Author Topic: US-Russia  (Read 111866 times)

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Trump looks to drive wedge between Russia and Iran.
« Reply #200 on: February 06, 2017, 07:45:26 PM »
Trump Administration Looks at Driving Wedge Between Russia and Iran
Officials say strategy marries president’s vows to improve relations with Putin and to aggressively challenge Iran’s military presence in Middle East
By Jay Solomon
Feb. 5, 2017 7:47 p.m. ET
119 COMMENTS

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration is exploring ways to break Russia’s military and diplomatic alliance with Iran in a bid to both end the Syrian conflict and bolster the fight against Islamic State, said senior administration, European and Arab officials involved in the policy discussions.

The emerging strategy seeks to reconcile President Donald Trump’s seemingly contradictory vows to improve relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and to aggressively challenge the military presence of Iran—one of Moscow’s most critical allies—in the Middle East, these officials say.

A senior administration official said the White House doesn’t have any illusions about Russia or see Mr. Putin as a “choir boy,” despite further conciliatory statements from Mr. Trump about the Russian leader over the weekend. But the official said that the administration doesn’t view Russia as the same existential threat that the Soviet Union posed to the U.S. during the Cold War and that Mr. Trump was committed to constraining Iran.

“If there’s a wedge to be driven between Russia and Iran, we’re willing to explore that,” the official said.

Such a strategy doesn’t entirely explain the mixed signals Mr. Trump and his circle have sent regarding Moscow, which have unnerved U.S. allies and caught Republican leaders in Congress off guard.
Related

    Russia Open to Pragmatic U.S. Relationship
    U.S. Suggests Path to End Russian Sanctions(Feb. 5)
    White House Issues Perplexing Statement on Whereabouts of Ukraine Conflict (Feb. 5)
    Renewed Fighting in Eastern Ukraine Presents Challenge for Trump’s Plans With Russia(Feb. 3)
    Trump’s Bluntness Unsettles World Leaders(Feb. 3)
    Russia, Turkey and Iran Agree on Syria Truce Monitoring(Jan. 24)

Days after the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, said a surge in violence in eastern Ukraine demanded “clear and strong condemnation of Russian actions,” Vice President Mike Pence suggested Sunday that Washington could lift sanctions on Moscow soon if it cooperated in the U.S. fight against Islamic State.

Mr. Trump himself spoke again about wanting to mend relations with Mr. Putin in an interview that aired before Sunday’s Super Bowl, saying “it’s better to get along with Russia than not.” After Fox News host Bill O’Reilly said Mr. Putin was a “killer,” the president responded: “What, you think our country’s so innocent?”

But those involved in the latest policy discussions argue there is a specific focus on trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran.

“There’s daylight between Russia and Iran for sure,” said a senior European official who has held discussions with Mr. Trump’s National Security Council staff in recent weeks. “What’s unclear is what Putin would demand in return for weakening the alliance.”

But persuading Mr. Putin to break with Tehran would be immensely difficult and—a number of Russian experts in Washington say—come at a heavy cost likely to reverberate across America’s alliances with its Western partners. Nor would Mr. Trump be the first U.S. president to pursue the strategy: The Obama administration spent years trying to coax Russia away from Iran, particularly in Syria, only to see the two countries intensify their military operations there to bolster the Damascus regime.

“If the Kremlin is to reduce its arms supplies to Iran, it is likely to expect a significant easing of sanctions,” said Dimitri Simes, a Russia expert and president of the Center for the National Interest in Washington. “The Russians don’t believe in free lunches.”

The Kremlin has said it aims to mend ties with the U.S. under the Trump administration but in recent months has also signaled its intent to continue to build on its cooperation with Iran.

Moscow and Tehran have formed a tight military alliance in Syria in recent years. The Kremlin is a major supplier of weapons systems and nuclear equipment to Iran.

But the Trump administration is seeking to exploit what senior U.S., European and Arab officials see as potential divisions between Russia and Iran over their future strategy in Syria and the broader Mideast.

“The issue is whether Putin is prepared to abandon [Ayatollah] Khamenei,” said Michael Ledeen, an academic who advised National Security Council Advisor Michael Flynn during the transition and co-wrote a book with him last year. “I think that might be possible if he is convinced we will ‘take care’ of Iran. I doubt he believes that today.”

Russia, Iran and Turkey have been leading talks in Kazakhstan in recent weeks to try to end Syria’s six-year war. Participants in the discussions, which have excluded high-level U.S. diplomats, said Russia has appeared significantly more open than the Iranians to discussing a future without President Bashar al-Assad.

A Russian-backed faction in the talks has promoted the creation of a new Syrian constitution and a gradual transition away from Mr. Assad.

Moscow has pressed the Trump administration to join the talks at a high-level, an invitation not extended while President Barack Obama was in office. Last week, the administration sent only a lower-level official, its ambassador to Kazakhstan.

Mr. Putin largely has succeeded in saving the regime of Mr. Assad from collapse through a brutal air war in Syria over the past 18 months. But the Kremlin is interested in fortifying its long-term military presence in Syria and doesn’t necessarily view Mr. Assad as an enduring partner, these officials said.

Iran, conversely, is wholly wedded to Mr. Assad as its primary partner for shipping weapons and funds to Iran’s military proxies in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Any future Arab leader in Syria, even one close to Mr. Assad, is unlikely to tie his position so closely to Tehran.

“Russia is fully aware of the corruption and incompetence of the Assad regime…[and] knows that a stable Syria—a country worth having military bases in the long term—is unattainable with Assad at the helm,” said Fred Hof, a former State Department official who oversaw Syria policy during President Obama’s first term.

He added: “Tehran knows there is no Syrian constituency beyond Assad accepting subordination to [Iran].”

The Obama administration also pursued a strategy of trying to woo Russia away from Tehran. During his first term, Mr. Obama succeeded in getting then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to support tough United Nations sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities. Moscow also delayed the delivery of antimissile batteries to Tehran, sparking a diplomatic row between the countries.

In return, the Obama White House rolled back missile-defense deployments in Europe that Russia believed weakened its strategic position.

Tensions between Russia and the U.S. flared, though, after Mr. Putin regained the presidency in 2012 and seized the Crimean region of Ukraine in 2014. The U.S. and European Union responded with tough financial sanctions on Mr. Putin’s inner circle.

A number of Russia experts in Washington say they believe Mr. Putin would demand a heavy price now for any move to distance himself from Iran. In addition to easing sanctions, they believe he would want assurances that the U.S. would scale back its criticism of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and stall further expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership for countries near the Russian border.

Montenegro is scheduled to join NATO this year. The U.S. Senate still needs to vote to approve the bid.

In a report released Friday, the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington think tank, cautioned that even if Moscow were to distance itself from Tehran, it wouldn’t contain the enormous influence that Iran wields over Syria’s economic, military, and political institutions. “Any U.S. effort to subvert Iran’s posture in Syria through Russia will undoubtedly end in failure,” the assessment said.

Russia delivered its S-300 antimissile system to Iran after Tehran, the U.S. and five other world powers implemented a landmark nuclear agreement a year ago. The Kremlin since has talked of further expanding its military and nuclear cooperation with Tehran.

Mr. Trump, though, campaigned on improving relations with Moscow, a theme that Mr. Putin has publicly embraced. Mr. Trump has suggested he could ease sanctions on Russia if the Kremlin took serious steps to cooperate in fighting Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and addressing other national security threats to the U.S.

Mr. Trump and his advisers have made clear since assuming office that constraining Iran would be among their top priorities. They have also privately acknowledged there is no certainty the Kremlin will cooperate.

Last week, the administration declared Iran “on notice” and the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 25 Iran-linked individuals and entities for their alleged roles in aiding Iran’s ballistic missile program and terrorist activities. The Pentagon also dispatched a naval destroyer, the USS Cole, last week to police the waters around Yemen.

The Trump administration’s show of force has raised concerns that the U.S. and Iran could stumble into a military conflict. But officials close to the Trump administration said they believed the White House could gain the respect of the Kremlin if it showed a commitment to enforcing its warnings to other governments.

“Iran has a continuing operation throughout the region…that is not sustainable, not acceptable, and violates norms and creates instability,” a senior U.S. official said on Friday. “Iran has to determine its response to our actions. Iran has a choice to make.”


Crafty_Dog

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PP: Seeing Russia from the White House
« Reply #202 on: February 17, 2017, 10:28:40 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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POTH: A Back Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, via Trump Associates
« Reply #203 on: February 19, 2017, 08:56:44 PM »
A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates

By MEGAN TWOHEY and SCOTT SHANEFEB. 19, 2017

President Trump on his way to Charleston, S.C., on Friday. Although he has expressed hope that the United States and Russia can work together, it is unclear if the White House will take a privately submitted peace proposal for Ukraine seriously. Credit Al Drago/The New York Times

A week before Michael T. Flynn resigned as national security adviser, a sealed proposal was hand-delivered to his office, outlining a way for President Trump to lift sanctions against Russia.

Mr. Flynn is gone, having been caught lying about his own discussion of sanctions with the Russian ambassador. But the proposal, a peace plan for Ukraine and Russia, remains, along with those pushing it: Michael D. Cohen, the president’s personal lawyer, who delivered the document; Felix H. Sater, a business associate who helped Mr. Trump scout deals in Russia; and a Ukrainian lawmaker trying to rise in a political opposition movement shaped in part by Mr. Trump’s former campaign manager Paul Manafort.

At a time when Mr. Trump’s ties to Russia, and the people connected to him, are under heightened scrutiny — with investigations by American intelligence agencies, the F.B.I. and Congress — some of his associates remain willing and eager to wade into Russia-related efforts behind the scenes.

Mr. Trump has confounded Democrats and Republicans alike with his repeated praise for the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, and his desire to forge an American-Russian alliance. While there is nothing illegal about such unofficial efforts, a proposal that seems to tip toward Russian interests may set off alarms.
Donald Trump’s Connections in Ukraine


Former Trump campaign manager with pro-Russian political ties in Ukraine now under investigation by the F.B.I.

The amateur diplomats say their goal is simply to help settle a grueling, three-year conflict that has cost 10,000 lives. “Who doesn’t want to help bring about peace?” Mr. Cohen asked.


But the proposal contains more than just a peace plan. Andrii V. Artemenko, the Ukrainian lawmaker, who sees himself as a Trump-style leader of a future Ukraine, claims to have evidence — “names of companies, wire transfers” — showing corruption by the Ukrainian president, Petro O. Poroshenko, that could help oust him. And Mr. Artemenko said he had received encouragement for his plans from top aides to Mr. Putin.

“A lot of people will call me a Russian agent, a U.S. agent, a C.I.A. agent,” Mr. Artemenko said. “But how can you find a good solution between our countries if we do not talk?”

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Sater said they had not spoken to Mr. Trump about the proposal, and have no experience in foreign policy. Mr. Cohen is one of several Trump associates under scrutiny in an F.B.I. counterintelligence examination of links with Russia, according to law enforcement officials; he has denied any illicit connections.

The two others involved in the effort have somewhat questionable pasts: Mr. Sater, 50, a Russian-American, pleaded guilty to a role in a stock manipulation scheme decades ago that involved the Mafia. Mr. Artemenko spent two and a half years in jail in Kiev in the early 2000s on embezzlement charges, later dropped, which he said had been politically motivated.


While it is unclear if the White House will take the proposal seriously, the diplomatic freelancing has infuriated Ukrainian officials. Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, Valeriy Chaly, said Mr. Artemenko “is not entitled to present any alternative peace plans on behalf of Ukraine to any foreign government, including the U.S. administration.”

At a security conference in Munich on Friday, Mr. Poroshenko warned the West against “appeasement” of Russia, and some American experts say offering Russia any alternative to a two-year-old international agreement on Ukraine would be a mistake. The Trump administration has sent mixed signals about the conflict in Ukraine.

