Author Topic: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War  (Read 442362 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: CAATSA
« Reply #705 on: May 28, 2018, 08:08:59 AM »
•   Middling powers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East will face increasing pressure from Washington on their ties with Russia because of the United States' new sanctions legislation.
•   Germany, Vietnam and Turkey are some of the major states most likely to defy U.S. pressure on their Russia relations.
•   In Asia, India may struggle to cope with the U.S. sanctions, while Indonesia could go either way.
•   Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates will find it easier to comply thanks to their limited links to Russia and deep defense relationships with Washington.
•   Measures such as the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act will encourage U.S. partners to adopt a more multilateral strategy in an emerging world of great power competition.

Yesterday was Tehran and today it's Moscow. As the United States, Russia and China engage in a great power competition, growing tensions between Washington and Moscow could soon have a major effect on U.S. relations with other countries. Upset by the Kremlin's actions around the world, U.S. lawmakers are hoping to hit Russia where it hurts most, its defense and energy business, through the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which applies secondary sanctions to countries engaging in business with Moscow in these fields. CAATSA has faced some resistance — not least from the commander in chief himself — but its gradual implementation promises to have far-reaching effects on all concerned.

The Big Picture

In its second-quarter forecast for 2018, Stratfor noted that the United States would turn its attention toward its competition with Russia and China. Washington already has targeted Beijing with trade tariffs, and now it is finally starting to implement measures that could change Russia's strategic ties around the world under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.

See 2018 Second-Quarter Forecast
A Potent New Process

Secondary sanctions are hardly new to U.S. foreign policy. Washington used them extensively against Tehran in an effort to force the Islamic republic to modify its behavior before the Iranian nuclear deal's signing in 2015. But Russia occupies a different position from Iran in the international system as a great power that boasts robust energy relationships with Europe and China, as well as diverse defense ties with many states, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. CAATSA also targets Iran, along with North Korea, yet it is the secondary sanctions against Russia — especially those stipulated in sections 231 and 232 of the act — that could affect the United States' partnerships the most.

Under Section 231 of CAATSA, any third-country firm or individual that engages in a "significant transaction" with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors will face a penalty. Companies and individuals can apply for an exemption from the sanctions. Getting one, however, would require U.S. authorities to certify not only that the exemption would not harm the United States' national security interests but also that Russia had made "significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions."

Given that the Kremlin is unlikely to meet the second condition anytime soon, countries wishing to continue trade with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors could opt for a waiver under Section 231. The waiver, which has a maximum length of 180 days, requires U.S. officials to certify that the applicant is "substantially reducing the number of significant transactions" with targeted Russian interests. (The U.S. Congress is also currently considering the 2019 National Defense Authorization Bill, legislation that would replace the waiver process with an upfront certification that determines whether the entity in question is taking "significant and verifiable steps" or "has agreed to reduce reliance" on Russia over a "specified period.") But the waiver could draw unwanted attention to countries engaged in trade with Russia and give Washington leverage to try to exact concessions from them.

Section 232, meanwhile, focuses on energy, targeting investments of $1 million or more in Russian pipelines or support for building or operating pipelines — in goods, services, technology and information — worth an annual total of at least $5 million. Unlike those prescribed under Section 231, Section 232 sanctions are discretionary rather than mandatory.

The waiver could draw unwanted attention to countries engaged in trade with Russia and give Washington leverage to try to exact concessions from them.
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Off to a Slow Start

U.S. President Donald Trump opposed CAATSA (the act largely stems from a unilateral initiative by Congress, which took action out of concern that the U.S. leader could become too conciliatory toward Russia). Nevertheless, it passed by veto-proof majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives alike. The president then delayed its implementation beyond the Jan. 29 congressional deadline, arguing that the date signified the start, rather than the end, of the process.

Facing growing pressure from Congress, Trump has signaled that he will begin applying the law. The State Department has tried to define "significant transaction" and is already engaged in conversations with many countries on their relationships with Russia. At the same time, U.S. diplomats also tried to entice countries to expand their defense ties with Washington to compensate for the loss of Russian supplies. The overtures suggest that CAATSA's aim is not simply to penalize Russia for its perceived bad behavior but also to expand U.S. arms sales wherever possible. Still, some prominent members of the U.S. Congress are dissatisfied with the progress toward implementing the act. Key Democrats, such as Sen. Robert Menendez, and some Republicans, in fact, recently requested a rare multiagency investigation into the delays in the law's application. But regardless of the snags in its implementation, CAATSA demonstrates that the United States is more strident than ever in pushing other countries to reduce their defense and energy ties with Russia.

Addressing Russia's Worldwide Influence

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is the world's second-largest arms exporter. From 2013 to 2017, the country accounted for 22 percent of the globe's weapons exports, lagging behind only the United States at 34 percent. (All other exporters' contributions, by contrast, are in the single digits.) Russia also has numerous clients in diverse fields that purchase its air defense systems, aircraft, missiles, ships, armored vehicles and aircraft engines. Nearly two-thirds of Russia's exports go to Asia, though the Middle East and Africa also receive a significant portion of the country's arms.

Regardless of the snags in its implementation, CAATSA demonstrates that the United States is more strident than ever in pushing other countries to reduce their defense and energy ties with Russia.
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Russia's deepest defense relationships are with China, India and Vietnam, which together account for 58 percent of Russian exports. China has received top-of-the-line Russian equipment of late, including the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 aircraft, while India and Vietnam have been purchasing and using Russian equipment since Soviet times. Farther afield, Russia has signed major arms deals with Indonesia and Turkey, and it's in talks with Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the sale of the S-400 system. The United Arab Emirates, too, is considering the purchase of Su-35 aircraft. Although these countries are some of Russia's biggest customers — or prospective customers — they aren't the only ones that could run afoul of CAATSA. States such as Algeria, Myanmar, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Ethiopia also could soon find themselves in hot water with the United States because of their "significant" defense relationships with Russia.

Mulling a Response

China

As one of the biggest purchasers of Russian arms, China will likely have the most difficulty scaling down its ties with Russia — all the more so since Washington has already targeted Beijing in separate trade disputes. Its connections with Russia are so deep and strategic that China will be unlikely to make more than token concessions on its core defense purchases from Moscow. (But even without the threat of U.S. sanctions, China is destined to purchase less Russian military hardware as it develops technology that would allow it to manufacture its own arms.) Similarly, major energy projects such as the Power of Siberia gas pipeline from Russia to the Far East are more or less irreversible.

As one of the biggest purchasers of Russian arms, China will likely have the most difficulty scaling down its ties with Russia — all the more so since Washington has already targeted Beijing in separate trade disputes.
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India

Russia also has deep relations with China's rival over the Himalayas, India. Moscow supplies most of the arms for the Indian military, including combat aircraft, naval destroyers, battle tanks and a lone nuclear submarine. The BrahMos missile — the product of Russian-Indian cooperation — is a signature success for New Delhi's defense establishment that also has great export potential. Furthermore, Russian arms deals offer generous terms, such as technology transfers and opportunities for joint production, that are important to India's strategic autonomy doctrine.

If push comes to shove, India will not sacrifice its relationship with Russia. Instead, it will try to compromise with the United States by purchasing more U.S. arms or by signing the two outstanding foundational defense agreements with the country. Despite its historical links with Moscow, New Delhi has expanded its security and economic relationship with the United States over the past two decades to try to increase its clout in the global system. Their ties are now strong, and India increasingly relies on the United States to balance China's rise in Asia. As a result, Washington has greater leverage over New Delhi, which, in turn, is more vulnerable to CAATSA's stipulations than Beijing is. In the longer run, however, the CAATSA process could rekindle anti-American sentiment in the Indian defense bureaucracy and the political class, two decades after a reset in U.S.-Indian relations consigned such nationalism to the margins.

