Author Topic: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics  (Read 432979 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Rule Based International Order is a Myth
« Reply #1200 on: March 29, 2022, 09:44:30 AM »
Ukraine War Shows the ‘Rules-Based International Order’ Is a Myth
There are no global threats or standards, only regional equilibria requiring constant maintenance.


By Jakub Grygiel
March 28, 2022 1:42 pm ET




The Biden administration has been vocal in defending what it calls the “rules-based international order,” but there is no such thing. An Earth-spanning security space governed by global rules or a few key powers doesn’t exist, as the war in Ukraine should remind us. There is also no “global threat” facing all states equally but, rather, regional revisionist powers threatening nearby states. Temporary regional equilibria with their own power dynamics are driven by local historical competitions. They are unstable and prone to wars. They require persistent attention and management.




Over the past three decades these regional orders—in Europe, the Middle East and Asia—have been relatively stable and the local competitions subdued. The resulting impression was of a world order. Liberals saw this global stability as the product of international rules, a growing number of democracies, and greater international trade—a “rules-based order” enhanced by democracies and commercial peace. Realists saw a world order underwritten by a rough equilibrium between the great powers—the U.S., Russia and China—with nuclear weapons as an effective pacifying equalizer.



Both visions of world order put too much emphasis on the global nature of this stability. If we look at the world through the lens of regional orders, the picture is more worrisome.



Russia’s wars in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014, as well as Iran’s actions in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, and China’s military expansion in Asia, were signs of growing local volatility. But until now these had been tentative pushes, conducted by hesitant revisionist powers and checked by American power. Russia’s war in Ukraine is the first full-fledged military offensive that aims to change the local balance of power drastically. Russia seeks to be the decisive power in Europe, and for that it needs to dominate Ukraine.



Regional orders are fragile for two reasons. First, military force is more likely to be used in local contests than in disputes between distant rivals. The stakes are high for the local parties, the perceived risks limited. A revisionist power is likely to pursue its goals, such as conquest of territory or control over a neighboring state’s political life, through war more than through negotiations. And the revisionist power’s targets won’t accept a hostile takeover without a fight. In the end, both sides are interested less in preventing war than in making war usable for their own objectives. War is an enduring regional reality.



The U.S. tends to think of stability as a broad goal of its grand strategy. As President Biden has said, the goal is to “strive to prevent” World War III. But regional revisionists in Eurasia aren’t afraid of putting pressure on their own frontiers to extend their influence. The states they threaten will also choose war over submission, regional disorder over lost independence. The U.S. will have to figure out how to navigate, even embrace, instability and war in regions that are important to its national interests.



The second reason regional orders are unstable is that local contests are geographically limited but last a long time. Local conflicts are based on, or justified by, historical claims. Perceived or real offenses committed in the past generate desires for revenge; aspirations to grandeur spur territorial demands; and national self-confidence motivates a stubborn hostility to aggressive neighbors. When the roots of a political action lie in national claims to greatness, diplomatic compromise becomes difficult. Lengthy conflict begins to look preferable to a negotiated settlement. It is more legitimate to dig trenches than to sit at negotiating tables.



Local antagonists are willing to incur high costs both when attacking (like Russia) and when defending (like Ukraine). The expectation is that the high risk will be rewarded with a high payoff: The aggressor anticipates greater influence or a larger territory, while the defender expects independence and greater security.



For a distant power such as the U.S., the enduring nature of regional conflicts in Eurasia is a political challenge. Managing such conflicts requires consistent involvement and a permanent presence. But the U.S. approach is to participate in regional geopolitical dynamics only when necessary to restore an equipoise, and then to move to a different region. Thus we hear talk of “uniting” Europe and “pivoting” to Asia.

It is historically rare for a local contest to come to a permanent end—usually only when a devastating war redraws the map in blood. The Franco-German conflict of the 19th and early 20th centuries turned into friendship only after two gruesome world wars. The end result was good for Europe, but getting there was tragic and something to be avoided.



The current war between Russia and Ukraine will end at some point, but the contest between the two nations won’t. The best that can be hoped for is a delicate local equilibrium demanding constant maintenance through Western economic and military support of Ukraine.



If Ukraine survives Russian aggression as an independent state, the Biden administration’s liberal temptation will be to call it a victory for world order based on rules and democracies. That would be a mistake. The victory will be Ukraine’s, resulting in a moment of fragile regional stability and not in a renewed world order.



Mr. Grygiel is a professor at the Catholic University of America, a senior fellow at the Marathon Initiative, and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution

Crafty_Dog

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George Friedman: A Visit to Dubai
« Reply #1201 on: April 02, 2022, 02:58:18 AM »
April 1, 2022
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A Visit to Dubai
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

On the last day of our trip to Dubai, my wife and I are struggling to understand the precise meaning of “one day.” In order to be allowed to return to the United States, we must be tested for COVID-19 within one day of departure. We leave at 3 a.m. on Thursday. Does one day mean today, or do we include that sliver of time on Thursday? The State Department is not using this hallowed 24-hour period to make the rules more understandable. Does the day start when a stick is shoved up your nose, or when the results are determined? And supposing you test positive and the U.S. doesn’t let you come home for 10 days, will the United Arab Emirates let you stay here, and if so, can you stay in a hotel? If not, where can you go? It is the government that has had my wife searching for the truth, while I contemplate a coming event.

I have been asked to do an interview for a program on NTV in Moscow in a couple of hours. It appears the Russians have read my book, "The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century," and want to know how I knew what would happen between Russia and Ukraine. There is a long answer and a short answer, so I won’t bore my readers with yet another rendition of buffer zones. I’ll say only that I am reminded of what Gen. George Patton reportedly yelled in North Africa as he fought the Nazis: “Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book.” It’s all I can muster before a Russian TV interview and the nine-hour flight home (plus daylight saving time) fries my brain.

If you’ve gotten the sense that I’m looking forward to being on Russian TV more than I should, you’re right. It’s a strange feeling that comes from participating in one of those conferences Dubai likes to host, bringing together the best minds to consider how to build a better world. I always feel inferior at these conferences since, at most, I have only an occasionally coherent mind and have no idea how to build a better world. I’d like to be helpful, but saying that the world is quite amusing as it is, and enjoying it as much as possible, lacks the gravitas of concern.

What does strike me is that Dubai is holding the kind of conferences that the World Economic Forum and Klaus Schwab created at Davos. But Dubai is far better because it has the added gravity of reality. Dubai is a city, one of seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates. The largest and by far the wealthiest is Abu Dubai, a traditional society that made its money off oil. Dubai ran out of oil years ago and built a city on the Persian Gulf that is now a trading, finance and budding technology center. The rest of the emirates are small and not major players in the game.

When I went into the auditorium where I was to speak, I brushed by a group of flags. What stood out to me was the Israeli flag. Recently, a summit was held between the UAE, Egypt, Morocco and Israel, the prime subject of which was the country I can imagine seeing out of my hotel room window: Iran. Hatred may be fixed, but interest overwhelms it, and these countries are meeting in anticipation of a potential new Iran nuclear deal. The Obama administration reached an understanding with Iran that sanctions would be dropped if Iran did not build nuclear weapons. The Iranians agreed, but critics felt that the inspection program was weak and that it failed to include the country's missile program, which Tehran is using to threaten Israel and the UAE (via its allies in Yemen). Under the Trump administration, the United States canceled the deal to the delight of the countries at this meeting. In due course, the Abraham Accords were reached, built on a shared fear of Iran. The Biden administration seems to want to revive the original deal. Hence the summit.

