Saudi Arabia & the Arabian Peninsula

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/world/middleeast/a-mostly-quiet-effort-to-put-saudi-women-in-drivers-seats.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20131027

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.clarionproject.org/news/saudi-arabia-behead-hajj-pilgrim

[Crafty_Dog]

 Saudi Arabia Wages Jihad Against Jihadism
Security Weekly
Thursday, March 20, 2014 - 03:00 Print Text Size
Stratfor

By Kamran Bokhari

Most discussions of Saudi Arabia and jihadists tend to focus on Riyadh's key role in producing the different variants of jihadism that have emerged since the 1970s. Although this narrative is true, it is dated. Often, once a narrative is formed it remains in currency even after it has become obsolete. This is because reality is usually more complex than presented and is constantly evolving, making it hard for observers to keep up with the shifts taking place. Despite the persistent narrative, in recent years Saudi Arabia has been waging a growing fight against jihadism. If al Qaeda's ideology is to be defeated, it is essential that the Saudis succeed in their efforts.

The news that the Saudi government on March 7 declared two al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria to be terrorist organizations confounded many. In a statement issued by the Interior Ministry, the kingdom formally blacklisted Jabhat al-Nusra (al Qaeda's official branch in Syria) and its rival, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Riyadh included the two along with the Saudi branch of Hezbollah and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.

The move against Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group linked to its parent organization in Lebanon, is obvious, given the sectarian struggle in the region. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood's calls for a republican form of Islamism, which run counter to the monarchy's interests, inform the historic animosity between the Saudis and the Brotherhood. However, the Saudis' denouncement of two groups that share the goal of toppling the Syrian regime -- especially when Damascus and its main regional patron, Iran (the Saudis' principal foe), have the upper hand in the civil war -- is notable. Even though the Saudis do not support Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, they benefit from the attacks that these two groups conduct against the Syrians and their Iranian/Shiite allies.

More important, the nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington are leading Iran to international rehabilitation and highlighting the divergence in U.S. and Saudi regional interests. Under these circumstances, why is the Saudi kingdom outlawing two groups that make up a large portion of the forces battling the Syrian state?
The Saudis' Reasoning

Recently, we explained how Saudi Arabia cannot effectively combat Iran unless it deals with al Qaeda and transnational jihadism. Al Qaeda and transnational jihadism are, in many ways, the unintended consequences of the Saudis using Salafism and jihadism as instruments to promote their foreign policy interests. For some time, the Saudis pursued this same policy in Syria, but it only created more problems.

Groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant have hijacked the anti-Iran/Shia ethnic and sectarian cause. Moreover, the Syrian regime bounced back last year -- aided by infighting among and against the jihadists -- and began retaking territories lost to the rebels. In addition, the United States and the West have held back support for the non-jihadist rebel groups for fear that jihadists would be the main beneficiaries of regime collapse in Syria.

This situation has forced the Saudis to overhaul their policy on Syria. A key component of this is the cultivation of a rebel force of relatively moderate Salafists and jihadists who are equally opposed to the Alawites and al Qaeda. This policy has yet to produce dividends because the Saudis face a strategic dilemma: Al Qaeda and transnational jihadists are challenging the Saudi monarchy's status as the ultimate authority over Salafism.

This is where Saudi Arabia has a problem in competing with Iran. Arab Shiite militant groups such as Hezbollah and others remain aligned with Iran, or at least do not wish to confront Iran. In contrast, many Salafist-jihadist militants fighting Tehran and the Shia also want to assume leadership of the Sunni world -- and have targeted the Saudi monarchy directly. This puts the Salafist-jihadists on a collision course with Saudi Arabia. From the Saudi perspective, Iran and the Shia represent the "other" and are thus easy to confront. The jihadists, however, are part of the "self" and are thus more difficult to deal with.
Challenges to the Saudi Fight Against Jihadists

Saudi efforts against jihadists are not new. During the mid-2000s, Saudi Arabia put down the al Qaeda insurgency within the kingdom. This forced the jihadists to relocate to Yemen, where the Saudis have largely been able to contain the problem.

The Arab Spring, however, has greatly complicated matters and constrained the Saudis' ability to act in the way they have previously at home or south of their border. Weakening autocratic regimes have created space for the jihadists to expand. At a time when the Saudis need to focus on the challenge posed by the Iranians and their Arab Shiite allies, Riyadh's attention is being diverted.

The jihadist threat from within the Sunni/Arab milieu not only distracts the Saudis from the larger threat of an assertive Iran, it also undermines the Saudi aim of assuming regional leadership. In this regard, Riyadh has two problems: countering the perception that Saudi foreign policy is largely responsible for the proliferation of transnational jihadism and the reality that Saudi Arabia's actions tend to work in favor of al Qaeda's agenda.

Ultimately, the challenge that the Saudis face is hardwired into the nature of their polity, the official ideology of which is Salafism. With the exception of a few occasions (such as the uprising of the Ikhwan militia in the late 1920s, the resistance to modernity in the 1960s, the uprising in 1979 and the short-lived insurgency in the mid-2000s), the Saudis have been able to combat the competing notion of Salafist-jihadism. Indeed, within the confines of the kingdom, the Saudis do not face any competition to their ownership of Salafism.

The problems occur outside their borders, where non-state actors who offer a competing view of Salafism abound and Saudi control is limited. From the Saudi point of view, jihad is only legitimate when sanctioned by the rulers (more specifically, an Islamic polity), which is the Saudi view of the struggle against the Syrian regime. Because it does not control the discursive boundaries of this type of jihad, the Saudis cannot control the actions of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which tend to subvert Saudi imperatives for their own ambitions. More specifically, rather than launching the war itself, the Saudi state is using non-state proxies to wage war. This empowers the non-state proxies, who then turn on the Saudi regime, which they consider corrupted.

As a result, the Saudis are less able to leverage jihadists for their strategic objectives. Instead, the jihadists are exploiting the Saudi moves for their transnational ambitions. Well aware of this problem, Riyadh is trying to counter the jihadists on both the ideological and practical levels.

On the practical level, the kingdom is trying to control the flow of money and weapons and give training and diplomatic support to the rebels who oppose al Qaeda and transnational jihadism. But there are limits to exercising such control because the battlefield is fluid. Once deployed, human and material resources can interact in unexpected ways, leading to undesirable outcomes.

Compounding the problem is that ideologies are much harder to control, especially in this age of social media. We are seeing this in the intra-jihadist debate centered on Syria, where leading jihadist theoreticians such as Abu Qatada and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi of Jordan are having a hard time trying to counter the formulations of those who support the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which no longer takes orders from al Qaeda. If such bona fide jihadist ideologues are struggling to maintain influence over the jihadist landscape, then the Saudis are even more removed from the context.

In essence, the core problem the kingdom faces is that Salafist and jihadist ideas have evolved well beyond the limits the Saudis prefer. This is why the state that exported Salafism and supported jihadists around the world for decades now cannot focus on the real issues -- countering Iran and managing the Arab Spring -- because it is distracted by Salafist-jihadists and is now working against the very forces it fostered.

Read more: Saudi Arabia Wages Jihad Against Jihadism | Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

Obama Seeks to Repair Ties in Visit to Saudi Arabia
________________________________________
 
U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Saudi Arabia Friday seeking to repair fractured relations with the kingdom. The United States and Saudi Arabia have forged a strategic alliance over the last seven decades, but have seen increased divisions since the uprisings that ousted former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Relations have particularly soured as the United States has worked to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran and failed to initiate a military intervention in Syria, where the Saudis are supporting the mainly Sunni opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. A goal of Obama's visit is to convince Saudi Arabia that U.S. relations with Iran will not compromise Washington's commitment to Saudi security. However, Saudi Arabia may not be persuaded, according to one Saudi official "The U.S. has underwritten the regional security order for the past 70 years and it sees now as a good time to disengage. We will have to do it all ourselves."

Marc:  This little paragraph brushes over the presence of AQ type groups such as Al Nusra in Syria.  The implications of the quote from the Saudi official are profound.

[G M]

The world is waking up to the reality of the end of pax Americana.

I guess we need a reset button and some extra deep bows from Buraq.

[Crafty_Dog]

 Saudi Arabia's Religious Scholars Are a Double-Edged Sword
Analysis
July 30, 2014 | 0419 Print Text Size
Saudi Arabia's Ulema Represent a Double-Edged Sword
Saudi policemen stand guard in front of the Al-Rajhi mosque in central Riyadh in 2011. (FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary

There are signs that imams of influential mosques in Saudi Arabia are re-creating distance between themselves and the Saudi government. For instance, imams recently resisted the government's call to condemn an attack on Saudi soil by Yemen-based al Qaeda fighters. Although it is an early indicator, this bodes ill for Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism strategy. Riyadh's dilemma is that the group of religious scholars and preachers, a group known as the ulema, whose ideas have given way to jihadism is also the antidote to violent extremism. Without the robust support of the ulema class, the Saudis cannot combat the jihadism that threatens the kingdom on its northern and southern borders.   
Analysis

The identity of the Saudi kingdom is a religious one based on the Salafist ideology of its founding theoretician, Muhammad bin Abdulwahab, a puritanical scholar from the Nejd region of the Arabian Peninsula. His pact with the patriarch of the royal family, Muhammad bin Saud, led to the founding of the first Saudi state in 1744 and the establishment of a monarchy. The legitimacy of the monarchy has been based on religion and manifested by the support of the ulema, which have grown into a massive power center over the centuries.
The Ulema as Tools for Containment

This ultra-conservative establishment of religious scholars has been an important tool that the House of Saud has used to prevent the rise of opposition groups. The Saudis have had great success with this strategy, whether the opponents were left-wing secular Arab nationalists, Islamists or even Salafists and jihadists who see the royal family and its supporters as having deviated from the founders' intent. The religious scholars' adherence to the Koranic verse "Obey Allah and obey his Messenger (Mohammed) and those in authority among you" has proved extremely helpful in maintaining a consensus against more extreme and radical elements.

The utility of the ulema has been seen on a number of occasions throughout the modern Saudi state's history, most recently in the kingdom established in the aftermath of WWI. Its founder, King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrehman, with the backing of the ulema in 1929, obliterated the Ikhwan, a religious and tribal militia that had gone rogue after helping Abdulaziz seize most of the areas that form the modern kingdom. Abdulaziz's son, King Faisal, used the ulema's support in 1963 to move against religious extremists opposed to introducing television in the kingdom. In 1979, his successor, King Khalid, was able to get the ulema to support his decision to allow French commandos to deploy and help regain control of the Holy Mosque in Mecca from a group of renegade Salafist militants under the leadership of Juhayman al-Otaibi.