But given Mr. Trump’s praise for Mr. Putin, John Herbst, a former American ambassador to Ukraine, said he feared the new president might be too eager to mend relations with Russia at Ukraine’s expense — potentially with a plan like Mr. Artemenko’s.

It was late January when the three men associated with the proposed plan converged on the Loews Regency, a luxury hotel on Park Avenue in Manhattan where business deals are made in a lobby furnished with leather couches, over martinis at the restaurant bar and in private conference rooms on upper floors.

Mr. Cohen, 50, lives two blocks up the street, in Trump Park Avenue. A lawyer who joined the Trump Organization in 2007 as special counsel, he has worked on many deals, including a Trump-branded tower in the republic of Georgia and a short-lived mixed martial arts venture starring a Russian fighter. He is considered a loyal lieutenant whom Mr. Trump trusts to fix difficult problems.
Photo
Andrii V. Artemenko, a Ukrainian lawmaker, at the Women’s March in Washington last month. He said his peace proposal had received encouragement from top aides to Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin.

The F.B.I. is reviewing an unverified dossier, compiled by a former British intelligence agent and funded by Mr. Trump’s political opponents, that claims Mr. Cohen met with a Russian representative in Prague during the presidential campaign to discuss Russia’s hacking of Democratic targets. But the Russian official named in the report told The New York Times that he had never met Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen insists that he has never visited Prague and that the dossier’s assertions are fabrications. (Mr. Manafort is also under investigation by the F.B.I. for his connections to Russia and Ukraine.)

Mr. Cohen has a personal connection to Ukraine: He is married to a Ukrainian woman and once worked with relatives there to establish an ethanol business.

Mr. Artemenko, tall and burly, arrived at the Manhattan hotel between visits to Washington. (His wife, he said, met the first lady, Melania Trump, years ago during their modeling careers, but he did not try to meet Mr. Trump.) He had attended the inauguration and visited Congress, posting on Facebook his admiration for Mr. Trump and talking up his peace plan in meetings with American lawmakers.

He entered Parliament in 2014, the year that the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych fled to Moscow amid protests over his economic alignment with Russia and corruption. Mr. Manafort, who had been instrumental in getting Mr. Yanukovych elected, helped shape a political bloc that sprang up to oppose the new president, Mr. Poroshenko, a wealthy businessman who has taken a far tougher stance toward Russia and accused Mr. Putin of wanting to absorb Ukraine into a new Russian Empire. Mr. Artemenko, 48, emerged from the opposition that Mr. Manafort nurtured. (The two men have never met, Mr. Artemenko said.)

Before entering politics, Mr. Artemenko had business ventures in the Middle East and real estate deals in the Miami area, and had worked as an agent representing top Ukrainian athletes. Some colleagues in Parliament describe him as corrupt, untrustworthy or simply insignificant, but he appears to have amassed considerable wealth.

He has fashioned himself in the image of Mr. Trump, presenting himself as Ukraine’s answer to a rising class of nationalist leaders in the West. He even traveled to Cleveland last summer for the Republican National Convention, seizing on the chance to meet with members of Mr. Trump’s campaign.

“It’s time for new leaders, new approaches to the governance of the country, new principles and new negotiators in international politics,” he wrote on Facebook on Jan. 27. “Our time has come!”

Mr. Artemenko said he saw in Mr. Trump an opportunity to advocate a plan for peace in Ukraine — and help advance his own political career. Essentially, his plan would require the withdrawal of all Russian forces from eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian voters would decide in a referendum whether Crimea, the Ukrainian territory seized by Russia in 2014, would be leased to Russia for a term of 50 or 100 years.

The Ukrainian ambassador, Mr. Chaly, rejected a lease of that kind. “It is a gross violation of the Constitution,” he said in written answers to questions from The Times. “Such ideas can be pitched or pushed through only by those openly or covertly representing Russian interests.”

The reaction suggested why Mr. Artemenko’s project also includes the dissemination of “kompromat,” or compromising material, purportedly showing that Mr. Poroshenko and his closest associates are corrupt. Only a new government, presumably one less hostile to Russia, might take up his plan.
Photo
President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine in Kiev on Wednesday. Two days later in Munich, he warned the West against “appeasement” of Russia. Credit Gleb Garanich/Reuters

Mr. Sater, a longtime business associate of Mr. Trump’s with connections in Russia, was willing to help Mr. Artemenko’s proposal reach the White House.

Mr. Trump has sought to distance himself from Mr. Sater in recent years. If Mr. Sater “were sitting in the room right now,” Mr. Trump said in a 2013 deposition, “I really wouldn’t know what he looked like.”

But Mr. Sater worked on real estate development deals with the Trump Organization on and off for at least a decade, even after his role in the stock manipulation scheme came to light.

Mr. Sater, who was born in the Soviet Union and grew up in New York, served as an executive at a firm called Bayrock Group, two floors below the Trump Organization in Trump Tower, and was later a senior adviser to Mr. Trump.

He said he had been working on a plan for a Trump Tower in Moscow with a Russian real estate developer as recently as the fall of 2015, one that he said had come to a halt because of Mr. Trump’s presidential campaign. (Mr. Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible.)

Mr. Artemenko said a mutual friend had put him in touch with Mr. Sater. Helping to advance the proposal, Mr. Sater said, made sense.

“I want to stop a war, number one,” he said. “Number two, I absolutely believe that the U.S. and Russia need to be allies, not enemies. If I could achieve both in one stroke, it would be a home run.”

After speaking with Mr. Sater and Mr. Artemenko in person, Mr. Cohen said he would deliver the plan to the White House.

Mr. Cohen said he did not know who in the Russian government had offered encouragement on it, as Mr. Artemenko claims, but he understood there was a promise of proof of corruption by the Ukrainian president.

“Fraud is never good, right?” Mr. Cohen said.

He said Mr. Sater had given him the written proposal in a sealed envelope. When Mr. Cohen met with Mr. Trump in the Oval Office in early February, he said, he left the proposal in Mr. Flynn’s office.

Mr. Cohen said he was waiting for a response when Mr. Flynn was forced from his post. Now Mr. Cohen, Mr. Sater and Mr. Artemenko are hoping a new national security adviser will take up their cause. On Friday the president wrote on Twitter that he had four new candidates for the job.
Correction: February 19, 2017

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article gave an incorrect middle initial for Paul Manafort. It is J., not D.

Crafty_Dog

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Russia-Dem connections
« Reply #205 on: February 26, 2017, 11:09:52 AM »
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2017/02/18/no-one-mentions-that-the-russian-trail-leads-to-democratic-lobbyists/#4da56aea3991

, , ,

In pushing its Manchurian-candidate-Trump narrative, the media fail to mention the much deeper ties of Democratic lobbyists to Russia. Don’t worry, the media seems to say: Even though they are representing Russia, the lobbyists are good upstanding citizens, not like the Trump people. They can be trusted with such delicate matters.
ADVERTISING

The media targeted former Trump campaign manager, Paul Manafort, for consulting for deposed Ukrainian president’s (Yanukovich’s) Party of the Regions. He also worked for billionaire oligarch, Firtash, who stands accused of skimming billions in the Ukraine gas trade in league with Russian oligarchs. The media also singled out Trump’s former national security advisor, General Michael Flynn, for attending a dinner with Putin and appearing on Russia’s foreign propaganda network RT. Trump’s own Russian ties were the subject of intense media coverage of an unverified opposition-research report purportedly prepared by an ex-British spy, who remains in hiding. It seems no enterprising reporter has tried to find him.

The media’s focus on Trump’s Russian connections ignores the much more extensive and lucrative business relationships of top Democrats with Kremlin-associated oligarchs and companies. Thanks to the Panama Papers, we know that the Podesta Group (founded by John Podesta’s brother, Tony) lobbied for Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank. “Sberbank is the Kremlin, they don’t do anything major without Putin’s go-ahead, and they don’t tell him ‘no’ either,” explained a retired senior U.S. intelligence official. According to a Reuters report, Tony Podesta was “among the high-profile lobbyists registered to represent organizations backing Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich.” Among these was the European Center, which paid Podesta $900,000 for his lobbying.
Recommended by Forbes

That’s not all: The busy Podesta Group also represented Uranium One, a uranium company acquired by the Russian government which received approval from Hillary Clinton’s State Department to mine for uranium in the U.S. and gave Russia twenty percent control of US uranium. The New York Times reported Uranium One’s chairman, Frank Guistra, made significant donations to the Clinton Foundation, and Bill Clinton was paid $500,000 for one speech from a Russian investment bank that has “links to the Kremlin that was promoting Uranium One stock.”  Notably, Frank Giustra, the Clinton Foundation’s largest and most controversial donor, does not appear anywhere in Clinton’s “non-private” emails. It is possible that the emails of such key donors were automatically scrubbed to protect the Clinton Foundation.

Let’s not leave out fugitive Ukrainian oligarch, Dymtro Firtash. He is represented by Democratic heavyweight lawyer, Lanny Davis, who accused Trump of “inviting Putin to commit espionage” (Trump’s quip: If Putin has Hillary’s emails, release them) but denies all wrongdoing by Hillary.

That’s still not all: Rep. John Conyers (D., Mich.) read Kremlin propaganda into the Congressional Record, referring to Ukrainian militia as “repulsive Neo Nazis” in denying Ukrainian forces ManPad weapons. Conyers floor speech was surely a notable success of some Kremlin lobbyist.

Lobbying for Russia is a bi-partisan activity. Gazprombank GPB, a subsidiary of Russia’s third largest bank, Gazprombank, is represented by former Sen. John Breaux, (D., La.), and former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R., Miss.), as main lobbyists on “banking laws and regulations, including applicable sanctions.” The Breaux-Lott client is currently in the Treasury Department list of Russian firms prohibited from debt financing with U.S. banks.

In his February 16 press conference, President Trump declared in response to the intensifying media drumbeat on his Russian connections: “I haven’t done anything for Russia.” K-Street lobbyists, on the other hand, have done a lot to help Russia. They greased the skids for a strategic deal (that required the Secretary of State’s approval) that multiplied the Kremlin’s command of world uranium supplies. They likely prevented the shipment of strategic weapons needed by Ukraine to repulse well-armed pro-Russian forces. A fugitive billionaire who robbed the Ukrainian people of billions is represented by one of the establishment’s most connected lawyers.

Gazprombank GPB hired Breux and Lott to gain repeal of sanctions. That’s perfectly fine in Washington; they are playing according established “swamp rules” in their tailored suits and fine D.C. restaurants. General Flynn lost his job when the subject of sanctions was mentioned by the Russian ambassador in their telephone conversation, but that’s the way the media and Washington play.

No wonder that Trump’s’ “drain the swamp” and anti-media messages resonate so well with mainstream America.

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POTH: Russia testing US/Trump
« Reply #206 on: February 28, 2017, 11:55:27 AM »


MOSCOW — The Kremlin, increasingly convinced that President Trump will not fundamentally change relations with Russia, is instead seeking to bolster its global influence by exploiting what it considers weakness in Washington, according to political advisers, diplomats, journalists and other analysts.

Russia has continued to test the United States on the military front, with fighter jets flying close to an American warship in the Black Sea this month and a Russian naval vessel steaming conspicuously in the Atlantic off the coast of Delaware.

“They think he is unstable, that he can be manipulated, that he is authoritarian and a person without a team,” Alexei A. Venediktov, the editor in chief of Echo of Moscow, a liberal radio station, said of President Trump.

The Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, has long sought to crack the liberal Western order, both as a competitor and as a champion of an alternative, illiberal model. To that end, he did what he could to buttress the electoral chances of Mr. Trump, who seemed like a kindred spirit with his harsh denunciations of NATO and the European Union, his endorsement of the British withdrawal from the European Union and his repeated shrugs over Russia’s destabilizing Ukraine.