Vietnam

In Southeast Asia, Vietnam — whose military gets nearly all its equipment from Russia — also has been more open to U.S. defense ties since the United States lifted an embargo on lethal arms sales to Hanoi in 2016. The United States has sold patrol boats to Vietnam, and a U.S. aircraft carrier even docked at the country's Cam Ranh naval base. Even so, Vietnam's connections to the United States remain limited at this nascent stage of their rapprochement. That means Vietnam will be in a stronger position than India in negotiations with Washington over CAATSA — even though it has deeper ties with Russia. In fact, the CAATSA process could discourage Vietnam from further building its defense relationship with the United States, if only to avoid future compromises to its strategic autonomy.

Indonesia

Indonesia could go either way in its ties with Russia. Its military has long relied on suppliers from multiple countries, including Russia, with which it is drafting a strategic partnership agreement. Indonesia reportedly defied U.S. pressure in February when it proceeded with a new order for 11 Su-35 jets in a deal with Moscow. At the same time, though, the Southeast Asian country counts the United States as a major export destination and tends to be less assertive than Vietnam.

Turkey

Toward the other end of Eurasia, Turkey would seem to be an unexpected target for CAATSA as a member of NATO, the gold standard for U.S. alliances. But Ankara has been moving to engage in more transactional relationships with all powers, including putative ally the United States. In a symbolic departure from the practices of alliance behavior, Turkey inked an agreement to acquire the S-400 air defense system from Russia, a NATO adversary.

The Trump administration has demanded that Ankara scuttle the deal, only to trigger a hostile response from the Turkish government. Now the U.S. Congress appears to
be upping the ante with a draft defense bill that would include provisions to suspend the sale of 100 F-35s to Turkey until U.S. authorities provide a report assessing the effects of Washington and Ankara's strained relations on U.S. operations in Turkey. And as in military matters, so in energy: Ankara is expected to defy Washington on the Turk Stream natural gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey, which could become a target of sanctions. If the United States becomes insistent in its demands, Ankara could use its cooperation in Syria as further leverage against Washington.

The Gulf States

Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, have far fewer defense ties with Russia than with the United States, meaning they will find it easier to demonstrate a reduction in defense transactions with Moscow.

Germany

In terms of energy, another of the United States' most enduring allies, Germany, will find itself in the CAATSA crosshairs. Large European energy firms such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Uniper, OMV and Engie could all suffer U.S. sanctions because of their financial involvement in Nord Stream 2, a controversial pipeline that will bring natural gas directly to Germany from Russia. Germany, which has publicly condemned CAATSA's provision regarding Nord Stream 2, is well-placed to resist U.S. demands, thanks to its position as a major global player. Yet its strong economic ties with the United States will also make it vulnerable to punitive U.S. action.

Risks and Rewards

Secondary sanctions are part of the United States' broader strategy to achieve a set of objectives with regard to an adversary by imposing its laws on other countries. Washington has applied extraterritoriality in this way several times in the post-Cold War era, to Cuba, Iran and Libya in the 1990s, and once again to Iran in the 2000s.
If CATSAA succeeds, the rewards for Washington will be nothing less than altering Russia's behavior or curtailing its influence in the international system.
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Most countries view energy and defense as delicate areas in which market dynamics compete with strategic considerations. Defense relations, however, naturally involve sensitivities that exceed those of energy ties. Price negotiations are often protracted, and it might take years to complete an order. Any major weapons system, moreover, requires contracts for maintenance, spare parts and potential upgrades. Supplier reliability is a huge concern — as are technology transfers and joint production, which importers value. Consequently, reorienting core defense relationships can be quite disruptive for the importer.

The CAATSA process is full of lofty ambitions. If it succeeds, the rewards for Washington will be nothing less than altering Russia's behavior or curtailing its influence in the international system. But it also carries risks. In today's world, middle powers are increasingly assertive and refuse to tie themselves to any single great power. The United States' reliance on the blunt tool of extraterritoriality could eventually backfire if it's not careful.



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Time to abort
« Reply #708 on: July 08, 2018, 03:33:29 PM »

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WSJ: The risk of failing to see the sea.
« Reply #713 on: October 23, 2018, 09:21:05 AM »
The Risks of Failing to See the Sea
The West suffers from a dangerous general ignorance of maritime and naval affairs.
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By Elisabeth Braw
Oct. 21, 2018 2:42 p.m. ET
On their way to Norway for NATO exercise Trident Juncture 18, British troops arrive in Hook of Holland, Netherlands, Oct. 10.
On their way to Norway for NATO exercise Trident Juncture 18, British troops arrive in Hook of Holland, Netherlands, Oct. 10. Photo: vincent jannink/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

This week some 50,000 men and women from 31 countries will conduct an enormous military exercise in and around Norway. Called Trident Juncture 18, it will be one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s largest exercises since the end of the Cold War. Europe’s roads have seen a procession of military convoys in recent weeks, but few Europeans have noticed the journey of 65 naval vessels, including an aircraft carrier, to Norwegian waters.

To its detriment, the West suffers from what is sometimes called “sea blindness”—a general ignorance of maritime and naval affairs. Even the United Kingdom’s famous Royal Navy needs a team to travel the country illuminating the public about what it does. “I always thought sea blindness particularly bad in Germany, so it was painful to discover that it exists even in a seafaring nation like Britain,” retired Vice Adm. Hans-Joachim Stricker, a former commander of the German fleet, told me.

The public-awareness tours are in the Royal Navy’s interest. It’s been decades since a Western country has been embroiled in an all-out naval battle on the open ocean. This has bred complacency. Many Britons question whether the Royal Navy needs the two aircraft carriers it recently acquired at a cost of some £6.2 billion ($8.1 billion), when Britain could easily piggyback on the U.S. Navy’s capabilities.

Though the general public may have a hard time imagining it, the risk of naval warfare remains real. This year the Chinese navy was disinvited from the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific Exercise due to Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea. Earlier this month, a U.S. ship conducting a freedom-of-navigation operation near the Spratlys had what the Navy called “an unsafe encounter” with a Chinese warship.

The Royal Navy itself received a stern warning from Beijing in September after one of its ships approached an island China now labels its own. In May the French navy sent an assault ship to patrol the Spratly reefs that China has surreptitiously turned into islands and is outfitting with missiles. The stakes are high, but most of us don’t take any notice.

Intense commercial activity—80% of the world’s trade volume travels by sea—makes waterways into targets. The Baltic Sea, which connects Russia with several NATO member states as well as Sweden and Finland, could be another flashpoint. “During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea was an area of confrontation, with about half the countries with Baltic Sea shorelines belonging to the Warsaw Pact,” Adm. Stricker noted. In the Baltic Sea today, hundreds of daily voyages transport goods such as Swedish iron and Finnish gas. A Russian-led consortium has just begun construction of its Nordstream 2 pipeline, which will cross the Baltic Sea and come ashore in Germany.

“Most Swedes are blissfully unaware of what happens in the Baltic Sea,” retired Gen. Sverker Göranson, supreme commander of Sweden’s armed forces from 2009 to 2015, told me. “The Swedish economy is completely dependent on trade, including the Baltic Sea’s enormous flow of goods. But in the past four years, our security environment has changed.”

