Africa

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. withdrawal. The U.S. confirmed that it will pull its troops out of Niger and close its air base in Agadez after the country’s military junta announced last month that it was revoking a military agreement with Washington. The U.S., which had roughly 1,000 troops stationed in Niger as of last year, has used the country as its primary base for monitoring and counterinsurgency operations across the Sahel. It has been reported in recent weeks that dozens of Russian military instructors and personnel have arrived in Niamey as the Nigerien government turns to Moscow for security assistance.

[Crafty_Dog]

May 29, 2024
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Russian Strategy in the Sahel
As the U.S. leaves Niger, Moscow’s intentions are becoming clearer.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

A date has been set for the United States to fully demobilize from its military bases in Niger. On Sept. 15, American forces will leave at a time when the West continues to lose ground to Russian influence in the Sahel. As this happens, a clearer picture of Moscow’s broader regional strategy is beginning to form.

The Sahel has long been a hotbed for global terrorism. It was initially identified in the so-called Global War on Terror as a threat to Africa and to U.S. and Europe security because of its potential to nurture extremism and to export extremists through legal migration channels to Europe. Unsurprisingly, Brussels and Washington have each spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the Sahel, with Niger receiving a substantial portion of U.S. training and support. The fact that Russia is now taking over and deploying resources and personnel to Africa amid a stagnating war in Ukraine attests to the importance of the region.

This explains why in March the U.S. engaged in negotiations to remain in Niger. During those talks, U.S. officials said they gave the Nigerien junta a pathway for continuing the relationship, which included a planned roadmap for a return to democracy (which no Nigerian leader has been able to provide) and a reconsideration of its choice to supply yellowcake, a uranium concentrate powder, to Iran. Clearly, the talks were unsuccessful; reports indicate that the junta has already agreed to move forward with the sale of hundreds of tons of the substance to Iran, even though it has denied doing so. U.S. and Nigerien officials met again in mid-May as a last ditch effort to ease tensions and keep a foothold in the country, but these talks failed too, thus the deadline for Washington’s departure.

The U.S. has since halted much of its support to Niger. Though some in the government expected deliveries of things like drones and weaponry to continue, it should not come as a surprise. Washington provides tons of material to countries like Niger, but it does so with strings attached: It tends not to provide military assistance to governments that come to power through coups, and it usually requires certain discussions and degrees of influence in exchange. Moscow has no such compunction. It has a long history providing arms to the region, and it leverages its relationship to curry favor with its regimes. Russia has already provided anti-air defense systems to Niamey, as well as some 100 Russian soldiers and military instructors “to train local forces in the fight against terrorism.” That Russia provides drones, equipment, arms, and ammunition without restrictions will continue to set it apart from Washington when dealing with governments across Africa.

Niger typifies Russian strategy in North and West Africa, but it is only one of many countries the Kremlin is trying to woo. Sao Tome and Principe, for example, recently signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia that calls for military training, logistical support and "possible collaborations" involving Russian ships and planes. The president of Guinea-Bissau recently visited Moscow and declared that Russia was a “permanent and loyal ally.” Guinea-Bissau has had a military agreement with Russia since November 2018, but it’s highly likely that during the president’s trip there was an updated framework agreement proposed to increase military cooperation. Russia also announced that it will be opening an embassy in Equatorial Guinea. The EU was slow to react but has now expressed significant alarm at the developments.

Russia's Increased Presence in Africa

(click to enlarge)

Why is Russia interested in this part of Africa? First, since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has been in search of friendly governments to support it in the international arena and help it avoid diplomatic and economic isolation. Many governments across Africa have bought into the Kremlin’s portrayal of the war as an anti-imperial conflict. Ukraine has fought back, dispatching Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba to a dozen African countries (some of which had never received a Ukrainian government delegation before) during four separate visits since early 2022. Kyiv also developed an Africa-focused communications strategy to counter Russian propaganda.

