Author Topic: Stratfor: Russia's Great Power Strategy  (Read 67824 times)

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: misc
« Reply #150 on: November 01, 2022, 04:34:33 PM »
second

Russian urgency in Turkey … At a press conference Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the natural gas hub under consideration in Turkey could be implemented fairly quickly but noted that it's difficult to work with European partners. With Russia under so many sanctions, it’s easy to understand Putin’s sense of urgency: The hub would send Russian natural gas from the Nord Stream pipelines to the Black Sea region, including Turkey, thus continuing to service much of Europe.

… and in Algeria. Algeria is expected to sign an arms deal with Russia worth $12 billion as it negotiates a framework agreement on military supplies for the next decade. Algeria is particularly interested in acquiring submarines, Su-57, Su-34 and Su-30 aircraft, as well as new air defense systems. The agreement is slated to be formalized when President Abdelmadjid Tebboune visits Moscow in December. Russia has had interests in Africa for years, but sanctions have created a more pressing need for other avenues of trade. Sending weapons to Algeria, a longtime Russian customer, certainly fits the bill.

Belarus’ role. Belarus and Russia plan to create joint combat training centers for their respective militaries. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has already authorized the Ministry of Defense to negotiate the agreement, but because it generally does what Russia tells it to do, it is unlikely to change anything substantial. In fact, last month Lukashenko reportedly placed Russian troops in Belarusian territory at Russia’s behest. Belarus may not be directly involved in Russia's war in Ukraine, but neither is it a bystander, so it has plenty of reason to worry about its own border security and internal stability.

Crafty_Dog

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Is war in Ukraine costing Russia its backyard?
« Reply #151 on: November 06, 2022, 06:48:43 PM »
Is war in Ukraine costing Russia control of its own backyard?
By Fred Weir Special correspondent
September 28, 2022
|
MOSCOW
For three decades, Russia has been struggling to manage the ongoing collapse of the USSR. Its primary goals have been to bind former Soviet republics to Moscow-led international organizations, to keep outside powers away from its backyard, and to use its considerable clout to at least freeze the many territorial and political disputes that still bedevil the region.

Now, thanks to the war in Ukraine, all of those objectives look compromised.

Tensions are spiking around the former USSR, where a massively distracted Russia seems increasingly unable to perform its usual role of regional stabilizer due to growing commitments to the war and the negative example it has set by using force to settle its own post-Soviet disputes.

WHY WE WROTE THIS
PEACE
Russia was able to impose a certain peace among the post-Soviet states for three decades through diplomacy and intimidation. But its invasion of Ukraine may have shattered that stability.

Over the past month, an armistice brokered by Russia between Armenia and Azerbaijan after a bitter war two years ago broke down as Azerbaijani forces, backed by Turkey, surged forward and attacked the recognized territory of Russian-allied Armenia. And an unresolved border dispute ignited in bloody fighting between the mountainous Central Asian republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both Russian allies, leaving at least 100 people dead and a diplomatic quandary for Moscow in its wake.

Those two crises have simmered down with hastily imposed cease-fires, but those and many other potential flashpoints remain. Analysts warn that the entire post-Soviet region – never very stable – will continue to present problems for Moscow in the form of conflicts, political instability, and an increasing tendency to flirt with foreign powers to offset the influence of a Russia preoccupied with Ukraine.


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“Russian military action in Ukraine, which is not going according to its initial design, has consumed a lot of Russian resources and energy,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “Obviously different countries will use this situation to pursue their own agendas. ... A general reconfiguration of the post-Soviet space has been underway for some time. Many of these new countries need to demonstrate their sustainability as states. They are very nervous about their neighbors and their own internal stability. The Russian operation in Ukraine has given a big impetus to all such tensions and uncertainties.”

Indeed, Russian behavior in Ukraine, which is ostensibly aimed at protecting Russian-speaking populations, must worry other post-Soviet states with large ethnic Russian minorities in their midst, such as Kazakhstan, Moldova, and the Baltic States, says Andrey Kortunov, director of the Russian International Affairs Council, which is affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. “It’s not just that Russia is distracted,” he says. “Many must wonder, if it can happen in Ukraine, why not to other countries as well?”


Paul Pelosi attack highlights soaring threats of political violence
Simmering regional conflicts
The world breathed a sigh of relief three decades ago when the USSR broke up peacefully along its internal borders, which had been drawn by successive Soviet leaders largely for their own political convenience. The savage wars that had rocked the former Yugoslavia seemed to be largely avoided, and 15 new sovereign states took their place on the maps and in the United Nations. That was in large part due to the extraordinary restraint and nonviolent convictions of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

But post-imperial issues abounded, including territorial disputes and breakaway statelets in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and even Russia itself. Large populations of ethnic Russians were left stranded beyond the borders of Russia, especially in Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Central Asia, and have been a constant source of tensions ever since.

“The problems that followed the USSR’s collapse were serious. The rules, boundaries, economic conditions that prevail in a united state turn dangerous when parts of it become separate entities. Rules and systems change,” says Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the official Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow. “These problems are not always resolved peacefully.”

Russia overturned any semblance of post-Soviet accord, experts say, by invading Ukraine and seeking to redraw the borders it inherited from the USSR. That sets an example to others, and also undermines Russian credibility as a mediator for other frozen conflicts in the region.

Two years ago, Russia declined to come to the assistance of its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ally Armenia on the grounds that the attacking Azerbaijanis were only retaking their own sovereign territory that had been illegally occupied by Armenia in a post-Soviet war. Russia was able to impose a peacekeeping regime at that time, but it has all but unraveled in recent weeks as Azerbaijan moved to take more territory and even attacked Armenia proper.

As Russia struggled to reimpose the cease-fire, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi flew to Yerevan to express her support for Armenia, and also fan the flames of Armenian outrage – that its supposed big protector, Russia, appeared to be missing in action as Armenia faced Azerbaijani aggression alone.

