Author Topic: Energy Politics & Science  (Read 610218 times)

G M

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DougMacG

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Re: SO MUCH LOSING, YOU'LL GET TIRED OF LOSING! Shellenberger
« Reply #1101 on: October 08, 2022, 10:10:09 AM »
https://twitter.com/ShellenbergerMD/status/1577740741660401664

Michael Shellenberger
@ShellenbergerMD
Biden thought it would be a political win for OPEC to increase production, so the US wouldn’t have to, thereby avoiding the wrath of green elites in his party. Instead, he’s undermined America’s standing in the world, helped Putin, and worsened inflation.
--------------------------------

My list of favorite (former?) Democrats is expanding.

Biden (also) thought he was so virtuous, canceling everything Saudi after the Khashoggi murder.  Good for him but he shouldn't have canceled domestic gas and oil at the same time as telling the Saudis to go [ ] themselves.

This isn't just about aging Joe being a dimwit.  These are the policies of the cabal behind him, and they are having horrible results for the American people and for the world.

Forecast is cold winter without food.

Janet Yellen says we need growth and resilience but everyone can see we are losing badly on both counts.
« Last Edit: October 08, 2022, 10:17:40 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1102 on: October 08, 2022, 11:12:52 AM »
"This isn't just about aging Joe being a dimwit.  These are the policies of the cabal behind him, and they are having horrible results for the American people and for the world"

THIS!

G M

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1103 on: October 08, 2022, 01:07:33 PM »
"This isn't just about aging Joe being a dimwit.  These are the policies of the cabal behind him, and they are having horrible results for the American people and for the world"

THIS!

Yes!


ya

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1105 on: October 09, 2022, 10:15:03 AM »
India benefitting from cheap oil, 7 % GDP expected this year. In contrast, germany has shot themselves in the foot, without gas their economy collapses and with it goes the Euro.

G M

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1106 on: October 09, 2022, 10:43:12 AM »
India benefitting from cheap oil, 7 % GDP expected this year. In contrast, germany has shot themselves in the foot, without gas their economy collapses and with it goes the Euro.


Exactly!

G M

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G M

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DougMacG

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Re: Local crime story, EU Edition, Silence of the bubbles
« Reply #1109 on: October 11, 2022, 10:22:42 AM »
https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/the-curious-silence-surrounding-the-baltic-gas-bubbles

A very astute analysis.

I second the question, why the silence of the bubbles?

Europe wouldn't be of one mind on that, if one of them did it and others are going to freeze.

From another thread:
Re: PanFa War; Supply Chain issues
« on: October 10, 2022, 10:06:12 AM »
[G M] "It prevents Germany from cutting a side deal with Russia, after Germans get tired of freezing this winter."

[Crafty] This makes sense to me.  Indeed, enabling Germany to backstab its East Europe allies was precisely the point of the NSs IMHO.
So, qui bono?
America?  Poland?  Norway?
Given Biden's statement in 2/21 and the military-tech capabilities required, I'm guessing it was us, though giving a wink to someone else is entirely possible as well.


[Doug]  Mentioned, it opens the idea of bombing the canals etc.  Hard for me to believe any of these did it.  But then, who did?  The silence on it is stunning.  Implication in the story is, they know and they're not telling.

Germany will investigate it:
https://www.foxnews.com/world/germany-opens-investigation-into-baltic-sea-pipeline-explosions
That seems rather belated.

Sweden is investigating, but won't tell the results:
https://nworeport.me/2022/10/11/sweden-refuses-to-share-results-of-nord-stream-pipeline-explosion-investigation-with-russia/

They can't tell us without telling Russia.  So we make war decisions in representative government based on rumor?


G M

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Europeans panic buying firewood and stoves
« Reply #1111 on: October 11, 2022, 11:04:41 AM »
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/back-old-days-europeans-panic-buy-firewood-and-stoves

General Winter is coming for a long visit.


Pray for global warming.

DougMacG

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1112 on: October 11, 2022, 01:20:39 PM »
The Inflation Hydra! Los Angeles Diesel Prices UP 176% Under Biden While Strategic Petroleum Reserve DOWN -34.7%

https://confoundedinterest.net/2022/10/11/the-inflation-hydra-los-angeles-diesel-prices-up-176-under-biden-while-strategic-petroleum-reserve-down-34-7/

Are these the people we want in charge?



DougMacG

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Re: Energy, Greta on nuclear
« Reply #1114 on: October 11, 2022, 06:09:30 PM »
World famous environmental super hero agrees with Doug. (Caught reading the forum.)

Greta Thunberg Calls Possible Shutdown of Nuclear Power Plants in Germany a Mistake.

You don't say.

https://www.latestly.com/socially/world/new-greta-thunberg-calls-the-possible-shutdown-of-nuclear-power-plants-in-germany-a-latest-tweet-by-disclose-tv-4316310.html

G M

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Re: Energy, Greta on nuclear
« Reply #1115 on: October 11, 2022, 06:11:24 PM »
World famous environmental super hero agrees with Doug. (Caught reading the forum.)

Greta Thunberg Calls Possible Shutdown of Nuclear Power Plants in Germany a Mistake.

You don't say.

https://www.latestly.com/socially/world/new-greta-thunberg-calls-the-possible-shutdown-of-nuclear-power-plants-in-germany-a-latest-tweet-by-disclose-tv-4316310.html

Greta is hoping to avoid the kinetic consequences many greens will suffer this winter.

G M

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1119 on: October 16, 2022, 07:39:19 AM »
Shhhh , , , that is a secret.

G M

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1120 on: October 16, 2022, 07:50:07 AM »
Shhhh , , , that is a secret.

I'd be willing to bet that if there was any evidence that pointed to Russia, we'd hear all about it.

Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Israel-Lebanon gas deal
« Reply #1124 on: October 18, 2022, 07:50:28 AM »
Lebanon and Israel Ink a Historic Deal on Disputed Offshore Gas Reserves
6 MIN READOct 17, 2022 | 21:47 GMT



A Lebanese-Israeli maritime deal will ease tensions caused by the natural gas fields off the Levantine coast, pave the way for Lebanese energy extraction and increase calls in Lebanon for deeper economic ties with Israel. On Oct. 11, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Lebanese President Michel Aoun announced they had signed a U.S.-mediated deal on divvying up energy resources in disputed waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. The agreement grants Israel exclusive control over the disputed Karish gas field, which is estimated to have 1.75 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of reserves. In exchange, Lebanon will be able to develop the Qana gas field on the basis that Israel is still compensated for resources extracted in nominally Israeli waters. The same day the agreement was announced, Hezbollah — the Iran-backed Lebanese political party and militant group who had initially staunchly opposed ceding the Karish field over to Israel — signaled it would not use its influence in Lebanon's parliament to block the deal's ratification. Other details (like the final delineation of Israel and Lebanon's maritime border) were not settled by the agreement, and appear to await more negotiations.

