-and NATO-led exercises shortly before both countries normalized ties with Israel in 2020.

Saudi Arabia has already developed other covert ties with Israel, including business connections and a rumored meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2019. These ties are reflective of the Saudi crown prince’s desire to build connections with Israel even without progress on the Palestinian issue, though it’s widely assumed the Saudi public would oppose normalization.

[Crafty_Dog]

uly 7, 2022
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Why a Middle Eastern NATO Won’t Work
The lack of trust and agreement on security threats precludes the formation of an Arab military pact.
By: Hilal Khashan

Last month, Jordan’s King Abdullah II announced his support for forming a Middle Eastern military alliance similar to NATO. Interest in establishing a regional military pact goes back to the Cold War years when the United Kingdom helped create the Baghdad Pact in 1955, though the alliance collapsed three years later after an Iraqi coup toppled the monarchy. This is just one example of the numerous attempts at regional military cooperation that have foundered over the years. One of the most recent was U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal in 2017 to establish a Middle East Strategic Alliance, also modeled after NATO.

Even though MESA did not take off, efforts to prod the region’s leaders to agree on a cooperative security arrangement have continued. Last March, a meeting in Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh resort brought together military officers from the U.S., Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the UAE to evaluate Iran’s ballistic missile and drone threat. More recently, Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a meeting with counterparts from the same countries and Morocco to discuss security issues ahead of President Joe Biden’s visit to the region in mid-July. But Biden is unlikely to fare any better than his predecessors. Deep-seated animosity, perpetual distrust of one another and disagreement on the perception of foreign threats preclude low-level cooperation, let alone the formation of a military pact.

History of Failed Partnerships

Arab countries have repeatedly failed to coordinate during key moments of regional conflict. In the 1948 war against Israel, for example, Arab armies failed to coordinate their plans, leading to a decisive Israeli victory. In 1950, Arab countries adopted the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation. They established a unified Arab military command, which remained inactive until 1964, when they decided at an Arab summit to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River and send Syrian and Iraqi troops to Lebanon and Jordan to protect the diversion sites. Both countries subsequently refused to accept Arab military units on their territories.


(click to enlarge)

On the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, however, King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense agreement with Egypt and appointed an Egyptian officer to lead the Jordanian army. He allowed an Iraqi army division to enter Jordan and ordered the Jordanian army to shell Israeli positions in west Jerusalem. He did so despite assurances by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that Israel would not seize the West Bank if the Jordanian army did not initiate hostilities. Hussein had concluded that his kingdom would be easier to govern without the West Bank, considering that the Palestinian people had rejected the Hashemites and assassinated his grandfather, King Abdullah I, in 1951.

In 1973, Egypt and Syria went to war against Israel without articulating a war strategy. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat wanted a limited conflict to convince the U.S. to enforce a U.N. resolution that called on Israel to withdraw from lands occupied in 1967. In contrast, Syrian President Hafez Assad believed he could recover the Golan Heights. Their lack of coordination and different war objectives enabled the Israelis to advance to 40 kilometers (25 miles) from Damascus.

Fearing Iranian and Iraqi hegemony, the GCC – consisting of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait – sought to create a military force to defend its members against the winner of the Iran-Iraq War. In 1984, it formed the Peninsula Shield Force based near the Saudi-Iraqi border. However, disagreements within the group, especially over troop deployment, meant the force never exceeded 4,000 troops and failed to prevent Iraq from invading Kuwait in 1990. In the Damascus Declaration, issued soon after the U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraq from Kuwait, Egypt and Syria pledged to provide military forces to defend the GCC countries against foreign threats. Distrusting their intentions, Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not honor the declaration, embarking on separate plans to build up their own armies with Western assistance.

In December 2013, GCC members announced the establishment of a unified armed forces command consisting of 100,000 troops, half of whom were provided by Saudi Arabia. Three months later, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Qatar to protest its foreign policy, shelving the proposed military command.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Seven Arab countries offered to participate in the war effort but quickly disengaged. In 2019, the UAE, which was focused on securing South Yemen, also withdrew from the war, choosing instead to rely on its local affiliates to pursue its objectives. Saudi Arabia continued to wage war alone, using mostly Yemeni army troops, African mercenaries and its own air power.

In 2016, Saudi Arabia invited 20 Muslim countries to participate in an ostentatious military exercise codenamed Northern Thunder and held near the Kuwaiti border, less than 400 kilometers from the Iranian city of Abadan. The symbolic drills lasted almost one month and included countries irrelevant to Middle East politics, such as Malaysia, Senegal, the Maldives and Mauritius. Another participant, Qatar, became the subject of a three-year blockade led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain just one year later.

Barriers to Cooperation

For Arab countries in West Asia, one of the barriers to cooperation is fear of antagonizing Iran. The GCC countries and Jordan understand that Tehran can destabilize their regimes. Iran is driven by a desire to dominate the Persian Gulf, though it has shown a willingness to cooperate with certain regimes regardless of their ideological orientation. Faced with this reality, some countries in the region, including Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, have maintained varying degrees of partnership with Iran. Every time the UAE draws closer to Israel, it sends a high-level official to Tehran to assure the Iranian leadership that it would not allow foreign powers to stage attacks on Iran from its territory. The ruler of Dubai has often called for easing sanctions on Tehran. Meanwhile, Egypt and North African countries, which boast the most powerful Arab militaries, do not perceive Iran as an enemy and are unlikely to join an alliance that considers it a threat.

Other countries, however, do consider Iran a major security threat. This explains why Jordan viewed Russia’s military presence in Syria as a stabilizing force against both radical Islamic movements and Iranian proxies near its northern borders. Notably, however, the war in Ukraine resulted in the withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria’s southwest and their replacement with pro-Iranian militias. In addition to posing a security risk, they became active in smuggling narcotics to the Gulf region via Jordan, precipitating frequent border clashes with the Jordanian army. Still, Jordan avoided criticizing Iran, only referring to rogue armed groups active in illicit activities across its borders. King Abdullah II’s unwillingness to name Iran as a threat casts doubt on his support for a NATO-type regional alliance. Though he did not specify the rationale for the project, he seemed worried about the resurgence of the Islamic State in Syria due to Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and the possibility of a second wave of Arab uprisings.

Another barrier to a regional security alliance is the fact that Arab countries have long depended on external security guarantors. From the 19th century until their independence between 1961 and 1971, five GCC countries were reliant on London for their defense as British protectorates. The Saudis, meanwhile, came to an agreement on a security arrangement in 1945 with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. Since 2015, the U.S. has proposed integrating the GCC’s ballistic missile systems, modernizing its security apparatuses, conducting more frequent military exercises, and upgrading its counterterrorism capabilities. But the Gulf countries want direct Western involvement in their defense. In recent years, they granted several countries, especially the United States, the right to establish military bases on their territories.

The Saudi royals do not trust their armed forces’ ability to defend the country against foreign threats, even militias such as the Houthis or Iraq’s pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces. Riyadh has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on military procurement over the past four decades, and it still does not have a fighting army. In 2015, it demanded from the Obama administration a formal commitment to defend it against Iran, which it did not receive. Though the U.S. often expresses unwavering determination to defend the Saudis and other GCC countries, it ultimately wants to maintain a regional balance in the Gulf, not to defeat Iran. In addition, senior U.S. officials don’t hold the Saudi leadership in high regard. The last three U.S. presidents issued negative remarks about the kingdom. Obama described the Saudis as “free riders,” Trump told King Salman that he would not last in office for two weeks without U.S. support, and Biden said the Saudi government has “very little social redeeming value.”

As for Israel, there is no evidence to suggest that it is interested in anything more than transactional relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, despite the fanfare over the dawn of a new era in Arab-Israeli cooperation. Israel might be eager to sell GCC countries advanced anti-missile systems and to promote trade relations, but it’s wishful thinking for Arabs to expect Israel to fight Iran on their behalf.

