Author Topic: Philippines  (Read 145933 times)





Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Philippines-Japan defense cooperation agreement
« Reply #204 on: July 08, 2024, 09:01:16 AM »
Closer ties. The Philippines and Japan signed a defense cooperation agreement amid China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The deal, reached during a visit by the Japanese foreign and defense ministers to Manila, will permit Philippine and Japanese military personnel to participate in drills in the other's territory.

FO:

Japan and the Philippines signed their Reciprocal Access Agreement this morning, allowing them to train and potentially station troops in each others’ territories. The Agreement is explicitly to counter China’s aggression in the South China Sea/ West Philippine Sea.

Australia is hosting Exercise Pitch Black, an international large-scale air force exercise from 12 July to 02 August this year. Italy, Spain, and the Philippines will participate for the first time alongside longstanding participants from Australia, the U.S., Japan, Canada, France, India, and Korea. Exercises include international force integration, night flying, low altitude training, and more.
« Last Edit: July 08, 2024, 09:09:21 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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WT: US happy with Philippines-Japan agreement
« Reply #205 on: July 09, 2024, 03:40:02 AM »
U.S. cheers as Japan, Philippines tighten alliance against Chinese expansionism

BY ANDREW SALMON THE WASHINGTON TIMES SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA | Japan and the Philippines signed a bilateral security deal Monday as part of a growing net of relationships involving U.S. allied democracies across and beyond the Indo-Pacific region.

The deal is expected to accelerate defense ties between the two nations, which have clashed in maritime territorial disputes with China in recent years.

The Reciprocal Access Agreement, designed to promote the smooth bilateral transfer of manpower, equipment and arms, was signed in Manila. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. watched as Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro officially approved the deal. Ms. Kamikawa hailed the agreement as “a landmark achievement,” and Mr. Teodoro called it a “milestone in our shared endeavor to ensure a rules-based international order.”

After the signing, the nations’ defense and foreign ministers held a “two-plustwo” meeting at the presidential palace.

With U.S. missions stretching forces worldwide while China builds up massive naval power in the region, the Biden administration has sought to expand defense partnerships among East Asia’s democracies, which lack any overarching NATO-style multilateral alliance.

Washington expressed approval of the deal.

“Another layer in the latticework of Indo-Pacific security partnerships,” U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel wrote on the social media site X. “Coming on the heels of Japan’s provision of coast guard ships to the Philippines, the historical reciprocal access agreement just signed between two of our allies not only boosts their cooperation and capabilities but also reinforces our collective

Philippine Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. (left) and Japanese Gen. Yoshihide Yoshida met Monday after the bilateral defense pact was signed.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

deterrence and commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Long-pacifist Japan, home base to 54,000 U.S. troops, America’s largest single overseas deployment, is emerging as a linchpin for security partnerships for the states across the region facing increasing pressure from Beijing.

Japan is suspicious of China, amicable toward Taiwan and deeply concerned about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The country’s military is muscling up, notably in the naval sphere with marines and light carriers and in the skies with the largest non-U.S. order of F-35 stealth fighters and an ongoing force of long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The Philippines and China have clashed violently over territorial claims in the South China Sea, and Japan is facing a similar hybrid challenge from China in the East China Sea. Manila is struggling to control the encroachment of Chinese fishing fleets and coast guard units off a hotly disputed shoal, and Japan is seeing a similar pattern in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The Philippines has visiting troop agreements with Australia and the United States, and, like Japan, it has a mutual defense treaty with Washington.

The reciprocal access agreement is Japan’s third such deal. After extensive negotiations, Tokyo’s first deal was signed with Canberra in 2022. Tokyo used that benchmark as a framework for another mutual access accord with Britain in 2023 and is in talks for a similar deal with French defense officials.

A reciprocal access agreement is a mutual defense treaty designed to enable the smooth transfer of manpower, equipment and weapons between the states, enabling personnel, vessel and unit exchanges and exercises.

In the decades since World War II, Japan has been loath to export military arms and other defense products. The Philippines is the first recipient of Tokyo’s defense aid package and is receiving coast guard vessels and offshore radars.

Backed by a government loan, Japanese contractors are building five more 318-foot coast guard vessels for the Philippines, which has faced recent attacks from China’s large coast guard.