“Pelosi has a big Armenian American constituency, so she might have been acting in her own political interests, but she also seems to speak for the U.S.,” says Mr. Lukyanov. “It was an opportune moment to emphasize to Armenians that Russia is not a reliable patron for Armenia, and she said that explicitly in Yerevan.”


Stepan Poghosyan/Photolure/AP
Demonstrators with American and Armenian national flags gather at the Cafesjian Center for the Arts where U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi delivered her speech, in Yerevan, Armenia, Sept. 18, 2022. Ms. Pelosi called for a negotiated solution to the countries' conflict.
That situation remains exceedingly dangerous, not just because Azerbaijani ambitions have grown amid political crisis in Armenia, but also because it raises the specter of a much wider war. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s key sponsor, while Iran has mobilized forces and warned that it might intervene if Armenia’s borders should be threatened. In recent years, Iran has become an important trading partner and even something of a strategic partner for Armenia.


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“Azerbaijan is getting stronger; Armenia is growing weaker. That’s reality,” says Mr. Kortunov. “If Armenia should be in real jeopardy, Russia will have to intervene because its credibility is at stake. But it’s the worst possible moment for that, as far as Moscow is concerned. For now, diplomatic tools are being deployed.”

The danger of a wounded Russia
No matter how it turns out, Russia’s war in Ukraine is going to have a huge impact on many former Soviet countries. If Russia should lose the war, the consequences could be widespread and devastating, says Mr. Kortunov.

In 2008, Russia successfully intervened to block a Georgian military attempt to retake two pro-Russian breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which belong to Georgia under international law.

“A lot of these suppressed conflicts will swiftly unfreeze,” he says. “Georgia has unfinished business [with those rebel regions], and a wounded Russia may not be able to exert itself next time. There is endemic unrest in other places, like Belarus, that could easily flare up again. Central Asia is a perennial problem. Russia and the CSTO were able to quickly restore stability in Kazakhstan earlier this year with a quick and limited intervention. Would it be able to repeat that in future?”

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After experiencing battlefield setbacks, Russia has doubled down on its Ukraine gamble and embarked on a “partial mobilization” that will likely bring more troops and fresh tactics to its prosecution of the war.

As of now, Mr. Kortunov adds, “Russia still intends to win in Ukraine. In that case, we will be looking at a very different set of consequences. But the changes will still be huge.”

Crafty_Dog

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RANEL Russia's long game on grain exports
« Reply #152 on: November 22, 2022, 06:50:51 AM »
November 21, 2022
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Russia’s Long Game on Grain Exports
Moscow expects a more favorable environment in the coming months.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

The Black Sea grain corridor, which enabled Ukrainian food to sail from three ports, was extended for another 120 days last week, according to the presidents of Ukraine and Turkey. Russia has not said whether it will participate but did not object to the extension. Having earlier failed in a highly publicized effort to terminate the grain initiative, Moscow prefers to keep its distance from the deal so that Russian participation doesn't seem like a result of Ankara’s growing influence over Moscow. Russia’s focus now is to continue criticizing the deal while seeking opportunities to use it to advance Russian interests.

Importance of Russia’s Exports

Grain exports are an important source of power and influence for Russia. First, Russia is a prolific wheat producer, so sales abroad support the Russian economy and foreign policy goals. For years the Kremlin has been trying to boost its grain harvest and set up sustainable trade relations with wheat importers in countries in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. Moscow hopes these partners, craving Russian food and indifferent or hostile to Western sanctions, might support Russian strategy. Poor harvests this year in some regions due to drought or difficulty accessing energy and fertilizers may further these goals.

Top 10 World Wheat Exporters
(click to enlarge)

Second, grain provides about a third of Russia’s revenues from food exports, which is important for supporting the national budget and securing foreign currency, access to which has been limited by sanctions.

Finally, Russian farmers need to offload record-breaking production. The country’s wheat harvest reached 105 million tons this year (compared with 77.8 million tons last year), and the government expects a record total grain harvest of more than 150 million tons for the year. However, this blessing will become a curse if Russian farmers cannot get the goods to market. Shipping costs remain elevated, and Russian grain exporters have recorded difficulties chartering ships, insuring cargoes and receiving payments because of sanctions.

Gross Harvest of Agricultural Crops in Russia
(click to enlarge)

The Kremlin’s Game

The grain deal has been extended, but not without Russia receiving some concessions and signaling that its continued participation will always be in doubt. The Kremlin expects its leverage will only grow in the near future, citing several trends. First is Russia’s massive harvest and stocks of grain and wheat, which it can release at any time. Second is expectations of growing demand for Russian wheat as Ukraine’s exports decline next year because of the war. Third is instability in the energy and fertilizer markets, which may harm output in other countries and further boost demand for Russian wheat.

Finally, although demand is high right now, market sentiment is gloomier over the next several months. Major buyers like Egypt and Pakistan are experiencing financial trouble. Moreover, Russia’s temporary exit from the grain initiative sowed doubts about the arrangement’s future, leading major importers like Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to stock up before the deal expired. The market situation may be very different when the grain deal’s extension is up for renewal again in four months.

Top Destinations for Russian Wheat
(click to enlarge)

In other words, with patience and luck, the Kremlin may be in a much stronger position for the next round of Black Sea grain negotiations. Russia still faces barriers to the export of grain and fertilizers, the Kremlin often notes, despite earlier agreements in Istanbul. After this latest round of talks, however, the West is discussing guarantees to restart Russian exports via the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline, which was halted when the war began (in September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed his opposition to restarting the pipeline), and the U.S. is rumored to be willing to ease sanctions on Russia’s state-owned Rosselkhozbank agricultural bank. France also said a corridor for the supply of Russian fertilizers to Africa via Europe had been established and could start deliveries within weeks. Moscow expects it can hold out for more such breakthroughs as market conditions develop early next year.