Second, Moscow is establishing a trade corridor to funnel natural resources from the region to Russia – and away from Europe. Russia provides weapons and military equipment, while its paramilitaries protect African military leaders as well as mining operations. In exchange, the African military juntas permit Russian firms to extract gold, oil, diamonds and other valuable commodities. From there, Russia can transport the commodities north to Libyan ports, where they are loaded onto ships and sold abroad. (Thanks to its close partnership with Libya, Russia is also able to disguise its natural gas as Libyan and sell it to Europe, undermining European efforts to end its dependence on Russian energy while refilling the Kremlin’s coffers.) If Niger were to sell yellowcake to Iran, as both Nigerien and Western officials have alleged it may, then the corridor to the Mediterranean would be an ideal route. It is also a superb choice for migrants who aspire to reach Europe – a journey that Moscow and Minsk have not just endorsed but facilitated in recent years to sow discord in European politics and society.

Finally, and perhaps most consequential for Western interests, Russia seeks to unite its allies from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. For a long time, Russia has been pursuing naval bases along the coasts of Africa. (It previously struck a deal with Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, who was removed from power during a coup in 2019.) In February, it reportedly started courting the West African country of Togo in a bid to extend its Sahel corridor to the Atlantic Ocean. Elsewhere in West Africa, Senegal’s recently inaugurated president has emphasized anti-colonialism, casting doubt on the future of Dakar’s relations with Paris, its former ruler. He has also spoken openly about drawing closer to the pro-Russia Alliance of Sahel States (comprising Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). For Russia, an Atlantic naval base would give it more secure access to trans-Atlantic trade routes and support its logistics chain to its Sahelian allies.

The focal point for Russia’s Africa strategy at the moment is Libya, whose rival authorities can both claim good relations with the Kremlin. Wagner mercenaries long fought alongside Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the east, while Russian diplomats kept in contact with the Government of National Unity in Tripoli. Besides the several thousand ex-Wagner military contractors who were already in the country, Russia has been sending professional soldiers to Libya since February. In the past month alone, it deployed 1,800 troops alongside several hundred special operators. Since April, Russian frigates have made at least five deliveries of military equipment to Tobruk. Moscow’s military build-up in North Africa poses a serious threat to Europe, but Russia’s forces are more likely to be deployed across the region than they are to remain in Libya.

Russia's Prospective Missile Range from Tobruk, Libya

(click to enlarge)

Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. is determined to ensure that its exit from Niger goes smoothly. One hundred U.S. troops have already departed, but approximately 1,000 remain. They will leave behind an expensive drone base that provided Sahelian governments with intelligence and reconnaissance for their fight against Islamist insurgencies. However, Washington remains convinced of the importance of monitoring and, when necessary, actively disrupting Islamist extremist networks across the Sahel, so it continues to seek a new home for its counterterrorism operations.

Meanwhile, Russia has been proactive in ensuring this will not be an easy task for the United States. In addition to building links between its African allies, Moscow is trying to push further into Lusophone countries. It is also prioritizing collaboration with the new Senegalese president and other countries along the Atlantic coast, including Togo. By forming tighter alliances across the region, Russia will benefit economically and politically, while gaining the ability to threaten NATO in new ways – all of which will increase Moscow’s future bargaining power.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 11, 2024
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In Africa, China Strikes Back
Beijing has prepared for the coming competition with new economic promises.
By: Ronan Wordsworth
A little over a year ago, China was consigned to spend less in pursuit of its interests in Africa. It cut back dramatically on lending, on infrastructure projects, and on any form of investment because the governments were corrupt and there wasn’t much competition to China besides. But now that there is a renewed global interest in Africa for its place in supply chains and its supply of critical minerals, Beijing feels it can no longer sit idly by. The reasons behind the decision are many, but perhaps most tellingly, it shows that Beijing believes it will come out of its current economic malaise.