In a confrontation with Iran, Israel and the UAE have the ability to rally a number of Arab countries and strike at Iran. Arabs and Israelis see no reason to let Iran out of the box without massive and verifiable guarantees. Following the Arab-Israeli summit, the United States challenged them to explain how they would proceed on the Iran question if the proposed agreement is not an option. I gather from the meeting that their solution is to allow Iran to remain isolated. The problem is that Iran can be even more dangerous in isolation. Israel and the UAE know this and may want Iran to strike a first blow.

The degree to which Israel and the UAE are aligned struck me during my visit. What is known intellectually isn’t always visible until you walk into an auditorium in the UAE to make a speech and see a furled Israeli flag nestled in a corner. I grew up at a time when the Middle East was Israel and the Arab world arrayed against it, or its countries under extreme pressure to toe that line. The degree to which the Middle East has been reshaped is striking, along with the degree to which the U.S. is seen as a supporter of Israel and therefore of much of the Middle East.

The UAE was key to integrating Israel into the Arab world formally. Israel had long had secret understandings in the region, but the UAE was prepared to do it publicly, in part because it saw Israel as a model: a small country with massive technical capability, able to defend itself or project power as needed – a capability partially provided by the U.S. and even more by Israel’s interest in a strong UAE. And that is what you see in Dubai. There are Israelis starting businesses and trading, and Arabs moving beyond traditional issues with Israel, and working with them against another non-Arab country, Iran.

There are those who want the world to boycott Israel. The interesting thing is that there are few Arab countries that would support that, except as a gesture covering their own trade. The fight against Israel has raged in the Arab world and moved to universities that lack precision-guided munitions. But the UAE pioneered the open acceptance and emulation of Israel. And when I mentioned the emulation, there were no arguments.

And then the Islamic State attacked a bus stop in northern Israel. One of the people at the conference told me that IS had hooked up with Iran to carry out these strikes. My friend and colleague Hilal Khashan tells me this is impossible. I say that nothing is impossible in the Middle East. He thought about it a while and decided that "unlikely" might be a better term than "impossible." So that might be a downpayment on what Iran might do if isolated and desperate.

So half of the meeting sounded like Davos and the other half like the Middle East I grew up with – terrorists killing Jews, Jews preparing to retaliate, wild theories of what is going on, and the Arab world quietly doing business while threatening to do war. Now they do business openly while fearing Iran. The strange gyrations of the Middle East remain, none perhaps stranger than having the spirit of Davos and speculation on who paid the terrorist organization to strike Israel discussed side by side. The UAE cannot prosper in a region filled with terrorists attacking Israel. I sense that no one has abanded the Palestinians more than their fellow Arabs. That seems to be the one constant in the Middle East. That and the hospitality I was offered, even in spite of my rhetorical style.

Crafty_Dog

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The Geopolitics of India
« Reply #1202 on: April 02, 2022, 10:41:23 AM »
Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China? (theepochtimes.com)


Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China?


April 1, 2022 Updated: April 1, 2022

According to a recent article in Asia Times, India has grown “increasingly skeptical about American policies and statesmanship.” The United States once presented a compelling picture to the world.

Today, however, the picture that the United States now presents is the opposite of convincing, according to the article. The United States has become a “battleground of tribalism and culture wars.” Once an attractive prospect, this “aging superpower” is in decline, with “dwindling influence globally.”

Because of this, India is looking elsewhere for support and potential business. By elsewhere, I mean China.

As the Asia Times piece noted, India now realizes “that it has no real partnership with the US or the European Union” and that its relationships with the two were, and still are, “transactional.”

For both the United States and the European Union, maintaining good ties with India cannot be emphasized enough. After all, India is the fastest-growing major economy in the world. Some authors argue (rather convincingly) that India will become the next great superpower. This fact is not lost on China.

Chinese state-run media Global Times recently published an intriguing piece.

“China and India,” it reads, “share common interests on many fronts.” It then went on to condemn those in “the West” who criticized India “for reportedly considering buying Russian oil at a discounted price.”

Back off, it continued, this “is India’s legitimate right.” The piece finished by calling on Beijing and New Delhi to “mend their fraught relations.”
Will New Delhi accept the invitation?

Don’t be surprised if it does.

But why would India embrace China?

Two years ago, Chinese and Indian troops began engaging in hostile face-offs at various locations along the Sino-Indian border. In June 2020, both sides engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Lives were lost. Three months later, for the first time in 45 years, both sides exchanged gunfire. Since then, tensions have been extremely high.

But, as we all know only too well, politics is a fickle business. Yesterday’s enemy has the potential to become tomorrow’s friend.

If India does embrace China, one must remember that the embrace would be borne more out of desperation than desire. China and the United States are the two biggest players on the world stage. If one begins to lose its pulling power and the other increases its own, then it’s only natural that India reconsiders where its loyalties lie.

Moreover, India now finds itself in a position of genuine power, with both Beijing and Washington knocking on its door. In the past, India was only too willing to open the door to the United States. However, times appear to be changing.

According to M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, Narendra Modi, India’s 14th and current prime minister, “is looking in all directions—Russia and China included—for partnerships.”

India, one must remember, has very close ties with Russia.

Vir Sanghvi, a well-respected Indian author, recently wrote the following: “When it comes to this [Ukraine] conflict, our hands are tied.”

Why?

Because “Russia is our major supplier of weapons.” Moreover, he added, it “isn’t just the arms we have ordered from the Russians. It is also spares, ammunition, and maintenance for our existing equipment. To stand against Russia would be to debilitate our armed forces. We have no real choice but to avoid criticising the Russians.”

Epoch Times PhotoIndia’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends a meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi, India, on Dec. 6, 2021. (Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via Reuters)

Xinhua, another mouthpiece of the Chinese regime, recently argued that “China-India diplomatic relations will significantly ease and enter a recovery period.” During this period, “China and India will realize the exchange of visits of diplomatic officials in a relatively short time.”

Staring into their crystal ball, the authors believe “Chinese officials will go to India first.” Shortly after, India’s foreign minister “will come to China.”

As unpalatable as the above lines may sound, India and China are neighbors. Meanwhile, the United States is situated on the other side of the world. Within the realm of social psychology, the proximity principle suggests that individuals form interpersonal relations with those close by (think flatmates, work colleagues, etc.).

In geopolitics, perhaps the proximity principle also plays a role.

The US Has Lost Its Appeal

In 2018, the scholar Gordon Adams wrote that since the end of World War II, American diplomacy “has been essential to multinational agreements on trade, climate, regional security, and arms control.” The United States could “claim to be at the center of a “rules-based international order.” Why? Because it was.

“Those days,” wrote Adams, “are gone.”

Indeed. In the four years since this piece was written, China has grown significantly stronger. On the other hand, the United States appears to have grown weaker, at least in India’s eyes.

According to the aforementioned Sanghvi, a man with his finger on India’s geopolitical pulse, up until very recently, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s biggest right-wing party, spouted largely pro-U.S. philosophies.