In this context, Mr. Trump’s election was an unexpected bonus, but the original giddiness has worn off, and Moscow has returned to its tried-and-true formula of creating turmoil and exploiting the resulting opportunities.

“They are all telling each other that this is great, he created this turbulence inside, as we wanted, and now he is focused on his domestic problems and we have more freedom to maneuver,” Mr. Venediktov said. “Let them deal with their own problems. There, not in Ukraine. There, not in the Middle East. There, not in NATO. This is the state of mind right now.”

Sergei A. Markov, a leading analyst friendly to the Kremlin, made much the same point. “Right now the Kremlin is looking for ways that Russia can use the chaos in Washington to pursue its own interests,” said Mr. Markov, a member of the Civic Chamber, a Kremlin advisory group. “The main hope is that the U.S. will be preoccupied with itself and will stop pressuring Russia.”

Any turbulence that Russia foments also gives the Kremlin leverage that it can try to trade in the global arena at a time when it does not have much that others want.

Mr. Venediktov compared the Russian position to an intrusive neighbor who promises to be helpful by avoiding noisy restoration activity at night even though it breaks the apartment building rules in the first place.

Analysts say the Kremlin is aware that the tactic of creating and exploiting disarray can become self-defeating, in that prolonged instability could allow threats like the extremist group Islamic State to flourish.

“It is important for Russia that America does its job in foreign policy,” said Alexey Chesnakov, a periodic Kremlin political adviser and the director of the Center for Current Politics, a trend analysis group in Moscow. “If there is nobody to do that job, it might not be good for us, either.”

The Middle East provides examples of both vectors, analysts say, a moment of chaos to exploit and concerns about achieving stability for the long-term future.

Moscow has begun courting Libya, where Mr. Putin seems to want to prove that the Obama administration and other Western powers made a mistake by working to force Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi from power in 2011. Russia invited various powerful figures to Moscow and sent the country’s lone aircraft carrier, the somewhat dilapidated Admiral Kuznetsov, on a port call to Libya on its way back from Syria last month. Khalifa Haftar, the military commander in eastern Libya, got a tour. The government invited veteran officials and analysts from around the Arab world this week to discuss the future of Libya and Yemen, among other topics.

Photo
Residents at a humanitarian food distribution site in Avdiivka, Ukraine, this month. Some analysts say American attention could be diverted from areas of conflict with Russia, like Ukraine, while President Trump focuses on domestic concerns. Credit Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images

Syria, on the other hand, underscores the limits to Russian power. In the two months since Russian-backed government forces took back the city of Aleppo, there has been little movement in forging peace.

Not least, Russia can ill afford the billions of dollars needed to rebuild the country. For that it needs Washington to help persuade its allies like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who all seek a political transition away from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Like much of the world, nobody in Moscow can figure out who makes Mr. Trump’s foreign policy, never mind what it will be. Since the inauguration, it has become clear that Mr. Trump’s rosy view of Mr. Putin is not shared by the president’s top foreign policy advisers, with the possible exception of Stephen K. Bannon, his chief White House strategist.

“We cannot understand how they will work in concert,” said Igor Yurgens, a Russian economist who is prominent in business and development.

The Kremlin has adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward Mr. Trump, analysts said, expecting the first meeting with Mr. Putin in Europe sometime this summer to set the course for relations.

Dmitry K. Kiselyov, the anchor of the main state propaganda program “News of the Week,” recently pronounced what seemed to be the new party line on the air. “Let’s not judge too harshly, things are still unsettled in the White House,” he said. “Still not a word from there. Only little words, and that doesn’t amount to a policy.”

Just how unsettled was underscored on Monday, when the White House announced plans to increase military spending by $54 billion, an amount just about equal to what Russia spends in total on its military annually.

While the appearance of such turmoil in the White House has probably been surprising, even gratifying, to the Kremlin, analysts say Russia’s government is worried about having too much of a good thing. “It would be better for us to have a predictable partner,” Mr. Markov said. “An unpredictable one is dangerous.”

The perception of weakness calls into question here in Moscow whether Mr. Trump can ever live up to the many statements he made during the campaign about forging closer ties with Mr. Putin and Russia. “The overwhelming view of the Kremlin is that Trump is not very strong,” said Valeriy Solovey, a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. “He might have sympathy toward Russia, but he is contained within the political establishment.”

Russia’s far right regularly predicts Mr. Trump’s assassination at the hands of the American establishment, a view occasionally echoed on state television.

Alexander Dugin, a nationalist Russian philosopher, called Mr. Trump’s inauguration the happiest day of his life because it signified the demise of the liberal international order. Mr. Dugin seemed most eager for Mr. Trump to get on with his promise to “drain the swamp” in Washington, although he worried about the consequences. “It can kill,” Mr. Dugin said in an interview. “It is not so easy to drain the swamp.”

Since the inauguration, however, enthusiasm for Mr. Trump in official Russia lurched from cool to uncool seemingly overnight. Dmitri S. Peskov, the presidential spokesman, denied that the new skepticism had been ordered from the top. The speed of the change was striking, however.

Russia’s political class marvels at how much time it now spends chewing over the minutiae of the American political system. Some attribute that to the fact that domestic politics are comatose, with Mr. Putin assured of winning another six-year term in 2018.

“Nobody is talking about the Putin election,” said Mr. Chesnakov, the political consultant. “We are discussing relations between Congress and Trump.”

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Khodorkovsky: The ultimate Trump-Putin deal
« Reply #208 on: March 09, 2017, 08:58:06 AM »

By Mikhail Khodorkovsky
March 8, 2017 6:43 p.m. ET
180 COMMENTS

Russia went glaringly absent from President Donald Trump’s speech to Congress last week. Although Russians expect relations with Washington to change, they are anxiously asking how. Will Mr. Trump confront Moscow with the brash rhetoric he has directed at others? Will he be President Vladimir Putin’s lap dog, as many American critics and Kremlin propagandists predict?

Or will Mr. Trump surprise the world by forging a relationship with Mr. Putin and striking a deal that could help pull my country out of its decline?

Russians wait with both hope and apprehension as they grapple with the uncertainty of Mr. Trump’s message and Mr. Putin’s future. Many expect some kind of deal. In any negotiation, each side must understand the needs and desires of the other. What kind of bargain can Mr. Trump offer, and what can Mr. Putin do in exchange?
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Let us break with conventional wisdom for a moment and set aside the expected American preconditions for normalized relations—the difficult matters of Syria, Ukraine, Iran, nuclear weapons and more. These are urgent issues. But no real progress is possible if Americans fail to understand the real, and very different, problems that face Mr. Putin, those around him, and Russia itself.

For today’s regime in Moscow, the overriding goal is to defer the inevitable question of leaving power. Military adventurism, like the police state itself, is a means to that end.

Mr. Putin has been in power for nearly 18 years—like Leonid Brezhnev, whose rule (1964-82) became reviled as the “age of stagnation.” Today, as in the late Brezhnev years, Russia’s economy is languishing and the standard of living is falling. Education, science and health care are decrepit. Russians tell pollsters, whom they assume to be agents of the FSB secret police, that they support the regime. Then they don’t go to vote.

As Brezhnev did in Afghanistan, Mr. Putin has boosted his popularity by creating his own unprovoked war in Ukraine, to make Russians feel that he is defending them from an external threat. The Kremlin insists Mr. Putin’s next presidential term will be his last, and that he would like to retire by 2024. But he cannot do so without taking a huge personal risk.

No Russian leader leaves power willingly. Since the Middle Ages, those who did not die a natural death in office were either assassinated, executed, forced to resign, overthrown or some combination thereof. One slight exception is Boris Yeltsin. In 1999 he transferred power to Mr. Putin, who promptly destroyed any positive legacy Mr. Yeltsin might have had. There were also two pretend departures, in 1560 when Czar Ivan the Terrible left the throne temporarily and put another man in his place before returning, and in 2008 when Mr. Putin installed Dmitry Medvedev as a token president for one term.

Russians today understand that a change of regime is inevitable, and that postponement, especially through Mr. Putin’s methods, only worsens the eventual outcome. He enjoys support not because the people love him or are satisfied with his policies. The people support him because they can’t imagine an alternative.

The regime maintains fear about what comes next by eliminating opponents. Most are simply destroyed politically, but some are physically liquidated. Electoral fraud, repressive laws and constant, paralyzing propaganda reinforce the expectation that the current regime will survive

The situation is an ever-deepening spiral. Russian society is losing its reserves of trust. Nobody can guarantee when today’s leaders will leave, and whether that transition will be peaceful and orderly or violent and bloody. Mr. Putin can’t step aside without such guarantees. He is destroying society to postpone his departure. But a damaged and fearful society is incapable of assuring an orderly departure.

Mr. Trump has an opportunity to begin a businesslike dialogue with Mr. Putin—not about the vital issues in the headlines, but about a far more important problem: how to avoid unnecessary conflicts inside and outside Russia by ensuring a smooth transition of power.

It raises important questions that must be considered now: What does the Kremlin have to do at home and abroad to make this soft landing possible? What reciprocal steps and guarantees can the West offer? It’s time for the world to start contemplating a post-Putin world.

Such guarantees are not merely personal. The dialogue must confront some unpleasant realities. Mr. Putin would like to use international agreements to preserve and formalize the “gains” he has achieved in Europe: his conquest of Crimea and neutral status for Ukraine and other states Mr. Putin considers to be inside Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence.

The desire for such concessions may motivate Mr. Putin to discuss the matter of his stepping down while Mr. Trump is in office. That, in turn, could create an opportunity to remove other problems from the table. But it could also tempt the West to appease and buckle under, or to throw up barriers.

In any other scenario, if Mr. Putin is going to be thinking about how to remain in power, he needs the U.S. for only one thing—to play the role of a “safe enemy.” That allows him to rally the Russian people around him, while knowing America presents no actual danger. To expect any other approach from Mr. Putin is a self-delusion that will carry a high cost in the end.

If concessions offered by Mr. Putin are not to America’s benefit, Washington will need to acknowledge that the only workable policy toward the Kremlin is a Cold War-style containment, with clearly defined parameters.

The window for handling Mr. Putin is very narrow. Mr. Trump’s brashness has stopped at attacking Mr. Putin personally. That atypical restraint horrified many Russia hawks in the West. But it may turn out that Mr. Trump took a better approach. Whether accidentally or by design, he has left the door open for Mr. Putin to make a graceful exit. That would be good for everyone.

Mr. Khodorkovsky is founder of the Open Russia movement and a former CEO of Yukos Oil.

ccp

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #209 on: March 09, 2017, 03:54:53 PM »
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/opposition-leader-trump-help-russia-drive-putin-power/

The few Russians I knew choose not to speak negatively about Putin.
I have not been able to get a satisfactory reason but I think they see capitalism as the system with lesser evil then the other . 

Anyone else know any Russians?


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Thanks to Merkel, sanctions continue
« Reply #210 on: March 21, 2017, 12:04:49 PM »
We Built the Russia Sanctions to Last
Europe has stayed united behind them, and now Merkel seems to have brought Trump along.
By Edward Fishman
March 20, 2017 7:00 p.m. ET


Western sanctions on Russia have always seemed on the brink of collapse. Business interests have opposed them, and perspectives on Russia within the European Union—which requires unanimity to make foreign-policy decisions—have been anything but uniform. Skeptics claimed the West has only a passing interest in Ukraine, whereas Ukraine’s geopolitical disposition is of crucial importance to Russia. The implication was that Moscow could surely wait out Washington and Brussels.

Yet here we are: Sanctions remain in place three years after the West first imposed them and two months after the inauguration of President Trump. And there are few signs that is about to change.