In 1994, King Fahd had to deal with opposition from within the community of religious scholars. Some of the members rose up -- albeit peacefully and through sermons -- calling for reforms and better adherence to Islamic principles while voicing opposition to the stationing of U.S. forces in the kingdom. The latest and perhaps most significant example of the monarchy's use of the ulema was under King Abdullah's administration, when Riyadh defeated the kingdom's branch of al Qaeda, with critical assistance from the religious scholars, in 2005-2006.
Changes Within the Ulema

Riyadh's continued success in rallying the religious establishment notwithstanding, the ulema class has gone through a great deal of change and internal fragmentation. There are significant factions that are uncomfortable -- to say the least -- with the monarchy's policies, especially those involving reforms. More important, there is considerable overlap between the ideas of the ulema and of transnational jihadists. The jihadists have used this common ground to maintain pockets of latent influence within the kingdom. Moreover, there is sympathy for the jihadists among the ulema ranks.

An undersecretary at the Islamic Affairs Ministry told the kingdom's English daily Arab News on July 19 that authorities were investigating imams of 17 mosques in the capital who, in their Friday sermons, refused to condemn a jihadist attack on the kingdom's border with Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militants based in Yemen conducted the cross-border raid on the al-Wadia border post near the small Saudi frontier town of Sharurah. It left four border guards and another Saudi citizen dead. Another report in the daily al-Watan quoted the Islamic Affairs Ministry as saying that some 100 imams ignored the call to condemn the incident.
Saudi Arabia and the Regional Jihadist Threat
Click to Enlarge

Under new management, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula re-established itself in Yemen in 2009 and has remained more or less contained there. The ouster of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime during the Arab Spring has aggravated divisions in Yemen, where a variety of forces are tearing the state apart. The resulting anarchy in Yemen has enabled the al Qaeda branch to expand in the country and use it as a base to strike Saudi Arabia.

While the Saudis are trying to deal with al Qaeda on their southern flank, another far more powerful transnational jihadist group has appeared to the north. The Islamic State, which declared the re-establishment of the caliphate in its controlled areas in Syria and Iraq, has emerged as a major threat to the kingdom. In order to protect itself, the kingdom deployed 30,000 soldiers to its border with Iraq after Iraqi soldiers reportedly abandoned posts on their side of the boundary in the wake of the Islamic State offensive. On July 18, Saudi security forces raised the threat level in light of intelligence about an Islamic State plot to attack critical infrastructure, particularly desalination plants, in the country.

Under these conditions, it makes sense for the Saudis to target the belligerent ulema. What is surprising, though, is that the authorities revealed their investigations via Saudi media. Normally such matters would be dealt with quietly, and more senior ulema would be involved in an effort to persuade the defiant imams to obey their rulers' orders. That did not happen, however, and the government decided to leak the investigations to the media. This suggests that the problem is not with a few of the ulema but is more widespread. It also suggests that the government is trying to create a national consensus against the dissidents. The disobedient imams appear to be a small group within the wider body of the ulema, but the number of such religious figures could grow.
Jihadists' Strengthening Position

In the past, the jihadists were a small movement and, despite the ambiguity within religious circles, there was not much support for them. But now that jihadists are gaining strength in the region, they are better positioned to parlay latent feelings of sympathy into more substantive support. The quandary for the Saudis is that the ulema class is an incubator for the ideas that promote jihadism as well as the means by which to fight Islamist militancy. Taken into account the country's youths -- increasingly educated, socially and politically aware, unemployed and inspired by the Arab Spring -- and the allure of resurgent jihadist fervor is an even more dangerous threat for Riyadh.

The jihadists are in a position to more effectively challenge the monopoly of influence that the monarchy has long enjoyed over the kingdom's religious scholars. To a great degree, this has to do with overlapping jihadist and Saudi interests, especially those related to fighting the Shia and Iran. Saudi efforts to enact social reforms also create space for the jihadists to exploit. Riyadh has been stretched thin as it deals with the fallout of the Arab Spring in the region, a fact that works to the jihadists' advantage as well. Finally, there is the matter of transitioning leadership from the second- to third-generation of princes.

Most of all, the perception that the monarchy is weak and ineffective in foreign policy matters, contrasted with a jihadist movement that is gaining support, could influence many in the ulema's ranks to quietly support both sides. Thus, the thing to watch for is whether the Saudis -- who have proved extremely resilient for nearly three centuries -- can deal with a much larger jihadist challenge than they have faced before and continue to use the ulema to wage jihad against jihadism.   

Read more: Saudi Arabia's Religious Scholars Are a Double-Edged Sword | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook

[Crafty_Dog]

 Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges in the New Year
Geopolitical Weekly
January 6, 2015 | 09:00 GMT Print Text Size
Stratfor

By Michael Nayebi-Oskoui

The Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world — it is no stranger to upheaval. The 2009 uprisings in Iran and the brinksmanship of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government were followed by the chaos of the Arab Spring, the spillover of the Syrian conflict into Iraq and a potential realignment of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Unlike recent years, however, 2015 is likely to see regional Sunni Arab interests realign toward a broader acceptance of moderate political Islam. The region is emerging from the uncertainty of the past half-decade, and the foundations of its future are taking shape. This process will not be neat or orderly, but changes are clearly taking place surrounding the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, as well as the region's anticipation of a strengthened Iran.

The Middle East enters 2015 facing several crises. Libyan instability remains a threat to North African security, and the Levant and Persian Gulf must figure out how to adjust course in the wake of the U.S.-Iranian negotiations, the Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Syria and Iraq, and the power vacuum created by a Turkish state bogged down by internal concerns that prevent it from assuming a larger role throughout the region. Further undermining the region is the sharp decline in global oil prices. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will be able to use considerable cash reserves to ride out the slump, the rest of the Middle East's oil-exporting economies face dire consequences.

For decades, long-ruling autocratic leaders in countries such as Algeria and Yemen helped keep militancy in check, loosely following the model of military-backed Arab nationalism championed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Arab monarchs were able to limit domestic dissent or calls for democracy through a combination of social spending and repression. The United States not only partnered with many of these nations to fight terrorism — especially after September 2001 — but also saw the Gulf states as a reliable bulwark against Iranian expansion and a dangerous Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. Levantine instability was largely contained to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, while Israel's other neighbors largely abided by a tacit agreement to limit threats emanating from their territories.

Today, Saddam's iron grip on Iraq has been broken, replaced by a fractious democracy that is as threatened by the Islamic State as it is by its own political processes. Gone are the long-time leaders of states like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Meanwhile, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Oman are facing uncertain transitions that could well take place by year's end. The United States' serious dialogue with Iran over the latter's nuclear program, once a nearly unthinkable scenario for many in the Gulf, has precipitated some of the biggest shifts in regional dynamics, especially as Saudi Arabia and its allies work to lessen their reliance on Washington's protection.

The Push for Sunni Hegemony

Riyadh begins this year under considerably more duress than it faced 12 months ago. Not only is King Abdullah gravely ill (a bout of pneumonia forced the 90-year-old ruler to ring in the new year in the hospital and on a ventilator), but the world's largest oil-producing country has also entered into a price war with American shale producers. Because Saudi Arabia and its principal regional allies, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, boast more than a trillion dollars in cash reserves between them, they will be able to keep production levels constant for the foreseeable future.

However, other OPEC producers have not been able to weather the storm as easily. The resulting 40 percent plunge in oil prices is placing greater financial pressure on Iran and the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq, Saudi Arabia's largest sectarian and energy rivals. Riyadh's careful planning and building of reserves means the Saudi kingdom's economic security is unlikely to come under threat in the next one to three years. The country will instead continue to focus on not only countering Iran but also rebuilding relationships with regional Sunni actors weakened in previous years.

Riyadh's regional strategy has traditionally been to support primarily Sunni Arab groups with a conservative, Salafist religious ideology. Salafist groups traditionally kept out of politics, and their conservative Sunni ideology was useful in Saudi Arabia's competition against Iran and its own Shiite proxies. Promoting Salafism also served as a tool to limit the reach of more ideologically moderate Sunni political Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, groups Riyadh sees as a threat because of their success in organizing grassroots support and fighting for democratic reforms.

With rise of external regional pressures, however, Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia are re-evaluating their relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood. Internal threats posed by Salafist jihadists and a desire to limit future gains by regional opponents are pushing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to try to forge a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood to limit the risks posed by rival groups in the region.

Restoring relations with the Muslim Brotherhood will also have effects on diplomatic relations. Qatar has long been a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that has strained its relations with other countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates even went so far as to close their embassies in Qatar. However, the continuation of the United States' rapprochement with Iran and Riyadh's own discomfort with the rise of Salafist jihadist groups has made it reconsider its stance on political Islamism. Riyadh, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi's agreement to resume diplomatic ties with Doha, and the latter's consideration of changing its relationships with Egypt and Libya, points to a shift in how the bloc's engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood has the potential to streamline the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) efforts in the region.

The Gulf monarchies' attempt at reconciling with political Islamists can potentially benefit the GCC. For its part, Qatar has engaged with the staunchly anti-Islamist Libyan government in Tobruk, and it appears tensions with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government in Egypt have calmed. Both scenarios point to the likelihood of the GCC moving closer to adopting a more unified regional stance beginning in 2015, one more in line with Riyadh's wishes to preserve the framework of the council.

This improvement in relations comes at a critical moment. With the United States and Iran undergoing a rapprochement of their own, the Gulf monarchies will try to secure their own interests by becoming directly involved in Libya, Syria and potentially Yemen. This military action will also aim to project strength to Iran while also filling the strategic void left by the absence of Turkish leadership in the region, especially in the Levant.

However, Qatar has been opposed to this course of action in the past. Despite its small size, the country has used its wealth and domestic stability to back a wide array of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia and rebel groups in Syria. Tensions between Qatar and regional allies came to a head in 2014 in the aftermath of Saudi and Emirati support for the July 2013 uprising that ousted the Doha-backed Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. The tension threatened the stability of the GCC and caused rebel infighting in Syria. This disconnect in Gulf policy has had wide regional repercussions, including the success of Islamic State militants against Gulf-backed rebel groups in Syria and the Islamic States' expansion into Iraq.

Without foreign military intervention on behalf of the rebels, no faction participating in the Syrian civil war will be able to declare a decisive military victory. As the prospects of a clear-cut outcome become less realistic, Bashar al Assad's Russian and Iranian backers are increasing diplomatic efforts to negotiate a settlement in Syria, especially as both are eager to refocus on domestic woes exacerbated by the current drop in global energy prices. Kuwait's recent decision to allow the Syrian regime to reopen its embassy to assist Syrian expats living within its borders points to a likelihood that the Gulf states are coming to terms with the reality that al Assad is unlikely to be ousted by force, and Sunni Arab stakeholders in the Syrian conflict are gradually giving in to the prospect of a negotiated settlement. A resolution to the Syrian crisis will not come in 2015, but regional actors will continue looking for a solution to the crisis outside of the battlefield.

