Latin America

[G M]

Mexico should be a wealthy nation as well.

"The Geopolitics of Argentina: The Superpower That Wasn’t"

It's an interesting case study.  They ought to be a smaller US of the southern hemisphere.  Instead they have one eighth the GDP per capita of an underperforming US.

Rather than model our success, we copy their failures.

[DougMacG]

Mexico should be a wealthy nation as well.

Right.  And Africa, and so on.

Basic prosperity in the 21st century is not rocket science.  Yet we do everything we can to avoid it.

[Crafty_Dog]

Mexican dictator president Porfirio Diaz (1870-1910)

"Poor Mexico!  So far from God and so close to the United States."

[G M]

Mexican dictator president Porfirio Diaz (1870-1910)

"Poor Mexico!  So far from God and so close to the United States."

The US is always their favorite scapegoat, while they ignore their cultural pathologies that result in the narco-state sh*thole they created.

[Crafty_Dog]

Competing in South America. Uruguay’s legislature ratified a defense agreement with China that entails cooperation on international peacekeeping operations and in matters related to science, technology and military equipment, and counterterrorism. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department approved a $74 million sale to Brazil of 33 Javelin anti-tank weapons and 222 missiles, as well as training and logistical support.

[Crafty_Dog]

Nicaragua: U.S. Considers Halting Imports of Nicaraguan Goods
2 MIN READAug 31, 2022 | 18:50 GMT





What Happened: The U.S. Biden administration reportedly is considering blocking imports from Nicaragua due to objections to increasingly authoritarian actions by Nicaragua's government, Voice of America reported Aug. 30. Washington would intend the block to limit finances for President Daniel Ortega's regime.

Why It Matters: Nicaragua exports more goods to the United States than it does to any other nation, so if the United States follows through on the import block, it would take a significant toll on Nicaragua's economy. However, the U.S. government has not issued an official statement that indicates a block on Nicaraguan imports is forthcoming, so it is possible that the Biden administration does not intend to take such steps. Even so, the Ortega government could interpret reporting on the potential block as inflammatory and increase anti-American rhetoric and/or take retaliatory actions over the coming weeks. Further retaliation is possible in the event that the United States actually restricts imports. Imports from Nicaragua account for only a small portion of total U.S. imports, but restrictions could lead to short-term increases in costs for products previously sourced from Nicaragua, including clothing, precious metals, meat, coffee, sugar and machinery.

Background: In recent months, the Ortega government has imprisoned opposition politicians, students and journalists, while also shutting down hundreds of nongovernmental organizations. The government also recently targeted individuals in the private sector, arresting the president and vice president of the country's main business federation and charging them with the crime of "conspiracy to undermine national integrity."

[Crafty_Dog]

Argentina: Without Subsidies, Energy Bills Will Rise Over 140%
1 MIN READAug 31, 2022 | 16:48 GMT





What Happened: Three specialists estimate that the Argentine government's efforts to cut public sector spending would increase households' electricity bills by 140% and that those who receive no subsidies under the new scheme likely would see their electricity bills rise by 170%, Clarin reported Aug. 30.

Why It Matters: The effects of reduced electricity subsidies likely will increase turnout for existing anti-government demonstrations, which will hurt the government's reelection efforts in 2023. There is a chance that such public discontent will push the government to abandon its efforts to reduce electricity subsidies, which would, in turn, jeopardize the country's deal with the International Monetary Fund.

Background: As part of a February restructuring deal with the IMF, Argentina's main concession was to decrease its energy subsidies in the near term (which totaled $11 billion in 2021) by creating a sliding scale in which the wealthy pay the full price of their energy bills while the poor pay only a portion.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/chiles-voters-reject-far-left-constitution/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=28953489

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19130/latin-america-china-backyard

[DougMacG]

Strange that Latin America doesn't want US meddling and interference - but openly accepts China's.

[Crafty_Dog]

Easy to understand.  This is a great chance for politicos to get rich.

[Crafty_Dog]

As This Latin American Country Falls Apart, China Looks on Anxiously
John Mac GhlionnJohn Mac Ghlionn December 21, 2022 Updated: December 21, 2022biggersmaller Print


On first inspection, Peru and China, 11,000 miles apart, appear to have very little in common. However, the two countries share a very close history.

As the academic Justina Hwang has noted, in the space of 25 years, between 1849 and 1874, more than 100,000 unskilled workers, many of them from China, arrived in Peru. Having recently abolished slavery, Peru was amid a worker shortage. This allowed “the importation of an indentured workforce of Chinese laborers in order to meet Peruvian need for labor,” wrote Hwang.

Fast forward to 2022, and Peru is home to around 60,000 Chinese people. Some researchers suggest that the Chinese community is much higher, possibly exceeding 1 million. If accurate, this means for every 33 people, there is one of Chinese descent. Besides sharing strong historical and demographic ties, China and Peru also share an incredibly close economic bond. However, as Peru falls deeper into crisis, its relationship with China is sure to be tested.

On Dec. 14, the South American country announced a nationwide state of emergency. The announcement, which granted police officers special powers and largely prevented people from assembling on the streets, came after a week of violent protests that, as Reuters reported, have resulted in at least eight deaths.

The protests came shortly after the former president, Pedro Castillo, was ousted from office and arrested after illegally trying to dissolve the country’s Congress. As tensions continue to flare, the world watches on with bated breath. One imagines that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is particularly perturbed by the goings on in the Andean state.

Epoch Times Photo
Supporters of Peru’s ousted President Pedro Castillo participate in a protest at the Plaza de Armas in Cusco, Peru, on Dec. 20, 2022. (Martin Bernetti/AFP via Getty Images)
In July 2021, during his first week in office, Castillo wasted no time in reaching out to China, a crucial commercial partner of Peru. Home to some of the largest copper mines in the world, Peru exports large quantities of this mineral, arguably the world’s most important, to China. In fact, China is now the largest purchaser of Peruvian copper, by far. The CCP doesn’t just purchase inordinate amounts of copper from Peru but also sends miners there to extract the valuable metal. This has been the case for years.

A number of Chinese-backed consortiums now own Peruvian copper mines. Worryingly, aided by a compliant Peruvian regime, they appear to have benefited from the use of exploitative practices. Over the past year and a half, China has undoubtedly benefited from Castillo’s presidency. Castillo and Chinese leader Xi Jinping appear to have positive feelings for each other. After being sworn into office, Castillo chose Beijing as his first embassy to visit. He was welcomed with open arms by Xi.

Some 18 months on, however, the friendship is being tested. Castillo is no longer in power. There is a new sheriff in town. Her name is Dina Boluarte, Peru’s first female president. The 60-year-old announced that her first task would be “to take action against corruption. This cancer has to be extirpated from the country.”

If the CCP isn’t concerned with Boularte’s promise, it should be.

After all, CCP-backed loggers play a key role in Peru’s illegal timber market. In exchange for secret payments, as InSight Crime’s Mark Wilson has discussed in great detail, Peruvian officials have granted Chinese timber firms logging concessions and generous transport permits. One of the beneficiaries of the bribes is a man named Xiadong Ji Wu, a Chinese owner of at least five logging companies based in Peru. As Wilson noted, certain “fraudulent Chinese companies” appear to be “directly corrupting officials in Peru to facilitate the illegal timber trade.”

A member of China’s infamous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2019, Peru has witnessed a string of multi-billion-dollar investments from China, mostly in the mining and energy sectors. In Peru’s mining sector alone, it is estimated that Chinese firms have invested at least $10.4 billion.

China is also heavily invested in other aspects of Peruvian society. A recent Freedom House report highlights how Beijing controls Peru’s media, greatly influencing what stories are and aren’t covered and what narratives are and aren’t permitted. Furthermore, the Chinese embassy, situated in Lima, the capital city of Peru, stands accused of acting “aggressively” and intimidating Peruvian citizens who dare to speak about Taiwan respectfully.

Does Boularte have what it takes to address the many ways in which the CCP has infiltrated her home country? In truth, only time will tell. It is clear that communist China has significantly benefited from weak leadership in Peru.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19292/iran-latin-america

[Crafty_Dog]

January 11, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
A Propaganda War in Latin America
U.S. rivals are frustrating its strategy through social media disinformation.
By: Allison Fedirka

As recession looms, the Ukraine war continues without resolution, and China tries to open up after months of lockdowns, Latin America has uncharacteristically made headlines lately. Last month in Peru, the legislature removed its president from office. Later in Bolivia, opposition protests shut down major transit routes in Santa Cruz province, which accounts for nearly a third of the country’s area. More recently, supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and vandalized several government buildings in Brasilia.

In a region where political unrest rarely affects the world at large, the latest bouts of instability are more consequential: Discontent driven by political anxieties is a ripe environment for U.S. adversaries to use propaganda and social media campaigns to undermine Washington’s efforts to bring these areas more firmly under its control.