China’s Decline

The significance of China’s near-monopoly in Africa cannot be overstated. From 2006, when it began to invest in Africa in earnest, to the height of its investment in 2016, Beijing faced very little competition. This enabled the government to secure long-term deals to develop mines and export raw minerals and maintain large trade imbalances. It also gave China a huge head start in developing batteries, solar panels and other products related to green energy. Beijing’s strategy was successful even when African governments failed to pay back their loans, and even when Beijing itself fell under economic duress. The mines stayed open, ensuring a constant flow of critical minerals.

But other countries started to take notice. The United States now intends to partner with Africa partly to develop trade relations but mostly to gain access to its resources. This was exemplified by the first U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in December 2022, when President Joe Biden hosted leaders from the continent in the hopes of demonstrating Washington’s commitment to building new economic engagement, strengthening ties, promoting private equity to use in such key sectors as health, infrastructure, energy, agribusiness and digital, and supporting peace initiatives throughout the continent. Thus, in 2023, a record amount of private and government investment flowed from the U.S. to Africa.

A major recipient of this money was the Lobito Corridor project. With Europe’s help, the U.S. mobilized nearly $2 billion to develop this rail corridor, which links the copper belt in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Angolan coast and provides a reliable way to export copper, cobalt and other rare earths such as niobium, tantalum and germanium to the Atlantic Ocean shipping routes. More than just an economic initiative, the Lobito Corridor is a way for the U.S. and Europe to counter China’s dominance in critical minerals and reinforce otherwise shaky supply chains.

The West isn’t alone in its interests. In trying to diversify their portfolios away from hydrocarbons, many Middle Eastern countries have started to invest in African commodities markets. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are all active there, and though they operate in different countries and sectors and for different short-term goals, they are all directly competing with China. The UAE, for example, which is now the fourth largest investor on the continent, is participating in areas such as infrastructure, energy, transport and logistics – areas in which China used to have a strong presence. It also signed an agreement with the DRC to establish a mining joint venture to extract tantalum, tungsten and tin – all critical raw materials used in the manufacture of green technology.

China is still Africa’s most important trade partner and the biggest beneficiary of African resources, but its position now is nowhere near as strong as it was just a few years ago. In fact, Chinese outreach had begun to drop even before the competition was rekindled. Money for programs related to agricultural assistance, climate and environment, health, peace and security, and trade dropped by roughly 50 percent. During that time, there was also an 80 percent drop in the sheer number of projects being announced. In a Zoom call with African leaders in 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping made no reference whatsoever to continental infrastructure – once seen as a hallmark of their relationship.

The most recent China-Africa summit, held just a few days ago, focused on how to add value to African exports. According to China's Foreign Ministry, imports from Africa reached $305.9 billion over the past two and a half years, beating preliminary objectives on targeted value but still failing to add much beyond the utility of the minerals themselves. Beijing also said it wants to reduce its trade imbalance to usher in a new era of bilateral ties, demonstrating a willingness to develop a more sophisticated relationship based on trade ties and potential dependencies rather than one based purely on extraction.

China’s Response

And because China knows its position in Africa has declined relative to others, it has prepared for the coming competition accordingly. Its plans, crucially, include the largest ever military pledges, but its outreach still centers on economic cooperation. At last week’s summit, Xi announced that the ”Beijing Action Plan for 2025-2027” includes a promise of 360 billion yuan ($50 billion) for the continent over the next three years comprising credit funds, government-issued yuan-denominated loans, private investment from Chinese firms, an involvement in 30 infrastructure projects, the creation of 1 million jobs in Africa, a unilateral improvement on access to its market for African trade, 30 clean energy projects and Chinese involvement in developing Africa's nuclear energy industry.