Strategic Patience

Russia can afford strategic patience for as long as it can satisfy its farmers. Eastern markets are too well-protected to be profitable. Farmers have almost stopped delivering grain to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and China, traditional importers, because transit tariffs on Kazakhstan’s railways are too high. According to Russian Railways, transit through Kazakhstan costs carriers as much as 3,300 rubles ($54) per ton, while a similar Russian route costs no more than 630 rubles. Russian Railways is in talks with Kazakhstan to reduce the transit tariff on agricultural products. Moscow is optimistic; stronger cooperation with Central Asia is in Russia’s interest, and some Central Asian states want access to cheaper Russian grain.

In the meantime, Moscow will distance itself from the grain deal and seek concessions, such as the easing of restrictions on fertilizer exports and payments. The near-term market outlook for Russia is positive. Over the longer term, however, eastern buyers cannot replace other markets choked off by Western- and self-imposed sanctions. With that in mind, Moscow announced an increase in the quota on grain exports to non-Eurasian Economic Union members from Feb. 15 to June 30, 2023. Until then, the Kremlin seems content to passively participate in the grain deal.


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Putin's New Power Strategy
« Reply #154 on: December 18, 2022, 07:00:38 AM »

Putin’s New Strategy: Laying Claim to Traditional Values
Searching for allies against Ukraine, Russia now presents itself as the leader of a global culture war against moral depravity. It’s not working.


By Yaroslav Trofimov
Dec. 17, 2022 12:01 am ET

Viktor Bout, a Russian arms dealer popularly known as “the merchant of death,” warned about the mortal peril facing humanity in his first TV appearance after returning home from an American prison.

“What is happening in the West is a suicide of civilization,” said Mr. Bout, who was traded this month for detained American basketball star Brittney Griner. “Can you imagine, in American schools they teach first-graders that there are 72 genders! Not just gays and normal people, but 72!”

The message coming from Mr. Bout, who is now a hero in Moscow, and from the Kremlin itself is that only Russia can rescue the world from moral degeneration and decay. That idea, long a key element of the Kremlin’s propaganda, has now been legislated as the Russian state’s official ideology, with the targeting of gay people as one of its most sharply defined features.


A decree issued by President Vladimir Putin in November proclaimed Russia’s mission as the bastion of “traditional values” and a savior of mankind. These values, it said, must be defended as a national-security imperative by Russia’s security services. Among other measures, that means cracking down on “nontraditional sexual relations” and promoting patriotic, religious families with multiple children, under the guidance of the Orthodox Church.


This new role for Russia, Mr. Putin’s decree added, has been made necessary by “the global crisis of civilization and values that leads to humankind losing traditional spiritual and ethical waypoints and moral principles.”

The Kremlin is searching for an ideological justification as it tries to garner some international sympathy for its war against Ukraine. The invasion that Mr. Putin launched in February is going badly, with Kyiv regaining more than half of the territories that Russia seized in the first weeks of the campaign, even as Moscow keeps pounding civilian infrastructure and wrecking residential neighborhoods.

Vladimir Putin’s challenge is to find a new ideology for Russia’s imperial aims.

Ukraine retook the city of Kherson, the only Ukrainian regional capital captured by Russia this year, just a day after Mr. Putin issued his traditional-values decree. On the world stage, Moscow faces international isolation, with only Belarus and Iran providing it with material help, while the U.S. and NATO allies spend tens of billions of dollars on arms and economic assistance to Kyiv.

By inserting Russia into the ideological cleavages of the U.S. and other Western societies, Mr. Putin seeks to weaken this Western resolve and undermine Western unity, said Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution who served as White House senior director for European and Russian affairs in 2017-2019. “What he wants to do is to stoke culture wars as much as possible,” she said.


The Soviet Union, whose demise Mr. Putin has repeatedly lamented as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, invoked the Marxist-Leninist language of class struggle and social equality to justify its imperial designs. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when Kremlin elites no longer believed communist ideology, those ideas were still taken at face value by millions around the world, in the West and even more so in the West’s former colonies. Mr. Putin’s challenge is to find a new ideology for Russia’s imperial aims.

“Putin and his entourage have Soviet brains, and so they try to rule Russia as if it were the Soviet Union,” said Igor Kochetkov, a Russian historian and human-rights activist who formerly headed the Russian LGBT Network group. “If before the dividing line was between socialism and capitalism, now it’s between the traditional values and what they call ‘destructive’ values.” The difference between the eras isn’t as wide as it may appear. While the Western left has been socially progressive since at least the 1960s, the Soviet Union of Mr. Putin’s youth was a deeply conservative place that locked up gay men in prison camps or psychiatric hospitals.

At times, Mr. Putin has been remarkably frank about his imperial ambitions. Earlier this year, for example, he compared himself to the 18th-century czar Peter the Great, saying that his mission, too, is to accumulate territory.

For more than a decade before the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin sought to build bridges to far-right movements in Europe and to parts of the Republican Party in the U.S.

Yet, when the Russian president announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions in a September speech, he framed that land grab as a move forced on Russia by the need to defend its society against dangers posed by Western immorality.

“Do we want that here, in our country, in Russia, there would be parent number one and parent number two and maybe parent number three instead of mama and papa? Do we want that our children be forced since elementary school to embrace perversions that will lead to degradation and dying out? That they be taught that there are genders other than man and woman, and be proposed to change their gender?” he thundered.

Only the fight against such Western depravity, Mr. Putin added, could allow Russia to rekindle relations with the “genuine, traditional West” as well as the rest of the world that, he said, already shares these traditional values with Russia.


That message, while much more vocal today, isn’t entirely new. For more than a decade before the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin sought to build bridges to far-right movements in Europe and to parts of the Republican Party in the U.S., while maintaining the sympathies of the global far left, which still sees Mr. Putin’s regime as the successor of the Soviet struggle against American world domination.