Indeed, many expect social unrest to intensify in 2023. Lags in economic recovery and rising costs of living have given rise to broad, intense and well-populated protests even by the standards of Latin America, where protesting is all but a national pastime. Nearly a third of the region lives in poverty, and impoverished households now rely more on social assistance and less on labor income than they did before the pandemic. Labor recovery remains slow, characterized by an increase in informal jobs. Inflation has already reduced household purchasing power, with private consumption slowing in the second half of 2022. The region’s economic growth is expected to slow from 3.7 percent last year to a mere 1.3 percent this year, according to estimates from the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Distribution of the Population by Income Strata, 2022
(click to enlarge)

The region’s economies, governments and citizens are ill-equipped to face another year of economic hardship. Latin American governments are no longer in pandemic-induced crisis mode, and their populations are now holding them accountable for the aftermath. This is all the more worrisome as governments remain constrained over the amount of fiscal spending they do to solve their economic woes and grapple with high debt, especially since there is notable risk of further currency depreciation. A volatile global economy has made governments more risk-averse and has slowed capital inflows to the region. The call for a change in political office and leadership is increasingly more commonplace.

This kind of environment plays to the strengths of Russia and China – namely, social media propaganda. Both use Latin America’s proximity to the United States to create problems in Washington. Until recently, both engaged on the economic front to gain more influence in the region. Russia targeted strategic industries like energy, while China used financing and mergers and acquisitions to occupy roles in important infrastructure and natural resource projects. Both, however, now face major economic constraints that force them to use other tools. Social media propaganda – a lower-cost option that still gives Russia and China reach into the region despite the long physical distances – is the obvious choice. In addition to having world-renowned expertise in the field, they already have established hubs in the region, most notably in Venezuela, which has sought surveillance equipment and capabilities from China and Russia in an effort to monitor and control the domestic population. Unsurprisingly, the groundwork for their respective campaigns has already been laid.

Latin America’s social instability makes it vulnerable to such propaganda. Citizens in the region are more online than the norm; 75 percent have internet access, 10 percentage points above the global average. About 85 percent of Latin American internet users get their news online, and of those almost 70 percent read news via social media. Nearly half of internet users in the region go on to share this news with others. The absence of oversight and regulation makes social media the ideal entry point for U.S. rivals looking to disseminate anti-U.S. propaganda and exacerbate instability.

Social Media and News | Latin America
(click to enlarge)

This is a challenge for Washington, which after years of neglect recently renewed efforts to grow and assert its influence in the Western Hemisphere. A key element of the U.S. strategy in Latin America is to encourage private investment, but unrest and uncertainty threaten that agenda. Without investment, the region’s economic recovery will sputter, and informal and illicit enterprises will grow in attractiveness. This, in turn, challenges U.S. efforts to combat organized crime in the region.

Finally, Washington is not well-equipped to counter anti-U.S. propaganda. Latin America has not forgotten the United States’ history of intervention, its support for unpopular regimes and its economic model – which it imposed on the region, creating significant hardship. U.S. efforts to rehabilitate its reputation will have to overcome anti-American social media campaigns. The U.S. can monitor social media for propaganda, but it lacks the tools to control social media posts, especially abroad. Just last year, during the Colombian presidential election, Washington warned that Moscow was using social media to boost Gustavo Petro, who won.

Moscow and Beijing cannot compete directly with the U.S. for influence in Latin America. They can, however, use their expertise in online disinformation to foster unrest and anti-Americanism. This will make it difficult for the U.S. to achieve its objectives and improve its standing in the region, and will benefit Russia and China in the short term.

[Crafty_Dog]

Iranian Navy Expands Operations in Latin American Waters
by Maria Zuppello
Special to IPT News
January 26, 2023

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9304/iranian-navy-expands-operations-in-latin-american

[Crafty_Dog]

February 22, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Bolivia Looks to China to Develop Its Lithium
Chinese firms give La Paz its best chance to capitalize on the green transition.
By: Allison Fedirka

The green energy transition is driving a global race for lithium. Countries sitting on large deposits of “white gold” suddenly find themselves with an exceptional opportunity. The prime example is Bolivia, home to the world’s largest deposits of lithium. The government in La Paz hopes this bounty will lift the country toward a more prosperous and equitable future. However, the window presented by the surge in green investment will not last forever. Facing a make-or-break moment, Bolivia has started to reform its lithium strategy and is partnering with China.

Bolivia's Geography
(click to enlarge)

Old and New Challenges

Lithium is a critical input in rechargeable batteries found in day-to-day items like laptops, cellphones and electric vehicles. It also has applications for storing hydrogen for use as a fuel and making alloys for aircraft. States’ intensifying focus on the green transition pushed up global consumption of lithium by 41 percent in 2022, to an estimated 134,000 tons from 95,000 tons in 2021. The primary driver is the EV market, specifically its need for lithium-ion batteries. As a result, lithium hydroxide and carbonate prices on the London Metals Exchange surged in December and now sit at $76,200 per ton, more than 10 times the price just two years earlier.

Battery-Grade Lithium Prices
(click to enlarge)

On paper, Bolivia is uniquely positioned to capitalize on the lithium craze. Three lithium salt flats – Uyuni, Coipasa and Pastos Grande – in the country’s southwest hold 21 million tons across an area nearly the size of Connecticut, according to a 2022 U.S. Geological Survey report. This makes Bolivia the largest source of the world’s estimated 89 million tons of lithium.

Global Lithium Resources
(click to enlarge)

But although Bolivia has massive lithium potential, it also has a long history of government interference in natural resource extraction. Much of this can be traced back to colonialism and the country’s loss of land in the early days of independence. During the colonial era, the city of Potosi was a hub for silver mining. The Spanish forced indigenous communities to labor in the mines and shipped the silver directly to Spain. Naturally, La Paz and indigenous communities are determined to avoid repeating this experience. Further, after Bolivia split from Peru in 1839 it lost nearly half its territory to neighbors, including areas with nitrate deposits, rubber trees and potentially oil. As a result, Bolivia is extremely protective of its natural resources. In the past, it has nationalized its hydrocarbons, lithium tin, silver, electricity and telecommunications, among others.

Bolivia's Lost Ground
(click to enlarge)

However, Bolivia’s state-run companies have struggled to turn its resource wealth into economic development. It primarily extracts lithium via evaporation ponds, a technique from the 1960s. Because of the inefficiencies of the process, the government recovers at best about 40 percent of its lithium. The result has been underwhelming: In the past five years, Bolivia produced just 1,400 tons of lithium. For reference, 2022 global supply totaled 600,000 tons.

The risk for Bolivia is that the demand boom and soaring prices will not last long enough for it to get its supplies to market. Industry estimates say it will take up to a decade for lithium supply to catch up with demand, at which point prices are expected to stabilize. Additionally, scientists are already hunting for the next transformative technology in energy storage, from recycling lithium to tapping into the battery potential of bromine and graphite. It takes approximately 5-10 years for new mines to come online and 1-2 years to build battery factories. This means Bolivia has a narrow and closing window to modernize its lithium production, and this assumes no major disruptions, such as a drastic decline in Chinese demand.

La Paz must overcome several challenges to reach its lithium output potential. First, it needs access to the latest technology to make production more efficient and cost-effective. It is faster and easier to import these insights from foreign companies than it is to develop them domestically. Second, it needs to find skilled labor. A well-established oil and gas industry could prove useful, as the skills are generally transferrable. Finally, and most difficult, Bolivia must overcome political infighting and indigenous unrest to establish a regulatory framework that investors trust.

To address these challenges, Bolivia abandoned plans to restrict lithium production to national firms. Instead, it copied its oil and gas strategy, where the government must own at least 51 percent of a given project, with the rest open to foreign firms. Opening to foreign competition gives Bolivia access to the latest technology and reduces financial risk for Bolivia, which spent an estimated $1.2 billion on developing its lithium over the past decade with little to show for it.

Chinese Partnership

Bolivia is betting on China to bring about its lithium transformation. In January, Bolivia’s state-run lithium company Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLP) signed a deal with Chinese conglomerate CBC worth more than $1 billion. CBC comprises Beijing’s lithium powerhouses: CATL, the world’s leading lithium battery maker; BRUNP, the leader of lithium battery recycling; and CMOC, the premier producer of a variety of minerals. The agreement calls for the construction of a direct extraction of lithium plant in Potosi and another in Oruro. (YLP also plans to open a lithium carbonate facility this year with the capacity to produce 15,000 tons annually.) Direct extraction of lithium, or DEL, is the latest extraction technology. It is both cleaner and more efficient than the process Bolivia currently uses. The Chinese conglomerate will assume all the financial risk for the first six months of engineering and feasibility studies, as well as production projections.

For La Paz, partnering with Beijing was the obvious choice. Chinese companies face fewer government limits on their activities and thus can move quickly on financing, scientific studies and due diligence. Chinese firms are also comfortable operating in areas with opaque regulatory frameworks and intrusive governments. And they are accustomed to weathering indigenous resistance to resource extraction, as evidenced by China’s operations at Las Bombas in Peru. Finally, China can greatly support Bolivia’s ambition to move up the lithium-based export value chain. China is a major supplier of anodes and cathodes, which Bolivia will need to become a battery producer.

For Bolivia and China, it’s a win-win. Bolivia gets funding and technology, while China gets access to and influence over approximately one-fifth of the world’s lithium reserves. At the same time, the partnership is a setback for Western efforts to bolster their own green industrial capabilities and cut reliance on China. Western investors initially showed interest in Bolivia’s lithium deposits but were deterred by the nationalization risk, political instability and the logistical complexities of exporting the metal from a landlocked country. The U.S. appears to have accepted that China will control about half the world’s lithium markets. So long as there are other areas for the U.S. and partners to compete for supply, they will accept La Paz’s alignment with Beijing and focus their efforts on less risky locales.