The Saudis understand that securing a more significant U.S. commitment to protect them is not a substitute for improving relations with Iran. Despite ongoing talks in Baghdad between Riyadh and Tehran, a lack of trust will block any workable agreement between them. In addition, Saudi Arabia will not normalize its ties with Israel until Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman succeeds his father. Even then, the Saudis have no delusions about Israel giving them security assurances beyond what Washington’s offering. Military alliances are formed to address specific security concerns that are clear to all participating countries. In the Arab region, frequent policy shifts will not allow for the establishment of a stable and enduring security coalition

[ccp]

https://www.foxnews.com/media/bidens-fist-bump-saudi-arabias-mohammed-bin-salman-shocks-twitter

used by both sides as political football

frankly my dear I don't care

worst crime in humanity is to harm a jurnolister 

[Crafty_Dog]

Can Biden Correct Obama’s Mistakes in the Middle East?
The opening to Iran, and the fiascoes in Libya and Syria, were devastating to U.S. credibility. But they brought Israel and its Arab neighbors closer together.
By Walter Russell MeadFollow
July 15, 2022 6:39 pm ET


As President Biden traveled through the Middle East this week, he was caught between the demands of human-rights activists and pro-Palestinian campaigners and the hard realities of the U.S. national interests. His administration had hoped to revive the Iran nuclear deal while pressuring Israel over its treatment of the Palestinians and reducing American commitments to and engagement with the Gulf Arab states. That policy mix thrills Democratic Party liberal internationalists but ignores reality.

It collapsed under the weight of Iran’s using Mr. Biden’s commitment to re-enter the nuclear deal as cover for a massive buildup of weapons-grade uranium while strengthening its relations with Russia and China, and of the failure of Mr. Biden’s green-energy agenda in the face of spiking oil and gas prices. The president now seeks to strengthen old American alliances with countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

This won’t be easy. Arabs and Israelis alike remember the serial failures of the Obama administration: the disaster of its pro-democracy policy in Egypt, its misguided embrace of Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a leader of “democratic Islamism,” its failure to establish order in Libya after helping engineer the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi, its dithering over the “red line” in Syria, its feckless acquiescence in Vladimir Putin’s reassertion of a Russian role in Syria. All eroded regional confidence in the wisdom and even the competence of America’s senior political leadership.

Unconscious of their diminished prestige, senior Obama administration officials alienated Israeli and Palestinian negotiators by attempting to dictate the terms of peace. Secretary of State John Kerry lectured his Israeli and Palestinian interlocutors tirelessly about their true interests. “You Palestinians can never get the f— big picture,” White House national security adviser Susan Rice admonished the chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat. At a White House meeting on March 17, 2014, Mr. Obama tried to persuade Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to sign on the dotted line, telling him: “Don’t quibble with this detail or that detail. The occupation will end. You will get a Palestinian state. You will never have an administration as committed to that as this one.”


Mr. Abbas was unimpressed. He and Erekat, to say nothing of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saw the big picture much more clearly than the Americans did. U.S. officials had failed to grasp not only their own drastically diminished authority and prestige but the changing nature of Israeli society and the implications for American diplomacy in the pursuit of peace.

The more liberal wing of the Israeli political establishment was rooted in the “Ashkenazi ascendancy” that dominated Israel in the early decades of independence as thoroughly as WASPs once dominated American life. But over time a mix of Sephardic and Russian immigrants, along with the rapidly growing ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic populations, began to challenge the old, largely secular and Western-minded elite. The old establishment held on in the judiciary, the universities and certain institutions in the security field. But its members were increasingly alienated from the less polished, less Western, less liberal, more religious and more Middle Eastern country Israel was becoming.

In an Israeli form of identity politics, right-leaning voters, resenting what they saw as discrimination and contempt from the establishment, banded together behind leaders like Menachem Begin (prime minister from 1977 through 1983) and Mr. Netanyahu (1996-99, 2009-21). These leaders were less open to American ideas and less vulnerable to pressure from Washington than their predecessors had been. The Russian, Sephardic and ultra-Orthodox voters who supported them mostly didn’t share the feeling of guilt about the Palestinians that haunted the old Israeli establishment. Their knowledge of Arab culture, language and attitudes left them contemptuous of what they saw as fuzzy-minded Americans spouting foolish platitudes about the Arab world.


They had even less respect for the opinions of American Jews. These Israelis or their parents were often refugees from Arab countries, where they had suffered discrimination and persecution. They felt they owed the world and the Palestinians no apologies. As they saw it, pampered and affluent American Jews who had never held a gun, patrolled a Palestinian street or crouched in the basement with their families as Palestinian missiles soared overhead had no business lecturing Israelis on where their boundaries should be.

Neither Mr. Kerry nor Mr. Obama seems to have understood how their own personal unpopularity in Israel changed the politics of peace among Israelis. As Jews from the former Soviet Union watched Mr. Putin run rings around Mr. Obama on the international stage, as Mizrahi Jews from Muslim countries heard Americans echo the flabby liberal rhetoric of a condescending Israeli establishment that despised them, association with those Americans became toxic. Right-wing politicians saw no reason to conceal their disdain for the Americans and their process; attacking Mr. Kerry in particular brought political dividends. Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon (2013-16), in conversations with journalists, would mock what he saw as American naiveté, messianic delusions and arrogance. The only thing that will save Israel, he was quoted as saying in 2014, “is for John Kerry to win his Nobel Prize and go home.”

Some of the key arguments the Americans used to convince Israelis to move toward a two-state solution lost traction. Unless a Palestinian state could be established, Americans often argued, Israelis would face the choice between becoming an undemocratic “apartheid” state ruling over an Arab majority and watching the Jewish character of the state disappear as Arabs took over the Knesset.

This demographic argument plays poorly among serious Zionists. In the 1930s and ’40s, Arabs heavily outnumbered Jews. The Jewish minority faced constant pressure from both the Arab majority and Britain, which administered Palestine under a mandate from the League of Nations, to accept minority status in a single state. If the tiny, impoverished and almost friendless Jewish community could reject a one-state solution then, surely a nuclear-armed regional superpower whose technological capabilities the world envied could define its frontiers and chart its political course.


When U.S. negotiators warned that failure to fall in line with Mr. Kerry’s peace initiative would isolate the Jewish state, Israeli officials felt that the Americans had again lost touch with key regional dynamics. Even as Jewish settlements on the West Bank grew, Arab governments drew closer to Israel and openly impatient with the Palestinians. As the Obama administration shifted from a policy of reconciliation with the Arab world to one of bridge-building with Iran, many Arabs interpreted the seeming inaction, along with U.S. passivity in Syria, as a historic betrayal.

Public opinion in the Arab world, appalled at the bloodletting in Libya and Syria and shocked by America’s lack of any positive agenda for these critical regional problems, became more tolerant of their own rulers’ faults and less willing to support dangerous movements for political change. The Arab Spring never turned into summer. Nobody wanted to end up like Syria or Libya, and everyone could see how worthless American support had been to the Egyptian democracy movement.

In a world where Russia and Iran were prepared to brutalize Syria back into obedience to the Assad dynasty, the fate of the West Bank seemed less significant than ever. And Israel and its Arab neighbors alike increasingly saw America’s new Iran policy as their gravest security threat.

The new constellation of forces debuted during the Gaza War in the summer of 2014, just after the last flames of the Kerry process had flickered out. Following a series of mutual provocations and retaliations, the Israel Defense Forces launched massive airstrikes and missile launches into Gaza. Ten days later, Israeli ground forces moved into the strip.

As cease-fire negotiations dragged, it became clear that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Fatah (the Palestinian Authority’s ruling party in the West Bank) were quietly supporting the Israeli position in hope that Hamas would be hit as hard as possible. American negotiators sided with Turkey and Qatar, which pushed to end the fighting more quickly to reduce the death toll, a result that would come at the cost of offering Hamas a result it could spin as a victory.

For Israelis, one lesson seemed obvious. In a shooting conflict that saw Israelis firing on Palestinian cities, the heavyweight powers of the Arab world were backing Israel—against the U.S. Unintentionally and unwittingly, the Obama administration had achieved a goal that had eluded generations of American diplomats: It had laid the foundation for the integration of Israel into the Middle East.

Mr. Biden’s attempt to revive the core features of Mr. Obama’s Middle East policies left Arabs and Israelis wondering if the days of condescension and arrogance had returned. One hopes they haven’t, and that the president and his team succeed in regaining the respect of important leaders and power brokers across the Middle East.

Mr. Mead is the Journal’s Global View columnist. This is adapted from his new book, “The Arc of a Covenant: The United States, Israel and the Fate of the Jewish People.”