Any negotiated settlement will see the Sunni principals in the region — led by the GCC and Turkey — work to implement a competent Sunni political organization that limits the authority of a remnant Alawite government in Damascus and future inroads by traditional backers in Tehran. Muslim Brotherhood-style political Islam represents one of the potential Sunni solutions within this framework, and with Saudi opposition to the group potentially fading, it remains a possible alternative to the variety of Salafist options that could exist — to include jihadists. Such a solution ultimately relies on a broader democratic framework to be implemented, a scenario that will likely remain elusive in Syria for years to come.
North Africa's Long Road to Stability

North African affairs have traditionally followed a trajectory distinct from that of the Levant and Persian Gulf, a reality shaped as much by geography as by political differences between the Nasser-inspired secular governments and the monarchies of the Gulf. Egypt, Saudi Arabia's traditional rival for leadership of the Sunni Arab world, has become cripplingly dependent on the financial backing of its former Gulf rivals. The GCC was able to use its relative stability and oil wealth to take advantage of opportunities to secure its members' interests in North Africa following the Arab Spring. As a result, Cairo has become a launching pad for Gulf intentions, particularly UAE airstrikes against Islamist militants in Libya and joint Egyptian-Gulf backing of renegade Gen. Khalifa Hifter's Operation Dignity campaign.

Like Syria, Libya represents a battleground for competing regional Sunni ambitions. Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, backed Libya's powerful Islamist political and militia groups led by the re-instated General National Congress in Tripoli after the international community recognized the arguably anti-Islamist House of Representatives in Tobruk. Islamist-aligned political and militia forces control Libya's three largest cities, and Egyptian- and Gulf-backed proxies are making little headway against opponents in battles to gain control of Tripoli and Benghazi, prompting more direct action by Cairo and Abu Dhabi.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are primarily concerned with the possibility of Libya, an oil-rich state bordering Egypt, becoming a wealthy backer of political Islam. Coastal-based infighting has left much of Libya's vast desert territories available for regional jihadists as well as a host of smuggling and trafficking activities, posing a significant security risk not just for regional states but Western interests as well. Egyptian and Gulf attempts to shape outcomes on the ground in Libya have proved largely ineffective, and Western plans for reconciliation talks favor regional powers such as Algeria — a traditional rival to Egyptian and Gulf interests in North Africa — that are more comfortable working with political actors across a wide spectrum of political ideologies to include Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamism.

Libya will likely find itself as the proving ground for the quid pro quo happening between the participants of the intra-Sunni rift over political Islam. In exchange for Saudi Arabia and its partners reducing their pressure on Muslim Brotherhood-style groups in Egypt and Syria, Qatar and Turkey are likely to work more visibly with Tobruk in 2015 in addition to pushing Islamist proxies into a Western-backed national dialogue. Libya's overall security situation will not be settled through mediation, but Libyan Islamists are more likely to re-enter a coalition with the political rivals now that both sides' Gulf backers are working toward settling differences themselves.
Regional Impact

Dysfunction and infighting have marred attempts by the region's Sunni actors to formulate a cohesive strategy in Syria. This has enabled Iran to remain entrenched in the Levant — albeit while facing pressure — and to continue expending resources competing in arenas such as Libya and Egypt. The next year will likely see an evolving framework where Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, will reach a delicate understanding on the role of political Islam in the region. 2014 saw a serious reversal in the fortunes of Muslim Brotherhood-style groups, which inadvertently favored even more far-right and extremist groups such as the Islamic State as the Gulf's various Sunni proxies were focused on competing with one another.

Iran's slow but steady push toward a successful negotiation with the United States, as well as the threats posed by militant Islam throughout the Levant, Iraq and North Africa, is necessitating a realignment of relationships within the Middle East's diverse Sunni interests. Less divisive Sunni leadership will be instrumental in coordinating efforts to resolve the conflicts in both Libya and Syria, although resolution in both conflicts will remain out of reach in 2015 and some time beyond.

A more robust Sunni Arab position, especially in Syria and the Levant, will likely put more pressure on Iran to reach a negotiated settlement with the United States by the end of the year. While a settlement may seem harmful to Gulf interests, the GCC is shifting toward a pragmatic acceptance of an agreement, similar to Riyadh's begrudging accommodation of a future role for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. The GCC's new goal is to limit Tehran's opportunities for success rather than outright denying it. Part of this will be achieved through an ongoing, aggressive energy strategy. The rest will come from internal negotiations between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey.

The next year will see the Sunni presence in Syria attempt to coalesce behind rebels acceptable to Western governments that are eager to see negotiations begin and greater local pushback against the Islamic State. More cohesive Gulf leadership will also present a more effective bulwark against Iranian and Alawite interests in the Levant. Most important, however, is the opportunity for regional Sunnis, led by Saudi Arabia, to present a more mature and capable response to mounting pressures. Whether through more assertive military moves in the region or by working with states such as Qatar to steer the Muslim Brotherhood rather than embolden the Islamist opposition, 2015 will likely see a shift in Sunni Arab strategies that have long shaped the region.

Read more: Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges in the New Year | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook

[G M]

http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2015/01/21/new-saudi-border-security-policy-shoot-on-sight/

Perhaps the pumping is primarily motivated by a fear of The I.S.

They take S.A., the caliphate will pretty much be unstoppable.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/world/middleeast/saudis-expand-regional-power-as-others-falter.html?emc=edit_th_20150126&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia Hacks its way to Victory
Posted: 28 Jan 2015 03:12 PM PST
Here's an interesting strategy that is in the near term adjacent possible.   It is one of the few strategies that could make a relatively unknown hacker a multi-billionaire overnight. 
 
____
Russia has been in the throes of a financial crisis since Saudi Arabia began driving down oil prices last fall.  Until the Russians reverse this economic assault, Russia will remain weak and vulnerable.  For example:
   the ruble will remain in crisis,
   European sanctions over Russian intervention in the Ukraine will continue to cause meaningful economic pain, and
   Russian bonds will still be considered "junk" by the global markets.
Reversing the Pain
Of course, Putin does have one way out.  He needs to increase the price of oil.  But how?  There's only one way to accomplish this quickly and easily;  destabilize Saudi Arabia.    Fortunately for Putin, the tool necessary to do this (and make a fortune in the process) is readily available. 
Russia has three great exports: oil, natural  gas, and criminal hacking.  To do this Putin needs to connect Russian criminal hackers with ISIS.  Once they make the introductions required, things could move forward very rapidly while providing the Russian government copious plausible deniability.  What would be the potential result?  Here's one scenario:
1.   Russian criminal groups would hack Saudi Arabia's northern border's defense grid (taking down radar towers, imaging systems) and the country's communications system (cell phones and military communications). 
2.   ISIS would then use the blackout to bring a couple of thousand jihadis across the border in one quick movement.  ISIS would overrun isolated border outposts seizing equipment and routing troops.  It would then move south (with a particular emphasis on the city of Arar in NW Saudi Arabia  (it houses the command and control facility for the entire northern border).
3.   ISIS expands as hacking/disorder continues.  Direct attacks by ISIS with Russian hacking support disrupts Saudi oil production (etc.).  Oil prices shoot to the moon.  Russian hackers, ISIS, and the Russian government all make billions from the increase in the price of oil (both by going long on oil in the market and  through the direct sales of product they produce).
Why a Saudi Hack is so Easy
The Saudis are the perfect target for hackers.  It's hard to imagine a country with more vulnerable to cyberattack.  Here's why:
   Saudi defensive systems and infrastructure have been cobbled together from external contractors who often win their contracts by bribing the royal family.  It's a motley collection of tools with lots of vulnerabilities. 
   Financially motivated guest workers do most of the real work in the Kingdom.  These people are easy to bribe/coerce/etc.  to get access to critical systems. 
   The Saudi government/military is extremely reliant on positive command and control.  So, if you can isolate command and control from the troops/population, panic will rapidly ensue. 
JR

[Crafty_Dog]

ISIS isn't the long term problem, Saudi Arabia is
Posted: 13 Feb 2015 09:32 PM PST

Here's a new way to think about something that should be obvious...

To the politicians in DC and financiers in New York, Saudi Arabia is an island of stability in a sea of chaos.  A reliable ally, willing to keep the oil flowing, year in and year out.  A place that's not vulnerable to the instability that routinely guts the countries around it.

Of course, that line of thinking is utterly misguided.  The opposite is true. 

In reality, Saudi Arabia is extremely fragile and much of the chaos we see in the Middle East is due to the way Saudi Arabia avoids falling to pieces.  Worse, we are largely to blame for this.  We go along with this charade, and our willingness to play along is doing much of the damage.

To understand why this illusion Saudi stability is so toxic, let's dig into a very smart idea from thermodynamics called dissipative structures.  In fact, the idea was so good that won Ilya Prigogine the Nobel prize in Chemistry.  Prigogine's idea provides us with insight into how everything from how biological structures (e.g. bacteria, apes...) to natural phenomena (e.g. tornadoes) to social systems (e.g. nation-states) build order and prevent collapse.

The important part of this idea for us, is that all dissipative structures grow by exporting or expelling waste products into an external environment.  In other words, they achieve "order" by getting rid of the disorder produced by building it. 

Here it is in very simple terms.  Within biological structures, eating produces the energy needed to build and maintain an organism.  In turn, consuming food produces disorder in the form of feces.  Organisms expel feces into the outside world because holding onto it is dangerous.  The same process is true with almost all complex structures. With automobiles, it's exhaust fumes. With complex social systems, it is everything from warfare to pollution.

We could spend all day on this idea, but let's cut to the chase and apply this framework to Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia is a particularly expensive dissipative structure because it is extremelyrigid, anachronistic, and unchanging.   To maintain this archaic structure despite the titanic forces of globalization trying to pull it apart, it must export an incredible amount of disorder (entropy) into the surrounding region.  Disorder such as:

   A corrosive fundamentalist ideology.  The KSA's Wahhabism fuels both ISIS and al Qaeda.

   Violent zealots.  The vast majority of the hijackers during 9/11 were Saudi as well as thousands of ISIS members.

   Financial support.  Saudi Arabia provided the start-up funding for both al Qaeda and ISIS.   

Obviously, this entropy has come at a cost to everyone in the world.  It has been causing instability in the countries around in the Middle East.  It caused the terrorism of 9/11 and the recent rise of ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.   

Worse, the damage being done by Saudi Arabia is getting worse with each passing year as it continues to defy the inexorable gravitational attraction of a fluid, dynamic, and tightly integrated global system. 

That's the problem. 

This means that even if ISIS is defeated in the next couple of years, Saudi Arabia's dysfunction will produce something worse soon thereafter. 

[G M]

One should examine what motivates the Saudis. That is the core problem.