Analysts say the U.S. Navy, despite a powerful presence in the region, is not well suited to respond to Beijing’s hybrid tactics short of open war. Analysts told a congressional hearing last month that the U.S. Coast Guard has that kind of expertise but lacks the manpower, equipment and reach to patrol the East Asian theater.

“The USCG’s primary focus and missions are much closer to U.S. territory than the Western Pacific and competition with China,” said Drew Thompson, a former U.S. defense official who is now a research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. “They are not designed to be a symmetrical force to confront China.”

Japan and the Philippines signed the deal a day before NATO was to kick off its summit in Washington. The leaders of Japan, New Zealand and South Korea will attend, but Australia’s prime minister declined his invitation


Crafty_Dog

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2021: A look back at a landmark South China Sea Ruling
« Reply #207 on: July 12, 2024, 11:55:14 AM »
A Look Back at a Landmark South China Sea Ruling, Five Years On
7 MIN READJul 12, 2021 | 17:34 GMT

An aerial photograph taken by the Philippine Air Force in November 2003 shows Chinese-built structures near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

On July 12, 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague effectively ruled that China’s sweeping nine-dash line in the South China Sea had no international legal standing under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), siding with the Philippines. Ahead of the fifth anniversary of that landmark ruling, I had the opportunity to take part in a semi-formal dialogue between researchers and officials from both the United States and China (notably, Philippine delegates were not invited). The Chinese side set the tone of the meeting. They considered the Philippine case without merit (China boycotted the tribunal), reasserted their historical claims to much of the South China Sea, and not so subtly told the United States to stay out of regional Chinese affairs. There was no dialogue. The meeting was intended to deliver a message that China would continue to assert its sovereignty over several built-up artificial islands and that it saw U.S. moves to challenge these claims or support regional counterclaimants as interference and acts of aggression against China and its core interests.

In the five years since the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled on the case brought by the Philippines, China’s response has highlighted the challenges of maritime claims in the region, as well as the limitations of international law. Without willing compliance or international enforcement, relative power remains the true arbiter — allowing for Beijing to gain an advantage in the disputed waterway.

A Look Back

Five years on, China continues to ignore the U.N. tribunal ruling, has hardened its positions in the South China Sea, formalized its administrative claims to the territory, and expanded its maritime patrols and exercises. In part, this was facilitated by the Philippines itself. Just two months before the tribunal issued its ruling, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office and rapidly distanced himself from the tribunal ruling and his predecessor’s China policies. In return, Duterte sought Chinese investment and stable relations, which would enable him to focus on his domestic priorities, including his anti-drug campaign and his push for greater federalism as a way to manage the restive southern provinces.

Manila’s shift in tone regarding China also comes amid Duterte’s frequent threats to distance the Philippines from the United States, as well as end the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which is a 70-year-old framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in the Philippines. This means that even if the United States sought to challenge China’s claims on the basis of the tribunal ruling, Washington would find little support from the very country that had brought the case against Beijing to begin with. The negative U.S. response to Duterte’s anti-drug campaign, which was reportedly rife with extrajudicial killings, added to tensions between the two erstwhile allies. While the U.S. Navy continued to carry out Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) around the Chinese-occupied islets, it did little more to try and dislodge the Chinese forces. Tribunal ruling or not, Beijing remains the de facto controlling power over the disputed islets, and also retains control of related fishing grounds. 

The Challenges of International Law

One of the frequent arguments Duterte has made for his China policy and his reluctance to press the tribunal ruling is that Manila simply does not have the capacity to enforce the ruling, and that Washington has failed to step up and shoulder the responsibility. In short, Duterte has essentially said that, while he still holds that the islands and other landmasses in the South China Sea are Philippine territory, Manila is incapable of asserting its claims, and thus it is near futile and self-defeating to undermine relations with China over something that cannot be altered any time soon.

In a similar vein, Duterte has blamed both the previous Philippine administration and the United States for failing to dislodge China in 2012, when Washington helped ease rising tensions around the disputed Scarborough Shoal. Duterte and his supporters have questioned why the United States failed to push Chinese ships out of the shoal after the Philippine ships withdrew. The crux of the argument is that, despite the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty and the superiority of the U.S. Navy at the time, Washington failed to fulfill its responsibilities to its ally. Thus U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) are disruptive and cause problems for Manila, but do not include any real benefit.

