Author Topic: Drones/UAV/UAS/Bots and Balloons  (Read 107873 times)


Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Drones/UAV/UAS/Bots
« Reply #204 on: April 19, 2020, 08:16:00 PM »
 :x :x :x






Crafty_Dog

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Army orders more high tech drones
« Reply #210 on: May 21, 2020, 07:53:54 PM »
https://www.overtdefense.com/2020/05/21/us-army-orders-more-black-hornet-nano-uavs/       But  they are mostly gray.

FLIR Systems have announced an additional order from the US Army for their Black Hornet III Personal Reconnaissance Systems (PRS) Nano-UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle). The deal, worth a reported $20.6 million, is in addition to last year’s $39.7 million order for the Army’s Soldier Borne Sensor (SBS) programme and a 2018 order for 60 Hornet IIIs worth $2.6 million.

The SBS programme is designed to improve the situational awareness of infantry squads and platoons, providing a surveillance and reconnaissance platform that can offer a ‘quick look’ over or into impeding terrain. The programme has tested the Black Hornet III in all-weather environments and the UAV can operate in darkness, fog or low-light.

The programme’s eventual objective is to equip every infantry squad within the US Army with its own PRS. The Black Hornet offers both live video and high definition still images (including thermal) and has an operational flight time of 25 minutes out to two kilometers from the operator. As can be seen from the accompanying images, the platform is remarkably small at just under 17cm (6.7in) and weighs only 33g (1.16oz). It has a low sound signature making it ideal for covert reconnaissance of structures.


The PRS can be operated semi-autonomously by plotted way points or live by an operator with imagery received via handheld tablet little bigger than an iPhone. It also offers GPS-denied operation through vision based navigation, allowing the Black Hornet to be flown into structures even whilst under GPS jamming.

More than 12,000 Black Hornets are in-service globally including with the Australian, Dutch, French, German and Norwegian armies. A number of special operations organisations have deployed the platform operationally in Syria including America’s Joint Special Operations Command and France’s COS Special Operations Command. The British Army deployed 160 earlier variants of the Black Hornet in Afghanistan but prematurely retired the system in 2017, citing a “diminished requirement”. 30 Black Hornet IIIs have since been procured at a cost of $1.8 million. The platforms will be used in testing by reconnaissance platoons.


Report to moderator    75.191.186.169 (?)




Crafty_Dog

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Iran's drones
« Reply #214 on: June 12, 2020, 12:30:54 PM »


Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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« Last Edit: August 02, 2020, 04:09:52 PM by Crafty_Dog »

DougMacG

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Re: Drone swarm over AZ nuke plant
« Reply #218 on: August 01, 2020, 03:23:10 PM »
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/07/30/drone-swarm-invaded-palo-verde-nuclear-power-plant/

The nuclear plant may not be the most vulnerable target for a drone but the need to deal with drones everywhere in the hands of the enemy, foreign and domestic, is a certainty.

G M

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Re: Drone swarm over AZ nuke plant
« Reply #219 on: August 01, 2020, 04:23:20 PM »
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/07/30/drone-swarm-invaded-palo-verde-nuclear-power-plant/

The nuclear plant may not be the most vulnerable target for a drone but the need to deal with drones everywhere in the hands of the enemy, foreign and domestic, is a certainty.

Exactly. Drones bearing IEDs will be seen domestically as things intensify here. Plan accordingly.

G M

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Hide from the Hunter/Killers
« Reply #220 on: August 05, 2020, 10:05:30 PM »
https://www.americanpartisan.org/2020/08/usmcs-new-guide-for-mitigating-signature-under-uas/

No worries. This probably won't be an issue until February 2021.



Crafty_Dog

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Slaughterbots
« Reply #222 on: August 07, 2020, 07:37:59 AM »

ccp

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Re: Drones/UAV/UAS/Bots
« Reply #223 on: August 07, 2020, 08:31:43 AM »
something straight out of some nightmare movie

 :-o



G M

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ccp

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Re: Drones/UAV/UAS/Bots
« Reply #227 on: September 28, 2020, 04:27:58 AM »
Black mirror

that is a riot!    8-)

G M

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Enjoy the microdrones!
« Reply #228 on: October 15, 2020, 11:10:07 PM »


Crafty_Dog

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Jihadi drones
« Reply #230 on: November 13, 2020, 12:48:42 AM »




Crafty_Dog

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D1: Drones
« Reply #234 on: February 09, 2021, 11:54:45 AM »
From roadside bombs to UAVs, drones are the "most concerning tactical development" for the U.S. military in the Middle East since IEDs began killing across Iraq 15 years ago. That's what Central Command Marine Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said at a virtual event Monday — echoing a speech delivered last summer at the Middle East Institute.

"Right now we're on the wrong side of the cost-imposition curve because this technology favors the attacker, not the defender," McKenzie said. "But we're working very hard to fix this and flatten the curve. We have a variety of systems in the field already."

As far as solutions (beyond what we've previously covered at Defense One), Military Times reports that "Long-term, the Army is pushing for a networked approach, using artificial intelligence and machine learning to find and track possible threats." What's more, "The Army's Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is also expected to build a school for the joint force focused on fighting small drones by 2024." Read on, here.