[Crafty_Dog]

Good idea GM.  Let's do that:

Three Saudi Options
Posted: 23 Feb 2015 09:50 AM PST
Saudi Arabia sees ISIS as an existential threat.  It has a reason to be scared, ISIS is a Wahabi jihad with updated technologies (social media) and techniques (open development).   That means when push comes to shove, Saudi troops will either a) turn tail and run or b) join up in droves.  To avoid this, the Saudis might attempt something radical:
1.   Build a completely useless multi-billion dollar wall around the country. Oh wait, they are already doing that.
2.   Ramp support for al Qaeda.  Optimally, a big al Qaeda on a western target would force the US to fully engage ISIS, since ISIS is a physical target and al Qaeda isn't.  Was al Qaeda's attack on Charlie Hebdo (and the Jewish deli) a Saudi funded endeavor to start the process?
3.   Hire western mercenaries to push ISIS around.  Erik Prince has been trying to sell this option for years and is waiting in the wings to get it going.  A few billion spent this way might be sufficient to turn the tide on ISIS.
 

The Middle East doesn't Matter Anymore
Posted: 23 Feb 2015 09:15 AM PST
Back in 2003, the US was headed towards complete dependence on foreign oil.  Additionally, the demand for energy (particularly from China) was growing far faster than production, which meant an energy price spike was inevitable. 
 
Of course, this could be avoided if another big source of oil was found and exploited.  However, based on existing production technology, the only big fields left untapped were in Iraq, but due to sanctions (limiting production to 2m barrels a day, far less than the 8 m bpd projected to be possible).
The result was inevitable.  The US invaded Iraq to free up production (that's largely why the fields were secured in the first couple of days of the invasion), but it screwed up.  The national security "brain-trust"  didn't anticipate that the Iraqi guerrillas would disrupt this production so effectively (I covered this in detail on this blog and in my book).  The result?  Iraq produced less oil, for years after the invasion, than it did under sanctions.
That loss of production in combination with disruption caused by Nigerian guerrillas (who copied the success of the Iraqis), produced an energy crunch that drove the global economy into a massive recession.  Worse, this recession became a decade long depression due to the disruption caused by the banks and hedge funds we allow to hack the global financial system. 
One of the benefits of this oil crunch was that high prices spurred technological innovation that led to an upheaval in the US energy system over the last decade.  New technology has enabled US oil and natural gas production to boom. Not only that, this tech enables energy production to scale industrially -- that's a big change if you understand the implications. 
The most immediate benefit of a return to US energy autonomy has been lower natural gas, oil, and gasoline prices (autonomy that will only grow as solar zooms). However, there's other benefits that should be obvious too.  Since the US isn't dependent on Middle Eastern energy anymore, US national security policy will be decoupled from Middle Eastern conflicts.  Like it or not, this is inevitable. 
What does this mean?
   If the US does get involved in Middle East conflicts it's due to outdated policy and doctrine.
   Nobody in the West will do anything to stop the spread of ISIS (as a humanitarian crisis it rates well below Rwanda). 
   Saudi Arabia is going to get desperate to get the US to intervene.  It sees ISIS as an existential threat.  How will it do that?  I've got some ideas...
 

[Crafty_Dog]

Pasting this post from YA on the Iran forum here as well:

This has been known on many pak discussion forums for years,,,

Saudi Arabia prepares for Iran nuclear deal
Saudi Arabia is quietly preparing for an international nuclear agreement with Iran that it fears will rehabilitate its Shiite Persian rival. King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud's approach eschews the public spectacle of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to Congress (indeed, the Saudis don't want any association with Israel) and instead focuses on regional alliances to contain an emergent Iran.

Author Bruce RiedelPosted March 8, 2015

The Saudis publicly welcomed US Secretary of State John Kerry's assurances in Riyadh last week that Washington will not accept a bad nuclear deal with Iran, and that a deal will not inaugurate a grand rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. They remain deeply skeptical about the negotiations, however, and are preparing for any outcome in the P5+1 process.

The Saudis recognize that a successful deal between Iran, the US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany will enjoy broad international backing and United Nations endorsement. Riyadh has no interest in being isolated in a dissenting minority with Netanyahu against a deal backed by a global majority. The royal family despises Israel, and Netanyahu is regarded as a war criminal by most Saudis. Any hint of mutual interest with Israel is unpalatable in the kingdom.

So the Saudi approach is to strengthen its regional alliances for long-term confrontation with Tehran. Most immediately, this means strengthening the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It has strong allies in Abu Dhabi and Manama. In Riyadh's eyes, there are two weak links in GCC collusion against Iran: Oman and Qatar. Neither is likely to give up their bilateral lucrative ties to Iran, but Salman is pressing both to adhere to GCC unity and not facilitate Iranian subversion.

Yemen is the key GCC battlefield. The victory of the Iranian-backed Zaydi Shiite Houthis in seizing control of most of north Yemen, including Sanaa, has led the Saudis and the GCC to move their embassies to Aden, where they are trying to back the tattered remnant of the Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi regime in south Yemen. The inauguration of Sanaa-Tehran air flights last month, a first, only underscores the extent of Iran's success in achieving a key goal in the kingdom's backyard and in its historically weak underbelly. The Saudis are on the defense in Yemen.

Egypt is Riyadh's key Arab partner. The kingdom played an important role in bringing Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power, and Salman met him a week ago to coordinate closely on regional issues, especially Iran. Cairo is too preoccupied with its own domestic terror threat from the Islamic State (IS) and spillover from Libya's disintegration to be very helpful against Iranian machinations elsewhere, however, and is more of a liability (especially financially) than an asset, albeit one Saudi Arabia is determined to keep afloat.

The Shiite government in Baghdad is regarded as a long-lost Arab partner. The Saudis expect Iran to emerge as the big winner in the war with IS, no matter how long it takes and how bloody it is. The Saudis know history, geography, demography and sectarian affiliation favor Iran in Iraq. They believe that President George W. Bush made a colossal error in 2003 and that President Barack Obama has made an "unholy alliance" today with Iran in Iraq. The only option now is to contain the Shiite breakthrough here, too.

Syria has been lost to Iran as well, but Riyadh still hopes to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Saudis are pouring money into the Lebanese army, as a potential brake on Hezbollah, along with the French. Salman also recently met with Jordan's King Abdullah to coordinate with Amman on Syria and with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well.

Riyadh's most crucial ally is Pakistan, the only Muslim nuclear weapons state. Last year, for the first time, the Saudis publicly displayed their vintage Chinese-made intermediate-range ballistic missiles — the only ones they have that can reach Tehran — at a military parade. In the reviewing stands was Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Gen. Rahul Sharif, the man who controls Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world, and the Saudis have been helping to pay for its development since the 1970s. It was a very calculated signal.

Salman, in late February, summoned the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, to Riyadh. The highly unusual and urgent public invitation was linked in the Pakistani press to "strategic cooperation" against Iran. Salman visited Islamabad a year ago as crown prince and gave Sharif a $1.5 billion grant to reaffirm the Saudi-Pakistani strategic accord. Sharif spent three days in the kingdom last week in response to the king's invitation. He received a royal reception.

One immediate result of the talks is a plan for Pakistan to move its embassy in Yemen to Aden.

The speculation in Islamabad is that the king sought assurances from Sharif that, if the Iran negotiations produce either a bad deal or no deal, Pakistan will live up to its longstanding commitment to Saudi security. That is understood in Riyadh and Islamabad to include a nuclear dimension.

Sharif also visited the kingdom in January of this year. He was apparently told that then-King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was at death's door, and Sharif came to pay his respects and meet with Salman before the king died. No other leader was given this advance notice — another sign of the critical importance of the Saudi-Pakistani axis.

​The exact details of what the Pakistani nuclear commitment to the kingdom includes is, of course, among the most closely held secrets of our world. Both Riyadh and Islamabad prefer to maintain ambiguity and deniability.

The Saudis have not given up on Obama; the United States is still their oldest ally. Washington is too important to irritate with speeches. The Saudis prefer a more subtle approach.



Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/saudi-arabia-prepares-for-iran-nuclear-deal.html##ixzz3UN27uGzE

[Crafty_Dog]

http://link.foreignpolicy.com/view/525443c6c16bcfa46f732b5d2f756.1xkg/41ba70b0

[ccp]

http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/63570-150308-saudi-arabia-becomes-world-s-biggest-arms-importer-amid-regional-concerns

I posted on the Middle East thread that I would bet Saudis are already working on nuclear weapons.   They are proactive not reactive in general.

[Crafty_Dog]

King Abdullah didn’t belong to this arm of the country’s ruling family, nor do Prince Muqrin and Prince Saud al Faisal, who served as foreign minister for 40 years before he was replaced Wednesday.

“The major change brought by King Salman has been the transfer of power to a new generation,” said Abdelaziz al Ghassim, an Islamist political activist and lawyer in Riyadh. “Prince Muqrin did not hold any power at any time anyway. And now that the new generation has been prepared, it is taking over the top positions.”

In a kingdom where elderly and infirm monarchs made all major decisions for decades, this is a significant departure, already translated since January into a surprisingly activist foreign policy that asserted Saudi leadership of a Sunni bloc confronting Iran. Angered by the U.S. outreach to Iran and eager to showcase its own ability to use military force, Saudi Arabia last month began airstrikes in Yemen, the first foreign war that Riyadh has run since it led a military campaign on the same soil in 1934.

“During King Abdullah, we did not have a foreign policy, and just watched events unfold in front of our eyes in Yemen,” said prominent Saudi sociologist and commentator Khalid al Dakhil. The new administration in Riyadh, he added, “is making the right choices and having the will to follow through.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei predictably had a less charitable take on Riyadh’s new approach, complaining earlier this month that Saudi Arabia’s traditional caution in world affairs has been jettisoned by “inexperienced youngsters who want to show savagery instead of patience and self-restraint.”

Though the world’s attention has focused on these changes in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, the developments at home have been just as important.

Along with his moves to curb Iranian influence, King Salman shored up domestic support by appeasing Saudi religious conservatives who had come to view King Abdullah’s tentative modernization drive, which included the creation of a coeducational university, with open hostility.

Within days of taking over, King Salman replaced the head of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, removing an official long criticized by conservatives for attempting, under King Abdullah’s direction, to defang the kingdom’s feared religious police.

Under new leadership, the Committee’s bearded enforcers have already become more active, resuming patrols in shopping malls where they have not been seen in years and raiding beach-front compounds used by foreigners.

Wednesday’s decree by King Salman also removed from her post the most senior female official in the kingdom, the deputy education minister, whose appointment in 2009 was hailed by the West as an encouraging sign of the kingdom’s progress on women’s rights.

Mohsen al Awaji, an Islamist lawyer and activist who was imprisoned six times, most recently in 2013, praised King Salman’s new outreach to fellow conservatives as “a very positive indication.”

“During King Abdullah, a lot of the decisions were taken against the will of the people—in internal and external affairs. King Abdullah had opened a very serious conflict with the conservatives,” Mr. Awaji said. “But King Salman is a man of common sense.”

