Russia/US-- Europe

[Crafty_Dog]

Europeans Try to Have It Both Ways
They expect American protection but aren’t prepared to defend their own countries.

By Walter Russell Mead
Feb. 17, 2020 4:20 pm ET

How solid is the West? At last weekend’s Munich Security Conference, the world’s largest gathering of security policy makers and officials, the theme was “Westlessness,” referring to the sense of disorientation that many Europeans feel in this age of America First.

Since the 1940s, U.S. leadership in the service of a united and secure Europe has been the one unchanging feature in the Continental landscape. For generations, the U.S. committed to protect Europe from Russia, maintain bases in Germany to prevent it from threatening its neighbors, and promote European integration. Now Europeans don’t know where they stand, and a mixture of bafflement, anger, disappointment and fear fills the atmosphere at conferences like the one in Munich.

There’s little doubt that Trump administration policies, ranging from trade wars to toughness on Iran, have tested trans-Atlantic relations to the breaking point. But to understand the growing weakness of the Western alliance, Europeans need to spend less time deploring Donald Trump and more time looking in the mirror. A good place to begin is with a Pew poll released earlier this month on the state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Superficially, the poll looks like good news. In 14 European countries plus Canada and the U.S., a median 53% of respondents said they had a favorable view of NATO, while only 27% saw the alliance unfavorably. Despite double-digit declines in NATO’s favorability among the French and the Germans, these numbers aren’t bad. Mr. Trump, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel are all less popular in their home countries than NATO is.

So far, so good—but that support is thin. When asked if their country should go to war with Russia if it attacked a NATO ally, 50% of respondents said no, and only 38% supported honoring their commitment to NATO allies.

Let those numbers sink in. Only 34% of Germans, 25% of Greeks and Italians, 36% of Czechs, 33% of Hungarians and 41% of the French believe their country should fulfill its treaty obligation if another European country is attacked. Only the U.S., Canada, the U.K., the Netherlands and Lithuania had a majority in favor of honoring the NATO commitment to mutual defense.

Europeans often contrast the “nationalism” of backward political cultures like Russia, China and the U.S. with their own supposedly enlightened attitude of cosmopolitan solidarity. Yet if these numbers are accurate, Europeans haven’t replaced nationalism with European solidarity. They have replaced nationalism with fantasy: the belief that one can have security and prosperity without a strong defense.

That vision leaves Europe vulnerable, and it is threatening to let the West unravel. European leaders believe they are trading parochial loyalties for higher and broader commitments, when in truth their countries lack the solidarity that makes international order possible. Those who dream that they can have security without the willingness to fight for it are slowly turning NATO into the paper tiger that its enemies hope it will become.

Meanwhile, Europeans still, mostly, trust America. Seventy-five percent of Italians believe the U.S. would rally to NATO’s defense if Russia attacks, as do 63% of Germans and 57% of French. Despite European ambivalence about fulfilling NATO obligations, the alliance is held together by their confidence that America—Mr. Trump’s America—will fulfill its obligations.

Europe’s problem isn’t Mr. Trump. It isn’t nationalism. It isn’t that others aren’t wise or enlightened enough to share Europe’s ideals. It is that too few Europeans stand ready to defend the ideals they claim to embrace. That young Germans no longer dream of fighting and dying to conquer Poland is an excellent thing, but it is a bad and even a dangerous thing that so few young Germans think Europe is important enough to defend and, if necessary, to risk their lives for.

This problem won’t be easy to solve. For many Europeans, the essential purpose of European integration was to end war. For centuries, the restless nationalisms of European peoples plunged the Continent into one wretched war after another. The European Union was meant to bury those national antagonisms and end the cycle of war. To love Europe was to enter a posthistorical age of perpetual peace. For voters who grew up in the European cocoon, the military defense of European ideas sounds like a contradiction in terms. How can you build peace by making war?

In contrast, Americans continue to believe that Europe is worth defending. We must hope that over the next few years more Europeans will come around to that position; otherwise, the prospects for “Westlessness” will only grow.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/20/poland-is-becoming-americas-key-nato-ally/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/06/05/trump-orders-massive-cut-to-us-troop-numbers-in-germany-report/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%206.5.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump’s Spite-Germany Plan
He’ll weaken America’s military posture and get nothing in return.
By The Editorial Board
Updated July 29, 2020 9:02 pm ET
SAVE
PRINT
TEXT
233

Soldiers of the U.S. Army disembark from an airplane upon their arrival at Poznan Airport in Poznan, Poland, July 16.
PHOTO: SEAN GALLUP/GETTY IMAGES
Beneath the din of media condemnation, it can be hard to sort the good from the bad in President Trump’s unorthodox foreign policy. Some initiatives scorned by foreign-policy elites have been wise, like pulling out of failing arms accords. Yet the Pentagon’s plan to withdraw almost 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany is far from a stroke of populist genius. It’s a blow to U.S. interests that won’t fulfill the cost-saving objective Mr. Trump claims to be concerned with.

Amid souring relations with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Mr. Trump in June ordered thousands of U.S. troops withdrawn from the country. On Wednesday Secretary of Defense Mark Esper sketched out the plan. He said the U.S. will cut its troop presence in Germany to 24,000 from 36,000, with some 5,600 moved elsewhere in Europe, including Belgium and Italy, and 6,400 stationed back in the U.S.


OPINION: POTOMAC WATCH
Who Will Win the Biden Veepstakes?


SUBSCRIBE
The Pentagon is presenting the move as improving its flexibility. Yet the U.S. presence in Germany—along with infrastructure and knowledge built over decades—is strategically located in the geopolitical and economic heart of Europe. Moving forces south or west in the Continent is a retreat that reduces U.S. ability to surge into the theater if Russia makes a military move. Indebted countries like Italy or Spain are unlikely to pay more than wealthy Germany for the U.S. presence.

The Obama Administration in 2012 and 2013 withdrew U.S. combat brigades from Germany, and Vladimir Putin responded by invading Ukraine in 2014. Expect the Kremlin to get similar signals from President Trump’s move. Mr. Esper said some forces will move to Poland, but there is no agreement yet to do so. One reasonable suggestion is moving the U.S. Africa Command, now based in Germany, to southern Europe so it is closer to the Mediterranean.

As for the troops coming home, Mr. Esper says many will return on rotations “in the Black Sea region.” This will be costly. The Journal reports that the retreat from Germany may cost $6 billion to $8 billion.

Mr. Trump is legitimately impatient about Germany’s failure to meet its Nato defense commitments, its support for Russia’s gas pipeline, and its naivete about China. He might have emphasized the last point by announcing that the Indo-Pacific is now a more important theater than Europe and moving a few thousand U.S. troops to Asia to pressure Berlin.

Instead he appears to be undermining America’s military position out of pique—moving U.S. forces to punish Germany, though many will go to countries that also aren’t pulling their weight. Oh, and in the middle of an election campaign he’s undermining the case, which he supported with action over three years, that he is tougher than Democrats on Mr. Putin. Mr. Trump’s erratic foreign-policy impulses remain the greatest risk of a second term.

[Crafty_Dog]

In Belarus, an Election Fuels the Fight for Russia's Borderlands
Sim Tack
Sim Tack
Senior Global Analyst , Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Aug 4, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
Plainclothed Belarus' security forces and riot police officers detain a protester at an opposition demonstration in Minsk, Belarus, on July 14, 2020.
Plainclothed Belarus' security forces and riot police officers detain a protester at an opposition demonstration in Minsk, Belarus, on July 14, 2020.

(SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images)

The likely tumultuous aftermath of Belarus's upcoming presidential election could significantly shake up the balance of power in the strategic borderland region between Russia and Western Europe. Amid the growing popularity of opposition movements in Belarus, the outcome of the country's Aug. 9 presidential election is widely expected to be heavily contested. The likely emergence of post-election protests will cast doubt over President Alexander Lukashenko's grasp on power and could open the door to a potential regime change. Belarus's importance to Russia's external security strategy will make Moscow extremely invested in the outcome of any power struggle in the country, which could prompt Russia to intervene directly.

A Heated Political Battle

Lukashenko's heavy-handed crackdowns against political activism have consolidated support for increasingly popular opposition candidates. The Belarusian government's repression of opposition activities, in particular — including detainments and refusal to register candidates — has concentrated opposition backing behind Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, Lukashenko's primary challenger in the upcoming election. His government's perceived poor handling of the country's COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent economic crisis, as well as ongoing concerns over Lukashenko's moves to limit political freedoms, has also helped propel her bid for the presidency. In response to EU demands and sanctions, Lukashenko scaled back pressure on opposition activities during the 2010 and 2015 presidential elections. But the current rise of opposition support and anti-government sentiment has resulted in a renewed culture of repression and crackdowns ahead of this year's election.

The opposition is unlikely to win the election given Belarus's history of electoral interference, which will almost certainly fuel intense protests rejecting the outcome. Lukashenko's regime depends on the active repression of political opposition and has been suspected of rigging elections to secure its grasp on power. There is no reason to believe this year's vote will be any different, especially given the particularly heated opposition campaign. Opposition candidates are calling for a high turnout to make any falsification of votes obvious. They are also already priming the Belarusian population to defend their vote after the election, though opposition leaders have yet to outright call for post-election protest action for fear of prosecution. The outcome of the 2006 election in Belarus resulted in protests that were eventually quelched by security forces. A repeat of those 2006 events, later dubbed the "Denim Revolution," is likely following the Aug. 9 presidential ballot. This time, however, post-election protests have the potential to escalate into larger or more violent persistent demonstrations given the current levels of opposition activity and large turnout at rallies.

President Lukashenko's ability to weather the coming round of post-election unrest is uncertain and may largely depend on his ability to maintain the loyalty of security forces. In many cases where governments have fallen to similar protests in the past, such as Ukraine's Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014, the alignment of security forces was decisive in shaping the outcome. Lukashenko maintains an active policy of frequently reassigning government officials and leaders of security branches to keep any individual position from amassing too much power. But while this practice avoids the rise of internal competitors, it also leads to weaker patronage structures that Lukashenko may come to depend upon to remain in control throughout intense protests. The position of security forces, and their behavior in response to post-election protests, will thus be critical in establishing the strength of Lukashenko's continued ability to repress dissent.

Gauging the Russian Response

A regime change in Belarus would intensify the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West by upending the current balance of power in Moscow's borderlands. The Belarusian opposition led by Tikhanovskaya has demonstrated a clear pro-Western orientation, meaning her rise to power could reorient the country toward the European Union and the United States. Such a geopolitical shift would present a clear existential threat to Russia, which depends on Belarus as it's last real buffer between it and NATO. Losing influence with Belarus would deny Russia of the strategic depth the country provides, and would leave Russia's core dangerously exposed to potential expansions of Western influence to its borders, which are located less than 400 kilometers (or roughly 250 miles) away from Moscow.

Russia's Slipping Grasp On Its Borderlands

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict against Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have decisively pivoted Kyiv toward the West in recent years. This shift, which itself followed over 20 years of gradual NATO expansion into Eastern Europe toward Russia's borders, has drastically remapped the balance of power between Russia and the West in the borderlands that lie between them. In trying to balance between its powerful neighbors, Belarus has also flirted frequently with the West, as evidenced by Lukashenko's government agreeing to host NATO forces for military exercises earlier this year. But a complete pivot to a clearly pro-Western administration would solidify Russia's losing battle against the eastward encroachment of NATO's influence.