G M

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G M

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G M

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Drones/UAV/UAS/Bots
« Reply #244 on: May 31, 2021, 08:14:26 AM »
The day we knew was coming has arrived.   Deep implications here.

Crafty_Dog

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Iran's Drone Strategy
« Reply #245 on: June 21, 2021, 07:14:56 AM »
June 21, 2021
View On Website
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Iran’s Drone Strategy
Drones have become a critical part of Iran’s grand strategy for the Middle East.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

In recent weeks, U.S. Central Command has been warning of an increasing threat to U.S. troops in Iraq from drone attacks launched by Iranian-backed militias. The warnings come as concerns mount about the increasing sophistication and coordination of the drone attacks. Indeed, over the past several years, Iranian drones have been deployed to Tehran’s allies across the Middle East including in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Thus, drones have become a key part of Iran’s strategy to expand its influence throughout the region and weaken its biggest rivals – namely, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States.

A New Type of Warfare

Drones are changing the shape of warfare as we know it. By relying on technology instead of foot soldiers, they enable nations and militias alike to attack targets using fewer troops on the ground and with a level of precision that wasn’t possible through traditional combat. It’s no surprise then that militaries around the world, including Iran’s, are increasingly relying on this emerging technology.

Iran’s drone strategy has been decades in the making. The program began during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s but gained serious momentum in the 2000s. In 2018, Tehran announced that its drone program was completely independent, meaning it could manufacture all necessary parts at home.

For Tehran, one key advantage of drones is that they can help Iran overcome certain barriers that might otherwise prevent it from expanding its regional influence. Mountainous terrain, distance and limited manpower have long placed a ceiling on Iran’s reach beyond its own borders. (Notably, Iran has also used drones to control its own restive populations, particularly ethnic minority groups like the Kurds and the Baloch.) Thus, drones have become a critical part of Iran’s grand strategy for the Middle East.

Iran's Path to the Mediterranean
(click to enlarge)

Iran’s drone program has four main goals. First, Tehran is hoping to suppress Kurdish separatist groups in Iraq, Syria and Turkey as well as at home. Second, it’s trying to undermine the positions of the U.S. in northern Iraq and U.S. allies throughout the region. Third, it’s hoping to muddle the long-standing conflict in the Palestinian territories. (During the recent bout of unrest in Gaza, Israel repeatedly accused Iran of providing military assistance to Hamas, including by providing it with so-called kamikaze drones.) Lastly, it hopes to destabilize one of its main regional adversaries, Saudi Arabia.

There are four main types of Iranian drones. The most common type is the Shahed-129, a combat drone armed with precision-guided munition. The Fotros, introduced in 2013, has similar capabilities, though not much is known about it. The Saeqeh 1 and 2, first announced in 2016, have similar properties to the United States’ RQ-170 Sentinel drone. In 2018, they were reportedly used in Syria against anti-Assad insurgents and Israeli targets. The last type is the Qods Mohajer series. They are tactical combat drones that have reportedly been acquired by Hezbollah and Venezuela. The latest addition, the Mohajer-6, has a range of about of 200 kilometers (125 miles) and is able to carry 40 kilograms (88 pounds) of arms.

Targeting the Kurds

The Kurds have been one of the main targets of Iran’s drone strategy. Their close relationship with the United States in Syria and Iraq irritates Tehran, which has been cooperating with Ankara since 2018 in joint military operations against the Kurds. Iran targets the Kurds both by supplying drones to its proxies and by launching its own drone strikes.

In 2015, Iranian kamikaze drones were used in an attack on the headquarters of Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, an adversary of pro-Iranian militias, in Syria’s Idlib province. In 2018, Iran reportedly carried out a drone strike in Iraqi Kurdistan targeting a Kurdish militant training camp there. Last April, Iranian-backed militias fired a drone carrying explosives at a U.S. military base near Irbil International Airport. It was the first time militants had used drones in an attack on Irbil, likely a message to the Americans and the Kurds that Iran, through its proxies, can strike anywhere in the country. It was later reported that the drone targeted a secret CIA hangar containing anti-drone equipment, showing a certain level of sophistication in Iran’s planning and execution of the attack.

This display of intelligence and precision was deeply concerning to Washington. The same month as that strike, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps published drone footage of a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf to demonstrate Iran’s technological capabilities and American vulnerabilities. Indeed, the drones are small enough to be loaded onto a ship and positioned to reach any number of targets from the Persian Gulf.

According to U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, this is the first time since the Korean War that U.S. forces have operated without complete air superiority. Noting the difficulties of countering small off-the-shelf drones that have undergone modification, he said it will take time for the U.S. to develop and field a capability to detect and destroy such drones. Small, low-flying drones are not typical targets for air defense systems, and thus they can sneak past defenses undetected. This is precisely what happened in late 2019 when Houthi rebels slipped drones past Patriot missile defense systems to attack Saudi oil facilities.

Three things are clear from McKenzie’s remarks. First, Tehran is orchestrating a massive proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles throughout the region. Second, it prefers drones in the hands of its proxies to avoid state-to-state conflict. And third, it coordinates with pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria to use them effectively in attacks.