Israel and Lebanon remain in a state of war and do not have a formalized border. For decades, the regional rivals have disputed a piece of land on their mutual frontier called the Shebaa Farms.

Israel and Lebanon also have overlapping maritime claims, with Israel's claim extending around the Qana prospect while Lebanon's claim covers roughly half the Karish gas field. Following the discovery of those gas fields in the 2000s, both countries have sought to establish a final maritime border to enable energy exploration and development in the region.

U.K.-based Energean is already preparing to extract gas from the Karish field, with tests now underway, while Lebanon has called on French multinational TotalEnergies to explore the Qana gas field.

As negotiations were underway and energy company Energean brought in equipment to extract gas from Karish, Hezbollah threatened to attack the field if Lebanese demands were not met and flew drones to harass the rigs several times. Israel threatened to respond with strikes on Hezbollah inside Lebanon if they carried out such an attack.

The Karish and Qana fields are smaller than Israel's other gas fields, Leviathan and Tamar, which together are estimated to have nearly 30 tcf of gas reserves. Qana's reserves have yet to be proven and are widely suspected to be smaller than Karish's reserves. But if the deal is ratified, Qana would be Lebanon's first gas field for a country that imports all its energy needs.

Israeli and Lebanese lawmakers are ultimately likely to ratify the agreement, though political factions in both countries could still try to modify or jettison it for ideological reasons. Israel's Security Cabinet approved the agreement on Oct. 12 and sent it to lawmakers in the Knesset for review. Under Israeli law, Knesset members cannot block the maritime deal but they can signal their opposition to it, which could, in theory, embolden Israel's nationalist Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked to formally vote against the motion when it returns to the Security Cabinet for a final vote — a move that could pressure the deal to go to the Knesset, where it's uncertain it would pass. Shaked abstained in the initial vote on the maritime deal on the basis that it didn't go far enough to secure Israel's interests. However, with his Jewish Home party currently polling below the threshold needed to enter the Knesset in Nov. 1 elections, Shaked appears unlikely to politically benefit from blocking the agreement, which could trigger a backlash from Israel's security establishment for bringing back tensions to the fields just as Israel begins production from Karish at the end of the month. In Lebanon, individual members of parliament could complain that the deal grants the country a less valuable gas field while it also brings Lebanon closer to normalization with Israel, which is deeply unpopular. However, Lebanese politicians are aware that TotalEnergies will not explore Qana without a deal in place, while Hezbollah knows that it is not well-positioned to stop Israel from extracting from Karish with or without an agreement. These calculations suggest that Lebanon will also ratify the deal.

Israel's opposition parties, led by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have slammed the agreement as a surrender to Hezbollah because it gives up Israeli claims to the Qana field. While Shaked's Jewish Home party is tempted to echo those arguments to potentially be part of a future right-wing government, it's unlikely such a gambit would work to win supporters in the upcoming election. Right-wing voters have already soured on Jewish Home for joining the current coalition that includes left-wing and Islamist rivals to the right wing.

Lebanon's economic crisis is making it hard for Hezbollah to credibly threaten to use military force to stop Israel's production in the Karish field, which would go ahead with or without an agreement. Hezbollah cannot politically afford another expensive war with Israel over the fields, while its patron, Iran, has shown little interest in ordering Hezbollah to escalate over the issue as well.

If the deal goes through, it would substantially decrease the threat of military escalation over the gas fields, allow Lebanese energy development, remove one stumbling block to an Israeli-European and/or Turkish pipeline, and increase calls in Lebanon for other ties with Israel. Hezbollah's surrender to the agreement signals that the militant group will likely reduce provocations and rhetorical threats against the Karish field. However, they may continue to conduct harassment flights and will likely threaten the rigs if Israel's tensions with Lebanon and Iran increase in a broader context. Additionally, TotalEnergies would be able to proceed with gas development in the Qana field, possibly leading to gas production if substantial reserves are found. The agreement also brings Israel closer to the reality of a European or Turkish undersea gas pipeline, though it will still need to find ways through Syria- and Cyprus-controlled waters to do so. Meanwhile, some Lebanese political figures will likely try to build on the deal by calling for deeper cooperation with Israel, which could unblock needed humanitarian aid and mitigate the risk of the crisis-ridden country entering another costly war with Israel.

The patriarch of Lebanon's Maronite Christian church, Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, and other influential Lebanese leaders have sought to ease anti-Israeli sentiment among their followers in the hopes of reducing the risk of a public call for war during future periods of tension with Israel.

Israel has offered humanitarian aid to Lebanon multiple times, including after the 2020 Beirut port explosion and in 2021 as its financial crisis continued. Hezbollah rebuffed these offers.

The proposed EastMed pipeline could theoretically connect Eastern Mediterranean gas fields to Europe. But the project is running into economic viability challenges because of the cost stemming from the pipeline's need to go through deeper waters. Meanwhile, attempts to connect these fields to Turkey could run into more diplomatic disputes north of Lebanon. Syria and Israel remain technically at war, and Turkey has maritime disputes with both Greece and Cyprus that make a pipeline project too risky to complete.

DougMacG

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Strategic Midterm Oil Reserve
« Reply #1125 on: October 18, 2022, 07:56:46 AM »


G M

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Good planning, Germany!
« Reply #1127 on: October 18, 2022, 03:02:57 PM »
https://twitter.com/WallStreetSilv/status/1582094359373426688

BTW, those LNG tankers are massive floating bombs.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1128 on: October 18, 2022, 04:41:34 PM »
In a similar vein I wonder how big the gas clouds are around the holes in the NS?

DougMacG

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1129 on: October 18, 2022, 06:24:49 PM »
In a similar vein I wonder how big the gas clouds are around the holes in the NS?

I guess one was turned off when it happened and the other not live yet. (?)   Still the one off for maintenance may have had gas in the line?