The potential for a significant upheaval of Belarus governance will force Russia to choose between either throwing its weight behind Lukashenko, or finding other means to guarantee its influence over the country. Russia will take whatever actions necessary to try and guarantee an election outcome that doesn't shift Belarus even closer to the West. But while Russia actively supported Lukashenko in the past, his government's oil diversification efforts over the past year, as well as Minsk's resistance to Moscow's push for deeper political and economic integration, has recently driven a wedge between the two countries. Russia would still prefer Lukashenko over the pro-Western opposition. Though if his position becomes untenable, Moscow may go to great lengths — including the deployment of covert military actions — to try and gain control over the political transition process in Belarus. Indeed, the recent arrest of 30 suspected Russian mercenaries in Belarus could indicate that Moscow is already preparing such plans. This approach, however, would be prone to strategic risk or miscalculations, as was the case in Ukraine. But Moscow is unlikely to stand idly by if there is a real risk of losing Belarus entirely to the West.

A complete pivot to a pro-Western administration in Minsk would solidify Moscow’s losing battle against the encroachment of NATO’s influence.

If Lukashenko manages to hold on to power, he will find himself strengthened in countering both Russian integration efforts and Western demands for political liberalization. Lukashenko's ability to survive heavily contested elections, whether through Russian support or by his own means, would grant him a greater degree of maneuverability. Lukashenko would be in an even better position to negotiate beneficial energy trade terms with Moscow, as well as resist Russian demands for greater economic and political integration. His firm grasp on power would also enable him to ward off European demands for political liberalization, though the oppression of opposition activity during the presidential election and possible violent crackdowns against protests thereafter could raise the risk of EU sanctions. Such sanctions would most likely target individuals engaged in violence against civilians as opposed to having a broader economic impact, thus representing only a temporary rollback in the warming of Minsk-EU relations.

[Crafty_Dog]

second

The German press is running heavy with last Wednesday’s Pentagon press conference, in which Defense Secretary Mark Esper confirmed the U.S. will withdraw 11,900 troops from Germany. Markus Söder, minister president of the state of Bavaria, called the decision “inexplicable,” while Angela Merkel’s trans-Atlantic coordinator, Peter Beyer, said it “makes no sense geopolitically for the United States.” For its part, Germany’s anti-American Left Party welcomed the decision. Its Bundestag leader proclaimed on prime-time television: “I can’t get enough of this punishment,” referring to Donald Trump’s seeming insistence that the move is more retaliatory than strategic.

Strains on the U.S.-German alliance have been attributed to everything from Mr. Trump’s bullying and ignorance and Ms. Merkel’s excessive circumspection to Vladimir Putin’s talent for sowing chaos abroad. But even if all these assumptions are accurate, none are root causes. The trans-Atlantic fissures predate Mr. Trump and Ms. Merkel and will outlast them, with potentially tectonic consequences for Germany’s role in Europe.

The core problem with trans-Atlantic relations is that they never evolved after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the original bargain struck after 1945, the U.S. provided security to its European allies and supported their struggling economies. In return, those allies backed the U.S. on most major issues related to the Soviet Union in Europe. This model of trans-Atlantic relations was founded on the reality of a near-hegemonic America, and a Europe that was economically poor, politically fragile, and militarily vulnerable to the Soviet threat.

Challenges to this model date to at least the Nixon administration, and no U.S. president has been entirely satisfied with Europe’s contribution to the Western alliance. But once the Soviet Union collapsed, and the European Union emerged as one of the world’s largest economies, many Americans began to think it unwise to keep bearing more than 70% of defense expenditures for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Even President Obama, whose personal relations with Ms. Merkel were famously warm, left office frustrated about the trans-Atlantic imbalance. In March 2016 he affirmed an “anti-free-rider campaign,” meant to dissuade the Europeans “from holding our coats while we did all the fighting.” “We expect others to carry their weight,” he explained.

While Mr. Trump hasn’t cultivated the personal touch exhibited by his predecessor, he has sustained Mr. Obama’s parting challenge to the trans-Atlantic model. If Joe Biden succeeds in November, he too will struggle to justify the viability of pre-1989 security and trade imbalances in a world in which Europe is no longer poor and the U.S. is no longer hegemonic.

It remains too early to judge the efficacy of U.S. sanctions on German gas pipelines, demands on German telecommunications infrastructure, pressure on German military spending, and general shaming of Germany’s international diplomacy. But critics aghast at the Trump administration’s continued preoccupation with alleged German delinquency would do well to consider how far a Biden administration would get in the opposite direction.

Would a President Biden find it easy to uphold unconditional security guarantees to Germany and its neighbors, even if Berlin buys more gas from Moscow, expands trade links with Beijing, and declines to help address U.S. trade concerns in Brussels?

These are not mere questions of “fairness,” but of the foundations of contemporary Germany. Consider the precarious circumstances which underwrite Germany’s position as both the wealthiest country in Europe and one of the most pacifist members of NATO.

While the Russian threat looms over Poland, Sweden, Finland and the Baltics, the Kremlin is hardly considered a menace in Italy, Spain or Portugal. France is attempting to revive a full-fledged Franco-Russian partnership, while Britain is no longer shackled to the consensus demands of Brussels. Given the wild asymmetry of European threat perceptions, a lopsided U.S. presence truly is the glue that keeps the continent’s security architecture together, and Germany’s postwar identity intact.

But if the U.S. ever withdraws from Europe in a significant way—as Mr. Trump’s troop plan suggests it could, and as events in the South China Sea seem almost designed to achieve—Germany will find itself in a kind of straitjacket.

As the seat of political and economic power in Europe, Berlin would become the main target of Nordic, Baltic and Visegrád pleas to do and spend more on defense, of French appeals to de-Americanize European security, and of Russian fears of German remilitarization. German leaders would also face a whirlwind of competing domestic passions, from advocacy for a renewed era of German military confidence to sheer terror at the notion of reopening the darkest box in Germany’s psychological attic.

Ms. Merkel has spent 15 years betting that steady growth, full employment and high wages can keep that box shut, and that U.S. forces can keep Germany’s nightmare scenario forever at bay. It is the tragic irony of her final year in office that these two strategies have collided, and that trans-Atlantic ties have frayed so much under her watch.

Mr. Stern was chief of staff and a senior adviser at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, 2019-20.

[ccp]

that us should are ask them to pay up to their promises:

https://www.westernjournal.com/victor-davis-hanson-germanys-furious-trump-pulling-thousands-troops-berlin-refuses-pay-nato-dues/

and of course the left will stamp and stomp there feet and say this is an example of we are mean to our enemies

(and of course add the obligatory "Trump cozies up to despots like Putin - another phony Russiagate angle)

[Crafty_Dog]

D1 is definitely Trump hostile.  FWIW here is their POV:

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/09/potentially-deadly-blow-nato/168853/

[ccp]

R.D. Hooker, Jr. served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council from April 2017 to July 2018
wonder what he thinks if Joe Biden , or better yet Kamala Harris  could lead the free world

or nato etc.

[Crafty_Dog]

What President Trump is doing here IS a major change in long standing American geopolitical strategy.  It is normal and understandable that people sincerely dedicated to the previous strategy would be concerned.

[ccp]

https://www.yahoo.com/huffpost/trump-russia-intelligence-explode-220746995.html

we keep hearing how Russia ran campaign to get Trump elected

can ANYONE  please tell exactly what they did and if it mattered?

not a peep about China doing the same with bribing everyone in US
   and infiltrating academics industry etc

This comment is curious:

"According to Ioffe, the scope of the attacks is actually much larger than previously known to the public ― CIA agents all over the globe have suffered its effects, which include lasting brain damage ― and, under the Trump administration, the United States is not doing much to stop them."

This suggests that Russian knows who the CIA agents are - how is this
  explained

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16900/germany-russia-nord-stream-pipeline

[Crafty_Dog]

Say it ain't so Manchurian Joe!

GPF:  Black Sea deployment canceled. The United States canceled the deployment of two warships to the Black Sea, according to Turkish officials. Washington had expressed concern about the military buildup along Ukraine's border with Russia, but Moscow criticized the deployment, calling it provocative.

[ccp]

https://www.npr.org/2021/04/16/985439655/a-worst-nightmare-cyberattack-the-untold-story-of-the-solarwinds-hack

Glad we have responded with sanctions - whatever that means

Unhappy Biden uses some false pretenses ("stealing the 2020 election ) "  "bribing AFghans to kill US troops"

Unhappy as noted above he makes a threat and changes his mind looking more stupid then if he did not make the threat

[Crafty_Dog]

   
Brief: Assassination Plot in Belarus
One suspect allegedly engaged in discussions in the U.S. and Poland.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Despite massive protests against his reelection last August, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and his regime clung to power and continue to suppress critics. The regime’s opponents have not gone away, however, and they continue to challenge Belarus’ stability. This concerns not just Minsk but also Moscow, for which Belarus is a key ally and important buffer between Russia and the West.

What Happened: On Saturday, the Russian Federal Security Service said it had detained two Belarusians: Yuras Zyankovich, who also holds American citizenship, and Aleksandr Feduta. The two men were accused of planning to kill Lukashenko and carry out an armed coup in Belarus, with the help of locals as well as unnamed Ukrainians. The suspects were caught in Moscow and were delivered to Belarus’ State Security Committee. Discussing the case, Lukashenko said his sons were also targeted for assassination, and he accused foreign secret services of being involved.

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said Monday that President Vladimir Putin had discussed the case with U.S. President Joe Biden during their phone call on April 13. When asked if the U.S. had been involved in the alleged assassination plot, however, Peskov declined to comment.

Bottom Line: This may be little more than the continuation of the power struggle between Lukashenko’s regime and its opponents, but it looks bigger than that. Importantly, Russia alleges that one of the suspects traveled to the United States and Poland for consultations before meeting in Moscow, where they were detained. It’s also significant that Putin and Biden discussed an assassination plot against Lukashenko before the Russian security service had publicized the case. The U.S. role, if any, is unclear, but we need to keep a close eye on happenings in Belarus.

[Crafty_Dog]

May 26, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Paying the Price for Belarus’ Plane Diversion
The incident has drawn strong condemnation from the rest of Europe.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
The fallout from Belarus’ diversion of a commercial plane over the weekend is still unfolding. The incident happened on Sunday, when Belarusian authorities forced a Ryanair plane en route to Lithuania to land in Minsk, supposedly because of a bomb threat. Once the plane landed, they arrested opposition journalist Roman Protasevich, the founder of a channel called Nexta on the Telegram messaging app. Nexta had covered the mass protests last year against Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who personally ordered the plane’s grounding. Details about what precipitated the incident are sketchy, but what matters more is how this will affect Europe’s relationship with Belarus and Belarus’ top ally, Russia.

Ryanair's Unexpected Flight Path
(click to enlarge)

What Happened

A number of theories have been floated about what exactly happened and why. In the absence of an investigation, we can posit two possible explanations. First, Lukashenko may have wanted the journalist arrested to try to put the squeeze on the opposition, which has enjoyed growing support among both the Belarusian public and foreign powers. If this was what motived the move, it would indicate that Lukashenko believes his position and that of his government is getting weaker, especially since the protests following the disputed elections last August. The threat posed by Protasevich must have been serious enough for Lukashenko to risk angering the West by scrambling a fighter jet to force the landing of a commercial plane midflight. This explanation doesn’t seem sufficient, however. The threat to the president after the protests last year seems to have been tamed enough not to warrant such a drastic move. Lukashenko stayed in power, and recent demonstrations have been smaller than those that followed the election. Tough new media restrictions were also imposed, and many opposition figures either left the country or were detained.

