North and South Korea

[Crafty_Dog]

stratfor

Summary

Editor's Note: This analysis explores the ongoing tensions between Washington and Seoul over a U.S. proposal to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. Tomorrow, Stratfor will consider the broader picture, namely, the competing U.S. and Chinese strategies that underscore the controversy.

Planned April discussions over the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system on the Korean Peninsula have strained the U.S.-South Korea defense relationship. The Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missile system, known as THAAD, is a mobile and air-transportable anti-missile platform and a key component of U.S. layered air defense. The United States argues this layered system is necessary to protect South Korea as well as U.S. forces deployed there.

In recent weeks, however, China has voiced strong opposition to any THAAD deployment in South Korea. Russia and North Korea have followed suit. Beijing has not so subtly reminded Seoul that China, not the United States, is South Korea's major trading partner and that any deployment could have significant political and economic costs. In reply, Seoul has said that it will make a decision on THAAD based on its own national interests. Beijing's public commentary, however, is making it likely that Seoul will decide to accept the deployment, rather than continue with its policy of strategic ambiguity. Regardless, South Korea's public hesitation in accepting the THAAD systems highlights the country's subtle desire for greater independence in its defense, challenges to the U.S. regional strategy, and China's rising concern.
Analysis

South Korea has not yet taken a concrete stance on whether it will accept THAAD deployments. There are several reasons for this posture. First, according to South Korean officials, the United States has not yet issued a formal request to deploy the system, meaning that there have been no consultations. This is technically true but South Korea and others have known for years that the United States considers Korea a prime location for THAAD deployment. Reports in South Korean media said that the U.S. military had already assessed potential sites in South Korea — a fact Seoul is aware of.

Seoul's second reason for remaining noncommittal stems from concern about maintaining its balance between the United States and China. While the United States is South Korea's most significant defense partner, China is South Korea's largest trading partner. Seoul has also worked for years to use its political ties with Beijing to help manage the North Korean threat. As North Korea's largest trading partner as well as its main economic and security patron, China is in a singular position to assist South Korea in its relationship with North Korea.
Risks of Deployment

THAAD deployment — as seen vividly in Beijing's public objections — carries immediate political risks for South Korea. The question is whether the benefits of deployment outweigh those risks. Authorizing the deployment of THAAD would increase the robustness of South Korea's layered missile defense system. THAAD would protect against tactical and theater ballistic missiles, at ranges up to 200 kilometers (125 miles) and altitudes up to 150 kilometers (93 miles). A THAAD battery, typically composed of nine transporter or launcher vehicles with eight missiles each, two mobile tactical operations centers and a ground-based X-band radar, also uses a "kinetic kill" system. The system does not employ explosive warheads and can intercept hostile ballistic missiles inside or outside the earth's atmosphere.
Interactive
Interactive Graphic: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

North Korea's missile systems, too, are layered, using artillery and KN-02 ballistic missiles for short-range attack, Scuds for further reach, Nodong missiles for medium-range and Taepodong missiles for long-range. South Korea is most concerned about North Korea's artillery rockets and ability to launch saturation attacks with short-range missiles. Fears of North Korea's more advanced Nodong missiles — which THAAD would counter — are less pressing.

But South Korea's defense system also includes Patriot PAC-3 systems for point defense and Aegis-equipped destroyers as the initial source of interceptors to knock out ballistic missiles during their mid-course flight. The PAC-3 system has proven itself capable of intercepting less advanced Scud missiles. Practically, the systems in place may be enough to protect South Korea — in a time of war many of North Korea's longer-range missiles would likely target U.S. bases in Japan. This is not to minimize the ballistic missile threat from North Korea. For Seoul, however, there are reasons to consider different air defense architecture. This architecture would deal with the full range of the threat from North Korea while giving South Korea a degree of operational independence and a freer hand in designing its own defenses.

Over the past decade, South Korea has sought to create a defense architecture that is more independent of the United States. Seoul is not necessarily looking to expel U.S. forces from the country but it cannot be sure that U.S. interests will always align with those of South Korea. Seoul also finds it politically fraught to be entirely dependent upon the United States for its defense. Washington has pressured Seoul to tighten defense ties with Japan — a move that many South Koreans oppose for historical reasons.

The United States has also been pushing for changes in the defense alliance architecture that would allow U.S. forces in South Korea to deploy elsewhere in times of crisis. Seoul fears that granting the United States this option would ultimately lead to South Korea being tied politically to any overseas U.S. war. Finally, South Korea is concerned that the United States is overly cautious about Chinese concerns to the detriment of South Korean interests. Seoul was frustrated by the long delay in a U.S. show of naval force off South Korea's coast following the March 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, allegedly by North Korean torpedoes.
Seeking More Independence

In addition to these strategic concerns, Seoul would like to boost its own domestic defense industry for economic reasons and technological development. It would also wean South Korea off of its dependence on the United States for supplies and defense. Seoul already invested money toward its own air defense network called the Korea Air Missile Defense, a series of systems that would include U.S. elements but not be completely tied into the U.S.-Japanese anti-ballistic missile architecture. The system would free up Seoul to pursue missile and anti-missile development projects with Israel or even Russia.

Washington has long hesitated to more fully share missile development technology with South Korea — a stance that has been a bone of contention between the two allies. The United States argues that reliance on U.S. systems preserves the balance of power because it reduces South Korea's ability to unilaterally begin a war with North Korea. While THAAD would bolster South Korea's immediate defense — or at least the defense of U.S. bases in South Korea — it would do little to improve South Korea's ability to develop its own systems or expand its own defense industry.

The South Korean debate over THAAD deployment has become highly public — something that Seoul never intended to happen. Managing the U.S. defense relationship has been a controversial topic in domestic politics with South Korean political parties expressing competing views. Though the government in Seoul — whether conservative or liberal — largely agrees that South Korea must maintain a robust defense alliance with the United States, the exact balance and level of self-determination are both hotly contested. Even before the introduction of the question of political risk to Chinese relations, the THAAD decision was subject to competition within Seoul.

However, China's decision to so actively and publicly decry a deployment that has yet to be officially requested has forced Seoul to openly and immediately address the issue. It has also pushed Seoul toward approving at least a limited THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula — if only to underscore the independence of its decision-making.

Editor's Note: This is the first of two analyses on THAAD deployment in South Korea, read the second part here. 

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.allenbwest.com/michellejesse/just-in-south-korea-on-high-alert-after-north-koreas-latest-move

[G M]

http://www.allenbwest.com/michellejesse/just-in-south-korea-on-high-alert-after-north-koreas-latest-move

This is very bad news. Luckily, we have Team "Smart Power" on the job!

 

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

Editor's Note: This is the first installment of a five-part series examining the measures that could be taken to inhibit North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The purpose of this series is not to consider political rhetoric or noninvasive means of coercion, such as sanctions. Rather, we are exploring the military options, however remote, that are open to the United States and its allies, along with the expected retaliatory response from Pyongyang.

Few countries intrigue and perplex like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Isolated by choice from the ebbs and flows of the international system, North Korea is an island of its own making. It is often painted as a weak, fearsome lunatic with delusions of grandeur and aspirations to become a nuclear power, but the truth is a little more complicated. Despite outward appearances, Pyongyang is not reckless in its ambition. Nor does it foolhardily invite destruction. It walks a fine line, hoping to quietly attain a credible nuclear deterrent without inciting world powers to take decisive action.

Deterrence has always been a part of North Korea's survival strategy. Pyongyang's calculated disarray is primarily for the benefit of potential aggressors, advising caution should provocation lead to a disproportionate response. Thriving on contradiction, Pyongyang simultaneously depicts itself as fragile to the point of collapse yet immeasurably strong. This act has served the Kim dynasty well, gaining concessions from major powers that normally would not have been afforded.

North Korea has a good read on the world's inability and unwillingness to respond, not only because of upcoming U.S. elections but also because of the risk of pre-emption: Pyongyang's conventional deterrent raises the cost of intervention far higher than it is at most other places. The window for a military option to stem Pyongyang's nuclear program is closing, but that does not necessarily mean a strike is more likely now than before. Still, the balance is delicate, and should Pyongyang overplay its hand, the repercussions could be catastrophic.
Analysis

North Korea's biggest fear is to be coerced into a position of subservience, having to prostrate itself before China (its primary benefactor) or another powerful country. Its carefully curated image of aggressive unpredictability is intended to preserve its authoritarian and regulated society and, as a result, its isolation. The North is unlikely to expose itself to the international community unless it can guarantee two things: the primacy and security of its leaders, and an effective military deterrent. And there are few deterrents as effective as nuclear weapons. Pyongyang's unswerving progress toward developing a nuclear capability reflects the singular obsession with which it chases its goals and why the West takes its threats seriously.
North Korea's Geographic Challenge

Security and longevity have always been at the forefront of Pyongyang's reasoning. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided into its constituent parts, sandwiching a Russian-backed northern Korean administration between mainland China and the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea to the south. North Korea flourished during the Cold War, maintaining strong connections with the rest of the communist bloc. Until the 1970s, North Korea was more prosperous than the South. Things changed, however, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

As Cold War structures crumbled around the North and its defense partners became less viable, Pyongyang realized it had to adapt to survive, especially in the face of a burgeoning South Korea. Beyond an asymmetric approach to defense — including assassination attempts, high-profile kidnappings, bombings and subterranean excavations — North Korean began pursuing other options to safeguard its existence. It soon realized that a fledgling nuclear program provided a weighty bargaining chip. Transitions of power within the ruling Kim family served to make Pyongyang only more insular and unpredictable. The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 led to a reduction of provocation across the peninsula, but Pyongyang's imperatives remained unchanged.

Being branded a rogue state by the United States did little to dampen the flame of juche, the ideology installed by Kim Il Sung and the epitome of Korean self-reliance. Juche effectively calls for North Korea to stand alone economically, militarily and on the world stage. North Korea began to act up again in 2010, in advance of another transition of power within the Kim family, sinking a South Korean naval vessel and launching artillery at a prominent border island. Then in 2013, the country threatened once more to withdraw from the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Under Kim Jong Un's tenure, North Korea has prioritized strategic weaponry over all else. Despite widespread condemnation from the international community, Pyongyang has actually accelerated its nuclear weapons program, for it sees a credible nuclear arsenal as the only guarantor against Western-imposed regime change.
A Generational Congress

All eyes were on North Korea for its 7th Workers' Party Congress at the beginning of May, the first such meeting in more than 35 years. It was also the first time Western journalists were invited en masse to attend, albeit with strict limitations and the ever-present threat of deportation. The congress served many purposes, not least of which was to consolidate and institutionalize Kim Jong Un's rule and move away from the informal lines of command and political fiefdoms that developed under the rule of his father. Shedding his previous title of first secretary, Kim was introduced as party chairman for the first time.

During his address on May 7, Kim was quick to point out the advances made by the country's nuclear weapons and missile programs. He singled out Pyongyang's burgeoning nuclear capability as the protective layer that will enable economic development, a concept known as byungjin. But considering that North Korea's nuclear aspirations have saddled the country with economic sanctions, the statement appears somewhat ironic. That said, the announcement of a five-year economic plan is telling: Kim is accepting the kind of responsibility once shouldered by his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and solidifying his primacy at the head of the people's republic.