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nord-stream-1-gas-flows-dwindle-maintenance-begins-2022-07-11/

If they were both live, the release would be unimaginable.

"Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency, said it was "very obvious" who was behind it but did not say who that was.
https
://www.reuters.com/world/europe/qa-nord-stream-gas-sabotage-whos-being-blamed-why-2022-09-30/

It's hard to analyze WWIII without knowing who blew up the pipeline and who may retaliate.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: US repeat mistakes and comes up with new ones
« Reply #1130 on: October 19, 2022, 12:14:28 PM »
The U.S.-Saudi Rift Over Oil Prices Is Déjà Vu All Over Again
Biden repeats some of Nixon’s mistakes in dealing with Riyadh and Tehran and makes some new ones.
By Karen Elliott House
Oct. 19, 2022 11:38 am ET



The Biden administration finds itself simultaneously snubbed by two bitter rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran. That’s quite a costly feat for the U.S., a nation that relies on stable oil prices to sustain a healthy economy.

Relentless pursuit of a chimerical nuclear deal with Iran—first by the Obama administration and now its Biden redux—has left Saudi Arabia with no trust in its former partner and protector. As a result, the kingdom, which Joe Biden once said he wanted to make a “pariah state,” has declared unequivocally its independence from American leadership by befriending Russia and China and cutting oil production to shore up its revenue despite repeated pleas from the White House.

How times have changed. Nearly a half-century ago, Saudi Arabia single-handedly rescued the U.S.—and the world economy—from recession by refusing a 15% price hike proposed by the oil cartel then dominated by the shah of Iran. When the cartel proceeded anyway, the Saudis flooded the market with oil, driving down prices and bankrupting Iran. In exchange the U.S. agreed to sell arms to Riyadh, beginning a 50-year buying spree that has made the kingdom the largest purchaser of U.S. weapons.

With a dramatic flair foreshadowing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s bravado, Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani arrived at the December 1976 cartel meeting in Doha, Qatar, to propose a six-month price freeze. Rebuffed by all cartel members, he walked out, returning eight hours later from Riyadh to announce the kingdom not only rejected a price hike but would enforce its decision by boosting its production from 8.5 million barrels a day to 11.8 million.

“Is it fair for others to decide [the price of Saudi crude] against our will?” he asked reporters as he stalked out of the meeting. The soon-to-be-overthrown shah called him “Judas Iscariot.”

In those days, the U.S. was dependent on foreign energy for 40% of its needs. By 2019 the U.S. was a net energy exporter. But thanks to President Biden’s suppression of domestic energy production in an effort to boost green energy, the U.S. this year is again a net energy importer.

Some things haven’t changed. The White House still puts domestic politics ahead of national interests. In the ’70s, as now, the White House begged the cartel to wait until after the U.S. elections to fiddle with prices.

Another thing that hasn’t changed is presidential blundering. Before resigning, Richard Nixon, like Mr. Biden, favored high prices as an incentive to develop alternative energy sources—and to fund Iran’s massive purchases of U.S. arms so the shah could serve as America’s bulwark for stability in the Mideast. That arms buildup in Iran alarmed Saudi Arabia then. Now the Saudi monarchy is fed up with Mr. Biden’s repeated disparagement of oil as an evil that must quickly be replaced by expensive green alternatives that aren’t yet anywhere near capable of sustaining global energy needs.


Another déjà vu: Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Even half a century ago Iran was seeking the bomb, thus forcing the U.S. to juggle two contradictory goals: curbing the global spread of nuclear technology and pacifying the shah. The Americans offered a deal allowing Iran to reprocess and store plutonium on its soil if carried out in a multinational plant that the U.S. would manage and secure. The shah stubbornly insisted that if he was such a valued friend of Washington, he ought to be allowed to control his own nuclear fuel. Today, that largely remains the demand of the Islamic theocracy that overthrew him.

The enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia remains deep, though now it is the Saudis rather than the Iranians who believe they are in the driver’s seat. But Riyadh would do well to remember that when Iran launched drone attacks on the Saudi Abqaiq oil facility in 2019, removing 5.7 million barrels a day of production, there was no U.S. retaliation. The Iranians could try something like that again under the assumption that Mr. Biden’s outrage at the Saudis’ decision to cut production means the U.S. would simply stand by. With Democrats in Congress demanding an end to U.S. weapons sales that have helped protect Saudi oil installations, and the Biden administration’s continued desperate efforts to secure a nuclear deal with Iran, it seems a reasonable bet that Washington would see this as teaching the Saudis a lesson, albeit an expensive one.

It’s hard to exaggerate the consequences of a serious disruption of Saudi oil on global political and economic stability—and on the kingdom. Saudi Arabia now is the world’s largest oil producer and any serious interruption while the West is boycotting Russian oil could leave Western Europe so desperate for energy it would abandon Ukraine.

This would be a big win for Russia and a huge defeat for the U.S. With the world already on the verge of recession, a big price spike caused by disruption of Saudi oil could precipitate a prolonged and deep global turndown. And the crown prince, whose ambitious and expensive Vision 2030 reforms are driving him to keep oil revenue high, could face his own economic depression with all the disappointment that would heap on his restless and demanding young citizens.

History would seem to teach both President Biden and Crown Prince Mohammed to reflect on the consequences of their policies way beyond November’s election.

Ms. House, a former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, is author of “On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future.” She covered energy as a reporter for the Journal, 1975-78

ccp

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Biden: boost energy production!!! NOW!!!
« Reply #1131 on: October 19, 2022, 01:39:38 PM »
https://www.newsmax.com/us/joe-biden-oil-strategic/2022/10/19/id/1092568/

anyone see specifics  about how he plans to boost production,

and buy back oil at  3 to 4 times the price Trump wanted to buy it ?

I predict
day after election Biden will say :

"we do not need to boost domestic production "

the LEFT media will be applauding this
and telling us how great he is .....
totally justified cynic in NJ.....