In an otherwise awkward press conference last Friday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Trump sounded harmonious notes on Ukraine policy. Mr. Trump praised Mrs. Merkel’s “leadership” on conflict resolution in Ukraine, and Mrs. Merkel noted that she was “very gratified to know that the American administration and also the president, personally, commits himself to the Minsk process.” That suggests Mr. Trump assured Mrs. Merkel he will stand by the existing policy of maintaining sanctions until Russia pulls back from eastern Ukraine.

As one of the diplomats involved in creating the sanctions, I am not surprised they have endured. We designed them to be sustainable—to apply meaningful pressure on Russia without risking a short-term economic crisis or overly burdening any one constituency in the U.S. or Europe. And good communication has prevented minor disagreements between Washington and European capitals from snowballing into threats to trans-Atlantic unity.

Why have sanctions proved so resilient? For starters, the EU has shown remarkable leadership and solidarity. Although semiannual decisions on whether to renew sanctions have caused jitters, the outcomes were never seriously in doubt. Despite frequent anti-sanctions rhetoric, no EU leader has challenged them head-on, and the EU’s biggest player—Mrs. Merkel’s Germany—has been a consistent supporter.

Even though any single EU member could veto sanctions, potential spoilers such as Russia-friendly Greece and Hungary have never posed a practical threat. That’s because a motion to break unanimity by a small country could cause a constitutional crisis in the EU. Many EU states might even refuse to implement a veto, undermining the legal and normative solidarity of the union writ large. None of the would-be spoilers are interested in accelerating the deterioration of the EU, so the veto option has never made sense.

Another reason sanctions have endured is that they haven’t harmed the U.S. or European economy in any serious way. Western sanctions on Rosneft, the world’s largest publicly traded oil producer by output, did not push oil prices upward, even as they froze some of the company’s major development projects. The same is true for sanctions against Russia’s six largest banks, which squeezed their finances but did not lead to broader contagion.

Because blowback was so limited, “sanctions fatigue” was turned on its head. Instead of becoming harder to stomach over time, sanctions faced their most intense business opposition in the beginning. As American and European companies have found alternative markets, living with Russia sanctions has become progressively easier for them.

A third reason for the durability of sanctions is that the U.S. and EU quickly settled on criteria for lifting them. In March 2015, all 28 EU leaders agreed that the core economic sanctions were “clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements,” the peace accords to resolve the Ukraine conflict. The Group of Seven leaders echoed the sentiment in June 2015.

This benchmark greatly simplified the EU’s semiannual decisions to renew sanctions. As long as Russia and its proxies continued to control parts of eastern Ukraine, there was no justification to undo sanctions. Only new rollback criteria endorsed by all EU leaders could alter this dynamic.

It is fair to ask whether the rise of Donald Trump has changed this equation. It isn’t far-fetched to assume Mr. Trump might try to cancel sanctions or that his rhetoric will erode cohesion in the EU.

The president does have the authority to end U.S. sanctions unilaterally. Unlike in the Iran context, Congress has been a paper tiger on Russia, frequently denouncing the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine but passing no significant laws that enhance or even codify existing sanctions. And in Europe, Mr. Trump’s “America first” rhetoric will only increase suspicions—hitherto groundless—that the U.S. is using sanctions to strengthen the competitive positions of American companies.

But it now seems doubtful that trans-Atlantic sanctions will end in the way most frequently envisioned: with the EU throwing in the towel. The irony of the present moment is that the EU—so often dismissed as “soft” on Russia—has emerged as the West’s bulwark. Even German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, one of Europe’s most vocal critics of sanctions, is encouraging Washington to hold firm.

Brussels’ unity on this critical issue should stand as a lesson that the EU is hardly feckless; it is a tremendous boon to American foreign policy. It may be frustrating to corral a bloc of more than two dozen European states, but when the EU settles on a policy, it can be a potent and steadfast force.

Mr. Fishman, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, served at the State Department, 2013-17.

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bigdog

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On China and Russia: Strategy for the New Administration
« Reply #212 on: March 30, 2017, 05:36:48 AM »
http://chargedaffairs.org/on-china-and-russia-strategy-for-the-new-administration/

"...the United States should work to improve relations between Russia and countries adverse to China such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, at least on the economic front."

ccp

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #213 on: March 30, 2017, 06:26:54 AM »
About the author of above post:

http://chargedaffairs.org/author/caleb-marquis/

John Bolton on threats to US.  He seems to categorize China and Russia as long term threats vs more immediate threats such as terrorism, N Korea
He might well agree with Caleb Maruis on some of hs strategy which is kind of vague :

http://www.breitbart.com/radio/2017/02/23/bolton-trump-needs-long-term-strategy-keep-russia-check-europe-middle-east/

I tried to find something written on Rex Tillerson's views on Russia China and all that comes up is mostly LEFTist slanted criticism:

"Tillerson skips Nato for meeting with Putin" etc.

« Last Edit: March 30, 2017, 06:38:28 AM by ccp »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #214 on: March 30, 2017, 10:41:37 AM »
Please post the last two posts on the Foreign Policy thread as well!

Crafty_Dog

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Russia supplying Taliban
« Reply #215 on: March 30, 2017, 08:20:39 PM »
Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, Putin grabbed Baraq's "flexible" pussy, and it would appear it is now Trump's turn.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/29/us-gen-votel-russia-providing-weapons-support-tali/d



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Stratfor: Tillerson-Putin meeting
« Reply #219 on: April 13, 2017, 04:56:34 AM »
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson held marathon meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 12. The length of the meetings and the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin granted Tillerson an audience is notable in and of itself, given the preceding back and forth between the White House and the Kremlin on whether Tillerson would in fact meet the Russian head of state.
 
In their comments following the meeting, both Lavrov and Tillerson said that substantive progress had been made in the U.S.-Russia dialogue. Following the April 4 attack on a Syrian airbase in response to a Syrian chemical weapons attack, Russia suspended a critical deconfliction agreement with the United States, designed to prevent collisions on the battlefield. Going into today's talks, Russia wielded the power of being able to act as a spoiler in Syria at a time when the United States is trying to focus on the fight against the Islamic State, and on the impending offensive against the militant bastion of Raqqa. Lavrov said in the post-meeting press conference that he and Tillerson discussed putting the deconfliction agreement "back on track." Meanwhile, the United States has backed off its allegations that Russia had advance warning — and covered up its knowledge — of a Syrian plan to launch a chemical weapons attack. Washington is also toning down threats of expanded sanctions on Russia.
 
Ultimately, the United States still wants to avoid expanding the scope of its mission in Syria, though Russia made clear ahead of the meeting with Tillerson that events on the ground could make that difficult. Putin said April 11 that he had knowledge that another chemical weapons attack is being planned in the southern suburbs of Damascus, maintaining that the chemical attacks are rebel actions meant to undermine the legitimacy of the Syrian government.
 
The United States will not tolerate certain activities by the Russia-backed Syrian government, including the use of nerve agents against civilians. (Notably, the Syrian government has regularly carried out attacks with chemicals that don't target the central nervous system, but the United States is not including those attacks in the current definition of its "red line".) Ultimately, the United States wants a final settlement of the Syrian civil war, and that means deciding whether to tolerate Bashar al-Assad as a leader or not.
 
The two countries are at least making the crucial first step of clarifying their priorities. For now, it seems that a temporary de-escalation in Syria has been agreed upon, which will enable the United States to better manage its risks on the battlefield.  Russia will meanwhile attempt to use this temporary and partial agreement to further the dialogue with the United States on other issues, including NATO, the situation in Ukraine, and sanctions. On the latter, Tillerson said that sanctions could even be added if evidence emerges of Russian interference in the U.S. election. It is still uncertain whether the United States would even entertain the idea of broader negotiations with Russia. There is certainly enough playing out on the global stage to continue to drive tensions between the two sides, but this conciliatory meeting provided the opportunity for much-needed de-escalation, even if such a respite is temporary in nature.

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Re: Stratfor: Tillerson-Putin meeting
« Reply #220 on: April 13, 2017, 08:21:00 AM »
"The length of the meetings and the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin granted Tillerson an audience is notable in and of itself."

   - That was my thought too.  I'm guessing some pretty frank discussions are going on behind the scenes and I'm guessing Tillerson is very good at this, diplomatic but not afraid to make his point.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #221 on: April 13, 2017, 09:17:43 AM »
Helluva coincidence that "Putin's poodle" has Mattis, McMaster, and Tillerson as his team.  It is almost as if he knew that the hand he was extending to Putin might be rejected.


ccp

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #223 on: April 21, 2017, 07:44:45 PM »
even THIS denial of the waiver is twisted by the God Damn left to be some sort of cover up to deflect away from some Trump Russia election connection



Crafty_Dog

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Re: The bee sting that drove Putin to seek revenge
« Reply #231 on: October 19, 2017, 09:50:04 AM »
quote author=Crafty_Dog
I can't say that this is something I would have opposed at the time , , ,
[Sticking it to Putin in 2012]
-------

I agree.  It begs the question of how to deal with these complex relationships (China, Russia, Saudi, etc.).  Not kowtow to them but not poke them in the eye at every opportunity. 

The instincts of Trump (his call with Taiwan for example) may be just as good (or bad) as the judgment of the experts and careerists.  Let them know they will get some cooperation and some aggravation out of us, carrot and stick.  Make them want to influence us positively, from their point of view.

Condi Rice was quite the Russian expert.  What did she accomplish?  I don't know, mixed results, mostly bad.

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #232 on: October 19, 2017, 10:51:56 AM »
Regarding the Bush 43 Russian-US era, FWIW my take on it is this:

President Clinton split the difference on possible responses in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, arguably coming up with the worse outcomes of each-- he didn't put the Russians away while they were weak, but instead did enough to piss them off (e.g. Yugoslavia) and persuade them to take  advantage of his failure to put them away.

When Bush 43 came in they Russians were already hard at work rebuilding their military and re-imposing on their near abroad.  With bandwidth consumed by the Iraq War, and Bush's polls at catastrophic levels, the Russians knew we would do jacksh*t when they invaded the Ossetia region of Georgia-- thus laying the groundwork for Crimea and east Ukraine.

DougMacG

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #233 on: October 28, 2017, 06:35:03 AM »
Regarding the Bush 43 Russian-US era, FWIW my take on it is this:

President Clinton split the difference on possible responses in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, arguably coming up with the worse outcomes of each-- he didn't put the Russians away while they were weak, but instead did enough to piss them off (e.g. Yugoslavia) and persuade them to take  advantage of his failure to put them away.

When Bush 43 came in they Russians were already hard at work rebuilding their military and re-imposing on their near abroad.  With bandwidth consumed by the Iraq War, and Bush's polls at catastrophic levels, the Russians knew we would do jacksh*t when they invaded the Ossetia region of Georgia-- thus laying the groundwork for Crimea and east Ukraine.

Discussion on US-China thread  reminded me that I wanted to add to this excellent description of what happened and didn't happen when the Soviet Union folded.  I wrote a counterpoint that ran alongside the Mple red star-tribune's endorsement of Bill Clinton, Nov 1992, and they omitted from my argument against the left turn to Clinton what was the most important point to me.  The continuation of growth economics (which unfortunately was not a choice on the ballot in 1992 anyway) was a most crucial component of a successful foreign policy.  Economic growth in a free economy is our answer to Nikita Krushchev's false promise of theirs, 'we will bury you'.  We needed to grow past these dangerous crony government tycoons in order to move them toward setting up a free market economy of their own to keep pace.  Instead we elected an agenda of other priorities, larger government, higher taxes, social democracy, etc. slow growth at best.  That agenda shifted later in the 90s and fast growth returned, but the new Russia was already off and running in a screwed up, central government fashion.

