Russia

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-february-19-2013/how-i-meteored-your-motherland

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/business/global/russia-cuts-budget-to-try-to-spur-growth.html?_r=0

[ccp]

http://www.celebritynetworth.com/articles/celebrity/how-vladimir-putin-stashed-away-a-secret-70-billion-personal-fortune/

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

Russia's legislature is considering a proposal to abolish one of the country's top courts, the Supreme Arbitration Court, and consolidate it under the Supreme Court. The bill before the Duma also would expand the Kremlin's power to politically shape the country on a more granular level via the judicial system amid political and social changes inside the country.

This is the Kremlin's first consolidation of a major part of the Russian system since a series of consolidations in the early to mid-2000s. While there are systematic reasons for the judicial consolidation, the proposal -- spearheaded by Russian President Vladimir Putin -- faces opposition, as the new, larger court would tip the political balance within the country and eliminate a court system that was regarded as more efficient and less corrupt than the Supreme Court.
Analysis

Russia's judicial system consists of three courts: the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Supreme Arbitration Court. These courts oversee tiers of courts below them: regional, district, magistrate and others. Each high court has its own jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court is largely independent from its two sisters, as it only oversees matters pertaining to the Russian Constitution and disputes between federal bodies. The Supreme Court is the higher of the two remaining courts, having a general jurisdiction over civil, criminal and nearly every other type of case. The Supreme Arbitration Court, also called the Commercial Court, oversees economic and commercial arbitration.

Russia's Judicial System

But even with the distinctions between the types of cases the high courts oversee, there are some discrepancies and ambiguities between the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court. The two have fought over power and jurisdiction since their inception in 1993. The Supreme Court and its supporters have argued that it holds final say in all matters except constitutional issues, even though the Supreme Arbitration Court is technically the ultimate venue for all commercial arbitration. The Supreme Court has, in several instances, encroached on commercial cases. This has occasionally led to one court overturning a verdict reached by the other court, and to commercial arbitration cases going to one court instead of the other in attempts to get a favorable outcome.

As far as perception, the Supreme Arbitration Court has been viewed as the more modern, efficient, impartial and less corrupt of the two high courts. The Supreme Arbitration Court's practices have even drawn praise from the European Court of Human Rights. The Supreme Court, however, has faced accusations from within Russia and by foreign groups of being protectionist, political and corrupt. The efficiency of the Supreme Arbitration Court could be attributed to the lighter caseload, as it receives only 35 appeals per month on average compared to the Supreme Court's 200 appeals per month.

There is also a political aspect to the courts' power struggle, because each is aligned with a different political group. The Supreme Court, headed by Vyacheslav Lebedev, is largely considered to have political support from the security hawk siloviki faction within the Kremlin. The Supreme Arbitration Court, headed by Anton Ivanov, is closer to the more reformist and liberal civiliki faction associated with Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.

In the past year, competition between the two courts has become increasingly fierce. In 2012, the Supreme Court attempted to create "administrative courts" that would oversee arbitration, meaning that all arbitration would become subordinate to the Supreme Court instead of the Supreme Arbitration Court. The Supreme Arbitration Court was able to block this move in March of this year. In recent months, the siloviki factions put forward the candidacy of Vladimir Vinokurov, who had never served as a judge, for deputy head of the Supreme Arbitration Court in order to infiltrate the system and undermine Ivanov -- something Ivanov was able to block politically because of his ally Medvedev's influence.
Attempts to Reconcile the Courts

Major structural reforms to clarify the courts' positions and power have been attempted continually, including previous proposals to merge the two courts. In the past year, Putin has attempted to find a compromise between the courts by proposing an Administrative Judiciary, which would create some sort of supreme judicial panel with three representatives from each of the three top courts. However, Constitutional Court Chief Valery Zorkin deemed this proposal unconstitutional in a rare disagreement between the court chief and the president. A series of criticisms in the media said the proposed Administrative Judiciary was too reminiscent of the Communist Party Central Committee, which developed centralized legal positions in the Soviet Union.

Instead, the president is now supporting the consolidation of the courts, which would give the Supreme Arbitration Court's functions to the Supreme Court, creating what Russian media have dubbed a "super court." The Supreme Court would then increase its number of judges from 125 to 170, which means that the new court would not absorb all of the current 53 arbitration judges. According to Putin, the consolidated court system would streamline judicial procedures and practices and eliminate redundancies.

This consolidation would require a change to the Russian Constitution, which divides the two court systems, though constitutional modifications would be relatively easy under Putin's direction. It would be the largest structural change within the Russian government since Putin's string of political, economic, social and security consolidations in the early 2000s.
Criticisms of Putin's Proposal

The Supreme Arbitration Court, as well as many in Russia's legal and political circles, has harshly criticized the proposed consolidation. On Oct. 10, seven judges from the Supreme Arbitration Court resigned in protest of the bill. The head of Russia's Intellectual Property Rights Court, Lyudmila Novoselova, said the quality of commercial arbitration would be reduced under the Supreme Court. Ivanov added that a unified court would end up being a "dinosaur guided by a small brain that needs tuning."

Many critics see political motives behind Putin's proposal. Having one super court instead of two competing courts would give one faction -- either siloviki or civiliki -- unprecedented power to shape politics, business and other facets of the country. It is unclear who would head the enlarged Supreme Court, which is aligned with the siloviki. Rumors have indicated that the Supreme Court's chief position could be given to the more liberal civiliki clan in order to avoid alienating foreign investors, who have said they are more willing to invest in Russia based on the more efficient track record of the Supreme Arbitration Court. Whoever might control the new Supreme Court, the appointment will create a battle within Putin's already delicately balanced inner circle.

There is another possible motive for Putin's proposal: The bill submitted to the Duma includes an amendment that would give Putin the authority to directly appoint prosecutors in the regions -- currently a prerogative of the prosecutor general. This would give the country's leader an unusual amount of granular power.

It could be that Putin is concerned about shaping the shifts taking place across the country. As Stratfor has observed, Russia is going through a series of social and political changes that are eroding Putin's consolidated control over the country. Handpicking the people within the regions' judicial circles could help Putin shape the policies and precedents for regional politics and business. In slipping the amendment in with larger judicial reforms, Putin could be signaling that he is increasingly worried about his power in the regions -- just as a growing power struggle is about to intensify in Moscow.

Read more: Russia: Putin's Motives for Judicial Consolidation | Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

 Is Russia's Destiny Autocratic?
Global Affairs
Wednesday, February 19, 2014 - 04:07 Print Text Size
Global Affairs with Robert D. Kaplan
Stratfor
By Robert D. Kaplan

In 1967, the late British historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote in his epic account, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, "If there is one single factor which dominates the course of Russian history, at any rate since the Tatar conquest, it is the principle of autocracy." He goes on to explain how the nations of Western Europe were formed by a long struggle between "the monarchial power and the social elite." In England, the elite usually won, and that was a key to the development of parliamentary democracy. But in Russia it was generally agreed that rather than granting special privileges to an elite, "It was better that all should be equal in their subjection to the autocrat."

This profound anti-democratic tradition of Russian political culture has its roots in geography, or as Seton-Watson prefers to explain it, in military necessity. Between the Arctic ice and the mountains of the Caucasus, and between the North European Plain and the wastes of the Far East, Russia is vast and without physical obstacles to invasion. Invasion of Russia is easy, and was accomplished, albeit with disastrous results, by Napoleon and Hitler, as well as by the armies of the Mongols, Sweden, Lithuania and Poland. As Seton-Watson argues, "Imagine the United States without either the Atlantic or the Pacific, and with several first-rate military powers instead of the Indians," and you would have a sense of Russia's security dilemma. Whereas in America the frontier meant opportunity, in Russia, he says, it meant insecurity and oppression.

Because security in Russia has been so fragile, there developed an obsession about it. And that obsession led naturally to repression and autocracy.

Russia's brief and rare experiments with democracy or quasi-democracy were failed and unhappy ones: Witness the governments of Alexander Kerensky in 1917 that led to the Bolshevik Revolution and of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s that led to Vladimir Putin's neo-czardom. Truly, Russia's fare has been autocracy, and given the utter cruelty of czars and communists, Putin is but a mild dictator. When Western pundits and policymakers say they are unhappy with his autocratic arrangement, they are basically making a negative judgment on Russian history. For by Russia's historical standards, Putin is certainly not all that bad.

Putin now represents an autocrat in crisis, a familiar story in Russia. His problems are, for the most part, unsolvable, like those faced by Russian autocrats before him. And there are many of them.

Controlling the ultimate destiny of Ukraine is of paramount importance to him, for reasons both geographical and historical. Russia grew out of ninth century Kievan Rus, located in present-day Ukraine. Ukraine's population density (compared to immense tracts of Russia) and geographical position make it a crucial pivot for the Kremlin, if it wants to permanently dominate Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. Yet, Putin finds that he cannot wholly control Ukraine or further undermine its sovereignty. There is simply a very substantial element in Ukrainian politics and society that demands a shift closer to Europe and the European Union. Putin has various tools to undermine Ukraine, such as erecting trade barriers and rationing deliveries of natural gas. But it is hard work, and he probably can never achieve an outright victory.

Putin fears the westward, pro-NATO and pro-EU stirrings inside the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova. He fears unrest in former Soviet Central Asia, where reliably autocratic, Soviet-style regimes may soon face increasing turmoil at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists -- the very force Putin fears could destabilize Russia itself. Russia needs stability and compliance in its near abroad, and both will be increasingly at risk in Central Asia: Witness Kazakhstan's recent currency crisis. Putin not only worries about Russia's possible deteriorating position in world energy markets in the long term, but of the rising demographic weight of Muslims in Russian society over the long term, too.

Putin worries about an American-Iranian rapprochement, given how the estrangement for so long between those two countries has been so convenient to Russia's interest. Oh, and here's what Putin really isn't happy about: internal interference in Russian politics by American, pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations. What the United States considers human rights activity, he considers foreign subversion. And that goes for what American NGOs are doing in Ukraine also.

Putin wants to engage in cynical geopolitical deal making; instead he often gets lectures on morality from the West.

Could Putin actually be toppled? Not likely. The unhappiness with his rule that the Western media fervently wants to believe in is probably manageable, and a really free and fair election today in Russia would probably return him to power. He is only 61 years old and lives a relatively healthy life, unlike Yeltsin, who drank to excess. Sure, Putin is under extreme levels of stress. But you don't rise to his position in a place like Russia without the ability to handle levels of intrigue and anxiety that would psychologically decimate the average American politician.

The United States has every right to hate Putin for the Snowden affair alone. But, as I've indicated, Washington may be dealing with Putin for many years yet. As his dictatorship continues, he is liable to become more embattled, and rather than move toward reform, he is more likely to retreat further into a corrosive, authoritarian model. For that is a Russian historical tendency -- something Seton-Watson would have understood. If that is the case, Russian institutions and civil society, such as they exist, will further deteriorate. And with that, a post-Putin Russia, whenever it comes, could be a Russia in some substantial degree of chaos.

