Author Topic: China  (Read 385909 times)

ccp

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Re: China
« Reply #600 on: March 12, 2016, 07:45:03 AM »
Yes we spend hundreds of billions and probably trillions in R & D and they  just "march" in and steal the blueprints for comparatively nothing. 

So Gilder says 'big deal'?

He lost me on that one going back 16 yrs or thereabouts.

G M

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Re: China
« Reply #601 on: March 12, 2016, 07:47:22 AM »
Yes we spend hundreds of billions and probably trillions in R & D and they  just "march" in and steal the blueprints for comparatively nothing. 

So Gilder says 'big deal'?

He lost me on that one going back 16 yrs or thereabouts.

It is a big deal, and not enough is being done.

DougMacG

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Re: China
« Reply #602 on: March 12, 2016, 01:45:59 PM »
They steal intellectual property on a massive basis via hacking.

That's right.   We need enforcement,  not a trade war.

ccp

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China expanding military might in South China Sea
« Reply #603 on: March 13, 2016, 04:16:11 AM »
My question is 'why'?  Why is China increasing military power in the South China Sea?  No one is threatening them.  The sea lanes are open.  What do they hope to achieve?  It could only mean some sort of expansion.  ? Is this against Japan.  Taiwan?   Indonesia?  What?  It would be like us building up atolls with military offensive capability in the Caribbean.

http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/03/11/intelligence-chief-china-will-have-substantial-military-power-in-south-china-sea-by-2017/

G M

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Re: China expanding military might in South China Sea
« Reply #604 on: March 13, 2016, 05:43:21 AM »
My question is 'why'?  Why is China increasing military power in the South China Sea?  No one is threatening them.  The sea lanes are open.  What do they hope to achieve?  It could only mean some sort of expansion.  ? Is this against Japan.  Taiwan?   Indonesia?  What?  It would be like us building up atolls with military offensive capability in the Caribbean.

http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/03/11/intelligence-chief-china-will-have-substantial-military-power-in-south-china-sea-by-2017/

China is the "Middle Kingdom", as in between heaven and earth. They see themselves as ascending to first a regional superpower and eventually a global superpower. They see it as a position wrongfully deprived of them in the past by imperialist powers that they will now claim.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Yuan about to tumble?
« Reply #605 on: March 15, 2016, 06:02:17 PM »
Someone around here has been predicting this for quite some time  :evil:

by Anne Stevenson-Yang and
Kevin Dougherty
March 14, 2016 12:17 p.m. ET
12 COMMENTS

After initial declines in the Chinese market to start the year, the past few weeks have seen signs of what some would call a rebound. Lending in China rose by 67% in January, iron-ore prices initially rallied by 64% and housing sales in the top four markets surged. The yuan gained back half of the nearly 7% it had lost against the dollar since November, sending hedge funds that had shorted on the currency running for cover. And yet there remains no sign of life in the underlying Chinese economy.

More than $800 billion in credit that had been pushed into the economy in January failed to boost production or increase sales. Producer prices remained negative, dropping 5.1% in January-February, while the manufacturing PMI fell to 48 in February from 48.4 in January, indicating worsening contraction. That’s because the rally was the result of a coordinated government effort to restore confidence in the China Dream of limitless growth at home and glory abroad. The market, apparently, isn’t so easily convinced.

From hiding capital outflows to propping up real-estate values, manipulating futures markets and squeezing short-sellers of the yuan, Chinese authorities have been trying to bring back the old, quasisuperstitious belief in Beijing’s omnipotence. But the political desperation behind these efforts betrays a different story: that an impending currency crisis is a signal of the dream’s undoing.

That’s why in China getting money out of the country is now the major preoccupation of both families and corporations. Risk-averse individuals are trading out of the wealth-management products they used to buy for 10% yields and moving their money to safety in the U.S., Australia, Canada and Europe. Chinese companies are making extravagant bids for overseas assets such as General Electric ’s appliance division, the equipment maker Terex Corp. , the near-dead Norwegian web browser Opera, the Swiss pesticides group Syngenta, technology distributor Ingram Micro and even the Chicago Stock Exchange.

In the first six weeks of 2016, Chinese firms committed to spending $82 billion on such acquisitions. Last year saw nearly $1 trillion in capital outflows, including a decline of $512.66 billion in the foreign reserves. Although no one is sure how much of China’s reserves are liquid and available, it’s safe to say that, at this rate, China can’t afford capital flight for more than another year.

One way to stem the crisis would be through depreciation. That would be sound policy for the people of China, but it’s a dreaded last resort for a leadership that wants, more than jobs for its people, to bolster buying power and save political face overseas. Yet history shows that holding the line on the currency is a losing strategy. Tightened liquidity causes more pain to the economy and simply delays the inevitable.

National leaders, when faced with a disorderly adjustment, will inevitably resist markets, promise major structural changes (which are then slow to materialize), inject liquidity into financial markets and insist that everything is under control. But these measures rarely work and in fact have never worked when imbalances are as severe as they are in China today.

In other countries, currency crises usually followed a sudden and irreversible loss of confidence. The Asian Tigers were booming and then fell apart rapidly. Same in Russia. China faces the added difficulty of having little institutional memory and few tools to manage the economy in a time of capital scarcity. And there is no sign that capital-outflow pressure will ease.

And so a painful adjustment will be unavoidable: Property values will decline by an estimated 50% from the current reported average of $142 per square foot in tier-two cities, roughly equivalent to the national average in the U.S., where incomes are much higher. (Current price-to-income ratios in China are generally over 20, while the U.S. averages about three.) Excess industrial capacity will shut down. People will lose their jobs.

But Beijing still has a choice: Either let the yuan take some of the pressure of adjustment, or let all of it fall on the domestic market. Placed in such stark terms, a currency adjustment seems inevitable.

A likely depreciation of at least 15% against the U.S. dollar would take the renminbi back to where it was on the eve of the global financial crisis, before speculative capital inflows flooded into China and drove up the currency’s value. This would be a “reset event” globally. All forecasts for inflation/deflation, interest rates, currency crosses, growth and commodity prices would have to be ripped up and recalculated. It would likely lead to an emerging-markets crash. As a percentage of global gross domestic product, China today is nearly twice the size of Asia (excluding Japan) in 1997.

Commodities, emerging-market equities and multinationals with exposure to China have already started to realize significant losses. Soon major corrections will reach other assets boosted by the Chinese economy, such as property values in Hong Kong and Singapore. When this unfolds, U.S. government bonds may be the world’s only safe haven. The end of the China story is at hand.

Ms. Stevenson-Yang is co-founder of J Capital Research Ltd. Mr. Dougherty is chief investment officer of KDGF Asset Management.

Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: China
« Reply #608 on: May 27, 2016, 02:27:26 PM »
Good follow up.

Crafty_Dog

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Has Stratfor been reading my posts?
« Reply #609 on: July 25, 2016, 02:34:39 PM »
 Dawn for the Dead Companies of China
Analysis
July 25, 2016 | 09:00 GMT Print
Text Size
China is grappling with how to handle unprofitable industries, many of them state-owned, that keep employment numbers up but threaten the nation's macroeconomic stability. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
Summary

China is battling a ghastly economic problem. For months, the country's so-called zombie corporations — failing, mostly state-controlled companies — have been teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, caught among high and rising levels of debt, ballooning debt-servicing costs and slim or nonexistent profits. In response, China's State Council released a statement July 18 describing a possible pilot program to enable indebted corporations to convert some of their outstanding debts to equities held by Chinese banks. On its own, a corporate debt-to-equity swap would do little to reform these companies into productive and profitable businesses, a key requirement if China is to "rebalance" to a more sustainable growth model. Even so, it would help lower the businesses' debt burden in the short term. For Beijing, bound as it is by the need to maintain employment and, in turn, social stability, that may be enough to stave off a crisis for the time being.
Analysis

Zombie corporations have been a serious problem for Chinese economic authorities since at least 2011. But when China's real estate sector entered a prolonged slowdown in 2014, the companies became an even greater risk. A large majority of them are state-controlled (or closely affiliated) enterprises engaged in property-related sectors, including residential and commercial development, infrastructure construction, steelmaking, and iron ore and coal production. Over the past two years, steady declines in real estate activity — which by some measures accounts for over a quarter of China's total economic output — have dragged down income and profits across the thousands of businesses in those sectors. As a result, foundering businesses turned to bank loans and shadow financing to cover the costs of maintaining their workforces, sending corporate debt levels soaring. In all but a few cases, the political imperative to prevent unemployment crises that could fuel broader social unrest — a powerful motivator for China's central and local governments alike — overpowered authorities' desire to reform the economy by letting failing companies fail.
A Staggering Problem

Now corporate debt is the greatest structural threat to Chinese macroeconomic stability. China's ratio of corporate debt to gross domestic product reached 165 percent by December 2015, up from 101.7 percent in 2008, the year before Beijing launched its emergency stimulus drive. By comparison, household and government debt equaled 40 and 22 percent of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2015 (though the government debt figure does not include debt held by local government financing vehicles, private companies responsible for raising money for local government investment since 2008-09). Corporate debt was by far the largest component of China's 247 percent total debt-to-GDP ratio, according to Moody's Investors Service.

Perhaps more concerning is the fact that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for 55 percent of total outstanding corporate debt, according to the International Monetary Fund, though they produce only 22 percent of China's total economic output. This imbalance helps explain the state's disproportionate representation among China's zombie corporations. On one hand, SOEs enjoy easy access to bank credit long denied to their private-sector counterparts. On the other, they face enormous pressure from their overseers in local, provincial and central governments to maintain stable output and employment. Combined, these factors give SOEs powerful incentive to keep borrowing and producing regardless of the wider economic costs. While China's private sector has steadily improved its efficiency, productivity and profits, the state sector has, by and large, lagged. In the coal and steel industries, dominated by hundreds of local and provincial state-controlled businesses, the contrast is especially pronounced. In many cases, these companies are too small, and their ties to local officials and banks too tight, for Beijing to control.
A Temporary Solution

The debt-to-equity swap proposal reveals Beijing's efforts to reconcile its growing desire for industrial reform and consolidation with local political and economic conditions. China's central government remains committed to reforming and restructuring Chinese industry, and, in particular, the state sector. At the same time, however, it understands that it can go forward with the measures only as long as the workers affected are taken care of, at least well enough to prevent unrest. Given China's weak economy and slowing industrial profits, that objective will entail finding new ways to temporarily offset borrowing and other costs for deeply indebted enterprises.

