Author Topic: Ukraine  (Read 147390 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Landslide win for the comedian
« Reply #150 on: April 22, 2019, 10:56:57 AM »

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-presidential-gamble-11555875881

also see

What Happened

With over 98 percent of the votes counted from the second round of the Ukrainian presidential election, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, best known as a TV comedian, has overwhelmingly won the post by capturing over 73 percent of the vote. Incumbent Petro Poroshenko has conceded defeat.
Why It Matters

Zelenskiy’s landslide victory can be seen as an expression of public frustration over business as usual in Ukraine. The 2014 Euromaidan revolution elevated public expectations of seeing significant changes in the country, but reform efforts under Poroshenko produced mixed results. Reforms in the energy sector, for instance, have led to higher utility costs, while wages have not kept up with inflation, and efforts to tackle corruption through judicial and legal reforms have largely stalled. Zelenskiy — who had no previous political experience and offered no clear policy prescriptions during his campaign — thus served as a protest candidate.

The Ukrainian parliament, currently led by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, presents a significant limiter on the power of the presidency.

With Zelenskiy’s victory now all but official, the question becomes how he will reshape Ukrainian policy after he takes office. In the short term, the likely answer is not much. The Ukrainian parliament, currently led by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, presents a significant limiter on the power of the presidency. Therefore, Zelenskiy — whose party currently has no parliamentary representation — will find it difficult to push through any significant policy changes at least until parliamentary elections in October, when he will have a chance to build his party’s numbers and will factor more heavily into coalition-building. Any changes Zelenskiy wants to make will also face external influence, including a push by the West for policy continuity on economic reforms tied to the country’s financial assistance program through the International Monetary Fund.

Beyond the immediate term, Zelenskiy could shift Ukraine’s approach to key issues like the conflict with Russian-backed separatists in Donbas. Indeed, he has called for a reset of the negotiation process over ending the war in Eastern Ukraine, but he also faces obstacles to that ambition. Ukraine’s Western backers have pushed for a continuation of the Minsk process and Normandy format of negotiations, a step that Zelenskiy’s representatives have confirmed a commitment to keeping, meaning the bid to find a resolution to the conflict will face the all same constraints. Russia, which has taken a cautious approach to Zelenskiy’s victory, will also serve as a major roadblock to ending the conflict, considering Moscow's interest in undermining Ukraine’s Western integration process regardless of who is president. Given that Zelenskiy supports broader integration with Western blocs such as the European Union and NATO (he has called for a referendum on Ukraine’s NATO membership as a means to clarify public consensus on the issue), any difference in foreign policy between Zelenskiy and Poroshenko is likely to be tactical, rather than strategic, in nature.

There could, however, be more potential for domestic change, as the Ukrainian public will hold Zelenskiy accountable to his pledge to do more to tackle corruption. But this, too, will be complicated by his alleged ties to influential oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, as well as efforts by vested interests within the political and economic establishment to resist anti-corruption reforms. The extent of the resistance that Zelenskiy will face in changing Ukrainian policy will become clearer in the weeks ahead as he makes key Cabinet and personnel appointments and pushes to increase his party's representation in parliament.
What's Next?

Ukraine is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on Oct. 27. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the Popular Front currently make up the ruling coalition, while Zelenskiy’s Servant of the People party will be trying to seat its first members.

 
« Last Edit: April 22, 2019, 01:50:34 PM by Crafty_Dog »



Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Watching for signs of progress
« Reply #153 on: September 28, 2019, 02:00:24 PM »
 

Watching for Signs of Progress in Eastern Ukraine

The Big Picture
________________________________________
As the conflict in Ukraine enters its sixth year, recent signs point to a revival of the stalled negotiation process between Ukraine, Russia and the West. While various political and security challenges still stand in the way of a comprehensive truce between Kyiv and Moscow, the successful implementation of more tactical measures, such as prisoner swaps and troop withdrawals, could help break the diplomatic deadlock over the war.
________________________________________
The Fight for Russia’s BorderlandsThe Ukraine Conflict
Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's 2019 Fourth-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis of key developments over the next quarter.
On Sept. 18, Ukraine announced it was preparing to pull back its military presence 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) from the roughly 450-km front line in eastern Ukraine on the basis that Russian-backed separatist forces do the same. Specifically, Kyiv stressed that the successful completion of this plan would depend on concurring "reciprocal actions from the opposite side." This announcement follows a high-profile prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia on Sept. 7. Combined, these two recent developments suggest that the door to further de-escalation may be opening wider — and with it, the potential for diplomatic progress toward addressing the nearly six-year conflict in the region.
Closer to Diplomacy?
There have been discussions of a resumption of talks between heads of state in the Normandy Four format (Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France). The last time such a meeting took place regarding the conflict in eastern Ukraine was in 2016. A successful, mutual pullback of military personnel and equipment along the front line in Donbas would create positive momentum going into the Normandy summit, as well as boost parallel natural gas transit negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the European Union (which are part of broader talks among Ukrainian officials). This could, in turn, increase the chances for Kyiv and Moscow to start implementing some of the political aspects of the 2014 Minsk Protocol, and lay the groundwork for further political concessions as well, including the potential lifting of EU sanctions against Russia.
 
What Stands in the Way
However, there are still significant hurdles for a comprehensive breakthrough (or even piecemeal agreement) to take place as a result of the potential upcoming Normandy Four talks. These include:
•   The Minsk impasse: Russia and Ukraine have divergent positions on implementing the Minsk protocols, particularly its sequencing. Before granting any concessions, Ukraine has demanded a complete removal of Russian military personnel from the region and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the Russian border with Donbas. Russia, however, has pushed against these demands, insisting that Ukraine must first recognize Donbas' political autonomy.
•   Domestic political pressures: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy — who took office earlier this year after securing a landslide victory — has made ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine one of his top priorities. However, domestic political pressures will make Zelenskiy (and, to a lesser extent, Russian President Vladimir Putin) hesitant to pursue more meaningful concessions for fear of appearing politically weak.
•   Past failures: Finally, previous troop pullbacks have proven to be unsuccessful. A previous agreement in 2016 to push back both Ukrainian and separatist forces from three specific areas (Stanitsa Luganskaya, Zolotye and Petrovskoye) has had little success. Over the past three years, the pullback has been successfully completed in only Stanitsa Luganskaysa — and even then, only recently.
A step back from the front line in eastern Ukraine could at least allow Kyiv and Moscow to reopen the conversation around ending the conflict.
What to Watch for
Despite these challenges, the fact that there is movement on the ground in terms of both prisoner exchanges and a limited version of troop pullbacks nonetheless suggests that more diplomatic progress could soon be reached. In gauging the likelihood of such traction, it will be important to monitor the following developments in the coming weeks and months:
•   A sustained cease-fire: Persistent crossfire in eastern Ukraine risks delaying or thwarting any troop pullbacks. A sustained cease-fire in the region would first have to take place for either side to feel comfortable enough to move their military troops and equipment.
•   A strong start to the pullback: Any successful troop pullback would have to occur sequentially across the front line in eastern Ukraine, likely beginning first in the Luhansk regions of Zolotye and Petrovskoye (the sites of the previously failed 2016 plans). If both Russian and Ukrainian forces are successfully removed in these two regions, then pullbacks in other parts of Luhansk and the more contentious Donetsk region would likely take place next.
•   The U.S.'s diplomatic position: The United States — while not a part of the Normandy Four — will nevertheless play a key role in peace negotiations. Given its own rivalry with Russia, along with its political and security support for Ukraine, Washington can be expected to side with Kyiv and insist on more concessions from Moscow. Zelenskiy is scheduled to have his first sit-down with U.S. President Donald Trump on Sept. 25 on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. The White House also recently signed off on the release of a $250 million military assistance package for Ukraine.
•   The Normandy Four summit: Concrete movement toward a cease-fire and troop pullback would likely set the stage for additional meetings among Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany that are needed to reach any more meaningful truce. There is also a chance that the potential meeting will yield some limited concessions from Ukraine and Russia, such as additional prisoner swaps, or granting greater access for forces with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor separatist territories in eastern Ukraine.
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« Last Edit: October 06, 2019, 10:43:11 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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The mess that Victoria Nuland made
« Reply #155 on: October 06, 2019, 10:46:07 AM »
I'm not going to Monday morning quarterback this , , , yet, but I post this to give an idea of the complexity of the situation.

https://truthout.org/articles/the-ukraine-mess-that-nuland-made/



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DougMacG

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Re: Nation: Why are we in Ukraine?
« Reply #160 on: November 15, 2019, 05:42:10 PM »
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-we-in-ukraine/

"Ukraine is not “a vital US national interest, ...
Ukraine is a vital Russian interest."

I realize this is The Nation, but isn't containing Russia to Russian borders, when and where we can, to not become Soviet Union 2.0, isn't that a "vital US national interest"?

What was the lesson of WWII? In my view it is to stop regimes like Hitler sooner, before they capture more territory, resources, confidence, momentum, before we have to take a half million casualties or more to stop them.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #161 on: November 15, 2019, 07:02:58 PM »
Yes, understood! 

I should have clarified with an accompanying explanation, that I posted because it articulates well a particular, and rational, POV.

It most certainly fair to point out that if the shoe were on the other foot, we would NOT be happy with the Russians militarily present in Mexico, contrast our NATO presence on Russian borders and our vague declarations of adding Ukraine and Georgia to the list.

My current thinking is this:  The problem is that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire there were two basic ways to play it with the Russians.  Extend the hand or step on the neck while they were weak.  President Clinton did it half-assed instead.


DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #163 on: November 17, 2019, 10:00:26 PM »
Yes, understood! 

I should have clarified with an accompanying explanation, that I posted because it articulates well a particular, and rational, POV.

It most certainly fair to point out that if the shoe were on the other foot, we would NOT be happy with the Russians militarily present in Mexico, contrast our NATO presence on Russian borders and our vague declarations of adding Ukraine and Georgia to the list.

My current thinking is this:  The problem is that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire there were two basic ways to play it with the Russians.  Extend the hand or step on the neck while they were weak.  President Clinton did it half-assed instead.

Thank you Crafty. 

"we would NOT be happy with the Russians militarily present in Mexico, contrast our NATO presence on Russian borders and our vague declarations of adding Ukraine and Georgia to the list."

   - Our Denny S also makes a persuasive 'backyard' argument.  Cuban missile crisis might be an example.  I would add clarification..  I would add a distinction, the US has no designs on Mexico or Cuba, except for them to be sovereign, independent and free, unlike the way Russia looks at Crimea/Ukraine.  If our goal was annexation, we might find ourselves facing reaction of a world community alliance in resistance to that, whether we like it or not.

"...in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire there were two basic ways to play it with the Russians.  Extend the hand or step on the neck while they were weak.  President Clinton did it half-assed instead."

    - Yes.  Just the voters' choice of Clinton was a significant left turn away from what should have been a 'third Reagan term' and then a fourth term (Bush Sr.) emphasizing freedom instead of statism.  That election took away our credibility to tell other nations to choose individual rights and freedoms and steer away from statism.  Russia was lost.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #164 on: November 18, 2019, 03:54:15 AM »
"I would add clarification..  I would add a distinction, the US has no designs on Mexico or Cuba, except for them to be sovereign, independent and free, unlike the way Russia looks at Crimea/Ukraine.  If our goal was annexation, we might find ourselves facing reaction of a world community alliance in resistance to that, whether we like it or not."

Well articulated and I agree entirely. 

That said, the Russians do not see themselves as we see them.  The Russian sense of history comes through the very distorted lens of Marxist-Leninist Pravda propaganda while shutting off Truth from the outside, which with the fall of the Soviet Empire simply put on a new cloak over the same old rationalizations.


Crafty_Dog

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Interesting reminders of reality in Ukraine with regard to Russia
« Reply #166 on: November 20, 2019, 01:31:27 PM »
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/impeaching-trump-and-demonizing-russia-birds-of-a-feather/?fbclid=IwAR0GlURRpJ6YZcfzplG4SXHw10oiBw7EYAoaPPhCuj_r9lxRAn6kj2Qa004

A friend with unusually deep expertise in Russo-American strategic issues comments:

"The author is a bit more willing to take the Russian perspective than I think is wise, but this is still a good and interesting piece. The bits about NATO’s expansion and our support for factions in Ukraine are particularly useful reminders. The moves may have been in our interest, and largely I agree that they were, but the notion that Russia wouldn’t react was naive."


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« Last Edit: November 20, 2019, 05:23:08 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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The Budapest Memorandum
« Reply #171 on: December 19, 2019, 01:59:19 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #172 on: December 30, 2019, 05:40:07 AM »
Stratfor Worldview

ASSESSMENTS

A New Gas Transit Deal Won't Keep Ukraine and Russia Together for Long
6 MINS READ
Dec 30, 2019 | 10:00 GMT

A natural gas line runs outside Donetsk, Ukraine, on March 11, 2015. In the future, gas transit deals between Ukraine and Russia could have less ability to keep the countries' tensions in check.

(ANDREW BURTON/Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Their new agreement notwithstanding, Moscow and Kyiv are ultimately set to go their separate ways on energy....

For the short term at least, Ukrainians and Europeans won't have to worry about shelling out more to heat their homes this winter. An eleventh-hour extension to an energy transit agreement will guarantee the continued flow of natural gas from Russia to Europe through Ukraine over the next five years, but there is little indication that the current deal will presage longer-term cooperation between Moscow and Kyiv. Indeed, lingering distrust between the two capitals will lead Ukraine down the path of producing its own natural gas to achieve self-sufficiency in the longer term, while Russia will strive to shift shipments to pipelines in the Baltic and Black seas that don't present as much of a political nuisance. Ultimately, the emergence of other transit routes will reduce the calming effect that natural gas transit deals have had on the two countries' larger political disputes over hot-button issues like Crimea, eastern Ukraine and more.

The Big Picture

Russia supplies nearly half of Europe's natural gas, and Ukraine's pipeline infrastructure plays a key role. But the construction of new pipeline infrastructure in the Baltic and Black seas will allow Russia to reduce its dependence on Ukrainian infrastructure.

See The Politics of Pipelines

The Road to an Agreement

At the outset of the most recent talks, Russia proposed a one-year deal. At the same time, Russia also demanded that Ukraine's Naftogaz drop all litigation it had filed against Gazprom for allegedly pumping less than the 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year it was required to ship during the previous contract from 2009 to 2019. Ukraine, by contrast, wanted a 10-year agreement that would have provided Kyiv with a guaranteed income from transit fees over a long period in which it hoped to further develop its own natural gas production or alternative import sources. At the same time, Ukraine, as well as the European Union, had proposed a minimum transit of 60 bcm per year, with an additional capacity for 30 bcm.

After exhaustive negotiations, representatives of Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz finally reached a preliminary agreement for a five-year extension to their new gas transit contract on Dec. 19, just 12 days before the present deal was set to expire.

Gazprom also committed to paying $2.9 billion that a Stockholm court earlier ordered it to pay Naftogaz as compensation after volumes dropped to less than 90 bcm per year, particularly as a result of the Euromaidan uprising. Naftogaz, in exchange, agreed to stop pursuing additional lawsuits related to transit in which it had demanded a total of $13 billion.

Both Ukraine and Russia ended up making concessions relative to their initial demands in order to pragmatically sustain gas flows.

And in terms of yearly volumes, the new agreement envisions a progressive reduction in Russia's use of Ukrainian infrastructure from the current volume of 90 bcm to 65 bcm next year and just 40 bcm in 2021. As a result, Ukraine would normally collect less revenue, just as the costs of maintaining the aging infrastructure will rise. But under the new deal, Naftogaz and Gazprom have reportedly fixed the transit fees over the next five years at a higher level to allow Ukraine to sustain its roughly $3 billion in revenue even though volumes could drop by more than half.

The extension is of great economic importance to both Russia and Ukraine, as the lack of a deal would have physically prevented Russia from pumping enough natural gas to European markets to meet demand, while Kyiv would not have been able to reap transit fees. Both countries ended up making concessions relative to their initial demands in order to pragmatically sustain gas flows. From Ukraine's perspective, the new agreement will give Kyiv some level of reliability and generate revenue of at least $15 billion — $2 billion more than it would have gained if Naftogaz had won the lawsuits it originally filed against Gazprom. While the country might not have achieved as much as it could if it had stood its ground in negotiations, it evidently chose to sacrifice revenue for more certainty.

This map shows various pipeline routes from Russia to Europe.

Toward New Routes

The agreement, however, does not herald a long future of Russian-Ukrainian energy ties. The importance of Ukraine as a transit country lies within the broader context of the natural gas pipelines that connect Russia and European markets. Next year, Russia hopes to bring both TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 online to increase its total export capacity to Europe and develop more alternatives to Ukraine. Since the breakdown of relations between Kyiv and Moscow in 2014, Russia has considered Ukraine an unreliable transit route, and numerous legal and political conflicts between the two have complicated their relationship.

For one, Gazprom has chosen to honor the $2.9 billion compensation verdict, but Naftogaz is still exposing itself by dropping litigation in the name of a new deal, as it has accepted the risk that Russia may choose not to abide by their new agreement in years ahead — something that could cost the Ukrainian company revenues down the road. (Naftogaz, nonetheless, will continue its efforts to recover over $5 billion from Russia it says it incurred when Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014.)

While the latest agreement may succeed in averting the disruption of natural gas flows to Europe, the devil in the details does portend a radical shift in the infrastructure that brings Russian gas to Europe.

As it is, Ukraine ceased to directly consume Russian natural gas in 2015 (it still depends on Russia for about 10 bcm a year, or a third of its consumption, through so-called reverse flows of Russian natural gas that Moscow sells to other European countries, which then sell it on to Ukraine) and intends to develop its own resources to the extent that it would no longer be import-dependent. While Ukraine is unable to do this for now — and has failed to meet several targets in developing such abilities — the country's long-term goals of self-sufficiency would make its transit infrastructure a viable political tool that Kyiv could use to disrupt Moscow's access to European markets without risking its own supply.