Bolivia’s government set a goal of producing its own lithium-ion batteries by 2025. Experts in Potosi predict it will be more like 2030. Either timeline is ambitious given Bolivia’s starting point and the scale of the competition. Partnering with China offers no guarantees, but it does give Bolivia its best shot to cash in on its lithium.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19477/iran-brazil-panama-canal-china

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3820294/china-slowly-taking-panama

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3824556/strategic-importance-of-panama

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3824231/panama-big-week-in-darien-gap-unfolding

[Crafty_Dog]

Chiquita’s Bagman: Key Intermediary Sentenced in Paramilitary Payments Case
Taxi Driver Given Checks, Delivered Banana Company Cash to Armed Groups
Imprisonment of Financial Go-Between Highlights Continuing Impunity for Senior Officials
Paramilitary Chief Darío Laíno Among Those Paid by Chiquita

Washington, D.C., April 18, 2023 – A Colombian taxi driver who last month was handed a 36-month prison sentence for his part in secretly delivering cash payments from Chiquita Brands International to a right-wing “paramilitary” organization played a more extensive role in the scheme than has been reported and was a key intermediary in the 1990s between the multinational fruit company and practically every major armed actor in Colombia’s conflict, according to internal documents and other material published today from the National Security Archive’s Chiquita Papers collection.

The conviction and imprisonment of Luis Alberto Agudelo Jiménez, a relatively low-level operative for Chiquita’s Colombia-based security staff, is a reminder that, despite mountains of evidence from its own archives, not a single Chiquita executive or manager has been penalized for authorizing and organizing millions of dollars in payments to groups responsible for scores of human rights violations, including massacres, homicides, and forced disappearances that produced thousands of victims.

As one of Chiquita’s primary go-betweens with armed groups, Agudelo transferred thousands of dollars in payments not just paramilitaries, as has been widely reported, but also to leftist insurgent groups and a variety of Colombian military units, according to the records published today.

The records included in this new briefing book suggest that the former banana company bagman could be instrumental in helping Colombian authorities understand the roles of company officials still under investigation in connection with paramilitary human rights violations and of Colombian military officers who encouraged and facilitated those relationships. Agudelo could help prosecutors construct a more detailed timeline of when and why the various groups were paid, provide information about the secret procedures Chiquita used to conceal the payments, and identify who his contacts were in the paramilitaries, the military, Chiquita, and the guerrilla groups.

Most significantly, Agudelo may be able to help authorities better understand the nature of the company’s agreements with the groups, including any benefits that the company received through quid pro quo “transactions” with both leftist insurgents and rightist paramilitary forces. He may also be able to explain to authorities evidence, revealed today for the first time, of links between Chiquita and former paramilitary finance chief Darío Laíno, who last year was sentenced to 32 years in prison for helping to fund paramilitary operations.

[Crafty_Dog]

second

Latin America tour. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Brasilia for talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Lavrov extended an invitation to Lula to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June. The Russian minister will also visit Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba on the same trip. Moscow is looking to expand cooperation with its international partners as it faces the fallout of tough Western sanctions. However, its presence in the United States’ traditional sphere of influence will likely irritate Washington.

[Crafty_Dog]

third

Energy cooperation. The oil ministers of Iran and Venezuela signed a series of agreements to increase bilateral cooperation in the energy sector. The deals focus on developing oil and gas fields, reconstructing Venezuela’s oil refineries and modernizing related infrastructure. The ministers also agreed on terms for the trade of oil, gas condensate and petroleum products.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-are-us-military-personnel-heading-peru

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/analysis-ccp-poised-to-expand-security-footprint-in-latin-america-with-new-port-in-argentina_5376143.html?utm_source=Goodevening&src_src=Goodevening&utm_campaign=gv-2023-07-10&src_cmp=gv-2023-07-10&utm_medium=email

[Crafty_Dog]

Backlash. The Argentine government and Bolivian opposition figures are demanding an explanation after reports emerged that the Bolivian government signed a defense agreement with Iran. Argentina is particularly sensitive about any engagement with Tehran, which Argentine authorities accuse of being involved in the bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994. On Monday, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry asked the Bolivian Embassy in Buenos Aires for details on its security talks with Iran. Bolivia’s opposition also submitted a written request to the government demanding information about the scope of the reported agreement.

[Crafty_Dog]

Iranian drones. Bolivian Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo confirmed reports that the country is interested in Iranian drones to monitor its borders and combat drug trafficking. Iranian state-owned media had said the countries’ defense chiefs last week signed a memorandum of understanding on defense and security, but Novillo, responding to petitions for information from Bolivian opposition lawmakers and the Argentine government, downplayed the agreement’s significance. Nearby, Venezuela has long worked with Iran on its drone program.

[Crafty_Dog]

July 26, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
For the US, Fentanyl Is All About China
Washington hopes Mexico and Colombia will see the drug trade the same way.
By: Allison Fedirka
While many governments around the world are focused on securing supply chains, there’s at least one the U.S. government desperately wants to break up: the fentanyl supply chain. Nearly a dozen U.S. government agencies are working together to choke off illicit flows of the drug. In addition to saving American lives, Washington wants to reduce insecurity in Latin America and highlight China’s role in the fentanyl trade to introduce an anti-China element into its security cooperation, particularly with Mexico and Colombia.

China’s rapid growth has over the past two decades helped it develop its economic influence in Latin America – aided in no small part by the absence of a U.S. counter-strategy. At first, Washington saw Beijing’s growing presence as simple economic diversification, and thus no threat to hemispheric security or U.S. security and military relationships with Latin America. Only recently has the U.S. started to see China’s commercial activities in the region as a potential threat, especially as it relates to U.S. access to rare earth elements and the security of allies’ ports and 5G technology.

At the same time, China’s economy is in secular decline. This slowdown, combined with the United States’ drive to decouple supply chains from China, is naturally steering Mexico back toward its northern neighbor. Mexico is an obvious destination for multinational firms that want to manufacture close to the U.S. market at a relatively low cost. For its part, Colombia – for years a beneficiary of Chinese trade and investment – has gotten closer to Beijing politically since the inauguration in 2022 of President Gustavo Petro. However, it too is questioning the future of Chinese foreign investment and trade, leading it to consider alternatives such as the United States.

But Washington doesn’t want to be an alternative patron; it wants to rebuild its influence while eroding that of China. To that end, it needs a wedge, and the consumption of fentanyl is a prime issue. In the U.S. alone, overdose deaths as a result of fentanyl use have skyrocketed over the past eight years to almost 110,000 in 2022. The opioid epidemic cost the U.S. economy $1.5 trillion in 2020 alone, according to estimates from the U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee, while the Council on Foreign Relations calculates that it has removed more than 6 million people from the workforce.


(click to enlarge)

Consumption is less of a concern in Mexico and Colombia, but that’s beginning to change. However, the more immediate concern in those countries is production and the insecurity and corruption that tend to accompany the drug trade. Due to its low production costs and synthetic nature, fentanyl production can be scaled up rapidly. Two Mexican cartels, Sinaloa and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, have a monopoly on the U.S.-Mexico fentanyl trade. The Sinaloa cartel is also considering opening operations in Colombia, including starting fentanyl “kitchens,” sourcing input materials and potentially building networks within the health care sector to tap into Colombia’s legal stream of the drug.

Chinese companies provide nearly all the precursor materials for fentanyl production in the Western Hemisphere. Not only that, but at least four Chinese companies offer information on optimizing fentanyl manufacturing, including providing customers with ingredients, advice on substitute ingredients, instructions on mixing and access to chemists. Other Chinese companies provide false labels on shipments and/or ship chemicals without keeping customer records.

Steps of Illicit Synthetic Drug Production
(click to enlarge)

Fentanyl is a profitable business. A single fake pill laced with fentanyl may cost 10 cents to make but will sell for $10 on the street. Chinese criminal groups and the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels have pooled their extensive money laundering experience, using mirror transfers, trade-based money laundering and bulk cash movements to facilitate the exchange of foreign currency. As an added bonus, this practice helps streamline the purchase of precursor chemicals.

Now, however, the U.S. government and partners are fighting back. In February, the Biden administration engaged Mexico, Colombia and Ecuador to collaborate against the growing availability and lethality of illegal drugs containing fentanyl. In March, Mexico’s president wrote to his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, seeking help stemming the flow of fentanyl to North America. (Beijing denied any wrongdoing.) In April, the U.S. charged four leading members of the Sinaloa cartel linked to the fentanyl trade. And in May, the Mexican president said his country’s navy had intercepted a container from Qingdao, China, that contained 75 pounds of packages with traces of fentanyl and methamphetamine. The U.S. also sanctioned seven Chinese companies and six individuals accused of exporting tablet presses to Mexico. Last month, the U.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges against four Chinese chemical manufacturers and eight individuals accused of illegally trafficking precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl. In spite of these developments, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration said recently that she wants to see more cooperation from Mexico.

Fentanyl Flow to the United States, 2019
(click to enlarge)

In Colombia, cocaine has become a secondary concern because it is less lethal and less profitable than fentanyl. Earlier this month, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota said it was indefinitely suspending its monitoring of coca crops in Colombia and would not produce its annual report on Colombia and cocaine. The embassy explained that U.N. reports made its work redundant and that observation satellites were needed for other purposes. (Colombia’s justice minister said he did not expect the decision to jeopardize U.S. funding for anti-drug and other programs.) Meanwhile, U.S. agencies reportedly coordinated with Colombian authorities earlier this year to arrest Sinaloa cartel members who were attempting to develop the fentanyl industry in Colombia.