To be sure, a debt-to-equity swap program could itself be a means to achieve industrial reform and restructuring. Combined with serious corporate governance reforms and forced consolidations of truly moribund enterprises, the swap could help put struggling but fundamentally sound businesses on surer financial footing going forward. Chinese authorities will certainly try to play up this aspect of the program. Nonetheless, the primary purpose and effect of the swap in the short run will be to reduce borrowing costs for corporations, much as the debt-to-bond swap program for local governments has served mainly to offset localities' borrowing costs. Without corporate governance reforms and industrial restructuring — changes that will depend on deeper adjustments to China's political incentive structure — the swap program would not go far in making Chinese SOEs the pillars of productivity that Beijing envisions.

Like the local government bond program before it, the new swap program will probably come into being slowly. In light of the State Council's announcement, some form of pilot program could well be in place by the end of 2016. But in all likelihood, it will be at least six months and probably longer before a program on a scale sufficient to address China's overall corporate debt exists. In the meantime, China's leaders will struggle to manage the country's corporate bankruptcy risks. If the housing sector falters again in the second half of the year, this will prove an even greater challenge.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: China's growing credit risk
« Reply #610 on: September 19, 2016, 09:26:40 PM »
The WSJ catches up with my table pounding here  :-D

China’s Growing Credit Risk
The bubble grows as Beijing keeps pushing growth before reform.
Sept. 19, 2016 7:30 p.m. ET


Respectable financial analysts once derided the tiny coterie of “China bears” for warning that the country could face a financial crisis. But over the last year the risk of a bad loan reckoning has become conventional wisdom. While Beijing possesses the resources to shore up the banking system, its continuing efforts to stimulate growth with more lending are complicating China’s economic and political predicament.

The latest alarm comes from the Bank for International Settlements, the clearing house of central banks in Basel. Its latest quarterly review shows that China’s credit-to-GDP gap, which measures credit growth above a country’s long-run trend, is now 30.1%. Anything above 10% is usually considered a red flag.

The idea behind the ratio is that there is no specific debt level that causes problems in all economies, but a sudden borrowing spree is a good predictor of a crisis. It suggests a mania in which loans create the illusion of high returns, which justifies more borrowing. The U.S. credit-to-GDP gap breached the 10% level in 2007 right before the housing bubble burst. As Goldman Sachs warned earlier this year, “Every major country with a rapid increase in debt has experienced either a financial crisis or a prolonged slowdown in GDP growth.”

The speed of China’s borrowing was staggering as Beijing opened the credit taps to stop the effects of the global financial crisis from reaching China. Total debt in the economy zoomed to more than 250% at the end of last year from less than 150% at the end of 2007.

This is especially worrying because the ratio continues to climb despite Beijing’s decision last year to rein in wasteful investment and undertake supply-side reforms. The government promised to stop state banks from evergreening, the practice of making new loans so troubled borrowers can repay old ones. Such zombie companies were supposed to go bankrupt. Instead China has seen few defaults.

Beijing has a good political reason for its caution. Carrying out reform promises would slow growth, and every time that happens social unrest soars. The protests this year in the town of Wukan seem to reprise the violence seen there in 2011, the last time the economy went south.

In the past few months Beijing has encouraged the three policy banks to finance new investments by state-owned enterprises. Banks have also fueled a mortgage boom that has boosted property prices. While the central bank hasn’t cut rates or reserve requirements, it has used open-market operations to give banks more liquidity.

Government statistics show that the banks’ nonperforming-loan ratio is approaching 2%, an 11-year high. But even officials acknowledge that the real number is much higher. Banking analyst Charlene Chu has predicted that it could reach 22%. That would require Beijing to recapitalize the banking system as it did in the early 2000s.

Fixing the financial system could be much messier this time, due to the advent of shadow banking. The state banks have created a complex web of “wealth management products” that attract investors with higher returns than ordinary deposits. According to Ms. Chu, WMPs grew by $1.1 trillion last year, accounting for nearly 40% of total credit growth.

These short-term liabilities fund long-term assets, a mismatch that has exacerbated crises elsewhere. And many of the buyers are other institutions, reminiscent of the U.S. mortgage-backed securities in 2008. Savers don’t understand the risks, and banks have been forced to repay their principal when the WMPs fail. A run on these investments could cause serious unrest and erode middle-class trust in the government.

Beijing faces a daunting challenge of engineering a market-driven deleveraging of an economy that has become dependent on monetary and fiscal stimulus. Managing the inevitable political fallout could be as dangerous as the economic risks.
 

Crafty_Dog

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China's demographic contraction
« Reply #611 on: October 22, 2016, 06:47:55 AM »
http://www.breakpoint.org/bpcommentaries/entry/13/30008

I have repeatedly made this point here for many years.

Crafty_Dog

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China's foreign exchange reserves
« Reply #612 on: February 10, 2017, 05:28:43 AM »
China’s foreign exchange reserves fell below $3 trillion for the first time in nearly five years in January, according to data released Feb. 7, the Financial Times reported. The $12.3 billion drop, a fall of 0.4 percent over December, marked the seventh consecutive month of foreign exchange declines. The Chinese central bank has been spending reserves on propping up the value of the yuan, as well as imposing capital controls to contain outflows. The yuan remains 4.4 percent weaker than a year earlier. While China's foreign exchange reserves have been dropping relatively swiftly over the past two years, at $3 trillion, they are still at levels most countries would consider incredibly high, and there has been no sense of urgency to taper the drawdown. 

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: The New Silk Road (OBOR)
« Reply #613 on: May 16, 2017, 07:41:39 AM »
China Now Has a Rail Link Into the Heart of Europe

Beijing touts globalization and freight shippers hail revival of Silk Road on eve of ‘One Belt One Road’ summit
Reviving the Silk Road
Under the One Belt, One Road initiative, Chinese President Xi Jinping aims to revive the ancient Silk Road trading routes with an infrastructure network that he hopes will widen Beijing's clout.
By Trefor Moss
May 11, 2017 12:23 p.m. ET
46 COMMENTS

ALASHANKOU, China—The trains chugging along the ancient Silk Road through this gateway city to the West are growing in numbers and freighted with geopolitical significance.

China’s reboot of old trade routes—President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign-policy initiative, known as One Belt, One Road—was designed to link Chinese companies with overseas markets. Four years on, it is emerging as the cornerstone of China’s bid to be the guarantor of globalization at a time when protectionist winds are blowing abroad.

Mr. Xi is likely to tout that theme when he welcomes leaders from about 30 countries to a belt-and-road summit in Beijing that starts on Sunday. Chinese state media have described the project as a “wide and open avenue for all.”

“There aren’t many ambitious international visions on the world stage right now,” said Jonathan Hillman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a U.S. think tank. “One Belt, One Road is one of them.”

For all the hype, a relatively modest share of the major infrastructure investments pledged by China have become reality. China’s slowing economy and mounting debt load risk interfering with Beijing’s ability to finance its sweeping effort to cement trade routes with two-thirds of the world’s population—in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

One solid example of Mr. Xi’s globalist outreach, however, is China’s use of existing Eurasian railways to transport high-value goods between China’s remote northwest and Europe.

After Mr. Xi launched his grand trade plan in 2013, China began consolidating a maze of railroads into three primary routes, coordinated regular timetabled service and simplified customs procedures. Beijing backed the project—the “belt” as opposed to the ocean-shipping “road” portion—with lavish cost-cutting subsidies.

Alashankou, a far-flung outpost in China’s northwest, is the primary exit point for Europe-bound trains and the quintessential belt-and-road boomtown. Its population has tripled to 32,000 in five years and new public projects include a sports complex and an opera center, said Wang Yong, the local deputy Communist Party secretary.

In the vast emptiness of this desert region, long-distance trade is the main lifeline. Mr. Wang said 1,220 Europe-bound trains rumbled through here last year, a small but growing part of the town’s rail traffic.


Trains carrying consumer electronics and auto parts toward European cities like Hamburg, Warsaw and Rotterdam return with sports cars, baby food and Scotch whisky. Authorities recently added routes including Xiamen to Moscow, Yiwu to Tehran, and Xi’an to Budapest. China Railway Corp. signed a deal in April to streamline service with rail operators in six European countries.

In recent years, China has sent about 3,700 trains to Europe, almost half in 2016, as the rate accelerates. It has set an annual target of 5,000 trains by 2020.

“There were doubts about the viability of doing this,” said Michael White, international marketing manager at UPS. But now, he said, the momentum is undeniable.

There are still plenty of challenges, including whether the rail component of Mr. Xi’s vision can thrive if Beijing curbs its subsidies. Another is persuading European companies; about three times as many goods-laden trains leave China as return to it.

“It’s not easy to start a new service, even though it’s all being supported by the [Chinese] government,” said Oscar Lin of U.K.-based OneTwoThree Logistics. The company operated London-to-China train service in April in a publicity coup for Mr. Xi’s globalization drive.

Rail freight will never supplant ocean transport: A container ship can handle 100 times the cargo of a train.

But for quick delivery of high-value goods—such as products from consumer electronics makers HP Inc. and China’s TLC—shipping containers by rail is ideal, logistics companies say.

DHL says it would cost about $5,000 and take three weeks to send a 20-ton container by rail to Hamburg from Chengdu in southwestern China. By air, it costs $30,000 and takes a week; by ocean, $2,000 and seven weeks.