While Saudi Arabia remains some of the world’s most repressive societies, the new administration in Riyadh has also made conciliatory moves toward Islamist dissenters, relaxing or ending restrictions on some, and ending King Abdullah’s policy of trying to crush the Muslim Brotherhood.

In a nation where stability and continuity have long been the official mantra, these changes are barely acknowledged in government discourse. But combined with the Yemen war, they have already bolstered the new king’s popularity, even among longtime critics of the regime.

“What was happening under King Abdullah was not real reform but fake liberalism,” says Saudi political analyst Abdullah al Shammari, a former senior diplomat and professor.

Saudi Arabia’s conservative brand of Islam is the glue that holds the kingdom together, and the new regime has wisely recognized the perils of attempting to dilute it, Mr. Shammari observed.

“Saudi Arabia is the center of Islam, and it is not our choice to be liberal. The moment Saudi Arabia tries to be liberal, it will collapse,” he said.

The architect of King Abdullah’s policies to roll back conservative restrictions—an approach welcomed by the U.S.—and to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood was Khalid al Tuwaijiri, the head of the Royal Court.

King Salman removed him within hours of taking over in January, appointing to that position his son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who held the job until his elevation on Wednesday to deputy crown prince. The young prince remains in charge of the Defense Ministry and the inter-ministerial committee overseeing economic affairs and development.

Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who succeeded his father as interior minister and has worked closely with the U.S. to curb al Qaeda and Islamic State, runs a separate committee responsible for political and security affairs.

The new economic committee, in particular, has brought significant changes to the way Saudi Arabia’s economy is governed, with ministries formerly run as individual fiefs now put under the prince’s direct control, and ministers deemed to be underperforming fired without ceremony.

“Every minister knows they are watched much more closely than before,” said Khalid al Sweilem, former head of investment at Saudi Arabia’s central bank and a fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Prince Mohammed bin Salman “is very much involved and he is looking at what is good for the country, not at what is good for a particular ministry.”

[Crafty_Dog]

 Saudi Arabia: A New National Guard for a New King?
Analysis
May 8, 2015 | 09:00 GMT
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Saudi Arabian National Guard personnel listen as a member of the U.S. 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment explains how to operate an M252 mortar during Operation Desert Shield. (SPECIALIST HENRY/Wikimedia)

Summary

The Saudi Arabian National Guard, also known as the White Army, has been a critical pillar of the Saudi state dating back to the kingdom's founding. For over fifty years, the National Guard has adapted to the region's changing political and military landscapes and helped the House of Saud maintain a leading role on the Arabian Peninsula. Today, the Saudi Arabian National Guard is once again at a juncture, because Saudi Arabia's role in the Middle East and North Africa is changing rapidly. Riyadh is engaged in increasingly proactive regional military campaigns and political efforts. At the same time, the state is facing a complex political succession. In January, King Salman ascended the throne, following the death of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and is now working to consolidate his power base. This combination of changing regional dynamics and domestic transition could compel Riyadh to reform, restructure, or reorganize the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Such a process, however, will be difficult because of the National Guard's delicate position within tribal politics and the critical role it plays in the Saudi power structure.
Analysis

Historically, the Saudi Arabian National Guard is rooted in a group known as the Ikhwan, a Wahabi religious force of hardened and conservative tribal fighters. The Ikhwan played a key role in putting King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud on the throne of the newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Initially, this group was deeply loyal to the king. The Ikhwan, however, had their own vision for the kingdom and inevitably clashed with the royal family. While Ibn Saud was focused on building Saudi Arabia into a modern nation state, the Ikhwan wanted to expand upon their recent conquests by invading the territory of perceived non-believers in the British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait. The king had no intention of risking his new state in a war with the British and what began with the Ikhwan undermining his authority by carrying out unsanctioned raids, rapidly developed into the Ikhwan Revolt in 1927. It took until January 1930 for the monarchy to stamp out the uprising.

Following the revolt, Saudi Arabia decided to build a professional military — the Royal Saudi Land Forces. Eventually, it became apparent that these troops would need to be bolstered by an auxiliary force and the already armed tribal fighters were a natural choice to fill the role. In 1954, a year after the death of Ibn Saud, the Saudi government transformed the Office of the Jihad and Mujahideen, which managed the Ikhwan and other tribal forces, into the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The guard, however, remained a relatively small force — the main Saudi military was still the priority.

This started to change in the early 1960s when the House of Saud became increasingly unsure of their hold over the professional military. Having witnessed a string of military coups throughout the Arab World, the monarchy decided to transform the national guard into a force that was both unquestionably loyal to the royal family and also equal in strength to the Royal Saudi Land Forces. The king began this transformation by appointing Abdullah bin Abdulaziz — who would later become king in 2005 — as the National Guard commander in 1962. This provided the institution with a great deal of prestige and brought about a series of reforms to modernize the force. To facilitate this transformation, the House of Saud turned to the United States in the 1970s to help train, equip and increase the National Guard's conventional capabilities. At this time, the guard also began to recruit fighters from a few, markedly loyal tribes. This reform process paid off over the ensuing decades, as the national guard grew in conventional strength and came to play a key role in national politics — a position it continues to enjoy today.
The Current National Guard

The Saudi Arabian National Guard has come a long way since the Ikhwan Revolt and in 2015 is now a pillar of the nation's security structure. In many senses, it now holds the pre-eminent role within the Saudi state and is specifically charged with safeguarding the House of Saud. The National Guard is also charged with protecting the key holy sites, Mecca and Medina, as well as with providing security for oil and natural gas infrastructure. The prestige of these internationally important pilgrimage destinations and the guaranteed revenues from the energy sector are two of the essential pillars of Saudi power.

Today, the Saudi Arabian National Guard and the Royal Saudi Land Forces are of approximately equal strength in terms of numbers of troops. There are, however, noted differences in the two forces' munitions and capabilities. Unlike the regular military, the national guard is predominantly a mechanized and mobile force designed to respond rapidly to threats across the country. Meanwhile, the Royal Saudi Land Forces possess all of Saudi Arabia's main battle tanks and the vast bulk of the nation's heavy artillery. While the Saudi Arabian National Guard is expected to act as an auxiliary force in the face of an external threat, the Royal Saudi Land Forces bear the primary burden of responding to these threats. The national guard possesses considerable capabilities, but their duties are internal. They are a last line of defense for the nation and for the House of Saud itself.
Power Shifts and the National Guard

Going forward, Saudi Arabia seeks to project more power across the Middle East and North Africa. As Riyadh adopts this new posture, however, it must also sort out the reconfiguration of power accompanying King Salman's January accession to the throne. The new king has already reshuffled a number of high-level positions and chosen his nephew, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif, as his successor. This move replaced King Salman's original successor, his half-brother Prince Muqrin. As in decades past, the Saudi Arabian National Guard's position in these negotiations is key.

The current commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard is Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah — a rival of King Salman's son, Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Because of his role as head of the National Guard, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah represents a potential challenge to King Salman's power consolidation. To mitigate this threat, Stratfor sources indicate that King Salman may be planning to centralize the security establishment in the hands of his son, current Defense Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This could mean incorporating the national guard into the Ministry of Defense — effectively ending the national guard's role as a separate ministry with the ability to counterbalance the Royal Saudi Land Forces. Such a decision would also indicate that King Salman is more concerned about external threats at the moment than he is about pushback from the royal family against his consolidation of power.

Such a momentous change to the role of the Saudi Arabian National Guard would make strategic sense for the monarchy but would also be extremely challenging. Although incorporating the national guard into the Ministry of Defense would consolidate power around King Salman, this move would require overcoming objections from the influential National Guard leadership and the increasingly powerful Allegiance Council, which is a bastion of entrenched interests wary of the king's consolidation.

The Saudi Arabian National Guard's ranks also include numerous powerful tribal groups, which are key to the balance of domestic power. Many of these tribes have seen their influence grow along with that of the National Guard and would be reluctant to forfeit their position. The commander of the guard, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, enjoys respect because of his considerable military experience and training. On the other hand, the current defense minister, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has little to no military experience beyond the recently initiated Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. King Salman would need to carefully negotiate any reforms to avoid offending these tribal forces.

Since its inception in the 1950s, the Saudi Arabian National Guard has grown into an influential, prestigious and capable security force. If it is at risk of being disbanded or subsumed by a relatively young and inexperienced minister of defense, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the new king would need to shepherd this transition with extreme caution. Upsetting the traditional balance of power could introduce a new internal conflict, not only in the House of Saud, but throughout the whole of Saudi Arabia.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-king-wont-attend-camp-david-meeting.html?emc=edit_th_20150511&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193

[G M]

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-king-wont-attend-camp-david-meeting.html?emc=edit_th_20150511&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193

Obviously Obama hasn't done enough bowing.

Time for another Cairo speech !

[Crafty_Dog]

The Islamic State (ISIS) suicide bombing in Saudi Arabia on May 23 is significant in that it's the group's first claimed suicide bombing in the country, but it's also a strategic move to spark sectarian upheaval in the Shiite-majority province that holds 90% of royal family's oil reserves.

The Islamic State is trying to spark a cycle of sectarian violence that will destabilize Saudi Arabia and heighten the Royal Family's tension with Iran. The terror group thrives in environments where Shiites feel they need Iranian protection and where Sunnis feel threatened by real or imagined Iranian influence. The Saudi Eastern Province has the added benefit of endangering the Royal Family's most critical resource.

The bombing's objective is to spur Islamic State supporters in Saudi Arabia into action against the Shiites and the royal family. An October 2014 poll found that 5% of the Saudi population of 29 million has a positive opinion of the Islamic State (2% very positive and 3% somewhat positive).

The Saudi population includes about 8.5 million foreign residents, and it is unclear if they are included in the poll. This means that the Islamic State has a pool of somewhere between 1 million and 1.45 million supporters in Saudi Arabia that could be inspired to act.

The prospects for the Islamic State are much brighter if an atmosphere of sectarian warfare is instigated; a scenario that can be easily envisioned.

The sensitivity of the Saudi royal family to the bombing's impact on sectarianism was evident in the immediate booking of the grand mufti on state television to condemn the attack on "sons of the homeland." The language was deliberately chosen to assure the Shiite minority that the Saudi government cares about their well-being and to distance itself from any Salafists who may cheer the bombing.

The New York Times reported on how Saudis were declining to donate blood in the wake of the Islamic State bombing, deriding them as infidels and one saying that a Shiite "does not deserve even my spit." Although there are Saudi Sunnis who stand up for Shiites -- like one prominent human rights activist who is a leader in the Shammar tribe -- their rarity is apparent in the very fact that their activism makes news headlines.

The Saudi government may deploy Salafist-dominated security forces to the Eastern Province to prevent attacks and to stop the Shiites from holding large demonstrations of grief that could easily turn political and demand better treatment.