China wagered that the United States would not risk triggering a larger military engagement over a few spots of rock and sand in a distant sea.

Despite his frequent rhetorical flourishes and occasional foul language, Duterte isn’t entirely off the mark. The inconvenient reality of treaties and international law more broadly is that they are only effective so long as they are enforced or willingly adhered to, or at least perceived by third parties to be actually binding. If China truly believed that the United States would risk its own ships, aircraft and personnel to preserve Manila’s claims to the unoccupied shoals and islets, Beijing may have taken a different path. But China’s experience has led it to assess that while the United States would complain, Washington would not take on the risk of a larger military engagement with China over a few spots of rock and sand in a distant sea, no matter how strategic the overall waterway may be. And the United States reinforced this view by frequently claiming it did not take sides in the Philippines' South China Sea dispute with China, thus failing to assertively back Manila’s claims. Not only was this the longstanding U.S. policy, it also matched the tribunal ruling, which did not assess Philippine sovereignty despite rejecting China’s claims. 
The Limitations of U.S. Power
The United States has long had mixed views on treaties, international law and multinational organizations. From its earliest days, U.S. leaders argued against entangling alliances, fearing that such relations could force the United States into economic or military action that would be detrimental to its own domestic interests. Like any large power, the United States has used international systems, laws and organizations when they largely fit U.S. needs and interests, but shied away when they did not. The United States has even failed to ratify UNCLOS, despite that being the basis for the tribunal ruling, as well as part of Washington’s justification for its naval operations in the South China Sea.

For much of the last three decades, even as there were growing voices urging Washington to take heed of China’s rise and its potential challenge to the U.S.-supported international order, U.S. administrations largely sought to entice Beijing through engagement, hoping China would “westernize” by default. While that idea has since lost credence, it does in part explain U.S. reticence in the past to directly challenge China, despite Beijing’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea. In more concrete terms, Washington has also felt that the risk of military escalation with China exceeded the threat posed by each incremental step China took in occupying, building up and arming the islets.

For the past 20 years, the primary U.S. security focus had been on counterterrorism efforts and on the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Great power competition was simply not in vogue, and U.S. training cycles and force deployments reflected the prioritization of non-state actors as the primary security threat. While that pattern is now shifting rapidly, the United States is no longer in a position to prevent Chinese action.

Washington must instead either manage the new reality of power in the South China Sea, or take on the cost of trying to roll back Chinese positions. It’s one thing to stop something from happening, but it’s quite another to reverse an existing reality.



Crafty_Dog

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This would appear to be a pivotal moment
« Reply #211 on: July 19, 2024, 08:30:36 AM »
My sense is that this is a "Put up or shut up" moment for America and will be taken as such by all concerned.

===========
FO

(6) PHILIPPINES LOOKS FOR ALLIES ON NEXT RESUPPLY: The Philippine Navy announced it is exploring options for a joint resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal with a regional ally (U.S., Australia, or Japan) as an “exercise” under the Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity agreement.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gibo Teodoro said the next resupply mission is awaiting the guidance of the Philippines’ maritime council.
The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff General Charles Brown Jr. and Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief General Romeo Brawner held a meeting in the Philippines to discuss “enhancing bilateral defense cooperation, strengthening joint military exercises, and addressing regional security challenges.”

Why It Matters: Regardless of which ally joins the Philippines, the U.S. Navy or a nation that has a mutual defense treaty with the U.S. could potentially have a wounding or lethal run-in with the Chinese Coast Guard, which could trigger greater escalation. – J.V.

===============

The Philippines Air Force conducted a dogfight exercise against the Thai Air Force’s Gripen fighters in Australia’s exercise Pitch Black. (The Gripen is similar in size, shape, and capability to China’s J-10, a potential aircraft the Philippines would face if it went to war with China. – J.V.)


Crafty_Dog

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FO: Philippines
« Reply #213 on: July 22, 2024, 10:38:45 AM »
Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. announced in his State of the Nation Address that Philippine Offshore Gambling Operations (POGO), a special type of casino that is frequently run and infiltrated by Chinese crime syndicates, are officially banned nationwide. (This shuts down a significant infiltration avenue for Chinese crime in one of the U.S. allies and friendshoring destinations. – J.V.)