Though this is no small matter, in some ways it is merely in keeping with previous efforts. In 2023, Chinese investment in Africa came roaring back. By the end of August, the Global China Initiative reported that China had approved $4.61 billion in loans to eight African countries and two regional financial institutions, marking the first annual increase in loans to the continent since the peak of the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese financing also returned to small-scale renewable energy projects, such as solar and hydropower, after two years of no energy investment in Africa. These projects remain modest, however, and the “30 clean energy projects” promised by Xi at the summit will likely be of similar scale. Infrastructure projects are also expected to be smaller, reflecting lessons from earlier large-scale initiatives that faced repayment challenges. However, China continues to extend loans to countries with ongoing financial difficulties, including Egypt, Nigeria and Angola – three of its largest loan recipients.

One notable memorandum of understanding from the summit concerned revitalizing a railway between Tanzania and Zambia. Built in 1976 and funded by a zero-interest Chinese loan, the railway helps copper and cobalt from Zambia and the DRC reach ports in Tanzania. The refurbished railway will highlight the benefits of cooperation between China and Africa, according to Xi. It also looks like a direct response to the Lobito Corridor.

Besides economic support, Xi also pledged $140 million in military aid to Africa. The aid package includes training for 6,000 military personnel, 1,000 police officers and 500 young military officers who will come to China for further training. Insecurity in places like Sudan, the Sahel, the DRC and the Central African Republic is disrupting Chinese mining and logistics operations. What’s more, some of this instability is a result of Russian activity, as Moscow exploits the lawlessness to access and covertly export minerals. This dynamic has led to clashes between Chinese and Russian actors in areas such as the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, China accounted for 19 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s arms imports from 2019 to 2023 – a figure that is likely to grow as Russia remains preoccupied with Ukraine.

Though African leaders welcomed these pledges, they now hold a stronger bargaining position with Beijing. As a result, China is unlikely to match the levels of infrastructure financing seen before 2016. Instead, Beijing is adopting a multifaceted strategy, deepening military ties with African countries while signaling its return as a reliable partner for development assistance. It faces significant competition this time from Western and Middle Eastern countries. These rivals are challenging China’s traditional areas of influence and working to secure their own supply chains in order to reduce their dependence on Chinese manufacturing for the green energy transition. The China-Africa summit shows that the competition has forced China to refocus on Africa just as it was beginning to shift its attention elsewhere

[Crafty_Dog]

France’s Orano nuclear fuel company announced this morning that it lost operational control of the Somair mine in Niger. (This is the latest hit to France’s power grid which heavily relies on nuclear energy. More expensive or less abundant energy is likely to fuel the political turmoil France is facing in the coming weeks. – J.V.)

[Crafty_Dog]

December 18, 2024
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Russia’s Presence in Africa After Assad’s Fall in Syria
The Kremlin must consider how to continue its overseas operations following the loss of a key ally.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

Bashar Assad’s ouster in Syria will likely have far-reaching consequences for close ally Russia, extending even into its operations in Africa. For decades, Syria had been a key logistics center for Moscow, hosting military bases and support facilities critical to Russian activities abroad. With Assad now living in exile in Russia, the Kremlin will have to consider the implications for its Africa operations.

Big Loss

Africa is critical to Russia’s long-term strategy for a number of reasons. Moscow reportedly earns $1 billion annually just from its operations in the Central African Republic, which include trade in illicit gold, diamonds and precious hardwoods. Russia’s management of oil fields in Libya and Sudan is a critical source of foreign currency and helps Moscow circumvent Western sanctions. Russia also has political interests in the continent. African nations have for the most part been reluctant to condemn Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and some have even supported its assertion that it’s leading the charge against Western hegemony.

Meanwhile, amid the Russia-Ukraine war, Africa (in addition to Central Asia) has become a key source of labor for Russia, which is facing a growing worker gap, particularly in the manufacturing and services sectors. African labor migrants have been recruited to work at Russian drone and ammunition factories, which are vital to Moscow’s war effort. Finally, the Sahel and Central Africa have become an avenue through which Russia can threaten NATO’s southern flank – by, for example, facilitating another migrant wave on southern Europe, potentially sowing discord among EU members. Russian military personnel and missiles deployed to Libya are also a valuable source of leverage for Moscow in future negotiations with European governments.