G M

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It's all "VodkaManBAD's" fault!
« Reply #1133 on: October 19, 2022, 02:27:01 PM »
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-threat-of-civil-war-in-europe/

Shakes fist at Putin

MARC:  Pasted this in the EUROPE thread-- better there.
« Last Edit: October 19, 2022, 06:39:51 PM by Crafty_Dog »




Crafty_Dog

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LNG ships just hanging around
« Reply #1137 on: October 25, 2022, 08:06:32 AM »
« Last Edit: October 25, 2022, 08:33:36 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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DougMacG

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Re: UK: Sunak stands by no fracking
« Reply #1140 on: October 28, 2022, 09:10:28 AM »
Looks like a conservative in name only.

ccp

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1141 on: October 28, 2022, 10:11:19 AM »
I am not familiar with any Goldman Sachs ex exec turned politician who are not liberals

from the several I am familiar with they are all globalists climate change diversity and the rest

ilk

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GPF: UK energy costs up 70%
« Reply #1142 on: October 28, 2022, 02:33:29 PM »
October 28, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
UK Energy Costs Are Through the Roof
A price cap is set to expire in April.
By: Geopolitical Futures
UK Energy Prices
(click to enlarge)

Following the downfall of another prime minister and the British pound’s collapse to its lowest level ever against the dollar, the U.K. urgently needs to tackle energy prices. In June, regulatory body Ofgem reported that more than 2.3 million British households are behind on their electricity bills and 1.9 million are behind on gas bills. Both figures are some 70 percent higher than at the end of 2020.

As part of her doomed mini-budget, the former prime minister, Liz Truss, introduced a bill to cap energy costs for consumers. Estimates of the program’s costs ranged from 60 billion to 150 billion pounds ($70 billion to $175 billion). It was supposed to last two years, but the new finance minister said it will now expire in April 2023. With the U.K. already in an economic crisis, the government will have its hands full dealing with the social fallout when the price cap ends.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Can Euro industrial sector survive without Russian gas?
« Reply #1144 on: November 03, 2022, 06:53:09 PM »
Can Europe's Industrial Sector Survive Without Russian Gas?
16 MIN READNov 3, 2022 | 17:43 GMT





EU efforts to shore up energy supplies and reduce consumption have lowered the likelihood of natural gas shortages in Europe between late 2022 and early 2023. But sustained high energy prices and demand destruction will likely hurt Europe's economic growth and industrial competitiveness in the medium-to-long term. EU countries approved on Oct. 20 a new package of emergency energy measures aimed at addressing the bloc's energy crisis, the fourth since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. EU leaders agreed on an emergency brake on price spikes through a dynamic price corridor — allowing the European Commission to work on the development of a new gas price benchmark tied to liquified natural gas (LNG) prices in the meantime — and to explore the temporary use of a price cap on gas used in electricity generation. Countries also agreed on a voluntary plan to jointly purchase gas and increase leverage in negotiations with global gas suppliers and on measures to increase energy savings, alleviate liquidity stress and price volatility in energy markets, increase energy solidarity in case of gas supply shortages in the absence of bilateral agreements, and simplify permitting procedures to accelerate the roll-out of renewables.

In May, the European Union unveiled 210 billion euros worth of measures aimed at reducing the bloc's reliance on Russian fossil fuels. To ease the impact of higher prices on households and businesses, Brussels also unveiled gas demand reduction targets In June, followed by windfall taxes on energy producers in September.

As part of the new package of energy measures announced on Oct. 20, member states agreed to pursue the creation of a new LNG price index that would help separate imported gas from the Dutch benchmark, Title Transfer Facility (TTF), by March 2023. TTF is traditionally dominated by pipeline gas transactions, the vast majority of which previously came from Russia and have since been replaced by LNG.

Member states have also tasked the European Commission with compiling a proposal for a ''temporary framework to cap the price of gas in electricity generation,'' which will include a cost/benefit analysis. This is the result of a compromise between EU members on the controversial issue of capping natural gas prices in the bloc. Most countries (including France, Italy, Spain, and Poland) have been pushing to enact such an EU-wide price cap in order to mitigate skyrocketing energy costs. But Germany and other countries have been more skeptical — fearing market interventions could endanger the security of the bloc's energy supplies by reducing European buyers' ability to outbid competitors in the increasingly tight global gas market. While Germany and other like-minded countries agreed to have the commission draw up a potential price cap, they could still veto the final proposal.

Under the new measures, joint purchasing will be voluntary, with a requirement for 15% of the volume needed to fill gas storage to be bought as a bloc.

In recent months, Europe has reduced its reliance on Russian gas by increasing gas storage levels, switching to alternative sources of energy, diversifying supply, and reducing overall gas consumption. Europe's energy supply crunch has intensified in the past month. In late September, suspected sabotage attacks damaged both of the Nord Stream pipelines that supply Russian gas to Europe via the Baltic Sea, dashing hopes that gas flows would increase anytime soon after Moscow took Nord Stream 1 offline in September in retaliation against EU sanctions. Prior to the war in Ukraine, 40% of the natural gas consumed by EU countries was supplied by Russia through the Nord Stream and other pipelines. That percentage has since dropped to just 9%, with Europe now only receiving limited amounts of contracted Russian gas via the pipelines in Ukraine and Turkey. Despite this, Europe looks increasingly prepared to withstand a winter without Russian gas, as reflected in the market by five consecutive weeks of falling prices. This is due to ongoing efforts to increase gas storage levels on the Continent, switch to alternative sources of energy, diversify supply, and reduce overall gas consumption (and with significant help from unseasonably warm October weather).

Storage: Gas storage facilities are now around 95% full. This should ensure a relatively well-supplied winter, provided that non-Russian supplies remain stable and that Europe doesn't experience colder-than-usual weather.

Substitution: Europe's consumption of coal in electricity generation increased significantly in 2022, mostly to compensate for significantly lower hydropower and nuclear electricity generation. Rising flows of crude and oil products (mostly diesel) from Asia and the Middle East are supporting the gas-to-oil switch in Europe before a ban on Russia's seaborne crude oil enters into force in December, followed by a ban on Russian oil products in February 2023. Germany decided to keep its 3 nuclear reactors running until April 2023 and Belgium postponed the closure of two of its reactors. Other countries are accelerating nuclear development plans as well.

Demand reduction: EU countries so far have agreed on a voluntary target to cut natural gas and electricity consumption by 15% and 10%, respectively, and a mandatory reduction target of 5% for electricity consumption in peak hours through March 2023.