Pyongyang is optimistic to consider itself a nuclear power. A variety of tests and launches indicate that North Korea is assembling the constituent parts of a re-entry vehicle, but nothing decisively suggests that it has a fully functional nuclear ballistic missile. The country's fourth successful underground nuclear test was conducted Jan. 6, followed a month later by a satellite launch into orbit. This was trailed by ground tests of a rocket nose cone capable of withstanding atmospheric re-entry. Meanwhile, North Korean scientists proceeded with the controlled ignition of a solid rocket engine and, allegedly, the development of a miniaturized nuclear warhead.

On top of these nuclear stepping-stones were a number of ballistic missile tests, including the use of mobile land-based platforms and submarine launches, the latter theoretically within strike range of Guam and Japan. Though these tests included some failures — most notably three successive failures of the Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile system — they demonstrate clear progress in developing most of the individual segments of a viable nuclear deterrent. And North Korea's intent is to keep progressing until Pyongyang has a survivable weapon it can launch at short notice that will deliver a nuclear payload to the continental United States.

In response, efforts by the international community seeking denuclearization of North Korea are falling short. Pyongyang's position is deliberately opaque, primarily because it is beneficial to keep the West uncertain as to North Korea's true capabilities. If the missile program's well-publicized failures can nonetheless create enough doubt in the minds of U.S. policymakers, it might be enough to defer any possible strike. If success is not assured in North Korea's nuclear program, is direct action justifiable? Yet, North Korea is coming late to the nuclear game, and the technologies it is pursuing are already decades old. For many strategists and speculators alike, it is simply a case of when, not if. The key question then becomes: Can the United States afford to let Pyongyang cross the nuclear Rubicon? If the answer is no, then consideration must be given to the ways in which countries opposing North Korea, primarily the United States and South Korea, will use military force to neuter the nuclear program and impose compliance. The threat alone might be impetus enough for Pyongyang to take the final steps, as Stratfor's expert on North Korea, Rodger Baker, considers:

    As Pyongyang approaches a viable nuclear weapon and delivery system, the pressure is rising for the United States and other countries to pre-empt it. Consequently, the final moments of North Korea's transition from a working program to a demonstrated system are the most dangerous, providing a last chance to stop the country from becoming a nuclear weapons state. For North Korea, then, these final steps must happen quickly. Because 2016 is a presidential election year in the United States, Pyongyang may feel it has a window to finalize its nuclear arms program while the United States is preoccupied with domestic politics and unlikely to take military action. Furthermore, having just held parliamentary elections and facing a presidential contest in 2017, South Korea, too, is in the midst of political transition. North Korea is making a gamble, one that bets both on its read of U.S. politics and on its own ability to overcome technological hurdles.

This is the cost calculation faced by policymakers in the United States and South Korea as they consider a political decision that could lead to military action. The United States is the singular military power that has both the intent and the capability to conduct such an operation and would naturally take the lead. Washington has also been branded a target for North Korean aggression, along with Seoul and Tokyo.

In the coming installments, we will examine the options available to the United States and its allies should they decide to act militarily against North Korea. We will also consider, in turn, the nature of any retaliation or counterstrike by Pyongyang. The focus here is on offensive action rather than diplomacy, though it is important to note that Washington does not make decisions lightly or in isolation. Though political will must drive military intent, the opportune time for offensive action is rapidly running out. This, theoretically, makes the final stages of Pyongyang's nuclear program the most risky — it is clear the North is nearing the final steps, and once it has a viable nuclear weapon, it is too late for Washington to intervene. These are the waning moments for any practical intervention. In light of this, the second part of this series will examine what targets would need to be struck if the United States chooses to take action.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.facebook.com/prageru/videos/1079959035380285/

[Crafty_Dog]

Shooting Down North Korea’s Missiles
Kim wants the ability to make U.S. cities his nuclear hostages.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in May 2016. ENLARGE
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in May 2016. Photo: European Pressphoto Agency
Jan. 2, 2017 1:10 p.m. ET
7 COMMENTS

Kim Jong Un announced Sunday that North Korea is about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the U.S. mainland. If he proceeds with the test, the U.S. should shoot it down.

The test itself is not a shock. Four previous tests of the Taepodong-2 missile were disguised as satellite launches, and two of them succeeded in putting objects into orbit over the U.S. The news here is that the young dictator is so confident of becoming a full nuclear power that he has dispensed with the fig leaf of a space program.

This is one more sign that Kim is racing to the finish line of full nuclear-weapons capability. Thae Yong Ho, the No. 2 in the North Korean Embassy in London until he defected, warned last week that Kim wants to deploy nuclear-armed missiles by the end of 2017.

The North already has the technology to launch a nuclear weapon against South Korea and Japan. But hurdles remain to deploying an ICBM with a nuclear warhead. Chief among them is a re-entry vehicle capable of withstanding extremes of temperature and vibration. A successful test could provide the North with valuable data to work the problem.

The U.S. has ship-based missile defenses in the region, and intercepting the test would have the dual purpose of slowing Kim’s nuclear progress and demonstrating an effective deterrent. Kim may figure the U.S. won’t take such action as it prepares to inaugurate a new President and South Korea is riven by an impeachment trial of President Park Geun-hye. But the U.S. right to self defense provides ample justification, and U.N. Security Council resolutions ban the North from pursuing its missile program.

Even the defensive use of force carries risks that Kim would retaliate, but the larger risk is letting a man as reckless as Kim gain the means to hold American cities hostage. Kim evidently believes that once the North has a credible ability to destroy Seattle or Chicago, the U.S. will have no choice other than to accept it as a normal nuclear state. The Obama Administration, in consultation with President-elect Donald Trump, can demonstrate its bipartisan resolve to thwart that plan.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-really-deal-with-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat/?utm_source=paramount&utm_medium=email&utm_content=AEITODAY&utm_campaign=021017

==============================

Stratfor


U.S., South Korea: Upcoming Military Exercises Expected To Focus On Pre-Emptive Strikes
Situation Reports
February 9, 2017 | 15:35 GMT Print
Text Size

The United States and South Korea are set to hold annual Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises in early March, with the joint drills expected to be the largest ever, Arirang News reported Feb. 9. The drills will focus heavily on developing pre-emptive strike capabilities versus North Korea. There is also a possibility that the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system (THAAD) could be incorporated into the Key Resolve simulated exercises. Seoul is continuing to focus its efforts on pre-emptive strike doctrine and capabilities alongside the United States as North Korea moves closer to accumulating viable nuclear delivery systems.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/14/kim-jong-uns-older-brother-killed-north-korean-spies-poison1/

[Crafty_Dog]

paracom.paramountcommunication.com/ct/40431535:sQNPGdlN4:m:1:1488789220:CA3B073C770DA6C1F7C0CED5199E75B7:r

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-suspends-north-koreas-coal-imports-striking-at-regimes-financial-lifeline/2017/02/18/8390b0e6-f5df-11e6-a9b0-ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.cefc8d0e23db&wpisrc=nl_evening&wpmm=1

Perhaps if this weren't WaPo more prominent mention might have been given to the possibility that the phone call with President Trump played a role here.

[ccp]

I hope the result of this is not a million Koreans starve to death.

[Crafty_Dog]

It most certainly seems to be a significant development.

[ccp]

I thought the news said VX gas?  Now they reveal that was just more AP fake news.  Apparently they don't know what killed him.
It seem hard to believe one of the involved women claims she thought it was some sort of candid camera pranks when one sees the video of the murder.


https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/malaysia-no-cause-death-determined-yet-north-korean-073333799.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Ummm , , ,  a lot of this intel seems to me quite unsuitable for public release , , ,  

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html?emc=edit_na_20170304&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0

also see:

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/left-of-launch-missile-defense.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article

How fg stupid do they have to be to publicize this?!? 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/24/world/asia/north-korea-propaganda-photo.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article



WASHINGTON — Three years ago, President Barack Obama ordered Pentagon officials to step up their cyber and electronic strikes against North Korea’s missile program in hopes of sabotaging test launches in their opening seconds.

Soon a large number of the North’s military rockets began to explode, veer off course, disintegrate in midair and plunge into the sea. Advocates of such efforts say they believe that targeted attacks have given American antimissile defenses a new edge and delayed by several years the day when North Korea will be able to threaten American cities with nuclear weapons launched atop intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But other experts have grown increasingly skeptical of the new approach, arguing that manufacturing errors, disgruntled insiders and sheer incompetence can also send missiles awry. Over the past eight months, they note, the North has managed to successfully launch three medium-range rockets. And Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, now claims his country is in “the final stage in preparations” for the inaugural test of his intercontinental missiles — perhaps a bluff, perhaps not.

An examination of the Pentagon’s disruption effort, based on interviews with officials of the Obama and Trump administrations as well as a review of extensive but obscure public records, found that the United States still does not have the ability to effectively counter the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Those threats are far more resilient than many experts thought, The New York Times’s reporting found, and pose such a danger that Mr. Obama, as he left office, warned President Trump they were likely to be the most urgent problem he would confront.
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Related Coverage

    U.S. Strategy to Hobble North Korea Was Hidden in Plain Sight MARCH 4, 2017
    interactive
    THE INTERPRETER
    What One Photo Tells Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Program FEB. 24, 2017
    Kim Jong-un Says North Korea Is Preparing to Test Long-Range Missile JAN. 1, 2017
    North Korea, Rebuking Trump, Says It Can Test Long-Range Missile ‘Anytime’ JAN. 9, 2017

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Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Iran

India

Thailand

China

Mongolia

Italy

Russia

Scud B/C/ER

180–600 miles

Spain

North

Korea

KN-11

600 miles

Norway

Britain

Nodong

800 miles

Japan

Greenland

(Denmark)

Guam

Musudan

2,200 miles

Australia

Papua

New Guinea

Canada

North Korea’s Growing Reach

The potential range of North Korea’s current weapons, particularly the KN-14 and KN-08 missiles, would put most of the world in reach of its nuclear warheads.

KN-14

6,200 miles

United

States

KN-08

7,200 miles

Mexico

Estimated

ranges
Source: The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

By Troy Griggs

Mr. Trump has signaled his preference to respond aggressively against the North Korean threat. In a Twitter post after Mr. Kim first issued his warning on New Year’s Day, the president wrote, “It won’t happen!” Yet like Mr. Obama before him, Mr. Trump is quickly discovering that he must choose from highly imperfect options.
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He could order the escalation of the Pentagon’s cyber and electronic warfare effort, but that carries no guarantees. He could open negotiations with the North to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, but that would leave a looming threat in place. He could prepare for direct missile strikes on the launch sites, which Mr. Obama also considered, but there is little chance of hitting every target. He could press the Chinese to cut off trade and support, but Beijing has always stopped short of steps that could lead to the regime’s collapse.

In two meetings of Mr. Trump’s national security deputies in the Situation Room, the most recent on Tuesday, all those options were discussed, along with the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea as a dramatic warning. Administration officials say those issues will soon go to Mr. Trump and his top national security aides.

The decision to intensify the cyber and electronic strikes, in early 2014, came after Mr. Obama concluded that the $300 billion spent since the Eisenhower era on traditional antimissile systems, often compared to hitting “a bullet with a bullet,” had failed the core purpose of protecting the continental United States. Flight tests of interceptors based in Alaska and California had an overall failure rate of 56 percent, under near-perfect conditions. Privately, many experts warned the system would fare worse in real combat.