Putin is not like Spain's Gen. Francisco Franco, who in his latter years methodically laid the groundwork for a less authoritarian, post-Franco era. He is not like the collegial autocrats of present-day China, who have made their country -- with all its problems -- a relatively safe and predictable place for foreigners to do business and thus aid the development of the Chinese economy. While Russia, with its high literacy rates and quasi-European culture, cannot be compared with the much less developed Arab world, Putin's Russia does contain a scent of the thuggery and benightedness that characterized former regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Because Putin is not a modernizer -- he is building neither a civil society nor a 21st century knowledge economy -- he is leading Russia toward a familiar dead end, from which only chaos or more autocracy can issue.

Russia is not fated to be governed illiberally forever. Geography is being tempered by technology, and individual choice can overcome -- or at least partly overcome -- the legacy of history. Though one cannot speculate about which future leader or group of leaders can save Russia, one can outline the shape of a less autocratic yet stable power arrangement. And that shape must feature decentralization. Because of Russia's very vastness -- nearly half the longitudes of the earth -- democracy in Russia must be a local phenomenon as well as a Moscow phenomenon. The Far East, oriented around Vladivostok, must be able to carve out its own political shape and identity, the same with other parts of Russia. The center must become by stages weaker, even as the whole Federation becomes more vibrant because of the emergence of a rule of law. Such a Russia would draw in a near abroad united by a legacy of Russian language use from Soviet and czarist times. Centralization is not the opposite of anarchy; civil society is. Thus only civil society can save Russia.

Read more: Is Russia's Destiny Autocratic? | Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.cnbc.com/id/101592426

[Crafty_Dog]

What Putin Is Costing Russia
Former finance minister Alexi Kudrin projects up to $160 billion in capital will flee this year.
By Ilan Berman
April 20, 2014 5:24 p.m. ET

Just how much is Vladimir Putin's Ukrainian adventure actually costing Russia? Quite a lot, it turns out.

New statistics from the Central Bank of Russia indicate that almost $51 billion in capital exited the country in the first quarter of 2014. The exodus, says financial website Quartz.com, is largely the result of investor jitters over Russia's intervention in Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea.

As Quartz notes, this was the highest quarterly outflow of capital from the Russian Federation since the fourth quarter of 2008. While Russia can mitigate some of the damage because of its extensive foreign-currency reserves—estimated at more than $400 billion—the new Central Bank statistics signal that worse is still to come.

Russia's economic development ministry has downgraded the country's forecast to less than 1% growth this year; an earlier estimate had been 2.5%. The World Bank projects that the Russian economy could shrink nearly 2% in 2014. That would cost Russia in the neighborhood of $30 billion in lost economic output.

Meanwhile, the Russian government's bid to pressure Ukraine could end up backfiring. The state-controlled natural-gas giant, Gazprom, OGZPY +5.53% recently jacked up the price of gas to Ukraine by 80% and levied an $11.4 billion bill on Kiev for previously discounted energy sales. But observers say that the price hike could lead to a reduction in purchases as Kiev diversifies away from Russia toward friendlier European suppliers. This may already be happening. On April 9 the Ukrainian government retaliated by temporarily ceasing purchases of Russian gas, pending resolution of the pricing dispute.
Enlarge Image

Russian President Vladimir Putin discussing the country's economy, April 8. Getty Images

Moscow's international standing is becoming increasingly tenuous. Russia has already been ejected from the G-8 and its path to accession in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has been halted, at least temporarily. In the latest development, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stripped Russia of its voting rights in protest over its interference in Ukraine.

Russia's annexation of Crimea it is turning into a costly boondoggle. The Kremlin has already earmarked nearly $7 billion in economic aid for the peninsula this year, funds that will be spent on everything from infrastructure to beefed-up pensions for local residents. Even when balanced against anticipated gains from Crimea's energy resources and savings on naval basing arrangements, among other factors, that's a cost Russia's sluggish economy can ill afford.

The situation could become even more dire if Western economic pressure, which is still minimal, is ratcheted up. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has threatened additional sanctions against Moscow in response to its instigation of pro-Russian protests in the Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk. Such measures, Mr. Kerry has indicated, could include broad restrictions against Russia's energy, banking and mining. These sanctions could have significant, far-reaching effects on the country's long-term economic fortunes.

President Putin is currently riding a surge of popularity at home, propelled in no small measure by his assertive moves in Ukraine. When tallied in mid-March by state polling group VTsIOM, Mr. Putin's approval stood at nearly 72%, a gain of almost 10 percentage points from earlier in the year.

But the longer the crisis over Ukraine lasts, the higher the economic costs to Russia are likely to be. Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, for example, has projected that Moscow's maneuvers in Ukraine could result in up to $160 billion in capital flight this year, and he concluded that the Russian economy will stagnate as a result.

Sometime in the not too distant future, it might become considerably more difficult for the Kremlin to continue to ignore the real-world price that is associated with its policies.

Mr. Berman is vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-to-cut-2015-budget-by-around-10-following-decline-in-oil-price-1421842914

[Crafty_Dog]

Share
Russia: Rumors Indicate Security Services Shift
Analysis
February 5, 2015 | 10:15 GMT Print Text Size
A photo shows the Russian Federal Security Service headquarters in Moscow. (MAXIM MARMUR/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary

Rumors persist about continued restructurings and consolidations among the security services within Russia. The shifts are part of Russian President Vladimir Putin's attempts to make the security organizations more effective and to limit the power of many figures among the security circles' elite in light of the crisis in Ukraine and Moscow's standoff with the West.
Analysis

In 2014, Russia's security services suffered a series of failures regarding the uprising in Kiev, struggling to rally parts of eastern Ukraine and to read the West's willingness to unite over meaningful sanctions. These failures weakened the security services, the foundation of Putin's power in Russia. Particularly hampered was the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's largest security institution. The FSB is tasked with internal intelligence, and its sister agency, the Foreign Intelligence Service, is responsible for external intelligence. However, the Kremlin considers Ukraine — like many other former Soviet states — strategically critical to Russia's national security and territorial integrity, making the Ukraine crisis an internal problem and the FSB's responsibility.

The security services' failures also changed how countries along Russia's periphery view Moscow. Russia resurged into its former borderlands for nearly a decade, and its security services were widely seen as infallible. The events in Ukraine changed this view.
Restructuring

In mid-2014, rumors spread in Russian media that Putin had purged the FSB of those intelligence operatives and analysts who faltered in handling Ukraine. In November, Putin said the FSB would undergo "restructuring," though he was vague in discussing the changes. Over the past week, hints of this restructuring have appeared. Russian media group RBC reported that Putin has decided that smaller security services — the Federal Drug Control Service and Federal Migration Service — would be consolidated under the Interior Ministry, one of the FSB's primary competitors within the security circles. These two institutions previously had strong connections within the FSB; the Federal Drug Control Service's current chief was a KGB general.

Putin's first strategy is to streamline many of the security processes in Russia while focusing the FSB on its primary directive: internal intelligence and counterintelligence. The FSB's influence and focus have spread throughout many institutions, such as the drug control service and migration service. The consolidation of these smaller groups under the Interior Ministry could serve to purge the FSB and hone its focus to prevent any more failures that weaken Putin's power base or authority.

A second strategy could be to continue sidelining members of the security elite who could eventually challenge Putin's position. Putin's control over Russia is fairly solid. In the latest polls by Levada, his approval rating has lingered at around 86 percent, and 54 percent of Russians believe that no one could replace Putin — a doubling of support over the past year.
Many Powerful Figures

However, Putin still has concerns for his future, especially as hardships grow in Russia. Among the many powerful figures within Putin's inner circles who could compete with the Russian president is Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev. Patrushev commands a great deal of loyalty among the FSB's ranks. He earned a reputation for organizing counterterrorism operations in Russia's northern Caucasus and was rumored to have organized many of the FSB's activities abroad, such as the assassination of former FSB agent turned critic Alexander Litvinenko. In 2008, Putin removed Patrushev as head of the FSB and moved him to the nominally important Security Council, which is considered more of an organizational role than a position of power.

In December, Stratfor received a report that Patrushev would be fired. However, because he has retained his post, it is likely that Putin decided to keep Patrushev in place because of his influence within Russia's security circles but limit his abilities. Multiple reports also surfaced in Russian media in November and January that Putin is backing Deputy Interior Minister Vladimir Zolotov and could give him the top Interior Ministry spot. Zolotov is the former longtime head of the Federal Protective Service, Putin's personal bodyguards, much like the U.S. Secret Service. Zolotov also was the bodyguard to Putin's mentor, Anatoly Sobchak, and is one of Putin's judo sparring partners. He is considered directly loyal to Putin and not tied into any other security circles or elites in the Kremlin.

The FSB has long influenced the Interior Ministry in an attempt to wield the ministry's large paramilitary and police forces. However, the Interior Ministry has begun acting more independently. Making Zolotov the ministry's chief could be another signal that Putin wants to ensure that the FSB focuses on its prime directive and that members of the FSB elite, including Patrushev, do not expand their influence.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-readies-itself-unrest?utm_source=paidlist-a&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=*|DATE:|*&utm_content=Daily+Intelligence+Brief%3A+Aug.+7%2C+2015

[G M]

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6287/sweden-military#.VcSHLgEo8VY.twitter

[Crafty_Dog]

y
Michael Khodarkovsky
Aug. 18, 2015 7:05 p.m. ET
124 COMMENTS

‘Where is Garry Kasparov?” asked many Russians recently, when they discovered that the famed chess player was missing from the new edition of a book celebrating the achievements of Russia’s largest athletic association, Spartak—of which Mr. Kasparov was a member. It turns out that an article about Mr. Kasparov had been removed at the last minute. The message was clear: No achievement can trump political loyalty, and for Mr. Kasparov, a harsh critic of the Kremlin, the doors to the Russian version of the sports hall of fame are currently closed.

Erasing dissidents from history was a standard practice of Soviet disinformation. I recall how one day in the mid-1970s at my university library in Elista, a small city between the Black and Caspian seas, I could not locate a book by a well-known Soviet literary critic, Efim Etkind. When I asked the librarian, she looked at me as if evaluating whether my question was a provocation or simply a result of naiveté. Concluding the latter, she sternly replied that the book was no longer available because the author was a dissident and had emigrated to Israel. The book’s title was “A Conversation About Poetry,” and it had nothing to do with politics.

I thought of this last week when the zealous authorities in Sverdlovsk Oblast ordered the books of two British military historians, Antony Beevor and John Keegan, taken from library shelves. These classic books about the battles of Stalingrad and Berlin reveal the Soviet generals’ disregard for casualties and soldiers’ mass rape of German women in 1945, taboo topics seen as undermining Russia’s glorious victory. The authorities insisted that the books present “a mistaken representation” of World War II and “Nazi propaganda stereotypes.”