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro announced that he would seek Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA) with France, Canada, New Zealand, and “other like-minded countries.” RAA are military cooperation and troop stationing agreements that fall short of mutual defense treaties.

Vietnam and the Philippines announced they will have their first joint Coast Guard exercise next month. The exercises aim at “countering China’s assertive maneuvers in the South China Sea.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Philippines-China deal over the shoals?
« Reply #214 on: July 22, 2024, 10:41:05 AM »
second

Philippine officials said the preliminary pact on the Second Thomas Shoal excludes key Chinese demands.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Surprising terms. China and the Philippines tentatively agreed on a code of conduct for the resupply of Philippine forces at Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the disputed Spratly Islands at the center of a tense standoff between the countries. Chinese coast guard and other forces have been increasingly aggressive in their attempts to stop the Philippines from resupplying personnel aboard a dilapidated amphibious transport that Manila deliberately grounded at the reef in 1999. Neither side released the text of the agreement, but according to Philippine officials it does not include Chinese demands barring the delivery of construction materials to reinforce the grounded ship, nor does it require Manila to give Beijing advance notice of resupply missions or to submit to inspections.





Crafty_Dog

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FO: Philippines-US
« Reply #219 on: July 30, 2024, 02:05:21 PM »
(5) PH-U.S. 2+2 MEETING: INVESTMENT PLANS AND POTENTIAL INTEL SHARING: At the latest Philippines 2+2 Meeting between the Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and their Filipino counterparts, the U.S. a $500 million military aid package, a new investment roadmap, and an in-the-works intelligence-sharing agreement.

Secretary Austin announced a finalized Security Sector Assistance Roadmap that lays out future joint investments. He also announced that the allies are currently negotiating a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMOIA), intending to finalize it by the end of 2024.

Why It Matters: A GSMOIA is specifically about protecting classified information, including weapons capabilities. If achieved, the U.S. could officially share highly capable weapon systems with the Philippines, such as the Typhon missile launcher and its associated missiles and higher-end versions of the F-16. – J.V.



Crafty_Dog

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FO: More Chinese fukkery
« Reply #222 on: August 16, 2024, 07:14:21 AM »

China and the Philippines are signaling a new potential avenue for clashes around the Sabina Shoal in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines rotates Coast Guard ships in the shoal as semi-permanent outposts similar to the Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal, and China is seeking to prevent the next rotation.


===========

Also see:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-got-very-dramatic-after-the-us-military-flew-a-new-missile-system-out-to-the-western-pacific-ally-says/ar-AA1oVxdS?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=8254d7d84bfa41fea62257ac710bc194&ei=14
« Last Edit: August 16, 2024, 11:10:21 AM by Crafty_Dog »



Crafty_Dog

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DougMacG

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Re: Somehow these things would seem worthy of notice by our President
« Reply #227 on: August 25, 2024, 05:48:30 AM »
No one is telling Biden because ... he isn't really the president, and he wouldn't fully understand.

They can't ask Harris either - because she doesn't take questions, and she's running as an outsider, not incumbent.

Why don't they cut out the middlemen and ask Barack Obama, 'are YOU in charge and what do you plan to do about this?
« Last Edit: August 25, 2024, 07:45:43 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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They have been reading our forum
« Reply #228 on: August 25, 2024, 07:33:13 AM »
https://amgreatness.com/2024/08/25/whoever-is-in-charge-needs-to-act-the-philippines-and-china-are-on-the-brink-of-war/

Whoever Is in Charge, Needs to Act: The Philippines and China Are on the Brink of War
It is painful to recognize that the U.S. does not have a president who can fulfill a critical component of deterring a war between the Philippines and the PRC to which the U.S. will be a party.