That’s putting it diplomatically. Russia, joined by the Chinese navy, this April carried out a major exercise in the Baltic Sea. Part of it, including live-fire missile testing, took place within Latvia’s exclusive economic zone. Sweden had to restrict civilian air traffic. Two months later, 22 NATO countries and partners conducted their own Baltic Sea exercise.

It’s possible that Russia could disrupt NATO in the Baltic Sea, without any of its soldiers setting foot on NATO soil. “It’s vital to a country to have a strong navy and air force, because that’s where the action begins,” Gen. Göranson said. All the ships transporting our daily necessities need protection, too.

Despite the risks, there’s an obvious reason for Western sea blindness: While most people have seen soldiers or perhaps some army jeeps, few have encountered frigates. Out of sight, navies are out of mind. But we indulge our sea blindness at our own risk. Precisely because we depend on the oceans, we should pay closer attention to their security.

Ms. Braw directs the Modern Deterrence program at the U.K.’s Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.

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GPF: Missile vs Missile
« Reply #714 on: December 12, 2018, 07:03:43 PM »
Like hitting a bullet with a bullet (in space). The U.S. military conducted its second successful test in as many months of the new SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor on Tuesday, shooting down an intermediate-range ballistic missile from an Aegis Ashore battery in Hawaii. Two previous tests in 2017 and 2018 failed, and the SM-3 Block IIA could substantially bolster U.S. missile shields in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. (The interceptor is being jointly developed with Japan.) But the implications of advancements in missile defense are difficult to gauge for two reasons: One, missile defense is expensive and extremely difficult, especially against longer-range missiles, and these tests are typically conducted in conditions optimized for success. Two, missile defense systems don’t always lead to stability, and they certainly don’t put an end to costly arms races. Rather, they’re just as likely to convince the countries they’re intended to contain (such as China, North Korea and Russia) to double down on developing missiles that are harder to shoot down. Moscow, for example, is citing U.S. missile defense installations on its periphery as justification for its continued testing of new missiles that violate the beleaguered Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

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Stratfor: Why logistics will be key in any conflict with Russia and/or China
« Reply #715 on: December 22, 2018, 08:30:33 AM »
Why Logistics Will Be Key to Any U.S. Conflict With Russia and China
Sailors attached to Navy Cargo Handling Battalion 1 with Detachment Guam move supplies from a naval base in Guam to the fast transport ship USNS Brunswick on Sept. 1, 2018.
(LT. MARY SMITH/U.S. Navy)


    The geographic distance that helps protect the United States will impinge upon its ability to project force across the Eurasian landmass unless it can improve its logistical supply chain.
    The emergence of new technologies, a weakening merchant marine fleet and many diplomatic issues such as national borders will all hinder Washington's ability to deploy in Eurasia.
    Aware of the challenges, the United States will continue its efforts to solve these problems through the establishment of new NATO commands, the purchase of new vessels and the harnessing of new AI technology.

 

Whether it's the development of new weaponry, the competition to sway middle powers, the collapse of arms control treaties or more, a number of issues have come to dominate the headlines in regard to the nascent great power competition among the United States, Russia and China. But there's another critical topic that has attracted far less attention but is of great concern for Washington: logistics. As it faces the prospect of conflict with Russia or China in Eurasia, the United States has no choice but to get its organizational house in order if it is to wage an effective battle.

The Big Picture

Competition between great powers is a defining theme of our times. As the United States gears up to challenge China and Russia in a number of domains, logistics and — more specifically — the ability to project and sustain its military forces in Eurasia will be a critical component of that competition.


The United States is blessed with a geography that has given it two wide oceans to guard its flanks, insulating it from many direct challenges to the homeland. But the same isolation that helps protect the United States also becomes a tyranny of distance when it comes to the U.S. military's ability to project force on the Eurasian landmass. During both World War II and the Cold War, the United States had to account for (and, in the case of World War II, battle across) the Atlantic Ocean to deploy forces in Europe. Similarly, the United States has created a vast logistics chain to ensure its ability to project forces across the Pacific Ocean to East Asia, Australasia and beyond.

Today, the United States benefits greatly from supply chains and transportation infrastructure that allow it to trade and deploy its forces across large distances in peacetime. Nevertheless, the United States must prepare for the real possibility that it will not enjoy such unencumbered access to maritime routes if its competition with either China or Russia escalates into open hostilities. And compounding the issue for Washington is the emergence of new disruptive technologies, the weakening strength of the United States' merchant marine fleet and the myriad diplomatic issues that Washington must consider every time it crosses national boundaries.
Washington's Transport Woes

If it faces its great power competitors in any armed conflict, the United States would have to move its forces rapidly across huge distances, since forward-deployed U.S. forces in Europe and the western Pacific would not be sufficient on their own to address Russia and China, respectively. Naturally, reinforcements in the form of troops and munitions would have to reach these forces as quickly as possible, yet their route would more likely be by ship than by plane, since there are limits to how much the United States can send by air to a conflict region — even with Washington's large inventory of transport aircraft. As the former head of the U.S. Transportation Command noted last year, the United States only has enough strategic transport aircraft to lift one armored brigade combat team (amounting to 5,000 troops and several hundred vehicles) to a theater of operations. It is thus the Navy that would have to shoulder most of the responsibility for transporting material to sustain a major conflict in Eurasia; in fact, the force has calculated that it would need to transport about 90 percent of the Marine Corps and Army equipment necessary to fight such a battle.

In so doing, Russia and China would naturally attempt to intercept U.S. forces on the high seas, long before American forces arrive at their destination. Russian submarines are, once more, displaying increasing activity in the North Atlantic, while the Chinese navy is dispatching vessels further into the Pacific as it grows in strength each year. Furthermore, emerging technologies could make the slow-going U.S. transport ships even more vulnerable to attack. The development of cruise missiles with ever-longer ranges, anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons could allow Russian and Chinese forces to engage U.S. transport ships from huge distances, especially when enabled by sophisticated satellite constellations such as China's BeiDou navigational satellite network.

An aging sealift roster and a lack of sufficient escorts would also challenge the U.S. logistical effort. According to Defense News, the U.S. Navy has been warning the U.S. Military Sealift Command that there are simply too few warships to adequately escort the slow transports, as the former will be too busy fighting at the front during a major conflict. And according to a U.S. Navy report on the issue from March, Sealift Command itself will seriously lack enough transport vessels, especially come the end of the 2020s.

The U.S. military requirement is for 15.3 million square feet (1.4 million square meters) of government-owned sealift capacity, along with an additional 4.3 million square feet (399,000 square meters) of capacity to be supplied by U.S. flagged commercial ships. But according to the study, this capacity is rapidly declining and will likely fall as far as 12 million square feet (1.11 million square meters) by 2030. What's more, many of the vessels currently in service require extensive maintenance because of their advanced age; the fact that a significant number of these ships still use obsolete, steam-based propulsion will only compound Washington's headaches.

It does not matter how capable, how well-trained or how advanced a nation's forces are if they can't get to the front in time.