“Putin has long been trying to become the leader of the conservative world, aware that the majority of the world’s population doesn’t approve of the LGBT agenda and actually lives in traditional societies,” said Nikolay Mitrokhin, a specialist on Russian nationalism at the University of Bremen in Germany. “He tried to replace the old communist sympathies with these conservative sympathies, and he was quite successful with this, at least until the war with Ukraine began.”

While the Kremlin has been openly courting European and American neo-Nazis, it has also painted the Ukrainian government, which is headed by a freely elected Jewish president, as a Nazi cabal—a view parroted by many on the European and American far left. “The Russians have been very canny. It doesn’t matter that they are putting out completely contradictory messages to different people,” said Ian Garner, a historian specializing in Russian propaganda at Queen’s University in Canada. “Russia taps into both angles because they’re shameless and because nothing about their ideology really makes any sense or stands up to any philosophical scrutiny.”

Russia’s record of brutality and weakness during the war in Ukraine has considerably diminished Mr. Putin’s appeal to many parts of the conservative and populist right.

Mr. Putin’s new stress on social conservatism has already paid dividends in the U.S., where a small but outspoken minority of the Republican Party bases its opposition to aiding Ukraine, in part, on cultural objections. One of these critics, Rep. Paul Gosar (R-Az.), has explained his votes by saying that Kyiv “promotes far-left ideology,” even though Ukraine is a relatively conservative country where same-sex marriage doesn’t exist and church attendance remains one of the highest in Europe.

Russia’s record of brutality and weakness during the war in Ukraine, however, has considerably diminished Mr. Putin’s appeal to many parts of the conservative and populist right. Following the 2016 election of Donald Trump, Republicans were consistently more likely than Democrats to describe Mr. Putin as a friend or ally, with 37 percent holding that view in December that year, according to polling by YouGov. But that gap disappeared amid widespread outrage following Russia’s invasion last February. The same shift occurred in Europe, where the invasion has had a more direct impact than in the U.S., triggering the influx of millions of refugees and an energy crisis.

“If you looked at statements from far-right leaders across Europe, they always said that we need a strong leader like Putin who defends our values, our civilization against the decadence of the West. It did work before the war,” said Benjamin Haddad, a French parliament member from President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist party. “But now, it’s more complicated to publicly make a case for Russia.”

Italy provides the most significant example of the break between European populists and the Kremlin. Newly elected Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party traces its origins to the neo-fascist movement, successfully campaigned on an appeal to traditional values in September’s elections. However, instead of aligning with Russia, her government—which includes politicians like Matteo Salvini, the deputy prime minister who once walked on Moscow’s Red Square in a T-shirt emblazoned with Mr. Putin’s portrait—has moved to increase support for Ukraine.

“We have to distinguish Putin from the Russian people. The war on Ukraine shows that the traditional values belong to the Russian people, but not to Putin,” said Ylenja Lucaselli, a parliament member from Ms. Meloni’s party. “Those who try to limit the freedom of others and other peoples, especially through an invasion, certainly don’t have any connection to traditional values, which include the respect for others and the respect for the liberty of others.”

The Italian experience highlights Mr. Putin’s challenge in positioning Russia as the leader of the global traditional-values camp: Many political forces espousing similar views are also deeply nationalist, and they put their own countries’ interests first.

For Ms. Meloni, maintaining Italy’s alliance with the U.S. and a constructive relationship with European Union partners is much more important than signaling any ideological affinity with the Kremlin, said Daniele Albertazzi, professor of politics at the University of Surrey in England. “I have always been very skeptical of taking these culture wars too seriously. They are the icing on the cake,” he said.

In Poland, the socially conservative government has also championed what it calls “traditional values” and tightened abortion restrictions. Yet it has emerged as one of Mr. Putin’s most determined foes, breaking its previous alliance with Hungary, whose populist leader Viktor Orban has opposed sanctions on Russia and refused to provide weapons to Ukraine.

Outside the West, Mr. Putin’s self-anointed role as the leader of the traditional-values camp isn’t an easy sell either, particularly for nations that pride themselves on their own, much older cultures, like India or China.

“We have our own great civilization, we have our own great value system, which is universal,” said Vijay Chauthaiwale, head of foreign affairs at India’s ruling party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. “Why should we look at everything in the context of Russia? They are doing something on their own. Why should we say something about it?”


Within Russia itself, the government’s ideology has shifted in a more restrictive direction with every setback in the war. The Russian parliament last month passed legislation extending a ban on promoting homosexual behavior to minors, instituted in 2013, to apply to all age groups. This move means that any work of literature or art with LGBT characters can be considered illegal. Russian bookstores have been forced to remove from shelves dozens of books, including one of the bestsellers of contemporary Russian literature, “Summer in a Pioneer Tie,” a novel about love between two young men in a Soviet summer camp.

“We must do everything to defend our children and those who want to live a normal life. Everything else is sin, sodomy and darkness,” said the Russian parliament’s speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, in explaining the new law.

In a country with a population in historic decline due to low birthrates and emigration, particularly by hundreds of thousands of men afraid of being mobilized to fight in Ukraine, same-sex couples serve as a convenient scapegoat for Russia’s demographic crisis, said Mr. Kochetkov.

“Their simple explanation for why the Russians don’t proliferate is that there is a Western-imposed idea of nontraditional relations, and that if we don’t stop it, this will be the end for us,” he said. “It will be the end because who’s going to fight wars for us? After all, they keep saying, the West hates us and dreams day and night about how to conquer our tundras with all their natural resources.”

In this campaign, Russian officials have adopted decidedly eschatological tones. Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of the Chechen Republic, has long been accused by human-rights groups of waging a campaign to kidnap and assassinate gay men in his fiefdom. Now Mr. Kadyrov, a three-star general in Russia’s security services, has called for a “jihad” against Ukraine and the “Satanist democracy” of the West, which, he claimed, seizes children from traditional families and gives them away to be perverted by same-sex couples.