A second possible explanation is that Minsk really did believe that there was a bomb on board the plane. The head of the aviation department at Belarus’ Transport Ministry said unidentified individuals who called themselves Hamas soldiers had threatened to blow up the plane the day before, demanding an end to Israeli aggression in Gaza. The CEO of Ryanair said the bags of the passengers were searched after the plane landed, although one passenger said authorities made no effort to rush passengers off the plane and demonstrated no concern while searching passengers and their bags that an explosion might be imminent.

Either way, the incident has placed significant pressure on Minsk, which could now see fresh protests and calls for Lukashenko’s removal and new elections. All of these possibilities would only further isolate the president.

What Now

Many countries in Europe and beyond have condemned Protasevich’s arrest and the forced landing of the plane. Britain banned flights from Belarusian state-owned carrier Belavia. And Lithuania blocked all planes from Belarus from landing at its airports. EU members decided during a summit on Monday to ban Belarusian planes from flying to the bloc and called on European carriers not to transit through Belarusian airspace. Germany’s Lufthansa, Latvia’s Air Baltic, Hungary’s Wizz Air, Poland’s LOT, the Netherlands’ KLM and Sweden’s SAS all announced that their planes would not fly over Belarus.

Belarus' Nearly Empty Skies
(click to enlarge)

These measures are particularly punitive during a pandemic that has placed the airline industry under serious strain. Now that lockdown measures are beginning to ease, having flights to and from Europe severely restricted could affect the recovery of Belarusian airlines and the Belarusian economy in general. Belavia is planning to cut its staff – by up to 50 percent, according to some sources – due to the European backlash.

As for Moscow, it has said that it doesn’t want to intervene in an issue that’s mostly between Belarus and Europe, likely trying to bide its time until it sees what the full fallout will be. It has used this wait-and-see strategy before, including during the protests against Lukashenko last year, though it could still react if it deems doing so necessary.

Rumor has it that Lukashenko will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on Friday. The two leaders will likely discuss how the Ryanair incident could affect transport between the two countries, especially considering that Belarus was an important corridor for travel between Russia and Europe. Russia might now become a corridor for travel between Belarus and Europe, especially as the summer tourist season heats up. So far, Russian airlines have made no changes to flights, but if they were to stop flying over Belarusian territory, under the threat of sanctions, they could find other routes to Europe – as they have done since the 2014 plane crash in Donbass that led to that region’s airspace being declared unsafe. Moscow also recently introduced a new train route that reaches Minsk in seven hours for the ridiculously low price of $20-$30.

The Kremlin is also likely concerned about Western retaliation directed at Russia. The European Council already agreed to impose new sanctions on Belarusian individuals, companies and sectors. Moscow can only hope that European leaders will find these measures sufficient punishment and not seek retribution against Lukashenko’s biggest foreign supporter. However, the U.K. said it was considering sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 and the Yamal-Europe pipelines, both of which carry – or, in Nord Stream 2's case, will eventually carry – Russian energy supplies to Europe, and the latter of which passes through Belarus. The dilemma for Moscow, which is eager to avoid any additional pressure on its economy, is that it needs to balance between pacifying Belarus and not further aggravating Europe.

Despite the intrigue over what led to the grounding of the Ryanair plane, the key issue here is how the European response could impact Russia as well as the Belarusian government and opposition. Moscow views any threat to the Belarusian leader as a threat to itself. Belarus is Russia’s last remaining ally on its western border, which explains why Moscow works so hard to keep Lukashenko in power and to keep him loyal to the Kremlin. But doing so is getting harder.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/the-tuesday/dispatches-from-the-future-front/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TUE_20210601&utm_term=Tuesday-Smart

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

June 1, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
A Russian Move in Europe
By: George Friedman
Russia and the European Union held a conference last week, during which Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in a speech: “The situation remains rather alarming. Our common European continent is experiencing an unprecedented crisis of trust. Division lines are emerging in Europe again. They are moving eastward and getting deeper as if they were frontline trenches.” These are not trivial points, nor are they the usual verbal jousting of international conferences. They reflect the Russian reality, and as before in history, it differs from the European and American views of things.

The organizing principle of the Russian perspective can best be understood by what President Vladimir Putin said years ago: that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe for Russia – not the collapse of communism, mind you, but the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the core of which had been forged during the time of the czars and which protected Russia from invasion.

The Soviet Union’s collapse shattered the westernmost reaches that face Europe. Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova all became independent, and Russia’s border moved dramatically eastward. In one sense, there was little Russia could do about it. In another sense, Russia could live with the loss so long as the Europeans and Americans didn’t control the region. A buffer zone could suffice, one that required genuinely Russia-leaning or at least neutral governments. Governments dominated by the West were dangerous.

Russia's European Buffer Zone
(click to enlarge)

The Ukrainian revolution of 2014 upset the balance by replacing a pro-Russia president with a solidly pro-West government. Putin regarded this as a U.S.-engineered coup, and he sought to retain control of the eastern portion of Ukraine that borders Russia. Three perspectives emerged. The U.S. perspective was that Ukraine had the right to self-determination. The Russian perspective was that this was a result of covert action. The European perspective was classically European in that there were just about as many opinions as there are countries in Europe. Countries on the former Russian border such as Poland saw Russian moves in Ukraine as a return of Russian aggression. Germany’s perspective was that whatever happened should not be permitted to affect Germany’s relations with Russia. The opinion of a country like Portugal was that all this was far away and did not necessarily affect Europe.

Even so, it was a watershed moment. Russia believed that the West had violated an implicit agreement on the neutrality of the buffer region. The U.S. believed it was witnessing a new Russian attempt to return to great power status. Europe was alternatively alarmed or indifferent.

But the recent events in Belarus have shifted this. A Ryanair aircraft flying from one EU country to another was forced to land in Belarus, where two of its passengers were arrested. Russia had been supporting Belarus and its embattled, pro-Russia president following the chaotic Belarusian election last year, so if it hadn’t been clear before, it was now: Belarus was a partner if not an outright satellite. The event confirmed to Europe that Russian power had moved westward and had now arrived on the border of the Baltics and Poland. But to Russia, the opposite – that European power was advancing steadily eastward – had long been true. And that is at least partly what Lavrov was referring to in his speech at the EU conference.

And yet he never raised the key issues. What is Europe’s relationship with the United States, and what exactly is Europe? You cannot answer the first question without first answering the second. The Russians need to know the answer now. If Europe is a united entity with a singular foreign policy that operates under the auspice of NATO, then Russia stands against not just Europe but also the United States. If it doesn’t, then Russia is in a much stronger position. Moscow can’t expect to change America’s mind on the matter, but it might be able to split Europe’s view of Russia. And since NATO operates on many issues based on unanimity, that essentially blocks the U.S.

In this context, Lavrov's speech makes sense. He was speaking directly to Europe, telling its leaders that Russia will respond if they continue to press east. He was speaking to those who hoped that the situation in Belarus would simply go away. His audience – the EU – is not Europe but a treaty on economic cooperation among most but not all European countries. The EU does not have a foreign policy beyond its trade policy, nor does it have a military. The EU is institutionally averse to national security issues intruding on economic issues. Lavrov’s speech was alarming to this group, and it was this group that he hoped to alarm. They might have been upset by the Ryanair incident but not so much that they want to confront Russia militarily or even economically.

For Russia, a fragmented Europe is the best defense because it freezes NATO and makes increased U.S. involvement more difficult. Without NATO, U.S. involvement will have to be done nation to nation, and thus without unquestioned support by European countries. That makes power projection from North America to Poland a difficult logistical matter.

In other words, Russia wants to preempt a joint American-European reaction to a hypothetical Ukrainian action. But there is a truth here: The Russians are weak and frightened. They are frightened by the full meaning of the fall of the Soviet Union, and despite massing troops here and there, they are not confident in their ability to prevail. They are unsure of their own strength. They believe they have a window of opportunity with Belarus, but to fully capitalize on it they must create cracks in Europe. It’s the move to make, and we can expect many attractive offers to various European countries. The problem Russia has is finding attractive offers.

[Crafty_Dog]

July 13, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Biden and Merkel to Meet
By: George Friedman

U.S. President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are scheduled to meet Thursday in Washington, where they are expected to discuss issues such as cybersecurity, Nordstream 2 and Afghanistan. But as is often the case, the official agenda items are secondary to the more important aspect of the meeting. After all, Berlin has never been especially decisive in Afghanistan, cybersecurity is a threat that affects all countries, and Nordstream 2 is nearly completed.

The latter two issues necessarily implicate Russia, which goes to the heart of the meeting. The actual point of discussions between Biden and Merkel will be what the U.S. relationship with Germany is, and what Germany’s relationship with Russia and Poland will be. Implicit in these questions is what Germany’s relationship with Europe will be, a subject that will be touched on gingerly, if at all, but matters more than all other questions.

The European Union was created for two purposes, according the founding treaty: peace and prosperity in Europe. The memory of the two world wars haunted Europe, so if the Continent could figure out a way to shed national distinctions of their importance, peace would be possible, or so the theory went. The path to transcending nationalism was in constructing a union in which universal prosperity was achieved, and with it a common European interest. Along with this would come a common European identity, in which nation-states would decline in importance.

From the American point of view, the European Union would be a logical epilogue to the Marshall Plan. The U.S. had included within the principles of the plan the integration of Europe’s national economies. It was a rocky trip, as European nationalism and mutual suspicion were inevitably high. The French in particular distrusted integration. But it was important to the United States, which was responsible for protecting Western Europe from a Soviet attack. To successfully do so, there had to be a restoration of European military power and integration into what would become NATO. Economic integration and military integration were, from the American point of view, inseparable. The European free trade zone emerged from the Marshall Plan, was redefined by the Europeans, and finally became the EU.

The legacy of the Marshall Plan was the principle of European integration. But Europe has become an entity in which military strategy, economic policy and foreign policy are uncoordinated. In terms of military policy, there are wide differences in Europe. Poland, always wary of Russia, is obsessed with protecting itself from potential Russian aggression. For, say, Portugal, Poland’s concerns are far from its own. From the German point of view, creating a military force equal to its economic power would both undermine its economy and revive historical fears of German power, both reasonable concerns with the first one dominant. NATO, which is the framework of both European defense policy and the trans-Atlantic relationship, has no common strategy, making NATO itself dysfunctional and rendering a strong trans-Atlantic relationship impossible.

A similar problem exists within the EU. The EU has created prosperity, but the prosperity is not equally enjoyed. Unlike regional disparities within a nation, these are regional disparities between nations, which ultimately retain their right to self-determination.