Now, though, Modi’s party views the United States negatively. Sanghvi noted, “Joe Biden is seen as antagonistic—if not to India, then to the sort of India that Modi’s supporters want to create.”

After the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States’ image has taken a significant beating. Today, whether you like to admit it or not, everything revolves around branding.

Online dating is an obvious example. How you present yourself to a prospective partner (or partners) matters. It matters a lot.

Similarly, LinkedIn, basically a glorified social media platform, is a place to sell your brand: your expertise, experience, etc.

The world of international politics is no different. For those who say that the United States is not a brand, you’re right. However, you’re also wrong. Definitionally speaking, the United States is nothing like Coca-Cola or IKEA, two of the most recognizable brands on the planet.

On the other hand, the United States is just like Coca-Cola and IKEA. After all, what is soft power but the ability to convince another nation (or citizens of another nation) to “buy into” your brand? It involves convincing people to “buy into” your policies and ideologies to subscribe to your vision.

The United States, once the leader in soft power, appears to have lost its edge. For this, it may very well pay a costly price. Losing India to China, once unthinkable, is a distinct possibility.

As the author Shekhar Gupta wrote just a few days ago, there’s no room for morality when it comes to India’s foreign policy stance. Instead, the only thing that matters is acting in the best interest of the Indian people. For Modi and his colleagues, this could mean embracing China and rejecting the United States.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

DougMacG

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Re: The Geopolitics of India (and US)
« Reply #1203 on: April 02, 2022, 12:13:12 PM »
"Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China?"

Weren't they (India) just at war with China a minute ago?  And now they are a more appealing ally than us?

And how are we (US) not a more strategic ally to India than Russia is, if India has to take sides.

Russia has gas and oil and we are shutting ours down.

Who, who served in the United States Senate through the 1970s, does not know oil and gas are strategic?  (Biden-Moron)

"The United States has become a “battleground of tribalism and culture wars.” Once an attractive prospect, this “aging superpower” is in decline, with “dwindling influence globally.”
Because of this, India is looking elsewhere for support and potential business. By elsewhere, I mean China.
"

Failed domestic policies equal failed foreign policies.  To quote G M:  We are not the shining city on the hill anymore. (To quote Doug), Decline is a choice. 

Stop choosing socialism, racialism, victimhood, woke, divided, decline and failure over freedom, responsibility, growth, strength and prosperity.

The George Floyd, Portland, Seattle, Michael Brown, trans issues, deficits, inflation, media hoaxes, no gas, no food things are hurting our brand name and relationships around the world, not just at home.

Crafty_Dog

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D1: What lessons is China taking from the Uke War?
« Reply #1204 on: April 03, 2022, 05:35:04 AM »
What Lessons is China Taking from the Ukraine War?
From battlefield concepts to geopolitics, Beijing is sure to be watching with avid interest—and some chagrin.
By THOMAS CORBETT, MA XIU and PETER W. SINGER
APRIL 3, 2022 08:00 AM ET
COMMENTARY
THE CHINA INTELLIGENCE
CHINA
EUROPE
STRATEGY
Operation Desert Storm was a turning point in modern Chinese military history. As military planners with the People’s Liberation Army watched U.S. and allied forces make short work of the world’s fourth-largest military (on paper), equipped with many of the same systems as the PLA, it became obvious that China’s quantitatively superior but qualitatively lacking massed infantry would stand no chance against the combination of modern weaponry, C4ISR, and joint operations seen in Iraq. The result was new military concepts and over two decades of often-difficult reforms, which produced the modern, far more capable, “informationized” PLA of today.

Today, the PLA is no doubt closely observing its Russian contemporaries in Ukraine as they under-perform in multiple areas, from failing to take key targets or claim air supremacy to running low on fuel and supplies and possibly experiencing morale collapse, and surely taking away lessons that will shape its own future. Of note, Russia’s experience appears to have confirmed many of China’s recent assumptions behind its investments, such as the utility of unmanned aerial systems in high-intensity conflict, as well as the necessity for the PLA’s 2015 reforms, which aim to fix many of the issues driving Russian failure that the PLA recognizes in itself.

Of the many issues that have contributed to Russia’s physical battlefield woes in Ukraine, one of the most important has been the lack of effective joint or combined arms operations, widely considered essential to any effective modern fighting force. Russia’s poor level of coordination between its various services and branches can only be generously described as incompetent. For example, it has repeatedly failed to provide effective air support to its ground forces or deconflict its air and air-defense forces to avoid friendly fire.

The PLA has long had its own serious issues with joint operations. Traditionally dominated by the Army, the PLA had little success developing a truly joint force until a series of sweeping reforms in 2015 that replaced the former Army-dominated system with a series of joint theater commands. The PLA is thus aware of its own shortcomings and taking steps to fix it, but likely remains far off from being able to conduct truly effective, seamless joint operations. Efforts to conduct joint exercises are becoming more common, but most senior PLA leaders are still relatively inexperienced with joint operations, and even new officers typically do not receive joint education below the corps level. Further, it remains to be seen how far these reforms will go or to what extent they will “stick;” indeed, one reason the PLA did not attempt these reforms until 2015 was because of strong institutional pushback from the Army, whose leaders wished to retain their dominant status.


To China, the Ukraine invasion will reinforce the importance of joint and combined arms operations, while also making clear that such operations are highly difficult to conduct in practice. Russia’s stumbles may give the PLA pause as to whether it is truly ready for all the joint elements that a successful Taiwan seizure would require, including close coordination between sea, air, and land forces.

Another issue which has contributed to Russia’s military woes is the low quality of its conscript force. Indeed, Ukraine has even turned images of Russian POW conscripts being allowed to call their mothers into a weapon in its information warfare. While some militaries, such as Israel, have managed to maintain a high-quality conscript force, a full-time professional force is generally considered to hold numerous substantial advantages, which is why most of the Western world now uses a voluntary recruitment model. Despite the copious hyper-masculine recruiting videos which so excited certain Western politicians, Russia has struggled to attract enough voluntary recruits to move away from its current system of 12-month conscription.

Despite some recent success in recruiting a higher-quality, more-educated voluntary force, the PLA has likewise failed to move away from conscription. It presently requires about 660,000 two-year conscripts, many lacking even partial high-school education, to fill out its ranks. While this does not bode well for the PLA’s ability to conduct complex operations, one area where the PLA may have an advantage over its Russian counterparts is in the area of motivation. The Russian conscripts are not just poorly trained, but also suffer from low morale. Many among the invasion force did not know why they were going to Ukraine, or even that they were going to Ukraine at all. By contrast, the PLA places heavy emphasis on personnel political education, and Chinese conscripts have been raised from an early age to believe in the necessity of “liberating” Taiwan. Still, the PLA is surely watching with concern as a conscript force with at least some similarities to its own fares so poorly, and will likely redouble their campaign to attract more, and preferably higher-quality, voluntary recruits.

Russia also allowed its adversary to dominate the information environment. Due to a combination of overly optimistic assumptions about the political weakness of its foe and logistical reliance on its target’s own communications networks, Russia never launched the long-feared effort to take down Ukrainian communications networks. Putin’s strategists wrongly believed that its own messaging and rapid military advances would go viral across these networks and aid in collapsing the Ukrainian state. As well, many of Russia’s units turned out to need access to Ukrainian civilian networks for their own operations.