Logistics companies regard the trains as a breakthrough. Several had previously tried China-Europe rail freight but found time-consuming border checks and incompatible rail gauges to be prohibitive obstacles.

For inland Chinese manufacturing cities, the trains allow them to send goods directly west rather than east to coastal piers.

Thanks to China’s subsidies, Chengdu-based car dealer Xiao Lin said he only pays $1,000 to send a container filled with Maserati and Mercedes-Benz cars from the Netherlands by rail via DHL in just three weeks. The 10-week ocean delivery time deterred impatient Chinese buyers, he said. “It’s good for our business model.”

U.S. sports-equipment maker Core Health & Fitness, which has a plant in Xiamen in southeastern China, said the ability to meet rush orders by train has enabled it to win contracts with European gyms.

“The One Belt, One Road initiative changed everything,” said Steve Huang, chief executive for DHL Global Forwarding in China. He said customs checks are now minimal, and containers are quickly hoisted from one train to another where rail gauges are different.

Turloch Mooney, senior editor at IHS Markit said costs may fall as the market matures—which would be vital to the trains’ survival once Chinese subsidies end. Down the line, he said refrigerated containers could make rail attractive for pharmaceutical companies and food producers.

As container trains clanked through Alashankou this week, Mr. Wang, the deputy Communist Party secretary, was upbeat. “More trains will lead to more cargo, and the efficiency of the service will improve,” he said.

—Junya Qian contributed to this article.


Crafty_Dog

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China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
« Reply #615 on: September 17, 2017, 07:13:42 PM »
Another Paradise Lost to China's Ambition
A Keriyan senior citizen picks Euphrates poplar tree branches in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
(China Photos/Getty Images)
Stratfor

The tale of the Silk Road is one of intrigue, war and cities lost. But within this complex and quixotic tableau, it is the story of China's Tarim Basin that best echoes the age-old warning: History is doomed to repeat itself.

The ill-fated river network comprises the Kashgar, Yarkant, Hotan and Aksu rivers, which stream from the glacial and snow melt of surrounding mountaintops to converge at Aral, where they merge into the Tarim River. The waterway then flows through the Taklamakan Desert, a sea of sand in the shadow of the Tianshan Mountains and one of the driest regions in the world. The name Taklamakan means "once you enter, you don't come out" — an accurate description, not just of the experiences of hapless ancient travelers but also of the river system whose waters never escape the desert.

The remains of the lost city of Niya lie deep in the Taklamakan Desert.
(International Dunhuang Project/Wikimedia Commons)

Few of the rivers that feed the Tarim flow year-round, particularly in recent decades as agriculture has strained the limited basin's supplies. But the burden farming has placed on the region's resources is hardly new. The westernmost reach of the Chinese world has long been essential to the country's aspirations of building a buffer against foreign invasion, and at the height of the Silk Road era, it provided the empire with access to lucrative trade networks that stretched across the Eurasian landmass. Sustaining the sizable populations needed to secure and defend the region naturally required funds and food, resulting in the adaptation of intensive agricultural practices and irrigation. From antiquity to modernity, this practice has caused rivers to run dry and lakes to vanish.

Even so, some areas of China have begun to make an effort to restore the vital waters. Nationwide environmental reforms, backed by growing popular support, have only bolstered this local initiative. But sprawling cotton farms, an emerging energy sector and the surrounding Xinjiang province's role as a link in Beijing's crucial Belt and Road Initiative could jeopardize the basin's nascent recovery.

By the Waters of the Taklamakan

Throughout history, the parched lands of the Taklamakan Desert have experienced some brief flashes of relief. Cities and kingdoms thrived near oases, creating stops along the Silk Road's northern branch. And where the Tarim River spilled its waters near the Kuruk-tagh ("dry mountain"), there was once a lake known by some as Lop Nur, and by others as the Puchang Sea. The body of water is estimated to have been somewhere between Lake Ontario and Lake Michigan in size, and it fed the Loulan Kingdom from 200 B.C. to 220 A.D. during the Han dynasty.

By 645, however, the settlement had been abandoned. According to recent sediment studies, its rapid collapse stemmed from the overuse of the region's water resources, which reached a level comparable to the desiccation of the Aral Sea taking place in this century. Lop Nur — and the Tarim Basin that fed it — simply wasn't up to the task of sustaining the needs of an empire. The westward expansion that the Han dynasty oversaw brought an unprecedented number of people to the region to live in fortified cities and trading posts. Large-scale irrigation emerged in the first century A.D., a novelty in a corner of the world where cultivation was confined to lands surrounding natural oases.

A satellite image shows the dried up lake of Lop Nur.
(NASA)
Growing Cotton in the Desert

Over a millennium later, the waters of the Tarim Basin are once again straining to meet the needs of the local population and economy. Already showing increasing levels of salinity — a sign of overuse — the waters began to face worse conditions in the latter half of the 20th century. Between 1959 and 1983, the rate of desert absorption of the Tarim Basin increased from 66 to 81 percent. Lop Nur, which had persisted in a diminished form as a "wandering lake," disappeared completely in 1964.

Many factors led to the unsustainable consumption behind these waterways' decline, but agriculture was undoubtedly the most culpable. The Chinese government has built numerous reservoirs and dams to alter the flow of the region's intermittently supplied rivers, including the Tarim, and today farming accounts for nearly half of Xinjiang's gross domestic product. Lately the region has only gotten thirstier. Throughout most of the past century, 60 to 80 percent of the land has been dedicated to growing grain, but by the 1990s the production of cash crops — primarily cotton — had skyrocketed.


Xinjiang's cotton industry is now caught in the middle of the tug-of-war taking place between China's geopolitical imperatives and the environment's limits. The region contributes more than 50 percent of China's total cotton production and about 10 percent of the world's supply each year — output supported by the Taklamakan Desert's water resources. At the same time, Xinjiang's population is expanding once again, and by some estimates it will maintain its double-digit growth through 2020. As a result, the pressure mounting on the Tarim Basin is unlikely to ease in the years ahead, even as the Chinese government sinks billions of yuan into restoring parts of the river.

Ironically, climate change has granted the Tarim River a temporary reprieve: Warming temperatures have accelerated the runoff from nearby glaciers, adding to its supplies in the short run. Still, this much-needed boost is finite. Current temperature projections indicate that glacial waters, which account for roughly 40 percent of the volume of rivers nearby, could permanently dry up in the long run.

Brimming With Discontent

To make matters even more complicated, the issue of water scarcity is closely intertwined with the fraught minority politics of Xinjiang — a region that China's Han majority shares with the Turkic Uighur minority. The Han control much of the area's cotton production through the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which functions as a blend of paramilitary and business units. Such bingtuan systems have deep roots: In the final centuries B.C., Han troops were responsible for implementing the region's first massive irrigation and land reclamation projects. This "Tuntian" model of military colonization was highly successful, leveraging the power of the state to see through the massive and complicated undertakings needed to ensure that agriculture flourished in Xinjiang.

The Tuntian model still exists today, though it has given rise to a glaring imbalance between large quasi-military operations and small civilian farmers. While local family plots in the region rely on public infrastructure for access to water, subjecting them to usage regulations, bigger farms can afford to install their own pumps, which aren't necessarily beholden to the same laws. Meanwhile, the runoff from agricultural pursuits pollutes what water resources are left. Each of these issues disproportionately affects native Uighurs, an ethnic group that has traditionally relied on oasis-based smallholdings and animal husbandry to survive. Alterations in the water system are deeply disruptive to this way of life, and as water scarcity worsens in Xinjiang, so, too, may the discontent simmering among its Uighur community.

Such discord could certainly throw a wrench in Beijing's plans for Xinjiang. The region is a cornerstone of China's newest Silk Road, the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative. Through Xinjiang, Beijing hopes to connect its lands westward to Europe, by way of Central Asia, and southward to the Indian Ocean, by way of Pakistan. But doing so would require maximizing Xinjiang's output — including in cotton-based textiles — for export along these trade routes.

After nearly two decades of restoration efforts in the Tarim Basin, it is still unclear whether the the region's water resources will be able to shoulder their newest burden. After all, attempts to line canals and improve irrigation efficiency can only go so far when it comes to growing cotton in the desert. If Xinjiang maintains its current level of production, it will likely come at the expense of an ecosystem that boasts one of the highest concentrations of rare vegetative species in the world. And though it won't be the first time a nation's imperatives trump environmental conservation, it could be the last in the Tarim Basin if Beijing stretches the river's resources too far.

ccp

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5 take aways from China's 30 yr plan
« Reply #616 on: October 26, 2017, 07:47:16 AM »
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/xi-jinping-speech-five-things-you-need-to-know

By contrast what are our 30 yr goals? 

I don't know of any unified vision for this?

I don't recall any from any politician.  We think in 2, 4 yr  cycles.

You carbon energy free by 2050 etc yada yada .......

By then the debt could be 30 trillion and we have 65% not working .

We could have a goal of turning us into a Spanish speaking country by 2050.

Atheism by 2050 the majority?

More females in the military then in law school?

The nation according to big tech far more then even now?

We are like a huge ship just drifting at sea................






Crafty_Dog

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Re: China
« Reply #617 on: October 30, 2017, 09:29:26 PM »
It sounds a bit like you are being taken in my the siren's song of central planning there , , ,


ccp

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Chinese military base
« Reply #618 on: November 26, 2017, 09:49:41 AM »
In Djibuti :

https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-displays-global-expansion-military-115118157.html

to protect their interests in Africa and of course, for peace keeping

 :-o :-o :-o

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Re: Chinese military base
« Reply #619 on: November 26, 2017, 10:31:15 AM »
In Djibuti :

https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-displays-global-expansion-military-115118157.html

to protect their interests in Africa and of course, for peace keeping

 :-o :-o :-o

Expect many more to pop up around the world.