The EU has had three significant crises: the global financial crisis of 2008, the migration crisis in 2015, and the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic costs. In all cases, the interests of particular nations clashed with the strategy laid down by the EU. At the moment, the economic conditions of various countries within the eurozone have competing needs required to stimulate a recovery – and some members of the EU are not in the eurozone to complicate matters further. Germany, the leading economy in Europe and the fourth-largest in the world, wants to maintain an economy that does not run deficits, and it wants the European Central Bank to follow this course. Germany fears inflation. Italy and other countries are facing a profound economic crisis that requires, according to John Maynard Keynes, massive stimuli and deficits to create a framework for recovery. Germany’s economic problem is not Italy’s, but whereas there are many nations in the eurozone, there is one central bank and therefore one monetary policy. In all three of these crises, there was a wide diversion of interests and needs, and the EU sought to use its power to punish the countries that were unwilling to follow its policy.

This then leads to a difference in strategy. As one example, consider Nordstream 2, which will deliver Russian natural gas to Europe and which the U.S. believes will make Europe far too dependent on Russian energy. In the past, the Russians have cut off the flow of energy to Eastern European countries. It had few long-term consequences beyond inflicting fear. But under other circumstances, the Russians might use this power to bring about changes in behavior or even capitulations to its demands. The Poles are terrified of excessive dependence on Russian fuel, not only because of their position but also because they fear that other EU members might cooperate with Russian strategy to keep the fuel flowing.

Germany and Poland are neighbors with a long history. To Poland, Nordstream 2 is an existential threat. To Germany, it is a useful source of energy. The Germans think they can form a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia based on German technology transfers and the like and avoid the threat of having energy cut off. The Poles see in this attitude that Germany has no interest in Polish needs, and so neither do NATO and the central bureaucracy of the EU.

The United States is inevitably drawn into this issue through its NATO membership. The U.S. has some forces in Poland but needs greater NATO involvement if it hopes to successfully deter Russia. There is no common NATO view in practice.

Similarly, there is no single view on the current economic crisis. The intention of the EU was to integrate Europe. What it has done is try to reconcile the diverse interests of European countries and, failing that, follow the interest of the more prosperous and powerful countries.

Germany is the most powerful country in Europe, and the problem Biden will have is discerning what European policy on various matters is and whether to link Nordstream to German pressure on Russia and German warfare, and make the U.S. dependent on Germany for that security area. But then Germany must also lead the EU, which is different from leading NATO or defining an immigration strategy. The production of a European strategy under these circumstances is complex in the extreme. The ability to understand that strategy is beyond the capability of putative allies.

The Europeans like to argue that the U.S. has turned away from the trans-Atlantic relationship. The fact is that trying to understand Europe’s defense policy, economic policy, and grand strategy verges on the impossible. The only option is bypassing these institutions and dealing with individual states. Of course, these states are constrained by the reality of being part of this chaos. Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that the problem in dealing with Europe is finding Europe’s telephone number. I would argue not that the U.S. has turned its back on Europe but that Europe has adopted a decision-making process designed to avoid clarity in what decision it has made.

[DougMacG]

"Biden and Merkel to Meet"

The greatest minds and powers of western civilization in our time.

God help us.

[ccp]

"Biden and Merkel to Meet"

When  former is not acting as a warrior for
  defense of "democracy" at home

fighting racial repression suppression and depression

just another reparations con.

I am not paying.

[Crafty_Dog]

What the U.S.-Germany Deal on Nord Stream 2 Means for Ukraine

Continued U.S. and German discord over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, along with the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, reflect Ukraine’s struggles to convince Western policymakers to fully support its foreign policy. Domestic tensions in Ukraine due to perceived meager support from the West could further weaken President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. The United States and Germany are planning to announce a deal on the disputed Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the coming days, according to unnamed sources cited in a July 19 Reuters report. This follows the July 16 meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. President Joe Biden in which both leaders declared their unity against Russian aggression and agreed to collaborate on mobilizing investment aimed at helping emerging economies in Central and Eastern Europe transition to cleaner energy, but failed to resolve their countries’ differences on the natural gas pipeline between Germany and Russia. As part of the to-be-announced deal with Germany, the United States has reportedly agreed not to resume its currently waived sanctions against the company behind the $11 billion project, Nord Stream 2 AG, and its chief executive following assurances and yet unspecified investments supporting Ukraine’s energy transformation from Russian hydrocarbon imports to domestic green energy production. U.S. and German investments in the transformation, efficiency and security of Ukraine’s energy sector, however, are unlikely to be enough to prevent the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from reducing Ukraine’s crucial transit revenues in the coming years.

In May, the White House decided to waive sanctions against the corporate entity and CEO in charge of the Nord Stream 2 project to protect its relationship with Germany and buy more time for negotiations. The move alienated partners in Central and Eastern Europe keen to oppose Russian influence and incited bipartisan backlash from U.S. lawmakers, both of which will resume in similar force.

The still hazy details of a possible U.S.-Germany deal on Nord Stream 2 are likely to entail continued challenges for Ukraine. Both Biden and Zelensky had insisted on concrete investments as compensation or gas volume transit guarantees through Ukraine to offset or limit the pipeline’s potential use as a tool of Russian geopolitical coercion against Kyiv. Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom is already preparing for an attempt to use high gas prices as a way to pressure German and EU regulators to allow the pipeline to quickly begin operations. The United States and Germany appear to have agreed on eventually investing in Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, but the continued lack of details could be an indication that the compensation will be underwhelming and most likely too late to seriously improve Ukraine’s energy security in the near term. According to the five-year transit deal that Russia and Ukraine signed in 2019, Ukraine’s minimum transport volumes can decrease from the minimum of 65 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas in 2020 (which is already down from the 87 bcm Ukraine received in 2018) to 40 bcm in 2021-24. This means Ukraine could receive transit fees over the next three years on just half the volume of gas it did three years ago. After 2024, Gazprom could be in a position to demand a further decrease in its minimum transport volumes through Ukraine, and it is unclear if U.S. and German investments in Ukraine’s energy security will significantly improve the situation even by then.

Gazprom has reduced bookings through the Ukrainian transit network by 20% this summer compared with previous norms. European states have, in turn, been unable to refill their gas storage prior to the fall, which is already low due to an unusually long winter across the Continent. This will lead to higher prices in the winter when Nord Stream 2 could near physical completion, which the pipeline’s backers will claim underscore its necessity.

While Nord Stream 2 is likely to be physically completed, there are still legal and political obstacles to the pipeline becoming operational. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Nord Stream 2 a “fait accompli” at a congressional hearing on June 7, suggesting that the White House believes it will be completed. Additionally, earlier concerns of faltering German support for the project amid indignation over Russian conduct have largely faded. And while the Green Party, which calls for the abolishment of Nord Stream 2, could enter the German government after the federal election in September, it may do so only as a junior partner of Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which supports the project. But physical completion, possibly as soon as the fall, doesn’t mean that the pipeline will enter operation in short order — particularly if the lingering risk of U.S. sanctions targeting the third-party service companies and insurance firms needed to operate the pipeline is not fully removed, which the reported U.S-German deal appears unlikely to achieve.

While Russian vessels can complete construction of the project while under U.S. sanctions, certification and insurance will have to be done by large, non-Russian entities, and it isn’t clear which will be willing to do so. Indeed, the threat of U.S. sanctions already prompted at least 16 third-party companies to pull out of the project in February.

Additionally, Nord Stream 2 must be fully compliant with German and EU regulations, and is likely to face a steady onslaught of legal challenges in both jurisdictions that could delay its opening and/or reduce its capacity once in operation.

Russia has downplayed and tried to draw the international community away from risks related to certification and insurance. On June 3, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the country sees no risks for the certification.

Domestic support for Zelensky’s government could fall as the perception builds that Ukraine is not receiving sufficient Western support against Russian aggression. Zelensky will seek political support from the United States during an upcoming meeting with Biden at the White House, which was previously scheduled for July but has been pushed into August. Domestic political tensions in Ukraine, meanwhile, have reached a high amid renewed national security concerns related to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent statements on reasserting Russia’s historical control over Ukraine and denial of legitimate Ukrainian sovereignty prior to the 2021 Russia-Belarus Zapad military exercise scheduled for September. Those security concerns have since only been augmented by the resignation of the country’s influential Internal Affairs Minister Arsen Avavok on July 12.

The Zelensky administration is worried that some members of the U.S. government believe Kyiv should cave to Russian and Franco-German pressure by following through with the so-called Steinmeier Formula, which is an interpretation of the Minsk agreements that would grant the Donbas breakaway regions constitutionally-enshrined autonomy and the ability to hold local elections prior to Ukraine receiving control of its border with Russia. Since it was proposed by Germany in 2016, the Steinmeier Formula has sparked protests in Ukraine for being a capitulation and a dangerous trap unfavorable to Ukraine’s interests.

Some U.S. officials believe the Steinmeier Formula could open the door for a de-escalation of the eastern Ukraine conflict, and could also enable the United States and Europe to more effectively focus on their true strategic priority of rallying an international coalition against China. But other members of the Biden administration are more willing to continue supporting Ukraine’s position that it should receive full control of its border with Russia before recognizing any local elections.

Against this backdrop, individuals close to Zelensky have speculated that Ukraine’s frustration with the West could prompt Kyiv to explore increased investment from China and other Asian countries. To that end, Zelensky held his first phone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 13 — the day before Merkel’s trip to Washington and the day after Zelensky’s meeting with Merkel in Berlin.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17603/germany-russia-nord-stream-biden-administration?fbclid=IwAR06TvaCv-DUMTlrnWEYTy38j-8dv6hG8RSE9YuZkG3Yx5bf0vgK_H-jQ3E

[Crafty_Dog]

Lukashenko's stance on integration. During a media event called the “Big Conversation,” Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said he would support integration with Russia so long as Belarus remained a sovereign state.

[G M]

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/russia-belarus-plan-massive-anti-nato-military-exercise-wake-afghan-defeat

[Crafty_Dog]

   
Daily Memo: Western Warnings for Ukraine
Officials have expressed concern about a buildup of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Concerns over Russian troops. Ukraine’s Western allies have warned that Russia is massing troops on the Ukrainian border. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Friday that Washington was “very concerned about some of the irregular movements of forces that we see on Ukraine’s border.” Meanwhile, Ukraine received the fourth delivery of supplies – 80 tons of ammunition – from the United States as part of a $60 million aid package promised to Kyiv in August.



Reaching out to NATO. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are considering triggering Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which allows member states to ask for consultations if they feel their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened, amid an influx of migrants coming across the Belarusian border. The Polish prime minister on Sunday called on NATO to take “concrete steps” to address the issue. The EU foreign affairs chief confirmed on Monday that the bloc would impose sanctions against Belarus targeting the Minsk airport and other facilities and hotels hosting migrants

[G M]

Nice they found a border they are interested in protecting. Too bad it’s not ours.

   
Daily Memo: Western Warnings for Ukraine
Officials have expressed concern about a buildup of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Concerns over Russian troops. Ukraine’s Western allies have warned that Russia is massing troops on the Ukrainian border. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Friday that Washington was “very concerned about some of the irregular movements of forces that we see on Ukraine’s border.” Meanwhile, Ukraine received the fourth delivery of supplies – 80 tons of ammunition – from the United States as part of a $60 million aid package promised to Kyiv in August.