And even if the United States were to successfully run a Russian and Chinese gauntlet at sea, it would encounter plenty of problems once it arrives at its destination, including political, infrastructure and even bureaucratic issues. During its recent deployment of rotational forces to Europe following Russia's takeover of Crimea, U.S. forces often found themselves bedeviled by long delays in their overland journeys to Eastern Europe, as they had to wait at borders for permission to cross and cope with infrastructure that was ill-suited for heavy military vehicles. While a conflict in the western Pacific would be a largely maritime and air affair, thereby necessitating fewer bureaucratic hassles at borders, Washington would still face political issues, as it would have to acquire permission to operate from airbases and ports across Japan and, potentially, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines at a time when some of these countries may be loath to provoke China.
The Search for Solutions

With these array of problems to consider, the United States is seeking solutions to ensure its forces and their equipment arrive in Eurasia during a crisis. To ensure greater coordination and unity of effort, NATO is establishing two new commands. The U.S.-based Atlantic Command will focus on coordinating allied efforts to facilitate access across the North Atlantic, while the Germany-based Logistics Command will ensure that U.S. troops arriving in Europe, as well as allied troops already stationed there, will experience no difficulty in rapidly deploying to the front. In addition, the United States also re-established the 2nd Fleet in July to guarantee U.S. naval dominance in the North Atlantic.

And to mitigate the lack of sufficient warships as escorts, military authorities are encouraging transport ships to learn how to reduce their visibility to potential enemies by reducing their electronic emissions. The United States is also exploring the potential of purchasing more transport ships on the commercial market to reduce its growing sealift shortfall, even if such a solution is not straightforward due to the expense and the need to retrofit them for military transport. But perhaps most promising in the long run for Washington is the advent of new technology such as logistics chains that are managed by artificial intelligence, as these can increase the efficiency and responsiveness of U.S. strategic logistics.

The questions surrounding the United States' ability to deploy to the far-flung corners of the globe provide a timely reminder of the primacy of logistics in war planning. After all, it does not matter how capable, how well-trained or how advanced a nation's forces are if they can't get to the front in time. As the United States gears up for its looming battle with Russia and China, logistical concerns will naturally be front and center in the minds of the country's military planners.

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WSJ: Silicon, not steel, will win the next war
« Reply #716 on: December 24, 2018, 02:10:18 PM »
Silicon, Not Steel, Will Win the Next War
America needs a domestic supply of military technology.
46 Comments
By Henry Kressel and
David P. Goldman
Dec. 23, 2018 3:57 p.m. ET
Silicon, Not Steel, Will Win the Next War
Photo: iStock/Getty Images

The Trump administration this year imposed tariffs on steel, claiming that imports “threaten to impair the national security of the United States.” But the age is long past when steel was the most important input in a nation’s military arsenal. The modern military depends more on digital technology—semiconductor chips, sensors and software—than it does on steel.

The U.S. pioneered the technology that made today’s advanced weapon systems possible. But America’s competitive advantage in the digital economy is eroding at an alarming pace, along with its domestic high-tech manufacturing capacity. The majority of electronic systems first invented in the U.S. now are designed and made overseas, mainly in Asia. With few and dwindling exceptions, the U.S. no longer makes things like flat-panel displays, memory devices, light-emitting devices, lasers, imaging chips for digital cameras, and computer system packaging software.

As the manufacture of these component technologies has migrated offshore, so have many key systems suppliers. Intel is the only remaining U.S. company capable of fabricating high-density, high-performance computer chips in America. International Business Strategies estimates that investors are pouring $50 billion a year into advanced chip production facilities in Asia, more than 10 times the level of domestic spending. A state-of-the-art chip-fabrication plant can cost $20 billion to build and must be continuously upgraded.

The national-security implications of this industrial migration are dire. Without a domestic capability in critical electronic technologies, the U.S. may find itself unable to translate innovation into effective weaponry. Overseas supply chains are inherently insecure. Unless the manufacture of critical technology remains under domestic control, American systems are vulnerable to espionage and sabotage.

To be sure, critical defense technologies can be manufactured much more cheaply in Asia than they can in the U.S. But those cost savings come at the expense of American security. China, Japan and South Korea subsidize capital investment to encourage manufacturing facilities to move to their economies. If the U.S. loses all of its most advanced chip-fabrication capacity, it will be like a country without a steel industry in the age of artillery—at the mercy of its enemies.

America’s urgent national-security needs require a reversal of the great migration of manufacturing capacity. That would be costly and in some cases disruptive, and it requires bold and decisive steps:

• Domestic sourcing of the most sensitive defense technologies, which in turn necessitates returning important parts of the supply chain to domestic industry. American industry will require tax breaks and subsidies to do so in some cases.

• Ensuring that skilled professionals and workers are available to fill these high-tech jobs will require government incentives for science, technology and math education comparable to the Eisenhower administration’s response to the 1957 launch of Sputnik, as well as private-public partnerships for apprenticeship programs in manufacturing.

• Tax credits for research and development will be necessary to encourage U.S. corporations to re-establish in-house laboratories like the ones that produced digital-age breakthroughs.

• More direct federal funding of basic research and development. Such spending by the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency, National Aeronautic and Space Administration, and other government agencies reached 1.25% of gross domestic product in 1977 but has fallen to only 0.7% of GDP today. This must be restored, though it won’t help if America lacks the facilities to turn ideas into robust technology.

Bringing high-tech manufacturing back to American shores is an expensive proposition. Part of the cost can be defrayed by reducing funding for aging weapons systems and changing priorities. In the long term, defense R&D will generate profitable civilian spinoffs. But national security is the overriding priority.

Mr. Kressel is a technologist, inventor and private equity investor. Mr. Goldman, a columnist for the Asia Times, formerly headed research groups at Wall Street firms.


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Re: Civilian-Military Relations not doing well
« Reply #718 on: January 03, 2019, 08:48:25 AM »
Mattis lasted longer than Obama's last 3 Secretaries of Defense.  It was probably good for Trump to have these Generals in close counsel during his earliest times in the White House.  Two years ago he thought nuclear triad was a trick question.  Most of his turnover has led to improvement in the positions.  Mattis' positive contributions in arming the US will have lasting effects - until they are reversed by the Left.

Some of these Generals were better in combat than in politics.  There is a difference between military and former military.  Wesley Clarke not mentioned in the piece but some show no more wisdom or discipline than ordinary politicians.  Being a Commander where no one answers back to you may not be good preparation for politics.

Hear them out and take in all their advice, but after all is said and done, thank God we have civilian leadership over our military.


G M

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Re: Appeals court rules for President Trump on transgenders in military
« Reply #720 on: January 04, 2019, 04:30:50 PM »
https://www.westernjournal.com/court-allows-transgender-military-ban-stand/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=westernjournalism&utm_content=2019-01-04&utm_campaign=manualpost

"According to USA Today, dozens of transgender recruits have signed up to serve since Jan 1, 2018, when they became eligible and there are several thousand active-duty transgender troops."

I call BS on those numbers.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #721 on: January 04, 2019, 06:17:04 PM »
Maybe they were looking for Uncle Sam to pick up the bill for the surgeries?

G M

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #722 on: January 04, 2019, 07:25:19 PM »
Maybe they were looking for Uncle Sam to pick up the bill for the surgeries?


The VA and Tricare struggle to provide baseline medical services.

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Quantum Arms Race
« Reply #723 on: January 11, 2019, 12:28:05 PM »


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Heather Mac Donald: Women don't belong in combat units
« Reply #725 on: January 16, 2019, 07:48:54 PM »
Women Don’t Belong in Combat Units
The military is watering down fitness standards because most female recruits can’t meet them.
1212 Comments
By Heather Mac Donald
Updated Jan. 16, 2019 1:38 p.m. ET
Female Marine recruits in boot camp in Parris Island, S.C., Feb. 27, 2013.
Female Marine recruits in boot camp in Parris Island, S.C., Feb. 27, 2013. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images

The Obama-era policy of integrating women into ground combat units is a misguided social experiment that threatens military readiness and wastes resources in the service of a political agenda. The next defense secretary should end it.

