Author Topic: Political Economics  (Read 1004238 times)

DougMacG

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Toward zero tariffs, Steve Moore, CTUP
« Reply #2650 on: March 14, 2025, 02:21:57 AM »
https://committeetounleashprosperity.com/hotlines/trump-is-right-about-our-trading-partners-imposing-excessive-tariffs/

We aren’t fans of the trade war, but blaming Trump (as the media and the Left are doing) ignores one key point: He’s right that other countries impose outrageous tariffs on American exports.
(chart)
Is there a path to reciprocal low or zero rates? We wouldn’t count Trump out. One idea we like would be to start immediately with a zero-zero trade agreement with Argentina, which Javier Milei is reportedly interested in. That would knock our trading partners off their high horse.
« Last Edit: March 14, 2025, 02:28:32 AM by DougMacG »



DougMacG

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Tax Cuts Boost Revenue Time After Time
« Reply #2653 on: March 25, 2025, 09:07:23 AM »
Charts at the link:
https://www.discoursemagazine.com/p/in-actual-dollars-tax-cuts-boost-revenue-time-after-time

In Actual Dollars, Tax Cuts Boost Revenue Time After Time
From the Kennedy legislation in 1964 to the Trump package in 2017, the naysayers are proven wrong again and again
Feb 14, 2022

By Jack Salmon

Historically high federal budget deficits and a mountain of debt larger than the entire U.S. economy have made the Build Back Better bill a tough sell in Congress. But proponents claim that if the 2017 tax cuts took a hatchet to Treasury revenue—President Biden says to the tune of nearly $2 trillion—then a bigger budget deficit can also finance the trillions in Build Back Better spending.

One problem: Federal revenue didn’t fall after the big Trump administration tax cuts, much less by $2 trillion. Instead, total revenue rose. In fact, after trimming the rates for five of the seven brackets and nearly doubling the standard deduction, the government collected nearly $100 billion more in personal income tax revenue for the year ended Sept. 30, 2018. That was the biggest jump in three years.

The conventional wisdom in media, political and policymaking circles is that tax cuts cost the government so much revenue that they drive the country’s enormous budget deficits, but this isn’t true. After President George W. Bush’s 2003 tax cuts, revenue rose for the next four years, with the deficit shrinking to as little as $161 billion in fiscal 2007. After the 1986 Reagan tax reform, which cut the top personal income tax rate from 50% to 28% and lowered the rates for other brackets, the deficit plummeted 32% the next year and stayed at that low level for another two years while revenue rose dramatically for three straight years.

Economists in Denial
But most economists, of all people, resist acknowledging this. The University of Chicago Booth School of Business polled 40 prominent economists in 2012, asking whether total federal tax revenue would be higher in five years if income tax rates were cut. Tax revenue has always been higher five years after a cut in tax rates, but not one economist agreed. A few were uncertain, the vast majority disagreed or strongly disagreed, with many sarcastically dismissing the idea in their comments.

Of course, revenue sometimes falls short of estimates of what it might have been if taxes weren’t cut. But these estimates, usually by the Congressional Budget Office, can’t consider the economic slowdowns that may be averted and the pandemics that come out of nowhere. When people in the press or on television talk about tax cuts reducing revenue, they’re talking about revenue compared with what might have been, not in actual terms. They like to talk about budget baselines—straight-line revenue projections that assume nothing will change—and then argue that tax cuts hurt the Treasury because the actual revenue growth didn’t meet the predicted growth.

To be sure, not all tax cuts are created equal. Merely mailing rebate checks to taxpayers, handing out child credits or offering tax breaks to businesses for dubious purposes doesn’t spur long-term economic growth. These Keynesian, demand-side tax cuts can add as much to the budget deficit as the government spends on them.

The Power of Incentives
But supply-side cuts that lower tax rates—for individuals, corporations and capital gains—do spur the economy and boost tax revenue. They offer incentives to people to work harder and invest more, therefore expanding the supply of labor, investment and savings. All big tax-cut packages contain both demand-side and supply-side elements, so they unfortunately never produce all the economic growth and increased revenue that a supply-side-only package would generate.

But no matter the type of tax cut, efforts over the decades to lighten the tax burden have never been the main culprit behind the government’s inflated budget deficits. Recent federal deficits have been driven by pandemic-related legislation, while the long-term fiscal imbalances are driven by the growth of Social Security and other entitlement spending.