Instead, the Zelenskyy regime turned the tables on Russia, winning the information war inside both Ukraine and the West, and in so doing, transforming the greater war. Deft Ukrainian government messaging and a mobilized civilian populace created a new sense of domestic unity, as well as mobilizing essential military aid and historic economic sanctions from a widened network of global allies. In turn, Russian use of civilian networks made it susceptible to intercepts and geolocated targeting of its units. The PLA has streamlined coordination between its cyber, electronic warfare, space, and information warfare efforts through the recent creation of the Strategic Support Force, indicating it recognizes the importance of information dominance. It can be expected to redouble its efforts at cyber/information warfare, as well as encrypted communications, to ensure its own operations don’t suffer the same flaws.

Another ongoing issue has been Russia’s serious problems with poor logistics. The sight of broken-down or abandoned vehicles has become common as Russian forces run out of fuel and other vital supplies. To its credit, the PLA has also been rapidly reforming and modernizing its logistical system as part of the same broad set of 2015 reforms. As part of these reforms, the PLA has emphasized its logistics organizations and created the Joint Logistics Support Force. This force’s training has focused on cooperation with other branches of the PLA, and it has cut its teeth training to establish supply lines during natural disasters. In 2018, the JLSF launched its first major exercise, dubbed “Joint Logistics Support Mission 2018,” featuring medical drones, helicopter-dropped refueling depots, and operations in harsh and remote terrain.

However, while the outward manifestation of many of the issues faced by the Russian military appear to be logistical in nature, the true heart of the issue may be corruption. There are reports that before the invasion Russian military officers sold off their fuel and food supplies, and that these corrupt practices may be responsible for the stalling of a Russian tank column outside Kyiv. In this regard, the PLA has much to fear. Corruption has plagued the PLA for decades, with some PLA officers bluntly stating in 2015 that it could undermine China’s ability to wage war. Reportedly, more than 13,000 PLA officers have been punished in some capacity for corruption since Xi Jinping took power, including more than a hundred generals. This was a particular problem in the logistics sector, where there are more opportunities for corruption and links to the civilian economy.

Yet, despite the reorganization of the PLA and widespread prosecution of corruption cases, it still appears to be a major issue. Anti-corruption efforts are ongoing, with Chinese Gen. Zhang Youxia recently calling for innovative measures to keep up the fight. But the fact that Fu Zhenghua, the man brought in to take down the corrupt former security chief Zhou Yongkang, is himself now under investigation for corruption does not bode well for the long-term effectiveness of China’s efforts. The troubled invasion of Ukraine provides a stark real-world example to Xi, the CCP, and PLA about the impact corruption can have on military effectiveness, and will no doubt cause them to redouble their anti-corruption efforts with a newfound urgency. However given its similar authoritarian system and emphasis on career advancement through patronage, systemic corruption may be baked into the system.

Finally, there is the strategic issue of Beijing’s reaction to the global sanctions that have hit the Russian ruble and economy. The swift and severe economic retaliation of the U.S., EU, and others took Moscow by surprise. Even more unexpected was the rapid withdrawal of almost 500 global corporations, pushed on by an effective effort at naming and shaming them into acting to protect their own brands. A longer-term effort targeting essential elements of Russia’s defense industry will hamstring it for years.

While China will benefit from Russia’s increasing reliance on its goods and services, Beijing can be expected to retool its geo-economic strategy to reduce its vulnerability to a similar nightmare scenario. For example, it will likely redouble its efforts to promote its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System—an alternative to the SWIFT international banking system—among its strategic partners and foreign aid recipients in the developing world. 

Likewise, China’s recent “Dual Circulation” economic strategy appears to be aimed at countering a decoupling from China’s trade partners. Further, Beijing has surely observed how easy it was for corporations to withdraw from Moscow. If China is to be exposed to the risk of global sanctions and corporate withdrawal, so too are countries and corporations exposed to dependence on the world’s second-largest economy, and thus the government will likely take efforts to make any sanctions or corporate turn against China as painful a prospect as possible. Either way, policymakers in Washington need to understand that the sanctions being used today against Russia are unlikely be as effective the next time around, as China is not just a different economy, but also will learn from the current conflict and adjust accordingly.

For all these valuable lessons, there is little doubt that China has been watching the ongoing conflict with no small amount of chagrin. Chinese leaders are reportedly surprised and unsettled by the poor military performance of its Russian partners, Ukraine’s resistance, and the level of solidarity from the international community. The image of a much smaller state, against all odds, successfully resisting a larger neighbor surely sits uneasily in the psyches of CCP apparatchiks and PLA officials. It also counters the narrative of overwhelming force and grim inevitability Beijing has sought to instill in the psyches of the Taiwanese people. It is notable that early attempts by Chinese state media to capitalize on the Ukraine invasion in precisely this fashion, illustrating how the United States will surely abandon Taiwan when the chips are down, quietly ceased after the initial days of the war, when it became apparent that the U.S. was not, in fact, abandoning Ukraine. Beyond purely psychological factors, Ukraine also offers a blueprint for successful resistance via asymmetric warfare very similar to Taiwan’s proposed Overall Defense Concept, perhaps giving a jolt to a plan that most analysts agree offers Taiwan its best chance of success against the PLA but has stalled out in the face of bureaucratic resistance.

While China and the PLA will surely watch Ukraine closely and try to take away the correct lessons, there is one uncomfortable parallel which China may be unable to avoid by the very nature of its authoritarian system. The runup to the Ukraine invasion featured multiple strategic miscalculations by Putin, driven at least in part by him surrounding himself with the yes-men who inevitably cling to authoritarian leaders, eager to please and afraid to speak truth to power. This was obvious in the visibly uncomfortable reaction of Russia’s SVR (foreign intelligence) chief as he was publicly pressured to agree with Putin in the days leading up to the war, as well as in the sackings and arrests of multiple military and intelligence officials after the war turned poorly. Authoritarian leaders have systemic problems in gaining reliable intelligence, oftentimes magnified by their overconfidence in their own singular understanding of a situation. As China continues its slide away from a system of intra-Party consensus toward a one-man cult of personality in which dissenting views are increasingly unwelcome, Xi is bound to encounter the same problem. It is unclear whether Xi will learn this lesson from Putin, or make his own similar miscalculations in the future towards China’s own neighbors.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor 2022 Q2
« Reply #1205 on: April 05, 2022, 02:43:29 AM »
QUARTERLY FORECASTS
2022 Second-Quarter Forecast
40 MIN READMar 28, 2022 | 00:00 GMT






Overview
During the second quarter, the world will continue to feel the impact of the war in Ukraine, high inflation, energy crunches, supply chain bottlenecks and a weakening — but still present — COVID-19 pandemic. Even if negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv make progress, the West will keep most of its sanctions against Russia in place, which will result in prolonged political and economic uncertainty. In the meantime, high energy prices will slow economic growth worldwide, negatively impacting households' cost of living and businesses' operating costs. Food and energy inflation will be particularly problematic because it will keep the risk of social unrest high, especially in emerging and developing countries where governments have less fiscal room to mitigate its impact. Against this backdrop, large central banks will struggle to find a balance between fighting inflation and encouraging growth as they seek the right speed to phase out their expansionary monetary policies.