By James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer
August 25, 2024
The U.S. president has many responsibilities, one of his most important is to state what U.S. interests are and to issue warnings when hostile states encroach upon them.  When an American president speaks it comes with a unique authority that is unmatched in history.  When push comes to shove, the president has to speak—not the Secretaries of State or Defense, or their public affairs officers.  Given that President Biden is suffering from the onset of dementia and is no longer capable of meeting the demands of the office, this has profound costs for U.S. national security.  One result is that the American people and American allies do not have the authoritative voice necessary to deter aggression.  When the U.S. needs the president to draw the line in the sand and warn adversaries of the great costs of crossing it in order to deter a war that will involve the U.S., the president’s voice is absent.  The consequence is a void, a security vacuum, and America’s enemy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is filling it.  In essence, the sheriff is gone, and the bad guys can do what they want.

While many Americans are focused on the 2024 election, the Philippines is on the verge of war with the PRC.  The cause of this conflict is the PRC’s hyperaggression to achieve its objective of conquering the islands and shoals of the South China Sea while building many more to ensure absolute control.  While the PRC has been pursuing this Maritime Sovereignty Strategy for many decades, the form of that aggression has been gradual, but it is now quickening, escalating in intensity, and broadening in location.

On August 19, at least three collisions occurred between Coast Guard ships belonging to the PRC and the Philippines. As seen in video imagery and still pictures providentially recorded by the Philippines, the PRC first tore a hole 3.6 feet in diameter on the starboard side of a Philippine coast guard vessel.  Shortly thereafter, a PRC Coast Guard vessel rammed another Philippine coast guard ship twice, ripping a gap 2.5 feet long and 3 feet wide on the port side, again as reported by photographic evidence by the Philippines.  Fortunately, no one was killed in the incident.  But there is no question that these attacks were deliberate escalatory acts by the PRC in an effort to prevent the Philippines from exercising its sovereignty over its territory.  This is a direct violation of the 2002 Code of Conduct to which both states are a party, and a stark violation of the sovereignty of the Philippines.

The incidents occurred near Flat Island and Nanshan Island, which are a short distance from Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines has outposts.  In addition, the Philippines is attempting to block further reclamation efforts by the PRC at Sabina Shoal.  The Philippines said the collisions resulted from aggressive maneuvers by the PRC’s Coast Guard—a large and potent force on the front lines of Beijing’s Maritime Sovereignty efforts to enforce its claims in the South China Sea.  As is their pattern of prevarication, the PRC accused the Philippine coast guard of deliberately colliding with its ship.  A clear falsehood given the video evidence and the fact that the Chinese coast guard ships were 2-3 times the size of the smaller Philippine vessels.  The PRC is putting teeth in its illegal territorial claim to the Nine-Dash Line and trying to absolutely control the territory within it.  Moreover, Beijing is determined to break the Filipinos to force Manila out of its territory.  Right here, right now, the PRC is aggressing against the Philippines.

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This matters to Americans because the Philippines is a 1951 treaty ally of the United States.  If the Philippines goes to war with the PRC, the U.S. is necessarily involved.  As such, the U.S. must deter this conflict from escalating to war, and that requires Presidential leadership that is lacking.  Second, this directly impacts Americans because Beijing’s aggressive ambitions will not stop if it successfully coerces the Philippines but will continue against other U.S. allies, partners, and other U.S. interests.  Third, the South China Sea and East China Sea are strategic bodies of water and critical for the world’s economy.  Trade through the East and South China Seas are estimated at $7.4 trillion, and critical for the PRC’s trade, as well as India’s and Japan’s.

While the PRC is using the stick to coerce the Philippines, it is employing the carrot to buy off Vietnam, a key actor in the South China Sea dispute.  General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and State President To Lam, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, his spouse and a high-level Vietnamese delegation concluded on August 20 a three-day state visit to the PRC, where new trade and economic agreements were reached.  The PRC is attempting to secure the western flank of its illegal Nine-Dash Line claim while it aggresses on its eastern.  But Vietnam is not immune from the PRC’s aggression, and if Beijing is successful against Manila, Hanoi might be next.

U.S. presidential leadership is needed now to state the PRC’s aggression will not stand.  Inconceivably though the Biden-Harris administration has chosen to gap U.S. Navy aircraft carrier presence in the Far East for just the second time in three years, after not gapping our carrier presence since 2003.  This is a clear message of weakness and only entices Xi Jinping and the CCP to unleash the PLA against our treaty ally.