The Eastern Province is known for its protests against the Saudi government and subsequent arrests of activists and clerics demanding an end to discrimination and democratic reform. The leader of the Municipal Council in Qatif, where the bombing took place, has already blamed the Saudi government for promoting anti-Shiite sentiment.

Through the bombing, the Islamic State has created a catch-22: Any move by the Saudi government to enhance security in the province risks inflaming the passions of the Shiites, resulting in clashes and oppression that further the cycle.

The popularity of Sunni terrorist groups known for oppressing Shiites is a strong indication of how quickly sectarian fervor could sweep across Saudi Arabia, particularly if there are mass Shiite protests and Iran rallies to their side.

The aforementioned poll found that 52% of Saudis support Hamas and 33% support the Muslim Brotherhood. A November 2014 poll by Zogby showed that Saudi Arabia is the only Middle Eastern besides Turkey where a majority (53%) feel that the Muslim Brotherhood played a positive role in Egypt and Tunisia.

A frightening 15% of Saudis most favor Al-Qaeda's branch in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, among all the forces fighting the Syrian regime. About 9% support the Islamic Front, a Saudi-backed Salafist group and 3% preferred the Islamic State.

The Iranian regime and its radical Shiite proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis are looking for an opportunity to strike back at the Saudis for their military intervention in Yemen and ongoing support for Syrian rebels. There is no better opportunity than upheaval in the Eastern Province, especially at this time when Iran's economy is suffering from low oil prices.

The objective of the bombing in Qatif is to make Saudi Arabia an extension of the Shiite-Sunni battlefield seen in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. And the Islamic State isn't crazy for thinking it could happen.

 

Ryan Mauro is ClarionProject.org’s national security analyst, a fellow with Clarion Project and an adjunct professor of homeland security. Mauro is frequently interviewed on top-tier television and radio. Read more, contact or arrange a speaking engagement.
Related Articles

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/06/19/wikileaks-says-its-leaking-more-than-500000-saudi-documents-classified-and-very-urgent/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Firewire&utm_campaign=Firewire%20-%20HORIZON%206-20-15%20FINAL

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/07/23/saudis-really-really-dont-believe-the-white-house-that-the-iran-deal-will-prevent-a-nuclear-weapon-so-much-so-that-saudi-media-has-this-scary-suggestion-on-how-to-respond/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Firewire_Morning_Test&utm_campaign=Firewire%20Morning%20Edition%20Recurring%20v2%202015-07-24

[G M]

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/07/23/saudis-really-really-dont-believe-the-white-house-that-the-iran-deal-will-prevent-a-nuclear-weapon-so-much-so-that-saudi-media-has-this-scary-suggestion-on-how-to-respond/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Firewire_Morning_Test&utm_campaign=Firewire%20Morning%20Edition%20Recurring%20v2%202015-07-24

http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=943.msg18429#msg18429

[Crafty_Dog]

Pretty good GM!!!

[Crafty_Dog]

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Saudi Arabia and Hamas: A Pragmatic Partnership
Analysis
July 27, 2015 | 09:30 GMT
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Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz (C) before the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Riyadh on May 5, 2015. (FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast

    Saudi Arabia will try to recruit various regional proxies, including Hamas, to its Sunni Arab coalition against Iran.
    Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Hamas will cooperate more in the post-nuclear deal environment.
    As Saudi influence grows, Iran will have a diminished role in Palestinian affairs.

Analysis

In the wake of the nuclear accord with Iran, Saudi Arabia has not been content to simply wait and see what shape regional developments take. Riyadh has already become more active as it positions itself as the leader of a Sunni Arab coalition to oppose a rejuvenated Tehran by, for one thing, chipping away at Iran's proxies in the region. One example of this strategy is the developing relationship between Saudi Arabia and Hamas, which Saudi Arabia has worked to strengthen over the past several months. Reinserting itself into Palestinian politics would extend Riyadh's power beyond the Gulf into the Levant and provide for Saudi Arabia to engage both Egypt and Israel beyond the three countries' shared concerns over Iran and the Islamic State. In pursuing closer ties with Hamas, however, Riyadh will have to be careful not to provoke its allies or to push other groups further into Iran's sphere of influence.
A Complicated Relationship

Saudi Arabia and Hamas have a long history of interaction. Hamas is far from financially independent; it has always depended on multiple sources of external support. In the early 2000s, Saudi Arabia was Hamas' chief patron, with some reports claiming that Saudi Arabia provided as much as 50 percent of Hamas' operating budget. Starting in 2004, however, Riyadh reduced this funding, in part because the West began to more closely scrutinize Saudi Arabia's financing of terrorist groups in the wake of Sept. 11 and various suicide attacks claimed by Hamas during the Second Intifada.

When Hamas was briefly elected to head the Palestinian National Authority in 2006, Saudi Arabia publicly defied the United States by ignoring Washington's request to cut off funding to the group. Then, in February 2007, Riyadh helped negotiate what would be a short-lived coalition government between Fatah and Hamas. Even afterward, Saudi Arabia maintained financial support to Hamas and still emphasized the importance of cooperation between Hamas and its rival, Fatah.

It was at this point that Iran increased its support of Hamas. It was a strange relationship on paper: a Sunni Arab militant group descended from the Muslim Brotherhood aligning with a Persian Shiite self-styled Islamic Republic. But Iran was eager to capture any influence it could in Palestine as it looked to connect a crescent of Iranian-satellites from Tehran to the Mediterranean.

After Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, abrogating the Saudi-brokered compromise, Iran's influence over Hamas steadily grew. Tehran provided military assistance to Gaza in addition to helping Hamas meet its monthly budgetary requirements. Much to Saudi Arabia's chagrin, Iran played this role for Hamas until 2012, when Khaled Meshaal, Hamas' then and current political leader, broke with Bashar al Assad's Iran-allied Alawite regime in part because of the violent crackdowns al Assad carried out upon Sunni Muslims in Syria.

Iranian support for Hamas did not dry up completely; Iran even increased funding during last summer's Operation Protective Edge, when Hamas and other Palestinian groups clashed with Israeli forces in Gaza. Overall, though, the Shiite power has greatly reduced its funding for Hamas. Hamas has survived in recent years by cobbling together support from Qatar and Turkey. But as it struggles to meet numerous financial obligations, Hamas would benefit from a renewed friendship with Riyadh and the economic perks that come with it. And Saudi Arabia is in some ways a more natural partner for Hamas than Iran, as a result of their shared Arab and Sunni identities.
Riyadh's Broader Strategic Goals

Saudi Arabia's ultimate goal is to build a Sunni, Arab coalition that can counter the imposing shadow Iran is casting over the region. Saudi Arabia is already combating Iran on multiple, more consequential fronts than the Gaza Strip: The kingdom leads a broad coalition of regional powers pushing back against the Iran-backed Houthi advance in Yemen, it supports numerous anti-Assad rebel groups in Syria and it pays Arab Sunni Iraqi tribes to convince them to fight the Islamic State. The warming of ties with Hamas, like Riyadh's recently improved relationship with Sudan, is a less overt tactic in pursuit of the same overall goal.

Backing Hamas can help Saudi Arabia's regional alliance against Iran in three ways. First, by becoming the chief benefactor of Hamas, Saudi Arabia would force its way directly into Levantine regional dynamics. If Hamas tightens its relationship with Riyadh, Egypt and Israel will effectively have to deal with Saudi Arabia whenever an issue with Hamas arises. The more influence that Saudi Arabia can exert in the region, the more likely the United States will be predisposed to side with the kingdom's overall interests.

Second, support for Hamas would allow Saudi Arabia to take credit for helping to combat the nascent Islamic State threat developing in Gaza. There is at least a small group of aspiring Islamic State militants in the Gaza Strip with which Hamas must deal. For example, on July 19, Islamic State sympathizers planted and detonated bombs beneath five vehicles belonging to members of the military wings of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Saudi financial support could help eliminate this embryonic threat by reducing the economic hardship that drives militants to join groups such as the Islamic State. Relative to other Saudi operations to fight the Islamic State, assistance to Hamas is a minor step, but it fits with Riyadh's desire to be seen as the most willing and effective Islamic State opponent in the region.

Third, and most obviously, funding and support from Saudi Arabia would reduce Hamas' dependence on Iran for aid. As Saudi Arabia repairs its relationship with Hamas, it diminishes Iran's ability to exert influence over the Palestinian group. That in turn means Iran will have one less satellite, or proxy, on the periphery of the main battleground, located in the heartland of Greater Syria and Mesopotamia.

As a result, Saudi Arabia has been pursuing closer relations with Hamas for months now, calling on Egypt, its regional ally, to ease restrictions on the group. In fact, it was in part because of discreet Saudi cajoling that Cairo decided to drop Hamas' designation as a terrorist group and to reopen the Rafah border crossing for several long stretches in recent weeks. The most obvious sign of reconciliation between the two groups, however, occurred last week: Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal made a rare trip to Saudi Arabia and had an even rarer meeting with King Salman, during which the two discussed the challenges posed by the Islamic State and the possibility of increasing Saudi financial support for Hamas. Stratfor sources indicate that Meshaal may also have raised the possibility of at least a limited warming of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in trying to combat their mutual enemy, the Islamic State. But from Riyadh's point of view, the distrust and enmity run too deep to pursue such an arrangement at this time. Hamas, isolated and poor as it is, must try to preserve as many different avenues of friendship as possible in the region, but the simple fact is that the group has more in common with Saudi Arabia than with Iran.
The Difficulties of Befriending Hamas

In reaching out to Hamas, Saudi Arabia will have to overcome numerous obstacles. Riyadh must make sure that by repairing its relationship with Hamas, it does not harm ties with West Bank-based Fatah, a group that could offer Iran another opening to pursue in Palestine. In the past, Iran has managed to find other Palestinian proxy groups to challenge Hamas and to fulfill its aims, as it did during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 by funding and arming Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The relationship between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran has weakened significantly in recent months — Tehran was not pleased with the Palestinian militant group's neutrality regarding Saudi moves in Yemen. Besides, Palestinian Islamic Jihad is also fundamentally a Sunni, Arab organization. Still, by itself, a strong Saudi relationship with Hamas does not mean Iran has lost all influence in Gaza; it reduces Tehran's options, but does not eliminate them entirely.

Riyadh also risks irritating the very regional powers it hopes to recruit to its Sunni Arab-led, anti-Iran coalition. Relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia have been unusually cooperative in recent months, and the two find themselves with more in common in the wake of the Iran deal. But any militant activity in Gaza could strain ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia if Riyadh is unable to restrain Hamas. Egypt, Turkey and Qatar all have ties with Hamas of varying strength, and though Saudi Arabia could see the ability to influence Hamas' actions as an opportunity to improve relations with those countries, it could also be perceived as a challenge. This is especially the case for Egypt, which is suspicious of Hamas' Muslim Brotherhood doctrines and views Hamas' activities and relationships to be within its sphere of influence.