In the meantime, much of the world will continue to transition to a "living-with-COVID" strategy that prioritizes economic growth over social distancing measures. Most countries will continue to soften, and in many cases completely lift, their lockdown measures as they seek to boost economic activity. But the process will be particularly slow in China, where authorities are likely to remain skeptical about a quick reopening. In addition, the threat of new, more contagious, variants of the virus is not gone, meaning some regions or countries may reintroduce social distancing measures for short periods.

FORECAST
Global Trends
5 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:23 GMT

A woman signs a Ukranian flag at the Ukraine Pavillion Expo 2020 in Dubai
As the Ukraine War Continues, So Does Russian Political and Economic Isolation
The invasion of Ukraine will lead to Russia's increasing economic and political isolation from the rest of the world, particularly as civilian casualties mount. Even if negotiations were to result in a cease-fire, significant sanctions on Russia will remain in place for an extended period and the exodus of Western companies from Russia will continue; companies leaving Russia are unlikely to reverse their decision in the short to medium term. NATO countries will maintain a high level of military aid for Ukraine, but will refrain from taking steps that could lead to their direct involvement in the conflict, such as implementing a no-fly zone in Ukraine. This will likely prevent the war in Ukraine from spreading to other parts of the world. As Russia's offensive advances and civilian casualties increase, the United States, European Union and members of NATO will scale up their sanctions against Russia, but differences in dependence on Russian oil and natural gas imports will keep the European Union and the West divided over implementing blanket sanctions targeting Russian oil and natural gas exports. China will maintain rhetorical support for Russia and many Chinese companies will maintain their operations in Russia, but China's large banks and national champions are unlikely to violate Western and U.S. sanctions to avoid economic damage. Nevertheless, Moscow will view Chinese companies as an alternative to Western investors, and Chinese companies could expand their presence in Russia and take control of assets or get involved in projects that Western companies leave behind.
 


High Commodity Prices Add to Global Inflation Woes
The conflict in Ukraine will cause economic headwinds in the second quarter, primarily due to food, fertilizer and energy price inflation, further undermining global economic recoveries and hitting the poor the hardest. Despite Western sanctions largely exempting Russian energy and agricultural products, the Ukraine conflict will cause food and energy prices to remain high in the quarter as Western majors shun some purchases of Russian crude oil and Russia restricts exports of certain raw materials, like fertilizers. The price of European crude oil benchmark Brent could remain above $100 per barrel for most of the quarter. High commodity prices will put more pressure on the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve to continue with their interest rate hikes to curb inflation, but the European Central Bank is likely to delay such a decision until later in the year due to the eurozone's meager economic growth. Rising prices of basic necessities will force many governments to respond with tax breaks or social spending programs — at the price of pervasively deep fiscal deficits — in order to offset the financial pain that poorer segments of their societies experience or risk protests. While some Western governments can afford such programs, emerging and developing countries whose governments have significant U.S. dollar-denominated debt will face more difficulty in expanding social spending programs as they are hit by the Fed's monetary tightening policy strengthening the U.S. dollar and the higher commodity prices. For countries facing fiscal challenges like Turkey, Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia, the two forces will exacerbate their situations, and could lead to protests and further debt crises.
 


A Lengthy Conflict in Ukraine Brings More Cyber-Risks to Europe, North America
The Ukraine conflict will also keep cyber-risks in Europe heightened as nation-state and nonstate threat actors carry out cyberattacks connected to the conflict and carry out information warfare campaigns. Russia-linked hacking groups will use data-wiping and -encrypting malware in their attacks against Ukrainian organizations, keeping the risk high that malware will affect machines of Western organizations that work closely with Ukrainian counterparts. As the conflict in Ukraine drags on and Western sanctions remain in place, the risk of Russia-linked hacking groups directly targeting U.S. and Western organizations to retaliate for sanctions will increase. The conflict in Ukraine is also blurring the line between Russian nation-state threat actors and cybercriminals. Nationalistic Russian ransomware gangs could more brazenly target Western organizations and critical infrastructure operators in attacks, either in coordination with the Russian government or for their own ideological motivations.
 

Western Countries Rapidly Adopt 'Live-With-COVID' Strategies
As the number of cases and hospitalizations from omicron continues to trend down in most countries, governments are accelerating their "live-with-COVID" strategies, which will provide some relief to their services sectors and could ease some supply chain disruptions. In our annual forecast, we laid out that most countries would adopt a live-with-COVID strategy this year, and omicron's rapid rise and decline in the West will accelerate that process. Most Western countries are removing pandemic restrictions and are likely to leave things that way barring a new variant that spreads as rapidly — if not faster — than omicron and that is more dangerous. Given their more aggressive strategies, East and Southeast Asian countries could face more challenges in adopting a live-with-COVID strategy. Even if China takes steps toward relaxing its zero-COVID strategy, the country will deal with localized outbreaks that it will struggle to contain, potentially leading to a return to lockdowns.
 

FORECAST
Asia-Pacific
6 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:22 GMT

file footage of a North Korean missile test
Key Trends for the Quarter
China's Economic Struggles and Diplomatic Humility
China's continued zero-COVID policy may spur renewed manufacturing relocations outside the country, while its push to secure energy supplies could worsen South China Sea tensions. Beijing will slowly ease real estate capital restrictions in an effort to recover fixed asset investment (a key driver of China's economy) but sectoral revenues and broader fixed asset investment will remain low compared to previous years despite renewed state-led infrastructure investments, putting a further drag on economic growth and hurting the Chinese Communist Party's chances of achieving its ambitious 5.5% annual GDP growth target. China will seek to find new sources of energy, food and raw materials in the wake of Western sanctions on Russia. This may spur higher state revenues for Asian commodities exporters like Indonesia and Myanmar, but could also lead to an unintended maritime clash between China and either Vietnam, the Philippines or Indonesia as China deepens oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea. China's zero-COVID strategy (which is characterized by heavy social restrictions and sudden supply chains disruptions) will persist, as will restrictions in Hong Kong, prompting further investment and manufacturing flight out of both territories as the "live-with-COVID" strategies of other regional countries attract business despite higher caseloads. China's diplomatic isolation amid its tacit support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine will prompt Beijing to redouble efforts to strengthen trade partnerships and settle disputes with U.S. partners and allies. Such efforts may include easing Australian trade restrictions, advocating for China's membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or easing sanctions on EU members of parliament in order to resume negotiations for the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Progress on these fronts may be limited, but China may nonetheless engage in fewer diplomatic spats as it seeks the goodwill of hesitant U.S. partners.


Elections Test U.S. Security Coalition
While leadership changes in South Korea, Australia and the Philippines are unlikely to result in drastic disruptions in security cooperation with the United States, nuanced shifts in the balance with China are possible. The new South Korean government will likely herald warmer relations with Japan, boosting U.S. efforts at trilateral security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in maritime competition with China in the East China Sea, which over time will ease the U.S. security burden in the region. If the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte win the presidency and vice presidency, respectively, on May 9, the duo is likely to maintain current President Rodrigo Duterte's amenable stance toward China on South China Sea territorial disputes and seek bilateral resolution mechanisms that exclude the United States in a key region for the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. This could make it harder for the United States to push back against Chinese territorial and military encroachment in the region. If the Labor Party wins the Australian federal election due on or before May 21, Canberra could pursue a more balanced strategic and trade policy toward Beijing, giving some nuance to current Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison's near-unqualified commitment to maritime security cooperation with the United States in pressuring China from the Pacific Islands region. All three of these countries are long-term U.S. defense partners, so major changes in security cooperation are unlikely, but more nuanced shifts regarding the degree to which countries balance between Chinese and U.S. security interests in specific theaters, like the South China Sea, are possible.