[Crafty_Dog]

February 20, 2023
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The Bigger Picture Around Juniper Oak
Though the military exercise was geared toward Iran, it suggests much more strategic calculations.
By: Caroline D. Rose

In late January, U.S. and Israeli forces staged a military exercise called Juniper Oak, their largest, most complex exercise to date. Planned in just 90 days, the U.S. and Israel sent nearly 150 aircraft, a dozen warships, advanced artillery systems, and just shy of 8,000 soldiers, including infantry and special operations forces, to simulate a large-scale attack by land, air, sea, space and cyberspace. An exercise of that magnitude – assembled that quickly – drew the attention of pretty much every country in the world, many of which couldn’t help but see it as a simulated attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. After all, tensions are rising, nuclear negotiations are dead in the water, and the U.S. and Israel are likely considering every option.

Several U.S. military and defense officials denied that Juniper Oak had anything to do with Iran, but the scope, scale and complexity of the exercise suggested otherwise. It incorporated combatant command elements, executing missions on command and control, maritime surface warfare, air operations, combat search and rescue, cyber and electronic attacks, and strike coordination, reconnaissance and air interdiction. Live-fire exercises were conducted in waves to simulate repeated missile, bomb and HIMARS attacks. The U.S. deployed KC-46 air refueling tankers – an aircraft that would absolutely be involved in an attack on Iran – allowing Israeli pilots to familiarize themselves with the planes before they receive their own. Other aircraft that would be used to penetrate Iranian air defenses were notably absent, but all told Juniper Oak checked a lot of the boxes, including support assets, mechanics and logistics, that would be vital in any large-scale assault against Iran.

Though Iran was an important element of the exercise, it wasn’t the only one, and perhaps not even the most important one. As the exercise concluded, CENTCOM officials promised to build upon Juniper Oak, accelerate regional interoperability, expand to include more participants, and eventually institutionalize the combined exercise. From this there is only one conclusion: that the U.S. has every intention to follow through with its drawdown in the Middle East, and that it hopes to steadily build a security architecture where regional partners assume more responsibility.

To that end, Washington sees bilateral cooperation with Israel as the first step toward much grander designs. Israel is a natural partner given its armed forces’ advanced readiness, modernization, and sophisticated combined arms capabilities, which allow the Israel Defense Forces to punch above its weight. Israel actively participates in bilateral and multilateral exercises with countries such as Greece and Italy that it hopes will eventually be part of a regional anti-Iranian coalition.

The timing of Juniper Oak is also telling, coming as it did at an unusually accommodative time in the Middle East. The U.S.-led Abraham Accords have paved the way for Israel to mend ties with certain Arab countries and, perhaps someday, launch overt security cooperation. Turkey, meanwhile, has warmed ties with regional adversaries such as the United Arab Emirates and has dialed down its aggressive posturing against traditional rivals in the eastern Mediterranean. More, the ice from the 2017 diplomatic crisis between Qatar and other Arab countries has begun to melt, facilitating cooperation and cohesion in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Looming over all of this – and, in fact, spurring much of it – is Iran. As the U.S. retreats, there is greater demand for a formal security mechanism to counter Tehran, especially as nuclear talks fail and as covert Iranian operations rise. Put simply, the conditions for a regional security mechanism to collectively counter Iran have never been this ripe.

That’s not to say it’s destined to happen or, if it happens, that it will succeed. But all the signs are there. Washington is clearly laying the groundwork for greater regional security cooperation, the ultimate objective of which is to allow trusted partners to handle their own affairs as it pivots to Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

In the coming months, the U.S. will probably try to bring new participants into the fold, enticing countries that don’t need much encouragement anyway (Egypt, Greece and the UAE) with equipment deals, capacity-building exercises or other incentives. It’s also likely that the U.S. will seek to play a greater role in regional normalization efforts – not out of the kindness of its heart but because it believes it could yield even greater defense cooperation. That’s no small thing for a power that is at once arming Ukraine, shifting assets to the Indo-Pacific and maintaining capacity in the Middle East.

[ccp]

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/10/arch-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia-agree-to-revive-ties-reopen-embassies.html

a lot of implications and questions here

interesting the AP goes to Anna Jacobs of the LEFT wing Soros funded
"International Crises Group" for comment

 

lets see what the Netanyahu crowd is thinking
we will have to wait for one of our few networks to discuss views from conservatives

[Crafty_Dog]

By: Geopolitical Futures
Russia and the Middle East. Syrian President Bashar Assad is on the second day of a visit to Moscow, where he is meeting with President Vladimir Putin to discuss cooperation and prospects for resolving Syria’s crisis. On Thursday, delegations from Syria, Turkey, Iran and Russia will meet in the Russian capital. The Kremlin needs friends, and the Middle East is changing rapidly amid the United States’ gradual disengagement and China’s moves to fill the vacuum.

[Crafty_Dog]

By: Geopolitical Futures
 

Naval exercises. China’s Defense Ministry announced that its navy will conduct exercises with Russia, Iran and others in the Gulf of Oman from March 15-19. The exercises, dubbed Marine Security Belt 2023, have been held twice before – in December 2019 and January 2022. The drills are largely symbolic: Iran and Russia get to counter Western claims that they are isolated, while China demonstrates its growing reach. Relatedly, Iran is continuing to make up with its neighbors. Iranian lawmakers met with Bahrain’s parliament speaker, and on Thursday, Iranian security chief Ali Shamkhani will visit the United Arab Emirates.

[ccp]

"Iran is continuing to make up with its neighbors"

except one of course

[Crafty_Dog]

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Russia: Moscow Mediating Talks to Restore Saudi-Syria Ties
2 MIN READMar 24, 2023 | 19:52 GMT





What Happened: Russia is mediating talks to restore Saudi Arabia's diplomatic ties with Syria after over a decade of strained relations between the two Middle Eastern countries, The Wall Street Journal reported March 23, citing Saudi and Syrian officials ''familiar with the discussions.'' Saudi state TV has since confirmed the talks, which are reportedly focused on trying to reopen the Saudi embassy in Damascus by the end of Ramadan.

Why It Matters: Saudi Arabia is considering resuming diplomatic ties with Syria as Riyadh looks for alternative partners to secure its interests in the wake of the United States' growing disinterest in the region. The kingdom is also laying the groundwork for a vote on restoring Syria's membership in the Arab League during the regional bloc's meeting in May, which Saudi Arabia is hosting. Russia's push to facilitate Saudi-Syria normalization, meanwhile, follows China's recent success in brokering the March 10 Saudi-Iran normalization deal that ended the Persian Gulf neighbors' seven-year rift — further highlighting both Moscow and Beijing's growing ability to mediate global conflicts where Washington is either unwilling or unable to do so.

Background: Relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria have been severed since the early years of the latter's civil war due to the former's support for the rebels fighting against the Syrian regime. But with the defeat of these rebels, Saudi Arabia has begun to shift its view of Syria, while other Arab states — led by Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt — began to reopen embassies and/or push for Syria to be brought back into the Arab League, from which it was suspended in 2011.

[Crafty_Dog]

April 13, 2023
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Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Reputed Rapprochement
The two countries have a long way to go before achieving genuine reconciliation.
By: Hilal Khashan
Last month, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a landmark agreement brokered by China to restore their diplomatic ties and usher in a new era of regional cooperation and non-intervention in domestic affairs. The deal will launch discussions on building a new regional security framework under China’s supervision. It also calls for strengthening Iran’s economic and diplomatic relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudi finance minister said the kingdom, which is working to diversify its economy away from fossil fuels, is ready to invest in Iran’s economy if all goes to plan. The agreement should create an economic outlet for sanctions-ridden Iran, which has long pressed Saudi Arabia to make a deal that guarantees their interests and frees the Saudis from American pressure. However, the two countries have a long way to go before achieving genuine reconciliation.

Saudi Shift

For the Saudis, one of the main motivations for making peace with Iran is to move toward extricating themselves from the quagmire in Yemen. On Sunday, a Saudi delegation went to Sanaa to discuss renewing a cease-fire that has been in place since April 2022, in preparation for a two-year transitional period to resolve the crisis. The Saudis are eager to end their involvement in the war against the Houthi rebels to focus instead on domestic development projects, which require peace and stability in the Arabian Peninsula. To achieve this stability, however, the Saudis have no option but to accede to the demands of the Houthis, who control northern Yemen. These demands include lifting the Saudi-imposed blockade, obtaining a fair share of Yemen’s oil wealth and, most critically, the adoption of a federalist system.