Reaching out to NATO. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are considering triggering Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which allows member states to ask for consultations if they feel their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened, amid an influx of migrants coming across the Belarusian border. The Polish prime minister on Sunday called on NATO to take “concrete steps” to address the issue. The EU foreign affairs chief confirmed on Monday that the bloc would impose sanctions against Belarus targeting the Minsk airport and other facilities and hotels hosting migrants

[Crafty_Dog]

RUSSIA

Putin seeks NATO pledge not to expand east

BY VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV ASSOCIATED PRESS MOSCOW | President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday that Moscow would seek Western guarantees precluding any further NATO expansion and deployment of its weapons near his country’s borders, a stern demand that comes amid fears of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian and Western offi cials have worried about a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine, saying it could signal Moscow’s intention of an attack. Russian diplomats countered those claims by expressing concern about Ukraine’s own military buildup near the area of the separatist conflict in the eastern part of the country.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken, noting that Mr. Putin could quickly order an invasion of Ukraine, warned that Washington stands ready to inflict heavy sanctions on Russia if he does. Speaking at a Kremlin ceremony where he received credentials from foreign ambassadors, Mr. Putin emphasized that Russia will seek “reliable and long-term security guarantees.”

“In a dialogue with the United States and its allies, we will insist on working out specifi c agreements that would exclude any further NATO moves eastward and the deployment of weapons systems that threaten us in close vicinity to Russian territory,” Mr. Putin said.

He charged that “the threats are mounting on our western border,” with NATO placing its military infrastructure closer to Russia and offered the West an opening to engage in substantive talks on the issue, adding that Moscow would need not just verbal assurances, but “legal guarantees.”

Mr. Putin’s statement came a day after he sternly warned NATO against deploying its troops and weapons to Ukraine, saying it represented a red line for Russia and would trigger a strong response.

Tensions have been soaring in recent weeks over a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine, which worried Ukrainian and Western officials, who saw it as a possible sign of Moscow’s intention to invade its former Soviet neighbor. NATO foreign ministers warned Russia on Tuesday that any attempt to further destabilize Ukraine would be a costly mistake.

The Kremlin insists it has no such intention and has accused Ukraine and its Western backers of making the claims to cover up their own allegedly aggressive designs.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the concentration of Ukrainian troops looks “alarming,” adding that he was going to raise the issue during a ministerial meeting in Stockholm of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on Thursday. Speaking before a meeting with Mr. Blinken, he again assailed Ukraine for failing to meet its obligations under a 2015 peace deal for the region that was brokered by France and Germany and signed in Minsk, Belarus.

Speaking Wednesday in Riga, Latvia, Mr. Blinken said that “we don’t know whether President Putin has made the decision to invade.”

“We do know that his is putting in place the capacity to do so on short order should he so decide,” Mr. Blinken told reporters. “We must prepare for all contingencies.” r. Blinken gave no details on what kind of sanctions were under consideration if Russia did invade Ukraine.

In April, the European Parliament approved a nonbinding resolution to cut off Russia from the so-called SWIFT system of international payments if its troops entered Ukraine. Such a move would go far toward blocking Russian businesses from the global financial system, even though Moscow has developed its own parallel system in preparation for such a move.

Western allies reportedly considered such a step during earlier escalations of tensions over Russia’s actions regarding Ukraine. In 2019, then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned that cutting Russia off SWIFT would effectively amount to a “declaration of war.”

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Ukraine has amassed about 125,000 troops — about half of the size of its military — near the conflict zone. She also pointed at an increasing number of violations of a cease-fire in the east.

Amid the tensions, Moscow on Wednesday launched drills in southwestern Russia involving over 10,000 troops. A smaller exercise also began in Russia’s westernmost region of Kaliningrad on the Baltic, involving 1,000 personnel from armored units.

Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 after the country’s Kremlinfriendly president was driven from power by mass protests. Moscow also threw its weight behind a separatist insurgency in Ukraine’s eastern industrial heartland, known as the Donbas. More than 14,000 people have died in the fighting.

[ccp]

great to see you again [Vlad]!

  

does biden sound like a horses idiot or not?
i get it ; "diplomacy" yada ..

https://nypost.com/2021/12/07/biden-putin-hold-virtual-meeting-as-ukraine-tensions-escalate/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1392934/ukraine-biden-warns-putin-putin-warns-biden-not-to-poop-pants

[ccp]

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-12-15/xi-says-china-russia-should-safeguard-each-others-security-interests

weird
did Adolf and Josef  wave to each other , or perhaps hug, or  kiss each other on the cheeks?

Do we need a China- Russia thread?
or China - Russian - Iran thread?

or thread such as relations between enemy countries of US?

[ccp]

https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/dick-morris-tucker-carlson-putin-neville-chamberlain/2021/12/15/id/1048756/

But Tucker would have a point
why is the /US funding the *majority* of Nato
let Europe fund most
and cut the foolish Russian pipeline.

[Crafty_Dog]

I love Tucker, but I agree that sometimes he is soft on Russia.

I confess I am not clear on his position regarding military supplies and hard economic sanctions here (including SWIFT)-- all of which I favor-- but I certainly agree with him regarding not sending troops and not bringing Ukraine into NATO.

Morris asks what's wrong with defending Ukraine?  Morally, nothing-- but we are seriously lacking in bandwidth AND LACKING COMPETENCE IN LEADERSHIP for the fight.  Germany stabs Ukraine in the back with the Nord Stream pipeline, and puts under 1.5% of GDP into NATO, and how we are supposed to defend them?

Fuck off!

Edited to add:

For several years now I have repeatedly emphasized the point now being made by this WSJ editorial:

The Xi-Putin Entente Rises
Both share a goal of undermining the U.S.-led global order.
By The Editorial Board
Follow
Dec. 15, 2021 6:59 pm ET


The gushing remarks at Wednesday’s video meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have drawn renewed attention to an underplayed story: The tightening strategic embrace between America’s two most formidable geopolitical competitors. Moscow and Beijing have held each other at arm’s length for decades, but as the world becomes less stable, both see regional advantages from rolling back American power and prosperity.


“China-Russia relations have emerged from all kinds of tests to demonstrate new vitality,” said the Chinese Foreign Ministryaccount of the discussion. It added that “Russia will be the most staunch supporter of the Chinese government’s legitimate position on Taiwan-related issues.” In his introductory remarks, Mr. Putin hailed “a new model of cooperation” between the two countries. He will travel to Beijing and meet Mr. Xi in person early next year.

This is more than talk. Joint military exercises between the two powers have been accelerating, including a naval demonstration in the Sea of Japan in October. Russian and Chinese warplanes have repeatedly intruded on South Korean airspace since 2019, most recently last month. Moscow surged its supply of military equipment to Beijing in the years after seizing Crimea in 2014.


The nations don’t need to present a single strategic front to imperil American interests. They can do so by pushing on different fronts simultaneously in hopes of sapping American power.

The military crisis Mr. Putin has generated over Ukraine works to Mr. Xi’s advantage, drawing U.S. focus from the defense of Taiwan. And if China starts a shooting war in Asia, Moscow could calculate that it’s more likely to get away with its own territorial expansion. A war in either region could trigger conflict in the other.

Both powers are also giving Iran crucial support as Tehran fights U.S.-led sanctions against its nuclear program. Mr. Putin’s new defense agreement with India also redounds to China’s benefit by pulling India away from the U.S.

The rising entente between Beijing and Moscow underscores the growing threats to the U.S.-led international order. The new reality means the U.S. needs to shore up its own alliances while also moving more quickly than it has to build military and cyber defenses that can meet this more dangerous world.

[Crafty_Dog]

If I am not mistaken, this site is led by John Bolton.

I post this piece not because I agree (IMHO it does not openly address the question of Ukraine in NATO) but because it is worth considering:

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18044/russia-biden-appeasement

[Crafty_Dog]

December 20, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
The Russian Treaty Proposal
By: George Friedman

We have been operating with a model of Russia. Having lost its non-Russian territories with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia is missing the buffers that protected it. Its national imperative is to recover those border states, either formally or informally. They could be either occupied by Russian forces or, at the very least, governed by native governments that exclude the presence of Western powers and coordinate with Moscow.
The Russians achieved this in the South Caucasus through diplomacy and the stationing of Russian peacekeepers in the region. They have been increasing their power in Central Asia. But the critical region for Russia is in the west, facing Western Europe, the United States and NATO. There, the loss of Belarus and Ukraine posed a critical problem. The eastern border of Ukraine is only about 300 miles (480 kilometers) from Moscow, and Ukraine is allied with the United States and European powers, informally if not as part of NATO.

Russia’s strategy to this point had been to avoid direct military intervention against hostile forces and use hybrid measures to build influence and gain control. This is what happened in the Caucasus. This is also what happened in Belarus, where a contested election left President Alexander Lukashenko in a weak position, and Moscow used its power to assure Lukashenko’s position and control events in Minsk. The surge of refugees toward the Polish border put Poland on the defensive and created a sense of crisis in Poland. As for Belarus, it was simply the arena chosen by Russia, a satellite taken softly.

As Russia was reclaiming its buffers, we turned our attention to Ukraine, which, as I said, is the key buffer. It is vast, it threatens Russia directly, and from Ukraine, Russia could threaten the West as well. Indeed, between Belarus on the North European Plain and Ukraine’s control of the Carpathian Mountains, Russia could not only defend itself but also threaten an attack on Europe from the Baltic to the Black seas.

The Russians mobilized forces along Ukraine’s borders – from the east, north and south – and, without making overt threats, created a situation in which an invasion of Ukraine seemed possible. I wrote last week doubting that the Russians would try a complex occupation of a hostile country because the possibilities of failure, even against minimal resistance, were real and because the Russians could not predict American actions. If it intervened, the U.S. would likely intervene on land, but it also possesses arsenals of anti-tank missiles launched from air or ships in the Baltic and Black seas. How this conflict would evolve is unknown, and the United States might not choose a military counter. But Russia could not know this, nor could it risk acting on intelligence, which is frequently mistaken.

For the Russians to complete rebuilding the Soviet Union, they have to first neutralize the United States without military action. The best strategy for this is to neutralize NATO, whose military forces are limited but still significant. More important, an American response to Russia without the availability of NATO territory, and without the political backing of NATO allies, would complicate the military and political dynamic of U.S. action. The U.S. had already indicated its caution by threatening the Russian banking system if there were a war in Ukraine, rather than threatening military action.

Therefore, before Russia even considered military action in Ukraine, it had to neutralize the (already cautious) U.S. politically, and the key to that was to paralyze NATO and particularly Germany. Germany sees Russia as a crucial source of energy, a trading partner that might grow in significance, and a problem to be avoided. Even more important to it is Europe, of which NATO is a crucial element – not so much as a military force, but as another force holding Europe together. As the dominant power in Europe (outside of Britain), Germany has a national imperative to maintain its dominant economic position, which gives it major influence on the behavior of the Europeans on military matters.

For Germany, a war would therefore not suit its needs. It would risk a conflict that could severely weaken Europe’s economy at a delicate moment. Germany sees Poland as a difficult problem since it is in NATO, but Poland’s posture toward Russia does not suit Germany’s interests. Germany would of course like a buffer against Russia in Belarus and Ukraine, but not if it means massive economic cost and increasing American power in Europe. The U.S. dominates NATO, and an extended conflict would maximize American military considerations and minimize German economic concerns. In short, while there may be an array of positions on Russia’s moves in Europe, Germany, the leading power, needs to avoid war and will pay a price for this. Russia’s neutralization of the United States leads through NATO, Europe and particularly Germany. If they have divergent views, a unilateral American defense against Russia becomes very risky.

