Iran

[Crafty_Dog]

Formidable summary there!

[Body-by-Guinness]

Good thing he’s reestablished Obama’s Iranian appeasement strategy, if it can be called that. But hey, how could nuclear armed Shiites possibly harm the US or its interests?

Biden should know by now why his message to Iran isn't getting through
The Hill News / by Jonathan Sweet and Mark Toth / February 08, 2024 at 07:02AM

A “tiered approach” is how National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby described the U.S. response to the Jan. 28 attack against Tower 22 in Jordan. That attack, carried out by the Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq, killed three American soldiers and wounded another 40. 

President Joe Biden's goal is to “degrade" the group's ability to attack American troops and facilities, while sending a “strong signal to their backers,” namely Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

According to Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder, the initial tier of the air strikes on Feb. 2 included “more than 85 targets that Iran's IRGC and affiliated militias have used to attack U.S. forces. The facilities struck included command-and-control operation centers, intelligence centers, rockets, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicle storage and logistics and munition supply chain facilities.” The general added that 80 of the 85 targets were “destroyed or functionally damaged.” 

Casualty account figures vary. According to the Middle East Institute, “of the 34 confirmed fatalities, all were locals, except four Afghan members of Liwa Fatemiyoun (an Afghan Shi’a force founded and supported by Tehran). In a separate report, the head of Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Rami Abdurrahman, said “23 people were killed in the Syria strikes, all rank-and-file fighters.”

Contrary to Ryder’s announcement, Hussein al-Mosawi, spokesperson for Harakat al-Nujaba, one of the main Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, said the targeted sites in Iraq were mainly “devoid of fighters and military personnel at the time of the attack.”

Of note, not one of the 85 targets was in Iran, and not one member of the IRGC was a casualty. Conversely, in a single airstrike hours before the U.S. response, Israel killed IRGC military advisor Saeid Ali Dadi in south Damascus — their third airstrike against IRGC targets in Syria since Christmas. 

Israel has repeatedly made clear it “will not allow Iran to expand its presence.” Tuesday evening, it backed that up by striking “Shuyrat airbase and several locations on the outskirts of Homs, Syria,” killing two Hezbollah fighters. No forewarnings, just steel on target, removing the threat from the battlefield.

Groundhog Day was another day of empty messaging for the Biden administration. And the message, having been received, was promptly ignored as Iranian proxies launched at least three more suicide drone attacks against U.S. bases. The drones were supposedly intercepted.

That does not include the Houthi response to joint U.S.-United Kingdom strikes in Yemen. Houthi rebels continue to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles at commercial shipping and U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and recently employed subsurface vessels. Houthi rebels have used subsurface vessels successfully against the Saudi Navy in their war against the Saudis.

A fourth attack occurred on Monday that resulted in six U.S.-backed fighters from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) being killed in a drone strike on the U.S. base at al-Omar oilfield in Syria’s eastern Deir ez-Zor province. Eighteen were wounded in the attack. While no American casualties were taken, it was an American base.

The common denominator in all cases is Iran.

So the only message Iran seems to be getting loud and clear from the airstrikes conducted last Friday is that the White House is reluctant to strike targets inside Iran. Their proxies? Yes, but not Iran directly. Therefore, Iran’s response was to launch still more attacks through its proxies. Although Iran respects the capabilities of the U.S. military, it does not fear Biden, the man who would be responsible for giving the order to escalate.

When Biden and his spokespersons say they “do not want a war with Iran,” or they “do not want to widen the war in the Middle East,” Tehran believes them. That is the only message Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei hears — everything else is noise. For Iran, it is part of the cost of doing business to have the U.S. target its proxies in northern Iraq and southeastern Syria. They are simply tools in Iran's toolbox, to be discarded when their usefulness is complete.

What seemingly is not at risk are the instruments of war that Iran maintains within its own borders — IRGC facilities and leadership, the Shahed-136 UAV production facility in Esfahan, nuclear facilities weaponizing uranium, and oil production facilities funding their proxies. And even some senior leadership of these proxy groups does not make the target list.

Conspicuously missing from the list of targets are Abu Fadak Al-Mohammedawi, chief of staff of Iraq’s Shiite-led Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraq’s equivalent of the IRGC) who likely ordered the attack on Tower 22, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi in Yemen.