The Colombian and Mexican governments agree on the need to change their anti-drug strategies. In Bogota, the Petro administration wants to move away from punitive, prohibitionist and militarized policies and instead target illicit profits, money laundering, large traffickers and mafias. Calling the war on drugs a failure, Petro said the same mistakes should not be repeated with fentanyl. Similarly, Mexico’s government wants to focus on economic development and youth outreach to reduce incentives for joining criminal organizations. The two presidents plan to meet in early September to discuss new anti-drug strategies. Talks will focus on youth prevention and socio-economic development. They also plan to address the challenge of synthetic drugs and the importance of adjusting interdiction, prevention and rehabilitation to meet new realities and social needs.

Many of these efforts will require the support of and collaboration with the U.S., which until recently was reluctant to link drug trafficking and economic development. The key question is whether Mexico City and Bogota will get on board with Washington’s anti-China approach. The answer may depend on whether the U.S. is prepared to align its anti-drug initiatives with new strategies taking shape in Mexico and Colombia

[Crafty_Dog]

CHILE’S COUP at 50
Kissinger Briefed Nixon on Failed 1970 CIA Plot to Block Allende Presidency

Chilean Military “Pretty Incompetent Bunch,” Kissinger Told President
Archive Book PINOCHET DESCLASIFICADO Reveals CIA’S “Exhaustive Debriefing” of Chilean Media Mogul Who Sought Coup Backing; Secret Meeting with Nixon
Military Plotters Wanted “Assurances They Would Not Be Abandoned and Ostracized”
As 50th Anniversary Nears, Chilean Government Seeks Still-Secret U.S. Documents on Overthrow of Allende

Washington, D.C., August 8, 2023 - As the commander in chief of the Chilean army, Gen. René Schneider, lay dying in a hospital after being shot in a CIA-backed coup plot in October 1970, President Nixon placed a phone call to his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to ask, “What is happening in Chile?” according to a transcript of their conversation posted today by the National Security Archive. Kissinger told the President that the CIA-backed plot to block Socialist president-elect Salvador Allende from being inaugurated—an operation ordered by Nixon five weeks earlier—had not succeeded. The Chilean military turned out to be “a pretty incompetent bunch,” according to Kissinger, having failed to seize power after the removal of Gen. Schneider, Chile’s top pro-constitution officer.

“There’s been a turn for the worse,” Kissinger explained, referring to the Schneider assassination, “but it hasn’t triggered anything else. The next move should have been a government takeover, but that hasn’t happened.”

“The [congressional] election is tomorrow and the inauguration is [November] third,” Kissinger informed Nixon. “What they could have done is prevent the Congress from meeting. But that hasn’t been done. It’s close, but it’s probably too late.”

Obtained by the National Security Archive through legal and FOIA efforts, the Kissinger-Nixon “telcon” was published for the first time last week in Pinochet Desclasificado: Los Archivos Secretos de Estados Unidos Sobre Chile, a revised, 50th-anniversary, Chilean edition of Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh’s book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability.

Today’s posting also includes newly available U.S. records on the role of Chilean media mogul Agustín Edwards in assisting the initial CIA coup plotting in the days following Salvador Allende’s dramatic election in September 1970. Internal White House scheduling records obtained by Kornbluh for the book provide concrete proof of a secret, September 15, 1970, meeting between Edwards and President Nixon in the Oval Office—an encounter never acknowledged by Edwards, who died in 2017. The posting also features a top secret report from CIA director Richard Helms to Kissinger on the agency’s “exhaustive debriefing” of Edwards on potential coup plotters and requirements for the military to move.

As the 50th anniversary of the coup approaches on September 11, the Chilean government of Gabriel Boric has publicly called on the Biden Administration to release still-secret U.S. records relating to the coup. “We still don’t know what President Nixon saw on his desk the morning of the military coup,” said Chile’s ambassador to Washington, Juan Gabriel Valdés, in a recent interview with EFE, the Spanish news agency. “There are details that remain of interest to [Chileans], that are important for us to reconstruct our own history.”

[Crafty_Dog]

A Far-Right Candidate Takes the Lead in Argentina's Presidential Race
Aug 14, 2023 | 21:34 GMT





Far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei waves after delivering a speech at his headquarters in Buenos Aires on Aug. 13, 2023.
Far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei waves at supporters at his headquarters in Buenos Aires on Aug. 13, 2023, following his strong performance in Argentina's primary election.
(ALEJANDRO PAGNI/AFP via Getty Images)

In Argentina, far-right libertarian candidate Javier Milei's surprisingly strong performance in the presidential primary will increase financial volatility in the coming weeks, deterring investment while raising the risk of a panic-induced bank run. The anti-establishment candidate who has promised to overhaul Argentina's economic and political systems unexpectedly came out on top in the country's open presidential primary on Aug. 13. With 96% of the ballots counted, Milei from the Libertarian Party came away 30.6% of the vote, beating out the candidates from the conservative Juntos por el Cambio coalition (who secured a combined 28.7% of the vote) and the candidates from the ruling leftist Union por la Patria coalition (who secured a combined 27%). Milei, who ran uncontested for his Libertarian Party's presidential nomination, will compete against the Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) nominee Patricia Bullrich and the Union por la Patria (UP) nominee Sergio Massa in Argentina's Oct. 22 presidential election. The outcome of the primary vote portends a close, three-way race that will likely go to a runoff in November, as no candidate appears set to reach the threshold needed to win the presidency outright in October.

A political newcomer, Javier Milei is the wildcard candidate who was only elected to the lower house of Argentina's Congress in 2021. He has attracted voters disenchanted with the mainstream political parties by denouncing the ''political caste,'' and has also proposed radical changes like shuttering the country's central bank, replacing the Argentine peso with the U.S. dollar, and drastically cutting public spending.
Argentina's former security minister Patricia Bullrich won JxC's nomination after defeating Buenos Aires Mayor Horacio Rodriguez Larreta in the coalition's primary. Bullrich has promised to cut public spending, make labor laws more flexible, and reduce taxes and regulations within the first 100 days of her tenure, seeking to quickly implement her pro-business reforms.
As polls had predicted, leftist Economy Minister Sergio Massa cinched UP's nomination after winning the ruling bloc's primary by a wide margin. A career politician, Massa was appointed Economy Minister in August 2022 with the main promise of reducing Argentina's inflation and avoiding a worsening of the country's economic crisis. Despite these promises, inflation in the country has continued to rise during his tenure.
Since voting in primary elections is mandatory in Argentina, the results of primaries have historically served as a strong indicator of the outcome of general elections. In both 2011 and 2019, the candidate who obtained the most votes in the presidential primary went on to win the presidency. However, in 2015, the candidate who secured the most votes in the primary won the most votes in the first round of the presidential election, though lost in the second round.
According to Argentina's electoral rules, if no presidential candidate obtains at least 45% of the vote in the Oct. 22 election (or 40% of the vote with a 10-point lead over the next candidate), the presidential race will advance to a run-off between the top two candidates on Nov. 19.
Milei's surprise lead in the primary reflects voters' strong anti-establishment sentiment amid Argentina's worsening economic crisis. Argentina's headline inflation is expected to reach 145% by the end of 2023. The ongoing cost of living crisis has hit Argentine households particularly hard, with food inflation set to reach 110% in the same timeframe. Meanwhile, the peso's unofficial exchange rate is nearly double the official exchange rate, which has drained the country's chronically-low foreign currency reserves since Argentina's central bank sells millions of dollars every day. In the wake of the Aug. 13 primary, the government also devalued Argentina's currency by 18%, which will further eat into households' peso-denominated savings. Against this backdrop, Milei's promises of sweeping change appear to have resonated among the growing number of Argentines struggling to make ends meet, with roughly 40% of the country's population estimated to be living in poverty.

The International Monetary Fund now expects Argentina's economy to expand by a mere 0.2% in 2023 amid the country's weakening currency, falling foreign currency reserves, increasing poverty rate, and struggle to tamp down on rampant inflation.
In the second half of 2022, 39.2% of Argentina's population was living in poverty, up from 36.5% in the first six months of the year. That figure is believed to have only increased since then due to the country's growing economic crisis.
On Aug. 14, the government devalued Argentina's currency to 350 pesos per U.S. dollar. But the official exchange rate has since further dropped to 365 pesos per dollar, signaling that the central bank has few other options to defend the country's currency. The peso's unofficial valuation, meanwhile, is much lower, with the currency trading at 685 pesos per dollar on the black market as of Aug. 14 (the black market is a key source of U.S. dollars for millions of Argentinians and is thus often viewed as a more accurate representation of the peso's true value).
The shock primary election will likely amplify concerns about the economic implications of a potential Milei presidency, which could slow new investment into the country and, in an escalatory scenario, trigger a run on Argentine banks. Conservative JxC candidate Bullrich and leftist UP candidate Rodriguez still have a decent chance of winning the presidency. But Milei's stronger-than-expected performance in the primary will nonetheless stir more anxiety among investors, citizens and businesses by suggesting that he and his radical policy agenda stand a serious chance of being elected later this year, which will increase financial volatility in the coming weeks. Even if Milei wins, his Libertarian Party is all but certain to secure only a small minority in Congress in concurrent legislative elections on Oct. 22, which would leave him unable to carry out most of his agenda unless he reaches a deal with UP or JxC (though such a deal would likely force him to scale back his proposals). But while this legislative check would likely keep Milei from following through on the bulk of his campaign promises, concerns about what such a presidency would mean for the economy would still almost certainly see investors press pause on starting new projects in Argentina. This would likely slow growth in the country's crucial mining and hydrocarbon industries (especially as the country pushes for new investment in its shale fields), along with its budding start-up culture. Given Milei's support for dollarization, such uncertainty also risks eventually triggering a run on Argentine banks, as households and companies may scramble to swap their pesos for U.S. dollars to avoid being potentially forced to do so when the exchange rate is less favorable. While such a mass manic remains unlikely for now, if the outcome of the Oct. 22 election confirms that Milei is indeed poised to become Argentina's next president, it will increase the risk of a full bank run that forces the outgoing government to further devalue the peso and impose even stricter capital controls (including a prolonged bank holiday to prevent savers from withdrawing their money).