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GPF: China's thin, red line
« Reply #620 on: December 30, 2017, 12:05:58 PM »
China’s Thin Red Line
Dec 27, 2017

 
By Jacob L. Shapiro
China declared war last week, though few seem to have noticed. The coming conflict will not be against North Korea, against which battle plans for a later fight are already being drawn. It will not be against the United States, despite the escalating tensions between them. It will not be against India, its adversary in a border dispute earlier this year. Nor will it be against South Korea, which defied Beijing by deploying ballistic missile defense systems. No, war was declared against enemies Beijing considers far more insidious and subversive than any nation-state: financial risk, poverty and pollution.

The Counteroffensive

If it seems as though I’m taking the metaphor too far, it’s worth noting that the declaration of war was, in fact, literal. During the Central Economic Work Conference, held from Dec. 18-20, the government identified 19 missions it would undertake in 2018. But against financial risk, poverty and pollution, Beijing described its future efforts as “effectively prosecuting rigorous war.”

It’s hard to quibble with Beijing’s assessment. Financial risk? China’s debt now stands at roughly 260 percent of GDP. Poverty? For all its wealth, China still has more than 500 million people living on less than $5.50 per day. Pollution? The government itself claims that more than 20 percent of Chinese farmland has been contaminated by pollution.
China has begun its counteroffensive, but as is often the case in war, the results have been mixed. New reform measures have been resisted in important sectors such as banking, energy and real estate. Even the battle cry against financial risk is a confrontation with resistance. On Dec. 19, the Wall Street Journal reported that Beijing decided to downplay its newfound emphasis on lowering debt as early as Dec. 8. Beijing now seems content to merely limit borrowing. Barely a month into his dictatorship, President Xi Jinping is already settling for half measures.

The poverty issue is inseparable from the finance issue. Unless China is prepared to distribute wealth with an iron fist – a last resort that China has not yet had to employ – then Beijing must balance between improving the financial health of the country and encouraging growth, all while making sure the traditionally poor interior provinces benefit from the country’s newfound wealth. Growth, after all, is a potential solution to the poverty problem. But debt is growing faster than growth, and more than half of new bank loans are being taken out to aid real estate speculation, not to form competitive businesses. So even as China makes compromises on reducing debt to stimulate growth, the economy is not growing as fast as it once was. The danger is that any number of the bubbles in the Chinese economy will pop well before the have-nots get a chance to share in its prosperity – and, in their vast numbers, revolt against the government.
 
(click to enlarge)

And then there is pollution, an admittedly overlooked issue at GPF that is affecting the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. Taking the lead against climate change on the global stage may be good optics for Beijing, but it’s hard to reconcile with the fact that its cities are covered in haze and its food and water supply are so toxic that it is having to transform the way it grows and buys food.

Here, too, the government is taking radical steps toward reform. On Dec. 22, the South China Morning Post reported that in Guizhou province party officials will now base political advancement on environmental progress instead of on economic growth. Local environmental departments will reportedly be empowered to enforce new standards – perhaps they will call them the Green Guards.

Being Combative

Most outside observers viewed Xi’s coronation at the 19th Party Congress as evidence that China is emerging as a global power capable of challenging the United States. Far from it. If China is to go through the transformations Xi laid out in his speech at the Party Congress, the next few years in China are going to be extremely tumultuous. The reforms Xi means to enforce will create enemies to his own rule and factions whose interests are not served by supporting the CPC. Xi must retain the power, then, not only to press his agenda, but to eliminate potential enemies. If Chinese history is any indication, he must also cultivate scapegoats for the inevitable policy failures or just to contain popular discontent. Mao, in whose likeness Xi has fashioned himself to a certain extent, was an expert at this.

Xi has been more cautious than Mao, of course. Mao’s leadership was intentionally chaotic. Where the country’s interests were at stake, no individual was too dear to sacrifice, no number of people too large. If China is indeed reverting to an authoritarian dictatorship, then the purges of the past five years are just a prelude to more to come. If Xi is really following in Mao’s footsteps, then we must keep a close eye on the company Xi keeps.

Wang Qishan is a good example. A top lieutenant and former enforcer of Xi’s corruption purges, Wang was left off the politburo in the 19th Party Congress. It’s possible that, as some have argued, he was excluded because he had reached the age of retirement and that Xi was merely following protocol. But that is unlikely. Xi has bucked convention time and again when it serves his purposes. After all, he didn’t even name his successor, an act more politically taboo than allowing an elderly man to continue working.

It is also notable that Guo Wengui, a Chinese billionaire who fled to the United States, has made Wang one of his key targets, eviscerating him in the American press with allegations of corruption. The Guo riddle has bothered us for a while at GPF. If Xi is so powerful, how could Guo have been allowed to escape? Is Xi less powerful than we think? Did he want Guo to make these allegations for all to hear? Is there another explanation we haven’t considered?

If Xi follows the pattern of previous Chinese authoritarians, eventually he will purge the purgers. This presents a unique problem. He has already created enemies by enacting such controversial reform. If he crushes those enemies, he will invite even more. If he fails to crush them, the government – and therefore the Chinese state itself – could break apart. We expect Xi to crush his opponents, so we will need to look at the relationships with even his oldest confidants in a new light.

If this all sounds combative, that’s because it is. By its own admission, China is at war. It’s just not the war that everyone thinks China is preparing for. China has to win the war at home before it can win wars abroad. But if the early reforms are China’s thin red line, then the results of the first battles don’t look overly promising.

The post China’s Thin Red Line appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: China a friendlier environment for green initiatives
« Reply #622 on: January 04, 2018, 01:45:59 PM »
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China: A Friendlier Environment for Green Initiatives
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Forecast Update

In our 2018 Annual Forecast, we wrote that China would accelerate its fiscal reforms in 2018, channeling more money toward the regional level and implementing reforms, such as environmental taxes and enforcing existing environmental regulations. As the new calendar year has arrived, that forecast has proven accurate with the implementation of initiatives designed to achieve precisely those goals.
See 2018 Annual Forecast

China is setting its sights on a new growth model, and putting environmental protection as one of the country's top priorities. In 2017, China focused intently on better enforcement of its environmental policies. From increasing inspections and fines throughout the industrial sector to setting new goals for integrating new energy vehicles into the domestic fleet, Beijing has worked to bring environmental protection measures under more national, centralized control. In 2018, China is poised to move full steam ahead in continuing this strategy.

The new year brought the kick-off date for two new initiatives. On Jan. 1, numerous automobile models suspended manufacturing, taking more than 500 versions of different vehicles off the assembly line. The cars targeted included domestic producers as well as joint ventures with major automobile manufacturers, such as Volkswagen. But even with the large number of models leaving production, Chinese officials have noted that the market share of the models being banned is limited. By coupling the new initiative with an extension of tax credits for electric vehicles, Beijing is looking to not only increase the number of electric cars on the road, but to improve their quality and actual environmental benefit as the country looks to eventually ban fossil fuels.

The second new initiative is a tax aimed at environmental protection, which also took effect Jan. 1. An environmental tax — along with several other changes to the country's tax code — is a key component of the ongoing fiscal reform aimed at bringing the country's socio-economic shift in line with its objective for healthier, more balanced growth. Announced in October 2017 and passed in December, the tax will be based on the amount of pollutants emitted by specific operations. Though the tax sets national standards and general guidance, it is similar to many other environmental policies that have taken effect in recent years. Like others, the new policy provides ample room for discretion in enforcement and tax rate, and regions are allowed to tailor their specific regulations to local circumstances. The new policy effectively brings an end to a one-time pollutant discharge fee that China has collected since 1979, and has an estimated potential to collect $7.7 billion annually throughout the country. That revenue will be kept at the local level, both to help incentivize local governments to enforce environmental protection measures, and as part of Beijing's ongoing fiscal rebalance away from solely focusing on economic development.

While the recent past has brought evidence of greater success in the enforcement of environmental policies, this newest environmental tax will be especially difficult to implement from a technical standpoint. The numerous potential hurdles ahead of local governments include inadequate or unclear standards, as well as potential shortages in staff or funding. Ambiguities in how pollutants are tracked and measured increase the risk that compliance and corruption could limit the policy's successful implementation. Regions such as Hebei and the northeast, where pollution is the heaviest, will be key locales to watch. The ability to hold on to the revenue may incentivize local compliance, but local governments will need to strike a careful balance to keep from hurting local industries and employment situations, as well as avoid corruption.
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China: A Friendlier Environment for Green Initiatives


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Apple betrays Chinese Users
« Reply #623 on: February 24, 2018, 11:17:35 AM »
Apple to Start Putting Sensitive Encryption Keys in China
Codes for Chinese users of iCloud will be kept in a secure location, company says
A man uses his mobile phone near an Apple store in Beijing.
A man uses his mobile phone near an Apple store in Beijing. Photo: Ng Han Guan/Associated Press
By Robert McMillan and
Tripp Mickle
Feb. 24, 2018 1:39 p.m. ET
18 COMMENTS

When Apple Inc. AAPL 1.74% next week begins shifting the iCloud accounts of its China-based customers to a local partner’s servers, it also will take an unprecedented step for the company that alarms some privacy specialists: storing the encryption keys for those accounts in China.

The keys are complex strings of random characters that can unlock the photos, notes and messages that users store in iCloud. Until now, Apple has stored the codes only in the U.S. for all global users, the company said, in keeping with its emphasis on customer privacy and security.

While Apple says it will ensure that the keys are protected in China, some privacy experts and former Apple security employees worry that moving the keys to China makes them more vulnerable to seizure by a government with a record of censorship and political suppression.

“Once the keys are there, they can’t necessarily pull out and take those keys because the server could be seized by the Chinese government,” said Matthew Green, a professor of cryptography at Johns Hopkins University. Ultimately, he says, “It means that Apple can’t say no.”

Apple says it is moving the keys to China as part of its effort to comply with a Chinese law on data storage enacted last year. Apple said it will store the keys in a secure location, retain control over them and hasn’t created any backdoors to access customer data. A spokesman in a statement added that Apple advocated against the new laws, but chose to comply because it “felt that discontinuing the [iCloud] service would result in a bad user experience and less data security and privacy for our Chinese customers.”