The detente between Riyadh and Tehran is part of a broader shift in the Saudis’ domestic and foreign policies that has been ongoing for years. Under the reign of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Riyadh’s approach to governance has evolved beyond recognition from what Ibn Saud envisioned when he founded the Third Saudi State in 1932. The king and crown prince have transformed the Saudi political system dramatically, concentrating authority in their hands while undermining the clerical establishment’s traditional role as overseers of government policies. The kingdom has also set new criteria for conducting its foreign affairs, aspiring to become the leader of the Gulf region and redrawing its relations with major powers, particularly the United States.

Saudi Arabia began to express dissatisfaction with the U.S.’ Middle East policy two decades ago, though its concerns became public only when President Joe Biden entered the White House. Saudi Arabia was disappointed with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, which led to Iran’s hegemony over Iraq. It was also frustrated with Washington’s lack of support for Saudi interests in Syria and Yemen and its reluctance to defend the kingdom when Iran targeted its oil facilities in 2019. It also objected to the Iranian nuclear agreement in 2015.

Riyadh moved to curtail its close relations with the U.S. beginning in 2012 during the rule of King Abdullah, who had developed the impression that U.S. President Barack Obama lacked energy and sophistication in confronting Iran, their common adversary. The Saudis were annoyed with Obama after he reneged on his promise to intervene militarily in the Syrian war if the Assad regime crossed a “red line” and used chemical weapons against the opposition. The Saudis were also afraid of the American president’s desire to draw closer to Iran and urge the kingdom to resolve its problems with Tehran directly, without U.S. intervention. The head of Saudi intelligence at the time, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, told European diplomats that Riyadh was considering a radical change in its relations with the U.S. in protest of its abandonment of the Middle East and pivot to Asia. The Saudi king and crown prince also distrust the current administration and have emphasized that they have strong cards to play both internationally and economically.

China’s Role

The Middle East has become essential to China due to Beijing's level of trade with the countries of the region and its desire to find an alternative trade route to the Strait of Malacca, which the U.S. Navy controls. The move toward China is part of MBS’ Vision 2030, a massive development project that requires forging strategic and industrial cooperation with multiple countries. Last month, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved a memorandum recognizing the kingdom as a “dialogue partner” in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an eight-member security grouping and counterweight to U.S.-led initiatives. Riyadh hopes its accession to the group will enable it to reach new markets in the East through its investments. The move confirms the depth of the Saudi economy’s focus on Asia since Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the kingdom last year.

Saudi Arabia’s joining of the SCO, as well as its rapprochement with Iran, further undermines Riyadh’s relationship with Washington. Riyadh understands the intentions of the Iranians and the Chinese in the rapprochement deal. The supreme commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps called it a setback for the United States. But MBS’ primary concern remains building Saudi Arabia’s economy, regardless of the long-term repercussions of its cooperation with Iran or China. MBS has come to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia can achieve economic development only if it is part of a global financial system.

The Iranians, meanwhile, see their relationship with China through a different prism. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s perspective of the world converges with that of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as they all view themselves as being at war with Western civilization. Khamenei aspires to establish an Islamic community led by Iran, while Putin desires a Slavic bloc controlled by Russia, and Xi strives for a Confucian-communist renaissance dominated by China. His desire for closer ties with Russia and China was revealed by his statement from a few months ago that the new world order he wishes to create aims to isolate the U.S., transfer power to Asia and weaken Western international influence. (Given the deep divisions among its members, the SCO must support the existing balance of power in international relations. It has therefore shifted its emphasis from security and politics to the economy.)

Expectations Versus Reality

The full fallout from the Saudi-Iran agreement remains unpredictable, despite some describing it as a historical event. Like every agreement between nations, it is liable to fail, especially given the absence of a rapport between the elites of the two countries. It will not lead to the immediate end of tensions, though it can help defuse the long-standing hostility between them. For Iran, one of the most important goals of the deal was to develop economic and trade cooperation with the Gulf states as it tries to overcome its economic stagnation and contain discontent with rising inflation, which exceeded 40 percent last year. Saudi Arabia’s hostility toward Iran was a result of Tehran’s interference in its allies’ affairs and its efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb. Despite Chinese assurances that it will ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement, the Saudis are fully aware that they cannot rely on the Iranian regime’s commitments to stick to the terms of the deal.

Iran is facing enormous internal and external pressures, and its agreement to stop arming its regional militias is nothing more than a tactical retreat, a product of its political and religious doctrine based on the concept of strategic patience. The preamble to the Iranian constitution speaks of exporting the Islamic revolution and calls for interference in the internal affairs of Iran’s neighbors. The U.S. has expressed annoyance with China’s mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, which, in its opinion, goes beyond normalizing relations or promoting security in the Middle East. The Biden administration views the deal as a nucleus for a new world order that works in the interests of Moscow, Beijing and Tehran.

Iran hopes to reap diplomatic, security and economic benefits from the agreement. It will improve Iran’s relations with other Arab countries such as Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE, though its implications for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon remain to be seen. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi recently called his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, to assure him that the changes taking place will benefit the so-called “axis of resistance.” He declared that the U.S.’ deployment of a nuclear submarine to the region was a sign of weakness. Assad, in turn, spoke of signs of collapse in Israeli society, attributing them to the resistance. When the Houthis took control of the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, the Iranians said it was the fourth Arab capital to fall to them. During Ayatollah Rullollah Khomeini’s return from France in February 1979, he said that the Islamic community was ruled for several centuries by the Arabs, and then by the Turks, and that now it was the Persians’ turn. Reconciliation with the Saudis, Tehran would argue, is a step in that direction.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19578/biden-middle-east-china

[ccp]

"In the absence of any desire on the part of the Biden administration to support the Saudis -- for decades one of Washington's most important allies in the region -- China has moved quickly to fill the diplomatic vacuum to launch its own initiative to restore ties with Iran."

Also Biden team (not him as he has no idea what he is doing) have meddles quite significantly is Israeli affairs
and hurting security there
turning SA away from better relations with Israel and interfering in judicial reform,
and providing aid to Palenstinians.

watch this PBS' Amna Nawaz on sided interview Israel previous Prime Minister Naftali Bennett:

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/former-israeli-prime-minister-on-the-escalating-violence-in-his-country

One can only think this is the Biden / Rice  administrations (obama people) contempt for. Israel conservatives - same as here .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amna_Nawaz

[Crafty_Dog]

May 17, 2023
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The New Middle East Order
A tripolar system has emerged with Israel, Turkey and Iran at the helm.
By: Hilal Khashan

A new Middle East order is emerging that will soon supplant pan-Arabism as the dominant regional force after decades of failure by Arab states to resolve long-running disputes and pursue shared interests. The new order – a tripolar system with Israel, Turkey and Iran at the helm – is also ushering in a new era in regional politics, evident through the shifting relations between states. Last week, for example, Saudi Arabia and Syria resumed full diplomatic relations, and Saudi King Salman invited Syrian President Bashar Assad to the upcoming Arab summit in Jeddah. This comes as several Middle Eastern governments work toward normalization with the Syrian regime, which was readmitted this week to the Arab League after 12 years of isolation.

Lack of Arab Cooperation

The emergence of this new order followed years of dysfunction among the Arab establishment. In the 1950s, a sort of Arab cold war erupted between radical pan-Arab regimes and conservative monarchies, dampening cooperation among countries of the region. It subsided after the 1967 Six-Day War, as Israel’s Arab neighbors became preoccupied with their loss of territory in the conflict. In 1970, Hafez Assad led a coup to overthrow the government in Damascus, following Syria’s losing bid to rescue the Palestine Liberation Organization from full-scale war launched by Jordanian King Hussein, leading to the PLO’s expulsion to Lebanon. Assad won the presidency in an uncontested election, eliminated the radical elements in the government and embarked on a domestic and regional policy of pragmatism, predicated on the principle of nonintervention in Arab countries’ affairs.

The death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser a few weeks before the coup facilitated the transition to an Arab political order, which promoted stability and security cooperation. In 1978, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat reached a peace treaty with Israel in violation of an agreement among Arab states that any comprehensive peace deal would be negotiated by a united Arab bloc. The move led to the suspension of Egypt’s membership in the Arab League and the resumption of the Arab cold war, which continued, to varying degrees, until now. Arab countries, along with Turkey and Iran, are putting their differences aside and focusing again on their economic and security imperatives.