Let’s take a look at the major post-war tax cuts. The first was the U.S. Revenue Act of 1964, which reduced the top personal income tax rate from 91% to 70% and the top corporate tax rate from 52% to 48%. Keynesian economists, as well as skeptical Treasury staffers, estimated that the cuts would result in a cumulative revenue loss of $32 billion by 1966 (in constant 1963 dollars).

But instead, federal receipts grew by 65%, or 32% in real terms, from 1965 through 1970. And a time series analysis published in the years following the act found that it led to a cumulative revenue loss of just $2.5 billion through 1966, compared with the estimate of what revenue would have been without the tax cuts. In fact, the economists who conducted the analysis concluded that the revenue effect was “virtually indistinguishable from zero.”

The First Supply-Siders
The impact of reining in such high tax rates may have surprised many policymakers, but market-oriented economists had long understood their negative effects. Indeed, almost 200 years earlier, Adam Smith wrote in the fifth book of the Wealth of Nations:

“High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.”

Similarly, 50 years later, French economist Jean-Baptiste Say in his “A Treatise on Political Economy” noted that when taxation is pushed to the extreme, “the tax-payer is abridged of his enjoyments, the producer of his profits, and the public exchequer of its receipts.”


Amid a double-dip recession, President Reagan signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act in 1981. This cut the top personal income tax rate from 70% to 50% over a three-year period. Inside-the-Beltway conventional wisdom was again turned on its head as federal receipts grew by 33% in real terms from 1983 through 1989. To this day, the Reagan tax cuts are widely accused of exploding the federal deficit, but the deficit as a share of gross domestic product fell by half during this period. Give much of the credit to slower public spending, which grew by an average of 11.8% a year in the six years before 1981 but by only 7% a year in the six years after 1981.

The Bush tax cuts began with the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which lowered the top income tax rate from 39.6% to 35%, cut three of the other four rates and created a new, lower, 10% rate. Critics bashed the tax cuts; some economists forecast that they would chop federal revenue by as much as $2.3 trillion by 2011.

Federal revenue did fall after the cuts—which were signed into law when the economy was in recession and three months before the Sept. 11 attacks—but by only $210 billion, or 10.6%, over the next two years. Market-oriented economists see these cuts as poorly designed and largely a failure, given the loss of revenue and the slow economic growth that persisted into 2002. This was because handouts such as tax rebates, expanded child credits, and other credits and deductions made up a big part of the cuts but did nothing to improve incentives to work and invest and so did not spur economic growth, according to a 2012 Mercatus Center report. These were Keynesian provisions, aimed at getting money into the hands of consumers and businesses and goosing demand, and not supply-side cuts that would increase the availability of labor and goods.


Revenue started rising again after Bush’s second round of tax cuts. This 2003 package was better designed and fixed some of the problems with the 2001 cuts, but not entirely.

The latest major tax-cut legislation is the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the Trump tax cuts. They lowered the top rate from 39.5% to 37% and sliced the top federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that compared with the budget baseline, the act would reduce revenue by almost $1.5 trillion over the next decade. For fiscal 2021, the committee said revenue would fall $198 billion short of the baseline, but instead it came in $39 billion higher. Overall, revenue has jumped $685 billion since the tax cuts, as of the end of fiscal 2021, rising every year except for a slight drop during the 2020 pandemic year.

Here’s another way to look at this package: As of 2020, revenue since 2017 as a share of GDP was half a percentage point a year below the average for 1950 through 2017, while expenditures were 12.3 percentage points a year above the historical average. But from 2021 onward, revenue is forecast to exceed the average, while expenditures are forecast to significantly exceed the average and by a growing margin. This signals not a revenue shortfall but a serious overspending problem.


In a new research paper, Charles Blahous tabulates legislated contributions to the government’s fiscal imbalance. With the fiscal 2021 budget, he finds that 66% of the deficit was rooted in pandemic-related spending and 25% caused by pre-2017 legislation. Just 7.8% was the result of lost revenue—money the government might have collected if the Trump tax cuts hadn’t been enacted and the economy would’ve performed as well as it did with the tax cuts. Looking at the long-term fiscal imbalance, he determined that 83% of the deficit is due to spending growth (especially with Social Security and Medicare and other government healthcare programs), while 16.8% is the result of tax cuts over several decades.

The lesson here isn’t that tax cuts don’t ever add to the deficit—those Keynesian ones certainly do—but that they don’t deserve anywhere near the blame they get for those deficits. The federal government doesn’t have a revenue problem; what it does have is a terrible addiction to spending.