So the Obama administration searched for a better way to destroy missiles. It reached for techniques the Pentagon had long been experimenting with under the rubric of “left of launch,” because the attacks begin before the missiles ever reach the launchpad, or just as they lift off. For years, the Pentagon’s most senior officers and officials have publicly advocated these kinds of sophisticated attacks in little-noticed testimony to Congress and at defense conferences.
Photo
The KN-14, one of two types of intercontinental ballistic missiles that North Korea is developing, at a military parade in the capital, Pyongyang, in October 2015, in an image released by the nation's government. Credit Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters

The Times inquiry began last spring as the number of the North’s missile failures soared. The investigation uncovered the military documents praising the new antimissile approach and found some pointing with photos and diagrams to North Korea as one of the most urgent targets.

After discussions with the office of the director of national intelligence last year and in recent days with Mr. Trump’s national security team, The Times agreed to withhold details of those efforts to keep North Korea from learning how to defeat them. Last fall, Mr. Kim was widely reported to have ordered an investigation into whether the United States was sabotaging North Korea’s launches, and over the past week he has executed senior security officials.

The approach taken in targeting the North Korean missiles has distinct echoes of the American- and Israeli-led sabotage of Iran’s nuclear program, the most sophisticated known use of a cyberweapon meant to cripple a nuclear threat. But even that use of the “Stuxnet” worm in Iran quickly ran into limits. It was effective for several years, until the Iranians figured it out and recovered. And Iran posed a relatively easy target: an underground nuclear enrichment plant that could be attacked repeatedly.

In North Korea, the target is much more challenging. Missiles are fired from multiple launch sites around the country and moved about on mobile launchers in an elaborate shell game meant to deceive adversaries. To strike them, timing is critical.

Advocates of the sophisticated effort to remotely manipulate data inside North Korea’s missile systems argue the United States has no real alternative because the effort to stop the North from learning the secrets of making nuclear weapons has already failed. The only hope now is stopping the country from developing an intercontinental missile, and demonstrating that destructive threat to the world.
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Photo
KN-08 ballistic missiles were paraded through Pyongyang in July 2013 on mobile launch vehicles that can be hidden in caves or underground, making the missiles hard to track and target. Credit Kyodo News

“Disrupting their tests,” William J. Perry, secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, said at a recent presentation in Washington, would be “a pretty effective way of stopping their ICBM program.”
Decades in the Making

Three generations of the Kim family have dreamed that their broken, otherwise failed nation could build its own nuclear weapons, and the missiles to deliver them, as the ultimate survival strategy. With nukes in hand, the Kims have calculated, they need not fear being overrun by South Korea, invaded by the United States or sold out by China.

North Korea began seeking an intercontinental ballistic missile decades ago: It was the dream of Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder, who bitterly remembered the American threats to use nuclear weapons against the North during the Korean War.

His break came after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when out-of-work Russian rocket scientists began seeking employment in North Korea. Soon, a new generation of North Korean missiles began to appear, all knockoffs of Soviet designs. Though flight tests were sparse, American experts marveled at how the North seemed to avoid the kinds of failures that typically strike new rocket programs, including those of the United States in the late 1950s.

The Rise of Missile and Nuclear Tests

The frequency of missile tests has risen dramatically under Kim Jong-un, with a recent increase in nuclear tests as well.

25

20

Nuclear test

15

Missile test

10

5

0

’01

’06

’09

’11

’13

’16

’17

Kim Jong-un

Kim Jong-il

1994–2011

2011–
Includes only major systems. Omits engine firings at ground facilities, ejection tests of submarine missiles, and firings of artillery, short-range rockets and air-defense missiles.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

By The New York Times

The success was so marked that Timothy McCarthy of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey wrote in a 2001 analysis that Pyongyang’s record “appears completely unique in the history of missile development and production.”

In response, President George W. Bush in late 2002 announced the deployment of antimissile interceptors in Alaska and California. At the same time, Mr. Bush accelerated programs to get inside the long supply chain of parts for North Korean missiles, lacing them with defects and weaknesses, a technique also used for years against Iran.
Threat Grows in Obama Era

By the time Mr. Obama took office in January 2009, the North had deployed hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles that used Russian designs, and had made billions of dollars selling its Scud missiles to Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. But it aspired to a new generation of missiles that could fire warheads over much longer distances.

In secret cables written in the first year of the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the emerging threat. Among the most alarming released by WikiLeaks, the cables described a new path the North was taking to reach its long-range goal, based on a missile designed by the Soviets decades ago for their submarines that carried thermonuclear warheads.

It was called the R-27. Unlike the North’s lumbering, older rockets and missiles, these would be small enough to hide in caves and move into position by truck. The advantage was clear: This missile would be far harder for the United States to find and destroy.

The North Korean Arsenal

The rockets currently being tested have a wide range of sizes and capabilities.

No flight tests to date

6ft

Scud B/C/ER

KN-11

Nodong

Musudan

KN-14

KN-08

600

7,200

180–600 miles

800

2,200

6,200

Primary engines believed to be based on Soviet R-27 missile system
Includes only major systems. Omits engine firings at ground facilities, ejection tests of submarine missiles, and firings of artillery, short-range rockets and air-defense missiles.
Source: The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

By The New York Times

“North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world,” said an October 2009 cable marked “Secret” and signed by Mrs. Clinton.

The next year, one of the new missiles showed up in a North Korean military parade, just as the intelligence reports had warned.

By 2013, North Korean rockets thundered with new regularity. And that February, the North set off a nuclear test that woke up Washington: The monitoring data told of an explosion roughly the size of the bomb that had leveled Hiroshima.

Days after the explosion, the Pentagon announced an expansion of its force of antimissile interceptors in California and Alaska. It also began to unveil its “left of launch” program to disable missiles before liftoff — hoping to bolster its chances of destroying them. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced the program, saying that “cyberwarfare, directed energy and electronic attack,” a reference to such things as malware, lasers and signal jamming, were all becoming important new adjuncts to the traditional ways of deflecting enemy strikes.
Photo
Intermediate-range Musudan missiles rolled through Pyongyang during a parade in 2015. Credit Kyodo News

He never mentioned North Korea. But a map accompanying General Dempsey’s policy paper on the subject showed one of the North’s missiles streaking toward the United States. Soon, in testimony before Congress and at public panels in Washington, current and former officials and a major contractor — Raytheon — began talking openly about “left of launch” technologies, in particular cyber and electronic strikes at the moment of launch.

The North, meanwhile, was developing its own exotic arsenal. It tried repeatedly to disrupt American and South Korean military exercises by jamming electronic signals for guided weapons, including missiles. And it demonstrated its cyberpower in the oddest of places — Hollywood. In 2014, it attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment with a strike that destroyed about 70 percent of the company’s computing systems, surprising experts with its technical savvy.

Last month, a report on cybervulnerabilities by the Defense Science Board, commissioned by the Pentagon during the Obama administration, warned that North Korea might acquire the ability to cripple the American power grid, and cautioned that it could never be allowed to “hold vital U.S. strike systems at risk.”
Secret Push, and New Doubts

Not long after General Dempsey made his public announcement, Mr. Obama and his defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter, began calling meetings focused on one question: Could a crash program slow the North’s march toward an intercontinental ballistic missile?

There were many options, some drawn from General Dempsey’s list. Mr. Obama ultimately pressed the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to pull out all the stops, which officials took as encouragement to reach for untested technologies.

The North’s missiles soon began to fail at a remarkable pace. Some were destroyed, no doubt, by accident as well as by design. The technology the North was pursuing, using new designs and new engines, involved multistage rockets, introducing all kinds of possibilities for catastrophic mistakes. But by most accounts, the United States program accentuated the failures.
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The evidence was in the numbers. Most flight tests of an intermediate-range missile called the Musudan, the weapon that the North Koreans showed off in public just after Mrs. Clinton’s warning, ended in flames: Its overall failure rate is 88 percent.

Nonetheless Kim Jong-un has pressed ahead on his main goal: an intercontinental ballistic missile. Last April, he was photographed standing next to a giant test-stand, celebrating after engineers successfully fired off a matched pair of the potent Russian-designed R-27 engines. The implication was clear: Strapping two of the engines together at the base of a missile was the secret to building an ICBM that could ultimately hurl warheads at the United States.

In September, he celebrated the most successful test yet of a North Korean nuclear weapon — one that exploded with more than twice the destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb.

His next goal, experts say, is to combine those two technologies, shrinking his nuclear warheads to a size that can fit on an intercontinental missile. Only then can he credibly claim that his isolated country has the know-how to hit an American city thousands of miles away.

In the last year of his presidency, Mr. Obama often noted publicly that the North was learning from every nuclear and missile test — even the failures — and getting closer to its goal. In private, aides noticed he was increasingly disturbed by North Korea’s progress.

With only a few months left in office, he pushed aides for new approaches. At one meeting, he declared that he would have targeted the North Korean leadership and weapons sites if he thought it would work. But it was, as Mr. Obama and his assembled aides knew, an empty threat: Getting timely intelligence on the location of North Korea’s leaders or their weapons at any moment would be almost impossible, and the risks of missing were tremendous, including renewed war on the Korean Peninsula.
Hard Decisions for Trump
Continue reading the main story
Photo
The single successful test flight in a run of Musudan missile failures came in June, shown in this image from North Korea’s state-run news agency. The Musudan had an overall failure rate of 88 percent, much higher than the 13 percent failure rate of the Soviet-era missile on which it was based. Credit Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters

As a presidential candidate, Mr. Trump complained that “we're so obsolete in cyber,” a line that grated on officials at the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, where billions of dollars have been spent to provide the president with new options for intelligence gathering and cyberattacks. Now, one of the immediate questions he faces is whether to accelerate or scale back those efforts.

A decision to go after an adversary’s launch ability can have unintended consequences, experts warn.

Once the United States uses cyberweapons against nuclear launch systems — even in a threatening state like North Korea — Russia and China may feel free to do the same, targeting fields of American missiles. Some strategists argue that all nuclear systems should be off limits for cyberattack. Otherwise, if a nuclear power thought it could secretly disable an adversary’s atomic controls, it might be more tempted to take the risk of launching a pre-emptive attack.

“I understand the urgent threat,” said Amy Zegart, a Stanford University intelligence and cybersecurity expert, who said she had no independent knowledge of the American effort. “But 30 years from now we may decide it was a very, very dangerous thing to do.”

Mr. Trump’s aides say everything is on the table. China recently cut off coal imports from the North, but the United States is also looking at ways to freeze the Kim family’s assets, some of which are believed held in Chinese-controlled banks. The Chinese have already opposed the deployment of a high-altitude missile defense system known as Thaad in South Korea; the Trump team may call for even more such systems.

The White House is also looking at pre-emptive military strike options, a senior Trump administration official said, though the challenge is huge given the country’s mountainous terrain and deep tunnels and bunkers. Putting American tactical nuclear weapons back in South Korea — they were withdrawn a quarter-century ago — is also under consideration, even if that step could accelerate an arms race with the North.

Mr. Trump’s “It won’t happen!” post on Twitter about the North’s ICBM threat suggests a larger confrontation could be looming.

“Regardless of Trump’s actual intentions,” James M. Acton, a nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently noted, “the tweet could come to be seen as a ‘red line’ and hence set up a potential test of his credibility.”