In the aftermath of the primary election, Argentina's dollar bonds were trading about 10% lower on Aug. 14, highlighting investors' concerns about a potential Milei presidency.

[Crafty_Dog]

second

Middle-Class Revolt in Argentina
Voters turn to an outsider who wants to close the central bank.
By
The Editorial Board
Follow
Aug. 14, 2023 6:38 pm ET




220

Gift unlocked article

Listen

(4 min)


image
Argentine far-right libertarian economist and presidential candidate Javier Milei speaks while celebrating the results of the primary elections in Buenos Aires, Aug. 13 PHOTO: ALEJANDRO PAGNI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Inflation is the thief of middle-class prosperity, and in Argentina prices are rising by more than 115%. So it shouldn’t be a great surprise that Argentines on Sunday gave the most votes to presidential candidate Javier Milei, an outsider promising to close the central bank and replace the peso with the dollar.

OPINION: POTOMAC WATCH
WSJ Opinion Potomac Watch
A $6 Billion Hostage Deal With Iran?


SUBSCRIBE
Add to Queue
Explore Audio Center
Argentina, once prosperous but degraded by Peronist socialism, is bracing for another currency crisis and owes $44 billion to the International Monetary Fund. The economy is stalled. On Monday the peso fell more than 13% in the black market, and the central bank moved its official exchange rate to 350 to the dollar, a 22% devaluation. The effective rate of 28-day government paper is now 209%, according to Goldman Sachs. Who wouldn’t yearn for dollar assets in that economy?

Mr. Milei, who holds a seat in Congress, wasn’t challenged in his primary bid for the nomination of the La Libertad Avanza (Liberty Advances) party. But since all candidates are on the multiparty primary ballot every four years and voting is technically mandatory, the exercise is widely considered to be a dry run of the first round of the presidential election.

Pollsters had Mr. Milei getting around 20%, but they underestimated popular resentment. He won more than 30% of the vote and finished first in 16 of the country’s 24 provinces.

Two candidates of the ruling Peronist party together received less than 27%, which shows how unpopular the government is. Two candidates vying for the nomination of the center-right opposition coalition Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) received 28%. Patricia Bullrich won the Juntos race but had been expected to do much better than her 17%. She’s tough on crime, an important issue. But her stint in the failed government of center-right Mauricio Macri (2015-2019) may have limited her upside.

The international press is portraying Mr. Milei as a crazy populist, and there’s no doubt he’s disdainful of Argentina’s political establishment—left and right. He draws large crowds of young Argentines and rails against the “entire political caste, stupid and useless.”

Mr. Milei is an economist who favors limited government and blames Argentina’s economic problems on suffocating taxation, hyper-regulation, special-interest subsidies and protectionism. He wants to open markets, cut public spending, end capital controls and privatize state-owned enterprises. He’s also a social conservative, but his appeal stems largely from his rage against the establishment.

With international reserves in net-negative territory, the next president will inherit an economic mess. If the prospect of a Milei presidency willing to break with the status quo excites a third of voters, it also raises questions about Mr. Milei’s ability to govern if he wins. His party has only two seats in Congress, which means he’d need to work with some of those he is lambasting now.

Much can happen between now and the first election round on Oct. 22. But Mr. Milei’s showing has sent a message to Buenos Aires—and the world—that the Argentine middle class may no longer accept a status quo that robs them of the fruits of their labor.

[ccp]

****The [US] media would like you to know that Javier Milei, the upstart candidate who improbably won Argentina’s presidential primary this week, is a “Trump admirer,” “right-wing populist,” “far-right outsider,” “far-right populist,” “rightist,” “far-right libertarian,” a “radical” — and did they mention he’s on the “far right”?***

Thus we know he is probably a good candidate. 

https://patriotpost.us/opinion/99798-the-best-presidential-candidate-in-the-world-is-running-in-argentina-2023-08-18

[Crafty_Dog]

Communist China Helps Itself to Ecuador
by Robert Williams  •  August 29, 2023 at 6:00 am

"We are basically being plundered. There are no words. There are no words to describe this tragedy.... China took control of the natural resources. They control the hydroelectric plants, they control the oil, a large part of mining, and they control political power. We've been colonized. Again." — Fernando Villavicencio, Ecuadorean investigative journalist and presidential candidate in the award-winning 2022 documentary, This Stolen Country of Mine.

From 2007 to 2017, Villavicencio, who was a leading critic of the country's sellout to China and government corruption, investigated the corruption and China dealings of left-wing Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who effectively sold the country and its rich resources to China. In 2020, Correa was sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison for corruption but had already fled to Belgium. Today, China is Ecuador's largest creditor.

n March 2023, Honduras cut ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic ties with China in order to handle its enormous debt and need for investments.

Even more disturbing is the fact that China's activities in Latin America amount to a significant security threat against US interests.

"What concerns me as a Combatant Commander is the myriad of ways in which the PRC is spreading its malign influence, wielding its economic might, and conducting gray zone activities to expand its military and political access and influence... The PRC is investing in critical infrastructure, including deep-water ports, cyber, and space facilities which can have a potential dual use for malign commercial and military activities. In any potential global conflict, the PRC could leverage strategic regional ports to restrict U.S. naval and commercial ship access. This is a strategic risk that we can't accept or ignore... This is a decisive decade and our actions or inactions regarding the PRC will have ramifications for decades to come." — General Laura Jane Richardson, Commander of the US Southern Command, to the House Armed Services Committee regarding her concerns over China's activities in Latin America. Those include China's recent financing of a $3 billion container port in Peru, and the establishment of a space monitoring station near the Strait of Magellan. March 8, 2023.


"We are basically being plundered. There are no words. There are no words to describe this tragedy. They [China] have control of the natural resources." — Ecuadorean investigative journalist and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, who was assassinated on August 9, 2023. Ecuador is just one of the Latin American countries that China is colonizing and exploiting. Pictured: A pipeline and a gas flare stack belonging to Chinese oil company PetroOriental, near the indigenous Amazon rainforest village of Miwuaguno in Ecuador, on December 10, 2020. (Photo by Cristina Vega Rhor/AFP via Getty Images)
"We are basically being plundered. There are no words. There are no words to describe this tragedy. They [China] have control of the natural resources," said Ecuadorean investigative journalist and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in the award-winning 2022 documentary, This Stolen Country of Mine. "China took control of the natural resources. They control the hydroelectric plants, they control the oil, a large part of mining, and they control political power. We've been colonized. Again."

From 2007 to 2017, Villavicencio, who was a leading critic of the country's sellout to China and government corruption, investigated the corruption and China dealings of left-wing Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who effectively sold the country and its rich resources to China. In 2020, Correa was sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison for corruption, but had already fled to Belgium. Today, China is Ecuador's largest creditor.

[Crafty_Dog]

second

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/peru/2023-08-28/perus-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-20-years-later?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=74be1beb-0580-4591-910b-36a9771c82c7

[Crafty_Dog]

Milestone. China and Nicaragua signed a free trade agreement on Thursday. China’s Ministry of Commerce described it as a milestone in bilateral trade and economic relations. Negotiations on the deal, which removes barriers to trade in goods and services and investment, began in July 2022.

[Crafty_Dog]

How Record Migration Will Impact Central America
Sep 12, 2023 | 18:17 GMT






(LUIS ACOSTA/AFP via Getty Images)
Record-breaking migration across Central America is straining government resources and increasing organized crime; as governments struggle to effectively respond, political tensions, supply chain disruptions and safety threats could rise over the next year. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported Sept. 5 that the Darien Gap between Panama and Colombia has seen more than 330,000 migrant crossings so far in 2023, the highest number of annual crossings ever recorded. As migrants have moved north through Central America, countries have reported a surge in migrant encampments. In Costa Rica, migrants unable to afford the bus fare to travel north to the Nicaraguan border have congregated on the border of Panama, leading authorities to declare a state of emergency in the region. Migrant arrivals in Honduras reached record levels in July and August, the majority of them arriving through the eastern border with Nicaragua. Mexico has already seen elevated numbers of migrants reach the country, with authorities in July apprehending more than 70,000 migrants in a single month for the first time, more than double the country's reported apprehensions in July 2022.

The regional drivers for migration — poor economic conditions, insecurity and government repression — remain pronounced throughout the region. According to data from the Mexican Refugee Aid Commission, most asylum requests in Mexico in 2023 have come from Haitians, Hondurans, Cubans, Salvadorans and Venezuelans.

Nearly 250,000 people crossed the Darien Gap in all of 2022, nearly double the 133,000 crossings in 2021.