Supply deals: Pipeline gas and LNG supplies into Europe from Azerbaijan, North Africa and Norway have increased since the start of the war in Ukraine, but remain far below those Russia used to provide. Italy has been the most active European country in this sense. New supply deals will bring an additional 24 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas to Europe in 2022, 10 bcm in 2023, and 64 bcm in the next few years, according to estimates from the Bruegel think tank.

New infrastructure: Europe has been expanding the infrastructure needed to import more gas. Germany leads the way in floating storage regasification units (FSRUs) capacity additions, providing Europe with roughly 10 bcm/year of new regasification capacity by 2022, and 50 bcm/year by 2024. Countries are also building new gas pipelines, with new interconnectors already coming online in 2022. The 10 bcm/year Baltic Pipe connecting Norway to Poland via Denmark came online on Oct. 1. Other projects will also come online in the next few years, with Poland commissioning a new pipeline connecting its network and LNG terminals with Slovakia in August and asking for EU funding to finance a new gas link with the Czech Republic in September. Spain, Portugal, and France agreed on Oct. 20 to build a new hydrogen/natural gas pipeline connecting Barcelona to Marseille.

Renewables: The European Union announced the REPowerEU package less than two weeks after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, aiming to make Europe independent of Russian energy supplies by 2030. Renewables will play a key role in this strategy. EU countries have accelerated renewables deployment, particularly by setting up investment schemes in renewable energy projects and simplifying rules and tender procedures. However, it will likely be months before these measures start having a meaningful impact on Europe's energy supplies.

With short-term supply-side solutions largely exhausted, Europe will now mostly focus on coordinated demand reduction to decrease the likelihood of gas shortages this winter. The European Union's close-to-full gas storage, combined with unseasonably warm weather and lower natural gas consumption, is easing immediate concerns over the security of the bloc's energy supplies. Reducing demand, however, will be key in ensuring EU states have enough gas to get them through the winter without leaving people and businesses in the cold, given Europe has now largely exhausted its short-term alternatives to Russian energy exports. Although changes in consumer behavior (such as lowering heating in private and public buildings) have helped, the recent drops in Europe's energy usage are largely being driven by falling industrial consumption. By decoupling from Russian gas, Europe is upending its industrial model based on cheap and reliable energy supplies, with impacts likely to reverberate across the Continent's economy for the foreseeable future.

Several European governments have mandated or recommended measures to reduce energy consumption across public and private organizations, but higher prices are also incentivizing households and commercial businesses to cut back consumption.

Natural gas prices in Europe are still more than three times higher than the period's previous five-year average, but they have fallen more than 70% below the peaks seen in August, when they soared above 300 euros per megawatt-hour.

While LNG will remain the main alternative to make up for losses in volumes from Russia, only a handful of FSRUs will be operational by the end of the year, which means that the risk of insufficient supply during the winter will persist.

In case of a complete cut-off from Russian supplies, the European Union would need to reduce natural gas use by 13% over the winter to avoid energy shortages, according to the International Energy Agency's (IEA) latest quarterly gas report.

In the short term, while full storage and energy-saving plans are reducing the risk of winter shortages, gas rationing may still prove necessary given tight supply-demand balances. While looking increasingly prepared to withstand the coming winter, Europe continues to face serious challenges amid minimal Russian gas supplies and competition from Asian buyers on the global market for expensive LNG shipments. Global gas supplies will remain tight through the winter, which means prices will also remain high and volatile. Any additional disruptions that affect this already extremely fragile supply-demand balance could still force countries to impose rationing measures in the coming months. Central and Eastern European countries — which are particularly reliant on Russian gas and have few alternative supply sources — would be hit hardest by such measures, though any eventual gas rationing would also be painful for Italy, Germany, and Austria due to their high reliance on gas for heating, industry, and electricity production. In such a scenario, energy-intensive sectors would be the most affected. But even without rationing, high gas and electricity prices will continue to threaten Europe's manufacturing base, with disruption in gas-intensive sectors affecting industries down the value chain that, whenever possible, will have to source substitution inputs for chemicals, steel, and other basic products from outside the European Union. Even less energy-intensive companies in the manufacturing sector will face increased supply chain risks if their suppliers are heavy gas users. More broadly, most European corporate sectors will be affected by the overall economic downturn affecting the Continent as high energy prices negatively impact demand for goods and services by reducing consumers' purchasing power.

Any unforeseen event that further disrupts global gas supplies or increases demand could easily drive prices up and create more shortages in the months ahead. A colder-than-expected winter in Europe, for example, could increase domestic energy usage, eating into the Continent's gas stockpiles. But a colder-than-expected winter in Asia could also impact Europe's supplies by increasing competition for global LNG volumes. Any non-Russian supply disruption (for instance in the North Sea or the Atlantic due to adverse weather events) could create more global supply and price shocks as well.

While not all European regulators published details on the rank of order and gas volumes that would be made available to each sector in case of shortages, under emergency protocols in most countries, households and critical infrastructure would be allocated energy ahead of industrial operators.

In the medium term, as prices will remain high and supplies limited while replenishing stocks could be an even bigger challenge, demand destruction will continue to hurt economic growth. Europe's energy markets are set to remain tight over the next couple of years. The Continent is expected to enter March 2023 with exceptionally low energy supplies after heavily depleting its stockpiles during the cold winter months. And Europe will likely struggle to replenish its reserves for the next couple of winters as well, due to very limited access to Russian gas, only marginal gains in non-Russian import capacity, and a recovering Chinese demand exacerbating competition for LNG. This means that continued demand destruction across the Continent is probable through at least 2024, when significant new supply becomes available. Switching to alternative and/or renewable energy sources, along with price-driven drops in household consumption, will help Europe endure this period of reduced gas supplies. But while these limited gains in demand reduction will help ease natural gas prices in Europe over the next year, most of that easing will continue to come from lower industrial consumption. Energy-intensive sectors will have to continue reducing output or halting operations altogether, with knock-on effects on economic growth that will deepen the recession Europe is already expected to enter next year and prevent any strong recovery until 2024. This, in turn, may lead to significant job losses and increase the risk of social unrest in European countries. Slower growth and high prices will also put further strain on public finances across Europe, with governments keeping financial support for households and businesses and bailing out struggling utilities and insolvent companies to prevent a wave of bankruptcies, which will push debt levels higher amid rising borrowing costs and raise concerns over debt sustainability.

With Europe's non-Russian import capacity increasing only marginally, the installation of five FSRUs in Germany and one in Italy will account for the biggest increase in supply until March 2023. But competition for limited LNG will not ease until 2024.