[Crafty_Dog]

China’s North Korea Feint
Beijing isn’t cutting economic support to its nuclear client state.
A coal yard beside Yalu River on the North Korean side of the border.
A coal yard beside Yalu River on the North Korean side of the border. Photo: Getty Images
Updated March 5, 2017 6:34 p.m. ET
36 COMMENTS

Is China greeting the Trump era by getting tough on North Korea? That may be the impression Beijing has tried to convey by announcing a suspension of coal imports from the nuclear-armed state. But there is less here than meets the eye.

As is often the case regarding Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang, the details of the coal cutoff are murky. In the most generous telling, China has decided to squeeze North Korea’s key source of hard currency to punish it for acting in destabilizing ways—testing missiles, assassinating overseas enemies with VX nerve agent and the like. By this logic, Beijing is signalling a desire to work with the new U.S. Administration on the shared goal of denuclearizing the Kim regime. North Korean state media have pushed this line, slamming China for “dancing to the tune of the U.S.”

Yet Beijing has said that it had to cut off coal imports to comply with United Nations sanctions passed in November. According to the Foreign Ministry, Chinese imports in 2017 have already approached the U.N.’s annual value limit of $400 million. Beijing would hardly deserve applause for buying its full quota and then stopping to meet its legal obligations.

A year ago the Chinese also promised to comply with an earlier round of U.N. sanctions on North Korean mineral exports. But Beijing made sure those sanctions included a loophole exempting transactions for undefined “livelihood purposes.” It then proceeded to rack up record purchases of North Korean coal.

After November’s sanctions moved to nullify the “livelihood” loophole with hard caps, Beijing promised a cutoff—yet still imported more North Korean coal in December than in any previous month of the year. Its total coal imports for 2016, a year in which it twice voted for sanctions on such purchases, rose 14.5% from 2015 and totaled more than $1 billion.

Pyongyang can fund a lot of missile tests with that money. Then there is the unspecified sum China will soon begin paying for 4,000 metric tons of North Korean liquefied petroleum gas, an arrangement quietly announced this month and spotted by Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Beijing sustains Pyongyang in countless other ways, including access to Chinese oil, banks, trading firms, ports and front companies. Contrast this with China’s unofficial economic sanctions on South Korea merely for wishing to defend itself against North Korean nuclear missiles by installing advanced U.S.-made antimissile defenses.

Beijing is clearly exploring its options in the Trump era, which is no doubt why it dispatched foreign-policy chief Yang Jiechi to Washington this week to meet the President and some of his senior aides. The coal gambit may have been a gift of sorts to Mr. Trump after he reaffirmed traditional U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

Whatever Beijing intends, it is clear that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities pose a direct and increasingly intolerable threat to U.S. security, and that the threat will end only when the Kim dynasty is deposed. If Beijing won’t cut its economic lifelines to the North, the Trump Administration should use financial sanctions on Chinese entities to force the issue.

[Crafty_Dog]

by Rodger Baker

"Irrational" North Korea has done it again. Even with U.S. and South Korean forces gathered on the peninsula for their largest annual joint military exercises, Pyongyang launched four ballistic missiles early on March 6. Three landed in the sea west of Japan, within Tokyo's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. As expected, the "irrational" Pyongyang's actions elicited the usual cries of condemnation, triggered a brief dip in the South Korean stock market and led South Korea's acting president, Hwang Kyo Ahn, to reiterate the need for South Korea to rapidly deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system — something that will undoubtedly further perturb North Korea’s closest friend, China. 

I use "irrational" in quotation marks for a reason. I have already discussed the use of "provocation" as a lazy term for describing North Korea's actions. But Pyongyang's latest moves, as well as the current U.S. review of North Korean policy, offer an opportunity to talk about the idea of the rationality of nations, governments and leaders. North Korea provides what could be a textbook case of the mixed perceptions of rationality and irrationality — a tool with utility beyond today’s feisty standoff between the hermit state and its geopolitical rivals.
More Than Just Emotion

At Stratfor, we are often asked why we default to attributing rationality to the behavior of governments. Many argue that the behavior of other governments (or our own at times) appears irrational. Think of the economically devastating land reform instituted by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in 2000, or former British Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum on the Brexit, or the U.S. plan in Iraq that assumed the country's disparate ethnic and sectarian divides would simply be overcome by the downfall of a dictator. We all know individuals who act in an irrational manner, whether because of emotional stress or stimuli, fatigue, mental conditions or any number of other reasons. Few of us can honestly say that we have never acted on impulse, out of emotion (be it anger or love), or out of a failure to think things through before engaging in some ill-advised endeavor that we hope will end in minor embarrassment and a funny story rather than in tragedy.

If individuals are susceptible to such irrational behavior, why not governments? Deploying secret agents to assassinate someone who was apparently such a low-level threat that he traveled without a security team seems irrational, or at least purely emotional. All the more so when the attack was done with a banned chemical weapon in an airport of one of the few countries with relatively good diplomatic relations with North Korea, and a key hub for the nation’s sanctions-skirting economic activity. Launching four ballistic missiles a few days after positive meetings with China (which eased tensions after Beijing had recently hit the North Korean economy by cutting off coal imports), and thus further justifying Seoul’s pursuit of the THAAD system to the detriment of China’s interests, just seems irrational. Why hurt the one country that continues to give North Korea international support and appeared intent on strengthening its relationship with Pyongyang rather than isolating it even more?

Our assertion of rationality as the default analysis does not claim that all decisions are perfect, or that errors cannot be made. Irrational or responsive decisions are possible, and even "rational" decisions can lead to catastrophes. But we do assert that choices made by governments are generally based on more than emotion or randomness. Rationality differs based on one's point of view, place and time. If I assume irrationality on the subjects of my inquiry, if I find their behavior illogical or unwise, my first job is to reassess my understanding of their perspective of rationality. This is the obligation of the analyst: to challenge the impulse to impose one's own sense of rationality upon others. What is it that has shaped those subjects' worldview, their perception of risk and reward, of threat and opportunity?
Back to the Geopolitical Basics

Even a cursory glance at North Korea reveals a worldview molded by geography and history. North Korea is a tiny country with insufficient arable land that is squeezed between China and South Korea, the latter of which hosts tens of thousands of U.S. forces. Historically, the unified Korea was caught between China and Japan, the proverbial minnow between whales. Today North Korea remains squeezed between whales, though this time the United States and China, and its basic question is whether it wants to subsume its national authority and identity to one of its neighbors or remain independent in policy and ideology. If Pyongyang prefers the latter, it can neither draw too close to China nor allow its economy and culture to open up fully to the West. Historically, North Korea has followed a path of isolation, of nominal fealty to China while maintaining domestic control — an approach that has been called the "poison-shrimp" strategy of being more dangerous to invade than to ignore.

This leads to a perspective of rationality that is very different than that of most analysts in the United States. Even if South Korea can partially understand the North’s sense of rationality, it does not match the national interests of Seoul, which in many ways is in the same position as Pyongyang but has allowed itself, much like Japan, to cede its national independence to the United States for years. The attribution of rationality to North Korea’s leadership is not a justification for its actions, nor does it argue that the North has only one path to pursue. Rather, it seeks to understand the behavior of the country's rulers — a vital step toward predicting both action and reaction.   

The second component is to assess the structure of power within the nation's leadership. No leader, no matter how dictatorial, operates alone. There are bureaucracies, formal and informal systems of relationships, and power, money, finances and resources that shape how a government or ruling group works. For a leader to lead, there must be those willing to carry out orders, and shy of a very small organization, that requires several layers of power and control. So, policy goes beyond the actions of a single individual. The system itself, then, provides in some ways a check on irrationality. Any decision, any command, must pass through this often complex system of power. By their very nature, governments slow down action, providing the equivalent of counting to 10 before responding to an emotionally charged situation.
A Careful Balance

In North Korea's case, elections are certainly a bit of a sham, but Kim Jong Un doesn't stay in power simply because of his family name. He is the third generation of Kim leadership in North Korea, and the least prepared or qualified of any for the task of leading the country, since his father delayed training or anointing a successor for fear that power would begin to form around the son, rather than himself. But the Kims are not divine leaders, holding power because none dare to challenge their right to lead. Instead, they must constantly manipulate, balance and counterbalance the various interest groups and power centers in North Korea.

The primary task of a Kim leader is to ensure that no single faction or small group of factions becomes too powerful. This involves a combination of reward (access to foreign funds and opportunities), punishment (death, at the extreme) and distribution of power among different groups as well as inducements to spy on one another. A perception of unpredictability by Kim may be beneficial to a point, but complete unpredictability would undermine the balance quickly, since there would be no way to ensure long-term power or influence, and the system would quickly turn against the leader. In many ways this is similar to the story that Thae Yong Ho, the recently defected deputy ambassador to the North Korean Embassy in London, has been telling in media interviews in South Korea and beyond.

One of the most striking things about North Korea is that its apparent irrationality has nonetheless allowed it to continue down a fairly independent path under three different paramount leaders, even as the world around them changed (at times, dramatically). This alone should suggest that there is rationality hidden in North Korea's behavior. Pyongyang has shown continuity of action, continuity of policy and, most important, continuity of leadership but for a few executions. North Korea has pursued variations of this policy since the end of the Cold War, seeking cooperation with the South to create a stronger single Korean confederation, playing various regional players off of one another, and pursuing in earnest a nuclear deterrent to reduce the perceived threat of U.S. military and political action to destabilize the government and force its collapse.

Assuming irrationality in the actions of North Korea, or of any other government, is often based on the cognitive error of mirror imaging — believing that others hold the same cultural, political, economic or moral norms as you, your culture or your government. Even among Western countries, there are many different ways that nations perceive rationality and their national interests. How much more misleading is it to apply Western or U.S. norms to North Korea's perception and decision-making? Assuming irrationality, then, is simply a poor analytic practice. Again, seeking to understand another's basis for rationality does not imply that all decisions are the "right" ones, or the most effective. Governments rarely have the luxury of a complete set of options, of time, or of full information when making choices or planning strategy. And in many cases, objective desire plays a role. Rationality does not exclude bad decisions, or more commonly, limited options.

One of the most important values to presuming rationality in others, particularly "foes," is that irrationality, by its very nature, is unpredictable. But rationality provides context within which to predict behavior, or at least to understand general patterns of behavior. That said, rationality must then be matched with reality. Governments are large entities. Decisions are being made at many levels, within many time frames. Contradictory actions are entirely possible, even frequent. Mistakes are made. Insufficient information, time or resources constrain decision-making and action. Internecine struggles for power or influence can lead to all sorts of chaos. But assuming irrationality is just lazy analysis.

North Korea is not irrational. But understanding its unique rationality is no small task.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post


March 7, 2017 7:00 p.m. ET
45 COMMENTS

With the arrival of a C-17 transport plane at Osan Air Base outside Seoul on Monday, the U.S. and South Korea began deploying the advanced Thaad antimissile system after years of uncertainty and months sooner than expected. With North Korea’s behavior becoming more dangerous, the sooner this system becomes operational the better.

Thaad—Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense—is far more capable than the Patriot and Aegis systems currently deployed around Korea. It can scan across 1,000 kilometers, intercept missiles 200 kilometers away and coordinate with U.S. and Japanese assets elsewhere in the region.

South Koreans were reminded of the need for defenses Monday when Pyongyang fired four missiles into the Sea of Japan. The North also barred Malaysian nationals from leaving the country unless Malaysia drops its inquiry into last month’s chilling assassination of Kim Jong Un’s brother in Kuala Lumpur.