In August, Costa Rican authorities reported that between 2,000 and 3,000 migrants were entering the country daily from Panama through the Paso Canoas border crossing, up from 13,248 in all of April 2023.

The surge in migration has strained government resources in transit countries, subsequently increasing the presence of criminal groups engaged in human trafficking. Transit countries in Central America historically have not experienced the brunt of regional migration given that migrants move through the region's countries as quickly as possible on their way to the U.S. border. With the exception of their approach to refugees from neighboring Nicaragua, Costa Rican authorities have typically managed regional migration by easing migrant travel and preventing buildups in cities and near border crossings rather than by providing long-term humanitarian assistance. In recent months, however, Costa Rica's transportation infrastructure has been unable to meet the elevated demand amid record-high migration, leading to increased encampments that local authorities have proved unprepared to handle. Throughout the region, strained transportation and humanitarian resources have made migrants increasingly desperate, raising their vulnerability to human trafficking organizations that transport migrants through countries and smuggle them across borders, often through unsafe means. These groups include major transnational criminal organizations like El Salvador's MS-13, Mexico's Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, and Colombia's Gulf Clan. Though these groups have long had a transnational presence, they have typically focused their operations on securing drug routes and seizing control of territories with businesses worth extorting. With the increased profits possible from the record-high number of migrants, groups have increased activities in areas where they previously did not have extensive operations.

The Southern Mexican state of Chiapas has historically been a low-crime state, but in recent years has seen increased violence alongside a buildup in migrant encampments near the Guatemala border. The Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Cartel have clashed with each other and smaller local groups to gain control of human trafficking routes, resulting in shootings and bombings near Mexico-Guatemala border crossings.

With migration potentially rising further next year, governments will continue to struggle to combat its effects, creating political, supply chain and safety challenges. As conditions in migrants' countries of origin show few signs of significant improvements, migration is likely to remain elevated or even increase next year. Amid persistent high migration, governments throughout Central America will be unable to provide enough support for migrants to safely transit their countries. In some cases, governments may face pressure to decrease funding for programs as local residents' frustration with surging migrant populations increases. As countries across the region face food insecurity and inflation challenges (including Guatemala and Honduras), political and funding limitations may prevent improvements to programs for migrants. Governments may also consider increasing border security measures, with Panamanian officials noting in August that they are overwhelmed and weighing the possibility of closing the land border with Colombia. As the countries have no official road crossing, however, it is unclear how this could be accomplished. Such measures would likely extend wait times at official border crossings, but the region's largely porous borders mean that such efforts would have little effect on migration levels and instead could drive even more migrants to use human trafficking groups. As human trafficking groups expand their presence, crime may increase in areas unequipped to handle it, creating safety risks for businesses and travelers throughout the region, with the potential for attacks to occur in the vicinity of border crossings, delaying regional supply chains and raising operational and insurance costs. Creating additional supply chain concerns, cargo drivers throughout the region have previously referenced safety concerns during labor actions, and a further increase in the targeting of cargo trucks (which are commonly used in human trafficking operations) may lead to further disruptive trucker strikes.

Truckers in Chile and Mexico have referenced poor safety conditions for drivers during protests over the last year. In Chile, protesters explicitly blamed Venezuelan migrant encampments in the country's north for violent crime targeting cargo drivers, resulting in violent clashes in January 2022 and disruptive blockades in November 2022.

One of the countries where residents could express frustration with migration policies is Costa Rica, which is experiencing its most violent year on record. Citizens and opposition political figures may criticize the diversion of resources to migrants stranded at the country's southern border, rather than to security forces to combat threats to Costa Ricans.

The increase in migration may create diplomatic tensions. Nicaragua, for example, makes little effort to cooperate with other governments on migration, an issue that may further isolate the government of President Daniel Ortega from his Central American neighbors. Panama has also previously criticized the Colombian government for not collaborating on efforts to reduce Darien Gap crossings.

As locals' frustration with increased migrant encampments worsens, protests against migrants, xenophobic attacks and a long-term rise in the popularity of far-right and anti-immigration political figures are possible. Migrants themselves may also become increasingly frustrated with the lack of humanitarian support and the increased price of legitimate transportation options, with the potential for protests in cities, at border crossings and near migrant processing facilities

[Crafty_Dog]

September 14, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Colombia and Mexico Push a New Drug Control Strategy
Their collaboration could force the U.S. to adjust or risk losing influence.
By: Allison Fedirka

Mexico and Colombia are jointly adjusting their anti-drug policy, with potential implications for the regional power balance and relations with the United States. For a long time, an emphasis on security and order has dominated the countries’ policies toward drug trafficking. However, a new focus on social welfare and economic development is gaining prominence in both capitals and in the wider region, fueled by a shared sense that the previous approach has failed. Mexico and Colombia also hope that by targeting the root causes of the drug problem, they can revitalize their economies, which are still staggering from the pandemic. In the bigger picture, the leaders hope to position their countries for a more volatile global environment, where countries like theirs in the Global South can exert greater influence within and beyond their borders.

A Demilitarized Approach

Earlier this month, Colombia hosted a conference for Latin American and Caribbean countries dedicated to this new anti-drug framework. It emphasized the need to refocus on tackling major transnational crime groups and implement demand-reducing social welfare policies. Gustavo Petro, the Colombian president, and Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador said the region’s drug problem indicated a health and social crisis. Continuing down the path of a militarized counternarcotics approach, Petro warned, would lead to more failed states and perhaps the death of democracy in the region.

For Mexico and Colombia, the matter is existential. After years of rising production, Colombia is now the world’s leading coca producer. Mexican cartels dominate the cocaine supply chain from start to finish, even overseeing and directly participating in production inside of Colombia. The illicit proceeds from the drug trade enable the cartels to capture political power in remote communities where the central government’s writ is limited – a common feature in both countries. Petro and Lopez Obrador hope that by promoting the development of the legal economy, they can reassert the state’s authority in these communities and eventually excise the cartels.

Cocaine Market Indicators in Colombia
(click to enlarge)

In addition to economic development, Mexico and Colombia want to shift more responsibility for addressing the drug problem from the military to civilian institutions. In many Latin American countries, the armed forces are heavily involved in domestic security and fighting organized crime. The U.S. often trains, exchanges intelligence and conducts operations with these militaries and other law enforcement bodies to reduce the northward drug flow. Enforcement will remain a priority, but Petro and Lopez Obrador hope that by elevating the role of government bodies tasked with public health, education, etc., they can create more areas for cross-border collaboration in the drug war. For example, Mexico’s Agency for International Development Cooperation is working with the Colombian government to implement development-focused counternarcotics programs like Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) and Jovenes Construyendo el Futuro (Youth Building the Future).

Having reached consensus on a new approach, the next challenge for Mexico and Colombia is implementation. For starters, both governments lack sufficient financing to truly transform life in affected communities. The drug trade exists because it is so profitable, and legitimate business – especially in rural communities – is rarely as lucrative. The twin plagues of official corruption and mismanagement will also complicate implementation.

Cocaine Seizures in the Western Hemisphere
(click to enlarge)

In the past, domestic opposition has also hindered attempts to move away from the militarized approach to drugs. However, this time the Colombian government appears to have bipartisan support. For example, Petro’s predecessor and political opposite, Ivan Duque, said recently that the “war on drugs” had failed and called for a public health approach to reduce demand. He also said the U.S. and European Union should open their agriculture markets to give Colombian farmers viable alternatives to coca cultivation. With elections scheduled for June 2024, Mexican politics are more erratic, but Colombia at least has come to see counternarcotics policy not as a political issue but as a national emergency.

The Biggest Consumer

Any changes in counternarcotics strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean will inevitably affect the United States. For one thing, Washington’s regional policy is tailored to the law and order approach. Most U.S. collaboration with the countries of the region in the fight against drug trafficking occurs through its law enforcement bodies. Moreover, the U.S. typically prefers to work with Mexico and Colombia separately, via bilateral arrangements such as the Merida Initiative or Plan Colombia.

But the drug trade knows no borders. Mexico’s cartels dominate global cocaine distribution and directly control the coca supply chain in Colombia. And as the Western Hemisphere’s largest producers of fentanyl and cocaine, respectively, Mexico and Colombia are strong candidates to lead a regional anti-drug initiative. By combining their voices, they stand a better chance of convincing the U.S. to accommodate their health- and development-centric strategy. A joint approach may also boost them in confronting the U.S. over its contributions to the drug problem, namely through the supply of guns and the highest drug consumption in the world.


(click to enlarge)

Success could have broader implications for bilateral and regional relations. Historically, Bogota has been Washington’s preferred partner in the region because of its strategic location and ability to counterbalance Mexico. But U.S. and Colombian interests are not as closely aligned as they once were, particularly with regard to the political crisis in Venezuela, where Washington shares neither Bogota’s urgency nor its strategy. At the same time, Mexico is offering cooperation that is more attuned to Colombia’s immediate needs. A strong Mexican-Colombian alliance, should one emerge, would shake the region and could lead to the formation of a coalition in the Caribbean capable of challenging U.S. interests.