It was not until Wednesday night that the U.S. targeted Abu Baqir al-Saadi and Arkan Al-Alawi in a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad. They were leaders within Kataib Hezbollah and were likely involved in the decision to strike Tower 22 on Jan. 28.

Biden and his National Security team need to get out of the messaging business with Iran. They are now 0 for 3 at effective messaging. The next tier of the “multiple actions” described by Kirby must hit closer to home for the message to resonate in Tehran. Washington must quit swatting at flies and start hitting nails on their heads. General Michael E. Kurilla and his team at U.S. Central Command are the hammer. The other instruments of national power can be applied post-strike to reinforce the message.

Iran is already preparing for the next tier. Biden needs to change his calculus. Iran likely believes he lacks the political will to take them on directly during a president election campaign. It is time for the president to prove them wrong before the next U.S. soldier is killed or wounded.

Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4454113-biden-should-know-by-now-why-his-message-to-iran-isnt-getting-through/

[DougMacG]

The whole reach out to Iran initiative never made any sense.  Pay them ransom and they will love and respect us?  Listen to them, the leaders, they hate us.  What part of "Death to America" all these years does our leadership not understand?

Toward the end of the Bush administration some of us wondered if Cheney would ever talk the President into taking out Iran's nuclear capability.  Didn't happen, and then we had the Obama American Apology Tour where we took the blame instead of them, and sent them planeloads of cash.  'We were only sending their money back to them', they said.  True only if you think the assets were wrongfully frozen.

What part of "world's number one state sponsor of terror" do they not understand about Iran?  How many of the American deaths in Iraq were Iranian-made IEDs? 

A proxy in terror is what a shell company is in money laundering.  Sure, shut it down but don't think you've addressed the problem. 

One interesting part of both Reagan and Trump was that the opposition, including media, made them out to be so trigger happy that adversaries feared them, cf. Kim Jung Un climbed back in his hole, Putin waited for a Democrat administration for his next attack.

I just don't get what Dem leadership or Dem voters are thinking.  The regime of Iran is a group you can work with?  Israel isn't?  Having no border security won't attract terrorists, espionage, worse?  We don't need fossil fuels?  Taxes and endless regulations don't harm regular people?  Chopping off genitalia is affirmation?  Men entering women's sports won't harm it?  What are you people thinking?  (Sorry about topic drift but the missing logic is the common thread.)

We're not waiting for another fly swat of 'retaliation' to appease the critics, that Biden advisers and controllers apparently can't agree on.  We're waiting for deterrence, a disproportional response that makes them regret they ever did it and makes them not want to try it again.  The kind of response that these people and the UN would criticize if Israel did it, like take down the regime.  Whatever the response was going to be, it should have been ready before each of these attacks.  These weren't surprises.  These weren't black swan events.  They were as predictable as the sun coming up, especially after they saw the bungling of Afghan retreat and everything else happening in Washington, Ukraine etc.

[ccp]

If I hear MSM reiterate one more time "we don't want war with Iran"

 

PS we are at war.

[Crafty_Dog]

I would like to pat myself on the back for being quite emphatic at the time here that Obama-Biden pulling our main force out of Iraq as they did was a huge historic error.  First ISIS, now this. 

[Crafty_Dog]

https://amgreatness.com/2024/02/09/could-joe-biden-order-a-u-s-attack-on-iran/D

Off the top of my head I would say:

A) real good idea as a practical matter, (especially with this lurking in the very near future https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/20384/global-order-nuclear-iran ) and

B) YES as a C'l matter.

[ccp]

when I click on top link this is what I see:

D.C. Jury Finds Michael Sussmann Not Guilty of Making a False Statement to the FBI

[Crafty_Dog]

I put the title of the desired article in Qwant and nothing came up, weird.   Could the piece have been pulled?

[ccp]

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/rasmussen-reports-iran-poll/2024/02/19/id/1154157/

[ccp]

https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2024/02/isis_renews_calls_for_terror.html

[Crafty_Dog]

GPF

Iran and Hungary signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement during Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto’s visit to Tehran. He met with his Iranian counterpart and signed a roadmap for cooperation in the agricultural sector. The ministers also exchanged views on regional and international issues.