Former president Dmitry Medvedev, who heads Russia’s ruling party and serves as deputy head of Mr. Putin’s national-security council, is using a similar language of holy war. “Our sacred goal is to stop the supreme commander of Hell, no matter what name he is using—Satan, Lucifer or Iblis,” Mr. Medvedev wrote in a recent treatise explaining Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. Iblis is a Muslim name for the devil.

“All of this discourse is delirious for a normal person,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a Moscow-based senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. “They lack arguments for imposing their ideology, for justifying war, which is part of that ideology, and so now they have been forced to resort to mysticism. That’s really the final stage.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
« Last Edit: December 23, 2022, 11:14:01 AM by Crafty_Dog »

DougMacG

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Re: WSJ: Putin's New Power Strategy
« Reply #155 on: December 19, 2022, 05:15:39 AM »
"Putin’s New Strategy: Laying Claim to Traditional Values
Searching for allies against Ukraine, Russia now presents itself as the leader of a global culture war against moral depravity. It’s not working."

I think this quote sums it up:

“Those who try to limit the freedom of others and other peoples, especially through an invasion, certainly don’t have any connection to traditional values, which include the respect for others and the respect for the liberty of others.”
----------
Putin represents the opposite of everything I understand about conservatism.  He is against life, against liberty and against the pursuit of happiness.  He is not just former KGB.  He is current KGB.  He is the evil head of a massive organized crime operation.  The only I have in understanding him is to the aim of defeating him, free the Russian people and free the world of the threat he poses.

His world view matches Leftists more than than the freedom seeking right.  He believes you can only enrich and empower yourself by taking from others. Tax the rich here, take from the neighbor Ukraine there.

Russian Fascism and the idea of a big central government controlling everything is the opposite of what conservatism or American creed stands for here.

« Last Edit: December 19, 2022, 05:17:16 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Misc
« Reply #156 on: January 04, 2023, 06:25:11 PM »
Russia’s navy … President Vladimir Putin dispatched the Adm. Gorshkov, a new class of Russian frigate armed with Zircon hypersonic missiles, on an extended voyage through the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The voyage fits with the new military doctrine Moscow adopted last year, according to which it will build up its naval fleet and enhance its presence in several regions.

​​… and naval exercises. Relatedly, South Africa, Russia and China announced that they will hold joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, off South African province of KwaZulu-Natal, in February. The drills are meant to develop artillery firing and air defense operations.

No rush on a gas union. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to discuss bilateral cooperation in a variety of areas. Tellingly, the conversation follows a meeting Putin had with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev over energy issues. The Kremlin still intends to create a gas union among the three countries, even if it’s in no hurry to finalize political agreements that will inevitably be pressured by Western sanctions.

Israel and Russia. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues. Officially, Israel remains neutral on the war in Ukraine, declining to impose sanctions on Russia. Cohen earlier met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who asked Cohen to pass undisclosed messages to Lavrov.



Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Putin's new foreign policy concept
« Reply #159 on: April 03, 2023, 06:43:56 AM »
Russia: Putin Approves New Foreign Policy Concept
Mar 31, 2023 | 19:18 GMT





What Happened: Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new concept for Russia's foreign policy that claims an "era of revolutionary changes" is under way in international relations, Bloomberg reported on March 31. The concept states that the flagship project of Russia in the 21st century is the "transformation of Eurasia into a single all-continental space," and it defines the formation of a multipolar world order that replaces the current allegedly U.S.-centric world order as a "foundational task for all areas of foreign policy."

Why It Matters: The concept names the strategic course of the United States as the main threat to international stability and the main factor complicating the normalization of Russia's relations with other states, such as European states. The concept thus reflects Moscow's goals in the years ahead and reflects its primary methods for achieving them: changing U.S. foreign policy and splitting Europe from the United States by fueling war fatigue on the Continent. The document claims that Russia does not consider itself an enemy of the West and does not isolate itself from it, but this statement does not reflect Moscow's actual views and is instead intended to further its goals. Russia is defined as "a distinct country-civilization" with a rightful sphere of influence over nearby states, an approach Moscow is pushing other countries to embrace in their foreign policies.

Background: Putin first announced the new concept in November 2021, but after Russia's Security Council submitted the prepared document for discussion in January 2022, Putin sent it back for revision. Russia adopted the previous version of the concept in November 2016.

Read More:

What to Make of Xi's Russia Trip and China's Growing Involvement in Ukraine (March 22, 2023)
What's Ahead for Belarus-Russia Integration? (March 13, 2023)
For Ukraine, a Deal to Supply Western Tanks Could Unlock More Advanced Weapons (Jan. 13, 2023)

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Russia's New Foreign Policy looks old and soviet
« Reply #160 on: April 14, 2023, 09:12:23 AM »
The author here appears to be Uke and writes as such, but what catches my attention is this:

"One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers."

Given the deranged nature of the Woken Dead Prog capture of so many organs of our government and our society, this is not irrational.

===========================================


Russia’s New Foreign Policy Looks Old and Soviet
A strategy document confirms Putin’s hostility to the West and desire for something like ‘détente.’
By Maksym Skrypchenko
April 13, 2023 12:59 pm ET



Vladimir Putin signed a foreign-policy strategy document last month that signals Russia’s troubling return to Soviet-era rhetoric and objectives. The document, whose creation was occasioned by Mr. Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, offers insight into the Russian president’s mind-set and strategic goals. In particular, it reveals a persistent fixation on anti-Western sentiment and the establishment of a new geopolitical order.

One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers.

The document also plays down Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, referring to the fighting indirectly and blaming the U.S. and Europe for initiating a “new type of hybrid war.” This rhetoric contrasts with the previous strategy document, which emphasized cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine. Additionally, the document expands on Russia’s “right to self-defense,” raising concerns about further military aggression.