But Moscow’s presence across Africa could be in jeopardy with the future of its partnership with Syria uncertain. Russia’s naval base at Tartus – leased to Moscow in 1971 by Hafez Assad, the father of Bashar Assad – is its only naval hub in the Mediterranean and has become one of its most important installations for overseas operations. In 2017, Moscow’s access to the base was extended with a 49-year lease, thanks in part to its decisive role in propping up the Assad regime since 2015. Russia and Russian mercenary groups have also been using the Hmeimim air base in Latakia as a staging ground for operations in Africa. Without access to the Hmeimim air base, Russia’s only ally in Africa reachable by aircraft without requiring refueling would be Libya, and even that could be challenging considering it would require flying directly over Turkey. These two bases offer logistics support for resupplying arms, ammunition and equipment, as well as personnel rotation, to Russian operations abroad and a hub through which Moscow could export African minerals and oil.

In addition, Russia’s failure to protect Assad could force governments in Africa to question the value of their relationships with Moscow. Russia has developed close ties with several African countries, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Central African Republic, Sudan and Libya. Officials from Russian state agencies and the Wagner mercenary group have developed close personal contacts with authoritarian leaders in the region to cement these relationships, and in exchange, Moscow was often granted access to minerals or other resources. But central to maintaining this network was the perception that Moscow could provide some level of protection for leaders who had fallen out of favor with the West. The Kremlin’s inability to save Assad from ouster will force governments across the continent to question this assumption. The junta-led governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are now undoubtedly wondering if Russia really has the capacity to come to their aid if they face a challenge to their power – particularly considering its potential loss of the Syrian bases.

Seeking Alternatives

The Kremlin must now consider how best to proceed. Russian officials have reportedly been in talks with the rebel groups that led the Syrian rebellion about Russia's continued access to the Tartus port. Rebel leaders have said that all agreements signed under Assad will not be renegotiated for the time being and that their fates should be up to the Syrian people. The chief of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which led the revolt, has not publicly commented on the matter, but considering that Moscow’s support was critical to keeping Assad in power for so long and that Moscow continues to offer safe haven to the Assad family, opposition groups will likely be skeptical of Russia’s peace offerings. In addition, HTS was heavily supported by Turkey, which has its own interest in preventing Russia from accessing Syrian military or logistical assets. Open-source intelligence indicates that Russian cargo ships and at least two Antonov An-124 cargo planes have already visited the bases in Tartus and Latakia, possibly to withdraw equipment.

Russia will likely consider alternatives in Africa through which it can manage its overseas projects. It has long wanted a base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. In 2017, the two countries signed an agreement calling for the establishment of a Russian base there. The Port of Sudan had reportedly already been used for limited Russian operations (including refueling and resupply for Russian mercenaries operating in Mali, as well as support for Sudan’s military) prior to Assad’s fall. However, distance will be a challenge for Moscow. It wouldn’t be able to transport supplies directly to Sudan from Russian territory, so maintaining a permanent base in Sudan could get complicated. In addition, the Sudanese war, now spanning 20 months, has shown little sign of slowing down, which could also threaten the security of any Russian military installations in the country.

Russia’s best-developed network in Africa by far is in Libya. Throughout 2024, Moscow has expanded its military presence there, refurbishing runways at its air base to enable Il-76 cargo planes to land in the country. Russia was granted permanent docking rights at the port of Tobruk in exchange for infrastructure upgrades, though naval facilities there are too underdeveloped for consistent use. Long-term access would require cooperation with the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar, who controls the eastern and southern parts of the country. Moscow has been cultivating a relationship with Haftar for some time, but any further investment there could be wasted if he is ousted from the regions he currently controls.