The short-lived outburst of freedom after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 was followed by a slow return to Soviet values. After assuming the presidency again in May 2012, Mr. Putin appointed as minister of culture Vladimir Medinsky, a man widely considered to be a crude propagandist and henchman. The appointment came as a shock to the Russian intelligentsia and marked a new aggressiveness by Mr. Putin toward reshaping the cultural and ideological landscape. Mr. Medinsky has regularly denounced regime critics as Russophobes, Russian liberals as national traitors, gays as products of Western decadence, and modern artists and writers as blasphemous.
Opinion Journal Video
Editorial Writer Sohrab Ahmari discusses renewed fighting on the Ukrainian border and why the White House won’t help Kiev. Photo credit: Getty Images.

Mr. Medinsky has suggested that there was no anti-Semitism in the Russian empire, that the reign of Ivan the Terrible was not so terrible after all, and that Stalin’s purges were necessary. When accused of falsifying history, Mr. Medinsky responded that history is solely a matter of interpretation and mass propaganda.

Last month he defended a popular legend of 28 soldiers of the Panfilov division who lost their lives bravely defending Moscow from the Nazis in November 1941. Even in the face of the fact that some of these men proved to be alive after the war and the story was shown to have been concocted by the editor of the Red Star newspaper, Mr. Medinsky dismissed the critics of this tale of Soviet heroism. “The only thing I can say to them is: It would be good if we had a time machine and could send you, poking your dirty, greasy fingers into the history of 1941, into a trench armed with just a grenade against a fascist tank,” he said.

In early 2013, Mr. Putin proposed the introduction of a single history textbook for all Russian middle schoolers, and Mr. Medinsky promoted the idea. “One should not create pluralism in school children’s heads,” he was quoted as saying, as he expressed support for a single textbook with a clearly defined pantheon of Russian heroes to serve as models of the country’s greatness. In the end the government decided against a single version of the textbook, probably realizing that what could rouse patriotism in central Russia might do the opposite in Chechnya or other regions. Nonetheless, a basic textbook that follows an approved government blueprint is supposed to be out this fall.

This rewriting of history sometimes puts the government at odds with the Orthodox Church. Mr. Putin has burnished Stalin’s image, presenting him as a shrewd leader faced with hard choices—much the same way Stalin once ordered Sergei Eisenstein to make a film about Ivan the Terrible, with whom Stalin identified. Yet this rehabilitation of Stalin does not sit well with the church, which was destroyed during Stalin’s rule but now is one of Mr. Putin’s most reliable supporters.

More surprising was Mr. Putin’s claim that Crimea is an ancient and sacred Russian land, where Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized in 988 and from which he brought Christianity to Russia. Yet neither Russia nor Moscow existed in the 10th century, and Prince Vladimir ruled in Kiev, now the capital of Ukraine. Even at the height of Russian nationalism in the 19th century, emperors never disputed the link between Prince Vladimir and Kiev, where the imperial authorities constructed St. Vladimir University, St. Vladimir Cathedral and St. Vladimir Monument, depicting the prince, cross in hand, looking over the Dnieper River.

Now Mr. Putin wants to claim Prince Vladimir for his own. An 80-foot monument of the saint will be erected on a hill in Moscow this fall. The goal, of course, is to legitimize Mr. Putin’s annexation of Crimea and delegitimize the sovereignty of Ukraine.

To impose the state’s version of history, Russia’s government is using both carrots and sticks. Those who do not toe the line are denied government grants and have difficulty finding publishers for their books or venues for their performances. Critics who are particularly vocal are hounded out: The departures of two prominent economists, Sergei Guriev to France and Konstantin Sonin to the U.S., and the firing of history professor Andrey Zubov from the Moscow Institute of International Relations drew headlines. Yet few noticed when the historian Vladimir Khamutayev was forced to flee the country after arguing that his native region of Buryatia, which borders Mongolia, was “Russia’s silent colony.”

That Russia should be taking such steps now is particularly striking. In the past three years, the Dutch government apologized for the mass killings in Indonesia in the 1940s, the British for the colonial abuse in Kenya in the 1950s, the French for the injustice in Algeria in the 1950s-60s, and the Japanese for their actions during World War II.

But Russia marches backward to its own drummer. One can only hope that some day a different set of Russian leaders will realize that history is not simply fodder for mass propaganda, to be rewritten and disseminated by the state.

Mr. Khodarkovsky grew up in the Soviet Union and is a history professor at Loyola University in Chicago.

[ccp]

Book recomendation:

'Once Upon a Time in Russia'

On best seller list.  First hand accounts of the turmoil in former Soviet Union after 1989.

Written like a fiction novel but as far as accounts can be trusted is non fiction.

At the end of the 1990's decade seven men controlled an estimated 7% of the Russian GDP.

The so called "oligarchs".   Some helped Putin get to be PM after Yeltsin resigned in 2000.  Putin changed the game.   They were no longer in charge.   He was.

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

Russia's State Duma, the lower house of Russia's Federal Assembly, and its Federal Council held an extraordinary session Nov. 20 to discuss issues related to terrorism. It is rare for both chambers to come together in session, let alone for a session to run into the night. The parliamentary meeting follows the release of a new poll showing that 65 percent of Russians fear that the Islamic State will carry out a terrorist attack inside Russia in 2016 — a number up from 48 percent last month.

Russia's increased focus on security and fighting terrorism will likely expand the powers of the security services, as proposed by Duma speaker Valentina Matviyenko. This raises the possibility of a struggle between the various security arms over those expanded powers into the coming year. If the Federal Security Service (FSB) can leverage the perceived threat of domestic terrorism — the prevalent fear in Russia — it could help boost the agency and its capabilities.

Analysis

Russia has some experience when it comes to combating terrorism, especially in the Caucasus, but is seeking to expand its remit. Many of the proposals presented during the Nov. 20 session were more stringent penalties for terrorists and those aiding them. The leader of the Just Russia party, Sergei Mironov, even proposed restoring the death penalty — a highly controversial issue already denounced by the Kremlin. Other measures discussed included enhancing security at public events and transportation hubs such as airports and train stations, which have been targets in the past. Historically, Russia's counterterrorism strategy focused on its own Muslim republics, such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Yet with the current threat emanating from abroad, many Russian lawmakers were quick to propose measures that would revoke travel passports issued to Russian citizens who visit conflict hot spots such as Syria and Iraq.

The FSB has done this before. When now-President Vladimir Putin came in to lead the FSB in 1998, he expanded the agency's powers to combat threats in the North Caucasus. Since becoming president, Putin has sought to balance the power of the FSB with other intelligence and security services, though given the current risks and circumstances the FSB will probably seek to expand its responsibilities and authority.
Consolidating Power

The FSB wants more influence in a number of areas. First, it wants greater control of the Investigative Committee, which is comparable to the FBI in the United States, wielding judicial and police authority. The FSB has greatly influenced the Investigative Committee at times, but now the agency wants formal jurisdiction to influence the Investigative Committee's actions. Second, the FSB wants more influence over its sister security service branch, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which oversees intelligence operations outside Russia. The FSB has jurisdiction over threats inside Russia and its borderlands, but because a threat to Russia's heartland is originating from conflict zones such as Syria, that could give the FSB recourse to insinuate itself into its sister agency. Third, the FSB is highly interested in gaining greater access to Russia's Chechen Republic. The FSB and Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov have long fought over control of security and intelligence operations in the Caucasus republic, with Kadyrov blocking much of the FSB's activities in recent years. The death of prominent opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015 did little to improve FSB-Chechen relations. The FSB could easily use the threat of Islamic State infiltration through Chechnya or the Northern Caucasus to expand the agency's powers in the region.

Another consequence of Russia's renewed focus on terrorism and external threats manifesting domestically could be another spike in xenophobic or nationalist movements. Nationalism is already at a record high in Russia following the conflict with Ukraine, anti-Russian sanctions enacted by the West, and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Russian government has expounded these events into strong support for the Russian government, resulting in an approval rating for Putin currently around 89 percent. In the past, nationalist movements quickly turned into anti-Muslim or anti-foreigner sentiments. In 2013, non-state militias formed in the Volga region following a bus bombing. The militias ultimately ended up harassing and assaulting Muslims living in the region. In 2011, tens of thousands of Russians protested in Moscow and other large cities to "Stop Feeding the Caucasus," a movement meant to pressure the Kremlin to cut federal subsidies to the Muslim Caucasus republics. Currently, the government is framing its newfound focus on terrorism in relation to the Islamic State and the Iraq and Syria battlespace, but this could easily mutate into an anti-Muslim reaction throughout Russia as the country comes to terms with its own history of domestic terrorism.

Beyond the threat of internal or external terrorism, the Kremlin could simply use the blanket reasoning of security as an excuse to increase the monitoring and coercion of opposition groups or other entities flagged as undesirable by the Kremlin. Russia will hold parliamentary elections in 2016, and the Kremlin has been particularly focused on preventing unsanctioned groups and individuals from making gains during a time of economic and political uncertainty. The Kremlin's drive for control was evident during the 2015 local elections, when cities and regions were targeted based on their opposition to the Kremlin, which then swiftly derailed anti-government campaigns and movements before they could gain traction.

[Body-by-Guinness]

Rocky times ahead for Putin and the ruble?

http://johnrlott.blogspot.com/2015/12/what-is-ahead-for-russia.html

[DougMacG]

Rocky times ahead for Putin and the ruble?

http://johnrlott.blogspot.com/2015/12/what-is-ahead-for-russia.html

I don't see how they survive this economically, falling GDP, falling currency, falling oil prices.  Lousy outlook for the global economy, china in trouble, Europe a mess, US in stagnation, and others in deep trouble.  Global demand for oil isn't about to bounce back real quickly.

"Between June and December 2014, the Russian ruble declined in value by 59%"

Interesting timing.  Crimea was 'annexed' by Russia two months earlier.  Russia will need to annex something better than oil or poor neighboring countries to grow via imperialism.

At least Putin has Trump's admiration as a good, strong leader.  He led them strongly down a storm sewer.  Risk taking is different when you own a country; you can't easily bankrupt off the parts you don't like.

[ccp]

I read in "Once Upon a Time in Russia" a read I recommend, how British intelligence traced the radioactive polonium from Litvinenkos' laced tea at a restaurant to the airport and essentially the border of Russia at which point their investigation was not allowed to proceed by the Russian authorities.  Only 3 countries in the world can even make this stuff.   To think Putin did not have a hand in this would mean total ignorance of his authority, power, and control in Russia.   Litvinenko was an outspoken critic of Putin.   Remember,  He was in London at the time of his murder.   So others reading this board agreed with me and decided it is time to revisit this murder:


http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/world/europe/alexander-litvinenko-poisoning-inquiry-britain.html?_r=0

PS :  I love Putin's patriotism towards his country and people, and wish we had the same here, but I don't respect his brutal thuggish methods.   Rumors are he is one of the richest men in the world.

see replies 102 and 112 on this thread.