Apple’s move reflects the tough choice that has faced all foreign companies that want to continue offering cloud services in China since the new law. Other companies also have complied, including Microsoft Corp. for its Azure and Office 365 services, which are operated by 21Vianet Group , Inc., and Amazon.com Inc., which has cloud operating agreements with Beijing Sinnet Technology Co. and Ningxia Western Cloud Data Technology Co.

Amazon Web Services and Microsoft, which serve businesses in China, declined to say where encryption keys will be stored for businesses using their security tools there.

Privacy specialists are especially interested in Apple because of its enormous customer base and its history of championing customer privacy. Apple in 2016 fought a U.S. government demand to help unlock the iPhone of the gunman in the 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack. “For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers’ personal data because we believe it’s the only way to keep their information safe,” Apple Chief Executive Tim Cook said then in a letter to customers explaining its decision.

Apple said it will provide data only in response to requests initiated by Chinese authorities that the company deems lawful and said it won’t respond to bulk data requests. In the first half of 2017, Apple received 1,273 requests for data from Chinese authorities covering more than 10,000 devices, according to its transparency report. Apple said it provided data for all but 14% of those requests.

Greater China is Apple’s second-most-important market after the U.S., with $44.76 billion in revenue in its last fiscal year, a fifth of the total. Some previous steps to comply with Chinese laws have been controversial, including removing apps from its China store for virtual private networks that can circumvent government blocks on websites. Apple has said it follows the law wherever it operates and hopes that the restrictions around communication in China are eventually loosened.

Jingzhou Tao, a Beijing-based attorney at Dechert LLP, said Chinese iPhone users are disappointed by Apple’s changes to iCloud data storage because privacy protection in China is weak. However, he said users there “still consider that iPhone is better than some other pure Chinese-made phones for privacy policy and protection.”

Apple’s cloud partner in China is Guizhou on the Cloud Big Data Industry Co., or Guizhou-Cloud, which is overseen by the government of Guizhou province. Apple plans to shift operational responsibility for all iCloud data for Chinese customers in China to Guizhou-Cloud by Feb. 28. Customer data will migrate to servers based in China over the course of the next two years. The company declined to say when the encryption keys would move to China.

Apple began notifying iCloud users in China last month that Guizhou-Cloud would be responsible for storing their data.

Updated terms and conditions for China users say that Apple and Guizhou-Cloud “will have access to all data” and “the right to share, exchange and disclose all user data, including content, to and between each other under applicable law.”

“Given that Apple’s China operations will be managed by a Chinese company, it seems implausible that the government will not have access to Apple data through the local company,” said Ronald Deibert, a political-science professor at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs who has researched Chinese government hacking operations.

Guizhou-Cloud and the Chinese cybersecurity administration didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Reporters Without Borders has urged journalists in China to change their geographic region or close their accounts before Feb. 28, saying Chinese authorities could gain a backdoor to user data even if Apple says it won’t provide one.

Apple said it has advised Chinese customers that they can opt out of iCloud service to avoid having their data stored in China. Data for China-based users whose settings are configured for another country, or for Hong Kong and Macau, won’t go on Chinese servers, and Apple said it won’t transfer anyone’s data until they accept the new mainland-China terms of service.

Mr. Green and others say Apple should provide more technical details on its steps to secure its encryption keys and internet usage data that might be available on Guizhou-Cloud.

This usage information, called metadata, could tell Chinese authorities the identity of users who download a book or other files of interest to the government, said Joe Gross, a consultant on building data centers.

“You can tell whether people are uploading or downloading things,” he said “You can tell where they are. You may be able to tell whether they’re sharing things.”

Apple said there would need to be a legal request to obtain metadata.

—Yoko Kubota, Jay Greene and Xiao Xiao contributed to this article


ccp

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Xi for life
« Reply #625 on: March 11, 2018, 08:55:35 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Debt Bubble continues to worsen
« Reply #626 on: March 16, 2018, 08:44:06 AM »
Reality Check


By Xander Snyder


China Struggles With Hidden Debt


Local governments are also susceptible to the growing rot in the Chinese financial system.


The implications of China’s debt burden appear increasingly grim. We have previously discussed the relationship between the real estate market, China’s debt and retail investors who invest in securities of this debt, but local governments are also susceptible to the growing rot in the Chinese financial system. Stuck between a rock and a hard place as one of their primary sources of revenue has been cut back in recent years, local governments have taken on more debt to finance their expenditures. And their financial position appears to be deteriorating as well: On March 14, a Chinese official publicly warned that local governments are at growing risk of default.

Yin Zhongqing, deputy director of the National People’s Congress Financial and Economic Affairs Committee, warned that Beijing’s official figure for local government debt, $2.6 trillion, may be excluding more than $3 trillion of additional debt that is being hidden through a series of complicated public-private partnerships and other complex financial arrangements. Since most local governments in China are not legally allowed to borrow directly, they form arrangements in which companies or special-purpose entities – which are ultimately wholly or in large part owned by those local governments – borrow against future cash flows. That loan is then carried by the affiliated entity rather than by the local government itself, obfuscating the true scale of the local government’s obligations.


 

(click to enlarge)


The Land Sale Boom

What’s driving local governments’ increased borrowing? Although local government debt may at first blush seem distinct from the country’s real estate debt concerns, they are in fact interrelated. The Communist Party technically owns all land in China, but property developers gain the rights to use and build on land by paying taxes to local governments. The taxes from these land sales (technically, the transfer of land usage rights) are a large portion of many local governments’ budgets. Since local governments receive more income the more land sales there are for development, they encourage real estate construction.

This conflicts with Beijing’s national goal of reining in property prices to contain the risk of a major price collapse, which could trigger a broader financial crisis. Beijing has seen some success with its property-related initiatives – over the past several months, property prices have remained stable or even declined slightly in a number of major cities. But disincentives toward new construction put local governments in a tough spot given their dependence on land sales meant for property development to generate tax revenue.

Beijing is aware of this conflict. One solution it has offered is a new property tax framework, presented in late 2017, that would emphasize taxes levied on property owners rather than on developers. This would be somewhat similar to the property tax system in the United States, where a percentage of the assessed value of the property is levied on the owner on an annual or semiannual basis. That said, a proposal and an implemented solution are two vastly different things, and there is a long way to go before a new property tax of that kind could plug the hole created by Beijing’s attempt to curb rising prices. As an example, in 2016, there were only two taxes on existing homes owned by Chinese citizens. They generated approximately $70 billion in revenue compared with the $550 billion raised from taxes levied on property developers.

Clandestine Arrangements

When costs exceed revenues, the gap needs to be plugged somehow, and local governments in China have been doing that by taking on more debt. Yin points out that local governments, recognizing Beijing’s campaign to deleverage its financial system, have been increasingly vigilant in hiding their debt through public-private partnerships or other, murkier arrangements. Yin also notes that the official level of nonperforming loans in China’s financial system – approximately 1.7 percent – is substantially understated, kept artificially low by banks extending or amending underperforming loans to prevent them from being officially categorized as nonperforming.

As in other areas of its financial sector, China is running into the persistent challenge of overcoming the perception of implicit guarantees – the idea that Beijing will bail out any and all struggling local government financing vehicles. The central government could, to a degree, bail out LGFVs that struggle with repayment, but this becomes a far more difficult proposition with dollar-denominated debt. Though the People’s Bank of China can always print more yuan, doing so will put downward pressure on the currency. Inflation is always a risk when increasing money supply, but more money would at least make yuan-denominated debt easier to repay. However, cheaper yuan makes dollar-denominated debt costlier to repay, and according to the Bank for International Settlements, since early 2016 property developers have been issuing more dollar-denominated bonds than yuan-denominated bonds. Since many LGFVs are set up to fund infrastructure and property development projects, this means that local governments, too, are likely facing increased exposure to dollar-denominated debt. There are other policy options available to the central bank and the central government, but there are limits to how much money the government can print, so that is not a long-term solution.

In other words, real estate debt risk permeates all corners of China’s labyrinthine financial system. Perhaps the most salient manifestation of the scale of this problem is that Chinese leaders have become openly vocal about it. Yin is just one recent example. President Xi Jinping and his cadre have also spoken about the severity of financial risk facing the country. China’s leaders know that any such crisis will not be confined strictly to the economic realm and, knowing this, they are trying to mentally prepare the country now so it is not surprised when it happens. The looming question for China’s leadership is not when China will find itself in a crisis, but what exactly that crisis will look like.



ccp

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China
« Reply #627 on: April 27, 2018, 09:29:25 AM »
even more debt and age demographic problems then us.

Beware of more aggressive things to come as they try to continue to promote the" illusion" and suppress the reality:

https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/xi-jinping-china-distracts-from-massive-debt-rural-poverty/

Crafty_Dog

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China getting old fast
« Reply #628 on: May 08, 2018, 06:17:52 AM »
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-limit-to-chinas-rise-its-getting-old-fast-1525028331?mod=e2fb

BEIJING—China is careening toward a demographic time bomb. In another decade, it will have more people over 60 than the entire population of the U.S. Its workforce is shrinking, and not enough babies are being born.

Yet when Li Yuanyuan, a professor, was expecting her third child last year, her employer in the eastern city of Qingdao pressured her to end the pregnancy or resign. She refused, but the stress gave her nightmares. “How can I not worry about it?” she said during her pregnancy. “We could end up raising three children without any income.”

In the nation with one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, couples are still discouraged from having multiple offspring—children who could help rejuvenate the fast-aging population.

Some experts have argued over the years that slower population growth could help ease the pressure for China to create new jobs as technology increases productivity. Others contend that the aging problem looms over China’s long-term economic health, presenting a vulnerability in its global ambitions over resources, technology and industry amid a deepening trade conflict with the U.S.