Escalating North Korean Missile Tests
North Korea is likely to continue conventional weapons development, expanding its options for non-nuclear responses to peninsular security threats, but a resumption of nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile testing could shift U.S. and South Korean aims in negotiations to arms control rather than denuclearization. Despite ongoing testing, new conventional capabilities do not signify an increased likelihood of a North Korean attack on South Korea or the United States in the short term, and the United States is likely to encourage the continued transfer of operational control of forces to the South Korean military. North Korea's continued development of mobile launch sites, however, will raise concerns over the type of missile being tested, as mobile launches are more advantageous for military missiles than civilian satellites, which the north aims to use for improved surveillance of the United States. Should Pyongyang restart nuclear testing or resume ICBM testing over Japan instead of continued testing in the sea between the two countries, South Korea may expedite the deployment of missile defense systems to defend against the ballistic missile threat. With the United States still focused on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its long-term strategic competition with China, renewed Korean Peninsula concerns would have to compete for attention from the Biden administration.

Supply Chain Uncertainty Complicates ASEAN Recovery
The war in Ukraine, global differences in COVID-19 policies and commodities market fluctuations will drive supply chain and economic growth uncertainty in East Asia and especially Southeast Asia, complicating manufacturing recoveries and encouraging political turnover. The war may impede global flows of key inputs for the tech industry, impeding Asian governments' plans to expand their chip production to boost national innovation, advance manufacturing capabilities and improve tech self-sufficiency. In addition, persisting high fuel prices will also impair national manufacturing recoveries, including in Vietnam, while rising food and raw materials prices will deepen Myanmar's economic turmoil as the country leans into another year of civil war. Myanmar's social and political situation may increase refugee flows and COVID-19 spread — due to the junta's poor ability to administer health care and the country's scant revenue — into the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, complicating governments' transitions to live-with-COVID strategies and potentially introducing tighter border restrictions. Rising fuel prices will also cause Association of Southeast Asian Nations governments to reconsider price caps and fuel subsidies, increasing the chances for political turnover via electoral upsets and adding to already simmering unrest in Thailand amid economic uncertainty. General energy insecurity could prompt new administrations in the Philippines, South Korea and Japan to reconsider expanding or resuming nuclear power capacity, reigniting environmental debates and questions of foreign investment, particularly from China, and the political influence that often accompanies it.

Key Dates to Watch
April 1: EU-China Summit
May 8: Hong Kong chief executive election (unless postponed)
May 9: Philippines presidential, vice presidential, and some House and Senate seat elections
May 21: Deadline for Australian elections for all House seats and a majority of Senate seats
May 22: Bangkok gubernatorial election

FORECAST
Europe
7 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:23 GMT

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the Italian Parliament via live video from the embattled city of Kyiv
Key Trends for the Quarter
Public Spending Levels to Remain High in Europe
European institutions and national governments will increase public spending to cope with the global energy crisis and the war in Ukraine. This will ensure continued economic growth, but also contribute to inflation and increase the risk of a debt crisis. The European Commission will relax the implementation of EU rules on state aid so that national governments can assist companies negatively impacted by high energy prices, sanctions against Russia and the overall increase in geopolitical uncertainty. Brussels will also urge EU governments to redirect grants and loans from the EU COVID-19 recovery fund to assist households and companies in distress. While governments will debate whether to authorize the commission to borrow on financial markets on their behalf, a decision may not be reached during the quarter because of internal divisions. The rise in global economic uncertainty will also reactivate the debate over whether to reform EU sovereign debt and fiscal deficit rules known as the Stability and Growth Pact. While a radical reform of the pact is unlikely due to resistance from Northern European governments, the Continent's growing economic challenges mean there will be room for a compromise to allow some spending areas (such as spending on the energy transition or defense) to be excluded from the calculations of a country's debt or deficit. The combination of all these expansionary policies will probably ensure continued economic growth in Europe during the quarter. But they will also keep inflation high, which will reignite the debate within the European Central Bank over whether interest rates should be hiked faster than anticipated (though a hike is unlikely to materialize during the quarter as the bank prioritizes growth). These measures will also result in pervasively high fiscal deficits and sovereign debt levels that could result in financial crises in the future.


Europe's Push for Energy Diversification to Accelerate
The European Union will adopt measures to accelerate its energy diversification away from Russia, but the process will be uneven and will last well beyond the quarter. The European Union will start to implement a plan to replace tens of billions of cubic meters of Russian natural gas by increasing LNG and pipeline imports from other sources, doubling the production of biomethane, and other measures. The bloc is also likely to announce measures to increase the production and import of renewable hydrogen, accelerate the installation of photovoltaic panels on buildings and farms across the European Union, and accelerate permitting procedures for on- and off-shore wind capacity and large-scale solar projects. In April, the commission will issue a legislative proposal requiring gas storage facilities in the bloc to be up to 90% full by Oct. 1 every year. These measures will take months (and in some cases years) to implement, however, meaning the bloc will not significantly reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas during the quarter, a situation that will keep the bloc from banning the purchases of Russian oil and natural gas. In the meantime, individual member states may announce plans to increase their reliance on nuclear energy while others are likely to slow down the phaseout of coal. Collectively, these moves could make it harder for the European Union to meet its carbon dioxide reduction targets for 2030, and could influence companies not to move away from coal as quickly as originally planned.

Crucial Presidential and Legislative Elections in France
France will elect a moderate president and National Assembly that will push for deeper EU economic, political and military integration. France will spend the entire quarter in electoral mode, with two rounds of presidential elections in April followed by two rounds of legislative elections in June. In both elections, voters will likely support moderate, pro-European parties that will defend France's role in the European Union and the eurozone and propose deeper European political, economic and security integration. While far-right or -left parties could perform well in both elections, the risk of one assuming control of the presidency or National Assembly such that France could exit the European Union or the eurozone will be very low. President Emmanuel Macron will use the electoral campaign and the war in Ukraine to push for reduced EU dependence on Russian energy by diversifying the bloc's energy sources and increasing the use of renewable energy and nuclear power. Macron's reelection will also see him promote greater cooperation on defense issues, including joint research, development and procurement, although the debate over these processes will extend well beyond the quarter. In the meantime, France's electoral season will also result in the European Commission slowing down the ongoing negotiations over free trade agreements, a controversial issue in France. This will slow negotiations with countries like Australia and New Zealand, while the ratification of agreements with blocs like South America's Mercosur will remain frozen.