Russia’s newfound restraint in its language regarding China and India—despite its previously announced “no limits” partnership with Beijing and warming relations with New Delhi—highlights a cautious approach to these emerging powers. The increased attention to Latin America, the Islamic world and Africa is also new, indicating that Moscow now places greater emphasis on relations with non-Western countries. Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela get special mention, as do Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The United Arab Emirates is notable for its absence.

The document’s vision of a new security order in which European states abandon their “confrontational policies and hegemonic ambitions” reflects a long-held Soviet dream of a Europe free from American influence. It reiterates Russia’s willingness for dialogue and envisions a future in which Washington seeks more-constructive relations, reminiscent of the Soviet-era policy of “peaceful coexistence” and “détente.”

The strategy’s response to Western sanctions demonstrates Russia’s intention to circumvent economic constraints through the creation of alternative monetary and payment systems. This not only underlines Russia’s determination to resist Western pressure; it also indicates a desire to break free from the U.S.-led global economic system.

The document’s language and focus strongly indicate that it was crafted by senior Russian diplomats seeking to mirror Mr. Putin’s positions. Georgia and Moldova aren’t mentioned. Only Belarus is acknowledged among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These omissions reflect the Kremlin’s recalibration of its foreign-policy priorities and its intent to forge new alliances while playing down relations with countries that it perceives as hostile or unsupportive.

That Mr. Putin has given his seal of approval to the document raises concerns about the future trajectory of international politics and the potential for increased tensions. Moscow is signaling a deeply concerning shift in Russia’s foreign policy, revealing a resurgence of Soviet ideologies and a confrontational stance toward the West.

Mr. Skrypchenko is president of the Kyiv-based Transatlantic Dialogue Center.


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Re: WSJ: Russia's New Foreign Policy looks old and soviet
« Reply #161 on: April 14, 2023, 09:18:07 AM »
The author here appears to be Uke and writes as such, but what catches my attention is this:

"One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers."

Given the deranged nature of the Woken Dead Prog capture of so many organs of our government and our society, this is not irrational.


No it is not. When I was a kid, the Soviets could literally ok at America with envy. Now everyone looks at us in horror and disgust.

===========================================


Russia’s New Foreign Policy Looks Old and Soviet
A strategy document confirms Putin’s hostility to the West and desire for something like ‘détente.’
By Maksym Skrypchenko
April 13, 2023 12:59 pm ET



Vladimir Putin signed a foreign-policy strategy document last month that signals Russia’s troubling return to Soviet-era rhetoric and objectives. The document, whose creation was occasioned by Mr. Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, offers insight into the Russian president’s mind-set and strategic goals. In particular, it reveals a persistent fixation on anti-Western sentiment and the establishment of a new geopolitical order.

One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers.

The document also plays down Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, referring to the fighting indirectly and blaming the U.S. and Europe for initiating a “new type of hybrid war.” This rhetoric contrasts with the previous strategy document, which emphasized cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine. Additionally, the document expands on Russia’s “right to self-defense,” raising concerns about further military aggression.

Russia’s newfound restraint in its language regarding China and India—despite its previously announced “no limits” partnership with Beijing and warming relations with New Delhi—highlights a cautious approach to these emerging powers. The increased attention to Latin America, the Islamic world and Africa is also new, indicating that Moscow now places greater emphasis on relations with non-Western countries. Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela get special mention, as do Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The United Arab Emirates is notable for its absence.

The document’s vision of a new security order in which European states abandon their “confrontational policies and hegemonic ambitions” reflects a long-held Soviet dream of a Europe free from American influence. It reiterates Russia’s willingness for dialogue and envisions a future in which Washington seeks more-constructive relations, reminiscent of the Soviet-era policy of “peaceful coexistence” and “détente.”

The strategy’s response to Western sanctions demonstrates Russia’s intention to circumvent economic constraints through the creation of alternative monetary and payment systems. This not only underlines Russia’s determination to resist Western pressure; it also indicates a desire to break free from the U.S.-led global economic system.

The document’s language and focus strongly indicate that it was crafted by senior Russian diplomats seeking to mirror Mr. Putin’s positions. Georgia and Moldova aren’t mentioned. Only Belarus is acknowledged among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These omissions reflect the Kremlin’s recalibration of its foreign-policy priorities and its intent to forge new alliances while playing down relations with countries that it perceives as hostile or unsupportive.

That Mr. Putin has given his seal of approval to the document raises concerns about the future trajectory of international politics and the potential for increased tensions. Moscow is signaling a deeply concerning shift in Russia’s foreign policy, revealing a resurgence of Soviet ideologies and a confrontational stance toward the West.

Mr. Skrypchenko is president of the Kyiv-based Transatlantic Dialogue Center.


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WRM: The view for Putin not all bad
« Reply #163 on: August 28, 2023, 03:34:33 PM »
The View From the Kremlin Isn’t All Bad
Putin has problems in Ukraine but is gaining in the Middle East, Africa and China.
Walter Russell Mead
WSJ
Aug. 28, 2023 6:04 pm ET


Not everything is going Vladimir Putin’s way. Ukraine’s counteroffensive has made gains recently, Russia’s foreign-exchange reserves are dwindling, and the Prigozhin fiasco revealed cracks in the Kremlin’s power structure. Even so, the view from the Kremlin is nowhere as gloomy as Mr. Putin’s opponents wish.

Mr. Putin’s original plans in Ukraine may have failed and left him in a difficult war of attrition, but the Ukrainians have problems of their own. U.S. and Ukrainian military officials are squabbling about who is to blame for the counteroffensive’s slow progress. With American officials warning that they are unlikely to provide Ukraine with equal or greater supplies for a second offensive next year, Mr. Putin may think he has passed “peak Ukraine” in terms of the country’s ability to resist.