North Korea is able to terrorize the region because of China, which poses as a responsible power but still protects Pyongyang economically and diplomatically. Beijing has raged against Thaad with bogus claims that it threatens China. But Chinese leaders’ real fear is that Thaad will deepen the U.S.-South Korea alliance, an outcome they apparently consider worse than North Korea’s continued nuclearization and military threats.

“South Korea will sacrifice its fast-developing relations with China if it should be seduced into the [Thaad] defense network,” Chinese state media warned in 2014. After Seoul decided last summer to proceed anyway, Beijing responded with unofficial sanctions against South Korean pop stars, cosmetics exports and tourism. Especially hard hit was Lotte, the company that agreed to provide land for the Thaad battery and has since faced arbitrary inspections, fines, store closures, licensing holdups, public protests, cyberattacks and other difficulties.

U.S. and South Korean leaders deserve credit for sticking to last year’s decision to deploy Thaad despite this pressure. Pentagon chief Jim Mattis made Seoul his first overseas visit last month, and President Trump has spoken with South Korean leaders several times, including a phone call Monday.

The broader lesson is that China’s support for the Kim regime is increasingly harming its own interests. Chinese leaders have long feared that turning on Pyongyang could cause a chaotic collapse, but their abdication of responsibility has now brought Thaad to the Korean Peninsula and otherwise strengthened defense cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea. As the North’s nuclear threat grows, South Korea and Japan will inevitably consider going nuclear themselves.

South Korean officials say Thaad could be operational by April. We hope so, especially as China will continue its economic pressure campaign to block it. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday that China will respond to the Thaad deployment and “the consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea.” The wiser course would be for Beijing to reconsider its dangerous patronage of Kim Jong Un.

[Crafty_Dog]

 By Bret Stephens
March 27, 2017 7:05 p.m. ET
47 COMMENTS

Rex Tillerson was widely criticized earlier this month when he suggested that “efforts of the past 20 years to bring North Korea to a point of denuclearization have failed.” The secretary of state then promised “a new approach” without offering details.

Perhaps he doesn’t yet know what that new approach is. But recognizing failure is the first step on the road to wisdom.

Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has pursued a three-pronged approach toward North Korea. First has been a policy of inducements aimed at getting Pyongyang to change its ways. These include the unilateral removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, yearly shipments of heavy fuel for most of the 1990s, South Korea’s construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex inside North Korea in 2003, and the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2008.
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None of it worked. North Korea is too cynical, greedy and poor to stay bribed for long. And it knows it cannot abandon its nuclear program, lest it also forsake the only reason the West would pay bribes in the first place.

Then there are sanctions. North Korea may be the “most sanctioned” country on earth, as Barack Obama pointed out in 2015, but sanctions on North Korea tend to fail because China has generally been reluctant to enforce them. China last year imported $1.2 billion of North Korean coal, above the level allowed by U.N. sanctions. More recently, Beijing announced that it would cut off coal imports from Pyongyang, but only after it had already purchased its annual quota. And politically influential Chinese individuals continue to help the North evade sanctions through front companies.

Finally there is what the Obama administration called “strategic patience”—a policy of waiting for the regime to collapse or change course.

Strategic patience would be a more plausible policy if time weren’t working against us. The North is now preparing its sixth nuclear test. Its ability to marry a nuclear warhead to an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the U.S. mainland is no longer a theoretical risk. A state-of-the-art uranium-enrichment plant gives it the ability to produce as many as eight bombs a year. Some of those bombs could be shared with or sold to Iran or other malign actors.

So what’s the alternative?

It’s time to make regime change in North Korea the explicit aim of U.S. policy, both on strategic and humanitarian grounds. But there are two ways in which regime change can be pursued—and one can be used in furtherance of the other.

The first type of regime change is pro-China. Beijing has little sympathy for Kim Jong Un, who brutally purged his regime of its China sympathizers after coming to power five years ago. But Beijing’s distaste is tempered by its interest in the existence of North Korea as an independent state, mainly because it has good reason to fear the strength and example of a unified, democratic Korea led from Seoul.

Pro-China regime change would take the form of a coup, in which Kim would be given the choice of exile or execution, to be replaced by a pro-Beijing figure willing to move the country from totalitarianism to authoritarianism—a Korean replay of the transition from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. The U.S. would recognize the new government in exchange for verifiable nuclear disarmament, sealing the division of the peninsula.

The U.S. could support such a policy and work with China to achieve it because it would ease the suffering of North Korea’s people and put the country’s nuclear arsenal in safer (and more negotiable) hands. China should support it because it would maintain the North as a buffer state and get rid of a regime that might otherwise collapse in unpredictable and dangerous ways.

Achieving such regime change will be tricky, but China could move things along by cutting off fuel supplies to the North and “inviting” Kim and his family for an extended luxury vacation.

And if the Chinese aren’t amenable to this strategy? In that case, the U.S. should support the anti-China model of regime change, aiming not only at the end of the Kim regime but of North Korea itself.

That would mean a formal U.S. declaration in favor of unification. Other steps might include cutting off Chinese banks and companies that do business with Pyongyang from access to U.S. dollars, undertaking a campaign to highlight Chinese mistreatment of North Korean refugees, and further speeding the deployment of antiballistic missile systems to South Korea. As another inducement, Donald Trump could return to his suggestion last year that the South should have an independent nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Trump is scheduled to meet Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago next month. It would be a good occasion for the president to ask his Chinese counterpart which kind of regime change he’d prefer.

Write bstephens@wsj.com.

[DDF]

This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.

[G M]

This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.

Even peacefully, reunification of Korea would be an epic economic and humanitarian crisis.

[DDF]

This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.

Even peacefully, reunification of Korea would be an epic economic and humanitarian crisis.

Undoubtedly. It made me think of the differences between the States and Mexico; cultural, economic, legal... and the two are much more closely tied in many ways than North and South Koreas' are, and the fact that the US and Mexico being drastly different. Still, it does make one think that maybe it's time to let the milk spill, and clean it up.

I have been thinking since you posted this, and it occurs to me; "we're both law enforcement, and have been for a while. Would either of us fail to execute an arrest warrant forr a murderer, just because it would throw a family or town into economic chaos?"

Kim Jong-un is no different. If it was me, he'd be gone so fast his head would spin, and (to me), we'd all collectively pick up the pieces afterwards, whatever they may be.

Obviously, it would cost a great many lives, but it is no different than what Europe suffered after WWII.

[G M]

I'm not advocating against the fall of the NorK power structure, I'm just pointing out that S. Korea and China dread the epic problems associated with that fall.


http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/326094-how-north-korea-could-kill-up-to-90-percent-of-americans-at-any

This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.

Even peacefully, reunification of Korea would be an epic economic and humanitarian crisis.

Undoubtedly. It made me think of the differences between the States and Mexico; cultural, economic, legal... and the two are much more closely tied in many ways than North and South Koreas' are, and the fact that the US and Mexico being drastly different. Still, it does make one think that maybe it's time to let the milk spill, and clean it up.

I have been thinking since you posted this, and it occurs to me; "we're both law enforcement, and have been for a while. Would either of us fail to execute an arrest warrant forr a murderer, just because it would throw a family or town into economic chaos?"

Kim Jong-un is no different. If it was me, he'd be gone so fast his head would spin, and (to me), we'd all collectively pick up the pieces afterwards, whatever they may be.

Obviously, it would cost a great many lives, but it is no different than what Europe suffered after WWII.

[Crafty_Dog]

 

[ccp]

http://mwi.usma.edu/five-fatal-challenges-warfighting-korea/

[Crafty_Dog]

An important and timely reminder of reality!!!

[Crafty_Dog]

I have had our webmaster merge two threads.

[Crafty_Dog]

North Korea: U.S. Increases Pressure on China to Act
April 10, 2017 | 20:12 GMT Print
Text Size
(Stratfor)

The U.S. missile strike on a Syrian air base on April 6 during the summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, at which North Korea's nuclear weapons program was a topic at hand, no doubt sent a clear message to Beijing about the United States' willingness to use military force. Following the strike, the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group was rerouted toward the Korean Peninsula, making that message even more explicit. At a time when the United States is reviewing its policy in dealing with North Korea, the deployment both ramps up military pressure on Pyongyang and broadens U.S. options in the region.

However, the prospect of unilateral military action against North Korea has unnerved U.S. allies. Both Japan and South Korea have expressed concerns about a possible U.S. strike aimed at derailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The Japanese Defense Ministry says Tokyo has not been informed of any preparations for an attack and said it would raise objections if it gets indications of a pending attack. The government in Seoul also appeared jittery about the safety and security risks that a preemptive strike would pose.

As the United States considers ways to thwart Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and missile programs, a military response remains a credible option, but one that could invite highly costly consequences. Unlike in Syria, Washington cannot assume that North Korea would not respond to an attack in kind. A retaliatory North Korean artillery strike against the South or assaults on U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan could easily spiral into a wider regional conflict. If a U.S. strike takes place without first consulting China, Beijing's reactions could cause further complications.

And as North Korea's nuclear infrastructure becomes more sophisticated, it grows more difficult to design a military campaign that could eliminate the entire program and facilities, especially in the absence of credible intelligence. Those challenges repeatedly plagued successive U.S. administrations, long delaying any use of force by the United States to deter North Korea. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton considered military action against the North, coming the closest any U.S. president has come, but he opted instead to engage in talks in an effort to thwart Pyongyang's nuclear program. North Korea's test of a long-range rocket in 1998 and a new U.S. tone under President George W. Bush's administration in 2001 brought an end to that approach.

With its recent moves, the Trump White House is delivering an ultimatum to the Chinese to either work with the United States in stopping North Korea's drive for a nuclear deterrent or deal with the consequences of U.S. action on secondary sanctions as it develops a credible military option and enlarges its military footprint in the region. Beijing, for its part, continues to urge diplomacy, but it also has shown some willingness to increase pressure on the North as it aims to ease Washington's challenges on trade and on other fronts and simultaneously reassesses its options against Pyongyang.

During an April 10 visit to South Korea by Wu Dawei, China's special envoy in charge of dealing with North Korea's nuclear program, both sides reportedly agreed to adopt "an even stronger U.N. resolution" in the event that the North conducts an additional test of a nuclear weapon. However, any Chinese action in dealing with North Korea will stop short of creating instability in North Korea by cutting Pyongyang's economic lifeline. But as Beijing struggles with its unpredictable and increasingly recalcitrant neighbor, even those in Chinese policy circles are beginning consider a different approach, including a possible decapitation strategy, to bring North Korea's leadership to heel.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4399076/China-deploys-150-000-troops-North-Korea-border.html

[G M]

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4399076/China-deploys-150-000-troops-North-Korea-border.html

I believe that is most likely to secure China's border to
prevent a flood of NorK refugees should the state collapse. Hopefully this means China is giving the NorKs the Fredo kiss.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://redstatewatcher.com/article.asp?id=73169

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/790843/world-war-3-china-bomb-north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-test

[ccp]

This announcement is quite bizarre all of a sudden.
some sort of pscyhological game ?

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/white-house-no-evidence-north-korea/2017/04/11/id/783854/

[Crafty_Dog]

My understanding has been that they are sedulously working on the ICBM thing AND making bombs small enough to put on them.

The point is to prevent them from having these two things in hand i.e. Nork threats of nuke war at this point in time are empty.