The same lessons apply today vis a vis China.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: US-Russia
« Reply #234 on: October 31, 2017, 08:37:38 PM »
It's easy to look at a string of recent indictments against members of U.S. President Donald Trump's former campaign staff and get sidetracked by the partisan rhetoric flying back and forth. But calls for impeachment from the left and claims of a state-sponsored set-up from the right ignore the deeper intrigue beneath the surface.

At the heart of the political turmoil is Russia, which believes itself to be a great power by right but has been held back by an international system designed and dominated by the West, with the United States at its helm. From its seat in Moscow, the Kremlin is determined to see this system undone and has worked tirelessly toward that end using every means it can except military force. Its inherent weakness, however, has determined the tools at its disposal.

Characterizing Russia as a weak nation might seem counterintuitive, but that doesn't make the description any less accurate. The country's options are limited and will likely only narrow in the years ahead. Over the past few years, cracks have begun to emerge in the political structure that Russian President Vladimir Putin built around himself. The government's tight grip on power is slowly starting to slip in the face of growing opposition groups, mounting regional resistance, enduring economic stagnation, increasing financial burdens, substantial international pressure and the rise of a new generation of citizens more willing than ever to challenge the establishment over corruption and hardship. All of these issues signal greater internal instability on the horizon, and as the Russian state grows more fragile, it will act decisively to mitigate any additional threats from beyond its borders.

Over the past few years, cracks have begun to emerge in the political structure that Russian President Vladimir Putin built around himself.

Moscow has thus turned to a grand strategy born of weakness, using asymmetric abilities to intertwine statecraft with unconventional military force. This approach offers a low-cost opportunity for confrontation that is just indirect enough to avoid eliciting a coordinated response from more powerful adversaries. Russia's activities in Ukraine are a case in point. Moscow was well aware that no Western nation would risk nuclear war — a possible outcome of any military conflict with Russia — to yank back the Ukrainian territory it had seized. Russia's reliance on a nuclear arsenal, particularly its tactical nuclear weapons, is therefore a key component of its asymmetric strategy.

Another is its use of information, including propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Russia has wielded such programs to great success in the past, gaining impressive advantages at the operational and strategic level, often at very little cost. The Kremlin's approach to the information realm is twofold: One part is geared toward influencing its audience at home, while the other is directed against states abroad. The second category, aimed at countries, includes sowing discontent, exacerbating political and social divisions, and wreaking havoc in strategic parts of the globe to keep the attention of other powers fixed elsewhere instead of on Russia.

Information operations are neither new nor exclusively Russian. They also aren't a tactic solely for the weak. Rather, they have long been part of international cooperation and competition, particularly for countries with complex interests that stretch far and wide. But what makes their use today different is technology. Recent advances, especially the birth of the internet, have dramatically expanded the scope of "information confrontation," creating a new and virtual battlefield where Russia has excelled. The Kremlin's information operations are highly nuanced and, by disseminating data that is partially true, they are often far more effective than those that rely on falsified news. In this way, Moscow's messaging appears more plausible to its audience and gradually builds support for Russian interests.

Until it is stopped, Russia will not abandon the tactics that have already proved so effective in the subtle war it is waging against the international system and the states that lead it.

Recent testimonies before Congress on election meddling, coupled with revelations of Russia's sophisticated "fake" news and targeted propaganda efforts, play perfectly into the Kremlin's strategy. Because at the end of the day, its activities have little to do with picking an election's winners and losers, and everything to do with sowing discord throughout the West.

The real question, then, is how will the United States and its European allies respond? So far they have not found a comprehensive and coordinated solution to the threat they face. It will take time for the piecemeal fixes that have emerged to coalesce into a cohesive policy that prevents, punishes or deters Russia — especially since some of their most potent tools, such as the control of information, run counter to the fundamental rights that their democracies hold dear. Until it is stopped, Russia will not abandon the tactics that have already proved so effective in the subtle war it is waging against the international system and the states that lead it.

DougMacG

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Re: Stratfor: US-Russia
« Reply #235 on: November 01, 2017, 09:37:55 AM »
I like this analysis.  We look at strengths of Russia and forget to look at them from their points of weakness. 

Interesting point from the article about their disinformation tactics:  "The Kremlin's information operations are highly nuanced and, by disseminating data that is partially true, they are often far more effective than those that rely on falsified news."    - Right out of the DNC / Rules for Radicals playbook.

Unmentioned are low oil prices, maybe implied in stagnant economy.  Note that Trump is opening large new areas for drilling.  Second is that if we aggressively produce and export LNG that squeezes them further.  Maybe they will have to grow a real economy.

Another idea is to quit telling them how special and important they are.  G8?  They aren't G10.
US, China, Japan, Germany, UK, France, India, Italy, Brazil, Canada and South Korea all have bigger economies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)

UN Security Council, permanent member, why?  Because of their moral authority??

Walter Russell Mead had an article this week about 5 countries that use informal and voluntary cooperation, US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/five-eyes-are-better-than-one-1509402670
Why not expand on that idea and keep out countries that work to sabotage out interests at every turn?

P.S. They didn't affect our election any more than a whole lot of other subversive forces.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #236 on: November 01, 2017, 10:19:13 AM »
"UN Security Council, permanent member, why?  Because of their moral authority??"

Because of their nukes and their willingness to act (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, etc etc etc)

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #237 on: November 01, 2017, 11:30:47 AM »
"UN Security Council, permanent member, why?  Because of their moral authority??"

Because of their nukes and their willingness to act (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, etc etc etc)

Right.  But they should be the topic of the Security Council meetings, not a voting member IMHO, if this was a serious organization designed to prevent and react to things like what happened in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, etc.

I understand why they are there but there is a downside to it.  We elevate Putin's standing with the Russian people and with the world.  What was the consequence for those invasions and annexations?
--------------------
Another good Stratfor point I meant to highlight:

"... its activities have little to do with picking an election's winners and losers, and everything to do with sowing discord throughout the West."

Facebook Admits That Russia Ads Are Actually Against Donald Trump
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0s4cLDwt7o
That doesn't fit any narrative, except it makes more sense that they supported Hillary than Trump.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-Russia
« Reply #238 on: November 01, 2017, 01:19:04 PM »
To be precise, that would be the post election ads, yes?

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Stratfor: How to deal with Renegade Russia
« Reply #239 on: November 27, 2017, 06:32:50 AM »
Note From the Interviewer:

These days Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union's former envoy to Moscow, is touring Lithuania presenting a documentary about the assassinated Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and offering audiences his insight into the world of Russian politics. One idea recurs throughout the question-and-answer sessions that precede the screenings: Even though Russia has violated international law, the West must try to improve its relationship with the country. I sat down with Usackas during a showing to ask him some questions about Nemtsov, Moscow and what to do if you find yourself stuck in an elevator with the Russian president.

 

As the movie about the slain Russian opposition leader plays in the theater next to us, let me start off by asking you whether you believe Boris Nemtsov had the potential to effect change in Russia?

I think he clearly had views and a vision for the country that corresponded to the initial expectations of the Russian people, i.e. a move toward embracing democracy, the rule of law and a free market. As the documentary, "The Man Who Was Too Free," suggests, Nemtsov was initially picked as the most likely successor to President Boris Yeltsin. However, later, under a different set of circumstances, the decision-making process was redefined and Vladimir Putin was promoted as Yeltsin's successor.

Before the movie you said that the West made a mistake in the early 1990s, after the Soviet empire's collapse, by treating Russia as it had treated Japan and war-ravaged Germany after World War II, i.e. by assisting them. Do you believe that the West had any other option then?

I think we can't speak about a mistake (in the treatment), but there was definitely a noble approach to Russia, trying to support it and promote profound democratic changes in the country. It was carried out with the intention to transform Russia later into a state like post-war Germany or Japan, a country that embraced democracy and the free market. At some point, however, Western leaders misinterpreted the real changes taking place in Russia, when the new president, Putin, embarked on a different path Western leaders hadn't promoted and hoped for.

I think this is where the question arises: Why did it happen, who made a mistake and at what stage? From my perspective, different kinds of developments were unlikely to have been expected because hypocrisy and complacency had overtaken relations between Russia and the West for a considerable time. Let's admit that there was too much wishful thinking and too little honest accounting between the two sides after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The West did not find it convenient to acknowledge that President Putin's Russia has been departing from the initial path of democratization and gradually tightening the screws over fundamental freedoms at home, while aggressively asserting its interests abroad. It all looked like a temporary fluke, but not a fundamental shift.

Russians are hugely disappointed in their authorities, yet Putin enjoys high support ratings across the country. How do you explain this?

Well, I believe there's one important factor that the West and Russia's immediate neighbors don't appreciate enough, i.e. the natural desire of the Russian people to recover the respect and pride of the nation. The transition from a Soviet planning system to a free market economy, from a one-party dictatorship to the multiparty system, is well-understood and highly appreciated from the perspective of a Lithuanian or anyone familiar with the Soviet system and anyone who had to go through this kind of transformation.

Unlike Lithuania, which managed to make the transition to the new system smoothly and fulfilled its aspirations of European Union and NATO membership, the reforms in Russia didn't yield satisfactory results for most people. In their view, they experienced too much suffering and too little positive change. As we in the Baltics enjoyed the fruits of reforms, the Russians continued to feel neglected and harmed by perceived American hegemony and the trans-Atlantic dictatorship. Once in power, Putin injected a sense of greater pride and self-confidence into the nation, albeit one that was accomplished through illegal means, such as the annexation of Crimea or the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Yet Putin demonstrated a stamina and political will as well as a capacity to use the Russian military to achieve the ultimate goal of putting Russia back on the world stage. This was shown not only through the illegal actions in Ukraine but also through military and political engagement in Syria. The latter helped Putin get out of isolation (following the Ukraine crisis) and reinstate himself as an indispensable negotiating partner for the Americans over Syria and the greater Middle East.

Russia hinges on its military might. Do you believe this will change anytime soon? With Putin still in power or with him out the Kremlin?

I think Russia will face a dilemma at some point. As a country, it has resources but very low productivity; its financial reserves have started to deplete, and the economy is underperforming due to a decline in the price of oil and because of economic sanctions. I believe the Russian economy will reach a point where Russia will have to make the choice whether to continue wasting much needed money in places like Syria or Ukraine or attempt to balance the books by embarking on internal structural reforms and restoring relations with the West, which can only come with a return to respecting the international rule-based system.

Do you believe relations between the United States and Russia have hit their lowest point?

I do think that West-Russia relations are indeed at the lowest point. On the other hand, any conflict, however unpleasant it might be, has its own timespan. We see that new urgent issues and priorities are appearing and Russia has a say as a U.N. Security Council member or a major regional actor.

There's a growing understanding that we have to live with Russia in a complex way. On some issues, like Syria and North Korea, we may find more commonalities. On the other ones, like regional and internal political freedoms, we will remain in an adversarial relationship for a considerable time. Western societies and leaders have to acknowledge that Russia has taken a different path of development, one marked by self-isolation from the West and an emphasis on military might. This will not change soon. We face a clash of worldviews that concerns core European values, such as freedom of speech or political pluralism. We also differ with respect to honoring World Trade Organization provisions. At the heart of this clash is Russia's continued rejection of the outcome of the Cold War and its insistence on a new security order based on its spheres of influence rather than on the free choice of nations such as Ukraine and Georgia to forge alliances and associations with the West.

But the most important thing is that we don't clash in a direct military conflict, which would have enormous multidimensional consequences. To me, it's obvious that Putin will stick to his worldviews until his last day in power. Yet I believe that we, as neighbors, have to be open to a certain kind of relationship with a view to better understand (Russia's) intentions and to seek to avoid worsening the security environment in Europe. At the same time, we have to stick to our principles, avoid the perception that the West is demanding, ensure unity within the EU and trans-Atlantic unity, and increase political and financial support for Ukraine.