Despite numerous obstacles to repairing their relationship, Hamas needs a financial backer and Saudi Arabia has the funds to help. Saudi Arabia is trying to build and lead a Sunni Arab coalition against Iran, and to achieve that goal it will have to engage in a great deal of diplomacy and military action, both behind the scenes and more overtly on the battlefields in Syria and Iraq. But Riyadh can also make smaller, more subtle adjustments in its foreign policy. By choosing to support Hamas now, it demonstrates its broader, regional concern with the spread of the Islamic State and proves that it is an influential player in the Levant. Strengthening its ties with Hamas, then, is a small step that both weakens Iranian influence and elevates Saudi Arabia's profile. These kinds of pragmatic relationships are the inevitable product of the U.S.-Iran reconciliation and represent an illustrative microcosm of what overall Saudi strategy will look like in the coming months and years.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/refugee-crisis-saudi-arabia-says-it-has-taken-2-5-million-fleeing-syrians-1519532

[Crafty_Dog]

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/will-the-united-states-help-if-saudi-arabia-starts-to-fall-apart/?utm_content=buffer1b9c1&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.meforum.org/5582/saudis-cheap-oil

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-declares-all-atheists-are-terrorists-in-new-law-to-crack-down-on-political-dissidents-9228389.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Somewhere we have a post about SA fibbing abut the refugees it claims to take in and asserting that in point of fact it has taken none.  Please help me find it.

[G M]

Somewhere we have a post about SA fibbing abut the refugees it claims to take in and asserting that in point of fact it has taken none.  Please help me find it.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/facts-figures-syria-refugee-crisis-international-resettlement/

Key facts:

    The six Gulf countries - Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain - have offered zero resettlement places to Syrian refugees.
    Other high income countries including Russia, Japan, Singapore and South Korea have also offered zero resettlement places.

[Crafty_Dog]

Can't say that Pravda  on the Hudson does not have a real good point here

Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That Has Made It

Black Daesh, white Daesh. The former slits throats, kills, stones, cuts off hands, destroys humanity’s common heritage and despises archaeology, women and non-Muslims. The latter is better dressed and neater but does the same things. The Islamic State; Saudi Arabia. In its struggle against terrorism, the West wages war on one, but shakes hands with the other. This is a mechanism of denial, and denial has a price: preserving the famous strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia at the risk of forgetting that the kingdom also relies on an alliance with a religious clergy that produces, legitimizes, spreads, preaches and defends Wahhabism, the ultra-puritanical form of Islam that Daesh feeds on.
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Wahhabism, a messianic radicalism that arose in the 18th century, hopes to restore a fantasized caliphate centered on a desert, a sacred book, and two holy sites, Mecca and Medina. Born in massacre and blood, it manifests itself in a surreal relationship with women, a prohibition against non-Muslims treading on sacred territory, and ferocious religious laws. That translates into an obsessive hatred of imagery and representation and therefore art, but also of the body, nakedness and freedom. Saudi Arabia is a Daesh that has made it.

The West’s denial regarding Saudi Arabia is striking: It salutes the theocracy as its ally but pretends not to notice that it is the world’s chief ideological sponsor of Islamist culture. The younger generations of radicals in the so-called Arab world were not born jihadists. They were suckled in the bosom of Fatwa Valley, a kind of Islamist Vatican with a vast industry that produces theologians, religious laws, books, and aggressive editorial policies and media campaigns.

One might counter: Isn’t Saudi Arabia itself a possible target of Daesh? Yes, but to focus on that would be to overlook the strength of the ties between the reigning family and the clergy that accounts for its stability — and also, increasingly, for its precariousness. The Saudi royals are caught in a perfect trap: Weakened by succession laws that encourage turnover, they cling to ancestral ties between king and preacher. The Saudi clergy produces Islamism, which both threatens the country and gives legitimacy to the regime.

One has to live in the Muslim world to understand the immense transformative influence of religious television channels on society by accessing its weak links: households, women, rural areas. Islamist culture is widespread in many countries — Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania. There are thousands of Islamist newspapers and clergies that impose a unitary vision of the world, tradition and clothing on the public space, on the wording of the government’s laws and on the rituals of a society they deem to be contaminated.

It is worth reading certain Islamist newspapers to see their reactions to the attacks in Paris. The West is cast as a land of “infidels.” The attacks were the result of the onslaught against Islam. Muslims and Arabs have become the enemies of the secular and the Jews. The Palestinian question is invoked along with the rape of Iraq and the memory of colonial trauma, and packaged into a messianic discourse meant to seduce the masses. Such talk spreads in the social spaces below, while up above, political leaders send their condolences to France and denounce a crime against humanity. This totally schizophrenic situation parallels the West’s denial regarding Saudi Arabia.


All of which leaves one skeptical of Western democracies’ thunderous declarations regarding the necessity of fighting terrorism. Their war can only be myopic, for it targets the effect rather than the cause. Since ISIS is first and foremost a culture, not a militia, how do you prevent future generations from turning to jihadism when the influence of Fatwa Valley and its clerics and its culture and its immense editorial industry remains intact?

Every weekday, get thought-provoking commentary from Op-Ed columnists, The Times editorial board and contributing writers from around the world.

Is curing the disease therefore a simple matter? Hardly. Saudi Arabia remains an ally of the West in the many chess games playing out in the Middle East. It is preferred to Iran, that gray Daesh. And there’s the trap. Denial creates the illusion of equilibrium. Jihadism is denounced as the scourge of the century but no consideration is given to what created it or supports it. This may allow saving face, but not saving lives.

Daesh has a mother: the invasion of Iraq. But it also has a father: Saudi Arabia and its religious-industrial complex. Until that point is understood, battles may be won, but the war will be lost. Jihadists will be killed, only to be reborn again in future generations and raised on the same books.

The attacks in Paris have exposed this contradiction again, but as happened after 9/11, it risks being erased from our analyses and our consciences.

=================

and here would be one small example:  http://www.salon.com/2015/11/20/western_ally_saudi_arabia_sentenced_a_palestinian_poet_to_death_for_renouncing_islam/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=socialflow

[G M]

The New Duranty Times and Slate are getting awful close to recognizing the core problem is islam. 

[ya]

Problem may be this

[Crafty_Dog]

And, another step along the spiraling stairs into nuclear armageddon

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-execution-sheikh-nimr.html?emc=edit_na_20160103&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0

[G M]

And, another step along the spiraling stairs into nuclear armageddon

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-execution-sheikh-nimr.html?emc=edit_na_20160103&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0

Who could have seen this coming

[Crafty_Dog]

Ummmm , , ,  all of us here?

[G M]

Ummmm , , ,  all of us here?

Actually below is what I was looking for.


Re: Politics
« Reply #127 on: June 06, 2008, 03:59:30 PM »

A headline from the future with President Obama: "The Sunni-Shia Nuclear Arms Race Escalates".

I wonder how much gas will be then....

[Crafty_Dog]

Pretty good GM, pretty good! 

Though if your secondary point is that gas prices will be driven up, that would appear to be much less the case than most people previously assumed , , ,

[G M]

Just wait for shots to be exchanged, or for Hezbollah to strike Saudi oil production choke points. The last few US oil companies with deep pockets will be yuuuuuuge!

[Crafty_Dog]

http://atimes.com/2016/01/saudi-arabia-in-policy-hell/

[Crafty_Dog]

y Tommy Stubbington And
Nikhil Lohade
Updated Jan. 5, 2016 4:24 p.m. ET
6 COMMENTS

The prolonged rout in oil has left Saudi Arabia’s long-standing peg of its currency to the dollar at its most vulnerable point in more than a decade.

For almost 30 years, the kingdom has held the riyal at a fixed exchange rate and that has brought stability to government finances. Ninety percent of the government’s revenue comes from oil, which is priced in dollars.

But fewer dollars are coming in now, straining a budget that is committed to generous subsidies and public-sector wages. Abandoning the peg would make those dollars stretch further when converted to a local riyal, because without the peg, the riyal would weaken.

What’s more, to hold the peg, Saudi Arabia spends billions of its dollars buying riyals in foreign-exchange markets.


With oil trading around $36 a barrel, some investors and Saudi Arabian businesses believe the government will succumb to the pressure and let the peg go—something long regarded as unthinkable. That is a minority view, but one that is growing in popularity.
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This week, the number of riyals that forward contracts can buy for a dollar in a year’s time surged to a 16-year high.

“We have a new economic reality in the Gulf region, with oil prices so much lower,” said Michael Cirami, a portfolio manager at Eaton Vance. “That requires an adjustment.”

Mr. Cirami isn’t betting on a weaker riyal, but he thinks Riyadh could shift its policy in the next few years.

The debate over the Saudi peg underscores how the oil-price rout has upended conventional wisdom in economies linked to crude. OPEC’s supremacy, for instance, has been eroded and rich oil states have fallen into budget deficits.

The riyal is fixed at roughly 3.75 to the dollar, and one-year forward contracts were buying the greenback for 3.822 on Tuesday, close to the high of 3.8235 hit on Monday. The moves reflect both speculators betting on a weaker riyal and some local businesses hurrying to lock in better rates, analysts say.

The price of oil has fallen by more than half since the middle of 2014, forcing the kingdom to run a record deficit of nearly 367 billion riyals ($98 billion) last year. Last week the government laid out billions of riyals in budget cuts.

Meantime, Saudi Arabia and Iran have intensified their diplomatic spat over the kingdom’s execution of a dissident cleric. That clash could push Saudi Arabia’s defense costs up while it is already fighting an expensive war in Yemen and supporting allies in conflicts elsewhere, analysts say.

To prop up its currency, the kingdom is buying the riyal with the dollar reserves accrued during years of high oil prices, analysts say. Those reserves fell to $635.2 billion at the end of November, down 15% from a peak of $746 billion in August last year, according to the latest central bank data.

It is impossible to say how far the riyal would fall were the peg to be removed, but a decline likely would be far greater than the 2% devaluation implied by the forward rates.

Many economists said the Saudi government will keep spending dollars to avoid devaluation, which would come with uncomfortable long-term consequences. Households and businesses have debt in foreign currencies, and payments costs would rise if the local currency falls. Consumers also would have to pay more for imports, from cars to luxury goods.

That could be a tough path for the government, local analysts said. Saudis already are angered by cuts to subsidies in the state budget.

“Speculation over a devaluation of the Saudi riyal has mounted in the past few days, but we think such a move is likely to be used as a last resort,” said Jason Tuvey, Middle East economist at Capital Economics. “In light of the potential political ramifications, this is something that the authorities will be extremely keen to avoid.”

During last week’s budget announcement, Saudi officials gave no indication that they were considering a change to the peg. But some analysts are reluctant to take the dismissals at face value. Officials at the Swiss National Bank, for instance, publicly backed the franc’s link to the euro mere days before the bank stunned markets by abandoning it a year ago.