Mexico and Colombia do not want to stop collaborating with the U.S. against drug trafficking, and in fact U.S. public and private capital would be invaluable aids for their economic development plans. Rather, they want to force Washington to engage on their terms. Bogota and Mexico City need to promote development in marginalized areas of their countries – for political and socio-economic reasons but also to exploit the opportunities presented by the global supply chain realignment. In reality, this is more important for both countries. Effective cooperation to crush the drug trade – while too important to ignore – is a means to an end.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Appeal (and Perils) of Crime Crackdowns in Latin America, Part 1
Sep 27, 2023 | 16:24 GMT





Soldiers conduct a patrol on July 22, 2023, in the Salvadorean municipality of Colon, where the MS-13 gang reportedly remains active.
Soldiers conduct a patrol on July 22, 2023, in the Salvadorean municipality of Colon.
(MARVIN RECINOS/AFP via Getty Images)

Editor's Note: This is the first of a two-part series that looks at El Salvador's fight against crime and why it's been so successful, as well as the implications and risks of other Latin American countries exploring similar strategies.

With the success of El Salvador's counter-crime state of emergency in decreasing the country's homicide rate to its lowest in history, similar measures have become attractive throughout Latin America, though extensive implementation would likely see only limited success, instead creating operational, safety and reputational risks for the region. In March 2022, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele imposed a state of emergency to combat violent crime, with a focus on the country's two largest criminal groups, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18. A massive crackdown on organized crime under the state of emergency led to a dramatic drop in the country's homicide rate, making it one of the safest countries in the region. Seeing El Salvador's success, in November 2022, Honduran President Xiomara Castro implemented a similar (albeit significantly less extensive) state of emergency to combat violent crime and extortion. Elsewhere in the region, elected officials and political candidates have called for the implementation of security tactics utilized by the Bukele administration, including mass incarceration, military presence in policing forces and targeted neighborhood-specific operations against cartel activity.

In 2015, El Salvador's homicide rate peaked at 103 homicides per 100,000 people, making it among the most deadly countries in the world. Over the following years, violence gradually decreased to levels on par with regional neighbors, before stabilizing in 2021 at 17.58 homicides per 100,000 people. In 2022, following the implementation of the state of emergency, that rate fell by more than 50% to 7.8 homicides per 100,000 people. Although the reliability of Salvadoran government crime statistics is unclear, interviews of residents of formerly high-crime neighborhoods have confirmed this improvement.

In Colombia, Diego Molano and Jaime Arizabaleta — candidates for the mayors of Bogota and Cali, respectively (though Arizabaleta has since withdrawn) — have proposed building prisons inspired by those that El Salvador has constructed in recent years if they win the regional elections on Oct. 29.

In Ecuador, businessman Jan Topic (who lost in the first round of the country's election on Aug. 20) promised to carry out a ''Bukele-style'' crackdown in addition to the construction of more prisons.

In Guatemala, Sandra Torres — the leader of the country's second-largest party, National Unity of Hope, and runner-up in the August presidential election — has also promised to emulate Bukele's security strategy, calling for the militarization of prisons.

In Peru, following a surge in crime, Lima Mayor Rafael Lopez Aliaga of the right-wing Popular Renewal party called for the implementation of Bukele-style measures as well, and for tanks to patrol the streets of the capital.

Continuing violence in Honduras nearly a year into the country's crime crackdown demonstrates that success is not guaranteed. Honduras' state of emergency shares many qualities with El Salvador's crackdown, including the regular deployment of additional police officers and army forces to high crime areas, the imposition of lockdowns and curfews, and limitations on citizens' constitutional rights. However, ten months into its implementation, Honduras' crackdown has done little to decrease crime risks. Some operations have successfully decreased violence in specific neighborhoods, and anecdotal reports indicate residents of some high-crime areas do feel safer, but nationwide crime levels remain elevated and in some ways have escalated. For example, violence in Honduran prisons has worsened significantly, with repeated massacres and riots. This limited success indicates challenges to replicating El Salvador's successful state of emergency elsewhere in the region.

In April, prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Tamara, Honduras, temporarily seized control of the facility, leading authorities to give control of the prisons to the military.

Honduras has been the most violent country in Central America since El Salvador's homicide rate fell below it in 2019. Homicides in the country dropped to 35.8 per 100,000 people in 2022 from 41.7 per 100,000 people in 2021.

Understanding El Salvador's Success

A key component of El Salvador's war on crime was the severity of the state of emergency, which suspended due process in the legal system. A significant, long-standing hurdle to combating organized crime throughout Latin America is the prevalence of police and government corruption. Corrupt practices among police officers, military members, and local and federal government officials enable criminal groups to entrench themselves in communities, evade capture, and expand criminal enterprises. This is the result of limited policy safeguards preventing corruption, low pay for government positions, and regular bribery and/or threats against officials. These risks have long been present in El Salvador, with the Bukele administration itself allegedly engaged in negotiations with the country's gangs prior to implementing the state of emergency. Continuing allegations of government corruption call into question how El Salvador has managed to overcome this challenge. One compelling explanation is that ''mano dura'' (iron-fisted) measures under the state of emergency have left little room for criminal groups to maneuver. Mass arrests and the abandonment of due process in the legal system may mean that members of Barrio 18 and MS-13 have not had the opportunity to bribe or threaten officials. Military deployment to high-crime areas has also overcome local alliances between police officers and gang members. Honduran police reported arresting 4,033 people between December 2022 and May 2023, with 81% ultimately released due to a lack of evidence; meanwhile, in El Salvador, over 70,000 people have been arrested, with only 6,000 people released. Approximately 2% of the country's adult population is currently in prison, many of whom human rights groups allege are innocent. Corruption in El Salvador persists, but the lack of due process and decreased opportunities for gangs to threaten or bribe police officers have overcome constraints from official corruption on counter-crime operations.

Transparency International's 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index gives El Salvador a low score of 33 out of 100 (in which a score of 100 indicates low levels of corruption). Meanwhile, Honduras has a score of 23, Ecuador has a score of 36, and Colombia has a score of 39.
In a recent example of the scale of El Salvador's localized gang crackdowns, on Aug. 1, authorities sent 7,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers to the rural Cabanas province in response to a shooting attack that wounded two officers.

This level of implementation of counter-crime measures has only been possible because of Bukele's high popularity and minimal policy limitations. Since Bukele took office in 2019, his approval rating has never dropped below 80%, typically staying between 85% and 92%, which is rare for a Latin American leader. This level of support has given him the leeway to take controversial steps to combat organized crime, as a less popular political figure would have to consider how their political opponents may criticize such actions. But while Salvadoran opposition parties and human rights activists have criticized the state of emergency, mass public approval for the crackdown limits political risks to Bukele. Relatedly, Bukele's New Ideas party retains a significant majority in the Legislative Assembly, and his administration has stacked the judicial system with friendly judges, effectively eliminating the potential for legal challenges to the state of emergency. In comparison, Honduran President Xiomara Castro's Libre party has only 50 out of 128 seats in the country's National Congress, recently preventing her government from gaining congressional approval for a new attorney general. Other governments in the region face similar restrictions on how states of emergency can be implemented, limiting their ability to impose measures similar to those in El Salvador.

Finally, El Salvador's high population density benefits counter-crime operations, potentially making the state of emergency unreplicable in other countries in the region. El Salvador has a population density of 307 people per square kilometer, making it the most densely populated country in Latin America (excluding the Caribbean). The next most densely populated country is Guatemala, with a population density of 129 per square kilometer. El Salvador's population density has historically fueled crime, with the country's crowded, impoverished neighborhoods providing bases for Barrio 18 and MS-13 operations. But this population density has also aided counter-crime efforts over the last year, as deployments to high-crime areas include a significantly larger number of residents (and therefore criminals) than an operation in a similarly sized area in neighboring Honduras. Such operations create significant safety risks for residents and disrupt daily life in affected neighborhoods for days, but still enable authorities to arrest targeted criminal cells. In addition, many countries in Latin America have vast, underpopulated regions where criminal groups can operate with lower risks of disruption by security forces. For example, Colombia's Amazon basin regions have long provided space for guerilla groups to evade authorities. Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Brazil face similar challenges. Therefore, even if such countries were institutionally and politically able to implement a state of emergency to the same degree as El Salvador, they may struggle to achieve the same level of success.

Honduras has a population density of 95 people per square kilometer. Mexico's population density is 66 people per square kilometer, while Colombia's is 47 people per square kilometer.

Up next: The Appeal (and Perils) of Crime Crackdowns in Latin America, Part 2

[Crafty_Dog]

second

The Appeal (and Perils) of Crime Crackdowns in Latin America, Part 2
Sep 28, 2023 | 14:14 GMT





Salvadoran security forces move a second group of 2,000 detainees overnight to the mega-prison Terrorist Confinement Center on March 15, 2023, in Tecoluca, El Salvador.
Salvadoran security forces move a second group of 2,000 detainees overnight to the mega-prison Terrorist Confinement Center on March 15, 2023, in Tecoluca, El Salvador.

(Photo by Handout/Presidencia El Salvador via Getty Images)

Editor's Note: This is the second installment of a two-part series exploring El Salvador's fight against crime and its impact on the region. In the first part, we examined El Salvador's strategy and the reasons behind its success. Part two focuses on the risks other Latin American countries will face if they implement similar strategies.

The political and potential economic benefits of El Salvador's state of emergency may inspire other regional governments to implement similar measures, which could create new safety, reputational and migratory risks. If other Latin American countries implement counter-crime states of emergency, even to a lesser extent than El Salvador, criminal groups would likely retaliate against government security forces, leading to bursts of violence that include public shootouts and bombings. El Salvador experienced these security impacts in the weeks following the state of emergency's implementation, though violence declined as the number of arrests spiked over subsequent months. However, if other countries' states of emergency are less successful, elevated crime rates could persist for months or years, creating safety risks for local residents and businesses operating in the region.