In September 2015 the Marine Corps released a study comparing the performance of gender-integrated and male-only infantry units in simulated combat. The all-male teams greatly outperformed the integrated teams, whether on shooting, surmounting obstacles or evacuating casualties. Female Marines were injured at more than six times the rate of men during preliminary training—unsurprising, since men’s higher testosterone levels produce stronger bones and muscles. Even the fittest women (which the study participants were) must work at maximal physical capacity when carrying a 100-pound pack or repeatedly loading heavy shells into a cannon.

Ignoring the Marine study, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter opened all combat roles to women in December 2015. Rather than requiring new female combat recruits to meet the same physical standards as men, the military began crafting “gender neutral” standards in the hope that more women would qualify. Previously, women had been admitted to noncombat specialties under lower strength and endurance requirements.

Only two women have passed the Marine Corps’s fabled infantry-officer training course out of the three dozen who have tried. Most wash out in the combat endurance test, administered on day one. Participants hike miles while carrying combat loads of 80 pounds or more, climb 20-foot ropes multiple times, and scale an 8-foot barrier. The purpose of the test is to ensure that officers can hump their own equipment and still arrive at a battleground mentally and physically capable of leading troops. Most female aspirants couldn’t pass the test, so the Marines changed it from a pass/fail requirement to an unscored exercise with no bearing on the candidate’s ultimate evaluation. The weapons-company hike during the IOC is now “gender neutral,” meaning that officers can hand their pack to a buddy if they get tired, rather than carrying it for the course’s full 10 miles.

Lowering these physical requirements risks reducing the American military’s lethality. A more serious effect of sex integration has become taboo to mention: the inevitable introduction of eros into combat units. Putting young, hormonally charged men and women into stressful close quarters for extended periods guarantees sexual liaisons, rivalries and breakups, all of which undermine the bonding essential to a unified fighting force.

A Marine commander who served in Afghanistan described to me how the arrival of an all-female team tasked with reaching out to local women affected discipline on his forward operating base. Until that point, rigorous discipline had been the norm. But when four women—three service members and a translator—arrived, the post’s atmosphere changed overnight from a “stern, businesslike place to that of an eighth-grade dance.” The officer walked into a common room one day to find the women clustered in the center. They were surrounded by eager male Marines, one of whom was doing a handstand.

Another Marine officer, who was stationed on a Navy ship after 9/11, told me that a female officer had regular trysts with an enlisted sailor in the engine room. Marine Cpl. Remedios Cruz, one of the first women to join the infantry, was discharged late last year after admitting to a sexual relationship with a male subordinate. Army Sgt. First Class Chase Usher was relieved of his leadership position for a consensual relationship with a female soldier that began almost immediately after she arrived at his newly gender-integrated unit in Fort Bragg, N.C.

Long before infantry integration became a feminist imperative, evidence was clear that a coed military was a sexually active one. In 1988 then-Navy Secretary Jim Webb reported that of the unmarried enlisted Navy and Air Force women stationed in Iceland, half were pregnant.

President Trump’s first defense secretary, Jim Mattis, had seemed a good candidate for reversing the integration of women in combat units. A retired Marine general, Mr. Mattis had previously addressed the incompatibility of eros and military discipline. New York Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand challenged him about these politically incorrect views during his confirmation hearings, but he left enough wiggle room to preserve his options.

Unfortunately, Mr. Trump chose to ban transgender people from serving in the military rather than tackling gender integration. Mr. Trump cited the cost to taxpayers of sex-reassignment surgery for soldiers, but those costs are minute compared with the future medical bills for women’s combat-battered bodies. And women pose a far greater challenge to combat-unit cohesion than do transgender troops, because of their numbers and the nature of sexual attraction.

The argument for putting women into combat roles has always been nonmilitary: Combat experience qualifies soldiers for high-ranking Pentagon jobs. But war isn’t about promoting equality. Its objective is to break the enemy’s will through precise lethal engagement, with the lowest possible loss of American life. The claim that female combat soldiers will perform as lethally as men over an extended deployment entails a denial of biological reality as great as the one underlying the transgender crusade.

Female engineers and others did return fire when attacked in Iraq and Afghanistan. But performing well in incident-related combat is a far cry from serving in a dedicated ground-combat unit, with its months of punishing physical demands.

The incoming Pentagon chief can expect an aggressive grilling on gender integration from the Senate Armed Services Committee. He should promise to resolve the claim that, when it comes to combat, there are no significant physical differences between men and women. He could do it by pitting an all-female infantry unit against an all-male unit and seeing how they measure up.

Ms. Mac Donald is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of “The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the University and Undermine Our Culture.”

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #726 on: January 16, 2019, 08:19:24 PM »
I was thinking no men should sign up for the military ,

Let the military have all the women they want and lets see how it goes.
I mean the military is all about experimentation these days.....

if the world would be a better place if only women were in charge lets start here.


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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #729 on: February 26, 2019, 07:30:41 AM »
I saw this.  I get the logic I suppose, but I'm thinking the military should be deciding these things, not judges.


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Re: Selective Service
« Reply #730 on: February 26, 2019, 01:06:06 PM »

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GPF: The miitary implications of batteries
« Reply #731 on: March 04, 2019, 10:29:57 AM »
Batteries Make the World Go Round
Sep 27, 2018
By Xander Snyder

Summary

Some innovations disrupt industries. Others disrupt the world. Gunpowder, the internal combustion engine, the microchip, the internet – these are all innovations that changed what it meant for a state to be secure and, therefore, what interests the state must pursue. Many have guessed, but it’s impossible to know what the next revolutionary, world-disrupting technology will be. But we can nevertheless look at how advancements in existing technologies are creating new industries and doing things like modifying states’ military capabilities. As technology progresses, and as costs come down, new applications emerge that can generate demand for inputs that were previously mostly ignored.

One technology that is progressing with global implications is energy storage, specifically electrochemical batteries, which store energy chemically and transform it into electricity via chemical reactions. The increasing energy density of new batteries, greater lifecycles and ability to recharge mean that batteries can be used to power new devices and for longer periods. Lithium-ion batteries, for example, have become the industry standard for consumer electronics of all types and are being adopted by the electric vehicle industry. Better batteries also enable the wider adoption of new types of energy generation, such as wind and solar, by providing a way for round-the-clock use of electricity that is generated only at certain times of the day.

The states with the best batteries will have a comparative advantage in commerce and on the battlefield. Securing supply chains critical to the production of batteries, therefore, will become an increasingly strategic concern for countries in the years to come – much like oil supplies today. And that means ensuring that all inputs of production are available in sufficient quantities to produce enough batteries to meet a state’s strategic needs.

This Deep Dive will investigate the current state of one of the most promising battery types right now, lithium-ion batteries, and how the need for cobalt in those batteries’ production in the coming years is increasing foreign powers’ strategic focus on the country with the most cobalt reserves and greatest production, the Democratic Republic of Congo. China has a sizable advantage right now in the cultivation of links to the DRC’s mines, while the U.S. is gradually turning its attention to the search for alternatives. More broadly, we will lay out a framework for thinking about technological advancement in geopolitical terms: By focusing on critical components and where they are located, we can get a sense for where future zones of competition can emerge and which technologies governments will focus their investment on.

Not Just Your Smartphone Battery

Lithium-ion batteries are being used in more and more ways because they solve a lot of energy storage problems. They can store and discharge more energy per mass than other older batteries like lead-acid or nickel metal hydride, and they have a slower self-discharge rate (i.e., how much of its charge the battery loses on its own without usage). These properties have made lithium-ion batteries ubiquitous in smartphones and other small consumer electronic devices that require frequent charging and are intended to have a relatively long life expectancy.