Since annexing Crimea and making an incursion into eastern Ukraine, Russia hasn't proceeded with any new acts of aggression for the last three years. Does this mean that it doesn't want new conflicts and would rather mend fences with the West?

I think President Putin has shown his unique capacity to surprise by making robust strategic and tactical decisions. In no way should we in the West become complacent and give up our vigilance or underestimate our strategic calculations. What NATO is doing in deterring Russia and reinforcing the bloc's military position in the Baltics is of paramount importance. It's also very important that we address the loopholes of cybersecurity and confront hybrid meddling into the democratic processes of the West. Yet, as I said, it's important, being on the front line with Russia, that we maintain a certain kind of dialogue to avoid unintentional consequences as a result of a lack of basic information between the two sides.

We're speaking a day after U.S. President Donald Trump and Putin shook hands and spoke briefly in Vietnam. Do you think it's a sign that the two adversaries are willing to speak?

We still have yet to learn what they were talking about. Initially, the Russian media reported that the main topic of conversation was the Syria conflict, but I would be surprised if the presidents didn't touch on the topic of North Korea. The United States' resolute approach to the reclusive country may spur Russian and Chinese leaders to employ a set of political and economic levers to address the situation. I believe the two heads of state spoke in this manner: "Help me on this and I will help you on that." Who knows, but it's very possible that they also raised the issue of Ukraine against the backdrop of the unfulfilled Minsk agreement.

Russia insists that it defends a multipolar world in which Russia counterbalances American hegemony in the world. Do you buy this?

A unipolar approach to me is based on the principle that all nations, including Russia, abide by international law. In reality, however, we see that Russia vigorously attempts to challenge what it perceives to be a Western dictate on political and economic developments. Russia does outreach to China and also to the (other) BRICS countries — Brazil, India and South Africa. We see that Russia is promoting alternative institutions through it, such as the BRICS (New Development) Bank etc.

It remains to be seen where it takes us, but we may be witnessing a shift in global powers. Within 15 to 20 years the Pacific nations will be producing more than 50 percent of the world's gross domestic product. The shift of economic might is already moving toward China, but India and other growing economies in the region also have potential. I believe that what matters at the end of the day is not whether we live in a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar world, but that we all live under a unified international system of rules and that nations comply with these rules.

President Trump is staving off accusations stemming from alleged contact between some of the leading men in his presidential campaign and high-ranking Russian officials. Do you believe the congressional probe into Russia's meddling in the U.S. presidential campaign is politicized to some extent?

I don't think it's politicized. We have plenty of evidence, including revelations by the U.S. investigators and even by French President Emmanuel Macron, who, in a press conference with Putin, said bluntly that pro-Kremlin news channel Sputnik was biased and that Moscow was supporting the Brexit.

As independent Russia media reported, last year the Anti-Globalist Movement of Russia, which is funded by a presidential grant, hosted a congress of separatists from around the world. It brought together populist and separatist movements from Europe and America.

Russian disinformation and meddling in the internal affairs of democratic countries continues as illustrated by a recent statement from British Prime Minister Theresa May.

As Russia gets ready for a presidential election next year, do you believe the outcome of the election is already clear? Do you believe Putin has any vulnerabilities?

Everyone has vulnerabilities, including Putin. But the vulnerabilities he faces don't provide sufficient room for him to lose, simply because the others will not enjoy a level playing field: The other candidates won't have the Kremlin-controlled media's support, access to resources and so on. And, yes, Putin's popularity remains very high. Unfortunately, the Russian people do not have a fair choice.

You're one of few top-level EU politicians who's met Putin in person, and you even talked to him during an awkward situation when you were stuck with him and former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso in an elevator in Brussels. You spoke about the encounter to the Nemtsov moviegoers earlier this evening and to the Lithuanian media, too. Can you recall the meeting for our international readers?

(Grins) I wouldn't call it an awkward situation, at least not for me. Everything happens. Especially after a tough meeting when two leaders cannot speak without a translator. While in the elevator and kind of ignoring President Barroso, President Putin started to complain to me about Dalia Grybauskaite, the Lithuanian president, asking why she always speaks so harshly to him on the world stage. My response was simple: "How can you expect her to talk friendly to you if you threaten Ukraine and introduce an embargo on Lithuanian agricultural products?" He commented tersely, "It's not me, it's the Russian business lobbyists who are trying to promote their particular interests and meddle in the work of the government."

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: The Evolving Stalemate
« Reply #240 on: December 08, 2017, 04:18:35 AM »
    Tensions between Russia and the West will remain high in 2018, with the United States and European Union likely to maintain — if not expand — their economic sanctions.
    Negotiations between Moscow and the West over contested hot spots like Ukraine and Syria will take place throughout the year, though talks ultimately will not lead to any breakthrough agreements.
    The importance of Russia's relationship with the West to Moscow will gradually ebb as the Kremlin increasingly turns its foreign policy focus to other regions of the world.

At the beginning of 2017, it appeared as if the strained relationship between Russia and the West was about to undergo a substantial shift. U.S. President Donald Trump, who had campaigned on a platform of improving relations with Russia, was about to be inaugurated. Upcoming elections in the core European Union states of France and Germany offered the possibility that Euroskeptic parties would rise to power, leading to a major change in those countries' positions, including on maintaining sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, it appeared as if solidarity within NATO, as well as support for Western-leaning states like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, was in danger of weakening substantially.

But as 2018 approaches, it's clear that instead of waning, Western pressure against Russia has intensified. In the United States, lawmakers wrested the power to withdraw U.S. sanctions against Russia away from the president, partially as a result of the numerous investigations launched into the extent of Russian interference in U.S. elections. Trump essentially was forced to cede his power to unilaterally lift the penalties in July, and Congress subsequently enacted a stronger sanctions regime against Moscow.

In France, the National Front, a Euroskeptic party, and its pro-Russian presidential candidate Marine Le Pen reached the second round of the country's presidential election, but Le Pen lost to centrist Emmanuel Macron in the decisive vote. Russia certainly had tried to influence the result in favor of Le Pen, but the exposure of the cyberwarfare and information campaigns it had used to try to influence the outcome of U.S. elections and the revelation that the Kremlin was employing the same techniques in Europe, blunted their effectiveness. The same held true during the German general elections in September, where despite Russian efforts, the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany party did not gain substantial traction, even though it did outperform expectations. After the dust of the European elections settled, the European Union maintained its cohesiveness, and its members voted unanimously to extend sanctions against Russia through the end of 2017.

In the meantime, neither the European Union nor NATO has backed away from the countries on the European/Russian borderland. The United States and the European bloc have been steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and NATO has followed through with the deployment of semipermanent battalions to Poland and the Baltic states. On its side of the border, Russia has built up its forces as well, and while there has been no major confrontation between Russia and NATO, their military standoff has maintained the intensity of past years.

What's Ahead in 2018?

Several key issues will shape the direction of ties between Russia and the West in 2018. One is the conflict between Russian-backed separatist forces and the Ukrainian government in Ukraine's east, which is entering its fourth year. Following an escalation of violence along the frontlines in the separatist Donbas region shortly after Trump's inauguration, military activity has decreased in intensity in recent months. The conflict has now taken on the "semi-frozen" nature typical of those in other Russian-backed breakaway territories in the former Soviet space. In the meantime, diplomatic activity between Russia and the West over the Ukrainian separatist conflict picked up after a suggestion by Russian President Vladimir Putin in September that a U.N. peacekeeping force be deployed to Eastern Ukraine.

Putin's proposal and associated diplomatic efforts have raised the question of whether the end of the Ukrainian conflict could be in sight in 2018. But given the gap between Russia and the West over the nature and parameters of a potential U.N. mission in Donbas, prolonged negotiations are likely before any agreement could be struck. Russia, on one hand, has suggested the deployment of a limited force purely to protect observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on the line of contact between Ukrainian security forces and the separatists. But Ukraine and the United States have both called for a deployment to span all of Donbas, including along the border between the separatist territory and Russia. That option essentially would represent a complete abandonment of Russia's strategic position in Donbas, given that Moscow is thought to funnel troops and weapons to support the rebels over the border. While Russia can use the peacekeeping proposal to show its willingness to negotiate over the conflict in an effort to stave off additional Western pressure, it does not mean that Russia will capitulate to the Ukrainian-U.S. position. What's more, Russia could drive an escalation of fighting if it suited its needs.

Depending on what ongoing U.S. investigations over Russian election meddling reveal, the United States could escalate its sanctions regime against Russia. And although Trump does not support it, key members of his administration are openly considering sending lethal weaponry to Ukraine. If the United States decides to take either of those actions, Moscow could choose to respond by escalating the conflict in Eastern Ukraine — or responding elsewhere in an asymmetric fashion.

A longtime driver of tensions between Russia and the West has been the ongoing military buildup by both sides along the European borderlands, which shows no signs of slowing. Russia is expected to permanently deploy Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems to its Kaliningrad enclave on a permanent basis at the beginning of 2018, while NATO will set up new Atlantic and logistics commands, as well as increase coordination efforts on Black Sea patrols and cyberdefense capabilities. The continued buildups could add pressure that would interfere with the resumption of already stalled arms control talks between the United States and Russia.

Moscow's continued use of hybrid warfare techniques in Europe, the United States and Western-aligned nations represents another front in the standoff.

Moscow's continued use of hybrid warfare techniques in Europe, the United States and Western-aligned nations represents another front in the standoff. As Italy prepares to hold general elections by May, Moscow is likely to ramp up its information campaign in support of parties like the Five Star Movement and Forza Italia that oppose Russian sanctions. But as in Germany, the Italian parties that Russia would prefer will likely struggle to access power. Russian efforts are more likely to be successful in Moldova, where there is a good chance the pro-Russian Socialist Party will unseat the ruling EU-oriented coalition and subsequently reverse some of the moves the country has taken in recent years toward Western integration in favor of closer ties with Moscow.

Russia's Foreign Policy Focus Shifts

One important emerging trend related to the Russia-West standoff is Moscow's rising influence in regions other than Europe and Eurasia. As its isolation from the West has become more pronounced, Russia has expanded its economic relationships with China and the Arab states. At the same time, Russia has increased its economic and security involvement in areas of substantial strategic interest to the United States and Europe, most notably Syria and North Korea.

Those efforts have substantially boosted Russian influence in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, and it has followed by deepening its ties in other strategic theaters such as Afghanistan, Venezuela and Libya. Initially, Russia appeared to be conducting the interventions in areas outside its traditional interests in the European and Eurasian theaters as a strategy to increase its leverage in negotiations with the United States over issues closer to home. But Russia's relationships in those regions has evolved beyond a negotiation strategy. Indeed, Moscow has developed significant political, economic and security interests in many of those areas.

Managing its relationship with the West is no longer the defining feature of Russia's foreign policy efforts. Instead, Moscow has created a much more complex and intertwined series of relationships spanning the globe. While its confrontation with Europe and the United States is expected to continue and perhaps even intensify in 2018, that competition will be only one facet among many emerging interests and priorities for Russia.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: US-Russia INF
« Reply #241 on: December 12, 2017, 03:47:21 PM »
The United States is gearing up to increase pressure on Russia over what it claims are Moscow's flagrant violations of an important Cold War-era arms treaty. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a cornerstone arms control pact between the United States and Russia that halted a destabilizing buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe during the 1980s. The United States has accused Russia of developing, testing and deploying a cruise missile that violates the limits set by the INF, and Moscow in turn has accused Washington of deploying drones and missile launchers that violate the terms of the treaty. Last week, the U.S. State Department released a report in which it vehemently refuted Russia's claims. To pressure Moscow back into compliance with the treaty, the U.S. State Department also announced Dec. 8 that Washington was preparing to take military, diplomatic and economic measures over alleged infractions of the pivotal arms treaty.