In Algeria, Russia has made clear its desire to construct a port that could be used as a base of operations on the continent. And this could be a good time to initiate talks, considering Algiers’ anger over the European Union’s stance on the Western Sahara dispute and its criticism of the Algerian president. Still, Algeria likely wouldn’t risk its remaining Western partnerships in order to host a Russian base.

In West Africa, countries situated along the Gulf of Guinea could also offer Moscow a base for its operations in the Sahel, though any facilities it manages to construct there likely wouldn’t have the capacity to operate as comprehensive logistics hubs. Countries such as Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast and Ghana are all on the Kremlin’s radar, but the U.S. is also increasing its focus to prevent Russian influence from spreading in the region.

Opportunities for Russia’s Adversaries

With Russia’s options limited, both Europe and the U.S. see an opportunity to limit Russia’s network abroad. It’s highly likely that the United States and Europe are in talks with the new Syrian administration led by Abu Mohammad al-Golani, and that he’s entertaining Russian proposals only to build leverage in future talks with the West. Meanwhile, Turkey, which has more influence over the new Syrian administration than any other country, could use the situation to limit Russia’s engagement in the Middle East and in Africa, where Ankara is increasingly in direct competition with Moscow.

That Russia was neither able nor willing to help Assad during the rebel advance is an indicator of the pressure facing the Kremlin amid the war in Ukraine. This will likely have a ripple effect for Moscow’s plans in Africa, limiting them to low-effort endeavors such as disinformation and propaganda campaigns and very limited troop deployments. Notably, in the past few weeks, both Chad and Senegal have moved to end their military associations with France, but neither has indicated it will replace the French presence with Russian troops.

Assad’s removal from power could be the end of decades of partnership between Moscow and Damascus. The U.S. and the EU will see Russia’s weakness there as an opportunity to undermine its power projection capabilities elsewhere. Turkey will see this as a chance to ensure Russia can’t rebuild its foothold in Syria through its relationship with HTS. And Russia will have to consider how these developments will impact its strategy in Africa.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 17, 2025
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Game Over for France in Africa
The loss of influence implicates more than just Paris.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

“I think someone forgot to say thank you.”

This loaded statement, made by French President Emmanuel Macron at the 30th annual Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, reveals much about the state of French foreign policy toward Africa. Not only does it signal the end of Macron’s revitalized outreach to France’s former colonies, but it also all but confirms what many already knew – that French influence in Africa is steadily and perhaps inexorably on the decline.

Marcon’s line is the culmination of a series of rebukes by West and Central African nations that, over the past year or so, have taken steps to remove French military assets from their territories. The situation, however, is more complex than it appears. This isn’t just a matter of former colonies throwing off the yolk of a colonizer. Many of the countries once close to France have turned to Russia for their security needs, much to the chagrin of other Western powers that continue to search for long-term viable and reliable partners for both economic and security development.

France has long maintained close ties to many of its former colonies. Economically, it holds sway in a range of sectors, including mining, logistics, telecommunications and finance. (Many local currencies are still denominated in the franc.) Over the years, Paris has worked closely with the political elite, some of whom have been in power for decades, and has solidified its presence through the establishment of military bases and associated deployments and training.

Naturally, France benefited greatly from the arrangement. There are many economic benefits to French companies, many of which are partially state-owned. It gave French products attractive export destinations that were secured by French troops, who were always on hand to protect the assets and interests of French companies. This only justified the large capital expenditure in costly deployments and establishing bases around the continent.

More recent developments reveal a less direct benefit. Around 2013-14, insurgencies in the Sahel triggered mass political instability that, in turn, triggered mass migration from sub-Saharan Africa to southern Europe. To contain the insurgencies, then, was to contain immigration and the social discontents it creates north of the Mediterranean. French military bases had strategic locations that could limit migratory opportunities.