DougMacG

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Blue states don't build, red states do
« Reply #2654 on: March 26, 2025, 06:49:12 AM »
https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/blue-states-dont-build-red-states

Cases in point, businesses left Seattle:
https://mynorthwest.com/local/this-is-catastrophic-seattle-payroll-tax-revenues-47m-short-as-jobs-leave-city/4067765

75 Days After CA Wildfires, FOUR Building Permits Have Been Issued in the Palisades  (gatewaypundit)
« Last Edit: March 26, 2025, 07:18:46 AM by DougMacG »

DougMacG

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Political Economics, Mar-A-Lago Accord
« Reply #2655 on: March 26, 2025, 09:37:05 AM »
Hat tip John Ellis News Items. I don't fully agree. "He wants tax cuts that will increase the budget deficit..."  - Good grief, didn't we just go through this?
 
Rebecca Patterson is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). A globally recognized investor and macro-economic researcher with more than twenty-five years of experience across the U.S., Europe, and Asia, Patterson studies how politics and policy intersect with economic trends to drive financial markets.

Previously, Patterson was chief investment strategist for Bridgewater Associates, the world’s largest hedge fund. From 2012 through 2019, Patterson was chief investment officer of Bessemer Trust, a multi-family office where she managed $85 billion in client assets. Before joining Bessemer, Patterson spent more than fifteen years at JPMorgan, where she worked as a researcher in the firm’s investment bank in Europe, Singapore, and the U.S., served as chief investment strategist in the asset management arm of the firm, and ran the Private Bank’s global currency and commodity trading desk. Patterson's transition to finance came after several years working as a journalist, covering financial markets, policy, and politics in the U.S. and Europe.

This is another in a series of “guest columns” that appear in Political News Items and/or News Items from time to time. There’s been a lot of chatter of late about the Mar-A-Lago Accord. We’ve struggled to grok it, so we asked Rebecca to explain it.

By Rebecca Patterson, 3/25/2025:

President Trump wants to have his economic cake and eat it too.

He wants to keep the dollar globally dominant but weakened to support US exporters. He wants tax cuts that will increase the budget deficit but lower Treasury bond yields. He wants to raise tariffs on other countries to reduce the US trade deficit but strengthen America’s standing as an attractive destination for foreign investment.

Achieving these aggregate goals – aimed at increasing US manufacturing jobs and making the US economy more resilient – will be difficult enough. But even more complicated - and risky - are the proposals to bake this economic cake: the Mar-a-Lago Accord.

Named after Trump’s Florida estate, the Mar-a-Lago Accord is the moniker given to a complicated set of plans and concepts of plans from Trump’s advisors that would mark an inflection point for the global economic order.

Unlike the Plaza Accord of 1985 where five countries agreed at the New York Plaza Hotel to collectively act to weaken the dollar, Mar-a-Lago is unlikely to get the cross-border coordination required to succeed.

But even just attempting to follow this policy recipe would create material risks for the US economy and financial markets. More immediately, these include a potential dislocation in the US Treasury market that would trigger global financial contagion and weigh on economic growth. Structurally, these efforts could call into question the Federal Reserve’s independence and increase incentives for countries around the world to reduce dependence on the USD-based financial system and US marketplace.

The ideas behind the Mar-a-Lago Accord started getting broad attention through a research note published last year by Stephen Miran, now Chair of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisors. It has gotten more focus in recent weeks as the administration has quickly adopted other unorthodox policies and as the President and cabinet members have publicly highlighted that their longer-term policy goals may necessitate short-term economic and financial-market pain.

To understand the risks from Mar-a-Lago, it’s useful to consider the policy recipe, so to speak, as laid out in five main steps by Miran.

Step 1, already underway, is tariffs. Mar-a-Lago recommends previewing tariffs before implementation and then ramping up tariff levels gradually, all to give US firms room to prepare and countries time to negotiate. This is what has largely happened to date. Indeed, as Trump and his team provide hints at the next tariff wave expected sometime around April 2, what the president is calling “Liberation Day,” US companies are building inventories and foreign companies are offering US investments, the latter in hopes of getting tariff exemptions from the White House.

Historically, tariffs have often caused the home country's currency to strengthen and the currencies of tariffed countries to weaken, as consumers in the home country buy fewer of the pricier imports. Miran suggests that the weaker foreign currency allows US importers to get tariffed items more cheaply (one dollar gets you more of the weakened foreign currency). That means that even with the tariff applied, the final price paid doesn’t change much. Assuming this logic holds, which he acknowledges is uncertain, he sees tariffs as a way to bring in US revenue without material inflationary risk.