[Crafty_Dog]

Bombing Iran
Nobody should welcome the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. But bombing the place is not the answer
Feb 25th 2012 | from the print edition

FOR years Iran has practised denial and deception; it has blustered and played for time. All the while, it has kept an eye on the day when it might be able to build a nuclear weapon. The world has negotiated with Iran; it has balanced the pain of economic sanctions with the promise of reward if Iran unambiguously forsakes the bomb. All the while, outside powers have been able to count on the last resort of a military assault.

Today this stand-off looks as if it is about to fail. Iran has continued enriching uranium. It is acquiring the technology it needs for a weapon. Deep underground, at Fordow, near the holy city of Qom, it is fitting out a uranium-enrichment plant that many say is invulnerable to aerial attack. Iran does not yet seem to have chosen actually to procure a nuclear arsenal, but that moment could come soon. Some analysts, especially in Israel, judge that the scope for using force is running out. When it does, nothing will stand between Iran and a bomb.

The air is thick with the prophecy of war. Leon Panetta, America’s defence secretary, has spoken of Israel attacking as early as April. Others foresee an Israeli strike designed to drag in Barack Obama in the run-up to America’s presidential vote, when he will have most to lose from seeming weak.

A decision to go to war should be based not on one man’s electoral prospects, but on the argument that war is warranted and likely to succeed. Iran’s intentions are malign and the consequences of its having a weapon would be grave. Faced by such a regime you should never permanently forswear war. However, the case for war’s success is hard to make. If Iran is intent on getting a bomb, an attack would delay but not stop it. Indeed, using Western bombs as a tool to prevent nuclear proliferation risks making Iran only more determined to build a weapon—and more dangerous when it gets one.

A shadow over the Middle East

Make no mistake, an Iran armed with the bomb would pose a deep threat. The country is insecure, ideological and meddles in its neighbours’ affairs. Both Iran and its proxies—including Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza—might act even more brazenly than they do now. The danger is keenly felt by Israel, surrounded by threats and especially vulnerable to a nuclear bomb because it is such a small land. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently called the “Zionist regime” a “cancerous tumour that must be cut out”. Jews, of all people, cannot just dismiss that as so much rhetoric.

Even if Iran were to gain a weapon only for its own protection, others in the region might then feel they need weapons too. Saudi Arabia has said it will arm—and Pakistan is thought ready to supply a bomb in exchange for earlier Saudi backing of its own programme. Turkey and Egypt, the other regional powers, might conclude they have to join the nuclear club. Elsewhere, countries such as Brazil might see nuclear arms as vital to regional dominance, or fear that their neighbours will.

Some experts argue that nuclear-armed states tend to behave responsibly. But imagine a Middle East with five nuclear powers riven by rivalry and sectarian feuds. Each would have its fingers permanently twitching over the button, in the belief that the one that pressed first would be left standing. Iran’s regime gains legitimacy by demonising foreign powers. The cold war seems stable by comparison with a nuclear Middle East—and yet America and the Soviet Union were sometimes scarily close to Armageddon.

No wonder some people want a pre-emptive strike. But military action is not the solution to a nuclear Iran. It could retaliate, including with rocket attacks on Israel from its client groups in Lebanon and Gaza. Terror cells around the world might strike Jewish and American targets. It might threaten Arab oil infrastructure, in an attempt to use oil prices to wreck the world economy. Although some Arab leaders back a strike, most Muslims are unlikely to feel that way, further alienating the West from the Arab spring. Such costs of an attack are easy to overstate, but even supposing they were high they might be worth paying if a strike looked like working. It does not.
Striking Iran would be much harder than Israel’s successful solo missions against the weapons programmes of Iraq, in 1981, and Syria, in 2007. If an attack were easy, Israel would have gone in alone long ago, when the Iranian programme was more vulnerable. But Iran’s sites are spread out and some of them, hardened against strikes, demand repeated hits. America has more military options than Israel, so it would prefer to wait. That is one reason why it is seeking to hold Israel back. The other is that, for either air force, predictions of the damage from an attack span a huge range. At worst an Israeli mission might fail altogether, at best an American one could, it is said, set back the programme a decade (see article).