Lithium-ion batteries are also becoming the standard battery in electric vehicles. Though lithium-ion-powered EVs still cannot quite match the range of gas-powered vehicles, they are getting close – a Tesla Model S with an upgraded battery can travel 335 miles (540 kilometers) on a single charge, among the longest travel ranges for any electric vehicle – even if EVs with the longest mileage are far more expensive than their gas-fueled equivalents. As the EV market pushes demand for lithium-ion batteries higher, their energy density has been increasing while the cost of production has been falling. The University of California, Berkeley estimates that the price for an EV-designed lithium-ion battery in 2016 was about $150 per kilowatt-hour – compared to over $400 a decade ago. And as the cost of lithium-ion batteries falls, they become more competitive with similar batteries and thus become viable alternatives. Advancements that lead to smaller lithium-ion batteries will also increase their potential use cases.
 
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Broader adoption, however, has implications well beyond the world of consumer electronics and electric vehicles and into national defense. In his 2009 book “The Next 100 Years,” GPF founder George Friedman pointed out that as infantry becomes increasingly mechanized and reliant on portable electronic devices, there will develop a growing strategic need to deliver electricity to the battlefield and forward bases. This trend is already developing: In 2004, a typical NATO soldier deployed in Iraq consumed approximately 500 watt-hours during a 72-hour mission. Today, that same dismounted soldier would consume twice as much electricity. Here, too, the effect of innovation in lithium-ion battery technology is being felt. In this case, lithium-ion batteries have three major advantages over existing battery tech used by soldiers in the field. First, they are rechargeable. (In 2015, NATO said dismounted soldiers needed to carry seven different batteries, which weren’t rechargeable and therefore needed to be replaced.) Second, they last longer than traditional lead-acid batteries. And third, they are lighter than other battery types that can deliver the same quantity of energy.

Another immediate application for lithium-ion batteries is enabling longer periods of what’s called “silent watch.” Often soldiers will be stationed for long periods in a vehicle with its engine turned off to keep watch over an area. Silent watch requires vehicles to power sensors and communication suites without the engine running. Lead-acid batteries, which have been standard, provide for only about four hours of silent watch, at which point the outpost must turn its engine on to power the generator, revealing its position. Lithium-ion batteries could extend this time to 12 hours, providing for all-night silent watches.
Reducing the strain on mechanized infantry and enabling longer silent watches may not seem like huge leaps in capabilities, but in war, supply and logistics are everything, and these advantages would reduce the logistical burden and improve forward operating capabilities. Efficient lithium-ion batteries can decrease the need for constant resupply of other types of batteries and of fuel needed for generators, since independent units could use solar and wind systems in conjunction with rechargeable batteries to provide for their electricity needs. Given that fuel often costs more than 10 times its purchase price to deliver safely to forward operating bases, this has meaningful financial benefits. It would also make it easier to station ground forces farther forward for longer periods.

There are other military use cases for more efficient batteries that go beyond minimizing supply constraints – for example, signal targeting, which is when a deployed unit uses a portable electronic system to detect and jam all frequency signaling in a given area by an adversary. The ability to disrupt an enemy’s command and control is a substantial tactical advantage. Signal targeting requires batteries, and if it’s a long mission – say, 10 or more hours – a highly efficient and, preferably, lightweight battery is needed.

Pulsed power supplies are another such use for efficient batteries. These use electricity to power applications like high-powered microwaves, electromagnetic launchers, lasers, railguns and similar devices that require a quick burst of electricity. A study by the University of Texas showed that lithium-ion batteries can make these pulsed power supplies substantially more compact, mobile and efficient. Right now, most pulse powered applications continue to rely on power supplied from the grid, which clearly limits their usefulness on a battlefield.

Democratic Republic of Cobalt

Though lithium-ion batteries are by no means the only new, efficient, rechargeable battery, they are one of the most promising, offering high energy density, minimal recharging memory effect (i.e., reduced longevity over time) and lower unintended discharge rates (lost charge while not in use). Among the category of lithium-ion batteries, one of the preferred types requires cobalt to be used in the cathode. (The cathode is the positively charged side of the battery; the anode is the negatively charged side. As lithium-ions flow from one side, or electrode, to the other, they emit electrons to an external circuit that powers devices.)

The problem with cobalt, however, is where it comes from. The Democratic Republic of Congo – a country not known for its political stability or ease of doing business – holds 50 percent of all cobalt reserves and provides nearly 60 percent of the global supply. From 1996 to 2003, the DRC experienced two extremely bloody civil wars, but the violence never really stopped. The second war – sometimes referred to as the Great African War because many other African countries were pulled into the fighting – is believed to have caused nearly 5.5 million deaths, making it the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II.
There are alternatives to producing lithium-ion battery cathodes with cobalt, but each has its drawbacks. For example, Daniel Abraham, a senior scientist at Argonne National Laboratory, described how cobalt can be substituted with nickel, which is cheaper. But using nickel increases the risk of a large release of oxygen – a significant fire hazard. Adding aluminum can increase the stability of a nickel cathode, but not without decreasing the cell’s capacity. To balance between these, some batteries use a combination of nickel, cobalt and aluminum, but regardless of the combination, cobalt is still the best solution for making high-capacity, efficient and stable lithium-ion batteries.

Similarly, there’s no good single substitute for the DRC when it comes to cobalt production. Though other countries have cobalt reserves, they are much smaller and more widely scattered. The remaining roughly 40 percent of production is split across several countries, with Russia, Australia, Canada and Cuba ranking as the second- through fifth-largest producers in 2017. But each of these countries produced only between about 4,000 and 5,500 metric tons of cobalt each, compared to the DRC’s nearly 65,000 metric tons.
 
(click to enlarge)

As cobalt use has grown in consumer electronics, companies like Samsung and Apple have begun seeking out agreements directly with large cobalt miners, which have more oversight than smaller operations, as opposed to purchasing it on the market. This is motivated in part by companies’ desires to distance themselves from the high incidence of child labor used in mining cobalt in the DRC, especially among smaller mining companies.

But the bigger risk for these companies is that the growth in electric vehicle production could take so much cobalt off the market that it becomes difficult to source a key component of their own products. For example, though a smartphone requires only about 8 grams of cobalt, an EV battery requires 10 kilograms – more than 1,000 times as much. Research initiatives have sought to reduce the amount of cobalt needed in lithium-ion batteries, such as the nickel-cobalt-aluminum cathode, but demand for cobalt in the next 10 years is still forecast to increase significantly.
 
(click to enlarge)

All of this means that, until comparable technologies can be invented to decrease the need for cobalt, the DRC will take on a more strategic role for companies and countries that depend on cobalt-based lithium-ion batteries – which is to say, every major country in the world. This is especially true as the increased production of lithium-ion batteries drives their cost down, thus increasing the number of use cases for them.

The China Factor

As it turns out, though, China currently controls 80 percent of the global cobalt sulfates and oxides market – the refined products needed to produce lithium-ion cathodes. China is also the largest producer of lithium-ion batteries, and Chinese battery makers have cut large deals with cobalt mining companies. Earlier this year, for instance, Chinese battery producer GEM signed a deal with Glencore to purchase one-third of its mined cobalt from 2018 through 2020. Glencore, for its part, is responsible for mining about a third of the world’s annual supply of cobalt.