East-West Tensions within the EU to Calm Down
The crisis in Ukraine will increase political stability in Central Europe and mitigate disputes with EU institutions, which will secure continued access to EU funds, at least temporarily. The war in Ukraine will contribute to the stability of previously fragile governments in countries like Poland and Romania as geopolitical concerns and the need to show a united response to Russia will temporarily put domestic political differences aside and allow their coalition governments to survive. Political and social stability will likely be short-lived, as an improvement of the conditions on the ground in Ukraine or a lowering of the perceived threat from Russia eventually will likely see a return to prewar internal political disputes. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe will keep their borders open to migrants escaping the war as they express solidarity with Ukraine, while countries in Western Europe will accept some of these migrants in their own territories. In addition, the European Commission will probably refrain from escalating its rule of law disputes with countries like Poland to avoid deepening internal EU divisions at a time of worsening relations with Russia, which will ensure continued access to EU funding for Warsaw and others. Finally, the war in Ukraine increases the probability of the United Opposition winning Hungary's parliamentary election April 3, as the ruling nationalist Fidesz party will struggle to distance itself from the Kremlin after years of expressing political sympathy for Russia. This could open the door to a pro-EU Hungarian government that reduces disputes with Brussels over rule of law issues and secures Budapest's continued access to EU funds.

The EU and the U.K. to Look for Compromises in Northern Ireland
The conflict in Ukraine and political calculations will result in the European Union and the United Kingdom toning down their dispute over the Northern Ireland protocol, which will open the door to compromises to avoid a trade war. Northern Ireland will hold a legislative election in May in which Unionist parties will campaign for the abolition of the Northern Ireland protocol while Republicans will support the protocol. Against this backdrop, London and Brussels will continue negotiations to amend the protocol and avoid a collapse in the talks that could result in more sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. The conflict in Ukraine will also convince Brussels and London to avoid a trade war that could create additional problems for their economies at a time of rising global uncertainty. If Brussels and London fail to reach a mutually acceptable amendment of the protocol, they will likely postpone the enforcement of some aspects of it to make sure that goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland continue to move with minimal disruptions for several more months until a permanent solution is found. While widespread violence in Northern Ireland is improbable, the electoral season could result in a temporary spike in demonstrations, limited clashes between Republican and Unionist groups, and small-scale attacks and acts of sabotage, especially against customs infrastructure and staff, but also against other politically symbolic targets.

Key Dates to Watch
April 3: Parliamentary elections in Hungary
April 10: First round of France's presidential election
April 24: Second round of France's presidential election
June 12: First round of France's legislative elections
June 19: Second round of France's legislative elections
June 23-24: European Council summit
June 26-28: G-7 Leaders Summit in Germany
June 29-30: NATO Summit in Spain
 

FORECAST
Middle East and North Africa
5 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:24 GMT

Aramco oil facility near al-Khurj area, just south of the Saudi capital Riyadh
Photo by FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP via Getty Images

Key Trends for the Quarter
A Deal for Iran’s Nuclear Program Would Change Little Else
The United States and Iran may reach a deal to resume compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in the second quarter, but regional tensions will persist. An agreement would allow Iran to boost its oil exports by as much as 1.5 million b/d, alleviating the currently tight global oil market and giving Iran an incentive not to target U.S. interests and partners in the region as aggressively. Although a deal is possible, significant roadblocks remain that could derail negotiations. If an agreement is not reached in the first half of the quarter, then escalation will become more likely due to Western concerns that Iran's rapidly advancing nuclear program may soon reach a stage where the JCPOA no longer can achieve its nonproliferation objectives. Any escalation would likely involve Iran and its proxies more frequently targeting oil infrastructure and commercial vessels in the Middle East. Regardless of whether there is a deal between Iran and the West, Iran and Israel's so-called "shadow war" will continue, as Israel will remain focused on Iran's missile program and its support of proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria — issues the JCPOA does not address. Consequently, Israel will continue to launch covert and overt operations against Iran's allies aimed at degrading Tehran's capabilities to project force near Israel's borders.

Erdogan Friendly Abroad but Combative at Home
Turkey will improve relations with regional rivals in order to increase trade and investment flows, but Ankara will not introduce significant changes to its domestic economic strategy unless political conditions deteriorate significantly. Roaring inflation, a weakening lira and new global economic interruptions caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine will continue to weaken Turkey's economy, further undermining public support for the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) ahead of June 2023 elections. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will, however, likely continue his low-interest-rate approach to growth. By virtue of his control over the Central Bank and over most of the opposition who used to balance him, Erdogan holds the levers of power over economic policy, so his calculations will drive the country's economic strategy. Turkey will likely continue to improve relations with former rivals from Greece to Israel to Saudi Arabia in hopes that a softer diplomatic approach will yield increased investment and trade, easing the economic crisis at home. To that end, Turkey will also likely try to maintain neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian war given its worries over the economic effects should Russia cut energy and food exports to Turkey. Its neutrality will be challenged by its fellow NATO allies, and will weaken should Russia directly provoke Turkey through accidental clashes with Turkish assets or allies in the Black Sea, Syria or the Caucasus.

A Threat of Violence After Lebanon’s Elections
Lebanon's May elections will not break the country's political impasse and might spur violence and emigration as more Lebanese lose faith in the state's ability to handle the economic crisis. Lebanon has not fundamentally restructured its sectarian election system, which means that most parties in power will return with similar results as the 2018 election. This will leave establishment parties — which lack an interest in deeply reforming the country's budgetary or economic policies, preferring instead to await fresh international aid — in place. As a result, public protests and strikes are likely, but these are unlikely to convince establishment politicians to begin a serious reform path given that previous nationwide protests have not forced changes and because the elections will not change the incentives that keep establishment politicians from reform. Public anger may manifest into violence that could trigger sectarian clashes. Higher fuel and food prices in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian war will exacerbate such unrest. With the political process paralyzed and the economy stagnating, more middle class Lebanese are likely to emigrate while poorer Lebanese emigrants attempt the sea journey to Europe, worsening the country's brain drain and pulling more capital out of its weakened banks.

America’s Gulf Allies Push Back
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will leverage their positions as major oil producers to win diplomatic concessions from the United States on their human rights records and military intervention in Yemen. With oil supplies uncertain in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions campaign, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will push back against U.S. criticism and pressure. Though they are unlikely to break with OPEC+ production quotas unilaterally, they will leverage their influence to calm oil markets in exchange for improved relations with the United States and potential U.S. support for their intervention in Yemen and defense against Iran and its regional proxies. The United States is likely to provide fresh diplomatic and intelligence support in Yemen, where Washington was already moving closer to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, and also is likely to discuss new U.S. arms sales to secure the Saudis and Emiratis.

The Land of Two Prime Ministers
In Libya, rival prime ministers will vie for international and domestic legitimacy, which could lead to disruptions in the export of the country's oil and gas resources. The Libyan parliament's March 1 approval of a new prime minister has resulted in competing prime ministers who will seek to gain international legitimacy in order to gain control of Libya's economic and government organizations, including the national oil company. Supporters of newly appointed Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha could shut down Libya's oil exports if Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh does not step down, which could exacerbate the tight oil market. If Bashagha tries to move the government from Tripoli, violence could break out in the capital between different rival militias.
 