But uncertainty would reign. Iran is a vast, populous and sophisticated country with a nuclear programme that began under the shah. It may have secret sites that escape unscathed. Even if all its sites are hit, Iran’s nuclear know-how cannot be bombed out of existence. Nor can its network of suppliers at home and abroad. It has stocks of uranium in various stages of enrichment; an unknown amount would survive an attack, while the rest contaminated an unforeseeable area. Iran would probably withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which its uranium is watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At that point its entire programme would go underground—literally and figuratively. If Iran decided it needed a bomb, it would then be able to pursue one with utmost haste and in greater secrecy. Saudi Arabia and the others might conclude that they, too, needed to act pre-emptively to gain their own deterrents.

Perhaps America could bomb Iran every few years. But how would it know when and where to strike? And how would it justify a failing policy to the world? Perhaps, if limited bombing is not enough, America should be aiming for an all-out aerial war, or even regime change. Yet a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated where that leads. An aerial war could dramatically raise the threat of retaliation. Regime change might produce a government that the West could do business with. But the nuclear programme has broad support in Iran. The idea that a bomb is the only defence against an implacable American enemy might become stronger than ever.

Get real

That does not mean the world should just let Iran get the bomb. The government will soon be starved of revenues, because of an oil embargo. Sanctions are biting, the financial system is increasingly isolated and the currency has plunged in value. Proponents of an attack argue that military humiliation would finish the regime off. But it is as likely to rally Iranians around their leaders. Meanwhile, political change is sweeping across the Middle East. The regime in Tehran is divided and it has lost the faith of its people. Eventually, popular resistance will spring up as it did in 2009. A new regime brought about by the Iranians themselves is more likely to renounce the bomb than one that has just witnessed an American assault.

Is there a danger that Iran will get a nuclear weapon before that happens? Yes, but bombing might only increase the risk. Can you stop Iran from getting a bomb if it is determined to have one? Not indefinitely, and bombing it might make it all the more desperate. Short of occupation, the world cannot eliminate Iran’s capacity to gain the bomb. It can only change its will to possess one. Just now that is more likely to come about through sanctions and diplomacy than war.****

[ccp]

https://spectator.org/dea-halts-weapons-grade-plutonium-en-route-to-iran/

 

I thought Robert Mitchum kicked their ass back in '74 :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Yakuza

[Crafty_Dog]

Iranian satellite. Relatedly, Russia launched an Iranian-made satellite into orbit on Thursday. According to Iranian media, the satellite will be used for imaging, collecting domestic remote sensing data and testing of satellite technology.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/obama-deal-to-give-iran-zero-breakout-time-in-13-years/?fbclid=IwAR2Qz1B1nYxrc9Opc-MmMq6f51psIk1wqd7xS1V1vG2yybH0yPLOlT4vpms

[ccp]

https://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2024/03/14/biden-rewards-irans-murder-of-3-us-troops-with-a-cool-10-billion-n4927293

Unless I am missing something (a good reason to do this not reported in the story) the idiocy of this speaks for itself.

[DougMacG]

https://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2024/03/14/biden-rewards-irans-murder-of-3-us-troops-with-a-cool-10-billion-n4927293

Unless I am missing something (a good reason to do this not reported in the story) the idiocy of this speaks for itself.

The idiocy of this speaks for itself.

For some reason (most) voters of the Left don't see the problem.  Being tough on Iran should be a 90-10 issue or 100-0.

Hard to generalize with voter groups but my moderate Dem Jewish friends seem fed up with Biden, though (it appears) they will never come to Trump or to being Republican.  And then he is losing Muslim support as well for not going far enough in that direction.

I've been puzzled for years how Jewish Americans and Muslim Americans find a home in the same party.  It seems the massacre of Oct 7 has brought this to a head.  (Also strange that gay Americans and Muslim Americans find home in the same political party.  Am I missing something - or are they?)

No one seems to dispute Iran is the world's number one state sponsor of terror, even when Obama was sending them planeloads of cash.  More money means more sponsoring of terror, and we send them more money.  Even if it is 'their' money, assets were frozen for a reason.