[DougMacG]

My understanding has been that they are sedulously working on the ICBM thing AND making bombs small enough to put on them.

The point is to prevent them from having these two things in hand i.e. Nork threats of nuke war at this point in time are empty.

The good news is that North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in 1994 under intense diplomatic pressure (sarcasm alert) from President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeline Halflbright, consummated with billions in graft aid.
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15210254/ns/politics/t/mccain-criticizes-bill-clinton-north-korea/#.WO5yPzvyvIU
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron
So that settles it.   

Fast forward:  "North Korea says it has conducted five successful nuclear tests: in 2006, 2009, 2013 and in January and September 2016."
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699

That doesn't mean NK has a "working nuclear weapon" but they have the pieces of the puzzle including significant range delivery systems.

There seems to be a lot of positioning and gamesmanship going on right now, besides the administration making mis-statements intentional and unintentional.  For what purpose we don't know...

[Crafty_Dog]

The Adventure continues!

[ccp]

"There seems to be a lot of positioning and gamesmanship going on right now, besides the administration making mis-statements intentional and unintentional.  For what purpose we don't know..."

Is he trying to bully the bully?

Have the made the calculation the bully of Korea will back down?

It is easier for us, but it is S Korea  on the front lines:

http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=2929444

What a horrible thought. 
But how much longer can we wait before doing anything?

[ccp]

I wonder if the navy has the means to shoot down Kim's missile if it does not crash on its own.  I think Kim will back down.  He probably is not willing to risk *his* own life

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/military-confrontation-US-Carl-Vinson/2017/04/12/id/784045/

[Crafty_Dog]

 Situation Reports
April 13, 2017 | 00:21 GMT Print
Stratfor

The North Korean government appears to be preparing for a nuclear test at the Punggye-ri test site, according to an April 12 report by 38 North, a program of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, part of Johns Hopkins University. The U.S. government believes a test could come the morning of April 15 local time, the White House bureau chief for Voice of America said via Twitter. April 15 is a politically significant date for Pyongyang because it marks the 105th anniversary of the birth of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung. An April 12 editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese newspaper that sometimes reflects the opinions of the country's leaders, cautioned that Beijing may allow tougher U.N. sanctions against North Korea should it carry out another nuclear test.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/13/pentagon-us-dropped-largest-non-nuclear-bomb-in-af/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWTJNd05HRTFNRFl4TWpZMCIsInQiOiI5RXcxR3pTaWJVd1wvY1wvZ3NGZU5kTWlFeWYxamZua3hrNDk3bG9lXC8xZTRaZU8yNmVuU1NkcFlGMld2TWFjcjBjNkk4VXZucGNyNEt1dlN2Zm1xYlFxTloxc2NXbnE2VllDU1wvYklBbkFuZFBoVTU4TE05MUg5RGZWR2pObTRCVngifQ%3D%3D

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_chcr16C_Q

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9H50tHiHjs

[ccp]

   
"Attention North Korea , , ,"

and maybe Iran too

[ccp]

http://solutions.heritage.org/geopolitics-flash-points/north-korea/

[Crafty_Dog]

Maps in the original not printing here:

Analysis

All eyes are focused on the Korean Peninsula. Signs suggest that North Korea is preparing to conduct another nuclear weapons test, perhaps as soon as April 15, to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the birth of the country's founder, Kim Il Sung. If Pyongyang follows through, the act will be nothing short of a provocation.

As tensions mount, China has stressed the importance of diplomacy and of preventing the situation from escalating to an "irreversible and unmanageable stage." So far, U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has relied largely on non-kinetic means such as additional sanctions and increased enforcement or enhanced regional missile defense to keep North Korea's nuclear ambitions in check. But Washington has made clear that it will keep all of its options open. As the United States demonstrated with its limited cruise missile strike in Syria on April 6, it is willing to take unilateral military action. And considering North Korea's dogged efforts to advance its nuclear program, the Trump administration will have to carefully calculate the risks of a potential military strike.

A Range of Options

Action against North Korea could take many shapes or forms, from a limited strike to a large-scale military offensive targeting all of North Korea's military assets. On the lowest end of the scale, the United States could launch a strike to punish North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear and missile arsenal and to deter it from pursuing nuclear weapons in the future. A punitive strike may be limited to a single base or facility in the country, with the threat of further action down the line if Pyongyang doesn't alter its behavior. Though this kind of attack offers the best way to keep the situation from escalating, it would by no means ensure that North Korea heeds the United States' warning and eases up on its nuclear and missile development. Nor does it eliminate the risk that Pyongyang may respond to the strike in kind.

Alternatively, the United States could elect to launch a more comprehensive punitive or preventive strike in an attempt to physically interrupt the nuclear and missile programs' maturation. The strikes would still be limited, focusing only on nuclear and missile infrastructure to signal that the United States is not trying to orchestrate a change in the country's leadership. This kind of operation, such as a strike on a single target, would encourage North Korea to curb its response so as not to provoke further attacks — though a full-scale retaliation could not be ruled out.

If Washington judges that Pyongyang is likely to launch a counterattack regardless, it may decide a comprehensive campaign to degrade or eliminate North Korea's retaliatory capacity would be most prudent. This scenario would best position the United States and its allies against a North Korean response, but it would entail significant risks, virtually guaranteeing full-blown war on the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, a campaign of this magnitude would require buy-in from regional actors — something that has yet to manifest — and a buildup of military assets far greater than what the United States has deployed in the region so far. A more limited strike, be it a focused punitive strike or a larger one targeting nuclear and missile infrastructure, is more likely at this point. In the meantime, the Pentagon has rerouted several carrier strike groups to the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

Weighing the Risks

Such an operation could involve cruise missiles as well as fixed-wing aircraft conducting strikes against various facilities across North Korea. Prime targets include the nuclear reactor or uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, as well as North Korean nuclear scientists. Should the United States plan more extensive strikes aimed at disabling all elements of the North Korean nuclear program, it may also deploy special operations forces to go after underground facilities that airstrikes couldn't easily or reliably destroy. But the broader the target set, the greater the risk of retaliation. North Korea has a hefty arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that it could launch at nearby targets, including U.S. military facilities elsewhere in the region. Pyongyang's conventional artillery, moreover, could also do significant damage to northern areas of South Korea, reaching as far as the country's capital. U.S. military planners would likely view this kind of escalation as an unacceptable risk.

The United States will base its decision about whether and how to strike North Korea in large part on the kind of reaction it anticipates from Pyongyang. North Korea has many reasons to mount a credible retaliation to any action taken against it, not only to maintain the appearance of a powerful actor on the global stage but also to ensure domestic stability. A weak response from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's administration could undermine its legitimacy among the country's public or perhaps prompt a palace coup. At the same time, however, Pyongyang understands that a significant retaliation would meet with a commensurate response, which could cripple North Korea's military capabilities.

If the United States determines the country is unlikely to take that kind of chance, it will have little else standing in the way of a military strike. Short of that scenario, however, Washington may still be willing to assume the risks of a limited retaliation. The United States could consider the launch of a small number of missiles that might be intercepted, for example, or incursions by North Korean special operations forces into South Korean territory to be acceptable consequences. Even low-level naval skirmishes may not be considered too great a repercussion. Still, anticipating the scale of North Korea's response is a daunting and treacherous gamble.

Beijing's Options

Then there's China's response to consider. Until now, Beijing has stressed diplomatic solutions to ease the rising tension, all the while warning against the chain reaction that military action against Pyongyang could set off. Beijing has consistently made clear that its red line on the issue is war or instability on the Korean Peninsula; China wants to make sure that it has a pliable buffer state along its northeastern border.

In the event of a military strike against North Korea, China could intervene, either to support the North Korean government or to facilitate a power transition without jeopardizing order in the country. Its options for intervention range from military backing for Pyongyang to support for a U.S.-led military campaign to a decapitation strike. But whatever path it chooses, it will stay focused on ensuring the North Korean state's continuity and preventing any scenario that could lead the Korean Peninsula to unify under a competing power.

The United States would doubtless risk a response in kind from China should it launch a military strike without consulting Beijing. And if Washington were to launch a full-scale campaign against North Korea, or if a limited attack spirals into a war, the likelihood of a Chinese military intervention to secure its interests on the Korean Peninsula will climb. Along with its desire to keep a buffer between its territory and U.S. forces in South Korea, China is worried about the threat of spillover from a potential conflict in North Korea.

What to Watch Out For

The window has not closed on a diplomatic solution to the problem. Pyongyang may decide to postpone its nuclear test, and the United States, in turn, could delay military action in favor of tougher sanctions. Still, given the high stakes at play, Stratfor will be watching closely for early warnings of impending military action.

North Korea's Nuclear Test

Having weighed the risks of another nuclear test, the North Korean government may be rethinking the move. On April 14, the country's foreign minister said in an interview that Pyongyang would forge ahead with the test "whenever supreme headquarters sees fit," not necessarily on April 15. Delaying the nuclear test, however, also carries enormous risk for North Korea since it could embolden the United States and provide an opportunity for a punitive strike. Preparations for a military parade to commemorate the founder's birthday appear to be on track so far. If the current leader tries to reduce his own visibility during the festivities, his behavior could indicate that he perceives a high risk of military action.
Defensive Preparations Near the North-South Border

South Korea is always on alert during its northern neighbor's test cycles. And because it is a prime target for North Korea's prospective retaliatory action, the country is anxious about the possibility of a military strike — all the more so as it deals with prolonged political instability at home. South Korea's acting president has ordered his military to intensify preparations. But reports have yet to surface that the country is bolstering security at the border.

A Shutdown at China's Border

Overall, we are on the lookout for any sign that China is changing its military posture or taking steps to evacuate foreigners from North Korea. Reports suggest that China is mobilizing troops along the border, though we have not been able to verify these claims. Nonetheless, Air China — one of two airlines with service to North Korea — has announced that it is canceling flights to the country starting April 17. As one of the only countries that operate flights to North Korea, China may be trying to prove that it is willing to ramp up its economic pressure on Pyongyang. Otherwise, it may have canceled the flights simply because of low passenger turnout. The move could also be a precautionary measure, though, and we're watching to see whether it indicates that China is preparing for a military crisis.

Changes in Travel Plans or Diplomatic Activity

Changes to the itinerary of U.S. Vice President Mike Pence's impending 10-day tour of the Asia-Pacific region would be a red flag. He is expected to celebrate Easter with U.S. forces in South Korea. A sudden uptick in diplomatic activity between the United States and China, likewise, could signal imminent action in North Korea.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html?emc=edit_na_20170415&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0

[G M]

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html?emc=edit_na_20170415&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0

Yeah, I was thinking the same thing.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a19877/how-the-military-will-be-revolutionized-by-laser-weaponry/

"Unlike their fictional cousins in video games and movies, lasers don't make a sizzling noise as they burn through the air. Lasers can also be invisible, unless they pass through a medium such as smoke or fog. Someone under fire from a laser weapon may not know they're under attack until holes start appearing in things, things get very hot, and ammunition starts exploding."

[G M]

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170414000750


[Robert Park] Japan and China visibly preparing for preventive strike fallout


   Published : 2017-04-16 17:48
Updated : 2017-04-16 17:48
Japan and China have already taken clear-cut measures to safeguard their nationals and interests in the event of a looming military confrontation.