The DRC is a major recipient of Chinese investment in Africa. In early 2017, China Molybdenum purchased a majority stake in the DRC’s Tenke Fungurume Mine, one of the largest deposits of cobalt and copper in the world, from a U.S.-based company for $3.8 billion. In June, China’s Citic Metal spent $560 million on a 20 percent stake in Ivanhoe Mines, which operates the Kamoa-Kakula copper mine. (Currently, about 98 percent of cobalt is mined as a byproduct of nickel and copper.) China has also invested heavily in the Sicomines copper project, a joint venture between Sinohydro, China Railway Construction Corp. and the Congolese state. The Sicomines project is perhaps the best known of the resources-for-infrastructure deals that China has made on the African continent. In exchange for a guaranteed quantity of copper and cobalt, Beijing has agreed to build transport infrastructure that would allow for easier production and export of those resources, as well as other projects such as hospitals.

There are two reasons China is spending so much money on developing mines in central Africa. The first is economic: China is hoping to become a leader in electric vehicles and, by extension, lithium-ion batteries. This accomplishes several things for China. For one, more clean vehicles work toward Beijing’s goal of reducing pollution, which it has already begun to combat with regulations restricting the number and type of cars on its roads, especially in big cities. Persistent and increasingly toxic pollution has become a political issue in China, and Beijing is aware that reducing pollution at this point would eliminate one more motivation for social unrest. China is also hoping to move up the value chain, and electric vehicles are one product it is focusing heavily on in hopes of becoming a global leader. Developing a comparative advantage – or, if it can corner the cobalt market, an exclusive advantage – would provide China with higher-paying manufacturing jobs, which would help grow its domestic consumer base. In the long run, a robust domestic EV industry could also decrease China’s dependence on imported oil.
 
(click to enlarge)

The second reason for China’s focus on central African mines is strategic. Because modern military technology requires an increasing supply of dependable, portable electricity, the development of exclusive or near-exclusive control of one commodity required to build that power supply would be no small advantage. This is especially true given that the U.S. imports almost all of its cobalt – approximately 70 percent of all cobalt consumed in the U.S. in 2017 was imported. Economically, this makes sense, since a lot of products with lithium-ion batteries that are sold to U.S. consumers are assembled not in the U.S. but in China. Nevertheless, the demand for cobalt is growing, and the U.S. currently has little direct access to where most of it is being mined or refined. This is why the U.S. Department of the Interior in February designated cobalt, along with 34 other minerals, as critical to the economy and national security of the United States.

In terms of securing more cobalt, however, the charge in the U.S. has mainly been led by companies like Apple and Samsung. Whether the U.S. government becomes more directly involved in the competition – a race against China, where the DRC’s cobalt reserves are the prize –  will depend on a few factors: whether stable, cobalt-free batteries are invented and at what cost they can be produced, and how high the price of cobalt goes.
 
(click to enlarge)

The price will to some extent determine whether there will be more investment in mines outside the DRC. Australia, as an example, has 17 percent of global cobalt reserves but currently produces only less than 8 percent of what the DRC does. Because most cobalt is mined as a byproduct of nickel and copper, the supply of cobalt has hitherto been determined less by its own price than by the price of these two primary metals. Should the price of cobalt go high enough, more mines may open and focus exclusively on cobalt production, which could lead countries like Australia or Russia to produce at greater levels. Still, with as much cobalt reserves as the rest of the world combined, the DRC will remain an invaluable part of the supply.

Being in a position where it is reliant on a large and dependable supply of cobalt, then, may not be a realistic proposition for the United States. Given the national security aspect of energy storage and China’s head start in controlling the cobalt market, the U.S. government in the coming years will need to invest more money in battery technologies that are not reliant on cobalt. Lithium iron phosphate, which does not utilize cobalt in cathodes, is one such example. In 2015, the U.S. Navy awarded an $80 million contract to K2 Energy Solutions to design a battery that would be “capable of powering a large modular capacitor bank for [an] electromagnetic railgun.” The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory is also researching ways to successfully and repeatedly recharge zinc batteries, which are widely used but only as single-use batteries.

Advances in technology fundamentally alter how states project power and, therefore, dictate where they must focus to secure their interests. This, in turn, can magnify the geopolitical relevance of places in the world that may not have had as much global influence as before. The Middle East and oil is just one example of this: Saudi Arabia became a focus for countries all over the world after it discovered oil in an age when all countries’ military capacities heavily depended on it.

As the world researches and discovers alternative sources of energy, storing that energy will become critical. Researching and developing alternatives to fossil fuels, delivering electricity to the battlefield and storing electricity produced by distributed generation sources such as wind or solar will become new arenas of technological, economic and military competition between states.

The post Batteries Make the World Go Round appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.





G M

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Re: RAND and WWIII simulations
« Reply #733 on: March 11, 2019, 01:58:04 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #734 on: March 11, 2019, 09:30:42 PM »
Big Dog:

What is your take on what you posted?


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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #736 on: March 12, 2019, 11:19:24 AM »
Big Dog:
What is your take on what you posted?

I wonder that also.  The results surprise me.  The study seems to have credibility: "a former deputy secretary of defense with years of wargaming experience".  True that the US is unwilling to take casualties in other people's wars, Vietnam, Iraq, etc., but does our will in a real, inside-the-US war?

I wonder what scenarios they are considering.  I don't see the potential real world conflicts as being all out war.  In previous 'world wars' the outcome depended on who is on whose side.  If it was Russia versus the world, how would they win?  With China it is more complicated. Aren't we roughly their number one customer and isn't their internal governance based on provided security and growing prosperity to the people, both that would be lost in an all-out conflict.

The US does not want to occupy either of these powers.  Other than people pouring in across our southern border, who would want to occupy us?  Once you get past our aircraft carriers and nuclear triad, don't we still have 400 million guns - widely dispersed?

The idea that a country or power can only gain by conquering and occupying others is so last century, IMHO.

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #737 on: March 12, 2019, 12:48:48 PM »
China's cyber capabilities, aided and abetted by its having snatched to security clearance applications of some 2.5 million Americans means that a lot of our capabilities may be a Maginot Line.


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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #748 on: April 25, 2019, 10:36:04 AM »
The U.S. Military: Like the French at Agincourt?

America risks a catastrophic defeat if it doesn’t radically change the way it thinks about war.


Bret Stephens

By Bret Stephens

Opinion Columnist

    April 25, 2019





United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images
Image
United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditCreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images

Early on a Sunday morning in 1932, a fleet of some 150 fighters, dive-bombers and torpedo planes struck the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The ships lying at anchor on Battleship Row sustained direct hits. Also hit were the base’s fuel storage tanks and the Army Air Corps planes parked nearby at Hickam Field.


The surprise was as complete as it was devastating. Only this was an Army-Navy war game, the attackers were American pilots operating from the carriers Saratoga and Lexington, and the bombs they dropped were sacks of flour.


The lesson of “Grand Joint Exercise 4,” as it was called, is that forewarned is not always forearmed. It took the actual sinking of much of the U.S. battle fleet nearly a decade later to bring the lesson home to U.S. military planners that the age of the carrier had arrived.


Fast forward to 2006, when a small Chinese diesel-electric submarine surfaced well within torpedo-firing range from the 80,000-ton Kitty Hawk, having gone undetected by the carrier and her escorts. That incident ought to have been a loud wake-up call to the Navy that the age of the super-carrier is drawing to a close just as surely as the age of the battleship was coming to an end by the 1930s.



The only question is whether we will learn the lesson for ourselves, or — as we did on Dec. 7, 1941 — have an adversary teach it to us.

The question is also at the heart of an incisive and important essay in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs by Christian Brose, the former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee.