Thus, we get to the extraordinary document that Russia delivered last week. The document is targeted at NATO. The key clause is Article 5: “The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties.”

In other words, Russia is demanding the right to limit the deployment of U.S. troops in NATO countries if the Russians feel threatened by that deployment. The immediate effect would be that, while Poland could build its strength, the U.S. would have to withdraw from Poland if Russia felt threatened, which it says it does. Of course, if the Russian Federation reintegrated former Soviet territories within its political system, which I think is a possibility, then Russia would be freed from Article 5.

There are other clauses that guarantee the United States will reject the document. It is therefore an interesting question why the Russians crafted it. It may be designed as a negotiating platform, but it is too skewed to the Russian interest to be a workable platform for Washington. Another possibility is that it is for domestic Russian consumption, showing that Russia speaks to the U.S. as a powerful equal to be respected. Or it might be that after the Americans’ initial response to Russian threats – that their banking system would be hurt – the Russians read the U.S. as unwilling to respond in Ukraine.

The key from my point of view is that no one wants a war in Ukraine because it would be long and bloody, and the geographic advantage would go to Russia. A proposal on the table, regardless of how preposterous, can give cautious nations an opportunity to capitulate while appearing to prefer a diplomatic course to irrational military responses. Much of Europe is unwilling to fight for Ukrainian independence. The United States, concerned with the free spread of Russian power through military force, might choose an intervention. This proposal might well be seen in Europe as a “basis of discussion,” limiting American options.

An invasion of Ukraine would be filled with risks for Russia. Failure or prolonged resistance would turn Russia from a reemerging power into a nation to be discounted. Russian President Vladimir Putin obviously knows this document will be rejected, but within its context, rejection will get back to counteroffers, and it is possible that NATO and the U.S. will give some ground in exchange for scrapping some of the egregious Russian demands. Or Putin wants everyone to see this in terms that are not mentioned – as an ultimatum – and to panic.

In any case, the key piece of Russian reconstruction – Ukraine – is on the table, and the document so completely confuses the issues, by demanding fundamental shifts in how the U.S. operates, that something may be conceded under European pressure. Putin has nothing to lose from this document and something to gain. I would assume the American response will be to refuse talks based on the document.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://amgreatness.com/2021/12/20/a-new-iron-curtain-descends-thanks-to-joe-biden/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://dailycaller.com/2021/12/21/european-natural-gas-prices-russia-gazprom-joe-biden/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2360&tpcc%3D=newsletter&pnespid=sbo_CnseOqgXgOXBujvsEs2BtgCkDYd0MPSzmu9m.kZm.rLecLnBVAQX5FV.iesnNgKFEl9h

[Crafty_Dog]

December 22, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
A New Periphery in Eastern Europe?
Russia has a plan to outflank Eastern Europe and undermine the West's monopoly over sea routes.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

Eastern Europe has been a buffer region between Russia and the West for centuries. In a nutshell, that means it has nearly always been contested by greater powers whose security depended on incorporating the region into their sphere of influence, thus keeping their enemies at a distance. That also means that countries of the region tend to be dependent, to some degree, on one patron state or another. To be sure, there have been times when they have enjoyed comparatively more sovereignty; such was the case briefly at the beginning of the 20th century and more recently after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But several developments, including the concurrent crises at the Polish-Belarusian border and in Ukraine, show that the region is regressing to the mean, falling once again into the historical pattern that has defined it for hundreds of years.

More interesting, however, is that there may be a new periphery forming that Russia can exploit if things in Belarus and Ukraine don’t go its way.

Bypassing Eastern Europe

Of course, neither Russia nor the West is ready to give up just yet. Ukraine, for example, is a valuable point of leverage for the West against Russia, and Russia needs Ukraine for strategic depth. Both would like to create special zones of control in Ukraine that correspond with ideological and cultural preferences of the local population. (Something they could likely do without resorting to war.) Both favor the status quo, and both understand that the status quo was nearly impossible to maintain without some concessions, however disinterested they are in making any.

Belarus is less contested but no less important. Moscow is firmly in control there, and Minsk’s foreign policy is little more than Russian foreign policy. Indeed, it is through Belarus that Russia plans to reorient certain supply lines so that it depends less on Eastern Europe and the Baltics and more on Central Asia and China.

For example, Moscow is building the Ust-Luga Multimodal Complex in the Gulf of Finland and is developing terminals at the Ust-Luga Sea Merchant Port. This year, the port at Ust-Luga was the biggest in the Baltic Sea by cargo turnover and the second largest in Russia (behind Novorossiysk, located in the Black Sea). Some Russian estimates suggest it will eventually be the largest in the world. In the next few years, Russia will finish the ambitious Lugaport terminal in Ust-Luga port, which will increase cargo turnover by about 30 percent – including the bulk of what Russia now sends to ports of the Baltic states. Moscow signed an agreement with China National Chemical Engineering in 2019 to construct petrochemical facilities in Ust-Luga, too, a cog in the grander Belt and Road Initiative worth about $13.3 billion, according to Xinhua.

Elsewhere, China is working with the Russian Defense Ministry to modernize the Baikal-Amur Mainline railway and to overhaul the M-12 highway, which connects western China and Europe. This is nothing less than an organized process to bypass Eastern Europe. In that sense, construction of new port facilities in Ust-Luga is comparable to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic, both of which aim to outflank the Eastern Europeans and undermine the Western monopoly over sea routes.

The China Factor

Still, it’s unclear how successful Moscow will be in integrating new hubs to a Europe-China corridor. For China, the Eastern European states are essential components of the Belt and Road Initiative, some projects of which have clashed with Russian interests. For example, China and Ukraine signed contracts for building BRI port facilities in Crimea months before Russia annexed the peninsula, which prevented Beijing from implementing any projects. And the ongoing conflict in the Donbas has only reinforced the barriers between Russia and the West. (The main hub between Europe and Eurasia was therefore shifted to Belarus.)

Meridian Highway
(click to enlarge)

Notably, the timing for China is bad. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of the so-called China-Europe Express has become much more important. Economic activity through the railway systems from China to Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus doubled annually over the past two years. This is why tensions between Lithuania and China over Taiwan, for example, are problematic. For Beijing, the Lithuanian ports are quite attractive, but political mistrust pushes the two countries further apart. Chinese trains continue to transit through the country but no longer stop to exchange goods.

More dangerous for China, though, are the tensions between Poland and Belarus. In November, Chinese industry was concerned about the knock-on effects of the border crisis because more than half of the entire cargo volume carried by Belarusian Railway is transited in or out of China. Beijing still considers Belarus an important hub and gateway to Europe, and – considering Chinese freight goes from Belarus to Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Kaliningrad – it will keep using it for as long as possible. But the border crisis has made Beijing think of alternative routes.

In other words, new geopolitical divisions in Eastern Europe are threatening Chinese plans for Eastern Europe, a region in which Chinese cargo has dramatically increased since 2011. China regularly provides Belarusian customs services with new contemporary equipment and gives some grants to help improve border crossings. At the same time, the situation on the Polish-Belarusian or Lithuanian-Belarusian border poses a threat to Chinese national economic interests because until now there hasn’t been any reliable alternative land routes (air and sea are too costly).

It’s unclear how successful Russia’s efforts in creating new routes will be, but for China they will be less than ideal. Beijing has said that the conflict between Belarus and the EU won’t harm the international transit of goods. However, already in September, Lukashenko said nothing threatens the transit of Chinese goods through Belarus. It’s not hard to see Belarus gradually becoming a land corridor that allows Russia and China to potentially circumvent problematic countries in Eastern Europe – so long as things break the right way.

The new periphery and spheres of influence in Eastern Europe can be established in case of a further deterioration of relations between Russia and the West and further Russian expansion on its borderlands. This would require Russia's reorientation of its economic routes out of Eastern Europe and maintenance of Belarus and Ukraine as buffer zones. Things are looking good for Russia in Belarus, but in Ukraine they are more uncertain.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=c8e3f3ea7f9a566da4c69b313528d782_61c491ce_6d25b5f&selDate=20211223

[Crafty_Dog]

Reversal. The Yamal pipeline, which delivers Russian natural gas to Germany via Belarus and Poland, was flowing in reverse direction on Thursday for the third day in a row – bringing gas from Germany to Poland. Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Berlin of reselling its gas, which was purchased at prices below current rates, to Poland.

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin warns Biden of ‘complete rupture’ in relations if sanctions proceed
Russia’s president spoke in a 50-minute phone call with Biden amid U.S. fears that Moscow may once again invade Ukraine

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with President Biden on a videoconference Dec. 7. (Mikhail Metzel/Pool/Sputnik/Kremlin/AP)
By Robyn Dixon and Paul Sonne
December 30, 2021|Updated yesterday at 7:32 p.m. EST



MOSCOW — Russian President Vladimir Putin warned in a phone call with President Biden late Thursday that any new sanctions on Russia as a result of the Ukraine crisis could lead to “a complete rupture of relations” between Moscow and Washington that their descendants would come to regret, according to Putin’s foreign policy aide.

Putin issued the warning during his second phone call this month with Biden, after the U.S. president reiterated how Russia would face unprecedented and punishing sanctions from Washington and its allies if Putin were to proceed with a new invasion of Ukraine, according to Russian presidential foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov.

Putin told Biden that such actions would be a mistake, “which our descendants will later appreciate as a huge one,” Ushakov said, according to the Interfax news agency. “Many such mistakes have already been made over the past 30 years. Therefore, it is advisable not to make such mistakes in this situation.”


The call, which took place at Putin’s request and lasted 50 minutes, came as the Kremlin ratchets up pressure for a sweeping new European security deal after massing troops near the border of Ukraine and firing a test salvo of hypersonic weapons last week to reinforce its demands.

Putin has demanded swift acceptance of a proposed security deal that would bar Ukraine from ever joining NATO and rule out any other eastward expansion by the U.S.-led military alliance. The Russian leader has accused Western nations of encroaching on Russia’s borders with military exercises in the Black Sea region and turning Ukraine into a beachhead for anti-Russia action.

Russian officials see a time frame of just weeks for Biden to agree to demands that NATO has long refused, including effectively allowing Russia to veto the security decisions of Ukraine and other nations in the region. The White House has rejected any such bans on NATO membership out of hand, saying all sovereign nations should retain the right to make decisions about their own security.


A senior Biden administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic matters, told reporters after the call Thursday that Putin was looking to set the “tenor and tone” for upcoming in-person talks between Washington and Moscow that are slated to take place in early January in three different settings.

The United States and Russia are scheduled to hold bilateral talks in Geneva on Jan. 9 and 10, the senior official said. Those will be followed by talks at the NATO-Russia Council on Jan. 12 and negotiations at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes Ukraine, on Jan. 13, the official added.

“Both leaders acknowledged that there were likely to be areas where we could make meaningful progress, as well as areas where agreements may be impossible, and that the upcoming talks would determine more precisely the contours of each of those categories,” the senior Biden administration official said.


Biden, who took the call from Wilmington, Del., where he and first lady Jill Biden are expected to ring in the new year, also told Putin that the United States wouldn’t be discussing the security of its European allies and partners without them at the table, and Putin said he understood, according to the administration official.