[ccp]

Here is a couple of forum posts going back to Mig in 2006:
http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1085.0

[DDF]

A British judge today announced that "Putin likely approved" the murder of Litvinenko a few years ago.

Two things:
1. How would he know?
2. What are you really going to do about someone (assuming it was true), going after one of his own?

[ccp]

Do you really think that this outspoken critic of Putin killed by this extraordinarily rare radioactive isotope with its traces being detected back to Russia was performed without Putin's knowledge and approval?   

As far as what can be done about it probably nothing.  But it is important to know this to understand the kind of man Putin is.

We don't imprison or murder people here for the exercising their freedom of speech.

[DDF]

1. Do you really think that this outspoken critic of Putin killed by this extraordinarily rare radioactive isotope with its traces being detected back to Russia was performed without Putin's knowledge and approval?   

As far as what can be done about it probably nothing.  But it is important to know this to understand the kind of man Putin is.

2. We don't imprison or murder people here for the exercising their freedom of speech.

1. Who cares?

2.Who am I to judge other people's shortcomings?

[Crafty_Dog]

Generally considered bad manners to kill your people in someone else's country.

[DDF]

Perhaps....others might view it as defending one's patria.

Matter of perspective, at least to me.

[ccp]

1. Who cares?

2.Who am I to judge other people's shortcomings?

Well the people of Russia should care.

Suppose Trump becomes President and does something you don't like and you speak out but alas you are murdered.......

Should anyone care?

Hey, Trump is not perfect eh?

[DDF]

My line of thinking isn't for anyone...worse... I am certain that I walk what I talk, although I'll admit, it isn't everyone's way. It makes it frustrating at times.

We all die. I live in a society where life is cheap. It makes contrasts between the two difficult at best.

[ccp]

DDF,
Fair enough.

I know what it is like not to be able to trust anyone.  How money or threats can affect everyone around you.

How friends, neighbors, relatives, co workers can lie and commit crimes or contribute to those who do and act like nothing is wrong.

People you know are committing crimes right around you and you cannot do a thing.

They pretend they are like everyone else.  Put up Halloween, Christmas lights, say hello to neighbors, take their kids to school, mow their manicured lawns.

And all the while they are part of organized crime.

They have their kids go to law school, they all know friends or friends of friends, relatives, union pals, who know people in places - DMV, police force, post office, bank, cable company, telephone company.  

They know how to play the system.  How to stay "outside" the law with regards to evidence.   They know how to approach people to bribe, threaten.  They can transfer their person to the right bank or the post office when needed.

People you've known for years look you in the eye and lie, you know they are lying but they won't admit.

Yes, just under the surface, the facade of politeness is the reality of humanity.

But through it all that doesn't mean we have to become them.  If at least some of us don't try to stand up to this then we really have nothing.  It really is all bullshit.

[DDF]

DDF,
Fair enough.

I know what it is like not to be able to trust anyone.  How money or threats can affect everyone around you.

How friends, neighbors, relatives, co workers can lie and commit crimes or contribute to those who do and act like nothing is wrong.

People you know are committing crimes right around you and you cannot do a thing.

They pretend they are like everyone else.  Put up Halloween, Christmas lights, say hello to neighbors, take their kids to school, mow their manicured lawns.

And all the while they are part of organized crime.

They have their kids go to law school, they all know friends or friends of friends, relatives, union pals, who know people in places - DMV, police force, post office, bank, cable company, telephone company.  

They know how to play the system.  How to stay "outside" the law with regards to evidence.   They know how to approach people to bribe, threaten.  They can transfer their person to the right bank or the post office when needed.

People you've known for years look you in the eye and lie, you know they are lying but they won't admit.

Yes, just under the surface, the facade of politeness is the reality of humanity.

But through it all that doesn't mean we have to become them.  If at least some of us don't try to stand up to this then we really have nothing.  It really is all bullshit.

Eloquent, and exactly so.

I particularly liked the touch about the Christmas lights, because it's true.

Just had four people from my squad over at my house a couple of nights ago... wound up attacking my wife for the first time in five years, in a nightmare that was directly attached to them. I was breaking her neck. She woke me up.

Sometimes it's difficult to know that we are so beautiful and ugly all at the same time.

Sometimes I think, it's time to find something else to do.

[ccp]

"Just had four people from my squad over at my house a couple of nights ago... wound up attacking my wife for the first time in five years, in a nightmare that was directly attached to them. I was breaking her neck. She woke me up."

Sorry to hear that.

If not for people like you we would have no society.  Thank you for protecting us.  I wish you and your family safety.

We would be even more controlled by criminals, by cheats and by our own evil halves.

I wish we had more law enforcement going after organized criminals of "soft" crimes not just the violent ones like you are in midst of.

Corruption is a much bigger threat to a civilized society than given credit (or blame).  My next thought is that is why Clinton must pay for her crimes.

The corruption of our system is so obvious and laid open for all to behold.  And the corruption of all her mobster friends and all her adoring fans showcases front and center how easily people, who otherwise are considered good citizens can be so corrupted by fame , money, power, and other selfish reasons.  (or from intimidation).

[DougMacG]

Says Stalin got it right.  Really?

Unfortunately, Russia and Putin are relevant in the world and this latest story either gives insight into his thinking or more likely is the disinformation you would expect from a trained KGB professional.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/25/vladmir-putin-accuses-lenin-of-placing-a-time-bomb-under-russia
http://www.voanews.com/content/putin-denounces-lenin-says-stalin-got-it-right/3162079.html

[DDF]

Thanks CCP. GC has met my wife. I got a great woman. Don't want to get off topic. Just wanted to say "thanks."

I'm way overpaid.

[Crafty_Dog]

Share
The Kremlin's Cracks Are All-Too Familiar
Analysis
February 27, 2016 | 14:00 GMT Print
Text Size
A Moscow rally commemorating slain opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in March 2015 (Wikimedia)
Summary

Feb. 27 marks the anniversary of the assassination of Russian opposition heavyweight Boris Nemtsov. His killing sparked two weeks of intrigue in Russia's top political circles, laying bare previously obscured Kremlin infighting and putting President Vladimir Putin's continued control in question. The dispute, which went far beyond the death of one opposition leader or even broad factional competition, was in fact a struggle over who controls Russia's future. In this it mirrored a three-year period of division in the early 1920s that ended in a leadership transition and set the trajectory of the Soviet Union.
Analysis

Struggles among the Kremlin elite are as old as the fortified stone citadel itself. The name Kremlin literally means "fortress inside a city," a potent metaphor for the murky elite power struggles at the heart of Russia's bustling government system. For the past decade, the Putin government has been divided into four camps: the powerful Federal Security Services (FSB), the so-called liberal reformists, the hawkish non-FSB security circles and a circle of those who are loyal to Putin alone.
Interactive
Interactive Graphic: Russian Influence

These clans are constantly competing for power, assets and influence, with Putin playing the role of arbitrator. At the moment they are balanced — no one clan can change the power at the top. Russian history has shown, however, that this can change quickly. The pattern in recent years has held steady, with the FSB squaring off against the other clans and even against Putin himself in some cases.
Ukrainian Roots

The story behind the Nemtsov assassination begins with the 2014 Euromaidan uprising in Ukraine a year before. The popular protests that ousted Kiev's pro-Russia government took Moscow by surprise. Russia's deep networks of influence unexpectedly failed to prevent a change in government, and only a sliver of eastern Ukraine rose up in defiance of the pro-Western government. For Kremlin insiders, blame for the failure fell squarely on the shoulders of the FSB, which held the main portfolio responsible for influence and intelligence inside of Ukraine. As a result, the FSB briefly lost its lead position overseeing Ukraine and, moreover, Putin reportedly restructured the group shortly thereafter.

This put the FSB on its heels, spurring it to engage in a series of power grabs that gave it control over key positions and increased its reach within various security circles. Toward the end of 2014, Putin's control over the FSB also came into question. His behavior became increasingly odd as he missed major press conferences and spent his birthday alone in the Siberian forest. Putin ultra-loyalists among the Kremlin elite, particularly Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, rallied around their leader, flooding social media with messages of support. The Chechen leader also gathered 20,000 troops from his infamous Chechen Brigades to support Putin and suggested deploying them directly to Ukraine.

The clash between Putin's cadre and the FSB escalated in 2015, culminating in two full weeks of disarray in the Kremlin. Nemtsov's assassination on Feb. 27, 2015, was part of this. Authorities then arrested a ring of Chechens connected to Kadyrov for the murder, and Putin canceled his trip to Kazakhstan, disappearing from public view for 10 days. Russian media went into a panic, speculating that illness or even a coup had taken Putin out of commission.

These high-profile power struggles added to the standoff in Ukraine. The start of an economic recession in Russia at the end of 2014 worsened the situation, creating a perfect storm for Putin. Today, Kremlin elites are still divided along the lines that emerged from the Ukraine crisis, disagreeing over both who should be in power and how to tackle Russia's various crises. Putin is still trying to manage these swirling controversies.
Stalinist Parallels

The current situation in the Kremlin bears distinct similarities to the period that saw the rise of Josef Stalin to replace Vladimir Lenin, a long process that was cemented in 1924 with Lenin's death. Lenin had ridden to power on the back of the Bolshevik Revolution, which stemmed from Russia's catastrophic role in World War I and collapse of the Tsarist system. As the Bolsheviks consolidated power in the early 1920s, they had to manage continual famines and an economy in shambles. Lenin ruled in conjunction with a system of elites who were rough analogues of the current Kremlin clans. Those in power were assiduous in moving to secure control over economic assets before the civil war among the Reds, Whites and an array of different forces had even ended. In fact, Lenin had begun his process of ruthless economic and political centralization as early as 1918.

But when the civil war ended and the Soviet system began to take shape, the elites within the Kremlin became deeply divided over what sort of economic system should come next. The region under Russian rule was in disarray, ravaged by war and blighted by famine. The Kremlin needed to catch up with the other great powers but was unsure how to rapidly modernize Russia's industrial sector. In another parallel to today, the main split was between those who wanted to pursue further centralization and those who wanted to reverse course and liberalize the economy. Lenin came down in favor of a more open economic system, warning that Russia is "being sucked into a foul bureaucratic swamp" of entrenched corruption.

Elites were similarly divided about policies in Russia's near abroad — much as Kremlin clans are today. In what came to be called the Georgian Affair, in 1922 Stalin proposed absorbing all the Caucasus states — Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia — into the Soviet Union in one overarching republic. His motivation was to prevent those populations from consolidating local power and challenging Moscow. Lenin accused Stalin of trying to create a "Great Russia," a historical concept that advocated that Moscow control all the lands of Rus, especially the ethnic and linguistically related populations of Ukraine and Belarus. Stalin won the debate, although Lenin continued to push his point in the years up to his death.