Farther afield, Mr. Putin also has much to be happy about. The coup in Niger underlines the massive success that the Wagner Group has had in disrupting the Western position across Africa. This is partially about Russia gaining control over such resources as gold and uranium, and partially about creating chaotic threats to Western interests. Western policy makers are left to wrestle with migrant flows as refugees stream north, and the threat of terrorism rises as jihadist groups gain ground across the Sahel. The collapse of French and European power across Africa does more than highlight the geopolitical impotence of the European Union. It diverts American attention and resources from both Asia and Ukraine.

Mr. Putin has also put points on the board in the Middle East. Thanks to Russian support, Bashar al-Assad scoffs at American threats in Syria. Longtime American allies continue to intensify their cooperation with Russia. The United Arab Emirates defied American pressure to deepen commercial ties with Moscow. Iran is becoming thoroughly integrated into Russia’s armaments pipeline.

And China’s relationship with Russia, despite Western hopes that Xi Jinping would wash his hands of an ally turned rogue, remains strong. China is buying all the Russian oil and gas it can get its hands on, and it’s supplying significant quantities of dual-use equipment that helps Mr. Putin keep both his economy and military campaign sputtering and grinding along. China is feeding Mr. Putin’s war machine, and will likely continue to do so, regardless of what President Biden says or does.

Mr. Putin can also take heart from political developments in America. Donald Trump’s path to the Republican nomination appears open, and the chances of his returning to the White House are if anything growing. Mr. Biden has not yet provided a coherent and compelling description of his Ukraine policy that can rally the nation. Whispers from the U.S. military that flawed Ukrainian command choices are responsible for the counteroffensive’s poor results won’t strengthen public support.

READ MORE GLOBAL VIEW
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Mr. Putin’s strongest asset, as ever, remains the incoherence of the contemporary West. His Western opponents are Churchills on the podium and Chamberlains in real life. They proclaim their undying commitment to a rules-based international order that forbids territorial conquest, while quietly pressing Ukraine to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbas. They solemnly commemorate Pride Month in Kabul while preparing the wholesale abandonment of Afghans to the Taliban. They oscillate between denouncing Saudi Arabia as a pariah state and begging for its help. They moralistically instruct the Global South to sacrifice for the common good on climate change even as they embrace protectionist policies that threaten the South’s economic future.

From Mr. Putin’s point of view, this mix of aggressive rhetoric and cautious policy making is the best of all possible American approaches. The administration’s chest thumping about American values often sounds like bullying to other countries, while the unmissable contrast between bold words and timid deeds invites contempt.

Meanwhile the incoherence of American policy is undermining the administration’s position at home. If Mr. Biden wants Ukraine to win the war against Russia, why isn’t he sending more and better weapons? If his goal is a compromise that leaves Mr. Putin with most of the territory he’s seized, why is the U.S. spending so much money for such a meager result?

Mr. Putin’s attack on Ukraine was a historic mistake, plunging Russia into a difficult and still unpredictable war. Total victory appears unlikely, and the war’s cost to Russia will be high. Moscow’s struggles in Ukraine are reducing its influence in much of the former Soviet space. In the Caucasus, Turkey and Azerbaijan are squeezing Russia’s Armenian clients—even as oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan wriggles further out of Russia’s grasp. In Central Asia, Chinese economic and political presence grows as Russia fades.

None of these developments, however, will help the West, promote democracy or disguise the reality that the Biden administration, having failed to deter Mr. Putin from launching the war, hasn’t found a path to making him lose it, or to drive him toward negotiation on reasonable terms.

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GPF: George Friedman: Russia seals its southern bordere
« Reply #165 on: September 26, 2023, 09:14:47 AM »
September 26, 2023
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Russia Seals Its Southern Border
By: George Friedman
Russia's focus currently is on its western front, in Ukraine and neighboring countries. There is, however, another front that concerns Russia: its southern border, which runs along and through the Caucasus Mountains. South of the mountains lie Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The mountains protect a strategic area of Russia. The area northwest of the mountains leads to the Sea of Azov and the Ukrainian border near Donbas, which has been heavily contested over the years. To the northeast is the Volga River and the historical city of Stalingrad, now called Volgograd. The land north of the mountains is flat, and from Astrakhan to Crimea is about 550 miles (885 kilometers). An attack on Russia from the south would have a decided effect on Russia’s ability to execute the war in Ukraine and, in the long run, could sever critical rivers such as the Volga and the Don. Therefore, protecting the Caucasus from penetration by any hostile force is vital.


(click to enlarge)

For Russia, it is imperative that it penetrate the North Caucasus. It is almost as important as Ukraine. From the mid-1990s to the 2000s, Russia and Chechnya fought an intense war, which was an element in the rise of Vladimir Putin. Russia’s victory helped shape Putin’s thinking about borderlands. Russia also fought a war with Georgia, which had received U.S. military support.

Recently, Azerbaijan sent forces to occupy an area between itself and Armenia. Armenia is relatively poor, while Azerbaijan is rich in oil. The two countries have been hostile toward one another since independence, with tensions focused on Nagorno-Karabakh, a small region with an ethnic-Armenian population but officially part of Azerbaijan. The strategic interests are unclear, but the political issue is intense.

Historically, Russia has supported Armenia, even when trying to mediate. This has shifted. The Americans entered the region – first by supporting Georgia, and then by maintaining a careful (on both sides) relationship with Azerbaijan, but always keeping distance from Armenia. However, a new Armenian government was elected a few years ago that was cautious about the Russians. In the course of the war in Ukraine, the U.S. decided to enter into much closer relations with Armenia, which welcomed the Americans as a counterweight against Azerbaijan. But with Russia no longer a threat, and the United States lacking sufficient military force in the region, Azerbaijan occupied Nagorno-Karabakh.