In recent months, two oil-rich nations also have abandoned their dollar pegs.

Azerbaijan scrapped its peg to the greenback in December and its currency quickly lost half its value. Kazakhstan, another economy dependent on natural resources, let its currency float freely in August and saw it lose more than a quarter of its value in one day.

China has also moved to devalue the yuan since the summer as it grapples with slowing economic growth.

“The last year has shown us that when economic fundamentals change, pegs break,” said Peter Kinsella, an emerging-market strategist at Commerzbank in London.

Write to Tommy Stubbington at tommy.stubbington@wsj.com and Nikhil Lohade at Nikhil.Lohade@wsj.com

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html

[ccp]

Of course.  Down size the military and beef up the legal tort system on the war on terror. 

A nod to her NY cronies:

http://nypost.com/2016/04/17/hillary-supporting-bill-allowing-911-victims-to-sue-saudi-arabia/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLtLeK7YLGY&ebc=ANyPxKrqKZzy6rv_ziRfnj8w1qqUXXGliQSw8oEWBDlJc0YI2PsHkZOj8ecL1d-MyYYsKYFA9UXYYIZPh_e_QQem3kct1X3ycw&nohtml5=False

[ccp]

One opinion piece on the matter:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/business/international/saudi-threat-to-sell-us-assetscould-hurt-but-mostly-the-saudis.html?_r=0

[Crafty_Dog]

The Long Divorce
How the U.S.-Saudi relationship grew cold under Barack Obama's watch.
Simon Henderson, April 19, 2016

The initial defining moment of President Barack Obama’s attitude toward Saudi Arabia, for many people, was when he bowed to King Abdullah as he shook his hand at the London G-20 summit meeting in April 2009. The gesture, which the White House vehemently denied was a bow at all, was variously interpreted as the new president groveling toward an important ally, or an early sign of Obama’s capacity to charm.

The Saudis themselves probably weren’t fooled. They would have known of Obama’s 2002 speech in Chicago, just over a year after the terror attacks of 9/11. That speech is most famous for Obama’s opposition to President George W. Bush’s planned invasion of Iraq, which he referred to as a “dumb war.” But the then-state senator also had a pointed message about the two countries that formed the pillars of U.S. influence in the Middle East.

“You want a fight, President Bush?” Obama asked. “Let’s fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East – the Saudis and the Egyptians – stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and tolerating corruption and inequality.”

So much has changed in the world since that awkward bow in 2009, never mind since 2002, and the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship has changed along with it. As the eight years of George W. Bush came to an end, the oil price was less than $50 per barrel, and would climb to well over $100 in 2014. Few people had heard of shale oil — mention of the possibility of U.S. energy independence, which the oil could soon make possible, would have been met with derisive laughter. In the Middle East, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was very much in power, as was Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. It would be two more years before uprisings would seize those countries, and Washington’s response in both cases would dismay Saudi officials.

Obama will meet King Salman in Riyadh on April 20, during what will likely be his final trip to Saudi Arabia during his presidency. Such meetings between national leaders are usually used for discussions about common interests rather than detailed agendas. The common question is: Are the allies on the same metaphorical page? But with the United States and Saudi Arabia today, it will be more interesting to see whether they can plausibly suggest they are still reading from the same book.

Although the upcoming visit is being touted as an effort in alliance-building, it will just as likely highlight how far Washington and Riyadh have drifted apart in the past eight years. For Obama, the key issue in the Middle East is the fight against the Islamic State: He wants to be able to continue to operate with the cover of a broad Islamic coalition, of which Saudi Arabia is a prominent member. For the House of Saud, the issue is Iran. For them, last year’s nuclear deal does not block Iran’s nascent nuclear status – instead, it confirms it. Worse than that, Washington sees Iran as a potential ally in the fight against the Islamic State. In the words of one longtime Washington-based observer: “Saudi Arabia wanted a boyfriend called the United States. The United States instead chose Iran. Saudi Arabia is beyond jealousy.”

Despite the possible pitfalls, both sides will have assembled lists of “asks” for the visit. These will probably be expressed in side meetings, given the king’s increasing delegation of his powers to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, known as MbN, and particularly his son, Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, aka MbS. Besides the Islamic State and Iran, the topics are likely to include Yemen, where the kingdom is increasingly bogged down, though there is hope for peace talks. The crucial interlocutor will be MbS, the 30-year-old who is increasingly expected to become king sooner rather than later – though the notional succession currently in place would first hand the crown to his cousin, MbN. MbS is known for touting his vision of a modernized Saudi Arabia with an economy that has moved beyond oil.

Obama’s attitude toward Saudi Arabia does not seem to have changed since his 2002 speech, and his comments about the kingdom’s rulers will be an elephant in the room during these talks. The president’s criticism of America’s “so-called allies” is a recurring theme in Jeffrey Goldberg’s cover story for the Atlantic, “The Obama Doctrine.” The 19,000-word article begins with Obama’s retreat from his “red line” after Bashar al-Assad’s forces used sarin gas against civilians in 2013 – an event that shocked U.S. allies in the Middle East and forced them to reconsider what U.S. security guarantees actually meant, but which the president described as a decision that made him “very proud.”

Why Obama decided to give the interview now — rather than, say, in April 2017 — is a mystery to many, who see it as damaging his diplomatic credibility. The profile will cast a dark cloud over Obama’s meetings in Riyadh and make the platitudes of his public statements less convincing. Counterterrorism cooperation, for instance, will be a key element in the talks – but in the Atlantic, Obama questioned “the role of America’s Sunni Arab allies play in fomenting anti-American terrorism,” Goldberg wrote, and “is clearly irritated that foreign-policy orthodoxy compels him to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally.”

When Malcolm Turnbull, the new Australian prime minister, last year asked Obama, “Aren’t the Saudis your friends?” Goldberg writes: “Obama smiled. ‘It’s complicated,’ he said.”

Obama’s skepticism appears to have permeated his entire administration. It’s gotten to the point where Saudi officials fear that the administration prefers their rivals in Tehran to their longstanding ally. “In the White House these days, one occasionally hears Obama’s National Security Council officials pointedly reminding visitors that the large majority of 9/11 hijackers were not Iranian, but Saudi,” Goldberg wrote. When the author observed to Obama that he wasn’t as likely as his predecessors to instinctively back Saudi Arabia in a dispute with Iran, Goldberg continued, Obama “didn’t disagree.”

Obama simply doesn’t seem to share the view of many Middle East leaders that the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to diminish U.S. influence and change the balance of power in the region. Saudi leaders increasingly fear the president has no interest in constraining Iran’s regional ambitions. The single line that probably generated the most apoplexy in Riyadh when the Atlantic profile was published was when the president implored Iran and its rivals “to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.”

Saudi Arabia has no interest in sharing the Arab world with its archrival. It sees Iran as challenging its leadership of the Islamic world and undermining its standing in the Arab world. Given Iran’s nuclear agreement and its revival in oil production, Riyadh’s status as a leader of the energy world is also threatened — even if it will be years, if ever, that Iran can rival its standing as the world’s largest oil exporter.

These fundamentally different perspectives on the Middle East may be the cause of the tensions between Riyadh and Washington, but Obama and King Salman will face other problems when they come face-to-face this week. Meetings with the 80-year-old Saudi monarch are carefully choreographed to obscure, at least to the public gaze, Salman’s increasing infirmity. Obama has already encountered this. When he came to Riyadh early last year to offer condolences on the death of King Abdullah, he had a conversation with Salman during which the king simply walked away without warning. Aides attempted to excuse him, saying he needed to break for prayers. Last September, when King Salman visited the Oval Office, he brought his favorite son, Muhammad bin Salman, to do the talking.

For most meetings, King Salman has a computer screen, often obscured by flowers, in front of him, serving as a teleprompter. With a recent U.S. delegation, the royal court devised another stratagem – the king spent the meeting looking beyond the group at a widescreen television suspended from the ceiling. An aide off to one side furiously hammered talking points into a keyboard.

The two heads of state will not be able to avoid discussing their rival interpretations of the events of 9/11, when 15 out of the 19 hijackers were Saudi. The issue has been revived by the calls in Congress for the publication of the missing 28 pages from the 9/11 report, which have remained classified, supposedly to spare the Saudi government embarrassment because of possible connections between the hijackers and Saudi officials. Riyadh’s continuing sensitivity on this point was underscored over the weekend, when the kingdom warned that it would sell off U.S. assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars if Congress passes a bill allowing the Saudi government to be held responsible in American courts for any role in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

How this issue will play out is hard to predict. But as I first wrote in an August 2002 Wall Street Journal op-ed, there is much more to the links between the hijackers and the House of Saud than many are willing to admit. That article cited a Jan. 9 story in U.S. News & World Report, titled “Princely Payments,” in which senior intelligence officials and a former Clinton administration official said that two senior Saudi princes had been paying off al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden since a 1995 bombing in Riyadh, which killed five U.S. military advisors.

Saudi officials vehemently denied the claim, with current Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir quoted as saying: “Where’s the evidence? Nobody offers proof. There’s no paper trail.”

As I wrote in the Wall Street Journal in 2002: “I followed the lead and quickly found U.S. and British officials to tell me the names of the two senior princes. They were using Saudi official money — not their own — to pay off bin Laden to cause trouble elsewhere but not in the kingdom. The amounts involved were ‘hundreds of millions of dollars,’ and it continued after Sept. 11. I asked a British official recently whether the payments had stopped. He said he hoped they had, but was not sure.”

If the Saudi leadership hopes to repair its relationship with the United States, it must find a way to put questions like this to bed. But the starkness of the president’s criticisms in the Atlantic probably make rapprochement to the former levels of diplomatic and economic intimacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia impossible, in any case.

The president certainly doesn’t intend to travel to Riyadh to sign the death certificate of the relationship. Nevertheless, the Obama administration may have ushered in a new era in ties between Washington and Riyadh – one more distant and marred by suspicion than in years past. One way or another, it will be a historic trip.

[ccp]

Frankly I am not so clear as to why we need to kiss up to the Saudis.  We have known since shortly after 9/11 that Saudi money was behind the attacks as well as many of the attackers were from Saudi Arabia.  W clearly buried it.   I am not sure why he was so infatuated with them.  Must have had something to do with a bond formed by his father during desert storm.

Saudis are very dubious friends indeed.  Though we would all prefer them to Iran.

[DougMacG]

Asked and answered:

Frankly I am not so clear as to why we need to kiss up to the Saudis. ...

... Though we would all prefer them to Iran. [and ISIS and al Qaida and Boko Haram etc.]

Take it one step further, some of the 'moderate' Arab states will soon be allies of Israel, because Israel never was a threat to them and the common enemies Iran, ISIS etc. are.

The Kingdom is a strange place but they are our strategic ally.