Biden and Putin will not attend any of the meetings set for January but will be represented by their respective top diplomats and defense officials.

The talks come amid significant disagreement about Putin’s intentions in Ukraine.

Some analysts say Russia’s insistence that a complex security deal be negotiated in such a short time and include pledges Putin knows Washington won’t make could be a pretext for military action. Others believe Putin has created the threat of a new Ukraine war simply to secure concessions from the United States and its allies in upcoming talks.


During the call, the Russian president told Biden that Russia wanted security guarantees and stressed that “the main thing we need is a result” from the upcoming talks, Ushakov said.

“The U.S. president, in principle, agreed with this point of view and reacted quite logically and quite seriously,” Ushakov said. Biden told Putin that Russia and the United States “could and should play a key role in efforts to ensure peace and security both in Europe and elsewhere in the world,” he said.

“It is important that the American side demonstrated a desire to understand the logic and essence of Russian concerns,” Ushakov added, describing the call as constructive and noting that Biden pledged to continue bilateral talks with Putin.

In their Dec. 7 videoconference, Biden warned Putin of tough new sanctions if Russia escalates action against Ukraine, a threat the Kremlin has shrugged off, saying it is accustomed to Western sanctions.


Putin last week made it clear he would not wait long for the written security guarantees he demands. He said he was not interested in negotiations, only results.

“It is you who must give us guarantees, and you must do it immediately, right now,” he told a Western journalist last week at his annual news conference, when asked whether he would rule out invading Ukraine. “It is the United States that has come to our home with its missiles and is already standing at our doorstep.”

Six ways Russia views Ukraine — and why each should worry the West

Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said last week that the United States had its own list of security concerns about Russian actions to bring to the January talks.

An unclassified U.S. intelligence analysis revealed by The Washington Post this month found that Russia was preparing to move as many as 175,000 troops in preparation for an invasion, though the White House has said Putin has not made a decision yet. U.S. officials and military analysts have predicted that if Putin proceeds, the offensive could take place in late January or February.


Putin blames Western aggression for the rising military tension over Ukraine and last week threatened to respond with “military-technical measures” if his security demands were not met, without indicating what the measures would be.

On Sunday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov explicitly linked Russia’s test firing of Tsirkon hypersonic missiles on Christmas Eve with Moscow’s demands for security guarantees, saying Russia hoped that its demands would “thus become more compelling.”

Putin, who has often boasted that Russia leads the world in hypersonic missile technology, said the first Tsirkon missile salvo test was “successful, impeccable.” He called it “a major event in the life of our country and a significant step in raising Russia’s security.”

Sonne reported from Washington. John Wagner, Sean Sullivan, Meryl Kornfield and Karoun Demirjian contributed to this report

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin’s pressure pushes nations toward NATO

Scandinavian outsiders assert rights

BY GUY TAYLOR THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tough talk and threatening military buildup on Ukraine’s border could backfi re and result in the one thing he says he doesn’t want: an expansion of NATO to more countries on Russia’s doorstep.

While Mr. Putin is seeking guarantees from the West that Ukraine and others not be allowed to join the Western military alliance, some countries in the region that long shunned NATO membership in favor of a policy of neutrality are reconsidering purely as a response to Russia’s aggressive posturing.

Most notably, top officials in Finland in recent days have forcefully asserted that Helsinki has a right to apply for NATO membership, regardless of how Moscow feels about it. Sweden’s more conservative parties also have edged closer to NATO in recent years, and elections this spring could bring the question new prominence.

Following a shift in policy by a farright party, Sweden’s parliament formally adopted a “NATO option” motion on a 204-145 vote last month. The option allows the Riksdag to consider applying for membership in the future. The measure passed over the strong opposition of the minority government, led by center-left parties.

The motion does not force the government to act, but “we can now expect a more comprehensive political debate about an eventual Swedish membership,” Calle Hakansson, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, told public service television, according to a report by Politico Europe.

Finland and Sweden already have positive diplomatic relations with the alliance, but both have long been firm in their autonomy as militarily nonaligned countries, in part for fear of provoking Moscow.

However, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin used their official New Year’s addresses to stress that Finland has the option of seeking NATO membership at any time, regardless of what security “guarantees” the Kremlin is seeking.

According to the online publication BrusselsMorning, Mr. Niinisto said Finland has “room to maneuver and freedom of choice” that includes “the possibility of military alignment and of applying for NATO membership, should we ourselves so decide.”

Ms. Marin said Finland has “learnt from the past,” an apparent reference to Helsinki’s troubled history with Moscow dating to the Soviet Union’s annexation of Western Karelia from Finland during the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish war.

Unease over that history has been rekindled among Finnish nationalists since Russia’s similarly forceful annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014. Sweden’s pro-NATO voices say the country’s long-cherished policy of neutrality has left it in no man’s land in the face of Russia’s resurgent foreign policy aggression in the Putin era. The aggression has included provocations aimed directly at Stockholm.

“For Sweden, one of the first wakeup calls of a resurgent Russia was the simulated nuclear attack on Sweden by Russian bombers on the night of Easter Friday in 2013,” according to 2016 commentary written by then-Swedish Air Force Maj. Carl Bergqvist.

The commentary, published in the online journal War on the Rocks, noted that the Russian posturing had prompted Sweden and Finland to sign “host-nation support agreements with NATO to speed up the process of hosting NATO forces when needed.”

In August, Swedish troops were hastily sent to the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea after Russian warships were spotted in the area.

Mixed public opinion is a factor in both countries. Polls find that Swedes are equally divided over the wisdom of joining NATO, but pollsters have found a major shift from the 1990s, when a strong majority opposed membership. A recent Finnish poll found a plurality — 40% — still oppose NATO membership to 26% in support, but pro-NATO sentiment is on the rise.

Even before the New Year’s speeches by the Finnish president and prime minister, Russia voiced frustration that Finland or Sweden might try to join NATO.

“It is quite obvious that the ascension of Finland and Sweden to NATO would have serious military and political consequences that would require an adequate response from Russia,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Dec. 29, according to EU Today.

The back-and-forth comes amid rising concern in the U.S. and NATO that Russia may be on the verge of invading Ukraine. Russia has been building up its military troop along the Ukrainian border.

The buildup, which has triggered U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces to dig in on their side of the border, has created a foreign policy headache for the Biden administration.

Moscow has even test-fired hypersonic missiles to underscore its demand that the West provide guarantees that NATO not expand any farther into countries surrounding Russia.

President Biden responded to the demand by warning Mr. Putin during a phone call last week that the U.S. could dramatically elevate sanctions against Moscow if Russian forces take further military action against Ukraine. Mr. Putin said such a U.S. move could lead to a complete rupture of ties between the nations.

Mr. Biden subsequently spent the weekend trying to prevent a war in Europe. He arranged a pep talk with Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Zelenskyy just days after the tough, nearly hourlong talk with Mr. Putin.

Although some in Washington say Mr. Biden is not firm enough with Moscow, a key Democrat warned Mr. Putin on Sunday that his tough talk may provoke the very thing he fears: more countries near Russia’s borders signing up with NATO for their own protection.

Rep. Adam B. Schiff, California Democrat and chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said Russian military action against Ukraine would spark a rethinking all along Russia’s borders with the West.

“I also think that a powerful deterrent is the understanding that if they do invade, it is going to bring [NATO] closer to Russia, not push it farther away,” Mr. Schiff said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jan/8/missile-deployments-military-exercises-table-russi/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=11Iw8MaFP720XtwqHL1S5DtzdrDhIDLpyohpeaLrUasUE%2FIeIyroEFN0b68HXFcx&bt_ts=1641675388354

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10383565/Finland-Sweden-closer-joining-NATO-Putins-demands-ban-them.html

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qAVPXle1--g

[Crafty_Dog]

Senate Democrats are working to kill a Republican measure to slap sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.


Catie Edmondson
By Catie Edmondson
Jan. 12, 2022
Senate Democrats unveiled legislation on Wednesday that would impose sanctions on top Russian officials if Moscow invaded Ukraine, in an effort to squash a competing Republican-led bill that would impose sanctions on a Russian natural-gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine.

The Senate is expected to vote later this week on a measure led by Senator Ted Cruz, Republican of Texas, that would impose sanctions on Nord Stream 2, a Russian undersea pipeline to Germany viewed as a means of exerting influence over Europe. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has both privately and publicly urged senators to support the bill, casting Nord Stream 2 as an existential threat. The pipeline would give Russia enormous leverage over Europe and would render Ukraine’s own pipeline to Poland obsolete, depriving Ukraine of substantial revenue.

But the Biden administration and its allies in Congress have lobbied against Mr. Cruz’s measure, which would go into effect 15 days after being signed into law, whether or not Russia attacks. They argue that quick passage would undermine unity among the nation’s European allies, including Germany, which has championed the pipeline as vital to its industrial success. They also argue that the sanctions would have little effect on the construction of the pipeline, because it is nearly completed.

They have instead encouraged Democrats wishing to penalize Russia for massing troops at Ukraine’s border to support legislation by Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat.


“We support Senator Menendez’s legislation, which would trigger severe costs to Russia’s economy and support additional security assistance to Ukraine should Russia further invade,” said Emily Horne, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council. “We will keep working with Congress on maximizing potential costs to Russia.”

That approach appeared to be resonating on Wednesday with even the most vocal Democratic defenders of Ukraine, as more than two dozen members of the party signed on to Mr. Menendez’s legislation. Ten Democrats would need to back Mr. Cruz’s bill in order for it to pass, and it would likely be doomed in the Democratic-controlled House.

“We need legislation that addresses the political situation we face today in response to increasing Russian aggression — not last year or two years ago,” said Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Democrat of New Hampshire. “The dynamics changed and so must our strategy.”

Mr. Menendez’s legislation would impose sanctions on top Russian officials, including President Vladimir V. Putin, as well as the nation’s banking sector if Russia engages in or supports “a significant escalation in hostilities or hostile action in or against Ukraine.” And it would provide Ukraine with $500 million in supplemental emergency security assistance in the event that Russia invades.

Republicans have argued that sanctions could still stop the completion of Nord Stream 2, and accused President Biden of indulging Russian lawlessness last year when the administration waived sanctions on the pipeline in an attempt to mend ties with Germany.


New sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline were included in the annual defense policy bill last year, but were quietly stripped out of the legislation at the last minute before its final passage.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.voanews.com/a/macron-s-call-for-eu-talks-with-kremlin-unnerves-european-allies-/6405475.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-chancellor-turned-down-biden-invite-discuss-ukraine-crisis-der-spiegel-2022-01-21/?fbclid=IwAR0QAEoycx41Wm1UNUFK5vcTRd0t2KJpYL6L4tB0feJto37gHbNMK6IT7is

[Crafty_Dog]

This does ignore the question of why Europe should not be taking the lead in defending itself, the failure of Germany and many others to pay their 2% of GDP, etc, but many relevant military observations are made:

Is the U.S. Ready for a Russian Invasion of Eastern Europe?
By JERRY HENDRIX
January 20, 2022 6:00 AM

The Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, along with Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are all watching Vladimir Putin’s military buildup in eastern Europe with great unease. Each of them was controlled by Russia during its previous incarnation as the Soviet Union, and none of them wishes to return to that subjugation. That’s why they originally sought membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and have increased their own defense spending to meet, and in some cases surpass, the 2-percent-of-GDP goal that the alliance first agreed upon in 2014. NATO membership brings with it the guarantee of security that the U.S. has provided to Europe for 70 years, and with an aggressive Russia looming to the East, security is very much a concern.