Chinese officials have been softening birth restrictions, and say they are reluctant to make sudden, drastic changes to longstanding policy. Some demographers say the moves are too slow to reverse the trend.

While all couples have been able to have two children without penalty since China abandoned its one-child policy in 2016, family-planning law stipulates penalties for those who have more. Local-government agents enforce the law with fines and state employers often pressure women to abide by the birth limits.

Baby Bust
China’s fertility rate, once above India’s, is now among the lowest in the world.






Note: Calculations for 2017-30 are based on forecasts.

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

China can’t afford such strong-arming, lawmakers, researchers and parents warn. These opponents of birth restrictions hoped 2018 would be the year China dropped limits altogether.

Yet Beijing can’t let go, continuing the reproductive meddling some demographers say was always based on guesswork and unnecessary even four decades ago.

Beijing did signal a notable change in March at the National People’s Congress, declaring it would replace the National Health and Family Planning Commission—the bureaucracy that enforces birth rules—with a new health ministry. But there was no pledge to lift birth restrictions.

That left some parents in limbo, including a 34-year-old businesswoman in southern China who asked to be identified by her surname, Cai. She was excited yet confused by the news from the congress, wondering if she would no longer have to pay a fine of about $12,000 for the birth of her third child last year: “Does that mean third children are legal now?”

Ms. Cai and her husband took a loan to pay the $7,000 fine for having a second child several years ago when the one-child policy was in effect. Faced with the steeper fine from the local family-planning branch for their third child, she sold her clothing shop in Fujian province.

“It is hard enough to raise the kids,” she said. “We don’t know what to do.”

Asked what will happen to the family-planning commission now and whether China has any plans to lift all birth restrictions, the information office of the State Council, China’s cabinet, responded: “We will continue communications and connections with the Health and Family Planning Commission.”

State family planners have cautioned against drastic change in birth policies. “The fundamental reality of the state is that it has a large population,” Wang Peian, who has been deputy director of the family-planning commission, told The Wall Street Journal last year. “The Chinese government has been adjusting and improving family-planning policy in a steady, cautious and realistic manner.”

Mr. Wang said at a press conference last year that technological innovation and health advances will leave China with enough workers.

“China doesn’t have a population shortage,” he said. “Not now, not in 100 years.”

It isn’t clear what Mr. Wang’s position will be after the reorganization. The family-planning commission didn’t respond to a request for comment on its scope in the future or on Mr. Wang’s role.

China’s clinging to birth restrictions defies a clear demographic trend: Its workforce is shrinking and the population is rapidly aging. By 2050, there will be 1.3 workers for each retiree, according to official estimates, compared with 2.8 now.

No matter what the government does now, it is too late to significantly change the overall trend because of social attitudes, say demographers such as Gu Baochang, a professor of demography at Renmin University in Beijing. “They should have lifted all birth restrictions before 2010,” he said. “Whatever steps they take now, China’s low-fertility trend is no longer reversible.”

Aging populations can hurt economies because a shrinking labor pool tends to drive up wages, while a growing elderly population requires more spending on pensions and health care. In a worse-case scenario, slowing growth and a labor shortage could leave China unable to care for hundreds of millions of retirees.

Senior Moment

A third of China’s population is predicted to be over the age of 60 in three decades.



*Forecast

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China  (2010); United Nations (2030, 2050)

A rapidly aging population was a major factor in Moody’s Investors Service’s downgrade of China’s sovereign rating in May 2017. Elderly care is expected to erode household savings and government coffers, straining the government’s ability to repay already high debt, Moody’s said. It predicted China’s potential economic growth rate would slow to about 5% over the next five years. China’s 2017 growth was 6.9%.

“China is really interesting and unique,” said Marie Diron, a Moody’s analyst of sovereign risk, “because it is aging so much earlier than anyone else.”

Countries facing shrinking workforces have tried to ease the impact by raising the retirement age or relying on immigration. Singapore, which has liberal immigration policies and which offers a “baby bonus” of up to 10,000 Singapore dollars ($7,500) in cash as well as grants for parents toward health and education, has a growing population despite a low fertility rate of 1.16. Japan has steered healthy retirees back to work, sometimes with the help of technology making up for age-related deficiencies.

Despite one of the lowest retirement ages in the world, at 55 on average, Beijing has been slow to implement a plan to gradually raise the retirement age amid severe opposition. Officials had originally indicated they would present the plan last year. It was left out of measures unveiled at the congress in March, in which Beijing said the new ministry “will actively deal with the aging of the population,” with measures to develop the elderly-care sector and health-care reform.

Past policy changes haven’t fixed the trend—not even ending the one-child policy did. Newborns rose by 1.3 million in 2016, the first year without the policy—less than half the official projection—to 17.86 million, from 2015, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.


In 2017, births slowed to 17.23 million, well below the official forecast of more than 20 million.

In a generation that grew up without siblings, a one-child mind-set is deeply entrenched. Maternity-leave policies have been expanded but some women say taking leave twice is a career impediment. An All-China Women’s Federation survey found 53% of respondents with one child didn’t want a second.

Even without birth limits, China’s economic development would have reduced fertility rates, says Martin Whyte, a Harvard University Chinese-studies expert. That has been the pattern elsewhere in the world: When incomes rise, the sizes of families tend to go down.

If the nation drops birth policies now, Mr. Whyte said, “China will learn what many other countries have learned—that it is much more difficult to get people to have more babies” than the other way around.
Population math

For China’s leaders, population math has never been simple. In Communist rule’s early days, Mao Zedong said: “With many people, strength is great.”

As the Communist Party struggled to build the economy, some officials began calling for population control to help China catch up with the West. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping launched the one-child policy saying “We must do this…Otherwise, our economy cannot be developed well and people’s lives won’t be improved.”

Fertility rates dropped below replacement levels in the early 1990s and have continued falling. Yet Beijing codified the one-child policy in 2001, passing the Population and Family Planning Law that provided a legal framework. It amended the law in December 2015 to allow for two children but kept provisions for birth-limit-violation penalties including fines known as “social-maintenance fees.”

Provinces and townships have local enforcers of the law. A bureaucracy of half a million workers has over the years collected billions of dollars in birth fines, calculates Wu Youshui, a lawyer who obtained disclosures from local governments via open-records requests.

While the government has realized the need to ease controls, it is fearful of drastic moves, said a senior official who has been in charge of implementing family-planning policy. “Any policy change in China has been incremental. The key is to ensure policy continuity.”

Even for “legal” births, there is paperwork required to give birth in many public hospitals. Because a birth registration, which is needed at some public hospitals, requires a marriage certificate, unwed mothers can’t give birth at those hospitals, according to nurses and administrators at public hospitals. Family-planning officials have been able to ask courts to seize savings of birth offenders, court records show. Compliance weighs heavily in officials’ performance reviews, language in government regulations shows.
Local enforcement

When Ms. Li, the Qingdao professor, refused to abort her third child, she said, her university employer accused her of selfishly putting at risk her supervisors’ careers, the school’s future and co-workers’ bonuses. A university spokeswoman didn’t respond to faxed inquiries.

With the help of local church friends, her family moved to the Philippines, where she gave birth in November.

Hu Zhenggao, 42, ran afoul of the limits last year visiting his Yunnan province hometown. A father of four, he was taken away one night by local county officials who forcibly sterilized him, saying he had broken family-planning rules, he said in an account he posted on social media.

His ordeal prompted an outcry online. Yunnan province authorities later put out a statement saying that forced surgeries aren’t allowed and that the officials had been wrong.

Mr. Hu confirmed his social-media post, saying he didn’t want to talk about his treatment and wasn’t seeking compensation. An official at the family planning bureau of Zhaotong, which was responsible for investigating the incident, said there had been an apology to Mr. Hu; she offered no further comment.

Wealthier Chinese have other options. Zou Yue, a blogger based in Guangzhou province, gave birth to her third child at an Irvine, Calif., clinic in 2016. Having a child overseas usually means the fine can be avoided. “I’d rather spend that money in the U.S. than paying a fine,” she said.

Beijing said in March at the National People’s Congress, above, that it would replace the bureaucracy that enforces birth rules with a new health ministry, but there was no pledge to lift birth restrictions.

President Xi Jinping has signaled the demographic dilemma is on his mind. In 2015, he said China needs more births. In October, he omitted a traditional reference to “family planning” in his party-congress report.

Last month’s sidelining of the family-planning commission is the strongest sign yet of his concern. Lifting birth restrictions would likely require a constitutional change.

“I think Xi’s views about demography are clear: He considers population more as a resource than a burden,” said Huang Wenzheng, a researcher at the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based independent think tank, and a co-founder of a hedge-fund firm that invests globally. “But of course he cannot easily abandon the family-planning policy because that would be a sharp turn away from his predecessors’ policies.”

U.S.-based Chinese researcher Yi Fuxian believes China overstates its population numbers and fertility rate—the number of children a woman has over her lifetime, which official data puts at around 1.5. He said a different reading of available data suggests the fertility rate is as low as 1.05.

In China, as elsewhere in the world, the hesitation to have more than one child is strongest in big cities, partly because of higher child-raising costs. Shanghai is especially lopsided, with low fertility rates and about a third of the population over 60, according to the municipal government. In New York City, adults over 65 make up about 13% of the total population, according to the city government.

The fertility rate in Liaoning, a province in China’s northern rust belt, is at 0.74, official data show. Even so, Liaoning punishes those who have a third child, with some couples fined more than 145,000 yuan ($23,000), according to public court records. The Liaoning family-planning commission didn’t respond to faxed questions

The March congress move hasn’t persuaded people such as a mother in Dalian, a Liaoning port city, who said she has been hiding since her third child’s birth to avoid a fine she fears would be five times her family’s annual income.

Even after the congress, she said, she didn’t dare approach local authorities and is putting her hope in birth restrictions being lifted soon. “Then I can take my son out to enjoy the sunshine.”