In the near future, the role of Iranian-made drones will increase in northern Iraq. They are key to Iran’s strategy to undermine U.S. positions and its ties with the Kurdish peshmerga. Washington provides safety and security to the Kurds, but intensification of drone attacks will drive a wedge in the relationship.

Iranian Proxies in the Levant

Israel is similarly threatened by drones emanating from areas controlled by Hamas and Hezbollah, and has been for more than a decade. In 2010, a motorized balloon believed to have been dispatched by Hezbollah came close to Israel’s Dimona nuclear facility before it was shot down. In 2012, an Iranian-made drone reportedly tarried in Israeli airspace for 30 minutes before it was brought down. The danger is growing by the year, as the drones available to Hamas and Hezbollah become more sophisticated.

Though Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system reportedly downed more than five explosives-laden drones assembled in Gaza during the brief May conflict, it would be premature to declare that they pose no threat. The Qassam rockets that Hamas typically launches at Israel are little more than glorified fireworks with no guidance. Palestinian Shehab drones, on the other hand, have longer ranges than the Qassam rockets, are highly accurate and can fly at unpredictable trajectories (well below radar coverage, for example, shielding themselves among civilian structures en route to their destination). The rockets can carry more explosive material, but the drones offer what the Palestinian groups have long lacked: precision.

It is too early to conclude that Palestinian groups are ditching rockets and missiles for drones, but during last month’s fighting, Hamas and other groups proved that, despite Israeli efforts, they had managed to accumulate massive arsenals of rockets and that they could coordinate to launch them in huge salvos. It is therefore possible to predict that Hamas could combine missile salvos with significant drone attacks to overwhelm Israel’s defenses.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has undergone significant transformations before. Prior to 2000, Hamas and other groups relied on suicide bombings to attack Israel. This strategy faded away in the 2000s, and in 2001 Hamas transitioned to using rockets. Signs of another change emerged in 2014, when the Palestinians started combining missile salvos with kamikaze or intelligence drones. Meanwhile, Israel has developed its own, highly sophisticated unmanned combat aerial vehicles, both tactical and strategic. In Gaza, Israel is searching for the perfect drone to conduct tactical special operations in an urban area while minimizing civilian casualties. This process of developing and deploying increasingly advanced drones – by both sides – will only intensify.

Iran’s part in this evolution, in Gaza and beyond, is crucial. The IRGC provides the weapons and trains and advises their users. It is easier to manufacture the drones in the insurgent areas than it is to ship heavy weaponry into blockaded enclaves throughout the Middle East. Iran’s power projection depends on its ability to support pro-Iranian proxies, especially in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Syria. These proxies cannot match the technological superiority of the regular armies fielded by Iran’s traditional rivals, but by supplying them with drones, Tehran can at least partly offset their disadvantages.

In the 2000s, missiles changed the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 2020s, drones will do the same. Successful drone attacks against Israel won’t change the status quo in the same way that they did in Yemen, but they represent a new threat, and they can seriously escalate Israel’s conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah.

Crafty_Dog

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D1: We're fuct against prosumer drones
« Reply #246 on: June 28, 2021, 07:48:52 AM »
One last thing about small drones: For at least the past year, CENTCOM's Gen. Frank McKenzie has been sounding the alarm bells over the disruptive and dangerous threat from unmanned aerial systems and armed small drones—not that there are a whole lot of countermeasures widely available, as we've reviewed in our podcast as recently as this past October:

"The UAS threat, the small drone threat, the quadcopter less than the arms length of a human being, is what really probably concerns me the most in the theater," he told reporters April 22. "I would note, those things concern me greatly because our air defense system and our patriots and our other radars, they're very good at seeing the larger objects, be it ballistic missiles or be it larger land-attack cruise missiles or larger drones. The smaller drone is a problem, and [the] smaller drone is the future of warfare, and we need to get ahead of that right now."

"I argue all the time with my Air Force friends that the future of flight is vertical and it's unmanned, and I believe we are seeing it now," he said on June 10, 2020, at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. "And I'm not talking about the large unmanned platforms which are the size of a conventional fighter jet that we can see and deal with as we would any other platform. I'm talking about one that you can go out and buy at Costco right now in the United States for a thousand dollars, you know a four-quad rotorcraft or something like that that can be launched and flown and with very simple modifications it can be made into something that can drop a weapon—a hand grenade or something else. Right now, the fact of the matter is we're on the wrong side of that equation."

Crafty_Dog

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More on Iranian Drones
« Reply #247 on: June 29, 2021, 08:25:59 PM »
About those UAVs: The 12- to 15-foot drones carry up to 30 kg of explosives, making them "a clear escalation by Iran — and a worrying signal to intelligence officials that the US no longer enjoys autonomy in the skies over Iraq," reports CNN's Katie Bo Williams. "Rather than being guided by a pilot from a remote location, some of these small, fixed-wing drones use GPS navigation, making them far less visible to US surveillance systems and impervious to jamming."

G M

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Crafty_Dog

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