While the latest agreement may succeed in averting the disruption of natural gas flows to Europe, the devil in the details does portend a radical shift in the infrastructure that brings Russian gas to Europe. Despite U.S. attempts to sanction the construction of Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, Russia will bring both of these pipeline projects online in 2020, allowing it to begin shipping natural gas to Europe through routes it considers more reliable. How quickly that happens will depend on Gazprom's delivery contracts with customers in Europe, as such contracts often specify the point of delivery. Whatever the case, the writing is on the wall for Ukraine's status as a major transit corridor between Russia and Europe, as cost and geopolitical risk are likely to drive Moscow to ship more natural gas to its European customers through alternate routes in the year to come. And that reality could have profound effects on their political problems; with the need to cooperate to ship natural gas to Europe diminishing, there will be one fewer factor inhibiting their geopolitical quarrel

Crafty_Dog

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Ukraine Pogrom?
« Reply #173 on: January 12, 2020, 06:27:50 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Ukraine clashes
« Reply #174 on: February 18, 2020, 01:10:06 PM »


Clashes in Ukraine. Ukraine’s military and the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic accused each other of shelling in Donbass and of using heavy weapons, which are prohibited under the Minsk agreements. Kyiv said armed groups attacked its military using 120mm caliber mortars, machine guns and grenade launchers near the settlements of Novotoshkovskoye, Orekhovo, Krimskoye and Khutor Volny on the demarcation line in Donbass. One Ukrainian soldier and one LPR fighter died. Kyiv also said armed groups tried to break through the demarcation line. Meanwhile, the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics said Ukrainian security forces attacked settlements using heavy weapons (large-caliber artillery and mortars) and caused damage to civilian infrastructure in Kirovsk and Donetsk. Moscow has not commented on the clashes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the attacks a “cynical provocation” and “an attempt to disrupt the peace process in the Donbass.” Zelensky convened a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council to discuss Ukraine’s next steps. It’s clear that neither Ukraine nor Russia is interested in a full-fledged war. But Zelensky is likely considering future negotiations with the Normandy Four leaders over not just Donbass but Crimea as well. He is planning to create a working group focused on returning to Kyiv control over the Ukraine-Russia border.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Crimea's future grows dimmer
« Reply #175 on: February 28, 2020, 03:30:21 PM »
Stratfor Worldview
ASSESSMENTS
Under Russia, Crimea’s Future Grows Dimmer -- and Drier
9 MINS READ
Feb 24, 2020 | 09:00 GMT
This photo shows a dry irrigation canal in Crimea.
An irrigation canal in Crimea runs dry without access to the North Crimean Canal. Russia’s annexation in 2014 has since severed the peninsula’s access to crucial Ukrainian water flows.

(A_Lesik/Shutterstock)
HIGHLIGHTS
Without access to Ukranian water, replenishing Crimea's near-dry resources will force Russia to either front costly infrastructure projects -- or abandon its economic hopes for the region....

Water scarcity is quickly dimming Russia's hopes for economic growth on the Crimean Peninsula. Reservoirs throughout the region are at record lows for this time of year, with only a few months of reserves left to cover the Crimean population's daily consumption. But while an unusually dry winter is partially to blame, Russia's annexation has been at the core of Crimean water woes by prompting Ukraine to close off the North Crimean Canal in 2014.

Without external access to fresh water, permanent relief for the peninsula can only be obtained by either desalinating water from the Black Sea, or by building new pipelines to feed water from Russia's Kuban River directly into Crimea. But unless Moscow coughs up the capital needed to fund such costly infrastructure projects, Crimea risks becoming a mostly barren military bastion as its industries, agricultural lands and population shrivel up alongside its water reserves.

The Big Picture

Crimea lacks the natural water reserves to meet the needs of its population while also serving its agricultural and industrial sectors. For decades, water supplies from Ukraine helped keep Crimea afloat. But ever since Russia’s annexation in 2014 severed this key artery, Crimea has struggled to meet water demands to sustain its economic activity.

Crimea's Water Woes

Crimea’s inherent vulnerability to water shortages has always been a part of its geopolitical reality, with recurrent dry spells limiting local water accumulation every five to seven years. The dry seasons from 2018 until now, however, effectively constitute the first of these cyclical droughts since Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, which has denied access to the Ukranian water reserves that have historically carried the peninsula through the droughts. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union built the North Crimean Canal connecting the Dnieper River in Ukraine to Crimean reservoirs and irrigation installations. For decades, the more than 400-kilometer-long (roughly 250 miles) canal provided up to 85 percent of the peninsula’s water needs. But as part of its standoff with Russia in 2014, Ukraine blocked the canal to complicate Moscow's control over the region. And the canal has remained closed, cutting Crimea off from its key water lifeline.

This, along with the effects of climate change and prolonged droughts, has exacerbated Crimea's water woes in recent years. Shortages have started to affect its population centers, reducing their ability to sustain normal consumption patterns. Without access to North Crimean Canal water, the Crimean capital, Simferopol, depends entirely on rainfall and snowmelt to replenish its three main reservoirs. But having endured dry years in 2018 and 2019, and without snowfall this winter, these reservoirs have continued to decline. Currently, they hold the equivalent of no more than five months' worth of daily consumption.


These low levels recently prompted Simferopol to announce it was restricting water flow to only eight hours per day. While a limited refill of the reservoirs has since temporarily delayed those restrictions, the levels of the reservoirs continue to remain low. And depending on weather conditions, they'll eventually drop even lower as summer approaches. Unless consumption is restricted at some point, or the reservoirs are refilled by other means, serious water shortages in Simferopol are all but guaranteed in the latter half of this year.

Water scarcity, however, is not limited to urban Simferopol. Across the peninsula, a large number of reservoirs capable of holding 188 million cubic meters of water (about 500 million gallons)  are now down to just 75 million cubic meters. This is at a time when melting snow typically brings the reservoirs to near full capacity. The rivers feeding these reservoirs — such as the Alma River that runs into the Partizansky reservoir at Simferopol — are now nearly dried up. A repeat of this phenomenon across the peninsula has caused a significant decline in vegetation as well. The southernmost area of the peninsula, an epicenter of Crimea’s tourism sector and the home to the city of Yalta, has been somewhat spared from these effects. But it's apparent that if the current situation holds, the overall water supply in the country has become unsustainable in the long term.

Underwater Investments

These water shortages have thrown a significant wrench into Russia's broader plans to boost economic development in Crimea, currently one of the poorest areas under its territorial control. Moscow set aside $13.3 billion to invest in road, rail and tourism infrastructure in the peninsula between 2015 and 2022, making it Russia's fastest-growing economic region in 2019. Throughout the region, construction and manufacturing levels have grown by 20 percent. And in some areas, such as the major port city of Sevastopol, those levels have spiked by 71 percent. Crimea's diminishing water supplies, however, are now weighing heavily on the potential for Russia to see a return on its infrastructure investments in the peninsula, given that water is an essential resource in many industrial activities — particularly in construction and chemical production.

Perhaps no sector that relies more on the water than agriculture, posing a significant challenge to Russia's desire to increase the output of Crimean farmers. Moscow has been especially keen on leveraging its forceful acquisition of the region to boost its own agricultural potential. Even though Crimea makes up less than a fifth of a percent of Russia’s entire surface area, it accounts for over 2 percent of its total grain exports. In recent years, Moscow has sought to expand this production via investments to increase the efficiency of the region's agricultural sector. But drought conditions have caused Crimea's grain production levels to fall significantly short of Moscow’s ambitions for growth.

Crimea churned out 1.7 million tons of grain in 2017, near-record production. But a dry spell reduced production to just 1 million tons in 2018. Local officials managed to bring production back in line with annual averages at 1.4 million tons in 2019, although as water use increases and soil quality declines, the low production levels of 2018 risk soon becoming the new normal. And indeed, Crimea's near-empty reservoirs at this point already suggest another meager harvest for 2020. In addition to insufficient precipitation, the overuse of groundwater resources is also threatening the quality of Crimean soil. To mediate the current water scarcity, Russia has so far relied on withdrawing from Crimea's underground aquifers. But overtaxing these aquifers has progressively deteriorated their mineral composition, increasing soil salinity. This unsustainable practice thus adds to the effects of water shortages by damaging the fertility of agricultural land in Crimea.

No Quick Fix in Sight

Without significant relief in water access, Crimea's agricultural production (and overall economic activity) will only become harder to sustain. But Russia will be hard-pressed to easily or cheaply remedy this reality. In addition to overusing the peninsula's underground aquifers, Moscow has developed several, localized pipeline networks to transport water within Crimea. Such networks, however, offer only a reprieve and won't provide a sustainable fix without access to external water sources. Indeed, scientific studies have shown that even with extensive infrastructure developments allowing optimal use of runoff and groundwater, the peninsula's water supply would still not be enough to sustain both Crimea's agricultural lands and its population's consumption needs.

Unless Russia coughs up the capital needed to fund costly infrastructure projects, Crimea's economic prospects risk shriveling up alongside its water reserves.

Reopening the North Crimean Canal would, of course, be the most immediate fix in rectifying the region's water access. But Ukraine has made it clear that it will not consider such an option unless Russia ends its occupation of the peninsula. Moscow has even offered to pay for water supplies, but for Kyiv, any economic interaction with a Russian-occupied Crimea is unacceptable, as it would imply a de-facto recognition of Russian sovereignty over the region. Moscow, however, will be just as unwilling to relinquish control over its newly attained military foothold on the Black Sea.

This leaves Russia with more radical — and costly — options to resolve Crimea's water issues: finding alternative access to external water sources, or desalinating seawater. While Moscow has been experimenting with limited desalination of seawater, making this a fully sustainable solution would require drawing in large amounts of water from the Black Sea, along with overall improvements to efficiencies in Crimea’s water distribution infrastructure including extensive wastewater treatment. Moscow has also considered building a pipeline to transport fresh water from Russia's Kuban River across the Kerch Strait into Crimea’s reservoirs, though this too would entail extensive (and expensive) infrastructure investments.

Hung Out to Dry?