A high-school teacher in Tangshan in northern China who asked to be identified by her surname, Sun, said she discovered mid-March she was several weeks pregnant. She has two children, 16 and 1½. She called the local family-planning agency to ask if the congress move meant a third child was allowed.

It told her nothing had changed, she said. Aside from triggering a fine, having a third child would probably cost her job, Ms. Sun said, as she is a government worker.

A few days later, she said, she swallowed a pill to terminate the pregnancy. “They are really going to scrap the family-planning controls this year?” she asked. “Who can tell me for sure?”

A spokesman of the Tangshan family-planning agency told the Journal in March, after the congress, that “we are still waiting for any new policies from the central government” and that “third children are still not allowed. The rules are the rules.”

—Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang

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Re: China getting old fast
« Reply #629 on: May 08, 2018, 08:52:27 AM »
"A third of China’s population is predicted to be over the age of 60 in three decades."

It seems to me that the retirement age will need to rise dramatically in nearly all developed countries. 

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GPF: China debt defaults
« Reply #633 on: June 02, 2018, 09:29:40 AM »
Discussing a theme I have been raising here for years:

China: China’s Ministry of Commerce said the profitability of state-owned enterprises increased nearly 10 percent in April year-over-year, with industrial firms’ profits growing 22 percent. Meanwhile, corporate debt defaults related to China’s deleveraging campaign continue. These items seem contradictory. Can we reconcile them?
•   Finding: The short answer is: SOEs aren’t the ones defaulting. Rather, the wave of defaults is centered on private firms that had grown bloated on cheap credit from shadow banking channels. Beijing’s crackdown on shadow lending, combined with tightening monetary policy from China’s central banks and heavier regulatory pressure, has left many companies facing a cash crunch and struggling to find refinancing. As a result, there have been more than 20 corporate bond defaults already this year in China – and this is expected to continue as additional bond repayments come due and new reforms kick in. This does not necessarily suggest that an unmanageable cascade of defaults is looming. The aggregate size of the recent defaults is still relatively small (around $2.5 billion). Meanwhile, firms have been adjusting to the new reality being imposed by Beijing. Beijing will relax its deleveraging campaign if the threat of contagion becomes too large.

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GPF: China taps on the brakes for investment
« Reply #634 on: June 20, 2018, 06:43:21 AM »
China Taps the Brakes on Investment
Jun 20, 2018
By Xander Snyder

For China, keeping economic growth sustainable keeps getting harder and harder. Last week, the Chinese government released a report that showed the annual growth of domestic fixed asset investment hit its lowest point in 22 years during the period from January to May. At almost 45 percent, investment is the largest component of China’s gross domestic product (ahead of consumer spending and exports). China needs to keep building construction and development projects to prevent a cyclical downturn from threatening employment and social stability. A slowdown in investment, therefore, portends a general economic slowdown. It’s important to understand its scale and what caused it.

Fixed asset investment is a broad category that encompasses all sorts of investments, including agriculture, construction and manufacturing, and infrastructure and services, so long as the investment is toward a physical asset. In China’s case, much of the reduced growth is a result of a slowdown in infrastructure investing (to 9.4 percent in the first five months of 2018, compared with 20.9 percent over the same period last year), much of which comes from China’s local governments.
 
(click to enlarge)

China’s local governments are strapped for cash because Beijing is trying to rein in debt in its financial system. China’s happy growth story in the past few decades was made possible to a substantial extent by massive credit growth, which helped provide the capital for development. But that approach has a darker side: It fuels a property bubble that, should it burst, can wreak havoc on the economy.

Among the many financial hazards posed by the complex interconnectedness of financial and non-financial institutions in China and their lending to the real estate industry, local governments are a unique threat to Beijing’s goals. Local governments derive tax revenue from land transactions (technically, from the transfer of land use rights) to property and infrastructure developers. More credit for developers means real estate and construction companies can afford to buy more land at higher prices, and thus local tax revenue rises.

Local governments have tried to line their own pockets by getting more credit into the hands of developers. Technically, local governments cannot take on debt, so they have established so-called local government financing vehicles, whose affiliations to local governments are usually elaborate and hazy. These entities are often development companies, which take on debt and use that money to purchase land and pay local government taxes on the transfer. In essence, local governments are borrowing to fund their own tax income.

This scheme has created some obvious problems for Beijing. For starters, it has resulted in debt that is less transparent, such that the true scale of liabilities has been difficult to discern. Second, it’s a challenge to Beijing’s centralized authority. Local government officials are willing to borrow money now since they can implement more initiatives with the additional tax revenue, with the hope of moving on to a more important official position by the time the debt comes due. But with so much riding on its success with debt alleviation, Beijing cannot afford to have local officials defying its directives on borrowing activity. It makes bureaucrats and local bigwigs too powerful and makes Beijing appear too weak to manage them. The central government has needed to bring what remains of local power under its thumb and stamp out opposition to its national plans. Its deleveraging campaign, which has restricted the amount of credit available to local governments, is one way Beijing is bringing local governments to heel.

But it is not just local governments that are facing tighter credit. Beijing recently rolled out restrictions on wealth management products, a shadow banking security that contributed to the growth in opaque and difficult-to-assess securities. WMPs are often “off-balance-sheet” items, meaning banks do not report them, even if they own affiliated entities that issue the WMPs. This lack of transparency meant that Beijing couldn’t even understand the true scale of its problem. No longer – after forcing greater transparency in this market, Beijing has issued new regulations that are significantly decreasing the issuance of WMPs (by 20 percent in April on a month-over-month basis), and funneling that money toward other types of securities that are more transparent and less risky and are required to be reported by banks (“on-balance-sheet” items). And it’s not just WMPs that are falling. Total social financing – a broad measurement of credit issuance in China’s economy – fell by almost 50 percent from April to May to 761 billion yuan (about $120 billion).

All this said, it’s important to keep in mind that slower fixed asset investment growth doesn’t mean investment is declining. It’s simply growing less quickly. This is clearly not good for China’s growth prospects, but it’s a necessary part of the process.
The post China Taps the Brakes on Investment appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: China weighs commercial growth against government control
« Reply #635 on: June 20, 2018, 06:46:41 AM »
Second post


Jun 20, 2018 | 09:00 GMT
3 mins read
Bending the Internet: China Weighs Commercial Growth Against Government Control
A demonstrator shows support for the Chinese government at a counterprotest held in response to an Amnesty International demonstration over human rights abuses and online censorship in China.


    China's government will try to drive economic growth with the Internet Plus initiative, a plan to integrate innovations such as automation, big data, artificial intelligence and the internet of things into all aspects of the country's economy.

    In doing so, Beijing will maintain a firm hand over the internet using an array of strict laws and interventions.

    The Chinese state, however, will also try to avoid restricting tech companies to the point of discouraging the innovation it needs to bring Internet Plus to fruition.



From a Western perspective, the internet in China is as locked-down as it gets. The country's massive firewall has been filtering global content for decades, and the Communist Party is as committed as ever to centralizing control of the internet and the information it transmits. To achieve that end, the Chinese government uses every trick in the book, deploying bots on social media platform Weibo — where the automated accounts make up an estimated 40 percent of the user base — devising rules to govern internet use and arresting violators.

The Big Picture

The internet is constantly evolving — and with it, national and global policies to regulate the technology's use. Unfiltered access to and unmonitored movement of information pose a strategic risk for many states. Now that most countries have roughly 25 years of experience honing their strategies to handle the freedoms and cultural changes that the internet unleashed on the world, their tactics for manipulating its use are becoming more sophisticated. This is the third installment of a five-part series examining the policies and tactics Iran, China, Turkey and Russia have devised to mitigate the threats — and exploit the opportunities — of the internet.

Yet Beijing considers the internet an opportunity as much as a threat. The economic incentive to keep it free enough to foster innovation is huge for China. Some of the world's most technologically proficient internet and tech firms, in fact, operate behind the "Great Firewall." The rise of companies such as Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent has helped sustain China's economic growth, and their continued success is a central component in the country's long-term online strategy, dubbed Internet Plus by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

Launched in 2015, Internet Plus is a five-year plan to integrate technologies such as automation, big data, artificial intelligence and the internet of things into nearly every aspect of China's economy. The government will maintain a firm hand over the process and is even using its internet monitoring to build a social credit system for evaluating its citizens. Since the internet will be central to China's economic growth from now on, striking the right balance between control and innovation in its internet policy will be crucial for Beijing.

A chart shows the trends for Freedom on the Net scores for Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and the United States.

As President Xi Jinping relies on China's formidable cybersecurity laws in his quest to centralize power and cement the Communist Party's supremacy, he will also have to weigh the effect of Beijing's bureaucracy on innovation. The question won't be so much what freedoms citizens have online, but rather how much the hoops Chinese businesses have to jump through limit the connectivity they need to thrive. So far, the government has left domestic internet companies to grow practically unchecked while ensuring that the Communist Party and its support play a central role in their success. But if the interests of the tech sector diverge from those of the Party, the state will be able to step in as needed, thanks to its control over the internet, and the assortment of tools Beijing has cultivated to enforce it.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Rumors , , ,
« Reply #636 on: July 22, 2018, 09:27:27 AM »

Rumors continue to swirl of a political uprising in China. We touched on them earlier this week, but we didn’t delve into them because they were unverified and, frankly, hard to believe. And while they remain unsubstantiated, it behooves us to consider exactly what has been said and why.

Last Friday, online reports indicated that gunfire had been heard for roughly 40 minutes in Beijing near the Second Ring Road. The reports claimed it was a violent spasm by groups that sought to overthrow Chinese President Xi Jinping. The following day, French public radio reported it had heard rumors that former Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, had allied with other disgruntled Chinese officials in an attempt to force Xi to step down. A Hong Kong tabloid went so far as to suggest that Wang Yang, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, might be the compromise leader next in line.