Similar concerns about Russia pushing beyond its borders undergird the ongoing dispute over Ukraine policy. For the past two years, Putin and many within the conservative non-FSB security circles have evoked a concept similar to Stalin's Great Russia, Novorossiya. The idea has its earliest roots in the ousting of the Ottomans by the Russian Empire and encompasses the swath of territory that includes southern Ukraine, modern day Transdniestria and the Donbas. Ultraconservatives in the Kremlin originally wanted Moscow to militarily capture all of Novorossiya, though Putin instead decided on a somewhat more moderate approach: annex Crimea and maintain eastern Ukraine as a semi-frozen conflict. Many are still pushing him to launch a full-on military intervention in Ukraine. However, the Kremlin's liberal circles have begun advocating a pullback on actions in Ukraine so sanctions can be lifted and the Russian economy can heal.

In the 1920s, the similarly divided elites shored up their respective positions. As Lenin's health declined, he continued to denounce Stalin as an unsuitable successor both within the Kremlin circles and in his written testament, which detailed his view of where the country should go. But Stalin had already started to groom loyalists behind Lenin's back and isolate Lenin from key decision-makers under the pretext of Lenin's illness. Toward the end of Lenin's life, there was a dilemma within Stalin's circles over whether to move against the iconic revolutionary. This led to wild vacillations of position and loyalties among the elites until Lenin's death and Stalin's consolidation.

Infighting among the Kremlin factions is similar to that seen in the Stalinist circles of the early 1920s. Putin has long been the uniting factor within the Kremlin, arbitrating among the clans, but now he seems increasingly isolated. Over the past year, Putin has encircled himself with ultra-loyalists and distanced himself from power players such as the FSB. One of the greatest factors keeping the Kremlin clans from moving against Putin is his extraordinary popularity among the Russian people. With myriad problems plaguing Russia, Putin is still the only elite able to appeal to the dissenting points of view — at least for the moment.

The echoes of the 1920s do not mean that Russia is going to witness the rise of another Stalin but that the Kremlin is in a period of division that makes it unclear precisely who is driving Russian strategy. Putin implemented a system over the past 15 years to stabilize Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaotic years under former President Boris Yeltsin. This is much like the Soviet system, which attempted to stabilize the union following war, the fall of an empire and a revolution. But cracks in the system are surfacing, and Putin's ability to continue driving a united regime is in question. It is an uncertain period for Russia — on its borders, within the homeland, and inside the Kremlin itself.

[DougMacG]

inspired by the discussion of rich socialist leaders in Venezuela and America, Vladimir Putin may be the richest man in the world.  Not easily verified or verifiable.

http://www.celebritynetworth.com/articles/celebrity/how-vladimir-putin-stashed-away-a-secret-70-billion-personal-fortune/

http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/040716/vladimir-putin-richest-man-world.asp

[Crafty_Dog]

Please post those two URLs at

http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1468.0

[ccp]

While media focused on bashing Ryan Lochte and Donald Trump, and bamster is playing golf with the lib of the day  it appears may be Russia getting ready to invade Ukraine 

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-military-forces-staging-near-ukraine/

[ccp]

Dusting off Stalinism all over again becoming more obvious:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/19/russia-to-reinstate-the-kgb-under-plan-to-combine-security-force/

[G M]

Dusting off Stalinism all over again becoming more obvious:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/19/russia-to-reinstate-the-kgb-under-plan-to-combine-security-force/

It is my understanding that the FSB never stopped referring to it's self as the KGB internally.

[Crafty_Dog]

Feb. 8, 2017 6:53 p.m. ET
9 COMMENTS

A court in Kirov Wednesday convicted Alexei Navalny on dubious embezzlement charges, which means Russia’s most popular opposition leader will likely be barred from challenging Vladimir Putin when the Kremlin strongman makes his widely expected presidential rerun in 2018.

The 40-year-old Mr. Navalny rose to prominence a decade ago as an anticorruption blogger shedding light on the ill-gotten gains of the Kremlin oligarchy. Young and charismatic, he extended his appeal beyond the middle-class urbanites who read his blog. When he called ruling United Russia “the party of crooks and thieves,” the label stuck.

Prosecutors in 2011 launched an investigation into Mr. Navalny’s work as an unpaid consultant to a state-owned timber company, accusing him of masterminding the theft of some $520,000 worth of timber. The investigation was procedurally suspect from the start, not least because prosecutors repeatedly closed it for lack of evidence only to reopen it later.

Mr. Navalny was eventually convicted of embezzlement in 2013, but due to his enormous popularity and Western pressure, the authorities suspended his five-year sentence and allowed him to campaign for mayor of Moscow, where he finished second with 30% of the vote. The Russian Supreme Court overturned his 2013 conviction and ordered a retrial last year, after the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights found procedural irregularities in the original trial.

Now comes the reconviction, and it amounted to a judicial raspberry blown at the European judges in Strasbourg. The Kirov judge reread the original verdict from 2013, Mr. Navalny told reporters. The court reimposed his five-year suspended sentence. With it comes a 10-year ban on running for elective office.

Mr. Navalny’s reconviction follows news last week that Vladimir Kara-Murza, a pro-democracy activist and contributor to these pages, had become ill with poisoning symptoms similar to those he suffered in 2015. Mr. Kara-Murza has now fallen into a coma.

The fashion among some Western politicians, from Donald Trump to François Fillon and Marine Le Pen in France, is to say they want to engage Mr. Putin the way Ronald Reagan did the Soviet Union. One difference is that the Gipper would not have hesitated to speak up for Messrs. Navalny and Kara-Murza.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qC7FiKMSUjg

[Crafty_Dog]

At 6:08 p.m. on Sept. 8, the cacophony of Kiev's Friday evening rush hour was pierced by an explosion under a black Toyota Camry in the middle of heavy traffic near Bessarabska Square in the heart of the capital. The car's driver, Timur Mahauri, a Chechen with Georgian citizenship, was killed instantly. His wife and their 10-year-old child who were riding with him were hurt, but they survived.
 
Mahauri was reportedly a member of a Chechen militant group fighting with Ukrainian troops against separatist and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. Media reports suggested that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov considered him an enemy. In addition to these two possible motives for his assassination, Kiev has recently become a hot spot for the assassination of Moscow's enemies, and opponents of the Chechen government are being killed in a worldwide campaign. Indeed, given Mahauri's enemies and location, it is surprising that he didn't check his car for bombs before he got into it. This case provides important lessons for others.

Moscow's Wetwork

As I've discussed elsewhere, Russia's intelligence agencies have a long history of involvement in assassinations, refered to by its intelligence officers as "wetwork" or "wet affairs." Indeed, they have pursued the enemies of the Russian government around the globe: Alexander Litvinenko was murdered in London in November 2006; and Mikhail Lesin died under mysterious circumstances in Washington, D.C., in November 2015. They are not the only examples. It should come as no surprise then that people considered to be enemies of the Kremlin — including opposition politician Boris Nemtsov — are being murdered in Russia itself as well as in adjacent countries.
 
However, there does seem to be a discernible difference in the tactics used in different geographies. For example, in Russia itself, targeted individuals tend to simply get shot. Although Russian agents will publicly deny any involvement in such activities, in domestic operations, they don't really take too much effort to cloak their hand. Indeed, they seem to relish flexing their muscle to intimidate opponents. But outside Russia, they attempt to be more discreet. Even though the Litvinenko case ended up becoming highly publicized because of sloppiness in the operation, the use of the rare and radioactive isotope polonium 210 to poison him was intended to create a slow and subtle decline so as to create an air of mystery around his death, like the shadowy fates met by Moscow opponents Badri Patarkatsishvili in 2008, and Boris Berezovsky in 2013, both also in the United Kingdom.

Danger Lurks in Kiev

But in Ukraine, the Russians and their Chechen surrogates have operated with a mostly unveiled hand. In July 2016, Belorussian journalist and Russia critic Pavel Sheremet was killed when a sticky bomb planted under his car exploded shortly after he left his home for his office. As we noted at the time, the Sheremet assassination was a precise and professional operation.

In August 2016, Alexander Shchetinin, a Russian-born journalist and prominent critic of President Vladimir Putin, was found dead on the balcony of his Kiev home with a gunshot wound to the head. On March 23, Denis Voronenkov, a former Russian Communist Party lawmaker and another a well-known Putin critic, was shot dead as he walked down a Kiev street on the way to a meeting in a hotel. The brazen assassination occurred at 11:30 a.m. in central Kiev, despite the fact that Voronenkov had been accompanied by an armed bodyguard who shot the assassin dead.
 
On June 1, Adam Osmayev, a critic of the pro-Kremlin Chechen government, narrowly escaped death when his wife, a Chechen militant, shot and wounded a would-be assassin, who had shot him twice in the chest. The assailant, Artur Denisultanov-Kurmakayev, a Russian national born in Chechnya, had posed as a French journalist and had arranged an interview.
 
On June 27, Col. Maxim Shapoval, a Ukrainian military intelligence officer, was killed in an assassination similar to the Sheremet hit. A small sticky bomb had been planted under Shapoval's car; it probably used a plastic explosive and was command-detonated as he was on his way to work. Kiev has clearly become a dangerous place for those perceived to be enemies of Putin and his Chechen vassal, Kadyrov.

Not Amateur Bombmakers

And this brings us back to the Mahauri assassination. The device used to kill him spared his passengers, indicating that it employed a small shaped charge, also likely a plastic explosive, judging from video of the explosion. It also looks as if it had been command-detonated. The assassination carried all the hallmarks of a professional, state-sponsored operation. The device that killed him almost certainly had been built by an experienced bombmaker who calibrated its explosive potential to kill without causing too much collateral damage. Although this attack happened in the evening rather than during the morning drive to work, it carried many similarities to the assassinations of Shapoval and Sheremet. Ukrainian investigators will certainly be looking for forensic evidence to conclusively link the three bombings.
 
In addition to his activities in Ukraine, Mahauri had fought with the Georgian military when the Russians invaded that country in 2008, Ukrainian press reports say. That would have put him in the crosshairs of Russian intelligence, which reportedly had attempted to kill him on three past occasions, including placing a bomb in the stairwell of his apartment building in Tbilisi in March 2009. Given that history and the recent spate of assassinations in Kiev, Mahauri would have been wise to have taken more precautions.
 
The best defense against a sticky bomb attack is to keep a vehicle locked in a secure area to prevent easy access. After the Sheremet killing, video emerged showing the assassins putting the bomb under his car as it sat by the curb outside his apartment. If a vehicle must be parked in an unsecured area, a small mirror with a light on a telescopic pole can be used to check the underside for sticky bombs. Given the tempo of Russian and Chechen activity in Kiev, it is hard to believe that Mahauri had grown complacent. Investigators will be attempting to reconstruct his schedule before the detonation to clarify where and when the bomb had been stuck under his vehicle.
 