While such major development projects to sustain the peninsula's economic potential are not impossible, it will come at a significant cost for Moscow. The question then becomes just how high Crimea ranks among Russia's already constrained economic priorities — and how that financial opportunity stacks up to Moscow's more immediate military priorities in the region. Even without any efforts to mediate the longer-term water emergency in Crimea, Russia would still be able to comfortably sustain its military presence in the peninsula. The water requirements for such an effort would not be nearly as extensive as broader economic development of the peninsula. With Crimea's tourist sector geographically concentrated in the country's southern region, it could more easily persist with current water access or only limited desalination in place.

Even if Crimea can’t be an agriculturally or industrially significant contributor within the Russian Federation, Moscow will still prioritize the region's sustainable military utility over any calls to relinquish control. For these reasons, Russia is unlikely to consider water scarcity in Crimea as an existential threat to its control over the peninsula. It's thus not guaranteed that Moscow will shell out the capital needed to permanently fix the problem. In such a case, Crimea’s agricultural sector may slowly peter out and its industrial potential never reached, as Moscow retains its hold on the geopolitically advantageous region. With no solution in sight, the region's population, meanwhile, would likely start to relocate in the hopes of finding better economic opportunities and more sustainable living conditions elsewhere in Russia.


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Stratfor: Kyiv's push to end Eastern Ukraine's conflict risks prolonging it
« Reply #177 on: March 04, 2020, 09:02:56 PM »
Stratfor Worldview


Kyiv's Push to End Eastern Ukraine's Conflict Risks Prolonging It

Global Analyst , Stratfor
7 MINS READ
Mar 4, 2020 | 19:21 GMT
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks following an outbreak of violence with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine on Feb. 18, 2020. Ruslan Khomchak, the commander of Ukraine's armed forces, stands behind Zelenskiy.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks following an outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine on Feb. 18, 2020. Because of severe challenges in implementing the Minsk protocols, the Ukrainian government is planning to propose an alternative framework to end the ongoing conflict with Russian-backed separatists.

HIGHLIGHTS

The continued lack of progress toward achieving permanent peace in eastern Ukraine has prompted Kyiv to officially pursue a replacement to the Minsk protocols.

Ukraine, however, lacks the leverage to coerce Russia and the region's separatist republics into complying with its plans to negotiate an entirely new diplomatic roadmap.

Kyiv's strategy could instead leave the opposing parties in Donbas without any mutually agreed-upon framework, which would increase the possibility of military escalation in the region.

With no end in sight to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv's desire to forge a new path to peace risks setting it back to square one. In late February, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was actively working on a proposal to replace the 2014 Minsk Protocol. But while the chances of permanently ending the conflict under the current Minsk agreements remain slim at best, the chances that Ukraine can successfully negotiate an entirely new framework with Russia-backed separatists in Donbas are even slimmer. Instead, Kyiv's strategy is most likely to collapse existing diplomatic efforts — and could potentially even lead to an escalation in fighting along the region's still-active front lines — by highlighting the very constraints that have prevented progress over the past six years.

The Big Picture

Since the initial Minsk Protocol was signed in September 2014, little progress has been made toward settling the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Growing frustration with the deadlock could see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy abandon or unravel his government's initial efforts to find common ground with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Out of Options

Kyiv's push for an alternative to the Minsk agreement indicates its intent to abandon the existing framework due to its failure to achieve permanent peace in eastern Ukraine. Convinced that certain aspects of the Minsk Protocol are impossible to implement as-is, the Ukrainian government has concluded its potential to secure peace in eastern Ukraine has now been exhausted. Kyiv's primary hangups with the current agreement include the organization of elections in Donbas, the special political status of the breakaway territories, and returning Ukraine's border with Russia back to Minsk's control. Ukraine has also argued that the timeline of these events, which currently requires the implementation of the special political status within Ukrainian law and the organization of elections before Ukraine can reassume control over its border, is particularly troubling. Ukraine's current government under President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has even said that it would have never agreed to an agreement under these terms in the first place.

This push, however, risks jeopardizing the Ukrainian government's apparent progress in normalizing ties with Russia over the past year. After Zelenskiy's election in May 2019, he appeared on track toward reaching a permanent resolution with Moscow to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. By initially tackling the easier aspects of implementing the agreement, through prisoner exchanges and tactical withdrawals from the front line in eastern Ukraine, this perception was drawn out even though greater challenges still continued to cast a shadow over the potential for full implementation.

A map explaining the requirements to implement the Minsk agreements.

These efforts culminated in a Normandy Format summit in Paris in December, where the heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France — the guarantors of the Minsk agreement — met to negotiate the further implementation of the deal. But despite the optimism around the summit, it failed to provide any breakthroughs beyond the continuation of prisoner exchanges and tactical withdrawals. And since then, there's been little progress on even these elements, and Ukrainian voices calling for the abandonment of the Minsk agreement altogether have grown louder.

The Specter of War

Ukrainian officials have floated the idea of an entirely new Minsk agreement since the second iteration was signed in 2015, and its implementation was questioned. This, however, is the first time the government has officially committed to the "Plan B" concept, which brings with it a great degree of uncertainty. Despite the failure to fully implement the Minsk agreement, both the initial 2014 agreement and the 2015 final version (as well as the 2016 Steinmeier Formula) have so far effectively kept Kyiv and Moscow working within the diplomatic framework. An attempt at renegotiation risks unraveling the achievements to this point, primarily consisting of the delineation of the contact line in eastern Ukraine and efforts to impose a cease-fire. Without a valid diplomatic framework, the parties to the conflict could once again be seen reaching for military means to strengthen their position in negotiations.

If this were to be the case, neither side of the conflict would be in a position to overpower the other. Ukraine has not yet managed to rebuild its military strength following the loss of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, though it has worked steadily toward a potential NATO membership. Russia, on the other hand, continues to provide support to the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, which would allow these separatist forces to extend the conflict indefinitely. Kyiv likely wants to avoid such a return to military operations, as it would complicate its own efforts at economic stabilization, and could potentially even jeopardize its bid for NATO membership (which rules out enrolling new member states with active armed conflicts within their borders). But Ukraine's push to reshape the diplomatic process may very well lead there.

Russia Refuses a Redo

Russia has downright refused to entertain the idea of straying from the current Minsk agreement. In response to the Ukrainian request for a new Normandy summit, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov clearly stated that Russia saw no need for a future summit before decisions made during the previous meeting (implementing elements of the Minsk agreement) had taken place. Even if this were the case, Russia has argued a draft agreement preceding such a summit would have to rule out any attempts at undermining the Minsk agreement. The next steps in this implementation mostly relate to providing the breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine with a permanent political status under Ukrainian law. Kyiv is hesitant to move forward with this step, as it would effectively lock it into the existing diplomatic roadmap that grants Moscow leverage over Ukrainian politics and presents a roadblock to Kyiv's NATO membership. But for that very reason, Russia prefers sticking with the current Minsk framework over exploring a new one.

While the chances of implementing the Minsk protocols in eastern Ukraine remain slim at best, the chances of Kyiv negotiating an entirely new peace deal with Russia are even slimmer.

Currently, this leaves Russia and Ukraine going head-to-head over the future direction of the peace process with no clear outcome. But the one thing that appears certain is the inability for the implementation of the Minsk agreement to progress. Overall, Ukraine's ability to force Russia (and, by proxy, the two breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine) to comply with its demands is weak, which was recently made clear in the renegotiation of a key gas transit agreement between the two countries. And unlike Kyiv, Moscow would be perfectly capable of accepting a long-term extension of the current reality in eastern Ukraine, or even an escalation of the conflict.

Kyiv will likely also draw on France, Germany and the United States to exert pressure on Russia to comply with its plans for renegotiation, though the appetite for this will be low. Kyiv's allies (and particularly those in Europe) are not looking to take on additional economic risks by re-escalating tensions with Russia. In the longer term, Ukraine — with help of those Western allies — could hope to rebuild its military strength to force Russia and the region's separatists into accepting Kyiv's conditions. But without any shifts to Kyiv's political or physical leverage, the fighting in eastern Ukraine will likely continue at the hands of separatist forces seeking to force a return to the principles outlined within the Minsk agreement.

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Re: Yovanavitch lied under oath
« Reply #179 on: May 17, 2020, 06:24:25 PM »
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/state-dept-emails-yovanovitch-met-with-burisma-despite-testifying

Calculated lying under oath means she is hiding a larger, higher crime, something to do with Biden and Burisma and likely her own complicity?

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Ukraine, Those who gave up Crimea without a fight must be held responsible
« Reply #180 on: October 25, 2020, 02:32:43 PM »
This week in the Kyiv post:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says those who allowed Russia to illegally annex Crimea in early 2014 must be held responsible.

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/rfe-rl-zelensky-says-those-who-gave-up-crimea-without-a-fight-must-be-held-responsible.html

I wonder if he means Biden Obama...

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GPF: Signs of War in Ukraine?
« Reply #181 on: April 06, 2021, 07:12:30 AM »
By: Geopolitical Futures
Signs of war? There are increasing signs of a possible outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine. In an interview with a Russian broadcaster, the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic said a military conflict in Donbass was nearly unavoidable at this point. He said he anticipated a full-scale offensive launched by the Ukrainian army in the near future as Kyiv redeploys military equipment to the east. Military cargo is also being transported by plane from NATO’s Ramstein Air Base to Kyiv, though this may be connected to NATO’s Defender Europe 2021 drills. Meanwhile, the European Union’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, said he was following developments in the region closely, amid concerns about a Russian military buildup across the border.