This does not change the reality on the ground, but it does indicate that a level of tension and even conflict is emerging. The Russians have a substantial peacekeeping force in the region that has been quiet but could conceivably act against Armenia or, with reinforcements, revive the Georgian war. Armenia has little choice other than to negotiate a deal with the Russians or turn to the Americans. Neither choice would comfort it.

The United States wants to continue holding some capability in the area to threaten to penetrate the North Caucacus, which would be a dangerous and unlikely maneuver. The Russians are not dismissing the Americans’ willingness to do the dangerous and unlikely. A war is raging in Ukraine, and the U.S. could use another card in negotiations with the Russians. On paper it is an excellent idea, but quite insane in reality. So, the question now is whether Georgia is prepared to pull closer to the United States in return for military aid, and whether Azerbaijan is willing for the same reason. But since Azerbaijan and Russia seem suddenly linked, that’s not going to happen. Russia seems to have secured the Caucasus and turned the unlikely into the unthinkable. The U.S. has Armenia, which does not give it much credibility. Therefore, Russia has sealed, for now, its southern border

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Re: Stratfor: Russia's Great Power Strategy
« Reply #166 on: October 18, 2023, 07:53:38 AM »
October 16, 2023
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Russia’s Involvement in the Israel-Hamas War
Despite unfounded allegations to the contrary, Moscow is much more interested in mediation than aggression.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
After Israel said it was at war with Hamas, several countries expressed concern over the conflict’s escalation and called on both sides to halt hostilities. One of them was Russia – despite the fact that some heads of state have accused Moscow of aiding Hamas’ initial attack on Israel, saying it would prove a useful distraction from the debacle in Ukraine. Israel itself has dismissed these allegations as purely conspiratorial, and though Russia could benefit from the conflict, it would do so only as a mediator, not an aggressor.

After all, it’s certainly true that the world has shifted its attention from Ukraine to Israel, and it’s certainly true that Russia welcomes the reprieve. The Kremlin has spent untold resources on its war effort, and it can’t afford to come out as a loser. Losing would rob Moscow of the international status it so desperately seeks, it would very likely lead to domestic discontent, and it would result in the very thing Russia sought to avoid: NATO troops close to its border. These facts have led many to believe Russia will use this moment to launch another offensive. But the opportunity isn’t as good as it appears. Russia is too deeply involved in Ukraine, and in the revitalization of economic growth in the face of labor shortages and crippling sanctions, to aid or abet either side of the Israel-Hamas war. And even if it weren’t, Russia has an interest in maintaining good relations with both parties. The worse the war gets, the harder it is for Russia to do either.

Moscow understands that one way or another, the Ukraine war will end. It understands that Ukraine isn’t its sole avenue for expanding its influence. And it understands that, given the circumstances, it needs to engage politically and economically as much as it can with countries it has good relations with.

Israel and the Palestinian Territories are just such states, and Russia continues to maintain dialogue with both accordingly. In fact, Russia’s ties to the territories are nothing short of historical. After Israel reoriented its foreign policy to the West during the Cold War, the Soviet Union supplied weapons to the Palestine Liberation Organization and trained its militants at Soviet military educational institutions. They’ve remained in contact ever since. Its support for the Palestinian Territories has contributed to its status among other Middle Eastern countries, many of which have increased trade with Russia dramatically since the onset of Western sanctions. These countries include Iran and Algeria, which also need Russian economic support in these difficult economic times. More, Islam is the second most popular religion in Russia, with many of its practitioners found in the North Caucasus, whose support the Kremlin needs to maintain stability in its southern reaches. Last, there are some 2,000 Russian citizens throughout the formal territory of the Palestinian Authority, of which 1,200 are in the Gaza Strip. This explains why President Vladimir Putin has advocated for Palestinian statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem.

Even so, Russia continues to maintain relations with Israel. Roughly 80,000 Jews live in Russia, and the Russian Jewish diaspora in Israel is likewise large. Israel was also one of the preferred destinations for Russians who fled the country after the invasion of Ukraine. In 2022, more than 37,000 people fled to Israel from Russia, and in 2023, ahead of stricter immigration laws, the number of people leaving Russia for Israel has increased sharply. In terms of foreign policy, Russia sees Israel, a nuclear power, as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and appreciates the fact that it has abstained from the Western sanctions regime. Of the war with Hamas, Putin said that Israel is under unprecedented attack and has the right to defend its citizens.

But perhaps the most compelling evidence that Russia is not involved in the Israel-Hamas war is that, so far, Russia hasn’t really used it to its advantage. It hasn’t undertaken any new offensives, nor is there any indication that the military was on alert for anything too dramatic to happen. All it has done is try to position itself as a mediator in the conflict. In addition to calling for a cease-fire, Putin emphasized the importance of diplomatic efforts to establish a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, noting that a ground operation in Gaza would lead to dire consequences and the death of civilians.

Russia knows that the Middle East is a much higher priority for the United States than Ukraine is, and that Washington might be particularly interested in having someone else mediate so that it doesn’t get drawn back into yet another regional conflict. And unlike Russia, the U.S. doesn’t curry much favor among the Palestinian Territories anyway. Already, the Kremlin is trying to figure out how to use its position to resolve its own issues, and there are already rumors of potential dialogue between the U.S. and Russia. Last week, a working-level meeting of the Nuclear Five was held in New York with the participation of Russian representatives.

For Russia, the benefits of mediation are twofold: It helps Moscow break out of its (relative) international isolation by working with partners it otherwise wouldn’t, and it potentially helps stop the war from escalating further or from implicating other regional countries with which Russia has lucrative economic, infrastructural and logistic partnerships.

The real question is whether Moscow will have time to seize the moment, given all the problems it is juggling. The benefits are high, and there’s an opportunity cost of inaction. If the war broadens to include Russian allies, it’ll be that much more difficult for Moscow to balance its powers in the Middle East, and Russia will lose its moment