A number of Russia's enemies remain in Kiev. Given the recent deadly events, it would not be surprising if more murders followed there. To escape Mahauri's fate, those who find themselves at odds with the Kremlin will need to be more careful.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

An unprecedented rash of bomb threats across Russia this week has left the country's emergency and security services scrambling to evacuate major cities. Though Russia is no stranger to bomb threats, it has never experienced so many at once. So far, over 115 threats have forced more than 130,000 people to evacuate 420 schools, shopping malls, theaters, train stations, airports, government facilities and universities across 22 cities stretching from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. Meanwhile, some 40 threats have been made in Moscow alone, though emergency responders have not found explosive devices in any of the locations targeted.

Notably absent throughout these incidents has been media coverage by Russia's state-owned outlets. At first, Federal Security Service (FSB) sources told several outlets that the threats originated from IP-based phone lines outside Russia's borders, later claiming that the lines were traced to Ukraine. FSB sources then suggested on Sept. 14 that the threats could be linked to extremist groups, perhaps even the Islamic State. Some local media outlets, on the other hand, attributed the events to drills by law enforcement officials. National and local security services, for their part, have downplayed the threats.

Many actors, both at home and abroad, have an interest in wreaking havoc in Russia. Within the country, criminal groups and anarchists have a history of targeting U.S. airlines, Russian schools and Australian community centers with automated "robocall" bomb threats in hopes of forcing evacuations and sowing chaos. Beyond Russia's borders, other entities have motive for causing mayhem throughout the nation, particularly in the wake of Moscow's own hybrid warfare operations in Ukraine and Europe. The Islamic State, too, may seek to pressure Russia as the country's military intervention in Syria continues. Though the extremist group has little interest in warning of its own impending attacks, the evacuations could play into its hands by spurring the movement of large groups of people from relatively safe structures to more exposed locations in the surrounding area. Up to this point, however, the crowds removed from Russian buildings have not been targeted in this manner.

[Crafty_Dog]

The understanding of the social contract seems to be shifting around the world. But for Russia, at least, the phenomenon is nothing new. The country has tried any number of variations on the social contract over the more than 1,000 years of its history. Leaders traditionally have resorted to autocratic rule to keep the unwieldy nation together, periodically introducing institutions, such as the secret police forces of Ivan the Terrible and Czar Alexander III, or reforms — like Alexander II's measure to emancipate the serfs — to maintain order. Over the past century, Russia's social contract has endured one experiment after another as the Russian Revolution, the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system transformed the country. The system has undergone so many permutations that today it is all but obsolete, and no rule is too fundamental to break.
The Soviet Social(ist) Contract

The past 100 years have been a rollercoaster for Russia. The Bolsheviks came to power championing equality and a better life for workers and peasants. In turn, they expected the support and acquiescence of the Soviet people as they embarked on the economically and politically demanding task of building a new society. Josef Stalin changed the rules when he took control of the country, dispensing almost entirely with personal rights in the name of developing the Soviet Union. After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev offered a new social contract that purported to relax the repressive rule of the previous two decades. The Soviet government gave citizens back some of the rights Stalin had stripped away and pursued policies to increase security, guarantee a basic standard of living for the population and maintain peace in exchange for the public's compliance.

Khrushchev's promise of peace was fundamental to the new social contract. As traumatic as Stalin's infamous purges were for the Soviet people, the harrowing events of World War II — in which more than 20 million Soviet soldiers and civilians died — quickly overshadowed them. The memory of the war was still fresh, and it weighed heavily on nearly every family in the Soviet Union. My grandmother would often say, "No matter what, the main thing is to avoid a war." And no matter how many tanks and missiles the Soviet Union produced, its leaders held fast to that conviction, even when the Cold War reached its hottest points. The public was well aware of the danger of a nuclear strike. Yet Soviet leaders were cautious to avoid incendiary threats, though a state propagandist might mention that the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal was deep enough to turn any country into a pile of dust. (Today, by contrast, the threats are more brazen; Dmitri Kiselyov, whom President Vladimir Putin named as head of one of Russia's state-run news agencies, proclaimed on national television in 2014 that his country could turn the United States to "radioactive ash.")
A New System Emerges

By the late 1980s, the Soviet government had exhausted its social contract. Mikhail Gorbachev, the final leader of the Soviet Union, introduced the liberalizing policies of perestroika and glasnost in a last-ditch effort to keep the massive state together, but the reforms proved to be too little too late. The Soviet Union collapsed.

The ensuing chaos was as liberating as it was terrifying. In the 1990s, the Russian state had neither the will nor the ability to uphold its previous social contract. The Russian people, meanwhile, felt a growing desire for freedom and economic independence. The 1993 Constitution struck a compromise between the old and new elite, describing Russia as both a liberal and a social state that simultaneously maintained the separation of powers and bestowed its president with practically boundless authority. Two social contracts vied for dominance in the emerging country, one that promised social services in exchange for the public's support and one that offered freedom.
The Gangster's Rule for Governing

Neither side won. And so, as it entered the 21st century, Russia introduced a new model that would provide its citizens a reliable standard of living so long as they paid their taxes. Professor Alexander Auzan described the setup in an article about social contracts in Russia:

    "Taxes are payment for social goods. But the saying, 'pay taxes and sleep well' is the typical motto of a stationary bandit who understands taxes as rent: You pay us rent and we leave you alone.'"

What Auzan outlines is a gangster's rule, but a rule nonetheless.

At some point, people started to ask what their taxes were getting them. The justice and safety they were theoretically paying for, after all, were in practice a privilege of the social and political elite. But for many Russians, even the prospect of security was worth the price, as long as the threat of attacks like the Beslan school siege and the Moscow Metro bombing loomed over the country. Skyrocketing oil prices, moreover, gave the government economic leverage over the public: Provided citizens agreed to sign over their political rights to the country's leaders, the administration would guarantee their financial security and prosperity. In this way, Putin's government bought the loyalty and support of the Russian people.

Since 2008, the situation in Russia has evolved, not only economically but also geopolitically. The same year that the global financial crisis hit, Russia went to war with the neighboring republic of Georgia. The timing was perfect. The United States was preoccupied with its own wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while Europe — dependent as it was on Russian energy exports — wasn't prepared to challenge the country in its traditional sphere of influence. Though the conflict lasted only a matter of days, it was enough to re-establish Russia as a world power. When the country, emboldened by its success in Georgia, annexed Crimea a few years later, its actions came as a shock to the rest of the world. Even so, the move was a logical next step in Russia's brash new strategy for dealing with the international system. The country's newfound power was intoxicating for its leaders.
Because We Can

For the Russian people, the idea of belonging to a great power was equally intoxicating. By standing up to the West, Putin framed himself as the only world leader who would dare to challenge the United States' ascendancy. He even gained the respect of some Western libertarians, who saw him as a brave individual, unafraid to buck the global economic system, its overregulated banks and its greedy governments, regardless of the authoritarian measures he favored at home. Defying the global trends toward tolerance, human rights — including rights for women and members of the LGBTQ community — and freedom of expression, Russian authorities have instead played by their own rules, sanctions and international opinion be damned. The political firestorm surrounding Russia's alleged electoral meddling has only reinforced this strategy by confirming the country's status as a dominant power and fueling the administration's machismo. For years, the Russian government and its propaganda machine have worked to foster among their public a hatred and aggression toward the rest of the world. Having acted out that hostility on the international stage, the Putin administration now can sit back and watch the United States rage.

At some point, however, bravado may not be enough to ensure the Russian public's continued loyalty, and tax payments. A survey from independent pollster the Levada Center conducted in April revealed that 53 percent of respondents claimed to be fulfilling their obligations to the state, compared with 39 percent in 2001. But in a poll conducted the previous month, 31 percent of respondents said they received so little from the state that they felt they owed it nothing, and 32 percent said they could demand much more.

Putin's administration has demonstrated that the social contract no longer serves as the basis of a government's legitimacy. (Furthermore, the reconsideration of social contracts around the world suggests that Russia's disrespect for long-standing rules and conventions may be spreading like a virus.) A growing number of Russians are catching on to the one-sidedness of the current social contract under which they pay into a system that gives them little or nothing in return. And though Putin's macroeconomic policies have managed to keep economic disaster at bay despite the burden of sanctions, low oil prices and capital flight, his administration hasn't undertaken the structural reforms necessary to sustain the country in the long run. Gone are the days when the government could build a social contract on the promise of prosperity.

Still, as long as state-run outlets dominate the media, as long as Russia opposes the United States and decries the Western notion of tolerance, and as long as Russians can cover their expenses with risky but readily available microloans, the arrangement will endure. Opinion polls suggest that most Russians are delighted their country and their president are exerting international influence. The government and state-run media will continue to seize on Russia's national pride and geopolitical bluster — along with the discord plaguing Western powers such as the United Kingdom, European Union and United States — as next year's presidential election approaches.

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia's Fraying Financial Safety Net Hangs by a Thread

Russia's sovereign wealth reserves, once bloated by years of abundant petroleum revenue, are today just shadows of their former selves. And on Feb. 1, the country's Reserve Fund, designed to help the government balance its budget, will officially disappear as it is legally recombined with the National Wealth Fund, a separate pot of money that backs up Russia's pensions. But the merger is a move in name only: It will come after the country's Finance Ministry appears already to have drained the Reserve Fund's remaining $17 billion in cash to plug a looming budget hole. With Russia's financial security blanket wearing thin, the question as national elections approach will become whether its people will continue to trust the current administration to manage the country's increasingly shaky finances.

[Crafty_Dog]

Protests will return to Russia this Sunday. On Jan. 28, opposition figure Alexei Navalny will launch a multi-city series of demonstrations to call for a boycott of the presidential elections in March. Navalny, who has been barred from running, is urging voters to stay home even if they're planning on voting for an alternative to Russian President Vladimir Putin who, despite the expanding list of candidates running against him, is almost guaranteed a victory. But eighteen years after gaining power, Putin's hold over the country is growing tenuous. Russia is likely slipping back into a recession, its banking sector is going through a financial crisis, its regional governments are weakening and dissatisfaction is rising among the country's rich and poor alike.

Over the past year, Navalny has served as a mouthpiece for the aggrieved, exposing the lavish lifestyles of Russian elites and championing anti-corruption campaigns. Of the more than 1100 protests across Russia in 2017, two-thirds were connected to economic and financial woes. But Navalny has struggled to unite dissatisfied Russians behind his political movement, and Sunday's rally will be the first in a series designed to create a unified movement against to the Kremlin.

Voter apathy could be the people's greatest weapon.

Anti-establishment sentiment may also be compounded in the coming weeks, buoyed by the U.S. Treasury Department's so-called "Oligarch List." The report, an exploratory document released as the United States considers expanding sanctions against Russia, will single out the country's most powerful and reveal their wealth, their assets and more. A consolidated list of Russian elites could fan the flames of anti-corruption sentiment among citizens and protesters, particularly because the country's poverty rate is now rising faster than it has since 1998.