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GPF: Ukraine: Black Sea deployments
« Reply #182 on: April 09, 2021, 01:45:18 PM »
Black Sea deployments. Amid rising concerns about a military buildup along the Ukrainian-Russian border, regional powers are deploying assets to the Black Sea. On Thursday, Ukraine carried out unexpected naval drills that limited traffic at Ukraine’s largest ports in the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Turkey said it received official notification that two U.S. warships would enter the Black Sea through the Bosporus next week and stay until May 4. Russia is also deploying ships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #183 on: April 10, 2021, 06:32:49 PM »

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #184 on: April 12, 2021, 08:41:59 PM »
Whatcha gonna do President Magoo?  Co-President Kommiela?
Putin and ‘Consequences’
Putin masses troops near Ukraine in an early test for Biden and the G-7 allies.
By The Editorial Board
April 12, 2021 6:35 pm ET

Most Americans haven’t noticed, but the world is becoming a more dangerous place by the day. The hottest current spot is Russia’s border with Ukraine and the Black Sea, where the Kremlin has amassed more forces than any time since its invasion of the Donbass region when Joe Biden was Vice President.

Vladimir Putin’s ambitions aren’t clear, though some think he wants to control the entire Black Sea coast, further squeezing Ukraine. An invasion to grab more Ukrainian territory is also possible. The U.S. Navy has dispatched two ships to the region.

On Monday the U.S. also joined the other G-7 foreign ministers asking Mr. Putin to cease and desist: “These large-scale troop movements, without prior notification, represent threatening and destabilizing activities. We call on Russia to cease its provocations and to immediately de-escalate tensions in line with its international obligations.”

Mr. Putin has never been one for “international obligations,” so don’t expect the G-7 to scare him—even when the foreign ministers also demand, as they did, that he follow “the procedure established under Chapter III of the Vienna Document.” International law: Such a lovely fiction.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken was somewhat more forceful Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “So the question is: Is Russia going to continue to act aggressively and recklessly? If it does, the President has been clear there’ll be costs, there’ll be consequences.”

This sounds like a line in sand, and we’ll see how seriously Mr. Putin takes it. He might assume that a G-7 that can’t even agree to stop the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany might merely huff and puff and do nothing. China and Iran will also be watching to see how Mr. Biden, now in the Oval Office, defines “consequences” if Mr. Putin calls the G-7’s bluff.

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Fortunately the US Navy won't be in the way
« Reply #185 on: April 16, 2021, 04:45:16 PM »
Non-commercial vessels will be blocked from crossing the waterway, according to Kyiv.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Russia's blockade. Russia is planning to block access to the waters around the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, for non-commercial ships, according to Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry. The closure will begin next week and last until October, while the Russian military carries out drills in the area. On Thursday, Ukraine also accused boats from Russia’s Federal Security Service of harassing Ukrainian naval vessels in the Sea of Azov. Meanwhile, the leaders of France and Germany held talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Friday over the recent rise in tensions between Moscow and Kyiv.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #186 on: April 16, 2021, 05:21:57 PM »
Secretary of State Antony Blinken was somewhat more forceful Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “So the question is: Is Russia going to continue to act aggressively and recklessly? If it does, the President has been clear there’ll be costs, there’ll be consequences.”

This the same Blinken that was just publicly bitch slapped by the Chinese?



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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #189 on: July 21, 2021, 12:05:52 AM »
Why Putin Still Covets Ukraine
A 5,000-word essay by the strongman explains his thinking. It pays to listen.

By Walter Russell Mead
July 19, 2021 6:30 pm ET



Writing long, historically focused opinion pieces is an activity more characteristic of think tankers than heads of state, but Russian President Vladimir Putin is anything but conventional. Last week he published a 5,000-plus-word article that reviews the last millennium to conclude that Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians share a common history, faith and destiny.

In Mr. Putin’s view, Western powers have tried for centuries to separate them, but those efforts are doomed to fail. He argues that “the anti-Russia project has been rejected by millions of Ukrainians” in Crimea, the Donbas and elsewhere. The Russian president believes that after centuries of common development and trade, the Ukrainian economy simply cannot flourish without close integration with Russia. Without his country, Ukraine will flounder, despite the occasional aid it receives from its Western paymasters, Mr. Putin writes. Even before the pandemic, Ukraine’s gross domestic product per capita was below $4,000. “This is less than in the Republic of Albania, the Republic of Moldova, or unrecognized Kosovo.” (Moscow doesn’t recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.) “Nowadays,” Mr. Putin writes, “Ukraine is Europe’s poorest country.”

Some observers dismissed the essay as an empty propaganda ploy aimed at distracting Russian public opinion in the face of a surging pandemic. Others saw it as an announcement that Russia will escalate its support for the pro-Moscow forces in the smoldering conflict in eastern Ukraine. Since deception and surprise are fundamental tools of Mr. Putin’s statecraft, anything is possible, but Western powers would be well advised to take the essay seriously. The Russian president’s policies will always and inevitably reflect his calculations about the opportunities and risks he faces at any given moment, but his strategic objectives are unmistakable. Mr. Putin’s quest to rebuild Russian power requires the reassertion of Moscow’s hegemony over Belarus and Ukraine.


In Belarus, where the Kremlin enabled the embattled government to survive months of pro-democracy protests and Western sanctions, Mr. Putin has crushed any hopes President Lukashenko had of escaping Moscow’s embrace. Ukraine is a tougher nut to crack. But the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is moving inexorably toward completion, weakening Ukraine’s influence over European policy making. Infighting and disorganization also continue to prevent the European Union from becoming a significant geopolitical actor. Amid all this, Mr. Putin has served notice that he will patiently but relentlessly pursue his strategic goals at Kyiv’s expense.


The best way to think of Russia these days is as being constrained but not contained. That is, the West has failed abysmally to develop a coherent policy to stop the Kremlin’s attacks on its neighbors or its opposition to the EU and the American-based world order. Sanctions don’t deter Mr. Putin; the West is hopelessly disunited on Russia policy, and the resulting incoherent policies offer Moscow opportunities from the Middle East to Myanmar to advance its foreign-policy agenda and bolster its commercial interests. Under these circumstances Russia will continue to test the West, and Mr. Putin will look to victories abroad to bolster his standing at home.

Yet the Kremlin operates within limits. Even as the recent surge in oil and gas prices pumps more money into Moscow’s coffers, Russia’s failure to develop a dynamic 21st-century economy prevents Mr. Putin from exploiting the tempting opportunities he sees on every side. Worse, the Russian president has been unable to replace the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with a political organization strong enough to give him the sort of control in Russia that the Chinese Communist Party affords Xi Jinping. His frustration must be enormous; as a foreign-policy strategist Mr. Putin, not without justification, likely feels a giant among dwarfs, but Ukraine is still out of his reach. Without it, not even his string of high-profile foreign policy wins since 2008 can make Russia great again.

What keeps Russian troops out of Kyiv is neither the Ukrainian army nor the faltering prestige of the West. It is Mr. Putin’s grudging realization that Russian public opinion wouldn’t countenance the accompanying sacrifices and the staggering Russian economy couldn’t bear the costs. Since an Anschluss-style solution is, for now, beyond him, the Russian president must cajole where he seeks to command. In this spirit, Mr. Putin’s essay suggests that if Ukraine adopts a friendly attitude toward Moscow and de-aligns from the West, Russia will welcome the prodigal home without demanding a formal reunion.

Mr. Putin can reasonably hope that time is on Russia’s side. Ukraine shows few real signs of overcoming the corruption and stagnation that keep it weak and poor. The EU continues to dither, the Western world order continues to erode, and Washington’s intensifying rivalry with Beijing both distracts U.S. attention and weakens its hand when it comes to Russia policy. If these trends persist, many things about our world will change, and the political balance between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine might be one of them.

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Stratfor: US-Ukraine
« Reply #190 on: September 03, 2021, 01:25:51 AM »
The Obstacles to the U.S. and Ukraine’s Strategic Partnership
7 MIN READSep 2, 2021 | 21:42 GMT





U.S. President Joe Biden (right) meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office of the White House on Sept. 1, 2021.
U.S. President Joe Biden (right) meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office of the White House on Sept. 1, 2021.

(BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images)

Despite new support measures and statements that the strategic partnership between the United States and Ukraine has never been stronger, a clash of short- and long-term interests will significantly challenge the future of the bilateral relationship, first becoming apparent in the Donbas conflict. On Sept. 1, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden at the White House, making Zelensky only the second European leader to do so following German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s farewell visit in July. Immediately prior to Zelensky’s meeting with Biden, the United States announced measures and initiatives aimed at supporting Ukraine’s security, Euro-Atlantic aspirations and reform agenda. 

The Biden administration announced the reinvigoration of the Strategic Partnership Commission (SPC) to codify the newly elevated status of U.S.-Ukraine cooperation. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukraine’s foreign minister intend to approve a new charter at the SPC’s meeting in Washington this fall.
In support of Ukraine’s domestic reform efforts, the U.S. government plans to allocate over $463 million in assistance this year, including for programs focused on democracy, human rights, local governance and decentralization, privatization and judicial reform.

The United States also authorized a new $60 million security assistance package for Ukraine, including critical Javelin anti-tank systems and other defensive lethal capabilities.

Ukraine and the United States agreed to finalize a memorandum of understanding on commercial cooperation authorizing the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide initial support of $3 billion for projects in agribusiness, infrastructure, climate and energy.

In addition, the U.S. government agreed to provide an additional $45 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians affected by the Donbas conflict in need of life-saving assistance such as food, shelter and safe drinking water.