Separately, Mar-a-Lago proponents expect tariff revenue will offset lower US tax revenue, which will help manage the country’s fiscal challenges.

Step 2 is blending trade sticks with defense carrots. Mar-a-Lago, as described by Miran, posits that “national security and trade are joined at the hip.” He and the broader administration see the US security umbrella as something foreign countries should pay for in some way. That’s where the trade war comes in. Countries that want to continue benefitting from US protection could take a variety of steps to help US businesses, from reducing local subsidies, agreeing not to retaliate against US tariffs, joining the US in trade restrictions against China, or pledging major investments in the US.

Step 3 is weakening the dollar while keeping it globally dominant. President Trump and Vice President JD Vance have stated their preference for the US dollar to remain the global reserve currency. At the same time, they want other countries’ currencies to strengthen from what are seen as unfair levels which give these countries an export advantage over the US. (Never mind that a weaker dollar, as noted in Step 1, could increase inflation risks.)

Mar-a-Lago’s recipe attempts to address this “dominant-but-weaker” dilemma with multi-step, coordinated central bank intervention.

The proposal suggests that the US would consider reducing tariffs if a foreign country agreed to sell its US government bonds from central bank reserves in exchange for its own currency. This would weaken the dollar and strengthen the local currency. The goal would be to get several major countries to do this at once, similar to Plaza in 1985.

But selling such a large quantity of Treasury bonds could easily trigger a market crisis by sharply pushing up yields. To reduce that risk, the same central banks would also agree as they sell current holdings to swap into smaller dollar amounts of ultra-long Treasury bonds (say 50- or 100-year bonds with zero or low coupons). The hope here is that these steps together would get the US both a weaker dollar and longer-term financing without losing much share of global central bank reserves.

This is where the recipe falls apart. In contrast to 1985, when countries agreed to pursue a weaker dollar and backed intervention with monetary and fiscal policies geared to achieve the same goal, today there is no broad agreement on preferred currency trends or policy.

While the US wants much stronger foreign currencies, China for instance would likely prefer a gradual, modest weakening of its renminbi to help fight deflation and encourage more consumption. Japan, meanwhile, might be okay with a modestly stronger yen but is mainly focused on currency stability to help its global businesses in their longer-term planning. Europe is currently cutting interest rates to support growth; a stronger euro would work against that goal by hampering exports. If the US wants global coordination this time, it won’t come easily.

Step 4 is a fix if Step 3 fails: Tax capital inflows or buy foreign currencies to weaken the dollar. Mar-a-Lago holds that if a multilateral effort can’t be secured, the US has alternative, unilateral ways to reach its goals. One idea is to have the President use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose a type of “user fee” on official foreign holdings of US reserve assets to make them less attractive and therefore reduce dollar demand. A directionally similar idea is for the US to purchase foreign currencies, potentially funded by government-held gold reserves or the Federal Reserve.

Finally, Step 5 encourages the Federal Reserve to support these government efforts and smooth over any market dislocations. Given risks of adverse market reactions to a number of these steps, a successful Mar-a-Lago Accord would require the Fed to act as supportive sous-chef. For instance, if the central banks’ shift into longer-term Treasury bonds causes panic selling of bonds by private investors, the Fed could intervene to ensure stability. It may also be required to provide short-term liquidity to central banks holding ultra-long bonds, which would likely be thinly traded and volatile.

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Overall, the administration sees this recipe as a way to help deliver on Trump’s economic promises. Of course, the White House is looking at additional creative ways to bake a great American economic cake. Supporting dollar stablecoins, cryptocurrencies that act as a globally available digital dollar, could increase demand for Treasuries held in stablecoin reserves to preserve the currency “peg” and reinforce global dollar usage. This could help cap US Treasury yields and reduce market risks from parts of the Mar-a-Lago Accord.

Meanwhile, selling government assets like land or buildings could generate revenue to fund foreign-exchange reserves (or other priorities). And encouraging more energy production, if successful, could contribute to lower energy prices and offset inflation pressures that the weaker dollar could create.

What about the risks? Miran acknowledges that these policies could cause near-term economic or market pain. He highlights the potential for inflation in particular, the latter already noted by the Fed at its March policy meeting and expected by many Wall Street economists if broad tariffs are pursued at a time when US inflection expectations are already rising.