The Kremlin, for its part, has responded in a scattered fashion. Regional leaders have been ordered to tailor their own responses to rallies. Many leaders in protest hot-spots — such as Tyumen, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg and Volgograd — have issued permits for rallies in an attempt to keep them peaceful. But Moscow and St. Petersburg are the biggest challenges for both Navalny and the Kremlin. With protests planned in Russia's major cities, major clashes between demonstrators and the security services cannot be ruled out. In recent weeks, Navalny's various headquarters were repeatedly raided by police, and his employees have been continually harassed. Authorities in Russia's largest cities have denied permits for gatherings in central or culturally significant squares, offering alternative locations on the outskirts.

[Crafty_Dog]

By Ekaterina Zolotova


Is the Russian Economy Defying Western Sanctions?


The country’s economy is improving, but the devil is in the details.


In a recent interview, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the Russian economy had overcome some significant challenges over the past several years, namely Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the global slump in oil prices. According to Putin, inflation is the lowest it has been in modern Russian history, gold and foreign reserves are growing, economic growth is slowly rising and foreign direct investment is increasing. The effects of Western sanctions appear to be easing. In 2015, Russian gross domestic product declined by 1 to 1.5 percent due to sanctions. In 2017, this number declined to 0.5-1 percent.

If the Russian economy really is recovering, it would give Russia a better negotiating position when it comes to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and would diminish some of the leverage the West gained through sanctions. We previously forecast that Russia couldn’t afford to be isolated from the global economy any longer and would therefore be forced to make concessions on Ukraine to gain some relief from sanctions. But these new indicators have made us take a second look at that forecast.

The Russian economy has indeed displayed some surprisingly positive results in 2018. The State Duma reviewed the federal budget on June 7, and for the first time since 2011, Russia is expecting a budget surplus – totaling 0.5 percent of GDP, or roughly 481.8 billion rubles ($7.7 billion), this year. According to the review, state revenue so far in 2018 was 17 trillion rubles – 2 trillion rubles more than was expected in the budget released in December. And according to the minister of economic development, Russia’s GDP in 2018 may exceed 100 trillion rubles – an increase from 92 trillion rubles in 2017. The World Bank has confirmed that the Russian economy is improving and forecasts that the growth rate will reach 1.5 percent in 2018 and 1.8 percent in 2019-20. In addition, the Russian government expects that non-oil and gas revenue will continue to grow by more than 1.8 trillion rubles in 2018. The government has also said about 60 percent of Russia’s income is not related to oil and gas.

But Russia’s moderate recovery was largely due to the increase in oil prices since early 2018, leading to an increase in revenue by 1.76 trillion rubles. And despite the government’s efforts, the economy is still heavily dependent on the energy sector. In the first quarter of this year, oil accounted for 27.4 percent of Russian exports, and fuel and energy products accounted for 42.5 percent, largely unchanged from 2017.

In addition, Russia’s National Wealth Fund has increased due to higher oil prices, but only marginally. In May, the fund grew by 5 percent if calculated in rubles, but in
dollars, it actually declined by 3 percent, or almost $2 billion, due to the weak Russian currency. For now, Russia has chosen not to spend this money but rather to save it in case it ends the year in a deficit.

Even if the economy has improved on the macro level, it seems that Russians remain skeptical. Polls by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center show that the private sector still believes that the economy is struggling. In fact, 69 percent of companies said they believe the government’s economic policies will be ineffective, a 5 percent increase from last year. Business leaders cited economic uncertainty, rising taxes and declining domestic demand among the most important causes of the negative business environment in the country.

In the first quarter of 2018, consumer debt reached 4 trillion rubles, increasing by 5 percent compared to the same period in 2017. Almost half of this amount consists of overdue loans. A recent poll commissioned by the central bank showed that inflation expectations in Russia increased to 8.6 percent in May from 7.8 percent in April, partly due to the rise in gasoline prices by 5.6 percent from May to April and by 11.3 percent in annual terms, sparking fears of rising food costs. Eighty-three percent of Russians expect their financial situation will deteriorate due to rising gasoline prices.


 

(click to enlarge)


Indeed, Russia has seen some growth but little development. In May, following March elections, Putin outlined the economic goals of the new government. In the next six years, he said, the country will be among the five largest economies in the world and will have a growing population, increased life expectancy to 78 years, sustainable income growth and reduced poverty. According to Putin, the country would need an additional 8 trillion rubles to achieve these goals. Yet, it hasn’t made any serious reforms that will increase government revenue to this level or transition the economy away from resource dependence.

The government has admitted that it currently doesn’t have the money to fund Putin’s plans, and so it has to either raise more money somehow or cut spending. But if oil prices don’t continue to rise, the government still has few options to raise revenue. The share of the population that’s economically active is declining and incomes have been falling for years. Raising taxes would only increase the burden on this already overburdened group. (The government is actually looking at cutting excise taxes on diesel, a move that would slash regional budgets.) The government therefore has been considering raising the retirement age and implementing pension reforms to cut public expenditures. But these are highly unpopular measures.

The more difficult economic conditions in the country become, the more Russia will be willing to make compromises in places like Ukraine. This is why it’s important for Russian officials to tout the country’s economic successes, however small and temporary they may be. A strong economy can show the world that Russia is able to withstand the West’s efforts to rein in its foreign policy – which it’s not prepared to do just yet.

[DougMacG]

https://strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20181113.aspx 120 deaths for every 100 births. No money for medicines, etc.

I'm looking for Trump to buy Siberia by the end of his second term.

[ccp]

https://pjmedia.com/spengler/a-sino-russian-greater-asia-from-shanghai-to-lisbon/

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia Takes on Its Demographic Decline
A picture taken on March 30, 2017 shows a woman entering a building of Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) in Moscow.

Highlights

    Russia's demographic decline will be a key concern for Moscow in the coming years as a result of emigration and low birth rates.
    Contradictory data sets and the Kremlin's plans to attract migrants make it difficult to predict the exact extent and speed of Russia's demographic decline, but it will nevertheless impact the Russian economy and Moscow's ability to project power abroad.
    Even if Russia succeeds in attracting significant numbers of migrants to mitigate its population decline, Moscow will face greater difficulties associated with managing domestic ethnic tensions and political instability.

 

From great power competition with the United States to internal unrest, Moscow has plenty of issues to deal with, but another problem looms ominously on the horizon: demographic change. Because of emigration and low birth rates, Russia's population is projected to decline precipitously in the next few decades. This could have significant geopolitical implications, impacting everything from the country's economy to its military power to its ability to project influence around the world — especially in its near abroad. But due to the disparities between population projections, and to Moscow's efforts to mitigate its decline, the true scale of the demographic threat facing Russia is unknown. While a perusal of various data sets suggests that fears of Russia's imminent demographic demise might be exaggerated, the country's planners still have much work to do to arrest the decline.

The Big Picture

Russia's demographic outlook will play a major role in shaping the country both internally and internationally in the coming decades. The looming population decline will challenge Moscow's ability to sustain its economic and military power, just as the changing ethnic balance in Russia will complicate Kremlin efforts to manage social and political instability.
See 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast
See Eurasia section of the 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast
See Russia's Internal Struggle

Disparate Data Sets

The primary sources for Russia's demographic data are the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), a Russian government agency, and international bodies such as the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In tracking Russia's historical and current population data, there is little discrepancy between the Rosstat and U.N. figures, but there is a far larger gap between Rosstat and the OECD regarding Russian emigration to specific countries like the United States and Germany.

That's because Rosstat only counts Russians who officially cancel their registration in their homeland — something that most emigrants do not do. As a result, the number of Russians emigrating from the country is much higher than the numbers Russia has officially reported, according to a study that the independent media outlet Proekt released in January, citing OECD data. Indeed, certain destination countries, including the United States, have reported Russian immigration figures as many as six times as high as those reported by Rosstat.

Crucially, however, the Proekt report cited OECD migration data published by the destination countries, which doesn't necessarily indicate that incoming Russians actually arrived from Russia. Instead, these "persons holding a Russian nationality arriving from anywhere" could, for example, be Russian citizens who emigrated from France to Germany. This could explain why the OECD figures diverge so much from Rosstat's numbers, as the latter only tallies people leaving Russia. But while the gap between the Russian and international numbers is simply too large to suggest that the difference consists of Russians migrating from third countries to the likes of the United States or Germany, it is likely an exaggeration to claim that the true rate of emigration is six times as high as the Rosstat figures; instead, the reality is somewhere in between.

What Awaits Russia

When it comes to projections for Russia's overall population, the country is currently projected to lose about 8 percent of its population by 2050 according to the United Nations. (Rosstat does not publish such projections.) Naturally, larger emigration numbers would accelerate the population decline. But given the incongruous data sets, it's difficult to project a precise timeline for Russia's downward demographic trend.

Another factor to consider is the Kremlin's efforts to offset its population decline and emigration trends. According to the Russian business daily Kommersant, the Russian government plans to attract 5 million to 10 million migrants from neighboring countries with large Russian-speaking populations, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Moldova, to offset Russia's population decline over the next six years. The government's efforts to attract migrants, as well as it bid to encourage more births, managed to hold the population trend steady in recent years, but 2018 was the first year since 2008 in which Russia's population dropped in absolute terms, falling by 93,500 to 148.8 million people. The country's current plan to attract at least 5 million migrants in just over five years, however, is far more ambitious.

The extent to which the Russian population will decline will have significant implications for Moscow. The continued fall in population will undermine Russia's economic position, particularly as the people most likely to leave are young, educated professionals in sectors like technology and the military. Rosstat, too, has noted the increased brain drain: In 2017, 22 percent of emigrants from Russia possessed advanced degrees, up 5 percent from 2012. The fall will make maintaining tax revenues and sustaining the pension system challenging for Russia, something that prompted the government to raise the retirement age effective this year.

The change will also alter Russia's demographic composition, as migrants from faster-growing countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia are likely to migrate to Russia in greater numbers to make up for the population loss. This, in turn, could foment more ethnic tensions in the country and increase political instability, as evidenced by recent protests against migration in Moscow and Russian Far Eastern cities like Yakutsk. The potential for ethnic tensions notwithstanding, the Russian government has few options but to attract more immigrants to offset its impending population decline.

From a geopolitical perspective, a weakened economy and smaller population will also compromise Russia's ability to project military power and political influence, as the country will lag behind countries that are growing in population and competing for influence in the region, including great power competitors China and the United States and even smaller powers like Turkey and Iran. So while the exact extent of Russia's demographic decline and changing ethnic makeup is difficult to predict, there is little doubt it will give Moscow great cause for concern in the long term.