The United States wants to ensure Ukraine’s long-term stability and ties to the West through major reforms and fighting corruption, including within Zelensky’s inner circle. The newly established dialogue channels and support measures will enable the United States to more effectively pressure the Ukrainian government via selective engagement. In doing so, the White House will likely make it clear that the additional political or material support is conditioned on the Zelensky administration’s willingness to follow through on reforms, which it has so far largely failed to do.

The sluggish pace of Ukraine’s economic reforms and lack of sufficient judicial and anti-corruption reforms have resulted in ongoing delays in the disbursement of tranches from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the country’s Stand-By Agreement with the international financial institution. The ongoing limbo regarding IMF support is detrimental to Ukraine’s development prospects. 

The United States wants to see the Ukrainian government move forward with legislation to reform the country’s entire judicial sector in line with international best practices. Washington also wants Ukraine to establish an independent anti-corruption infrastructure to implement several initiatives, including those aimed at safeguarding the authority of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and selecting a new Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor.

As part of the U.S. push against corruption, the Biden administration on March 5 sanctioned the Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, Zelensky’s long-time business partner who bankrolled his successful presidential bid in 2019. Observers widely understood the U.S. sanctions as an indication that Kolomoisky should be investigated by Ukrainian law enforcement. Ukrainian officials, however, still have yet to move against Kolomoisky, which the Biden administration sees as a sign that Zelesnky is not serious about fighting corruption or the influence of oligarchs and powerful business clans in his country.

Amid the immediate threats posed by Russian aggression and the economic fallout from COVID-19, Zelensky will continue embracing reforms rhetorically while avoiding or delaying some key reforms he believes could undermine Ukraine’s stability in the short term and/or be politically damaging to him. Ukraine’s near-term security concern remains the frozen Donbas conflict along the country’s eastern border with Russia. A flare-up in Donbas would not only be politically unpopular but could provoke the remote possibility of another Russian military intervention. Mitigating this risk thus remains one of Ukraine’s primary priorities, given that ensuring the country’s long-term security with NATO membership is still many years away. Zelensky also fears that heeding U.S. calls for more reforms and anti-graft initiatives could further disrupt Ukraine’s already pandemic-rattled economy, where corruption is rampant — threatening his prospects for re-election in the spring of 2024.

Corruption is endemic to many parts of the Ukrainian society and economy, including government institutions like the police, judiciary and customs service, as well as the country’s still largely state-owned energy and utility sector.

Zelensky has for several months been forced to temper expectations that the United States would provide Ukraine with rapid or unconditional assistance. Now that substantial U.S. assistance has come in via the initiatives announced on Sept. 1, Zelensky will find himself increasingly boxed in, facing domestic pressure from both pro- and anti-reform factions while international partners reiterate that they will only help Ukraine as much as Ukraine is willing to help itself.

Zelensky is concerned that a fight against corruption could lead to higher prices or endanger the country’s growth due to short-term capital flight. Zelesnky has likely not taken action against Kolomoisky specifically due to these same concerns, as well as the threat that deputies within Zelensky’s own Servant of the People party loyal to Kolomoisky could oppose key reforms — increasing domestic strife that Russia would be keen to amplify and exploit. Deputies loyal to Kolomoisky within Zelensky’s party have already quietly worked with pro-Russian politicians under the leadership of Viktor Medvedchuk to block anti-corruption efforts.

Medvedchuk, whose pro-Russian TV channels Zelensky forced off-air in February, was indicted for treason in May.

The Donbas conflict is one of the first places where the United States and Ukraine’s clash of interests will arise, threatening their newly reaffirmed partnership. Ukraine is looking for the United States to play a larger role in the conflict to ensure its short-term stability against Russian aggression in case of an escalation. Zelensky’s administration has repeatedly spoken in favor of either involving the United States in the Normandy-format talks on the Donbas conflict, or establishing an alternative format with Washington’s participation. Indeed, Zelensky claimed that he personally asked Biden to do so during their recent meeting. But disagreement within the Biden administration means the United States will most likely continue to defer to France and Germany on the Donbas conflict. The conflict is thus likely to remain frozen in its current state, with neither Ukraine nor Russia prepared to follow through with the Minsk agreements.

France and Germany continue to push for the so-called Steinmeier Formula, an interpretation of the Minsk agreements that would grant the Donbas constitutionally-enshrined autonomy and the ability to hold local elections prior to Ukraine receiving control of its border with Russia. Proposed by Germany in 2016, the Steinmeier Formula sparked protests in Ukraine for being a capitulation and a dangerous trap unfavorable to Ukraine’s interests.

Zelensky’s administration believes the United States would stick up for the Ukrainian position against the Steinmeier Formula. Ukraine also hopes that Washington would perhaps even show a willingness to help negotiate a replacement to the Minsk 2 agreement more favorable to Kyiv, which France and Germany have resisted. But the United States has instead declined to confirm its support for this idea. The U.S.-Ukraine joint resolution released Sept. 1 also reaffirmed Washington’s full support for the Normandy Format, marking a subtle swipe at the possibility of greater U.S. involvement.

Reports indicate that there is significant disagreement within the Biden administration on the Donbas conflict. Some White House officials believe the United States should join the French and Germans in insisting on the Steinmeier Formula, arguing it would open the door for a de-escalation of the Donbas conflict and enable the United States and Europe to more effectively refocus on their true strategic priority in the coming years of rallying against China. Other members of the Biden administration, however, believe the United States should support Ukrainian efforts to scrap the Minsk agreement and start over, even if it risks escalating the conflict — arguing that the enactment of the Steinmeier Formula would be catastrophic for Ukraine.

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Re: MY: Sec Def Austin is dumb
« Reply #192 on: October 21, 2021, 04:58:46 PM »

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GPF: Ukraine-Crimea-Russia-Turkey
« Reply #193 on: November 03, 2021, 06:09:02 AM »
   
The Geopolitics of Crimea
Russian control has never been uncontested.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is intensifying. Just a few days ago, the Ukrainian military used Turkish-made drones to strike fighters in Donbass, a disputed region in the eastern part of Ukraine that is supported by Russia. Meanwhile, Turkey and Ukraine announced they would create a facility near Kyiv to maintain, repair and modernize combat drones. Caught literally in the middle is the Crimean Peninsula.

Russia has long claimed Crimea as being in its sphere of influence, using the peninsula to increase its strategic depth, improve its position in the Black Sea and provide a strategic location for sophisticated military bases. In 2014, it dispensed with appearances and straight up annexed the region. Yet, despite Moscow’s influence there, history shows that maintaining permanent control is difficult because doing so brings it directly against Turkish interests.

Expanding to the Sea

To understand Russia’s options in Crimea, we need to examine the geopolitics of the peninsula. Extending off a thin isthmus from mainland Ukraine, Crimea sits in the middle of the Black Sea. It covers approximately 10,000 square miles (26,000 square kilometers) and is home to roughly 2.5 million people, many of whom recently migrated to the area from other parts of Russia. Its subtropical climate produces mild winters compared to the rest of Eastern Europe, its harbors secure against major storms, and its mountains have shielded it from invaders (and are now a great location of air defense installations).


(click to enlarge)

Over the years, Crimea’s natural defenses attracted just about every Eurasian and European power, which would leverage their positions to create favorable maritime security and commercial environments. The Greeks occupied the peninsula as early as the 7th century B.C., creating a hub for cultural and economic exchanges between Eastern Europe, the Eurasian nomadic world and the ancient Greco-Roman world. Centuries later, the eastern part of Crimea and the Kerch Peninsula would be home to a strong Greco-Scythian state known as the Bosporan Kingdom, which controlled one of the most important chokepoints in the region. Along with the southern portion of Crimea, this kingdom became part of the Roman Empire and, later, the Byzantium Empire. But only the Crimean south was controlled by the Roman Empire, and the geographic division of the region would influence power struggles there for centuries to come – between the Romans, the Byzantines, the Goths, the Huns, the Khazarians, the Vikings, and so on. Naturally, this dramatically affected the cultural and religious composition of the peninsula, though Catholics and Orthodox Christians would eventually emerge as the two most significant practitioners. (Islam would come a little later.)

By the 1400s, the Mongolian Empire had taken control of much of Eurasia. One of its constituent parts, the Crimean Khanate, ruled the lands from Moldova to the North Caucasus, Crimea and the entire modern Ukrainian coastline. Its rulers repeatedly laid siege to Moscow, even destroying it in 1571. Russia fought back, expanding to the south and southeast with mixed results. By the 18th century, the Russian Empire was eager as ever to destroy the khanate and gain access to the Sea of Azov and eventually to the Black Sea. The khanate, however, was the main source of the Ottomans’ military presence in Eastern and Central Europe. This laid the groundwork for the ensuing Russia-Turkey rivalry over the coming centuries.

As the Russian Empire grew more powerful, it came to understand more intimately the geostrategic importance of Crimea and its role as the main obstacle in its expansion into the Balkans, Caucasus and what we now call Ukraine. Similarly, the Ottomans came to realize their entire strategy in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Balkans rested on Crimea. The last chance Turkey and its Crimean allies had to stop Russia’s advance came with the Swedish invasion of Russia. Russia defeated Sweden in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, so Crimea and Istanbul, worried that they would be the next targets of Russian expansionism, preemptively declared war on Russia in 1710. Crimean Khan Devlet II Giray constructed an alliance with Sweden, a small fraction of pro-Turkish Cossacks and the anti-Russian faction of Poles. They defeated Russia at the Battle of Pruth in 1711, and as punishment, the Ottoman Empire, already in control of the Kerch Strait, deprived Russia of access to the Sea of Azov.