To correct this the U.S. must now state that it will support Filipino efforts to maintain its sovereign territory by providing a strong arm to permit resupply of its outposts.  The U.S. must not permit the PRC to be successful in its effort to break the Philippines.  Much more can be done by the Philippines.  Manila can take a page out of Taiwan’s playbook.  On August 23rd, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te made his first visit to Kinmen Island, which is just over a mile from the PRC’s coast, and one of the islands on the frontline of increasing tension with the PRC.  Lai has stated exactly what he should, Taiwan will not be intimidated by the PRC.  So senior Filipino leaders may travel to these outposts with the U.S. Ambassador and other senior U.S. officials and officials from Japan, South Korea, and Australia.  It is also in Vietnam’s interest to stand with the Philippines too.  Strong statements to this effect would be welcome.

It is painful to recognize the harsh truth that the U.S. does not have a president who can fulfill a critical component of deterring a war between the Philippines and the PRC to which the U.S. will be a party.  As the July Crisis that led to World War I started with the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife in Sarajevo, so too World War III might start at Second Thomas Shoal.  The world is drifting into a conflict in the South China Sea.  Strong U.S. action is immediately necessary to deter it.  Whoever is acting for President Biden needs to respond today.

***

James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer are authors of Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure.

Crafty_Dog

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Chinese fukkery accelerates
« Reply #229 on: August 26, 2024, 06:15:31 AM »
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/in-beijing-s-quest-for-control-of-the-south-china-sea-a-new-flashpoint-emerges/ar-AA1pnKhl?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=1a2d4d16f72444f384befebdaa8d5603&ei=9

For months, the Philippines has pushed back against Beijing in the South China Sea. China has responded with increasing hostility, directing its ire against Philippine vessels and crew.

Now, a 97-meter coast-guard ship has become a new symbol of the David-and-Goliath fight between America’s top geopolitical rival and an ally it has pledged to defend in the event of an armed attack. Tensions around the vessel this week have shown China’s willingness to escalate its use of forceful tactics to tighten its control of the South China Sea.


Since mid-April, the Philippines’ BRP Teresa Magbanua has stood anchored at a stretch of low-lying reefs called Sabina Shoal, 75 nautical miles off the Philippines’ western coast. Manila says it wants to keep a close eye on the site—which lies within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone—after it detected an intensifying presence of China’s fishing militia and marine research vessels there, as well as signs of what it suspects could be preliminary land reclamation.

China has demanded that the Philippines withdraw the ship. It says much of the South China Sea belongs to Beijing—including the uninhabited Sabina Shoal, which lies 630 nautical miles from China—and rejects a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal that said its claims have no legal basis.

It says the Teresa Magbanua, anchored for months, marks an attempt by Manila to create a long-term presence at Sabina Shoal. Meanwhile, dozens of Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels persistently patrol, swarm and monitor contested reefs and rocks across the South China Sea, hundreds of miles from its coast.

Matters came to a head this week when China sent its coast guard to chase away its Philippine counterparts. Beijing says it believes the pair of Philippine vessels was on its way to deliver supplies to the Teresa Magbanua. Collisions ensued, leaving the Philippine ships with large holes and heavy damage.

Manila said the vessels were headed elsewhere and that China’s coast guard aggressively rammed them. China accused the Philippines of causing the collision.

“Essentially what they did was that they violently interdicted the Philippines’ freedom of navigation on the high seas within the [Philippines’] exclusive economic zone,” said Raymond Powell, director of an initiative called SeaLight, which tracks China’s activities in the South China Sea, at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. “Their approach is that they can’t allow the Philippines to win or to visibly contest.”

On Sunday, the Philippines said that a vessel belonging to its fisheries agency was harassed, rammed and hit with water cannons in an encounter that, it said, involved eight Chinese ships, including a warship and coast guard vessels. The Philippine vessel was headed to Sabina Shoal with supplies for the country’s fishermen in the area, but China’s actions caused its engine to fail, the Philippines said. China blamed the Philippines for the collision.

The Philippines also said over the weekend that China on Thursday launched flares from one of its military bases in the South China Sea—built on an artificial island—when an aircraft belonging to the Philippine fisheries agency was on routine patrol. A few days before that, at a different location, a Chinese fighter jet shot flares at a distance of 15 meters from the same patrol aircraft, the Philippines said.