[DougMacG]

https://beta.washingtonpost.com/outlook/putins-power-depends-on-his-popularity-that-makes-him-vulnerable/2019/08/27/c5e0cf1a-b4a2-11e9-8e94-71a35969e4d8_story.html

For all his apparent strength, his hold on power is surprisingly contingent on maintaining public support.
...
This reliance on popularity makes Putin vulnerable. Being too harsh on protesters could easily lead to a backlash in public opinion. But being too soft might encourage even more demonstrations against the evident corruption and mismanagement across Russia. As a result, the Kremlin often acts tough then backs off.
...
Putin’s popularity is extraordinary valuable to Russia’s elites — its billionaires, generals and media superstars. They support him, and burnish his image, not (only) because they’re afraid of him or share his ideology, but because so long as he remains popular, they can maintain their position of privilege and keep the people at bay, despite staggering inequality; in 2015, the top 1 percent of Russian’s owned 43 percent of the nation’s wealth. As long as he is liked by ordinary Russians, Putin is the best defense of that wealth and privilege.

But a regime that is built on one man’s popularity is also a regime with a built-in weakness.
...
the realities of a decade of economic stagnation — and five years of declining real incomes — start to erode support.
----------------------------------------------------------

With protests in Russia, China [Hong Kong] and Iran, wouldn't it be ironic if Trump got reelected and some of these thugs got dumped.

[Crafty_Dog]

With the Prime Minister's Resignation, Russia Initiates Major Constitutional Reforms
4 MINS READ
Jan 15, 2020 | 22:30 GMT
The Big Picture
Russia has been moving toward the inevitable scenario of a post-Putin era. Russian President Vladimir Putin won't be able to run for re-election in 2024 given constitutional limits, and he is seeking to shape a political system that continues his legacy rather than relying on any one powerful individual.

See Russia's Internal Struggle
What Happened

Russian President Vladimir Putin has set in motion his first real steps toward creating a political system that he hopes will maintain the country's course beyond his rule. Following Putin's address to the Federal Assembly, the Russian government of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev announced its resignation Jan. 15. Putin has already selected Medvedev's successor, submitting the candidacy of the head of the Federal Tax Service, Mikhail Mishustin, for Duma approval Jan. 16.

The announcement of the resignation followed a meeting between Putin and Medvedev after Putin's Federal Assembly address, during which he advocated for several changes to the Russian Constitution relating to the powers of the presidency and the Duma. These would include limiting presidents to two terms total. At present, presidents can only serve two consecutive terms, but the law doesn't specifically rule out multiple nonconsecutive terms (a loophole Putin himself took advantage of). In another change, parliament, not the president, would hold the sole power to select and appoint prime ministers and Cabinets. Under current law, the president selects a prime minister, subject to Duma approval.

Why It Matters
These changes reflect the maturation of the Putin regime after 20 years into a more resilient, less personality-driven structure able to maintain his political legacy. They indicate that Putin is working to lessen the role of personalities in parliament in favor of party rule of the legislature. The changes carry some risk, however, in that Putin's party could theoretically lose control of parliament.

With Medvedev having resigned, Putin can put in place a team of ministers charged with enacting the announced constitutional changes.

With Medvedev's resignation, Putin can put in place a team of ministers charged with enacting the announced constitutional changes. Kremlin watchers have observed a decline in Putin's trust in Medvedev for some time; for changes like these as critical to his aims for Russia, Putin will want a team whose loyalty and strength he can completely rely on. Mishustin has the additional advantages of being an economically savvy administrator who has not accrued significant ill will from the public. This will help him navigate a potential referendum on constitutional changes in 2020 or 2021 and 2021 Duma elections, all while contending with severe economic challenges.

A Managed Transition

The developments represent just the beginning of a long-term transition for Russia. For Putin to shape a system that outlasts him, many more steps will be required — and success is not guaranteed. First, a new government to support Putin's ambitions will have to be put in place, and the planned constitutional changes will have to pass. Additional changes to the responsibilities of the parliament and government, or the presidency, may be required ahead of 2024 to guarantee the United Russia party itself dominates Russian politics rather than whoever is serving as president.

The process can be expected to spark competition between Russian political factions, perhaps generating opposition from individuals who had hoped to win the presidency and so dominate the country. Perhaps more important, United Russia will have to devise a careful strategy to assure its control of the new structure. More power to parliament could backfire unless the party maintains strong control over parliament at a time when electoral challenges to United Russia have been on the upswing. Continued disruptions of opposition activities and offering Russian voters a number of alternatives within the United Russia-allied spectrum of parties will be key components of those efforts.

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia's Economy Faces Stormy Seas Despite Moscow's Optimistic Forecast
Sim Tack
Global Analyst , Stratfor
7 MINS READ
Mar 19, 2020 | 11:00 GMT


(Photo by Vladimir Gerdo/TASS via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Russia will be able to implement its budget largely as planned as it empties foreign exchange reserves to make up for lost oil revenues.
But if oil stays below $40 throughout the year, Russia could slide back into recession and see its ongoing economic challenges worsen.
The current crisis will affect the purchasing power of the Russian population, which will cost the government popularity ahead of key elections in 2020 and 2021.

The current crisis caused by low oil prices and COVID-19 bolsters skeptical perceptions of Russia's 2020 growth forecast. With no revenues entering the country's National Wealth Fund at current oil prices, financing for Russian President Vladimir Putin's much-hyped social spending plan could become impossible to carry out. Growing inflation, rising prices and declining purchasing power are already unavoidable due to COVID-19 and low oil prices, with implications for political stability and elections in Russia.

The Big Picture

Russia is facing a new crisis before it can even fully pull its economy out of stagnation caused by its 2015-2017 economic crisis. Depending on how long it takes oil prices to return to the $40 range, Russia could face significant challenges to its budgetary ambitions, and to its ability to keep its economy out of a renewed recession.

See Russia's Internal Struggle

As elsewhere, Russia's stock markets have suffered and the ruble has continued to weaken. Low oil prices meanwhile threaten the sustainability of Russia's government budget. While Russia currently has substantial reserves that will allow it to weather immediate budget shortfalls, some anticipated sources of government spending may become unavailable. Meanwhile, Russia's economy may stall out and possibly even see a contraction in GDP, while rising inflation will further suppress the already-dwindling purchasing power of Russia's population.

Budgets Under Pressure

Despite the potential effects this crisis could have on Russia's economy, the government's response in terms of economic stimulus measures and direct intervention has remained relatively limited. Many adjustments to a world of oil prices well below the $42.20 budgeted price trigger automatically, but these will only help soften the macroeconomic blow since they do not provide economic stimulus beyond the regular budget. When oil prices drop below the level budgeted by the federal government, foreign currency reserves are automatically applied to cover shortfalls. The central bank will thus sell foreign currency for rubles to cover the shortfall in government revenue from oil prices below $42.20. With over $450 billion in foreign exchange reserves, Russia can easily weather the current oil prices of around $30 for another five years without depleting its reserves, but even pessimists don't expect oil prices to remain that low for that long.


Lost oil revenues might be tougher on Russia's regions. According to estimates, a majority of its regions could need to spend their entire reserves (a total of about $20 billion across regional administrations, with half held by the Moscow region and the balance by the other regions) during 2020 to make up for revenue shortfalls and the weak ruble. Even then, many would still have to take out significant commercial loans, or receive subsidies from the already-strained federal budget. These estimates are also based on a recovery of oil prices in the second half of 2020. If such a recovery does not occur, regional administrations could face an even worse situation, possibly requiring a significant bailout from the federal government if their debt burdens become unsurmountable.

Inaccessible Reserves

While Russia continues to emphasize that its reserves are sufficient to cover the shortfall in budget revenue, a politically critical part of the budget for the coming years could, however, become inaccessible at current oil prices. In order to pay for the social spending plan that Putin announced Jan. 15, the Russian government was counting on a special budgetary maneuver to pad the federal budget with funds from the National Wealth Fund. While the government can't directly tap its wealth fund, it planned to have the Central Bank sell its majority share in Sberbank to the National Wealth Fund — a legitimate investment for the fund — and to pay a portion of the profits from the sale into the federal budget.
 
For this sale to take place, however, the National Wealth Fund would need to grow by a significant degree in order to reach the required liquidity to afford the sale. The generation of liquidity in the National Wealth Fund, however, is done by skimming oil profits over an indexed value. This year, the fund will not produce any profits to skim when oil prices are below $41.60. With wealth fund liquidity insufficient to purchase the first tranche of the Sberbank sale despite the declining value of Sberbank shares, the sale has been postponed from June to December, and if oil prices haven't recovered by then, will be postponed even further.

Some financial analysts anticipate that if oil prices don't bounce back during the year and result in an annual average of over $40, Russia could see inflation rise to over 7 percent and enter a recession with a GDP contraction of over 1.5 percent.

Another major element of financing for this social spending was the rerouting of funds destined for the Pension Fund. This was possible at the beginning of the year, since the Pension Fund itself had been more profitable than expected. But as overall economic performance in Russia dwindles, so will the profitability of Pension Fund assets. This means Russia might not be able to redirect money initially destined for it without weakening the fund significantly.

The issues at the Wealth and Pension funds ultimately mean that the federal budget may not be able to meet Putin's social spending goals, or that meeting them may require cutting other planned budget expenses.

Negative Outlook

In its response to low oil prices, Russia's government has adjusted its expectations for budget revenue and inflation for 2020. It still, however, insists that all of its goals for new social spending and its growth target of 1.9 percent will be maintained. Analysts at the Accounts Chamber, the Russian parliament's public auditor, are less sanguine, and warn that Russia could face zero growth or even recession as poverty increases. The Accounts Chamber typically has a less optimistic outlook than the government, and its takes tend to be closer to reality. In this case, many other Russian financial analysts are backing the Accounts Chambers' stance. Even worse, some of those financial analysts anticipate that if oil prices don't bounce back during the year and result in an annual average of over $40, Russia could even see inflation rise to over 7 percent and enter a recession with a GDP contraction of over 1.5 percent.
 
As inflation — initially forecast at 2.2 percent for this year, but now expected to reach at least 4 percent during 2020 — goes up, this also means that the cost of consumer goods will rise in Russia. But wages, which never recovered from their contraction during the 2015-2017 crisis, will not be growing in sync with these price rises. Putin has requested that the government and Central Bank do whatever they can to shield the population from the effects of this crisis, but their means are limited. The State Duma has continued to proceed with legislation related to its social spending package, but without adjustments, whether it can proceed remains uncertain. Dwindling purchasing power had already become a controversial political issue in Russia last year, and the current crisis will only make matters worse.
 
This increases the potential for political unrest, and could sap the government's popularity ahead of the April 22 popular vote on constitutional amendments and ahead of next year's Duma elections. United Russia's control over parliament or the passing of a new constitution wouldn't immediately be at risk. But as a poor economic situation increases support for more potent opposition parties, these parties could enter the parliament and carve out a sustainable — if small — presence within Russia's political institutions. These parties' ability to compete with United Russia will be greater in regional gubernatorial and legislative elections in September 2020. The Kremlin will likely block most real opposition candidates from taking part in the latter elections, something it has done before. But even so, growing economic malaise could help reignite large waves of pro-democracy protests in the run-up to these elections.