Syria at the Center

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said, “The Arabs can’t make war without Egypt, and they can’t make peace without Syria.” This maxim is true now more than ever. Syria is a fulcrum of Middle East power politics. The Arab rapprochement with the Syrian regime is aimed not at ending the conflict there but at making sure Syria will remain an arena for settling international and regional issues without directly affecting external parties. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries engaged in the Lebanese civil war for similar reasons. That conflict didn’t end until 1989, when Arab countries realized they couldn’t settle their differences by waging war in Lebanon. Today, Middle Eastern states have a keen interest in keeping the Syrian conflict a controlled battleground through which Israel can vent its anger without it leading to a general war against Iran, which would threaten the security of the Gulf states. Thus, the changing Arab regional outlook coincides with the resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations, reflecting the desire to confine the Israeli-Iranian conflict to Syria without negatively impacting other countries.

Middle East and West Asia
(click to enlarge)

However, the recent wave of reconciliation does not reflect what’s happening on the ground in Syria. Turkey will keep its current positions in the north under the pretext of securing its national interests, and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will maintain their control in the east, protected by U.S. troops. Russia and Iran, meanwhile, will continue to prop up the Assad regime, which has neither the will nor the ability to curtail Iranian influence – though it doesn’t seem that the Arab countries are asking Assad to do so anyway. Arab governments want to achieve fruitful cooperation with Iran in Syria to protect their future investments in Syria’s reconstruction from government corruption. Iran and Arab countries also have a shared interest in restoring security in the war-torn country. As for Russia, it can benefit from the Arab-Syrian rapprochement by using it to bolster relations with Arab states at a time when it is increasingly isolated.

Investors will still be wary about investing in Syria, even if the U.S. turns a blind eye to attempts to circumvent sanctions under cover of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, the Gulf countries believe committing financial resources to Syria’s reconstruction will have stabilizing effects. Tehran is also looking to benefit economically from Syria’s recovery. On a recent trip to Damascus, Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi wanted to focus on their economic relations, characterized by complete Iranian control over real estate, electricity and milling sectors.

The push to restore Arab countries’ embassies in Damascus hasn’t translated beyond a diplomatic level. One day before announcing Damascus’ return to the Arab League, Jordan launched a military operation inside Syrian territory to combat drug smuggling. The move sent a message to Assad that his return to the grouping does not give him free rein. Oman, which played an essential role in mediating the rapprochement, added figures close to the Syrian regime to its terrorism watch list the same day that the Arab League announced it was restoring Syria’s membership.

Syria’s rehabilitation also means little in terms of the integrity of the Arab League, a grouping made up of countries with their own questionable human rights records. Many Arab governments did not intervene in the Syrian conflict to support the uprising and even disrupted opposition forces by using them to pursue their own agendas at the expense of the Syrian people.

Iran, for its part, considers the war in Syria over. It’s now focused on a strategy, known as frontal defense, aimed at constructing sectarian military barriers as its first line of defense in any future war. The strategy also aims to ensure that the Iranian regime can maintain supplies to and communications with Iran-linked militias. Tehran must therefore secure safe transportation routes by purchasing land in Greater Damascus to build a buffer and establish reliable and permanent access to its most prominent ally, Hezbollah. The Arab openness to the government in Damascus has no effect on this plan.

Saudi and Emirati Defensive Posture

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been gradually developing a new regional policy to ease tensions in the Middle East, starting by improving relations with Turkey and Qatar and developing dialogue with Iran and the Assad regime. Abu Dhabi has adopted a more aggressive regional policy predicated militarily and economically on the peace agreement with Israel. Its rulers understand that the Biden administration’s Middle East policy does not hinge on the Gulf countries or Egypt, in part because of their dismal human rights records. Instead, the U.S. bases its vision for the Middle East on Israel, which it views as a reliable ally.

The UAE thus reformulated its regional policy in line with this vision and withdrew from the costly conflicts in Yemen and Libya. Saudi Arabia belatedly followed suit, pulling out of the conflict in Yemen, a costly affair that exposed Saudi military weakness. It didn’t take long for the kingdom to realize that the only way out of its miscalculated military adventure was a rapprochement with Tehran. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are now increasingly focused on economic development, as they transition away from oil dependence and costly foreign misadventures.

The Middle East is witnessing an awakening under a new regional order that will combine cultures, nationalities, religions and ideologies. This could lead to separatist conflicts in the future and will alter the cultural and intellectual fabric of Arab society. Regardless of Turkey’s domestic political polarization, it will emerge as an active partner in the Gulf region and among the Arab Sunnis in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Iranian influence will also hold more weight because of Tehran’s close relations with Shiites in the countries of the Arab world. Israel will hold significant sway as a pivotal regional state, serving as a role model for modernization and an effective liaison with the West. Egypt, meanwhile, will continue to coordinate among Arab countries, calming conflicts as they arise – which they inevitably will.

[ya]

I see someone's flag missing ?

[G M]

I see someone's flag missing ?

They refuse to put up the FUSA's skittles flag.

[Crafty_Dog]

June 22, 2023
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The Drumbeat of War in the Middle East
By: Hilal Khashan
Threats of impending war have permeated the Middle East since Israel’s establishment in 1948. Though Egypt made peace with Israel in 1978 and Jordan followed suit in 1994, Iran’s rise as a player in the Arab-Israeli conflict has elevated the violent rhetoric to new heights. Iran’s strategic patience and establishment of assets across the region have raised its status, forcing the U.S. to reckon with Tehran’s central regional role.

Israel is predictably unhappy about Iran’s rise. It now faces the burden of making a consequential decision in an attempt to restore the balance of power in the Middle East and reclaim its regional preeminence. Though Israel doesn’t want to engage in battle directly with Iran, it does have the capability and the will to strike Iranian assets in Lebanon and Syria, despite international pressure not to do so. Notably, Israeli Army Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi recently warned that Hezbollah was “about to make a mistake that could plunge the region into a major war.”

Hezbollah’s Threat

Israel’s spectacular victory in the 1967 Six-Day War altered the pattern of military confrontation in the Middle East. The conflict convinced Arab countries that they could not win a conventional war against their technologically superior and ideologically driven rival. Palestinian guerrilla warfare spearheaded by Fatah subsequently escalated, though Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 effectively ended the anti-Israel attacks of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the umbrella group in which Fatah is the largest faction. Meanwhile, the triumph of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s decision to export its principles throughout the Middle East drove Tehran to become an active Middle Eastern player, including by promoting the Palestinian cause after the Arabs abandoned it. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Iran created Hezbollah as a resistance movement. It carried out shadowy functions, mainly kidnapping Westerners in Lebanon under the pseudonym Islamic Jihad. In 1985, after the Israeli army withdrew from Sidon in south Lebanon, Hezbollah officially announced its formation.

Backed by religious dogma and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah retained an aura of military success. It survived Israel’s withering firepower in the 2006 Lebanon War and described the U.N.-brokered cease-fire as a divine victory. Despite subscribing to a different variation of religious doctrine, Hezbollah emerged as a role model for Palestinian factions, especially Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Though Fatah’s guerrilla attacks against Israel began in 1965, the Iranian revolution gave the group hope that military action could help the Palestinians achieve statehood. Thus, many have grown to believe that destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities would decimate Iran’s regional ambitions, dissuade the Palestinians from armed resistance and mitigate the consequences of a nuclear deal between the United States and Iran.

There have been recent reports that the U.S. and Iran are close to reaching an interim agreement under which Tehran would limit its nuclear program in return for the U.S. lifting some sanctions. Despite U.S. and Iranian denials of an impending deal, the Iranian foreign minister confirmed that dialogue was ongoing, arousing concerns in Israel that it will be excluded from U.S. plans to work with Iran on the nuclear issue.

The Israelis believe that the U.S. wants to avoid a visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington to discuss Iran. The leaks about secret U.S.-Iran negotiations preceded a statement from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei earlier this month that it was possible to reach an agreement with the West on Tehran’s nuclear activities if Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could remain intact. Khamenei added that Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization should continue to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to agree on a framework for mutual guarantees. The IAEA confirmed last month that it made limited progress on outstanding issues with Iran, including reinstalling some monitoring equipment initially put in place under the 2015 nuclear deal, which was suspended by the Trump administration in 2018.