“The traditional model of U.S. military power is being disrupted, the way Blockbuster’s business model was amid the rise of Amazon and Netflix,” Brose writes. “A military made up of small numbers of large, expensive, heavily manned, and hard-to-replace systems will not survive on future battlefields, where swarms of intelligent machines will deliver violence at a greater volume and higher velocity than ever before.”


The logic here is the same as the one that decided the Battle of Agincourt, where the humble and effective English longbow made short work of the expensive and vulnerable French cavalry. Today’s version of that cavalry consists of aircraft carriers priced at $13 billion apiece and fighter jets that go for $90 million (and cost $30,000 an hour to fly).


These systems are all beset by the usual technological hurdles, cost overruns and bureaucratic pitfalls. Still, they’d be worth their enormous price if they conferred a long-term, decisive edge over our adversaries, as U.S. technological superiority over the Soviets did during the Cold War.



The problem is that they no longer do. On the one hand, we are burning through billions of dollars by deploying state-of-the-art resources against technologically primitive enemies in the Middle East and Africa. Why? Because, for example, an Air Force obsessed with acquiring fifth-generation stealth fighters still can’t bring itself to purchase a squadron of cheap turboprop planes to patrol, say, the skies of northern Iraq.


On the other hand, we are burning through trillions in order to build a relatively small number of ultra-sophisticated platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to detection and destruction by near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. “Put simply,” Brose writes, “U.S. rivals are fielding large quantities of multimillion-dollar weapons to destroy the United States’ multibillion-dollar military systems.”


That’s a recipe for strategic failure on budgetary grounds alone. The coming of technologies like hypersonic propulsion, space-based weapons and quantum sensors (able to detect minute disruptions of air or water) makes it a recipe for rapid military defeat as well — at least if nothing changes.

The answer, Brose argues, is to radically increase the numbers of military platforms, lower their costs, and — within ethical limits — enhance their autonomy. This puts fewer war fighters in harm’s way, creates more (and more difficult) targets for an enemy to track, and makes the loss of any one of them far easier to bear. Right now the Navy is straining to reach a target of 355 ships. It should be aiming for a significantly higher number, much of it unmanned.


So what stops it? The answer is what Brose’s old boss, the late John McCain, called the military-industrial-congressional complex.


“Military pilots and ship drivers are no more eager to lose their jobs to intelligent machines than factory workers are,” Brose writes. “Defense companies that make billions selling traditional systems are as welcoming of disruptions to their business model as the taxi cab industry has been of Uber and Lyft. And as all this resistance inevitably translates into disgruntled constituents, members of Congress will have enormous incentives to stymie change.”


It doesn’t have to be this way. A Pentagon with a visionary and independent leader, a Congress ruled by a non-parochial and bipartisan spirit, and a

serious president capable of long-term thinking could change the way America prepares for the next war — to prevent it if possible, to win it if necessary.


For that, we’ll have to wait for a future administration. In the meantime, the risk of being on the losing side of our own Agincourt grows.

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #749 on: April 25, 2019, 08:54:17 PM »
https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/war-china-the-us-could-lose


The U.S. Military: Like the French at Agincourt?

America risks a catastrophic defeat if it doesn’t radically change the way it thinks about war.


Bret Stephens

By Bret Stephens

Opinion Columnist

    April 25, 2019





United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images
Image
United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditCreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images

Early on a Sunday morning in 1932, a fleet of some 150 fighters, dive-bombers and torpedo planes struck the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The ships lying at anchor on Battleship Row sustained direct hits. Also hit were the base’s fuel storage tanks and the Army Air Corps planes parked nearby at Hickam Field.


The surprise was as complete as it was devastating. Only this was an Army-Navy war game, the attackers were American pilots operating from the carriers Saratoga and Lexington, and the bombs they dropped were sacks of flour.


The lesson of “Grand Joint Exercise 4,” as it was called, is that forewarned is not always forearmed. It took the actual sinking of much of the U.S. battle fleet nearly a decade later to bring the lesson home to U.S. military planners that the age of the carrier had arrived.


Fast forward to 2006, when a small Chinese diesel-electric submarine surfaced well within torpedo-firing range from the 80,000-ton Kitty Hawk, having gone undetected by the carrier and her escorts. That incident ought to have been a loud wake-up call to the Navy that the age of the super-carrier is drawing to a close just as surely as the age of the battleship was coming to an end by the 1930s.



The only question is whether we will learn the lesson for ourselves, or — as we did on Dec. 7, 1941 — have an adversary teach it to us.

The question is also at the heart of an incisive and important essay in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs by Christian Brose, the former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee.


“The traditional model of U.S. military power is being disrupted, the way Blockbuster’s business model was amid the rise of Amazon and Netflix,” Brose writes. “A military made up of small numbers of large, expensive, heavily manned, and hard-to-replace systems will not survive on future battlefields, where swarms of intelligent machines will deliver violence at a greater volume and higher velocity than ever before.”


The logic here is the same as the one that decided the Battle of Agincourt, where the humble and effective English longbow made short work of the expensive and vulnerable French cavalry. Today’s version of that cavalry consists of aircraft carriers priced at $13 billion apiece and fighter jets that go for $90 million (and cost $30,000 an hour to fly).


These systems are all beset by the usual technological hurdles, cost overruns and bureaucratic pitfalls. Still, they’d be worth their enormous price if they conferred a long-term, decisive edge over our adversaries, as U.S. technological superiority over the Soviets did during the Cold War.



The problem is that they no longer do. On the one hand, we are burning through billions of dollars by deploying state-of-the-art resources against technologically primitive enemies in the Middle East and Africa. Why? Because, for example, an Air Force obsessed with acquiring fifth-generation stealth fighters still can’t bring itself to purchase a squadron of cheap turboprop planes to patrol, say, the skies of northern Iraq.


On the other hand, we are burning through trillions in order to build a relatively small number of ultra-sophisticated platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to detection and destruction by near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. “Put simply,” Brose writes, “U.S. rivals are fielding large quantities of multimillion-dollar weapons to destroy the United States’ multibillion-dollar military systems.”


That’s a recipe for strategic failure on budgetary grounds alone. The coming of technologies like hypersonic propulsion, space-based weapons and quantum sensors (able to detect minute disruptions of air or water) makes it a recipe for rapid military defeat as well — at least if nothing changes.

The answer, Brose argues, is to radically increase the numbers of military platforms, lower their costs, and — within ethical limits — enhance their autonomy. This puts fewer war fighters in harm’s way, creates more (and more difficult) targets for an enemy to track, and makes the loss of any one of them far easier to bear. Right now the Navy is straining to reach a target of 355 ships. It should be aiming for a significantly higher number, much of it unmanned.


So what stops it? The answer is what Brose’s old boss, the late John McCain, called the military-industrial-congressional complex.


“Military pilots and ship drivers are no more eager to lose their jobs to intelligent machines than factory workers are,” Brose writes. “Defense companies that make billions selling traditional systems are as welcoming of disruptions to their business model as the taxi cab industry has been of Uber and Lyft. And as all this resistance inevitably translates into disgruntled constituents, members of Congress will have enormous incentives to stymie change.”


It doesn’t have to be this way. A Pentagon with a visionary and independent leader, a Congress ruled by a non-parochial and bipartisan spirit, and a

serious president capable of long-term thinking could change the way America prepares for the next war — to prevent it if possible, to win it if necessary.


For that, we’ll have to wait for a future administration. In the meantime, the risk of being on the losing side of our own Agincourt grows.