He also notes the risk of market volatility. Central banks unloading billions worth of Treasury holdings and dollars in short order would be a massive market event, creating contagion to broader markets that Miran seems to be significantly underappreciating.

The Plaza Accord itself provides an example of what could easily happen. About a year after its implementation, then Treasury Secretary James Baker said: “The Plaza Agreement achieved its purpose, perhaps too well. What began as an orderly adjustment of exchange rates threatened to become a free fall.” After the dollar lost about 40% against the Japanese yen and 20% against the German deutsche mark, policymakers had to reunite in September 1987 for what was called the Louvre Accord – coordinated action to stabilize the dollar and financial markets.

The Mar-a-Lago Accord creates more structural risks as well that could weigh on US growth - similar to what the UK experienced after its 2016 decision to exit the European Union.

A trade war would not just put US companies at risk from retaliatory tariffs but also loss of market share, as foreign firms look for more reliable partners. US farms saw such a shift from the US-China 2018-19 trade war – Chinese buyers switched more of their soybean purchases to Brazil and to date have not come back. In the European Union, meanwhile, recent months have seen new trade deals finalized with Latin and South American countries, excluding the US. The EU, in its proposed “Readiness 2030” security strategy, could strictly limit purchases of US materials, a notable shift in policy from past decades.

Meanwhile, risks arise from a potential loss of trust in the Federal Reserve’s independence and reliability of US institutions more generally. That could be reflected in foreign firms’ interest in investing in the US. (In Trump’s first term, foreign direct investment inflows slowed, even before the pandemic.) It could also emerge in a sustained, higher bond “term premium,” the extra return required over the policy interest rate to loan the US government money for longer time periods. Higher yields would mean more challenging borrowing costs for firms and households which could weigh on broader economic growth. Finally, this environment would likely increase support around dollar alternatives, including the BRICS group of emerging economies and led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It’s no coincidence that China this month increased the number of local sectors available to foreign investment, offering tax breaks and other incentives. It hopes to gain “market share” not just in goods but also in global capital flows.

Most Americans support the Trump administration’s goals of a stronger manufacturing sector and more resilient economy. But if they understand the risks involved, few seem likely to support the Mar-a-Lago Accord as the best recipe for reaching those goals.
« Last Edit: March 27, 2025, 08:30:34 AM by DougMacG »

DougMacG

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No big surge in government workers getting unemployment benefits
« Reply #2656 on: March 27, 2025, 08:32:58 AM »
A lot of these laid off federal government remote workers already had full-time private sector jobs?

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/jobless-claims-not-showing-big-surge-in-federal-workers-seeking-unemployment-benefits-02c368e5?mod=home_ln

"Jobless claims not showing big surge in federal workers seeking unemployment benefits
Layoffs in the private sector are still very low. "

(Millionth viewer to this thread gets a free forum subscription!)
« Last Edit: March 27, 2025, 08:45:27 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Political Economics
« Reply #2657 on: March 27, 2025, 04:12:27 PM »
Closing in!


DougMacG

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Kudlow, Laffer, Moore and Forbes
« Reply #2659 on: March 29, 2025, 01:23:55 PM »
Video: Getting the CTUP band back together...  Link below.

They would like to see more pro-growth policies.

They trust that Trump understands the dangers of tariffs. He is negotiating from a position of strength. (Though he may be screwing up Canada. )

https://www.foxbusiness.com/video/6370545784112
18 minute segment.
« Last Edit: March 29, 2025, 01:26:44 PM by DougMacG »

ccp

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does gold going up mean expect inflation
« Reply #2660 on: March 29, 2025, 02:01:00 PM »
only listened to first part as I cannot sit through 18 min. of economic chatter gossip etc.

but Forbes states gold going up portends inflation but I don't see it in this graph:

https://finbold.com/guide/gold-price-vs-inflation-how-well-does-gold-keep-up-with-inflation/

if true of course, we will lose in '26, '28 and forward

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Political Economics
« Reply #2661 on: March 30, 2025, 05:02:13 AM »
Gold also responds to geopolitical risks. (e.g. are we getting ready to hit Iran?)

China and India can influence the demand for gold.



DougMacG

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Re: Political Economics
« Reply #2662 on: March 30, 2025, 05:58:07 AM »
Gold also responds to geopolitical risks. (e.g. are we getting ready to hit Iran?)

China and India can influence the demand for gold.

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Political Economics
« Reply #2663 on: March 30, 2025, 07:13:23 AM »
Far out!