Unprecedented Military Exercises

In recent years, the holding of military exercises in the region has been used as a deterrence tactic rather than a prelude to war. The U.S. conducts military exercises in the Middle East to support Israel and its Arab partners in the Gulf, assuring them that it will help defend them against Iran and its proxies. Tehran, meanwhile, frequently holds drills and parades its weapons to show its enemies that it’s ready for war. Israel also routinely launches military maneuvers to maintain its deterrent power and prepare the home front for a possible conflict.

Since 2022, however, Israeli drills, especially those involving its air force, have increased significantly. Exercises often simulate a war against Iran, especially after talks on a new nuclear deal stalled. Other drills simulated a conflict against Hezbollah.

Last year, the Israeli air force and navy conducted large-scale maneuvers in Cyprus called Chariots of Fire simulating a war with Hezbollah, as well as air and naval attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities. Last August, Israel launched its Lightning Shield drills, in cooperation with the Italian air force, at the Nevatim air base in southeastern Israel. In late 2022, the Israeli army conducted a heavy armor maneuver near the Lebanese border. A few weeks later, it carried out air drills with the French air force. 2023 began with large-scale drills dubbed Juniper Oak, which included simulations of air, land, sea and electronic warfare. They aimed to send a powerful message to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to halt their political and economic shift toward China and Russia. In this context, CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla announced that massive joint exercises with Israel had renewed U.S. commitment to the Middle East.

Political disagreements between the Biden administration and the Israeli government don’t affect the U.S.’ commitment to Israel. Many joint exercises attest to American determination to ensure Israeli military superiority and integration in the Middle East’s regional system. Earlier this month, the U.S. Air Force launched B-1 Lancer bombers from Britain’s Royal Air Force Fairford base to carry out a live-fire exercise over Saudi Arabia and Jordan in which the Israeli air force also participated. Many military officers described the maneuvers as a demonstration of overwhelming American power. U.S. analysts also noted that the drills were part of an escalation of U.S. air and naval operations in the region in a show of force against Iran at a time when Saudi-Iranian relations saw a remarkable improvement after years of animosity.

The exercises coincided with U.S.-Saudi joint drills dubbed Eagle Resolve, which included simulations of cyberattacks. Around the same time, Israel, with limited American participation, carried out massive military maneuvers simulating raids on Iranian territory and ground incursions into Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories. They aimed in part to avoid Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine and prepare for military naval operations to secure sea lanes and Israel’s exclusive economic zone. The maneuvers involved the Home Front Command, which rehearsed civilian operational plans, including maintaining functional continuity and evacuating citizens from their homes.

This followed Hezbollah’s offensive exercises last month ostensibly aimed to deter Israel from launching military operations in Lebanon. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah often claims that in the event of war, his troops will occupy Israeli settlements in the Upper Galilee. The drills, which seemed more flashy than serious, included a simulation of occupying military sites in northern Israel and capturing soldiers. Hezbollah allowed more than 700 correspondents to observe the drills. Nasrallah seems convinced that the Israeli government, which is currently mired in internal crises, wouldn’t start another war with Lebanon, so the drills were mostly for domestic consumption.

Drumbeat of War

Still, there are mounting indications that tensions are rising to the point of a possible confrontation. There are voices in Israel calling for a preemptive strike against Hezbollah, even if it risks the eruption of a regional war. Palestinian human rights and religious activists have warned of the repercussions of an Israeli bill that would divide Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem between Muslims and Jews. They say it would usher in a religious war, noting that international law prohibits any changes to the status of holy places in Jerusalem. And Hamas says it’s working to integrate 40 militant groups in Gaza to develop a joint operations room as part of its insistence that all Palestinian factions participate in an upcoming confrontation with Israel.

It’s unlikely that Hamas, or even Palestinian Islamic Jihad, would take part in a coordinated war effort with Hezbollah. Still, the region’s dissent into full-scale conflict seems inevitable. One of the clear indicators is Hezbollah’s failure to elect its presidential candidate to replace former President Michel Aoun, whose term ended last October. Under normal conditions, Hezbollah would easily install its candidate of choice. Daring to veto Hezbollah’s nominee suggests that local forces opposed to Hezbollah have indications that the group’s grip on Lebanese politics could soon end.

[Crafty_Dog]

August 10, 2023
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Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Art of Managing Expectations
The Palestinian issue and Riyadh’s parallel talks with Iran are major obstacles.
By: Caroline D. Rose

Last month, Israeli spy chief David Barnea quietly met with Biden administration officials at the White House. The brief meeting reportedly centered on Israeli-Saudi relations – specifically, how the two traditional rivals, with U.S. support, could proceed toward normalization. Soon after Barnea’s rendezvous in Washington, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Coordinator for the Middle East Brett McGurk traveled to Riyadh for talks.

It’s clear that serious efforts are underway for a U.S.-brokered normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The incentives for all parties are clear. Rapprochement would present a unique opportunity to counterbalance Saudi-Iranian normalization in the region, hedge against Iranian nuclear ambitions and escalation through proxy militias, and exact political or security concessions from each party to achieve their respective goals. However, there are strict limits to just how far rapprochement can go.

Arduous Path to a Deal

Relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia have always been fraught. In fact, the countries never established diplomatic relations. From the start, Saudi Arabia was a vocal opponent of the United Nation’s 1947 proposal to partition British Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. Following Israel’s creation in 1948, the kingdom supported Arab Palestinian aspirations for statehood and continually called for Israel’s withdrawal. It also opposed Arab neighbors’ engagement in direct negotiations with the Israelis. For instance, it criticized Egypt and suspended ties over Cairo’s role in the 1978 Camp David Accords.

But over time, Israel developed into a formidable security actor in the region, Israeli-Palestinian peace talks continued to fail, and Iran doubled down on its forward-leaning militant posture after the 1979 Islamic Revolution – focusing on Israel and Saudi Arabia as potential targets. As a result, the Israelis and the Saudis adjusted their positions, entertaining backdoor discussions and even engaging in limited cooperation over shared interests. Iran’s escalation through its extensive proxy network, stretching from the Zagros Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea, and its expanding nuclear program became a shared concern. And as Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its economy away from oil and promote regional infrastructural and commercial integration, Israel – a rising hub for energy connectivity projects and high technology – is a potential partner, capable of offering lucrative commercial, infrastructural and financial opportunities.

Iran's Path to the Mediterranean
(click to enlarge)

However, Saudi Arabia did not want to be the first Gulf country to take the dive with Israel. Though it behaves as the de facto leader of the region via the Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh has a habit of leading from behind. The first to take the plunge were instead the Arab signatories to the U.S.-brokered 2020 Abraham Accords. In a series of pathbreaking agreements, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Bahrain and Sudan reached agreements with Israel concerning banking, infrastructure, the environment, tourism and security.

Arab Countries that Recognize Israel
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Enter Saudi Arabia. Although the details of a tentative Israeli-Saudi normalization deal are murky, the broad demands are clear. Having kept its distance from Israel for decades over the Palestinian issue, Saudi Arabia has demanded Israeli concessions regarding settlements as well as the ability to offer aid packages in the West Bank. Saudi Arabia also seeks Israeli and U.S. approval to build a civilian nuclear program, which Israel has long opposed but which could help counterbalance Iran’s uranium enrichment. Finally, Riyadh wants a defense and security pact with Washington that would enable it to purchase advanced U.S. weapons, such as the THAAD ballistic missile defense system, and would assure U.S. protection in the event of an attack on Saudi territory. This last element reflects Saudi Arabia’s continued distrust of Iran despite their ongoing normalization discussions and gives the U.S. and Israel an opportunity to drive a wedge into China-brokered talks.

For its part, Israel has had a strong imperative to normalize with Saudi Arabia for years. Rapprochement would present a chance to build a regional coalition that could coordinate against Iranian activity in the region. The Saudi-Iranian normalization deal announced in March gave Israel a renewed sense of urgency, even if it has yielded limited results.

Overwhelming Complexity

Despite the fresh momentum for normalization, several factors could limit just how far the two sides can go. One constraint is the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Any potential step by Israel – freezing the construction of Israeli settlements, pledging never to annex the occupied West Bank, or hinting at revived Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations – would be a major political concession for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Having just enacted a controversial judicial reform that sparked nationwide protests, boycotts and even backlash from military reserve units, Netanyahu and his ministers are wary of doing anything that could aggravate their base or that domestic critics might interpret as weakness. If a deal means concessions on the Palestinian issue, the government may put its political survival over the country’s broader aim of achieving an anti-Iran coalition.