Additionally, strict states of emergency could raise human rights concerns and create reputational and logistical challenges across the region. If more countries and regions implement similar tactics to that of El Salvador's Bukele administration, such as mass incarceration and mass trials, they will likely draw criticism from human rights organizations and foreign countries. As military personnel often police the populace during states of emergency, there are likely to be additional concerns over police militarization. Therefore, these tactics could lead to increased reputational risks for companies operating in the region, particularly if security conditions do not substantially improve as a result of the measures. Such measures could also raise concerns of authoritarianism, as governments could use (or be perceived as using) measures from states of emergency to quash dissent and limit opposition. This could spur criticism and even sanctions from international powers such as the United States and the European Union. In El Salvador, such international responses have so far been minimal, but this risk may escalate over the coming years. Companies operating in sanctioned countries may experience logistical and compliance challenges that cause financial harm.

Relations between the United States and El Salvador have deteriorated under the state of emergency, with the U.S. Biden administration imposing sanctions on officials close to Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele under the Magnitsky Act in December 2022. However, these measures have scarcely impacted the Salvadoran government.

The United States previously sanctioned Nicaragua over authoritarianism and repression under the government of President Daniel Ortega. Sanctions included limiting Nicaraguan sugar exports to the United States and issuing an executive order allowing limitations on exports from Nicaragua's mining sector.

Mass Arrests and Human Rights Trade-Offs

El Salvador's success has come at the expense of civil liberties and due process. The nationwide state of emergency allows authorities to suspend constitutional rights, including limiting freedom of movement, intercepting communications and making arrests without warrants. Human rights organizations including Amnesty International have repeatedly alleged that authorities often arrest individuals with no indication that they are involved in crime in order to meet arrest quotas. For example, officers have reportedly arbitrarily arrested detainees, many of them minors, for living in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods and having tattoos (a quality traditionally associated with organized crime in El Salvador), resulting in the arrest of more than 72,000 people since March 2022. Mass arrests have necessitated the construction of a 40,000-person capacity prison, and authorities recently began conducting collective trials for thousands of people at a time. Reports have also alleged extrajudicial killings, inhumane conditions in the country's prisons and torture.

Finally, states of emergency could increase regional migration, raising criminal activity and spurring border disruptions. The state of emergency in El Salvador has placed poor Salvadorans (particularly men) at risk of arbitrary arrest, leading many to leave the country. If mass arbitrary arrests occur during counter-crime operations in other countries, similar increases in migration could occur. Elevated migration would raise regional crime risks, as criminal groups would increase their presence in areas with high migrant encampments to target migrants for human trafficking and extortion. In addition, the United States and Mexico would likely try to deter any northward increases in migration, which would likely lead to supply chain disruptions, including within Mexico and at the U.S.-Mexico border.

Texas Gov. Greg Abbott increased inspections at the U.S.-Mexico border in April 2022 and May 2023.

In September, Mexican freight company Ferromex suspended some of its northbound cargo train operations due to safety concerns as the number of migrants attempting to ride the trains north spiked.

[ccp]

Must be easier said than done.
but it would help our neighbor's economies, reduce poverty and hopefully the need to flock north .

It would also reduce or eradicate the reliance on China
Reduce the distance of the supply chain

https://hbr.org/2021/06/the-case-for-a-pan-american-manufacturing-ecosystem

The only obvious downside is it would still ship jobs overseas but still seems better .

[Crafty_Dog]

MY:

https://michaelyon.substack.com/p/pan-american-suicide

"Panama’s location is strategically vital for various reasons such as Canal, and pathway to South America. Panama is one of the most vital terrains on earth.

"Costa Rica is on Silk Road 2.0 and will be taken. The land and sea will not be left to Panamanians, or anyone else who cannot defend and operate it. Panamanians and indigenous will be swept aside by storms and global currents beyond comprehension of most Americans, Europeans, and Panamanians.

"Netherlands and others also being swept away. Places like Ukraine and Israel are nothing under force of these currents.

"Texas does not have a border.

"The US Government is pumping millions of incompatibles into our aquarium. While the highly-vaxxed US military concentrates on foreign, concocted wars, core Americans are scheduled for genocide.

USA has no border."

=============================

 https://oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/China-has-strong-incentive-to-widen-Panama-Canal.pdf

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/anarcho-capitalist-javier-milei-elected-president-in-argentina/

[DougMacG]

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/anarcho-capitalist-javier-milei-elected-president-in-argentina/

Cato:

https://www.cato.org/blog/mileis-remarkable-victory-argentina-paves-way-dollar-zone

The potential is now there to start reversing 8 decades of failure.

Too bad to go to the (US) dollar right while we are abandoning it.

[Crafty_Dog]

When there’s no real alternative, there’s no problem, as the saying goes. And that may be the logic of Argentina voters on Sunday who rejected the catastrophe of Peronist rule in favor of impulsive and charismatic outsider Javier Milei, who promised what for Argentina is the radical change of free-market economics.

Mr. Milei, a Congressman and self-described libertarian, won the Presidency in a rout with 56% of the vote to 44%. He defeated Sergio Massa, the incumbent economic minister and architect of the policies that have produced runaway inflation, declining living standards, a government shedding foreign reserves, and the worst economic crisis in decades.

“Today we begin the reconstruction of Argentina,” Mr. Milei said Sunday night. “If we do not move quickly with the structural changes that Argentina needs, we are heading towards the worst crisis in our history.”

He’s not exaggerating. Inflation is running at 143%, the peso has lost some 90% of its value against the U.S. dollar on the black market, and the middle class is increasingly impoverished. This is the result of industrial policy, export taxes, capital controls, rigid labor markets, uncontrolled government spending and the political abuse of the central bank to monetize the spending. This policy mix fails wherever it’s tried, but Argentines keep giving it another chance until it blows up again.

Mr. Massa tried to buy the election with handouts to voters, as the Peronists always do. He and the international media stigmatized Mr. Milei as a crazy radical who is akin to Donald Trump. The leftist leaders in the rest of Latin America—Mexico, Brazil and Colombia—hinted that Mr. Milei meant a return to fascism.

The comparisons to Mr. Trump are especially inapt. Mr. Milei is a free trader and believes in sound money. Mr. Trump is a protectionist who wants higher border taxes and demanded low interest rates as President.

None of the attacks worked. Mr. Milei had finished second to Mr. Massa in the first round election, but he was able to consolidate the vote from the center-right candidate, who had finished third, to win the runoff.

Mr. Milei will now get his chance to clean up the mess, and this will be harder than winning the election. The Peronists control the largest faction in the Argentine Congress and will oppose him every step along the way. Some of his proposals lack detail. He says he’ll dollarize the economy, which could work if there are enough dollar reserves to manage the transition. He wants to abolish the central bank, but it isn’t clear what would replace it.

The President-elect is a political movement unto himself, and he will have to form a coalition with conservative and centrist politicians in Congress. Known for his often caustic and insulting rhetoric, Mr. Milei electrified Argentina’s desperate younger generation with his candor. But now he will have to show he can moderate his persona or risk wasting his great opportunity.

The stakes are high for Argentina’s 46 million people, who have suffered from more misrule over a century than most other nations. But they are also high for those who believe in Mr. Milei’s campaign theme of “freedom” and economic liberty.

If he fails in his reform efforts through incompetence or vainglory, he could discredit market policies in Argentina, which could put the Peronists back in power. Mr. Milei has given his country new promise of better days, and let’s hope he is capable enough to deliver.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=598e5250-e651-4dca-ae66-3c5b809009cf

[ccp]

https://www.creators.com/read/ben-shapiro/11/23/why-the-media-despise-javier-milei

[ccp]

called "FAR RIGHT" threat by the LEFT and mentions of Hitler come up on CNN MSNBC when his name is mentioned

VISITS GRAVE OF FAMOUS RABBI IN NYC:

https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/11/27/photos-argentinas-javier-milei-visits-the-ohel-gravesite-of-lubavitcher-rebbe-before-meeting-u-s-officials/

[JUST LIKE HITLER WOULD HAVE DONE ]

[DougMacG]

called "FAR RIGHT" threat by the LEFT and mentions of Hitler come up on CNN MSNBC when his name is mentioned

VISITS GRAVE OF FAMOUS RABBI IN NYC:

https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/11/27/photos-argentinas-javier-milei-visits-the-ohel-gravesite-of-lubavitcher-rebbe-before-meeting-u-s-officials/

[JUST LIKE HITLER WOULD HAVE DONE ]

We very much need (shouldn't need) to straighten out which side of the political spectrum is or leans fascist.

The individual liberty, limited government side of it is the opposite of fascist!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://notthebee.com/article/argentinas-new-libertarian-president-javier-milei-immediately-cuts-number-of-cabinet-members-in-half-after-taking-office?utm_source=Not+The+Bee+Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=12122023

[Crafty_Dog]

Chinese tanks. Chinese arms manufacturer Norinco presented a plan to produce VT4 main battle tanks for the Colombian armed forces. During a visit to Colombia earlier this month, a delegation from the firm proposed supplying the country with a wide range of armored vehicles, including MBTs, light tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery units and mine-resistant armored vehicles.