There are, however, several problems with this calculation. First, the botched withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the abandonment of American citizens and loyal allies there have dealt a significant blow to the U.S.’s credibility everywhere else. Second, the U.S. Army, the linchpin of security in Europe, largely returned to the United States years ago. Finally, due to Russia’s investments in anti-access area-denial weapons at its enclave in Kaliningrad, the U.S. Navy can no longer get Army units to Europe in time to blunt a Russian onslaught should one occur. Russia has amassed a force of over 100,000 troops along its border with Ukraine, including formations of heavy artillery, armored troop carriers, and main battle tanks. It has also already initiated cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. If Russian forces should suddenly roll over Ukraine and then position themselves to threaten the Baltic nations, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, NATO will find it difficult to respond quickly.

As part of the European Defense Initiative, the U.S. has built a cache of pre-positioned ordnance, including enough equipment for an armored brigade, in Poland. The men needed to make use of that equipment and man the tanks and armored personnel carriers would be flown in from the United States at the first sign of trouble. Additionally, NATO has established a response-force brigade (5,000 personnel) and enhanced forward-presence battalions (400 personnel), but it must be admitted that these will serve as nothing more than a speed bump if Russia initiates a rolling start and then sprints across Ukraine, a nation that is just under 800 miles wide and possesses modern road and rail systems. Should they meet with minimal resistance, Russia’s armored forces, with adequate logistical support, could cross Ukraine and be on NATO’s doorstep in ten days or less. They would confront a NATO ill-prepared for the threat they posed.

Over the past 20 years, NATO nations have decreased their investments in mobile armor and artillery, by far the most expensive of the ground forces, and the United States has not only followed this path but also pulled its last permanently based armored unit out of Europe. The U.S. Army, which once fielded numerous armored divisions of up to 12,000 to 16,000 men each, now retains but one, although there are smaller armored brigade combat teams (BCTs) incorporated into the six standing infantry divisions and one mountain division that remain in the active force. The simple truth that few wish to reckon with is that, aside from air-power assets — the F-35 would most certainly get its baptism-by-fire against Russia’s fighters and its advanced S-400 missiles — under the best circumstances only one or two U.S. armored brigades would be available during the first 72 hours. Thus, only 10,000 men, some transported by air to join up with pre-positioned equipment and others previously assigned to the region as part of a rotational force, would be available to aid our European allies and blunt a rolling Russian assault.

The Administration Knew the Afghan Air Force Would Collapse after a U.S. Withdrawal

Such an understanding emerges from an acknowledgement that armored units cannot be flown to Europe. The men, their equipment, and their vehicles are too heavy and must travel by sea. It would take a minimum of three days to onload tanks and other armored vehicles in the United States, whether in Texas or any of the available ports on the east coast. The ships that would carry them, purpose-designed roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, would then take four to five days to cross an Atlantic Ocean that is no longer controlled by the United States and its NATO allies. Russia has spent ten years designing and building the new Severodvinsk class attack submarine. A derivative of Russia’s previous highly effective Akula and Alfa class fast-attack designs, the Severodvinsk has allowed Putin to challenge allied supremacy over, on, and under the Atlantic at the same time as NATO has divested of its own subs and submarine-hunting frigates.


If the transports survived their Atlantic crossing, they would not be able to traverse the Baltic Sea to their preferred offloading ports in Poland or one of the Baltic nations; the Kaliningrad-based S-400 surface-to-air missile (250-mile range) and Iskander surface-to-surface missile (175-mile range) give Russia the ability to control the surface of the Baltic Sea east of Denmark. (It should also be noted that the Baltic is too shallow and dangerous for large, missile-laden U.S. nuclear submarines to operate safely within its waters without being quickly detected.)

These facts would render it necessary for the ships carrying American Army units to offload their cargos in Belgium or France, and then load their vehicles onto railcars for transport to eastern Europe. This process would take another seven to ten days, and would be complicated by the fact that eastern and western European rail networks, as an artifact of the Cold War, lack uniform railroad gauges. The net result is that it would take nearly three weeks for American armored forces to travel from the U.S. to the front lines of a conflict which by then would almost certainly be over.

NATO and the United States need to understand that for the moment, a massive return of forces to Europe will not be the answer to the Russian threat, simply because there are not a massive number of appropriate, armored forces available for transport. Europe must take steps not only to increase its defense spending, but to also grow its forces, supplementing them with the types of platforms needed to confront the Russian threat at their doorstep. Additionally, the U.S. Army must return its strategic focus to Europe rather than aimlessly casting about for a role in the Pacific. It should rebuild its armored elements, and advocate for a return to a forward-base model, perhaps establishing new bases in eastern European nations rather than returning to its previous garrisons in Germany. While this might run counter to agreements made during the 1990s between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, the simple fact is that Russia’s annexation of Crimea, occupation of parts of Georgia and the Donbass, and persistent threats against Ukraine have rendered such agreements moot.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and its NATO allies must confront the threat of Russia’s naval units in the Atlantic and in particular its new generation of submarines. They need more attack submarines, towed-array-sonar-equipped surveillance ships, and frigates, and they need them soon. Because without them, Europe could soon be rendered a continent the United States cannot reach or aid.

[G M]

Sounds like Checkmate.

This does ignore the question of why Europe should not be taking the lead in defending itself, the failure of Germany and many others to pay their 2% of GDP, etc, but many relevant military observations are made:

Is the U.S. Ready for a Russian Invasion of Eastern Europe?
By JERRY HENDRIX
January 20, 2022 6:00 AM

The Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, along with Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are all watching Vladimir Putin’s military buildup in eastern Europe with great unease. Each of them was controlled by Russia during its previous incarnation as the Soviet Union, and none of them wishes to return to that subjugation. That’s why they originally sought membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and have increased their own defense spending to meet, and in some cases surpass, the 2-percent-of-GDP goal that the alliance first agreed upon in 2014. NATO membership brings with it the guarantee of security that the U.S. has provided to Europe for 70 years, and with an aggressive Russia looming to the East, security is very much a concern.

There are, however, several problems with this calculation. First, the botched withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the abandonment of American citizens and loyal allies there have dealt a significant blow to the U.S.’s credibility everywhere else. Second, the U.S. Army, the linchpin of security in Europe, largely returned to the United States years ago. Finally, due to Russia’s investments in anti-access area-denial weapons at its enclave in Kaliningrad, the U.S. Navy can no longer get Army units to Europe in time to blunt a Russian onslaught should one occur. Russia has amassed a force of over 100,000 troops along its border with Ukraine, including formations of heavy artillery, armored troop carriers, and main battle tanks. It has also already initiated cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. If Russian forces should suddenly roll over Ukraine and then position themselves to threaten the Baltic nations, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, NATO will find it difficult to respond quickly.

As part of the European Defense Initiative, the U.S. has built a cache of pre-positioned ordnance, including enough equipment for an armored brigade, in Poland. The men needed to make use of that equipment and man the tanks and armored personnel carriers would be flown in from the United States at the first sign of trouble. Additionally, NATO has established a response-force brigade (5,000 personnel) and enhanced forward-presence battalions (400 personnel), but it must be admitted that these will serve as nothing more than a speed bump if Russia initiates a rolling start and then sprints across Ukraine, a nation that is just under 800 miles wide and possesses modern road and rail systems. Should they meet with minimal resistance, Russia’s armored forces, with adequate logistical support, could cross Ukraine and be on NATO’s doorstep in ten days or less. They would confront a NATO ill-prepared for the threat they posed.

Over the past 20 years, NATO nations have decreased their investments in mobile armor and artillery, by far the most expensive of the ground forces, and the United States has not only followed this path but also pulled its last permanently based armored unit out of Europe. The U.S. Army, which once fielded numerous armored divisions of up to 12,000 to 16,000 men each, now retains but one, although there are smaller armored brigade combat teams (BCTs) incorporated into the six standing infantry divisions and one mountain division that remain in the active force. The simple truth that few wish to reckon with is that, aside from air-power assets — the F-35 would most certainly get its baptism-by-fire against Russia’s fighters and its advanced S-400 missiles — under the best circumstances only one or two U.S. armored brigades would be available during the first 72 hours. Thus, only 10,000 men, some transported by air to join up with pre-positioned equipment and others previously assigned to the region as part of a rotational force, would be available to aid our European allies and blunt a rolling Russian assault.

The Administration Knew the Afghan Air Force Would Collapse after a U.S. Withdrawal

Such an understanding emerges from an acknowledgement that armored units cannot be flown to Europe. The men, their equipment, and their vehicles are too heavy and must travel by sea. It would take a minimum of three days to onload tanks and other armored vehicles in the United States, whether in Texas or any of the available ports on the east coast. The ships that would carry them, purpose-designed roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, would then take four to five days to cross an Atlantic Ocean that is no longer controlled by the United States and its NATO allies. Russia has spent ten years designing and building the new Severodvinsk class attack submarine. A derivative of Russia’s previous highly effective Akula and Alfa class fast-attack designs, the Severodvinsk has allowed Putin to challenge allied supremacy over, on, and under the Atlantic at the same time as NATO has divested of its own subs and submarine-hunting frigates.


If the transports survived their Atlantic crossing, they would not be able to traverse the Baltic Sea to their preferred offloading ports in Poland or one of the Baltic nations; the Kaliningrad-based S-400 surface-to-air missile (250-mile range) and Iskander surface-to-surface missile (175-mile range) give Russia the ability to control the surface of the Baltic Sea east of Denmark. (It should also be noted that the Baltic is too shallow and dangerous for large, missile-laden U.S. nuclear submarines to operate safely within its waters without being quickly detected.)

These facts would render it necessary for the ships carrying American Army units to offload their cargos in Belgium or France, and then load their vehicles onto railcars for transport to eastern Europe. This process would take another seven to ten days, and would be complicated by the fact that eastern and western European rail networks, as an artifact of the Cold War, lack uniform railroad gauges. The net result is that it would take nearly three weeks for American armored forces to travel from the U.S. to the front lines of a conflict which by then would almost certainly be over.

NATO and the United States need to understand that for the moment, a massive return of forces to Europe will not be the answer to the Russian threat, simply because there are not a massive number of appropriate, armored forces available for transport. Europe must take steps not only to increase its defense spending, but to also grow its forces, supplementing them with the types of platforms needed to confront the Russian threat at their doorstep. Additionally, the U.S. Army must return its strategic focus to Europe rather than aimlessly casting about for a role in the Pacific. It should rebuild its armored elements, and advocate for a return to a forward-base model, perhaps establishing new bases in eastern European nations rather than returning to its previous garrisons in Germany. While this might run counter to agreements made during the 1990s between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, the simple fact is that Russia’s annexation of Crimea, occupation of parts of Georgia and the Donbass, and persistent threats against Ukraine have rendered such agreements moot.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and its NATO allies must confront the threat of Russia’s naval units in the Atlantic and in particular its new generation of submarines. They need more attack submarines, towed-array-sonar-equipped surveillance ships, and frigates, and they need them soon. Because without them, Europe could soon be rendered a continent the United States cannot reach or aid.

[DougMacG]

Is Germany our ally?