Like we said, these stories are hard to believe. China is good at censoring its media, but it stretches the imagination to think there would be politically motivated violence in the Chinese capital with nothing but a few blips on social media to show for it. What’s not hard to believe is that there is dissent within the Chinese ranks. A recent protest of army veterans had to be put down by force. The U.S.-China trade war is putting pressure on China’s economy – so much so that Xi’s campaign to reduce debt has been deprioritized as Beijing moves to support growth. China has gagged the media over the coverage of the trade war. It likes to project confidence to the world, but the political, economic and cultural transformation it has planned (and has already begun to execute) inevitably leads to dissent. This is why we will at least notice even the most outlandish headlines.

As for the rumors themselves, there are a few possible explanations for them. The first is that they are wholly unfounded, the products of disinformation spread by those who want to make the government look weak. The rumors are specific but are backed up by nothing, so this explanation makes some sense.

Another possibility is that Xi is indeed encountering serious resistance within the Communist Party – he has, after all, eliminated term limits and emphasized deleveraging at the expense of economic growth – and that Xi has been forced to compromise on the goals he laid out for China late last year. If this is true, it suggests Xi will be forced to blink in the trade war earlier than expected. The third possibility is that the rumors were a Chinese government plant designed to flush out opposition to Xi’s rule.

The likeliest explanation, though, is that the rumors are sensationalism. Some went so far as to suggest that Xi hasn’t been seen in weeks – except that he just landed in the United Arab Emirates on Friday. If Xi is under pressure, he is showing no signs of it. China and the UAE released a plan for a comprehensive strategic partnership to wide fanfare in Chinese media. In the past 24 hours alone, moreover, the Chinese government has released a new tax plan meant to increase control over collection, published an op-ed written by Xi in a Senegalese newspaper (and republished by Chinese news agency Xinhua), and announced its intention to invest around $100 million in North Korean infrastructure.

Still, China is under immense pressure as Xi attempts to reform the economy while fighting a trade war and solidifying his position as dictator-in-chief. Even the faintest whisper that a coalition may be forming against the newly appointed emperor deserves the closest possible scrutiny and requires an extremely close watch on all internal Chinese issues – as close a watch as can be affected in a country that has become an expert at projecting nothing but blue skies.

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Stratfor: Chinese debt problems
« Reply #637 on: August 16, 2018, 05:02:25 PM »
I have flagged the risk of this sort of thing for several years now.
================
What Happened

On Aug. 15, the Sixth Division of State-Owned Asset Management, a military-affiliated company in western China's Xinjiang region, said that it had made up the repayment of bonds worth 500 million yuan ($73 million), two days after it missed the deadline to repay the loan that could have left the company in default. According to a statement, the local government financing vehicle (LGFV) made the overdue principal and interest payment on the morning of Aug. 15, narrowly escaping the fate of being the first government-linked financing vehicle to default in a decade.
Why It Matters

Despite the turn of events, the incident has increased concern about the growing risk of default on the enormous debts of many local governments and corporations, especially as the economy continues to slow. Corporate defaults are already on the rise this year, due to Beijing's deleveraging efforts, which were in effect until quite recently. And the risk to local government-linked borrowing is sharply growing, because of maturing bonds and declining asset returns — particularly in the property market.

The state-owned firm's late repayment prompts questions about how the company was able to raise so much money; it's unclear whether the firm's parent company, the Xinjiang local government or the state played a role in the repayment, given the implicit Chinese government guarantee on these bonds. With several similar LGFVs now under stress, it bears watching to see how the authorities manage the default and market confidence.

Reining In Debt

China is trying to slowly resolve the massive debt it has accumulated at a local level as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis. Since that time, local financing vehicles have served as the primary way for local governments to raise money and support their economies, especially since they were prohibited from directly borrowing from banks and from raising large bonds. Over the years, these pseudo-corporations continued to proliferate, and their total debt has reached as much as 20 trillion yuan and accounts for about half of local government-related debt (including official local bonds) — or a quarter of China's gross domestic product.

Over the past decade, LGFVs have commonly raised credit through various types of off-balance-sheet loans from banks, insurers or other financial institutions, promising high returns and often an implicit guarantee from local governments or real estate as collateral. However, this method left LGFVs largely unregulated. Over the past two years, Beijing has been working to limit these shadow financial vehicles, and the result is that much of the local government-linked debt is under major stress.

Although Beijing recently turned again to stimulus spending and easier credit, more defaults are still expected from local financing vehicles and other government-related financing platforms. Adding to the challenge is the fact that a lot of debt will be maturing in the coming months and will likely put stress on some central and western regions and provinces that have weaker economic foundations and higher debt burdens.

Given the likely sequential defaults and challenges to government-linked bonds, some financial experts, local governments and investors anticipate that political authorities will ultimately assist in preventing defaults. At this point, Beijing must walk a fine line financially, balancing its policy tools and further refinance challenges to these government-linked debts with the risk of contagion effects. 

What to Watch For

    Did the Xinjiang government or the state play a role in the repayment?
    The Sixth Division of State-Owned Asset Management will have another 500 million yuan bond mature in the coming week. How will it manage that repayment?
    How will other central and western regions manage their local debts, and will defaults spread?

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Re: China's house of debt cards
« Reply #639 on: November 13, 2018, 07:22:34 AM »
Trump trade War May expose China's economic House of Cards.

https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/09/economy/china-economy-risks/index.html

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GPF: Trade War a side show to Financial Crackdown
« Reply #640 on: November 21, 2018, 04:39:00 AM »
Very interesting!

====================

China’s financial crackdown may be working too well. According to Rong360 data, yields on wealth management products issued by Chinese banks during the second week of November dropped to 4.36 percent, the lowest level in more than a year and a half. The drop is due to regulations issued in April meant to convince investors, once and for all, that the government will not rescue the risky funds should they go belly up. Meanwhile, according to China’s banking regulator, growth in bank assets continued to slow in the third quarter to 6.96 percent, compared with 8.68 percent a year ago. These are just the latest signs that Beijing’s war on reckless lending and speculative investment are working as intended. But the measures, which officials said Tuesday will continue, have produced unintended consequences. The banking sector, for example, is still struggling to get liquidity to the private sector, which receives just around 25 percent of bank loans, even though it makes up more than 60 percent of the Chinese economy. Short of reinstituting massive the stimulus measures that followed the 2008 financial crisis, Beijing is unsure how to proceed, so it’s experimenting to see what works. On Monday, Beijing announced new measures to support private sector bond issuances, and state media reported that more than 300 billion yuan in new bailout funds have entered the market. As we’ve said before, Beijing’s financial crackdown is a far bigger drag on growth than U.S. tariffs. The trade war is a side show next to China’s war on its internal dysfunction.

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Re: GPF: Trade War a side show to Financial Crackdown
« Reply #641 on: November 21, 2018, 06:40:21 AM »
Very interesting!

====================

China’s financial crackdown may be working too well. According to Rong360 data, yields on wealth management products issued by Chinese banks during the second week of November dropped to 4.36 percent, the lowest level in more than a year and a half. The drop is due to regulations issued in April meant to convince investors, once and for all, that the government will not rescue the risky funds should they go belly up. Meanwhile, according to China’s banking regulator, growth in bank assets continued to slow in the third quarter to 6.96 percent, compared with 8.68 percent a year ago. These are just the latest signs that Beijing’s war on reckless lending and speculative investment are working as intended. But the measures, which officials said Tuesday will continue, have produced unintended consequences. The banking sector, for example, is still struggling to get liquidity to the private sector, which receives just around 25 percent of bank loans, even though it makes up more than 60 percent of the Chinese economy. Short of reinstituting massive the stimulus measures that followed the 2008 financial crisis, Beijing is unsure how to proceed, so it’s experimenting to see what works. On Monday, Beijing announced new measures to support private sector bond issuances, and state media reported that more than 300 billion yuan in new bailout funds have entered the market. As we’ve said before, Beijing’s financial crackdown is a far bigger drag on growth than U.S. tariffs. The trade war is a side show next to China’s war on its internal dysfunction.

Interesting that they compare the financial issues with the trade war as if they are unrelated. 

In the US, the trade war is testing the resilience of the economy, the markets and the people.  China's economy is 6 times(?) more reliant on the trade and an unknown multiple less resilient and more vulnerable to their debt issues.

Forbes looks from another angle:  "175.6% of China’s overall trade surplus last year related to sales to the United States.  That’s up from full-year figures for the three preceding years: 149.2% for 2010, 115.7% for 2009, and 90.1% for 2008."

From the GPF article:  "the private sector, which receives just around 25 percent of bank loans, even though it makes up more than 60 percent of the Chinese economy".

I would say they are tinkering with, not declaring "war on  internal dysfunction."  75% of bank loans go to the unproductive, state owned sector.  What could go wrong with that?

Economic inflections happen at the margin.  How does their debt solvency go if sales fall 1%, 3%, 10% or if trade is cut off altogether with their largest export market?

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-markets-goodwill/china-investors-dump-once-acquisitive-firms-on-write-down-fears-idUSKCN1NO0P2
https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/2173881/chinas-tougher-delisting-rules-send-stocks-problematic-and

Debt over-reliance and other house of cards financial issues are reasons for Xi to cut a deal with Trump, sooner rather than later.  The last thing an oppressive totalitarian dictator of 1.4 billion people needs is financial and economic unrest.


Crafty_Dog

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Intresting read on China's trajectory
« Reply #643 on: November 25, 2018, 06:29:09 PM »

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Re: Lippmann Gap
« Reply #647 on: December 05, 2018, 02:48:18 AM »
https://warontherocks.com/2018/12/the-lippmann-gap-in-asia-four-challenges-to-a-credible-u-s-strategy/

Bigdog, thank you, a good serious read but my impression is that the author does not acknowledge the concept of an inflection point in mathematics.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: China
« Reply #648 on: December 05, 2018, 03:01:42 AM »
Yes, glad to see Big Dog here again.

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« Last Edit: December 07, 2018, 11:41:18 AM by Crafty_Dog »