To ensure conformity with the treaty, the United States will seek to work with its NATO partners to present a united front against Russia. Last month during the North Atlantic Council meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis reportedly presented NATO allies with an ultimatum: Either NATO acts jointly on punitive measures on Russia related to the INF violations by summer 2018 or Washington will move ahead unilaterally. Furthermore, U.S. Commerce Department is preparing new sanctions that will target Russian companies believed to be involved with developing weapons that violate the terms of the treaty. On the diplomatic front, the United States and Russia will meet this week as part of the Special Verification Commission to potentially address the U.S. accusations. However, past meetings on the same issue have failed to produce any breakthroughs.

Finally, the United States could pressure Russia militarily. For instance, the U.S. Congress has moved toward authorizing funds for the development of a U.S. missile that if fielded would violate the INF treaty. (Though, for now, the United States would develop the missile but not deploy it.) In addition, Washington is also looking into increasing its force deployments in Europe as well as expanding its missile defenses as a response. If the United States elects to ratchet up the pressure even further, it could then test and deploy its own missiles that violate the treaty.

 The fragility of the INF highlights the fraying legacy of an arms control framework left over from the Cold War. Complicating matters, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire in 2021, and the dispute around the INF could impair negotiations over New START's renewal. If the dispute over INF ends up undermining New START, that would further exacerbate an already unstable arms control regime and lead to a significant new arms race between the United States and Russia that could even extend to other nations.
 STRATFOR

Crafty_Dog

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GOP Chairman worried by Trump's stance on Russian interference
« Reply #242 on: December 17, 2017, 07:52:24 AM »
http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/365168-gop-chairman-worried-by-trumps-stance-on-russian-interference

In addition to the Trump related commentary, note this:
==============================================

Last week, the House passed legislation sponsored by McCaul that would elevate Homeland Security’s cybersecurity mission by replacing the little-recognized headquarters office called the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) with an operational, stand-alone agency to handle cyber and infrastructure protection.

Part of the NPPD’s mission is providing penetration testing and other services to state and local officials worried about the security of their voter databases and other systems. Homeland Security opened up election infrastructure to voluntary federal protections after Russia tried to infiltrate election infrastructure in 21 states ahead of last year’s election.

Broadly, NPPD is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure — the majority of which is owned privately — from cyber and physical threats.

McCaul’s legislation has received strong backing from Kirstjen Nielsen, Trump’s new Homeland Security secretary. She has urged the Senate to pass similar legislation.

« Last Edit: December 17, 2017, 07:54:50 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Washington weighs sanctions 2.0
« Reply #243 on: December 28, 2017, 11:49:50 AM »


    Washington will increase pressure on Moscow in 2018 through a series of expanded sanctions aimed at Russia’s financial stability, elites, reputation and defense industry.
    Russia will weather the increased pressure by further insulating its economy, oligarchs and companies, placing additional responsibility for the country’s stability on the Kremlin.
    The Russian government can maintain its position next year, though its resources are growing slim and the Kremlin faces a pivotal series of elections.

Heading into the new year, tensions between Moscow and Washington show no sign of abating. The United States is continuing its investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; both sides have accused each other of arms treaty violations; and both countries are continuing to build up their positions across the globe as they prepare for a long-term struggle. In addition, the United States has specified four areas — each with varying effects and degrees of political fallout — for further sanctions against Russia. The added pressure on the Kremlin comes as President Vladimir Putin faces re-election and Russia grows increasingly fragile.

Sanctions in Place

Since the Soviet period, the United States has targeted Russia with numerous sanctions. The primary ones currently in effect were instituted over human rights violations and the conflict in Ukraine. In late 2012, the United States expanded its Soviet-era sanctions over human rights and approved the Magnitsky Act to punish those deemed responsible for the death of Russian tax accountant Sergei Magnitsky, a whistleblower who investigated Kremlin abuses and a tax-fraud scheme. The act penalizes dozens of people believed to be involved in the case, but the measure has evolved into a platform for the United States and its allies to punish Russia for a much wider scope of human rights abuses.
 
The Ukraine sanctions imposed by the United States (and, to a lesser extent, by the European Union, Canada, Australia and Japan) stem from Russian involvement in the conflict there and includes the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russian support of the previous government, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and the annexation of Crimea. Those penalties include:

    Limits on debt issuance to Russia's six largest banks, four primary state oil firms and four state defense firms.
    Sanctions on Russia's energy industry, prohibiting U.S. firms from providing, exporting or re-exporting goods and technology related to deep-water, Arctic offshore and shale oil and natural gas projects in Russia.
    Bans on subjects receiving dual-use goods by Russia's primary state defense companies.
    Sanctions (travel and asset freezes) against hundreds of Russian entities and individuals.

But the effects of these sanctions on Russia are open to debate, because low oil prices plunged the country into a recession in the same year that some of the penalties were implemented. And Russia insulated much of its economy as ties soured with the West. It has curbed Western imports by building up its domestic capabilities (including in food, credit services and online infrastructure) and by looking to the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East for investment partners and some level of trade. The sanctions did bite into some key energy projects, such as the giant oil deal with Exxon Mobil Corp., and they will have a long-term effect on Russia's oil production. But much to Washington's chagrin, Moscow has, for the most part, weathered the penalties.
 
During the past year, Washington has drafted a string of sanction options; some were extreme, such as cutting off Russia from Western-based financial and credit systems. But four key subjects — sovereign debt, oligarchs, human rights and defense — are moving into range as targets of expanded sanctions. In July, the U.S. Congress wrested the power to directly withdraw the Russian sanctions away from the presidency, and lawmakers now require that changes to the sanctions regime go through them first. President Donald Trump signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in August, and it included provisions for expanding penalties in the coming years.
 
Beginning in February, the U.S. Treasury Department will submit the details on possible expanded sanctions, though their general targets — sovereign debt and oligarchs — are already known. These penalties are connected mostly to the U.S. investigation into Russian interference during the 2016 presidential election, which has sent U.S. perceptions of Russia plummeting — particularly in Congress.

The Sovereign Debt Squeeze

In its February report, the Treasury Department will detail the effects on Russia and the global market of possible sanctions on U.S. citizens who buy new Russian domestic government debt. Current sanctions prevent certain Russian companies (such as its largest bank, Sberbank, and oil giant Rosneft) from issuing bonds to Western investors, but they don't prevent the government from issuing the debt. So the Kremlin has been taking on sovereign debt and reportedly transferring it to its sanctioned firms. In 2017, foreign investment in Russian government debt rose from 5 percent to 30 percent of the total $25 billion in bonds issued. Among many Western financial firms, Russian government bonds have been considered some of the best performing in emerging markets this year.
 
In 2018, the Russian government expects to borrow an additional $18 billion to supplement its federal budget, which is already slim for the year. While the country is pulling out of a recession, it is also settling into a prolonged period of economic stagnation. Moreover, the Russian people and many of the country's strategic firms and banks are facing even more difficulties, forcing the Kremlin to take on increased financial burdens to ensure the economic system doesn't destabilize and to mitigate popular backlash. The Kremlin will likely draw on much of its reserve funds to stay afloat, while borrowing more heavily internationally.

If the United States implements sanctions on Russian sovereign debt, Western investors (beyond American) could be spooked away from buying it. The Russian Finance Ministry said in mid-December that the government would not try to issue bonds ahead of the February report; it was confident Moscow had enough non-Western connections to purchase its future debt. Russia has spent much of its energy in recent years strengthening its relationships in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to mitigate pressure from the West. So expanded sanctions on Russian sovereign debt would be a hindrance, but not a burden heavy enough to change Russian behavior.

Pinching the Oligarchs

Another sanctions option that has caught the Kremlin's attention will be part of a second U.S. Treasury Department report to be released in February. It will outline the most significant Kremlin-tied oligarchs, the silovarchs, their net worth, evidence of corruption, their business ties abroad, their assets abroad and their sources of income. Their families (wives, children, parents and siblings) and associates will be subject to sanctions, as will their assets. In addition, their children could even be prevented from studying abroad. The scope of this option is starkly different from the current sanctions on Russian personalities. Those Kremlin-tied oligarchs mostly keep their assets and lives inside Russia, and they are also directly tied to Russian foreign policy — mostly to the conflict in Ukraine. Expanding the list to the oligarchs and silovarchs who are Putin's personal cronies comes closer to directly targeting the president.
 
And among members of the general oligarchy, concern has spread that they may get roped into sanctions under this investigation. These elites are holdovers from the chaotic 1990s and are not necessarily loyal to Putin. They typically hold vast sums of money, assets and business interests abroad, and most of them are tied to the Kremlin because they need Putin's support. Names floated among the media are mostly the surviving oligarchs of the metals and energy industries: Oleg Deripaska, Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman, Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Prokhorov. According to The Moscow Times and RBC media group, Russian oligarchs have flooded Washington with lobbyists and lawyers, who have reportedly suggested that the oligarchs divorce their wives and put their assets in the names of their now ex-wives to protect them. On a side note, the oligarchs have also reportedly threatened Forbes Russia to not publish its annual list of Russian billionaires. In early December, Russian media reported that Forbes would pull back on the list, though it didn't confirm or deny that it was acquiescing to the oligarchs.
 
After Putin's crackdown on the oligarchs during his first decade in power, the remaining handful of businessmen running major non-state firms are powerful. The Kremlin relies on these oligarchs to maintain non-state businesses, to shore up the country's financial sector and to supply the livelihoods for the many regions and cities dependent on a single industry. Should they come under U.S. attack for a foreign policy they are not responsible for, then they may turn on Putin and his administration, destabilizing the already tense system of elites.
 
Unnamed sources in Washington told the newspaper Izvestia that the list of oligarchs and businessmen drawn up by the U.S. Treasury Department won't be released publicly. The move is probably intended to prevent those people from moving their funds and shifting their business ties to duck sanctions. In addition, the Izvestia report claimed that the list would be shared with the United States' European partners to attempt to persuade them to not do business with those on the list. That move is likely just a recommendation, because most Europeans are not fully behind expanded sanctions, which could harm their economies and businesses. And concern about the U.S. use of this sanction option sparked increased capital flight from Russia by foreign investors during November and December.
 
On Dec. 21 Putin called a large bunch of the oligarchs to the Kremlin; such a call typically means the government is going to demand that the billionaires flush cash into the Russian system to keep it stable. Such a demand was issued last month, but the most recent sit-down was starkly different. The Kremlin offered to help the oligarchs move their money safely from abroad by using Eurobonds to protect it from U.S. targeting. The Russian Central Bank and Finance Ministry assured the businessmen that the infrastructure to move foreign currency investments in bulk back to Russia had been put in place. Unofficial reports claim the Russian government will float $3 billion in Eurobonds, but not through the typical security accounts, such as Euroclear or Clearstream — which are required to notify the U.S. Treasury Department. Instead, the float would be available to anonymous Russian investors directly, though it is unclear what system Moscow will use instead.

Magnitsky and Human Rights

Though the Europeans are not necessarily on board with either of the aforementioned measures, they could agree to sanctions over human rights. The United States has expanded the Magnitsky Act over the years, turning it from a vehicle for sanctions on people responsible for the Russian accountant's death to one targeting global human right offenses. The original act was adopted by a handful of Western allies, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Estonia and Lithuania. The only high-ranking individual on the sanctions list until recently was Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia's Investigative Committee.
 
However, on Dec. 20, the Treasury Department expanded the list to include one of Russia's most powerful and controversial figures: Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. He is accused of being involved in a purge of homosexual men in his region this year. Dozens of gay or bisexual men have fled Chechnya, though Kadyrov denies the accusations. He responded in his usual way: with a rant on Instagram. He blasted the sanctions, then mocked their impact because he says he has no assets in the United States and doesn't want to travel there.
 