Europe's gas storage units are typically 20% full at the end of an average winter season. But without imports of Russian natural gas that would normally continue throughout winter, storage levels are set to near zero by March 2023. In preparation for next winter, the European Union is aiming to have 95% of its gas reserves filled by November 2023. However, given the expected depletion of supplies this winter, hitting that target will require the bloc to purchase 20% more gas than in previous years, which Brussels will have to achieve without its once largest supplier: Russia.

In a report published on Nov. 3, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said the European Union would face a supply-demand gap of about 30 bcm this summer, in case of both a complete cut-off of the bloc's Russian pipeline gas supplies and a recovery of Chinese LNG imports to 2021 levels. According to the IEA, such a gap could represent almost half the gas needed to meet Brussels' 95% storage target by the start of the 2023-24 winter heating season.

In the long term, Europe's supply diversification, demand destruction and high energy prices may negatively impact the Continent's competitiveness in energy-intensive industrial sectors. While infrastructure development and long-term LNG supply deals will ensure that Europe receives adequate supplies of non-Russian energy in the future, energy supplies to the Continent will remain more expensive than they have been for the past few decades if Europe does not restore its pre-war energy relationship with Russia once the conflict in Ukraine ends (or freezes). Sustained higher input costs risk making European products less competitive compared with their North American or Asian equivalents, particularly in countries that utilize high amounts of gas in industry and/or power generation. Prior to its energy crisis, Europe was able to undercut Asian countries, which were forced to import LNG, by using cheap Russian energy, but since Europe is now also reliant on LNG imports , that competitive advantage has disappeared. Some industrial players with operations in Europe will have to decide whether to maintain lower production, operate at lower margins, shut down or relocate. However, European manufacturers have long operated at a competitive disadvantage against peers in the United States, where gas prices have been on average two to three times cheaper than in Europe for the past decade, without facing deindustrialization or large losses in market share. This indicates that while increased energy costs will create headwinds for European industries, they will not lead to a complete deindustrialization of the Continent.

Europe's industrial base employs about 35 million people, which is roughly 15% of the Continent's total workforce. However, according to research firm Rhodium Group's estimates, 81% of industrial gas consumption in the European Union is concentrated in five energy-intensive sectors — refining and coking, chemicals, basic metals (iron and steel), non-metallic mineral products (mostly serving the construction sector), and paper — that together account for only a modest share of overall economic value (3%) and employment creation (2%). While relatively small compared with other manufacturing sectors, these industries still directly employ millions of European workers and create annually several hundred billion euros of economic value, especially considering the value and jobs generated from associated supply chains.

Germany's BASF, the world's largest chemicals producer, announced on Oct. 26 that it would need to ''permanently'' reduce its costs and operations in Europe due to high energy prices, high regulatory standards and an increasingly sluggish chemicals market.

In absolute terms, Germany's economy will see the largest losses from reduced industrial production, as the country alone accounts for a quarter of all industrial gas demand in the European Union. However, the impact will be higher in countries and regions that place more importance on gas-intensive sectors in the overall economy and employment, such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, northern Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.

Persistently high energy prices and dual-use development infrastructure will, however, also incentivize a quicker deployment of renewables, while likely EU carbon tariffs will partially offset incentives for delocalization. While current emergency responses to the energy crisis are likely to crystallize natural gas demand in Europe until at least the late 2020s or early 2030s, they are also accelerating the Continent's transition to low-carbon energy sources. As part of Europe's strategy to phase out Russian fossil fuels, a roll-out of renewables at scale will start replacing coal and oil (and then eventually natural gas) once the emergency is called off, probably around 2024. Most current projects to expand Europe's natural gas infrastructure (i.e., import terminals and pipelines) are dual-purpose, meaning that infrastructure could be repurposed for the transport and storage of hydrogen. This would commit the Continent to natural gas only for the duration of long-term LNG supply deals that its countries are signing now. By the time those contracts expire, hydrogen technology may have become an economically viable alternative to natural gas in powering energy-intensive industries, particularly considering the likely implementation of an EU carbon tariff currently set for 2026. Additionally, by the end of the 2020s, high prices will have incentivized larger companies with the financial resources to operate at a cost disadvantage while accelerating energy-transition plans to pursue technological innovation that will eventually make it advantageous again to produce in Europe.

Global green energy investment is set to rise to more than $2 trillion a year by 2030, up by 50% from present levels.

The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has the potential to act as the most significant balancing force against European deindustrialization, as it would add costs to offsetting production in regions where carbon emissions reduction requirements are looser for goods exported to the European Union.

Crafty_Dog

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NRO: Winter not cancelled
« Reply #1145 on: November 06, 2022, 01:05:01 PM »
Surprised to read that Europe is topped off at present.  I read quite a bit more than most, so why was I ignorant of this?

=================================

Europe’s Energy Crisis: Winter not Canceled

The price mechanism works.

CNN:

Europe has more natural gas than it knows what to do with. So much, in fact, that spot prices briefly went negative earlier this week.

For months, officials have warned of an energy crisis this winter as Russia — once the region’s biggest supplier of natural gas — slashed supplies in retaliation for sanctions Europe imposed over its invasion of Ukraine.

Now, EU gas storage facilities are close to full [around 94 percent, comfortably above initial targets of 80 percent], tankers carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG) are lining up at ports, unable to unload their cargoes, and prices are tumbling.

The price of benchmark European natural gas futures has dropped 20% since last Thursday, and by more than 70% since hitting a record high in late August. On Monday, Dutch gas spot prices for delivery within an hour — which reflect real time European market conditions — dipped below €0, according to data from the Intercontinental Exchange.

Prices turned negative because of an “oversupplied grid,” Tomas Marzec-Manser, head of gas analytics at the Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), told CNN Business.

On the rare occasion that (spot) prices for a commodity turn negative (on this occasion, only for about an hour), it’s typically a sign of temporary market dysfunction. For example, West Texas also saw negative gas prices last week when production outstripped what pipelines could cope with. In these situations, negative prices simply mean that holders of the gas pay “buyers” to take it from them.

But, that blip aside, Europe’s energy crunch has not gone away. Today’s unseasonably warm weather and good levels of wind power will not last forever, and gas is still trading at around €108 ($108) per megawatt hour (based on the Dutch TTF benchmark). That’s slightly more than twice where it was at the beginning of October, 2021— a time when prices had already been surging thanks in part to post-pandemic disruptions and some early Russian game-playing.