Meanwhile, Korean civilians -- who would suffer most devastatingly as “collateral damage” on account of preventive strikes against North Korea -- remain singularly and inexplicably vulnerable as well as thoroughly unprepared for the possibility.

Bewilderingly, South Korea’s opposition to such strikes has yet to be delivered to the US in an unequivocal and unwavering manner.

As political scientist John Delury stated regarding the “pre-emptive strike” scheme for a March 10 report, “The role of a South Korean president, whether liberal or conservative, is to be the person who gently takes that option off the table. The South Korean president has to be saying, ‘If you take out their missile pad, they take out our capital.’ But that hasn’t been happening.”

Trump’s “unpredictability” renders South Korea’s present ambiguity on the vital matter all the more perilous. It is critical to immediately clarify with counterparts in the US the South’s stance.

Brian Bridges, an adjunct professor of Asian politics at Lingnan University, told Bloomberg for an April 12 report: “This has the potential to turn into a conflagration that Asia hasn’t seen since the Vietnam war. If anything, his unpredictability makes the situation more risky because the North Koreans aren’t 100 percent sure he won’t attack.”

Many analysts have stressed that the risk of miscalculated military operations -- via adversaries misreading each other’s intentions -- remains among the gravest and most credible dangers the Korean Peninsula and people face today.

South Korea should pay closer attention to relevant developments in Japan.

In March, Japan began civilian evacuation drills preparing for a North Korea-related contingency.

During a bilateral government meeting preceding last week’s Trump-Xi summit, Japan’s Kyodo News reports Washington informed Tokyo it is highly possible they will strike the North and that the US president intended to deliver this plan to Xi.

Following the US-China summit, the Huanqiu Shibao, one of China’s state-run newspapers, addressed war rumors relevant to the Korean Peninsula as of legitimate concern, calling for heightened vigilance over this particular period on Tuesday. Kim Jong-un is generally believed to be preparing a nuclear or missile test, or possibly another type of provocation this month for his grandfather’s birthday and/or for the foundation date of the North Korean armed forces on April 25.

On Wednesday, Japan’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported the US has accepted Tokyo’s request for bilateral consultation preceding military action against North Korea. Somehow, South Korea seems to be left out when the region, in the wake of US strikes, would be required to absorb the full force of Kim Jong-un’s reprisals while woefully unprotected.

KBS reported Tuesday a senior researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies warned “a US pre-emptive strike against North Korea will cause massive civilian casualties in South Korea,” further pointing out that the North’s counterattack “would not deal a severe blow to US troops, however South Korea‘s capital region, with a population of 25 million, is within the range of the North’s artillery attack.”

Cheong Seong-chang, senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, stated for an April 11 article: “If the US attacks the Yongbyon facility, it will open the curtains to the worst-case scenario -- nuclear war -- as North Korea could attack South Korea’s nuclear plants or Seoul using nuclear weapons. ... Japan will support the US in attacking North Korea.”

On Sunday, former Japanese Cabinet Minister Shigeru Ishiba -- who has openly advocated for his country to establish the capability to conduct “pre-emptive” strikes against North Korea, and may become prime minister -- declared “Seoul might turn into a sea of fire,” while “calling for measures to rescue Japanese citizens in Seoul.” As Dong-A Ilbo pointed out in an editorial Tuesday, “Such a remark was publicly made by such an influential politician, which is simply petrifying.”

None can convincingly deny that Japan would be considerably more privy to what the US may or may not do, given the undisguised closeness of the Abe and Trump administrations.

As Joongang Ilbo pointed out in an April 10 editorial, Trump phoned Shinzo Abe before the Trump-Xi summit to discuss issues that would be raised, while no such conversation was held with Seoul.

Following the summit, Trump spoke for 45 minutes with Abe but only 20 minutes with South Korea’s Prime Minister and acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn.

We witnessed a similar disparity during Rex Tillerson’s time in Asia, and in other settings.

Most conspicuously and alarmingly, while Trump has appointed ambassadors to Japan, China and Russia, none has yet been named for Korea.

On Tuesday, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga conveyed Tokyo’s support for Washington’s consideration of “all options” vis–a–vis North Korea.

Japanese media reports the return of Tokyo’s ambassador to the South was linked to the need for facilitating the evacuation of Japanese citizens in the event of war.

It seems both China and Japan are not quite convinced that threats of a US strike on North Korea are merely bombast. The fact that both countries’ leaders have had summit meetings with Trump -- while South Korea has not -- and are taking such substantial measures ought not to be dismissed by South Koreans.

In a March 20 commentary titled “Bombing North Korea is not an option,” Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times reminds that multiple “waves” of preventive strikes would be needed to achieve US stated objectives as “North Korean nuclear and missile programs are widely dispersed, including underground and underwater.”

“It is unlikely that the whole program could be destroyed in a single wave of strikes, which would immediately raise the prospect of nuclear retaliation by the North,” Rachman wrote.

A positive and commendable step in the proper direction is that Seoul’s unification minister, Hong Yong-pyo, has stepped forward to declare South Korea’s opposition to American military action against North Korea. Through a media conference Monday, Hong stated the government will need to “consult with Washington about a pre-emptive strike against the North considering the impact it would have on the security of South Korea.” The above suggests, however, that this conversation has yet to sufficiently take place. Hong added “South Korea cannot see eye to eye with the US on every military decision,” KBS reported.

The South Korean government must now deliver the equivalent message to US authorities and “gently” but categorically remove the US military strike option “off the table” -- so that such a catastrophic misstep would never be left to chance nor a distressed, unprepared and precariously assailable populace abandoned to such agonizing speculation.


By Robert Park

Robert Park is a founding member of the nonpartisan Worldwide Coalition to Stop Genocide in North Korea, minister, musician and former prisoner of conscience. He can be reached at wcsgnk1@protonmail.com. -- Ed.

[G M]

http://observer.com/2017/03/rex-tillerson-north-korea-threat-strategic-patience/

Rex Tillerson: North Korea Threat Is Imminent, Strategic Patience Is Over
All options are on the table—including South Korea and Japan becoming nuclear powers
By Austin Bay • 03/23/17 6:30am
   
The dire threat North Korea presents to peace in East Asia starts with this fact: The Korean War never really ended.

It may shock some mainstream media minds to discover that Donald Trump is already a Korean War president, but so was Barack “Nobel Peace Prize” Obama, and every other American president since Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman. Truman was president in 1950 when, with the backing of Soviet Russia, North Korea’s “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung launched a surprise invasion of South Korea. The war Kim the First (Kim 1) began would eventually involve the U.S. and Communist China.
The Military Demarcation Line dividing the United Nations’ “truce village” of Panmunjom doesn’t legally demarcate the political boundary between North Korea and South Korea. It simply splits a demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating two warring armies ostensibly observing the fragile ceasefire the 1953 armistice established. The DMZ more or less reflects the final positions of the dug-in Free World and Communist armies.


Unfinished historical business? The Korean War isn’t the past. It’s a complex geo-political nightmare of the present. North Korea’s now-dynastic “Kim family” Communist regime creates the nightmare—and economically and politically exploits the fears it incites. The Kim dictatorship apparently believes that perpetuating the threat of another massively destructive conventional war with South Korea and its allies is essential.


History demonstrates that the North Korean regime is responsible for the ceasefire’s fragility. Since 1953, Pyongyang has repeatedly shattered the ceasefire, waging in belligerent fits and spasms a calculated, contained, yet always deadly war of aggression against South Korea. The March 26, 2010 attack on the corvette Cheonan is a particularly bloody example. Forty-six South Korean sailors died when a North Korean torpedo sank the ship. It was the highest death toll from a single North Korean attack since the 1960s.

The Kim dynasty also employs assassination and terror to kill its enemies (real and imagined) throughout the world.

East Asia is one of the world’s most economically productive regions. Seoul, Tokyo and Shanghai confirm that. The Kim dynasty’s “contained war” implicitly threatens damage (to various degrees) to these multi-trillion dollar contributors to global GDP. (Damage Shanghai? China believes a conventional war on the Korean peninsula could drive millions of refugees into northern China.)

The “contained war” willfully risks igniting a devastating, uncontained multi-polar war that could spread far beyond East Asia.

Why? The explanation links two dynastic goals. Pyongyang’s paranoid Communists still believe that they can ultimately obtain their key 1950 war objective: a Korea unified under Korean Communist control. They have also concluded that, in order to maintain control of the North Korean state, they must maintain a perpetual state of war. Both Kim Il Sung’s son and successor, Kim Jong Il (Kim 2), and his successor, current dictator Kim Jong Un (Kim 3) have pursued these goals.

The Kims don’t threaten to die fighting; they are already fighting. For a price, paid in aid or cash or food or fuel, their regime will restrain itself and end its latest belligerent fit. It may also tone down its violent rhetoric—until the next time. This summarizes the regime’s script for rattling its enemies and extorting bribes.

Time—time passes. Time has passed. There have been dozens of next times.

Now, North Korea’s next times routinely involve ballistic missiles and nuclear devices.

In 2011, North Korea began an accelerated ballistic missile test program. Since then, it has conducted over 30 live-fire tests. Still, the tests tended to follow the script. North Korea would issue rhetorical threats then fire a missile.

A missile test launch in August 2016 demonstrated improved capabilities. After traveling 1,000 kilometers, the missile splashed into the Sea of Japan but inside Japan’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Missile tracking data confirmed the strike location. A threat? No, a North Korean missile had physically violated Japanese sovereignty.

North Korea’s first nuclear test, conducted in 2006, was a fizzle, with a yield of about 0.7 kilotons. But a decade makes a difference. On September 9, 2016, North Korea claimed that it tested a nuclear warhead. Warhead or not, the device was nuclear and powerful. Monitors estimated its yield at 20 to 30 kilotons (about twice the size of the Hiroshima bomb).

It’s 2017. Kim Jong Un possesses ballistic missiles with near-intercontinental range. His regime has nuclear devices and, over time, intends to produce nuclear weapons. On March 6, 2017 his forces launched a volley of four ballistic missiles. This time, three landed in Japanese waters. The next day, Pyongyang announced that the missile launches were “practice” for targeting U.S. bases in Japan.

Practice for a first strike in a regional war? Yes.

North Korean extended-range missiles can already threaten Guam and parts of Alaska. Some analysts think the Hawaiian Islands are in range.

North Korea has declared that it will soon deploy long range missiles that can target the continental U.S. In March 2013, North Korea revealed that Austin, Texas (where South Korea’s Samsung Electronics Co. has a manufacturing facility) is a potential target. Washington, D.C. appeared on the target list.

On February 12, 2017 the regime tested a new intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Pukgukson-2 (Polaris-2). Solid fuel propels the missile, so Kim Jong Un’s troops can launch it on short notice. A tracked transporter erector-launcher (TEL) fired the missile, so the new missile is mobile. North Korea has few paved roads; a tracked TEL isn’t road bound. Moreover, the Pukgukson-2 was cold-launched—expelled from the TEL before main booster ignition. Missile experts say that indicates that a submarine can launch it.

The bottom line is that over the last eight months the regime has conducted weapons tests that demonstrate that it’s acquiring the operational military capabilities required to launch a very uncontained nuclear war.

The North Korean regime’s “contained war” strategy has exploited two policies that have been more or less strategic constants since 1953. The first is Communist China’s tacit long-term support for North Korea’s Communist dictatorship.