The past year or so, however, has changed the status quo. The Central African Republic was the first to turn to Russia back in 2018. Since then, the three countries that would later form the so-called Alliance of the Sahel States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – taken a similar path following military coups that resulted in the ousting of regimes friendly to Paris in favor of nominally more nationalist ones that, as it happens, have replaced French security assets with Russian security assets. Other countries seem interested in following suit. Chad has signed initial agreements with Russia, even as it removes French and U.S. forces, while Senegal’s new president has spoken repeatedly of breaking neo-colonial ties and removing foreign militaries from its territory. (The decision by Chad is an especially damaging blow.)

The last two remaining French outposts are in Gabon, which is currently ruled by a military junta following a coup, and Djibouti. Gabon should be considered at risk, but in truth it isn’t so important to Paris. With only 350 French troops there, Gabon is unable to help France project power in the region. Djibouti is another story. France has had a military base there since 1977 and currently has five French naval and air bases, hosting 1,500 troops. It is thus vital for French power projection in the Indian Ocean. This likely explains Macron’s visit there last Christmas, and why a defense agreement was renewed last summer. For these reasons, Djibouti is the least likely to be dislodged from France’s sphere of influence.

For France, the consequences of losing its influence are many. Already, mass migration to Europe has resumed, and with Moscow ostensibly in charge of security, it won’t abate anytime soon. (Manipulating migration will give Moscow a lot of leverage in Europe.) China, meanwhile, is moving into mining operations and increasing trade ties to fill the void left by the hasty French departure.

But the bigger issue is that the situation in Francophone Africa implicates a bunch of other powers. Djibouti alone is home to military bases belonging to the U.S., Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, Italy and Saudi Arabia. In countries like Niger, where France was the primary security partner, Germany and the U.S. now have to withdraw their troops predominantly through their association as foreign actors.

The U.S. is already looking for new strategic partners to help combat growing insurgencies. Militant Islamist group Boko Haram, for example, is resurgent in northeast Nigeria. In Benin, there have been multiple cross-border attacks on security forces by militant groups from Niger and Burkina Faso. Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo are all facing threats from their northern borders as militant groups look to expand into the West African coastal regions, which would provide them a hub to improve logistics and financing.

In Algeria, conflict has resumed between Tuaregs, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Malian Defense Force and Wagner troops. Security has been enhanced at the border in the hope of avoiding spillover. The country is also grappling with a refugee crisis, sending record numbers of displaced Nigeriens back to their home country. The uptick owes overwhelmingly to the security vacuum created by the departure of Western security forces. (Niamey repealed a law that criminalized migrant trafficking.) Should this become a larger issue for North Africa, it will impact Europe with both security concerns and an increase in migrant crossings.

For Western companies, Francophone Africa is becoming an increasingly hostile environment. In Mali, local authorities have begun to crack down on foreign companies, restricting them under the auspice of “resource nationalism.” (Tellingly, Russian and Chinese firms are excluded from these restrictions.) Canadian mining firm Barrick Gold has frozen operations and will potentially withdraw from the market following export restrictions imposed on gold. Over the past week, the government has seized 3 tons of Barrick’s gold stocks, worth around $250 million. Arrests of executives of Barrick in December and of Australian mining company Resolute Mining in November – essentially for ransom – further evince the growing hostile investing environment. Barrick accounts for as much as 10 percent of Mali’s gross domestic product.

In Niger, a similar story is taking place. Resource nationalist policies have produced a hostile operating environment and are unlikely to change in the near term, resulting in a possible exodus of Western business. The economic fallout would certainly affect government coffers, but there are almost certainly a bunch of Russian and Chinese companies waiting to take their spots. On Tuesday, China’s National Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement to boost oil extraction following an initial agreement last year.

France will likely be the biggest loser here, while China and Russia will be the biggest beneficiaries. The situation has already begun to evolve from just encompassing French military bases to a larger political and economic problem that embroils much of the West

[Crafty_Dog]

https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1888589439334584813