CNN:

Prices could rise sharply again in December and January as the weather turns colder, providing an incentive for some of those tankers to wait offshore a while longer before coming into port to unload, said Booth.

Another CNN report makes the point that there could be a spike in demand for LNG from China when it emerges from its Covid isolation. And to that end, it’s worth adding that China has recently banned its importers of LNG from reselling it to buyers outside the country, a reminder that Beijing understands that the underlying LNG supply position remains tight. Indeed, the January 2023 gas price is currently around €141/MWh. That compares with a range of €70-€92 in January 2022.

And then there’s the winter of 2023/24 to think about. The ability to fill this year’s storage facilities rested in no small part on Russian gas. But there won’t be much Russian gas to refill them next year. To get an idea of the scale of the challenge, Russia had accounted for around 40 percent of Europe’s gas imports, but that figure now stands at 9 percent and will probably fall further. At best, LNG can only replace about half the missing Russian gas. That’s why prices next winter are forecast to be in the €150–200 range, somewhat above what the futures now indicate.

Qatar’s energy minister has already expressed his concerns about the winter of 2023/24, and he’s in a good position to know. Qatar is the world’s second largest exporter of LNG after the U.S., and it wants to export more. But adding capacity takes time, and has to make economic sense. It takes more than two cold winters to justify the investment. What ‘economic sense’ may mean will not be the same in Qatar as in the U.S., but building a new LNG export terminal in the latter will take 3–5 years. And it costs billions. That would be risky enough even without the potential intervention of climate policymakers.

Global Energy Monitor, April 2022:

Once deployed, export projects could take decades of LNG shipments to recover returns on investment—far beyond the resolution of Europe’s current crisis, and in direct contradiction with international climate goals. For the world to remain on an emissions pathway consistent with the Paris Agreement, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has called for global methane emissions to decrease 35% by 2030 and the International Energy Agency (IEA) has found that the LNG trade must peak in the middle of this decade.

Must: Something somewhere is going to have to give.

Meanwhile, at least two major projects in the U.S. are — in the words of a Bloomberg report — “inching forward.” But inching forward is not going to do the trick.

Europe also faces fierce competition from Asian buyers for LNG. However, it is adding much-needed import capacity. Turning to floating import terminals (FSRUs – Floating Storage and Regasification Units) rather than onshore installations is speeding things up. These terminals can, to grossly oversimplify, be “parked” offshore. And if one is available for charter, it can be ready to operate within the year. Germany has now chartered five.

But there are currently only around 50 FSRUs in operation worldwide, although another 19 were reportedly under construction at the end of 2021. It says something about European preparedness for this crisis that there were only four active FSRUs in service there at the end of 2021 — and that one of those was moored off Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave. It also says something that one of the others, subtly named Independence, was based in Lithuania.

The quickest way to add to the FSRU fleet is by converting an existing LNG tanker. This takes 18–24 months and costs $100–$150 million. The equivalent figures for a new FSRU are up to three years, and $300 million. Needless to say, there are capacity constraints for both newbuilds and conversions.

The Financial Times’s Chris Giles looks at lower European gas prices and takes a broadly optimistic view. His article is a hymn of praise to the way that people adapt to price changes.

The gas-hungry process of producing ammonia for fertiliser — a low value added business — ceased until a couple of days ago, with the bulk chemical imported from the US. Dirty coal and clean renewables have been used to substitute for gas in electricity generation. Analysis by Ember, a consultancy, has found that there was a record year-on-year increase in solar and wind electricity generation across the EU between March and September.

Ember, it should be added (although Giles doesn’t), describes itself as “an energy think-tank that uses data-driven insights to shift the world from coal to clean electricity.” As part of the “sustainability” eco-system, Ember certainly has an agenda, but there’s no reason to think that its numbers are incorrect. That said, given the amount invested (and still being invested) in wind and solar, it would be disappointing if there had not been an increase in the power they generate. Moreover, given that the problem arising out of wind and solar’s intermittency (the sun doesn’t always shine, the wind doesn’t always blow) has yet to be resolved, it’s fair to ask whether some of those billions would have been better spent elsewhere, not least on nuclear. Answer: They would.

Giles, I think it’s reasonable to believe, is a glass half-full man:

Most impressive of all has been the reduction in consumption of gas by both industrial and domestic consumers, not merely related to the mild weather. In recent weeks, Germany’s industrial use of gas has been around 20 to 25 per cent down on a year ago while its production in the sector was 2.1 per cent higher in August year on year. German household gas consumption is down similar amounts as families compete to see how far into autumn they can go without turning on the heating.

The statistic comparing industrial use with production is impressive on its face, but it would be interesting to see more like-for-like comparisons across countries. The message contained in this report from the Financial Times, for example, was published just a few days before Giles wrote his piece and is rather less upbeat:

On the surface, European industrial companies are putting a brave face on it — talking about the energy-saving measures they are implementing and the other costs they are finding to cut. While some are looking to coal and other fossil fuels to get them through the winter, others talk optimistically about the green revolution that the crisis is spurring.

But there is already evidence that major companies are reducing production in some sectors because of the energy shortage, even before the winter kicks in. And executives from chemicals to fertilisers to ceramics businesses warn that they risk losing permanent market share and could be forced to move some of their production to parts of the world that can offer cheaper and more reliable energy.

The alarm bells are ringing among Europe’s politicians. “We are risking a massive deindustrialisation of the European continent,” says Alexander De Croo, Belgium’s prime minister.

This earlier report includes examples of how some companies have responded to the challenge of higher gas prices with impressive displays of ingenuity, of which, doubtless there will be more to come. But that’s unlikely to be enough to head off trouble:

Gas is the single most important source of energy for Europe’s industrial companies. But gas is also an important feedstock, used in the chemicals and fertiliser industries. In total, industry consumes about 27-28 per cent of the bloc’s total supply, according to Anouk Honoré, ​deputy director of the gas research programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

And:

t is not that easy to cut the fuel out of many industrial processes. Roughly 60 per cent of industrial gas consumption is used for high-temperature processes of 500C and above, such as glassmaking, cement or ceramics.

