https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/in-beijing-s-quest-for-control-of-the-south-china-sea-a-new-flashpoint-emerges/ar-AA1pnKhl?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=1a2d4d16f72444f384befebdaa8d5603&ei=9For months, the Philippines has pushed back against Beijing in the South China Sea. China has responded with increasing hostility, directing its ire against Philippine vessels and crew.
Now, a 97-meter coast-guard ship has become a new symbol of the David-and-Goliath fight between America’s top geopolitical rival and an ally it has pledged to defend in the event of an armed attack. Tensions around the vessel this week have shown China’s willingness to escalate its use of forceful tactics to tighten its control of the South China Sea.
Since mid-April, the Philippines’ BRP Teresa Magbanua has stood anchored at a stretch of low-lying reefs called Sabina Shoal, 75 nautical miles off the Philippines’ western coast. Manila says it wants to keep a close eye on the site—which lies within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone—after it detected an intensifying presence of China’s fishing militia and marine research vessels there, as well as signs of what it suspects could be preliminary land reclamation.
China has demanded that the Philippines withdraw the ship. It says much of the South China Sea belongs to Beijing—including the uninhabited Sabina Shoal, which lies 630 nautical miles from China—and rejects a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal that said its claims have no legal basis.
It says the Teresa Magbanua, anchored for months, marks an attempt by Manila to create a long-term presence at Sabina Shoal. Meanwhile, dozens of Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels persistently patrol, swarm and monitor contested reefs and rocks across the South China Sea, hundreds of miles from its coast.
Matters came to a head this week when China sent its coast guard to chase away its Philippine counterparts. Beijing says it believes the pair of Philippine vessels was on its way to deliver supplies to the Teresa Magbanua. Collisions ensued, leaving the Philippine ships with large holes and heavy damage.
Manila said the vessels were headed elsewhere and that China’s coast guard aggressively rammed them. China accused the Philippines of causing the collision.
“Essentially what they did was that they violently interdicted the Philippines’ freedom of navigation on the high seas within the [Philippines’] exclusive economic zone,” said Raymond Powell, director of an initiative called SeaLight, which tracks China’s activities in the South China Sea, at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. “Their approach is that they can’t allow the Philippines to win or to visibly contest.”
On Sunday, the Philippines said that a vessel belonging to its fisheries agency was harassed, rammed and hit with water cannons in an encounter that, it said, involved eight Chinese ships, including a warship and coast guard vessels. The Philippine vessel was headed to Sabina Shoal with supplies for the country’s fishermen in the area, but China’s actions caused its engine to fail, the Philippines said. China blamed the Philippines for the collision.
The Philippines also said over the weekend that China on Thursday launched flares from one of its military bases in the South China Sea—built on an artificial island—when an aircraft belonging to the Philippine fisheries agency was on routine patrol. A few days before that, at a different location, a Chinese fighter jet shot flares at a distance of 15 meters from the same patrol aircraft, the Philippines said.
Since President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.came to power in 2022, the Philippines’ security policies have undergone a shift. Manila has challenged China’s ubiquitous presence in the South China Sea, sought to regain the ability to patrol contested areas, broadcast aggressive Chinese tactics to galvanize global support and strengthened its alliance with the U.S.
Each step of the way, China has doubled down, resulting in risky confrontations at sea. It says it is protecting its sovereignty and maritime rights, and accuses the Philippines of stirring trouble. The threat of a dangerous escalation looms large.
For the Philippines, keeping a ship at Sabina Shoal indefinitely isn’t only burdensome—the country has only a handful of coast-guard vessels of the size of the Teresa Magbanua, while China has dozens of large vessels—but now also perilous. Beijing’s response this week suggests it plans to block any effort to either send supplies to the anchored vessel or replace it with another ship.
That potentially creates the same escalatory dynamic at Sabina Shoal that for months existed at another reef, Second Thomas Shoal. That site hosts a small detachment of Filipino marines. Until last month, each time the Philippines sent ships to resupply the outpost, China sought to obstruct them with water cannons and ramming, and on one occasion threatened Filipino personnel with axes and knives.
A deal last month appeared to ease tensions there, at least for now, but similar confrontations could play out around Sabina Shoal—once again raising the potential for conflict and stretching the Philippines thin. Dozens of Chinese vessels can surge, often at short notice, from Mischief Reef—one of China’s artificial-islands-turned-military-bases—located just 50 nautical miles west of Sabina Shoal.
Another option for the Philippines would be to withdraw the coast guard ship. That, however, might be perceived as a win for China. More important, Beijing—which has dialed up its deployment of vessels at Sabina Shoal—may take permanent control of the site. It could potentially deny the Philippines access and create a new presence just 75 nautical miles from its coast.
“It’s a Catch-22,” said Rommel Ong, who retired as a vice commander of the Philippine Navy in 2019. “There’s no way that we can leave Sabina Shoal anymore. If we leave, then most likely they’ll take over.”
Ong said the Philippines should avoid repeating what happened at Scarborough Shoal—another atoll—in 2012, when Philippine ships withdrew after a long standoff and China seized control. Now, Chinese coast guard and maritime militia are present there around the clock, blocking the Philippines from accessing its lagoon for fishing or patrols.
Occupying Sabina Shoal would advance China’s quest for control of the South China Sea, Ong said. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to turn the sea—a vital artery for shipping and commerce—into a Chinese lake where others have limited room to maneuver, he said.
For the Philippines, losing access to Sabina Shoal—and contending with a Chinese footprint there—would further complicate its ability to resupply its outpost on Second Thomas Shoal. Sabina Shoal serves as a rendezvous point for Philippine forces headed there.
Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said that China’s modus operandi has long been to gradually encroach on different sites in the South China Sea and unilaterally subvert the status quo. The Philippines had thwarted such attempts at Sabina Shoal, he said.
“By having a presence, it means that you’re not acquiescing to the Chinese presence,” said Koh. To do that, Koh said, even one ship was enough.
Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com