Now we know they are sponsors of Oct 7 massacre and sponsors of the war Yemen is launching against commerce.  And we send them more money?

It is pure, self destructive idiocy.  I'm shocked our leaders come up with these policies.  I'm even more shocked and offended that their followers will follow them, apparently anywhere no matter how idiotic or destructive.

[ccp]

https://www.newsweek.com/why-jimmy-carter-owes-iranian-people-apology-opinion-1813190

[DougMacG]

https://www.newsweek.com/why-jimmy-carter-owes-iranian-people-apology-opinion-1813190

Historians will always debate one question about Jimmy Carter, was his domestic or foreign policy dumber?

https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/07/jimmy-carter-gets-it-wrong-on-venezuela-again/

[ccp]

" Historians will always debate one question about Jimmy Carter, was his domestic or foreign policy dumber?"

if only they would do the same for Brock/and his puppet

[Crafty_Dog]

April 10, 2024
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Iran’s Strategic Patience Dilemma
Israel’s recent strike on an Iranian consulate put Tehran in a difficult spot.
By: Hilal Khashan
Iran faces a dilemma in the wake of the Israeli attack last week on its consulate in Damascus, which killed seven senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It’s under pressure at home to respond to the strike but is concerned about the possibility of igniting a broader conflict. The escalation comes amid repeated direct attacks on Iranian targets that could weaken its regional power. Over the past few months, Israel has been stepping up attacks on Iranian assets, specifically in Syria. Since October, the rules of engagement between Israel and Iran’s so-called axis of resistance have tilted in Israel’s favor. Israel’s military does not believe that Iran will launch a direct military strike in retaliation for the Damascus attack, but it has taken exceptional precautions by calling up air force reservists and canceling military leaves. The assumption is that Iran will bide its time and pursue a policy of “strategic patience.”

Patience as Policy

In 2015, the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama was the first to articulate a policy of strategic patience. Obama stressed that the United States’ unique set of challenges required perseverance and used this policy to pursue goals related to democracy, human rights, energy security, climate and nuclear security.

The U.S. applied this strategy in dealing with North Korea by maintaining political dialogue with Pyongyang while keeping open the option of military action. China has also used it with Taiwan, as Beijing awaits the right time to reunite the island with the mainland. In both cases, the United States and China can impose their conditions on their opponents, even though they prefer not to antagonize them. By definition, this concept can be used only by countries that enjoy a surplus of military power over their opponents and have other options but prefer to exhaust diplomatic means before resorting to decisive military force.

Iran, however, cannot prevail over the United States and Israel. It instead uses its regional agents to distract its opponents, pushing them to recognize it as a legitimate partner in managing the region’s affairs while falsely asserting that they are independent in making their decisions.

Iran does not see either country as an eternal enemy, even though Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolution in 1979 designated the United States as the Great Satan and Israel as the absolute evil. These labels are not necessarily historical inevitabilities but rather convenient slogans that can be waived under opportune situations. After the nuclear agreement in 2015, Iranian authorities removed many of the revolutionary slogans that described the U.S. as the Great Satan from the walls of Iranian cities.

Iran began to use the concept of strategic patience after the U.S. assassinated Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in 2020. Since then, Tehran has opted for a subtle conflict with the United States rather than direct confrontation. It has not taken actions that could seriously harm U.S. interests; it even warned the Trump administration before striking American targets in Iraq to avenge Soleimani’s killing. Over the past four years, it has also tried to strike back at the United States using Iraqi militias.

Resisting Pressure to Retaliate

However, recent developments in the Middle East indicate that Tehran actually suffers from strategic deadlock. Iran once again faces the problem of wanting to respond to deter Israel from launching more attacks while also being careful to avoid an all-out war. Tehran believes it must respond to show its readiness for confrontation but in a calculated manner without causing an escalation or inflicting casualties. Its hesitation to retaliate is an indication that the Islamic Revolution is nothing but a paper tiger.