Similarly, in a good number of cases temporary shutdowns are unfeasible because of the damage they do to machinery. Rather than closing their doors, other firms, as mentioned above, are moving production to facilities outside Europe where energy costs are lower. In many cases, such transfers will not be reversed. Still others are saying that future expansion will be located outside Europe, including in the U.S., where energy costs are (for now) cheaper. But if the Biden administration and its successors move on with decarbonization as currently envisaged, that is an advantage that will be thrown away in this country — something to bear in mind amid all the talk about the jobs that will be created by the energy transition.

The Financial Times, always on message when it comes to climate policy, ends the report on an optimistic note.

But there are those who believe the result of the crisis will be a stronger, greener industrial base. Companies such as Saint-Gobain, Solvay and Smurfit Kappa told the Financial Times they were all accelerating energy-transition plans that were in place before Russia’s invasion. Tony Smurfit, chief executive of Smurfit Kappa, says his company is “spending three times what we would have spent” under previous plans. So there are reasons to be optimistic. “This will accelerate the green revolution. Fifty years ago there were no options for green energy and now there are. I think this will make Europe very green.”

As green, perhaps, as a field where only grass grows.

The FT’s Giles concludes in a similar vein:

The price signal will encourage more investment in liquefied natural gas terminals and in interconnectors across Europe to create a single gas market. But most important, higher prices will lower demand for gas, both by encouraging the development and use of other means of generating electricity and, directly, by crushing the amount consumed.

No one should feel delighted they are paying more for energy this winter, but the price signal has done its job. It has forced Europe to adapt. Advanced capitalist economies are remarkably successful in this regard.

Setting aside the fact that “crushing” demand for gas —whether by the price mechanism or mandated decarbonization — is unlikely to encourage investment in LNG terminals, particularly for exporters, Giles is missing something else. Short-term adaptation has been impressive so far — although considerably more painful than he seems to imply — but over the long term many energy-intensive companies will adapt by moving more and more of their operations elsewhere. Investors who provide the capital that any enterprise requires may feel the same way about where their money should go.

Meanwhile, via the Financial Times:

BASF has said it will have to downsize “permanently” in Europe, with high energy costs making the region increasingly uncompetitive….

“The European chemical market has been growing only weakly for about a decade [and] the significant increase in natural gas and power prices over the course of this year is putting pressure on chemical value chains,” chief executive Martin Brudermüller said on Wednesday.

BASF, which produces products from basic petrochemicals to fertilisers and glues, spent €2.2bn more on natural gas at its European sites in the first nine months of 2022, compared with the same period last year.

Brudermüller said the European gas crisis, coupled with stricter industry regulations in the EU, was forcing the company to cut costs in the region “as quickly as possible and also permanently”

DougMacG

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We need 38 Trillion KWh of new power plant capacity to replace fossil fuels
« Reply #1146 on: November 06, 2022, 07:55:58 PM »
Do the math!   )

Let's say someone (Joe Biden) says to you, we need to ban fossil fuels.  Ask them what it takes to generate 38 Billion Megawatt hours capacity of electricity.

"the total additional non-fossil fuel electrical power annual capacity to be
added to the global grid will need to be around 37 670.6 TWh. If the same non-fossil fuel energy mix as that reported
in 2018 is assumed, then this translates into an extra 221 594 new power plants will be needed to be constructed"

https://tupa.gtk.fi/raportti/arkisto/42_2021.pdf

Definition of Terawatt-Hour (TWh)
A terawatt-hour (TWh) is a unit of energy that is equal to 10 raised to the power of 12 watt-hours.
It is also equal to 1,000,000 megawatt-hours (MWh) or 1,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh).
https://www.carboncollective.co/sustainable-investing/terawatt-hour-twh

ccp

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1147 on: November 07, 2022, 07:39:08 AM »
do the math

I think all those European climate activists  who glue themselves to art work

should be glued to the wall of a jail cell
for a month hahaha

« Last Edit: November 07, 2022, 07:51:51 AM by ccp »

DougMacG

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1148 on: November 15, 2022, 08:23:53 AM »
"Drill baby drill" is what this country and the world needs right now for the energy crisis, but that is not the slogan that will win the under 30 vote who grew up on "climate change" for breakfast, lunch, dinner and math class.

ccp says Republicans need to address climate change.  Why not just do it soberly and honestly, and put that up against the hysterics.

We are subsidizing people (most of them millionaires) to buy electric cars, but the electric cars are powered on the electric grid that is 61% fossil fuel-based.

We are subsidizing solar and wind power with money that goes to China to build more coal plants over there while we feel good about it over here.  They build them with coal and ship them with oil and we pay farmers to give up precious farm land to make inefficient electricity.

Solar and wind power have grown exponentially, but by the time that capacity doubles again, our total demand for power will have grown by even more than that with the balance of it made up with fossil fuels - IF WE DON'T START DOING SOMETHING DIFFERENTLY.

Hydro power is great and almost free but is more likely to decline than expand going forward as all the easy sources have been tapped and expanding water usage dries up some sources.

Then there is conservation and efficiency gains.  Insulate your homes and inflate your tires, great, but we still want to heat and cool our homes, travel, refrigerate and manufacture.  Demand for energy only goes away if it's taken away.

The argument for nuclear power comes through the process of elimination.  Comparing all the carbon free sources needed to step up our underpowered grid without fossil fuels, nuclear power wins by every measure. 

Wind farms require 360 times more land use than nuclear for the power produced.  See what that looks like when you increase the current capacity by 20-50 fold.  We will have energy (when the wind blows) but no food.  And no birds.

https://www.nei.org/news/2015/land-needs-for-wind-solar-dwarf-nuclear-plants

https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2022/08/27/nuclear-power-could-cut-the-worlds-carbon-emissions-in-half/?sh=2f8c741f7738

ccp

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Re: Energy Politics & Science
« Reply #1149 on: November 15, 2022, 09:05:13 AM »
Doug wrote :

"Drill baby drill" is what this country and the world needs right now for the energy crisis, but that is not the slogan that will win the under 30 vote who grew up on "climate change" for breakfast, lunch, dinner and math class.

YES EXACTLY

all they hear is how their future world will collapse if we don't get rid of fossil fuel

and our response : drill baby drill

which may play well in Alaska or Texas (except Austin. )

but it don't play well in college campuses
or probably even grade school anymore

or in the work movies and shows they watch

I don't know about TIKTOK etc