Beijing’s support for Pyongyang circa 2017 may not be as iron-clad as its support circa 1997, but that support remains.

The second policy, “contained war,” exploited the policy of “strategic patience” followed by South Korea, Japan and the U.S. It was part of the U.S. Cold War strategy of “containment.” South Korea and its allies would militarily contain North Korea. South Korea would pursue economic development and political liberalization. Over time, the North Korean regime might “mellow,” to appropriate George Kennan’s word for diminishing Soviet belligerence.

Until that change occurred, South Korea would absorb small attacks, no matter how vicious and provocative, in order to prevent a confrontation escalating to all-out war. Seoul’s northern suburbs are still within range of North Korea tube and rocket artillery. Even a short conventional war might kill tens of thousands of civilians. South Korea would definitely suffer severe economic loss.

“Soft power” appeals might solicit North Korean cooperation and eventually reduce its aggressiveness. So South Korea, Japan and the U.S. tried soft power—and did they ever.

The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Agreed Framework gave Kim Il Sung heavy fuel oil and technical assistance if his regime would shut down the nuclear reactors it used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The U.S. would even help North Korea acquire light water nuclear reactors for electrical generation if it permitted International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and complied with other IAEA safeguards. In 2002, the U.S. determined that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework and had an ongoing uranium enrichment program. Indeed, it did.

In 2000 South Korea began its Sunshine Policy—soft power on steroids. South Korea would reward North Korea with “economic incentives” in exchange for political cooperation. Seoul’s goal was eventual détente and peace.

Then, North Korea conducted its 2006 nuclear test. The test was supposed to scare South Korea, and it did. Pyongyang refused Seoul’s demand that it halt its nuclear weapons program.

In 2008, the South Korean government decided that Sunshine would diminish as long as the North sought nuclear weapons. Current incentive programs would continue, but there would be no new endeavors until North Korea ended its nuclear quest. North Korea conducted another nuclear test in 2009. The Cheonan incident solidified opposition to the Sunshine Policy. In November 2010, South Korea’s Unification Ministry terminated the program.

The Sunshine Policy’s “soft power” failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. UN sanctions may have hindered it, but they haven’t stopped it, either. The “Panama Papers” scandal revealed that the Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca, helped a financial firm fund North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to investigators, the firm’s owners were based in Pyongyang. The Kim regime knows how to evade sanctions by hiring the skillfully incurious.

By 2010, South Korea and Japan had concluded that “strategic patience” had failed. President Barack Obama said “strategic patience” still guided U.S. policy, but he also approved the deployment of a U.S. Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense battery to South Korea. The battery arrived this February.

In Seoul on March 17, after visiting the DMZ, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson succinctly sketched America’s evolving position: “Let me be very clear: the policy of strategic patience has ended. We are exploring a new range of diplomatic, security, economic measures. All options are on the table.”

All options included the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan. Japan and South Korea are already investing in improved ballistic missile defense systems.

A day later in a sit-down interview with the Independent Journal Review, Tillerson insisted, “Our objective is a denuclearized Korean peninsula. A denuclearized Korean peninsula negates any thought or need for Japan to have nuclear weapons. We say all options are on the table, but we cannot predict the future. So we do think it’s important that everyone in the region has a clear understanding that circumstances could evolve to the point that for mutual deterrence reasons, we might have to consider that. But as I said yesterday, there are a lot of… there’s a lot of steps and a lot of distance between now and a time that we would have to make a decision like that.”

When the interviewer pressed him about how to “get ahead” of North Korea, Tillerson added, “We’re not sure if we can get ahead of them. If they just continue, you know, we’re headed to a place no one wants to be… if they continue with their testing and continue the development of both their weapons and their delivery systems, then we’re going to find ourselves in a place that’s even more dangerous than we are today.”

The Independent Journal Review’s interview transcript indicates that Tillerson used the word “imminent” at least four times—“imminent circumstances” and “imminent threat.” “Imminent” is a politically flammable term and, in regards to Iraq, still incites bitter argument. The Bush administration never used the word “imminent” to describe Saddam Hussein’s potential use of weapons of mass destruction. However, it definitely portrayed the threat Saddam posed as dire and urgent.

Saddam had a WMD record. His forces had used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Kurdish rebels. WMD was certainly part of Saddam’s “threat profile.”

“Imminent” is an important word. In 2002, the Bush administration argued that 9/11 demanded the international legal concept of “imminent threat” be revised to deal with 21st century adversaries.

Inaction, particularly when an adversary has WMD, entails risk. Inaction when an adversary is a terrorist with WMD may entail unacceptable risks.

Unlike the Bush administration, the Trump administration has deliberately and emphatically used the word “imminent.” Secretary of State Tillerson repeated it. Diplomats know he was sending a message.

On February 13, the day after the Pukgukson-2 launch, assassins in Malaysia murdered Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam. The hit team killed him at the Kuala Lumpur airport in front of a closed circuit television camera.

Korean media report that North Korean defectors repeatedly asked Jong Nam to politically challenge Jong Un. One defector group in Europe even asked him to lead a government in exile. Jong Nam rejected the proposal. Though he said he supported reform in North Korea, Jong Nam also said he supported his younger brother.

Yet, Kim Jong Un decided his brother presented a growing threat to his regime, so had his brother killed. The assassins apparently sprayed Jong Nam’s face with liquid nerve agent VX. When delivered with missile warheads or artillery shells, VX is a weapon of mass destruction, “the most deadly chemical weapon ever produced.”

Is war with North Korea a “trip wire” conflict? Yes. It has been since Kim Il Sung’s surprise attack in 1950. With Kim Jong Un in charge any “incident of escalation” could lead to conflagration.

The Trump administration is clearly pressuring China. I guarantee Beijing gulped when Tillerson suggested that South Korea and Japan might acquire nuclear weapons—and it was supposed to. China has regarded the presence of U.S. forces in Japan as a brake on a revival of Japanese militarism. In the mid-1980s, I attended a U.S. Army War College reception for a Chinese military officer who had given a talk to War College students. The Chinese officer wore his uniform; most of the American student officers wore business suits. I overheard a part of a conversation the Chinese officer was having with a group of students. The subject was the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and specifically the stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Japan. The Chinese officer smiled. “The U.S. Navy in Yokahama…in China we think this is very good.” His eyes twinkled. I doubt they’re twinkling now.

Japan doesn’t really want nuclear weapons, and China definitely doesn’t want Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.

But the Kim dynasty’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them continues unabated and the threat they pose is increasing.

China must bring decisive pressure on North Korea’s regime. By decisive, I mean pressure that terminates North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Perhaps China can produce a diplomatic miracle and convince Kim Jong Un that ending the program is the only way he and his regime will survive. This diplomatic miracle would deserve a Nobel Peace Prize.

China may have the covert wherewithal to induce the North Korean military to conduct “regime change from within.” I suspect this fear haunts Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Nam reportedly had numerous friends in China.

If China cannot bring decisive pressure, or refuses to do so, then the threat of a high-intensity war fought to determine the Kim dynasty’s fate will eventually become imminent. Should this last phase of the Korean War erupt, it won’t be confined to the peninsula. If nuclear weapons strike cities the casualties will be enormous.

Like Rex Tillerson said, “…we’re headed to a place no one wants to be.”

Austin Bay is a contributing editor at StrategyPage.com and adjunct professor at the University of Texas in Austin. His most recent book is a biography of Kemal Ataturk (Macmillan 2011). Bay is a retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel.

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump’s Art of the China Deal
Will Xi Jinping really help the U.S. contain North Korea?
President Donald Trump, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago, in Palm Beach, Fla.
President Donald Trump, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago, in Palm Beach, Fla. Photo: Associated Press
April 16, 2017 5:44 p.m. ET
42 COMMENTS

President Trump is reversing some of his foreign-policy positions, but this should be no great surprise and so far the changes are mainly for the better. Mr. Trump is never going to pursue a consistent geopolitical strategy because he doesn’t think that way. As President he is approaching the world as he does everything else—as a transactional deal maker who wants agreements that he can sell as a security or economic success. Exhibit A is his recent engagement with China over North Korea’s nuclear missile program.

Mr. Trump campaigned last year as the President who would challenge China’s trade practices, naming Beijing a currency manipulator “on day one.” But after the election President Obama advised him to make North Korea’s nuclear advances a priority. Mr. Trump had no problem shifting quickly from threatening China on trade to using trade as a lever to get China to help the U.S. restrain or end North Korea’s nuclear threat.

“Why would I call China a currency manipulator when they are working with us on the North Korean problem? We will see what happens!” Mr. Trump tweeted on Easter Sunday, explaining why his Treasury Department chose not to slap the manipulator label on China. This policy shift has the added benefit of recognizing that China has been trying for months to prop up its currency, not devalue it for trade advantages.

Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has made a theme of ramping up political pressure on North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. The Pentagon sent a carrier group to the East China Sea for maneuvers with the Japanese navy. Mr. Trump tweeted after his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping this month that “I have great confidence that China will properly deal with North Korea. If they are unable to do so, the U.S., with its allies, will!”

H.R. McMaster, Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, warned North Korea on Sunday that its “destabilizing” behavior “can’t continue” after the North launched another missile Saturday, albeit a failure that exploded soon after launch. There’s been much media speculation that a U.S. cyber attack helped to scuttle the missile launch. We’d like to think so, though no one in government has confirmed it.

The problem is that so far there’s little evidence that China is changing its policy toward Pyongyang. The case for optimism includes some editorials in Chinese state media criticizing the Kim regime, as well as reports that China has turned back North Korean ships carrying coal exports. The White House also points to China’s decision last week to abstain at the U.N. and not join Russia in vetoing a resolution condemning Syria’s nuclear attack.

But none of this deterred Mr. Kim from his Saturday missile test or from a public parade of military hardware and missiles. China’s trade with the North has grown tenfold in the last 15 years, even as China has claimed to support United Nations sanctions to punish Pyongyang. And China has played a double game on the North’s coal exports in the past. (“China’s North Korea Feint,” March 5, 2017.)

China’s official rhetoric toward the North also hasn’t changed, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi telling reporters Friday that “we call on all parties to refrain from provoking and threatening each other, whether in words or actions, and not let the situation get to an irreversible and unmanageable stage.”

That’s the usual Chinese formulation blaming the U.S. and the North equally for tensions on the Korean peninsula. China still shows no sign of considering regime change in the North, even to a friendly new dictator who wouldn’t pursue intercontinental nuclear missiles. And it hasn’t shown that it’s willing to enforce sanctions to a degree that would seriously squeeze the North.

Perhaps that will change, as Mr. Trump’s hopeful tweets imply. But China is expert at offering cosmetic concessions while adhering to what it considers its long-term national interests. China’s goal now may be to coax Mr. Trump into the same multinational arms-control dialogue with North Korea that has failed three previous U.S. Presidents.

Mr. Trump’s art of the deal includes keeping adversaries guessing, but eventually China may choose to test how far he is willing to go to stop a Korean nuclear missile. Mr. Trump needs to make clear what he will do if China won’t make a Korean deal.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html

[Crafty_Dog]

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/329952-us-unlikely-to-have-been-behind-botched-north-korean-missile-launch

[G M]

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/329952-us-unlikely-to-have-been-behind-botched-north-korean-missile-launch

Disinfo, IMHO.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://thehill.com/policy/international/330080-former-un-ambassador-it-only-gets-worse-with-north-korea