Turkey and Russia went to war again over this area in 1768. This time, Crimea, the Ottoman Empire and Poland lost and were immediately absorbed into the Russian Empire. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774 gave Russia full access to the Black Sea and rights to Russian merchant fleet to pass through the Turkish Straits. Russia annexed Crimea in 1783. The gateways to the Caucasus and the Balkans were opened.


(click to enlarge)

What Russia Can’t Afford

But Russia’s domination of the Black Sea was never uncontested. By the middle of the 19th century, Russia had penetrated deeply into the Balkans and Caucasus, thanks to its possession of former Ottoman territories and the Crimean Khanate (now southern Ukraine). Moreover, the Russian navy became much stronger than Turkey’s in Sevastopol. European powers found this imbalance in power concerning, so they partnered with the Ottoman Empire to successfully defeat Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-56.

World War I gave the Ottoman Empire another opportunity to retake control of Crimea and Sevastopol from Russia. The peninsula was an important stop for the Germans who were invading Russian territory. Germany needed an ally, a state that could prevent Russia from dominating the Black Sea. The presence in the Black Sea could have allowed Germany to control Russian merchant ships because the main flow of Russian exports went through the straits. On the eve of World War I, more than 60 percent of Russian grain exports went through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. In other words, Germany needed Turkey. Russia declared war on Turkey, and Moscow ended up controlling Crimea after the Entente lost.

The peninsula was similarly important in World War II, situated as it was on the route to the oil-rich Caucasus. It was also a valuable aviation base. Losing Crimea would mean that the Soviet Union would lose the ability to raid the Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. Russia thus bogged down German troops throughout the war and secured the land after its conclusion.

One of the most pivotal decisions on Crimea came in 1954, after Josef Stalin died, when new Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine. But the region still retained importance to the Soviet regime. In the Soviet era, the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol was responsible for the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Migration escalated the ethnic tensions, which were often based on a particular group’s attitude toward Russia’s role in Crimea. The future of Sevastopol became a highly contentious issue, too. (Pro-Russian officers threatened to use weapons if the Black Sea Fleet transferred to Ukraine.) Only in 1997 did Ukraine and Russia reach an agreement regarding Sevastopol. Kyiv made multiple concessions, the last of which occurred in 2010, when Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych extended the Russian presence till 2042. In 2014, after the Ukrainian revolution, Russia annexed Crimea and attained full control over the peninsula and Sevastopol. Unfettered control over Sevastopol allowed Russia to establish uninterrupted communication lanes between Russia and Syria during the active phase of the Syrian campaign. Moreover, the Black Sea became the main base of the 5th Operational Squadron, which is operating in the Mediterranean near Syrian shores.

Crimea’s geostrategic position gives Moscow both defensive and offensive advantages. Defensively, it would be next to impossible for an enemy to carry out an assault on Russia's southern borders without destroying its military assets in Crimea. It has one of the strongest concentrations of military forces in Eurasia along with Kaliningrad. Both regions are key to Russia's defenses in the west, one in the south and the other in the north.

Russian Military Presence in Crimea, 2014 & 2018
(click to enlarge)

Offensively, Crimea is an important source of power projection in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Possession of Crimea and Abkhazia gave Russia the biggest share of the Black Sea coastline of any power in the region. Before this, its coastline was more or less equal to that of Georgia or Romania. More, the fleet in Sevastopol is the main source of Russian defense against NATO warships. In case of military conflict with Ukraine and NATO, Russia could initiate offensive operations using its Crimean assets along the more than 500-kilometer Ukrainian shore on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to cut western supply lines to Odessa or even to Romania. It could also block NATO warships at the entrance to the Black Sea (i.e., the Bosporus Strait) using Russian warships and air defense systems stationed in Crimea. Moscow could also impose a blockade of Ukraine and even penetrate into its southern regions and support military formations in the Moldovan breakaway region of Trans-Dniester.

For Russia, another benefit of controlling Crimea is that, with a population of more than 2 million ethnic Slavs, the peninsula helped improve Russia's demographic situation. Its annexation ensured that the population balance in the country, especially relating to non-Slavic groups in the North Caucasus, stayed in Moscow's favor.

Nearly eight years since Crimea's annexation, there is still a possibility of further escalation of conflict. Turkey supports the Crimean Tatars on the peninsula, with whom it shares ethnic and religious ties. It also provides military and economic support to Kyiv, acting as a counterweight to Russia. For Ankara, the entire northern Black Sea region with Crimea at the center is key to its security. If Russia were to occupy Odessa, it would amount to a return to the 18th century when Turkey lost key parts of its foothold in the region and a path was opened for Russian expansion into the Caucasus and the Balkans.

Russian influence in Crimea has strengthened, but Russia continues to fight for Crimea in other ways. Crimea remains unrecognized by many states of the world, which creates additional pressure on the introduction of Russia's foreign trade. Social and economic issues, such as water supply and the development of the region in general, require immediate solutions, large financial investments and effective projects – none of which Russia can really afford right now. But it can’t afford to ignore Crimea either.

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GPF: Russians planning invasion of Ukraine?
« Reply #194 on: November 17, 2021, 02:50:07 AM »
November 17, 2021
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Is Russia Planning Another Assault in Ukraine?
Many are warning of a potential escalation, but the reality is much different.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

The war in eastern Ukraine began more than seven years ago. The conflict has grown more complicated each year as rumors swirl that both Moscow and Kyiv plan to move on the embattled region of Donbass. Both sides are increasing their military presence at the border, training exercises are becoming more frequent, and new surveillance technologies are being employed. Just this week, This week, there are once again warnings that Russia may be planning a military operation this winter as it reportedly masses military forces on its western border.

On the surface, these moves seem to support speculation of renewed fighting. But escalating the frozen conflict into a hot war would be risky for both sides considering it could significantly change the balance of power in the region and complicate Russia’s relationship with the West even further. Russia would thus use other means to achieve its goals there, especially now that other key players in the region are distracted by more pressing issues.

Destabilizing Ukraine

Ukraine is a critical part of Russia’s western buffer zone, which separates the Russian border from NATO forces. Moscow therefore has an interest in keeping Ukraine weak and destabilized so that it can more easily expand its own influence there while curbing the West’s. It can achieve this in several ways. One is that it can destabilize Ukraine by launching a surprise attack in the east using Russian-backed rebels. Considering that the balance of forces and capabilities here favor Russia, Ukraine would likely lose more land to the separatists, weakening the position of the government in Kyiv.

Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

Another way is that Russia can destabilize Ukraine through economic means. Kyiv depends on revenue it generates as a transit zone for Russian energy exports destined for other parts of Europe. Earlier this year, Ukraine said it expected to generate $7 billion to $15 billion (depending on the volume of deliveries) over the next five years through energy transit fees. But if Russia were to reroute these deliveries through territory outside of Ukraine, it would strain Ukraine’s budget, which is already weighed down by debt and a pandemic-induced economic slowdown. For this reason, Kyiv views the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which will circumvent Ukraine as it transports Russian natural gas to European markets, as a threat. The lack of reliable gas and coal supplies for Ukraine from Russia is another vulnerability. All this could then lead to social discontent, which could result in rising pro-Russian sentiments in the country. Believing that closer ties with Europe has brought few financial benefits and endangered their access to affordable fuel, Ukrainians may end up siding with Moscow, especially as the cold winter season approaches.

A third way Russia could destabilize Ukraine is by undermining its politics. Indeed, Ukrainian politics are already on shaky ground. According to a recent poll, only 33 percent of Ukrainians are satisfied with the job Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is doing. Zelensky is also in the middle of a battle against Ukraine’s oligarchs that could threaten his political position. Earlier this month, he signed a bill into law that is meant to limit their political and economic influence in the country. It restricts oligarchs’ contributions to political parties and prohibits them from participating in the privatization of certain assets. It’s believed that the law will impact the operations of the richest man in Ukraine, businessman Rinat Akhmetov, who owns three coal mining enterprises in Russia’s Rostov region.

Thus, Western fears of a Russian assault are not unfounded. With the president’s approval ratings falling, energy prices soaring and average Ukrainians wondering if they’ll be able to heat their homes this winter, Moscow may view this as a perfect opportunity to strengthen its position in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the European Union is focused on the migrant crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, and the United States is distracted with myriad other issues, both domestic and international.

Talk of a Winter Assault

But Russia understands its capabilities, limits and goals better than anyone, and those goals do not include a chaotic destabilization of Ukraine. Moscow prefers a controlled destabilization that leads to implementation of the Minsk agreements, the 2015 deal intended to resolve the conflict in the east. The Kremlin believes it can get what it wants – for Ukraine’s eastern separatist republics to function as a pro-Russian, independent buffer zone between pro-Western Kyiv and Russia – with only the threat of greater destabilization and even war.

Direct military action is probably not even on the Kremlin’s radar. It would be very risky and would endanger the Minsk agreements. From Moscow’s perspective, it’s Kyiv that is behaving provocatively, using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones in the east and talking up Russian troop deployments in Crimea, a key base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. A Russian attack would invite new sanctions, would damage economic recovery efforts, and would anger many Russians, some of whom have familial ties with Ukraine and most of whom want the Kremlin to focus on the post-COVID-19 recovery. Moreover, Russia and the U.S. have reached something of an understanding: The U.S. won’t deploy weapons in Ukraine or Georgia that could threaten Russia, and Russia will not move deeper into those countries’ territory. Moscow does not want to risk the status quo.