Tehran has repeatedly promised a response. The IRGC issued a statement reassuring the Iranian people that it will make Israel regret its actions in Damascus. Iran’s joint chief of staff, Mohammad Bagheri, said in a speech during the funeral of senior Quds Force commander Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who was killed in the strike, that Israel’s demise is near. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said recently that an Iranian response is inevitable – though he did not specify whether it would come from inside Iran or from its Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. And Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei threatened Israel with defeat.

These statements, however, are mere chest-thumping. Iran does not want its proxies in the Middle East to perceive it as weak because it would erode the impression it’s trying to build of itself as a strong and feared country. Still, Iranian media and some officials have called for restraint, arguing that the bombing of the consulate might be a trap meant to stir up anger within Iran and threaten its internal stability. The Iranian press is preparing citizens to accept that retaliatory military strikes are futile.

Despite Tehran’s repeated threats of revenge, its long-term strategy is based on preserving its achievements over the past decades and avoiding any knee-jerk reactions. It aspires to reach a deal with the United States in which the latter acknowledges it as a leading regional power. This objective lies at the center of its dispute not only with the United States but also with Israel, which refuses to recognize Iran as a country with equal regional influence.

Pro-Iranian analysts have sought to justify the delay in responding to the Israeli strike by arguing that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should not be able to remain in power under the pretext that his country is at war. They believe Iran must maintain its patience to defeat its enemies’ plans. Iranian leaders will thus adopt a strategic patience policy in dealing with this incident as they have done on many occasions since the Iranian Revolution. They will refrain from escalating regional tensions that might lead to direct conflict with Israel or the United States. However, they face the challenge of continuing Iran’s regional meddling, especially with the increasing strategic costs and risks.

Avoidance of War

For 30 years, Iran has tried to create a deterrent aura around itself. Missile parades, drills and animated videos are meant to publicly display Iran’s strength and permanent combat readiness, but the reality on the ground is entirely different. Avoidance of confrontation and eschewal of confidence-building measures with Israel are constants in Iranian foreign policy.

Given the norms that govern relations between countries, Iran must respond to the Israeli strike, but it is careful to avoid inviting Israel’s military wrath. Tehran even informed its Shiite proxies, just as it did with Hamas, that it would not participate directly in the fighting against Israel. It will arm and finance them but not to the extent of triggering a regional war requiring Iran’s involvement.

For Israel, Iran’s subversive agenda is too apparent to hide, let alone tolerate. The building that Israel bombed in Damascus was not a consulate in the internationally recognized sense but rather a center for military planning. Why, after all, would senior IRGC officers be working out of a diplomatic facility? Iran often uses its diplomatic missions to spread its influence worldwide, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, it used its cultural centers to spread the Shiite doctrine, which led to the closure of some of them in several countries. But Israel’s destruction of the Iranian consulate in Damascus is a pivotal event because it puts Tehran in a difficult position, indicating that the rules of engagement between the two countries have changed in Israel’s favor.

Deep in their collective consciousness, Iranians believe that no one can defeat them. The reason has nothing to do with military balance. The Iranian people are patient and persevering. However, the past two centuries did not go well for Iranians as they suffered frequent defeats by Russia and Britain. Modern warfare is about technological innovation, not just patience. The Israelis highlighted their technological superiority at the beginning of the recent confrontations, which differ radically from previous Arab-Israeli wars. Israeli operations have depended more on high-tech equipment and weapons than on conventional warfare. Intensive shelling and bombardments of border villages have given way to targeted attacks.

The Israelis say they can target warehouses, drone operating rooms and missile launching pads with absolute ease. Nasrallah even had to ask his fighters to refrain from using cell phones and to block and turn off surveillance cameras from the internet. However, these actions didn’t stop Israeli drones from successfully targeting Hezbollah commanders. It’s no wonder that Iran is adhering to a policy of strategic patience.

[ccp]

just wondering if Iran will give us the excuse to bomb and hopefully destroy their nucs sites once and for all.

if possible.

I certainly am not one to understand all the risks and rewards but it seems like the prudent thing to do.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://nypost.com/2024/04/15/opinion/how-biden-helps-iran-pay-for-its-terror-by-refusing-to-enforce-current-sanctions/?fbclid=IwAR3kmRe1swcOPFQmb9DiBpooW7opF494RnSB9B331h6MUKc8ReHhTUjti7c