Since President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.came to power in 2022, the Philippines’ security policies have undergone a shift. Manila has challenged China’s ubiquitous presence in the South China Sea, sought to regain the ability to patrol contested areas, broadcast aggressive Chinese tactics to galvanize global support and strengthened its alliance with the U.S.

Each step of the way, China has doubled down, resulting in risky confrontations at sea. It says it is protecting its sovereignty and maritime rights, and accuses the Philippines of stirring trouble. The threat of a dangerous escalation looms large.

For the Philippines, keeping a ship at Sabina Shoal indefinitely isn’t only burdensome—the country has only a handful of coast-guard vessels of the size of the Teresa Magbanua, while China has dozens of large vessels—but now also perilous. Beijing’s response this week suggests it plans to block any effort to either send supplies to the anchored vessel or replace it with another ship.

That potentially creates the same escalatory dynamic at Sabina Shoal that for months existed at another reef, Second Thomas Shoal. That site hosts a small detachment of Filipino marines. Until last month, each time the Philippines sent ships to resupply the outpost, China sought to obstruct them with water cannons and ramming, and on one occasion threatened Filipino personnel with axes and knives.

A deal last month appeared to ease tensions there, at least for now, but similar confrontations could play out around Sabina Shoal—once again raising the potential for conflict and stretching the Philippines thin. Dozens of Chinese vessels can surge, often at short notice, from Mischief Reef—one of China’s artificial-islands-turned-military-bases—located just 50 nautical miles west of Sabina Shoal.

Another option for the Philippines would be to withdraw the coast guard ship. That, however, might be perceived as a win for China. More important, Beijing—which has dialed up its deployment of vessels at Sabina Shoal—may take permanent control of the site. It could potentially deny the Philippines access and create a new presence just 75 nautical miles from its coast.

“It’s a Catch-22,” said Rommel Ong, who retired as a vice commander of the Philippine Navy in 2019. “There’s no way that we can leave Sabina Shoal anymore. If we leave, then most likely they’ll take over.”

Ong said the Philippines should avoid repeating what happened at Scarborough Shoal—another atoll—in 2012, when Philippine ships withdrew after a long standoff and China seized control. Now, Chinese coast guard and maritime militia are present there around the clock, blocking the Philippines from accessing its lagoon for fishing or patrols.

Occupying Sabina Shoal would advance China’s quest for control of the South China Sea, Ong said. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to turn the sea—a vital artery for shipping and commerce—into a Chinese lake where others have limited room to maneuver, he said.

For the Philippines, losing access to Sabina Shoal—and contending with a Chinese footprint there—would further complicate its ability to resupply its outpost on Second Thomas Shoal. Sabina Shoal serves as a rendezvous point for Philippine forces headed there.

Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said that China’s modus operandi has long been to gradually encroach on different sites in the South China Sea and unilaterally subvert the status quo. The Philippines had thwarted such attempts at Sabina Shoal, he said.

“By having a presence, it means that you’re not acquiescing to the Chinese presence,” said Koh. To do that, Koh said, even one ship was enough.

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com
« Last Edit: August 26, 2024, 07:58:48 AM by Crafty_Dog »



Crafty_Dog

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« Reply #232 on: August 27, 2024, 08:54:40 AM »
This seems important.  The comment about needing the Philippines to activate the MDT seems clarifying.

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(4) HIGH-LEVEL TALKS ABOUT ESCORTING THE PHILIPPINES: Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo said that escorting Philippine vessels to their resupply points in the South China Sea is “an entirely reasonable option within our Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).” This was in response to a question about the repeated Chinese aggression surrounding the Spratly Islands.
General Romeo Brawner, chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, said that the Philippines would run resupply missions on its own until they are constrained from doing so. He followed-on that the Philippines may turn to “other like minded nations” instead of the U.S.
Why It Matters: Admiral Paparo’s statement suggests the Philippines will need to activate the Mutual Defense Treaty for U.S. Navy escorts. The Philippines seeking other allied nations (such as Japan or Australia) could be seen as an intermediate step to avoid invoking the MDT and provoking China. It could also be a recognition of the U.S. Navy’s relatively weak force in the region. – J.V.