Another constraint – the elephant in the room – is the parallel Saudi-Iranian normalization discussions brokered by China. Riyadh will find it extremely difficult to balance simultaneous diplomatic tracks with two regional rivals. If one track drifts into a lane that Iran or Israel is uncomfortable with – for example, a military cooperation agreement – then it could derail both discussions. Saudi Arabia contends that the parallel dialogues reflect its diversifying foreign policy agenda, but the complexity could slow the pace of progress or even backfire.

This summer’s shuttle diplomacy among U.S., Saudi and Israeli officials would have been unthinkable not so long ago. Nevertheless, even if the Saudi-Israeli backdoor talks lead to direct negotiations, a complete breakthrough on normalization is unlikely. With Israel unable to make significant political concessions and Saudi Arabia juggling simultaneous talks with Iran, any agreement between them could lack the teeth to fully counter Iranian activity in the region.

[Crafty_Dog]

Netanyahu and MBS Make a Play for Mideast Peace
Diplomatic ties are in the interests of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the U.S., but security threats could impede their efforts.
By Karen Elliott House
Sept. 14, 2023 1:48 pm ET




Political normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is an idea whose time has come. At least that’s the increasingly optimistic view of Saudi and Israeli officials working to make it happen with the Biden administration’s support. But how realistic is it?

There’s little doubt Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 38, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 73, want to reach a deal. They’ve met at least twice in secret since November 2020, and both have serious reasons for doing so.

Mr. Netanyahu seeks to secure the survival of the Jewish state. Diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia—the wealthiest, most dynamic Arab nation—would be as significant for Israel as its 1979 peace with Egypt, which ended the threat of an Arab-Israeli war. Such recognition would encourage much of the Islamic world to engage with Israel and establish a new home for Saudi investment. A deal would also deepen already substantial Israeli-Saudi intelligence and military cooperation.

Crown Prince Mohammed knows he can’t create a modern high-tech economy without close links to Israeli technology and business. MBS envisions himself as the leader of a strong, economically integrated Mideast that serves as a bridge between Asia and Europe. Diplomatic relations with Israel would aid those goals, allowing the kingdom to lure much-needed Western investment and expertise and cementing MBS as the head of the second tier of world leaders.

For his part, Mr. Biden wants a splashy signing ceremony at the White House that would give him the ability to boast of historic success in the region. The president who once labeled Saudi Arabia a pariah now seems eager to make it a pillar of U.S. strategy in the Gulf.

Yet simply because three powerful men want the deal to happen doesn’t mean it will. There are many moving parts, including what the Israelis will offer the Palestinians. Do concessions exist that would satisfy the crown prince without irreparably dividing Mr. Netanyahu’s governing coalition? Will Congress accede to Saudi Arabia’s security demands? Will Iran stay on the sidelines or send its proxies to ruin efforts at peace?

Sources in each nation are confident their diplomats will crack the code. Their shared goal is to conclude a tripartite agreement by January, before the U.S. presidential election gets under way or terrorists disrupt the talks.

The trio’s efforts got a boost on Saturday when Group of 20 leaders agreed on a plan to build a shipping and rail corridor linking India to Europe through the Middle East. The railway would run through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, allowing goods to transit across the continents three weeks faster than by ship, according to a Saudi official. The kingdom already is building its section of the rail line. In addition to boosting trade, the corridor would include pipelines to deliver energy and fiber-optic cable for digital communication links. “This is a really big deal,” Mr. Biden said in New Delhi.

It isn’t as groundbreaking as it sounds. Israel already has a pipeline that runs from Eilat on the Red Sea to the Mediterranean at Ashkelon. It was built in 1968 as a joint venture with Iran; Israel nationalized it in 1979 after the shah fell. After signing a peace agreement with the U.A.E. in 2020, Israel agreed to transport Emirati oil through the pipeline, and in June the managing company, Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Co., agreed to add fiber-optic cables along its route to enhance digital communication from Asia to Europe.

Yet a Saudi-Israeli peace deal would let the pipeline expand—potentially linking it with the Petroline, a Saudi pipeline that runs from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea at Yanbu. These efforts are meant to enhance global energy security, and financial security for Riyadh, by creating multiple ways to export oil while avoiding three choke points for ship transit at the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, each of which is vulnerable to attack by Iran.

As incremental normalization proceeds, two obstacles to formal diplomatic relations remain: the Palestinians, and Riyadh’s demand for security guarantees from Washington.

Palestinian leadership under Mahmoud Abbas, 87, is mired in corruption and paralyzed by its maximalist negotiating posture. In April Mr. Abbas met with the crown prince to deliver a long list of Palestinian demands, which the Saudis and Israelis alike have described as “unrealistic.” MBS, who cut funding to the Palestinian Authority over its corrupt affairs several years ago, now offers the prospect of renewed assistance to entice them to bargain seriously. He has also named his ambassador to Jordan as his representative to the Palestinians.

Mr. Abbas seems to be engaging with Riyadh, if only to seek money and avoid blame for any failure at peace. His past efforts, however, have spoiled domestic support. According to a source in the kingdom, a recent Saudi government-sponsored poll found that only 16% of Palestinians supported the Palestinian Authority. Many young Palestinians are eager for economic opportunity, not continued intransigence.

Almost any consequential concessions would bring down Israel’s right-wing government. But Israeli and American sources believe that opposition leaders Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid could be persuaded to join a unity coalition to approve a peace deal with the Saudis if it included genuine progress on the Palestinian question. Such harmony is a tall order, but still a possibility, in a fractious democracy like Israel.

The biggest threat to the crown prince’s regional ambition is Iran. Normalization with Israel would heighten that vulnerability. Religious and royal opponents at home would accuse MBS of selling out the Palestinians, and Tehran would feel jilted. “Our dilemma is this: Do we open ourselves to terrorist attacks to secure Saudi-Israeli peace?” a Saudi official says.

MBS is therefore demanding that the U.S. offer the kingdom security guarantees, backed by Congress. Extending protection to Saudi Arabia—as America does with North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and Japan—isn’t as controversial as it seems. NATO’s Article 5 provision asserts that an armed attack against one is an attack against all. It doesn’t necessarily trigger war, but rather requires a party to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” Several U.S. congressmen will meet with the crown prince to discuss these issues next month, according to a Saudi source.

Whatever guarantees the U.S. gives, the real boost to Saudi Arabia’s safety and prosperity would be diplomatic relations with Israel. Open partnership with Jerusalem on defense, economic development, technology and investment is a security guarantee that a future U.S. president or Congress can’t take away.

If all this comes together, the Western world wins. That’s still a big if—and even if the plan succeeds, challenges will remain. Peace wouldn’t erase Palestinian opposition to Israel’s existence or end Iran’s determination to destroy Israel and remove the Al Saud monarchy’s control of the kingdom’s oil and Islam’s holy sites.

Ms. House, a former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, is author of “On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future.”

[Crafty_Dog]

I find the analysis here a bit narcissistic, but post it anyway:

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Would Israeli-Saudi Normalization Bring the Regional Order the U.S. Wants?
undefined and Senior Middle East and North Africa Analyst at RANE
Ryan Bohl
Senior Middle East and North Africa Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
Sep 28, 2023 | 19:32 GMT





U.S. President Joe Biden makes his way to board Air Force One at Israel's Ben Gurion Airport on July 15, 2022, as he departs for Saudi Arabia after a two-day visit to Israel.
U.S. President Joe Biden makes his way to board Air Force One at Israel's Ben Gurion Airport on July 15, 2022, as he departs for Saudi Arabia after a two-day visit to Israel.
(MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images)

The United States seems to be going the extra mile for Saudi-Israeli normalization, despite the fact that both Israel and Saudi Arabia are becoming increasingly nationalistic — and increasingly disinterested in fully aligning themselves with the United States in its rivalries with Russia and China. In Washington, Saudi-Israeli normalization may look like a step toward what many analysts and journalists have dubbed a ''Middle Eastern NATO,'' a network of friends and allies the United States can rely on to police the region — thus enabling it to draw down its own military presence there — while also keeping rival influence from Moscow and Beijing at bay. But in practice, Saudi Arabia and Israel's rising tide of nationalism seems unlikely to cooperate with such aspirations.