This fall, Canada introduced its own version of the Magnitsky Act and sanctioned 52 people tied to the case. Ottawa is also using the act as blanket legislation to target global human rights offenses, though it is primarily aimed at Russia. The United Kingdom, as well, is considering expanding its Magnitsky-style bill in February. And France, South Africa and Ukraine are all considering introducing similar measures against Russia next year.
 
The Magnitsky Act and related bills do not directly hit the Kremlin or Russia. However, Putin has repeatedly noted that he takes personal offense to the measures. For an autocratic leader who has aggressively consolidated power and has not shied away from conflicts abroad, this sentiment may seem peculiar. But this issue is reportedly one of the primary demands Russia has repeatedly raised in larger negotiations. Putin seems to believe that the act undermines his reputation at home and abroad. Now that the act is expanding to his closest loyalists, the issue is likely rising in the Russian leader's priorities.

Targeting the Defense Industry

Next year the United States is likely to impose sanctions on Russian defense companies that provide technology or development that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). The United States and Russia have repeatedly accused each other of violating the 1987 arms-control pact, which bans a buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In November, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis presented NATO allies with an ultimatum to join U.S. punitive measures on Russia over the INF Treaty. The U.S. Commerce Department is preparing a list of companies believed to be involved in developing weapons that violate the treaty.
 
The Cold War arms treaties have long been a bone of contention between Moscow and Washington, and they have grown obsolete as both sides have been developing missiles that could violate the treaty and as arms programs have proliferated to many other powers who are not bound by the pact's restrictions. Putin said in his recent televised news conference that the treaty was all but dead. The United States is already planning to increase force deployments in Europe and expand missile defense programs — both against Russia's wishes.
 
Despite the INF Treaty technically still being in place, Russia is already responding to U.S. sanctions over the agreement. Putin ordered 77 defense firms to ensure that they can develop equipment and parts currently imported from the West. The Russian government has also decreed that all purchases made by its Defense Ministry and various security services should be made in secret. All documentation of contracts, registrations, purchases and permits by these agencies and their contractors will be issued in closed tenders and classified as state secrets. Banks and financial institutions will also mark such transactions as classified.
 
With increased financial allocations for the defense industry, Russia is also preparing for the eventuality of a break in the treaties. However, Putin has said Russia will challenge the United States if there is a renewed arms race, but he would not bankrupt the country to do so, reflecting a lesson the longtime Russian leader learned from the mistakes of the Soviet Union.
 
So for the United States and Russia, 2018 is shaping up to be another contentious year. While Washington is laying out the tools it can use against Moscow, Russia is getting ready for even tougher relations by insulating its economy and building bridges to the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: US prepares to shine light on oligarchs
« Reply #244 on: January 27, 2018, 09:23:41 AM »


    The United States is mulling its options to increase pressure on Russia over its reported election meddling and disinformation campaigns. Moscow is preparing for expanded sanctions by attempting to insulate its government, companies and elites.
    While Russia has mostly shielded itself from sanctions affecting its ability to issue sovereign debt, the possible targeting of its most powerful and wealthy citizens, even if not implemented, will ripple deep into Russia’s core.
    As the poverty rate in Russia expands, the population's dissatisfaction with widespread corruption and the exorbitant wealth held by the elites is growing. A list detailing that wealth could spark pushback on the Kremlin during this pivotal election year.

The United States has for years used economic sanctions as a cudgel against Russia for various perceived transgressions, including its actions in Crimea and Ukraine. They not only have targeted sectors vital to the Russian economy, contributing to its recession, but they also hit individuals in the upper echelons of Kremlin leadership. Now, Russian leaders are bracing for the possibility of even more sanctions, these stemming from allegations that Moscow interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections.

On Jan. 29, the U.S. Treasury Department will begin releasing a series of reports detailing options to increase pressure on Russia through expanded sanctions. The U.S. Congress ordered the reports in August as part of its Countering America’s Adversaries Sanctions Act. The Treasury Department reports are not an automatic expansion of sanctions, but rather are an exploration of the various pressure points the United States could use against Russia and the ramifications that doing so could have on the wider international economic and financial systems. Even as the reports were being readied, Moscow has taken steps to blunt the impact of any new sanctions that might be levied. In anticipation that its ability to fund sovereign debt could be restricted, Russia has worked to line up alternate sources of financing.

But it's the other possible targets of U.S. penalties that have drawn the most attention: Congress ordered the Treasury Department to draw up a list of oligarchs with strong Kremlin ties, and to include any evidence of corruption against them, plus details of their net worth, assets, foreign business ties, sources of income and families (wives, children, parents and siblings). The scope of this option marks a stark contrast from any other sanctions the United States has undertaken. Even though a string of Russian personalities already has landed on U.S. sanctions lists, they have been people directly tied to Russian military interventions, or personally to President Vladimir Putin and his grip on power.

Those who land on the highly anticipated "oligarch list" will likely be a who's who of Russia's most powerful and wealthy elite, many without clear ties to Russian foreign policy or activities abroad. The new sanctions option is intended to go after the less obvious Russian power bases, closing supposed loopholes that allow Russia to skirt current sanctions, and to apply direct pressure to Putin's administration. Leaks emanating from Washington indicate that the oligarch list initially will remain separate from the Treasury Department’s specially designated nationals list of people targeted by individual sanctions. The exploratory report naming Russia's wealthy power brokers, portions of which may remain classified, will give Congress another option.

The Guessing Game

The question of who will land on the list has been somewhat of a parlor game among international news media outlets. Russian media giant Kommersant reported that it had identified some 50 elites, plus their families and associates — about 300 people in total — who will be named by the Treasury Department. Forbes has compiled a list of 96 Russian citizens, mostly oligarchs, who hold some $386 billion in assets. In addition, there's a group of Kremlin elites thought to hold vast sums of secret money, estimated in one new study performed by academics in Paris and London to approach the trillion-dollar range.

In the past, the United States has not compiled and publicized a comparable list without implementing sanctions. But the atypical nature of the oligarch list has raised questions whether this is a "shame list," meaning that no sanctions are intended on the individuals named, but rather it will be used for its optics. The Kremlin and many Russian elites have reportedly bolstered their lobbying efforts to persuade the Treasury Department to keep certain names off the list.

Possible Targets of the Oligarch List
 
(NOT PRINTING HERE)
 
The intense interest in who will be named in the oligarch list has been matched by speculation over what its publication might mean for Putin's administration and Russia as a whole. The elites expected to be named on the list fall into four broad categories:

1. Senior Kremlin officials who are directly tied to the administration and its mechanisms for creating and implementing foreign policy. Most of these Kremlin elites serve on boards of some of the largest and most lucrative companies in Russia, own shares anonymously, and store much of their wealth in safe havens abroad.

2. Russian elites who are part of Putin’s loyalist circle and who help him maintain a hold on power. Like the senior figures in the Kremlin, these elites also hold shares in large Russian firms or occupy critical seats of power and are willing to carry out Putin's bidding.

3. Other government officials who either plan, implement or finance Russian activities abroad.

4. Russian oligarchs, who are mostly holdovers from the 1990s holding vast amounts of wealth and assets. While mostly on friendly terms with the Kremlin and Putin, these oligarchs are not particularly loyal to the current government but understand that they have to work with it to survive.
Preparing for Action

As the Treasury Department reports were being formulated, the Russian government held a series of meetings to develop strategies to shield elites and oligarchs from U.S. sanctions. The Kremlin exempted large state firms from disclosing their contractors, thus offering fewer possible targets for U.S. actions. Putin called on the elites and oligarchs to repatriate their assets held abroad. The Finance Ministry and Central Bank offered methods for anonymous money transfers that would fly under the sanctions radar. The government is also allowing a $3 billion eurobond float to Russian business elites that offers them anonymity. Multiple reports indicate that many elites have either liquidated their assets abroad or run them through a series of stress tests to gauge risk. Many large Russian companies have tapped international capital markets and issued hundreds of millions of dollars worth of bonds in recent months. Many oligarchs, cautious of the state's monitoring and its propensity to nationalize assets, don’t want to keep their cash in Russia.

The Russian government has characterized the upcoming oligarch list as an attempt to destabilize the country financially and politically in a pivotal election year. The Kremlin already has laid the groundwork for reciprocal sanctions against the United States, but it is waiting to see how far Washington will take the issue.

Even if the list does not lead to sanctions, it will have two powerful effects in Russia and among Putin’s administration. The elites and oligarchs remain loyal to Putin as long as they have the freedom to run their fiefdoms. Even the thought that the United States might move to seize or limit their wealth and power will have a strong psychological effect on their perception of Putin’s ability to protect them, and thus affect their continued loyalty to his administration. In recent years, many elites have already dissented from Putin’s direct orders on a slew of issues, as the Russian economy and financial sector fell back into recession. Putin reacted by surrounding himself with a group of ultraloyalists, shifting his presidency to an even further autocratic extreme. The longtime Russian leader understands that struggles in the Kremlin and among the country's elites have led to the downfall of other powerful Russian leaders in the past.

But even more dangerous to Putin could be the Russian people's reaction to a list of wealthy elites at a time when the country's poverty rate is growing at its fastest pace in 20 years. The primary cadre of elites and oligarchs hold as much wealth abroad as the combined wealth of all Russians back home, the academic study found. Calls for an anticorruption campaign in Russia have grown louder in recent years, and two-thirds of the more than 1,100 protests in 2017 were focused on corruption and economic woes. Most of the ire of those protests was not directed at the oligarchs, but at the government officials, such as Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, who live lavishly while claiming meager salaries. Seeing a list of the elites with the details of their wealth could reignite those sentiments during this election year, and force the Kremlin to respond with a campaign against corruption — even at the cost of sacrificing some of its own.

DougMacG

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Russia military spending cut in half, US Fracking, oil prices
« Reply #245 on: January 31, 2018, 11:24:08 AM »
Strange that we don't hear about this in the Russia debate.

Russia military spending was cut almost in half from 2015 peak, Russia in near financial collapse


https://www.nextbigfuture.com
On January 4, 2018, Russia’s finance ministry said it had fully spent its reserve fund, as planned, in late 2017 to cover budget shortfalls.
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Second source, Russia GDP Drop:
https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp
Russia GDP 2013:  US$ 2.2 trillion.
Dropped to 2016:        1.3 trillion

                  
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Russia was worth 1283.20 billion US dollars in 2016. The GDP value of Russia represents 2.07 percent of the world economy. GDP in Russia averaged 893.96 USD Billion from 1989 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 2230.60 USD Billion in 2013
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Fracking, not mentioned in the article, is our best, contain-Russia policy, same for several other rogue states.  Fracking caused the price drop in oil. Now Republicans are opening up ANWR, Keystone and off shore drilling.

What are the implications of this?  Can Russia still prop up Venezuela and other new conquests or are they now out of that business?  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-15/russia-venezuela-sign-deal-on-3-15-billion-debt-restructuring

DougMacG

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US-Russia: Electronic Warfare
« Reply #246 on: February 01, 2018, 11:20:19 AM »
Hard to say how this squares with my previous post that Russian military spending is tanking with their economy, but on the other side of it they seem to be flying by us in the area of electronic warfare.

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-steadily-cultivating-electronic-warfare-u-s-nato-lag-behind/

Maybe Facebook raising their advertising rates will squeeze Russia and their ability to accelerate chaos in the US.
« Last Edit: February 01, 2018, 11:22:40 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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ccp

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New take on one of the "top ten greatest "
« Reply #248 on: February 27, 2018, 06:10:56 AM »
Presidents (according to liberal historian).

Not this conservative historian (VDH):

https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/russia-spreading-chaos-fooling-media-exposing-fbi/

we will NEVER read this in left msm never .