Even its destabilization efforts demand caution; Russia has no interest in seeing another Euromaidan situation next door, so it is proceeding cautiously. Russian energy giant Gazprom is in no hurry to book more pipeline capacity to Europe via Ukraine, and recently Russia banned the supply of thermal coal to Ukraine. As temperatures fall, this could create panic among Ukrainians who don't want to left without heat during the long winter. Russia provides about 60 percent of Ukraine’s imports of coal and about 20 percent of its gas. But in all likelihood this is for show: During all the years of the frozen conflict, Russia remained Ukraine’s main supplier of coal. Supplies were redirected through Belarus and other countries.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to Ukraine’s use of Bayraktar drones in the east by flaunting the economic opportunities Russia can offer the Luhansk and Donetsk republics. Moscow fully opened its markets to the republics’ manufactured goods, which may help businesses in the Donbass region boost sales and create jobs. Putin also signed a decree on the provision of humanitarian support to the two republics. According to the document, Russia will take steps to reduce the barriers that Donbass businesses face selling goods to Russia – for example, giving them the same access as Russian firms to public procurement deals. Moscow also recognized certificates of origin issued by firms in the region and scrapped import quotas. In other words, the pro-Russian eastern territories get economic support and access to a large market, while the rest of the Ukrainian economy struggles to cope with COVID-19 restrictions.

Every spring or fall since the second Minsk agreement, Kyiv goes to the media and its allies at some point with warnings that Russia is preparing for the next war. The same happened last March. Usually it occurs before a round of Normandy format negotiations. But while Kyiv probes how Moscow will react to its deployment of Bayraktar drones, the Kremlin is using a more relaxed and deliberate approach, not trying to throw Kyiv into disarray. Having shown Kyiv that it can make its life harder or easier, Moscow is trying to push Ukrainian authorities to implement the Minsk agreements or to strengthen its own hand in the negotiations to come.

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Gatestone: Ukraine facing Russian invasion
« Reply #195 on: December 06, 2021, 02:47:42 AM »
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18000/russia-ukraine

President Trump had great geopolitical insight in wanting to find a way to better relations with Russia/Putin.
Unfortunately the seditious RussiaRussiaRussia conspiracy of Hillary/FBI/CIA/Pelosi/Schiff/Schumer/and the Pravdas tied his hands and made that impossible.

Our corrupt and compromised President Biden made things even worse by empowering Russia by approving the Nord Stream pipeline that both increases Russian revenues and its leverage over Europe.

So now we face the entirety of Asia (contrast Nixon-Kissinger cutting a deal with China so as to separate it from working with the Soviets against us)  working as a tag team against us in Taiwan and Ukraine.     

In the immortal words of John Wayne "Life is tough.  It is tougher when you are stupid." 

Washington has been revealed as a corrupt and incompetent Rome .

Led as we are by senile Manchurian Joe, Cackling Kommiela Harris, Sec Def Austin, Blinkin' Binken at State, and Thoroughly Modern Millie at the Joint Chief of Staff things look to end very, very badly.
« Last Edit: December 06, 2021, 03:14:18 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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George Friedman: War or Bluff?
« Reply #196 on: December 07, 2021, 05:12:19 AM »
December 7, 2021
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Russia and Ukraine: War or Bluff?
By: George Friedman

Two weeks ago, I wrote an analysis of Russian strategy titled “Russia’s Move.” Here’s a brief recap: When the Soviet Union collapsed, it lost control of the western borderlands that had been the bedrock of its security for hundreds of years. Those borderlands created a strategic depth that forced invaders into an extended and exhausting campaign that Russia could resist. Russia had been attacked in the 18th century by the Swedes, in the 19th century by France, and twice in the 20th century by Germany. There had also been wars with Turkey in the 18th and 19th centuries. In 1991, these borderland regions became independent, and from the Russian point of view, the West generally and the United States specifically sought to control the newly formed states. This constituted nothing less than an existential threat to Russia.

A few days after “Russia’s Move,” I wrote a piece called “Intelligence and Love,” in which I argued that to defeat an enemy you must objectively understand how they see themselves. And for its part, Russia sees itself as vulnerable, particularly from the west, where the most dangerous threats have historically originated. Belarus and Ukraine are the heart of Russian fears. The Ukrainian border is only a few hundred miles from Moscow and is therefore a major threat when in the hands of enemies. Distance will not wear down an enemy attacking from there. From the Russian point of view, the unwillingness of the United States to recognize these deep-seated fears suggests the United States has aggressive and dangerous designs. The only imaginable value Belarus and Ukraine hold for the Americans is to put Russia in a position where it must capitulate to the United States on all critical matters – or risk an outright invasion. Where the United States has no overriding interests, Russia has existential ones.

Russia must therefore act. In Belarus, it already has. Last year, President Alexander Lukashenko won a dubious and heavily criticized election. The Russians intervened to save Lukashenko and are now in effective control of Belarus, thereby securing the North European Plain, the primary invasion route from Europe to Moscow. This leaves Ukraine, a much larger and more important state, in Russia’s crosshairs.

Russia appears to have amassed forces along the Ukrainian border. It is believed to be a substantial contingent. If the purpose is to occupy Ukraine, it is not enough to defeat the Ukrainian army, but it could physically occupy key areas of the country. In invading a country, the need to continually detach forces to occupy and pacify various areas can rapidly overstretch your forces. So if the reports are true, this is a risky play.

Russia’s war plan is obviously secret, but the government of Ukraine has released its view of how a Russian invasion would be executed. It consists of three thrusts intended to isolate and occupy Kyiv: northward from the Crimean Peninsula, southward from Belarus and westward from Volgograd. Together, they would surround Kyiv and pass through a substantial part of Ukraine, giving them maximum opportunity for low-cost pacification.

National Security Threats to Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

There are three problems with the strategy. The first problem is logistical. These multi-division forces would be engaged in high-intensity maneuver and combat. All three would have to be supplied, and as they approached Kyiv they would take on a circular formation. Since it must be assumed that combat increases as movement declines, one phase would require massive amounts of "POL" – petroleum, oil and lubricants. The second phase would demand large amounts of munitions of all varieties. The possibility is high of uncoordinated pauses in advancing, leaving Russian flanks open.

The second issue is that it would create a complicated, multi-front war waged by untested troops. The Russians have not fought a multi-divisional battle like this since World War II. Their military is competent, but none of their commanders have commanded this type of battle. War games and maneuvers are valuable, but an untested force under fire for the first time needs a very sophisticated command structure. The Russians won’t know if they have one until they try it.

The third issue is the Americans, who will probably not attempt to block the advance with their own troops. Time is of the essence, but imposing friction on an enemy is valuable in itself. The U.S. is in a position to transport Polish forces, for example, to create that friction. (Assuming the Poles are willing.) But if it chose to send its own troops, it would force Russia into full-scale combat on a schedule it was not prepared for. The most important threat from the Americans, however, would be air and missile power. Their targets would be logistic nodes. In armored warfare, which seems to be the plan, the destruction of POL and munitions is the same as destroying tanks. The Russians would need to preempt this by taking out U.S. air and missile installations, very likely on a global scale. Doing this would escalate the war to world war status, and in that situation, the risk for Russia would skyrocket.

The United States recognizes the Russian threat, or at least wants Russia to believe it has recognized it. President Joe Biden’s statements on the matter imply a level of concern that suggests there would be a U.S. intervention if Russia struck. At the very least, the Russians have to factor this possibility into their war planning. The military and political implications of American intervention reduce the urgency of claiming Ukraine as a buffer zone.

Of course, the threat of invasion isn’t exclusive to this strategy. If Russia intends to occupy Ukraine, some variation will be necessary. But an invasion might simply entail taking a piece of Ukraine in the east or the north. The U.S., eager to avoid a war in the middle of Eurasia when the threat is trivial, will likely respond only with sanctions. Russia can stomach that as it threatens further penetration without taking it. This changes the political dynamic if Europe, incapable of mounting a defense, chooses to accommodate Russia.

To be sure, the entire threat might simply be an attempt to test Biden. During the Cold War, testing a new president was a Soviet routine. Doing so now could be seen as a low-risk, high-reward proposition. In fact, there are many counterarguments to my view that a full invasion of Ukraine is too complex and risky to undertake. The Russians cannot afford a defeat in their bid to secure Ukraine in the present geopolitical reality. They have time to move – that is, unless Putin, who hungers to restore the former Soviet border, sees the hand of time moving and is prepared to take a risk for the sake of glory. Perhaps so, but KGB men are trained to be careful. My bet is this is a bluff. But I wouldn’t bet the house on it.

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« Last Edit: December 07, 2021, 09:48:45 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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Ukraine prepares
« Reply #198 on: December 07, 2021, 07:36:01 PM »

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #199 on: December 08, 2021, 02:09:56 PM »
Actually this sounds quite reasonable to me:

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/putin-biden-finlandize-ukraine-or-we-will?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=331

That said, worth remembering is that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Ukraine became the 4th largest nuke power in the world (working from memory here). In return for giving Russia its nukes
back Ukraine received formal written promise from the Russians to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity.

(cf Chinese promise to respect Hong Kong integrity for 50 years after the Brits returned it, but I digress)

The US was not a signatory to the deal.  Perhaps a written promise to us that there will be no more territorial encroachments would be a good part of coming to understanding here?