The U.S. Search for Order in the Middle East
The United States is leading a major diplomatic push to bring about normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and one of its latest considerations is tying the three nations together with separate U.S. defense pacts for each country. This isn't the only offer the White House is floating; it's also reportedly mulling ways to allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium on Saudi soil, but with some kind of appropriate safeguards to reassure Israel, which has long opposed a Saudi nuclear program. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden seems to be calculating that such a diplomatic breakthrough ahead of the 2024 election would be a boon to its electoral prospect (though former President Donald Trump also had major breakthroughs for Israeli normalization during his term and lost the 2020 election anyway). The White House's push to formalize Saudi-Israeli ties is probably also a reaction to China's mediation of the recent diplomatic breakthrough between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But in the bigger picture, Biden is following in the footsteps of many of his predecessors.

In 1955, with U.S. help, Great Britain established METO, the Middle Eastern Treaty Organization, (commonly known as the Baghdad Pact), which they hoped would become a bulwark against Soviet influence as NATO was in Western Europe. However, coups, revolutions and internal divisions hampered METO, which eventually dissolved in 1979. More recently, under the Trump administration, the United States pushed for another pan-regional alliance — a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) that never found its footing.

Again and again, the same dynamics undermine unity: the Middle East, unlike Western Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, is not united against an existential superpower threat, but rather exists in a complicated web of competition, cooperation and conflict. The Middle East is riven with differences, even between nominal friends like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, whose relationship has cooled in recent years. And their political systems in the region are often unstable and/or are so centralized as to make personal whims the strategic goals of a nation. To find an order that the United States can rely on in this environment, where interests rarely overlap, is a struggle indeed. Saudi-Israeli normalization will improve some aspects of regional security, but it will do little to address the contentious ways Middle Eastern countries are asserting themselves in this era of great power rivalry.

What Normalization Would (and Wouldn't) Change
It will remain to be seen just how far the United States will be able to advance a framework of nuclear and defense pact concessions through its Congress (though the odds of such pacts passing improve so long as Israel buys into them, given the still high levels of pro-Israel sentiment among U.S. lawmakers). But for the sake of argument, let's assume the final normalization deal does include security pacts for Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as some kind of restrained civilian Saudi nuclear program that meets Israel's satisfaction. This would certainly open up commercial, infrastructure, technological, touristic and military opportunities for Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States. With the geography of Saudi Arabia included, Washington's new plan to link India to Europe through the Middle East via the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor — which Biden and his allies unveiled on Sept. 10 at the Group of 20 (G20) summit — would theoretically become more viable. A Saudi-Israeli normalization deal would also formalize the already existing anti-Iran pact between Israel and the Arab Gulf states, and, should defense pacts get through the U.S. Congress, might provide a new level of deterrence to Iranian harassment and encroachment against Israel and/or Saudi Arabia. And both Israel and Saudi Arabia would remain focused on suppressing militant Islam, at least as it affects their interests.

But in many ways, normalization would simply put an overt label over an already-existing covert one. It's long been assumed Israel would have access to Saudi air space should the day ever come that the United States and Israel decide to strike Iran's nuclear program. The new India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor will likely also use railroads and ports that either already exist or are being built, rather than constructing new regional infrastructure from scratch (and normalization plays a minor role in whether such infrastructure is built). And Iran must already calculate a U.S. response when it harasses Israel and/or Saudi Arabia, though, with Riyadh, Tehran has recently been leaning into detente through Chinese mediation.

Indeed, that final part may help explain the United States' urgency to broker a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal, and its willingness to provide such expansive guarantees to do so. China's mediation of Iranian-Saudi detente was received with alarm in Washington, as proof of China's encroachment on what has for decades been the purview of the United States. But Saudi-Israeli normalization would not reverse that trend, as it would do little to reshape the Middle Eastern countries' relations with Russia — another goal of U.S. policy in the region. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia are becoming more nationalist, and their national interests will sometimes lie with U.S. rivals.

Saudi Arabia would still need to sell energy to China, its biggest customer, regardless of whether it signs a normalization deal with Israel that includes formal security guarantees from the United States. The kingdom will continue its defense diversification plans, moving away from U.S. arms, both by developing its own weapons and by purchasing equipment from NATO countries like France and Turkey. Riyadh will continue to flirt with Chinese and Russian military suppliers, aiming to keep all options on the table. Saudi Arabia will take Chinese investment into its economy as it seeks the fulfillment of its post-oil economic diversification strategy, and it will host non-sanctioned Russian trade and investment for the same reason. And when China can offer a diplomatic breakthrough in Riyadh's interest, like improved ties with Iran, no defense pact with Washington will stop Saudi Arabia from taking it.

For Israel, normalized ties with Saudi Arabia or a new defense pact with Washington would similarly do little to alter its behavior with Russia and China. Israel will remain focused on combating Iranian influence, and it will cooperate with Russia in the skies over Syria to do so, which will continue to limit its willingness to join the West's isolation and military pushback campaign against Moscow. It will need international investment into its ports, infrastructure and technology sector, and so long as China has money to invest, it will welcome ties with Beijing. And Israel will continue to drift toward a one-state solution with the Palestinians, regardless of the violence that might engender or the risks that might entail to Israel's democratic institutions.

Future Risks
And these imperatives that are currently keeping Saudi Arabia and Israel from further aligning with U.S. interests will only become stronger in the future, as younger, more nationalist citizens come of age in both Middle Eastern countries — and as Israeli politicians and Saudi royals look to meet their aspirations and ideologies. Against this backdrop, any nuclear and defense concessions that the United States grants Saudi Arabia and Israel in order to ink a normalization deal could backfire by emboldening even riskier behaviors down the line.

Say, for example, that Washington approves a Saudi civilian nuclear program. A surge of Saudi nationalism might one day prompt Riyadh to remove safeguards on that nuclear program if Iran ever develops a nuclear weapon, and/or if Saudi-U.S. ties sour again. In addition, Saudi nationalism may not always be under the crown prince's control, and may evolve into something more aggressive, even anti-royal — in which case, the history of the Baghdad Pact may repeat itself, with internal political upheaval hampering Riyadh's ability to maintain cooperation with Israel and/or the United States. And what side would the U.S. take if Saudi and Turkish nationalists once more drew their ire on one another, as they did after the Arab Spring, in some civil war or ideological struggle?

Meanwhile, as Israel's national identity shifts to become more religious and nationalist, a defense pact with the United States would also risk emboldening its most hawkish elements. With the assurance that the United States would come to its defense in a conflict, Israel may calculate that Iran would be even less likely to retaliate for covert action. Israel's tolerance of Iranian enrichment may become weaker, and Israel, under a radical right-wing government, may become more likely to carry out its long-warned direct strike on Tehran as well. In regards to the Palestinian conflict, there remain some in Israel who regret the withdrawal from Gaza, and even a few who lament the loss of the Sinai. But there are many who think the one-state solution, in which Palestinians have little to no rights in an expanded Israel, is the only path forward. In the more distant future, these elements might one day win elections to form a government that formally annexes the West Bank and even re-occupies Gaza, which would again push Palestinians out into Egypt and Jordan, possibly destabilizing those two countries and souring relations between Israel on one side and Cairo and Amman on the other. Such a scenario once looked like the propaganda of anti-Zionists, but with elements like Religious Zionism now in government, it is now a less far-fetched prospect.

When it comes to developments beyond the Middle East, Israel or Saudi Arabia remain similarly unlikely to align with U.S. interests, regardless of what comes of Washington's normalization push. In particular, neither country would likely take a strong stance should China invade Taiwan; after all, what do they care about who controls the Taiwan Strait, so long as they can still trade through those waters? Instead, Saudi Arabia and Israel would probably react as they did to Russia's invasion of Ukraine by seeking to navigate neutrality while preserving their still-considerable ties with the West, with both countries resisting any pressure to cut off their trade and investment ties with China.

If anything, in the event the United States does want to bring Israel and Saudi Arabia deeper into its orbit against its great power competitors, Washington may have to repeat what it is currently doing: offer more concessions to them. If defense pacts are already in place, that may mean becoming more confrontational with Saudi Arabia and Israel's rivals, like Iran, Houthi militants in Yemen, or Palestinian militants. Paradoxically, a normalization process designed to enable the United States to draw down from the Middle East could end up pulling it back in