Key Dates to Watch
April 2 - May 2: Ramadan 
May 15: General election in Lebanon
 

FORECAST
Eurasia
5 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:25 GMT

Smoke rises from a Russian tank destroyed by the Ukrainian forces on the side of a road in Lugansk region
Key Trends for the Quarter
The War in Ukraine Continues
Russia's and Ukraine's radically different strategic goals mean that a sustainable solution to their conflict is unlikely during the quarter. Ukraine will maintain its strategy of repelling Russia's invasion with the goal of causing Russia to sustain enough material and human losses that Moscow softens some of its demands for a cease-fire. Russia's strategy meanwhile consists of progressively weakening the Ukrainian government's resources to force it to accept a cease-fire on Moscow's terms. This means that regardless of any negotiations, Russia will maintain a significant degree of territorial control in Ukraine during the quarter. Moscow will continue its attempts to establish pro-Russian regional regimes in areas such as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that create a land bridge from Russia to Crimea. The Ukrainian government's reluctance to recognize Russian territorial gains amid Russia's continued seizure and occupation of new areas will strengthen Moscow's demands for a deal that imposes costs that are simply too high for Kyiv to accept, making a complete withdrawal of Russian troops improbable. In an alternate scenario, Kyiv would accept a painful deal at a high territorial and political cost to end the active phase of the war. In this scenario, the deal would codify Ukraine's neutral and demilitarized status on terms largely dictated by Moscow, while Ukraine would also surrender its claims to Crimea and cede the eastern region of Donbas. The deal would allow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's government to survive and regain control over some of the regions Russia occupied in eastern Ukraine as Moscow moves to fortify and integrate the Donbas into Russia.

Russia Will Increasingly Feel The Pain Of Sanctions
The Russian economy will contract significantly under crippling sanctions, threatening long-term growth prospects but not causing a change of government or foreign policy. Russia's GDP will contract significantly in the second quarter due to Western sanctions and boycotts, which will likely remain in place or even expand despite a possible end of the most violent phase of the war. Russia will also see a significant increase in inflation, which a likely sovereign default and government efforts to prop up ruble liquidity will accelerate. This will result in stagflation as businesses and consumers seek to minimize their loss of purchasing power by spending on an increasingly shrinking amount of available goods. High prices for hydrocarbons and other commodities of which Russia is a major exporter (most notably, minerals such as nickel, aluminum and titanium), however, will mean that the Russian government can still bring in large amounts of foreign currency and run a current account surplus, providing the government with the means to intervene to stabilize the economy and banking sector in the long run. Russians will see their standards of living fall precipitously, but this will not significantly affect the Kremlin's pursuit of the war in Ukraine let alone spur political change in Russia because of Moscow's efforts to restrict access to information it views as undesirable, increasingly harsh punishments for dissent and the accelerated brain drain of those opposed to Russian actions in Ukraine.


Russia’s Economic Struggles Will Impact Central Asia
Russia's economic turmoil will cause an economic contraction in Central Asia, increasing regional political volatility and creating the risk of social unrest. As Russia's economy severely contracts due to Western sanctions and boycotts, the economies of Central Asia states, which are highly interdependent upon Russia, will undergo their own economic downturns. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are heavily dependent on Russian remittances, will likely be hit the hardest as the volume of remittances declines due to the loss of economic opportunities in Russia and sanctions on Russia's banking sector cut off avenues for financial transactions. The ruble's decline will mean that even the remittances that do make it back to the region will be worth less. The depressed economic environment, which will happen on top of the ongoing spike in fuel prices, will increase the risk of social unrest across the region, but governments will likely avoid collapse with a combination of repression and modest support measures. Proponents of extremist ideologies will look to capitalize as the economic downturn deepens, reaching out to millions of potential followers, including the many migrant workers returning to the region from Russia vulnerable to radicalization amid the lack of work. Moscow will pressure regional governments to increase border controls and reduce the ability of Islamists in Afghanistan to link up with sympathetic Central Asian elements, but may be forced to provide security assistance to protect Central Asian governments from destabilization. This would further strain Moscow's budgetary and military resources, limiting Russia's ability to influence political developments in the region and prompting governments to seek economic support elsewhere.

Key Dates to Watch
April 3: Kyrgyzstan's census concludes
April 8: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) foreign ministerial summit
April 11-13: Russia International Arctic Forum 2022
May 26-27: Eurasian Economic Forum
May (date unspecified): CIS heads of state summit
June 10: CIS Economic Council meeting

FORECAST
Americas
5 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:25 GMT

Facade of Argentina's Central Bank in Buenos Aires
Key Trends for the Quarter
High Food and Energy Prices Drive Unrest in Brazil
In reaction to high food and energy prices, Brazil will see more frequent labor strikes and social unrest and increased government spending, sparking investor concern about the country's social and economic stability. As President Jair Bolsonaro tries to boost his odds of reelection in October amid record-high global food prices, the government is likely to attempt to limit exports of cereals in an effort to relieve inflationary pressures. International energy prices are likely to remain similarly high as Western powers maintain sanctions on Russia, leading the government to contain the price of gasoline and diesel by either forcing state-owned energy giant Petroleo Brasileiro to keep prices artificially low or by subsidizing fuel prices for a set period. In either case, government spending and a lack of political will to decrease the government's high debt burden will make it hard for Brasilia to reduce its fiscal deficit. Foreign and domestic investors will be wary of the increased state involvement in the Brazilian economy. They will likely wait to issue new investment in the country until after the election, though the country will likely see limited new investment concentrated in its oil and gas sector. Despite the subsidies, households are likely to feel some of the effects of rising prices of food and fuels, providing fodder for domestic unrest (including labor unrest), which could result in supply chain disruptions if strikes target major highways or ports.

The Mexican Government Compromises on Electricity Sector Reform
Horse-trading between the Mexican government and the opposition will result in watered-down reform to the country's electricity sector that decreases the likelihood of USMCA violations. While the opposition coalition Va por Mexico is unlikely to be cooperative ahead of June 5 gubernatorial and regional elections in six states, it has indicated that it will be more open to supporting the government's plans to reform Mexico's electricity sector in exchange for government support on other issues after the election. Though Va por Mexico and the governing National Regeneration Movement are likely to strike a deal on electricity reform, the reforms are likely to be watered-down from what the government had originally wanted. For example, the opposition will demand the preservation of independent regulatory agencies and decreases in the percentage of the electricity sector that will be designated for state-owned electricity company Federal Electricity Commission to control. Weaker reforms will be less likely to violate the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement than the original government proposal. But even weak electricity reforms, however, will discourage foreign direct investment in Mexico's energy sector for fear that the state will follow up with additional reforms limiting private investment.

Relief From the IMF and the Agricultural Sector Boost Argentina Amid Price Surges
New International Monetary Fund special drawing rights and agriculture export revenue will temporarily stabilize Argentina's economy, allowing Buenos Aires to implement food and fuel subsidies amid rising global prices. Argentina's deal with the IMF will provide $9.8 billion in special drawing rights that Buenos Aires will use to boost its Central Bank's weak dollar reserves. As the price of wheat and oil and gas rise globally, Buenos Aires will be well-positioned to cash in on its wheat and soy harvest (anticipated to be 21 million metric tons of wheat and 40 million metric tons of soy products for the 2021-2022  growing season) as the country's high export tariffs remain in place. Both developments will allow the Argentine government to maintain social welfare spending amid high food and fuel prices, though inflation is likely to remain high and the government will be unable to soften capital controls because of households' and businesses' persistent lack of confidence in the government's economic policies. The stability afforded by the IMF program could lead to a small increase in investment interest in the country's extractive industries such as the petroleum, natural gas and lithium sectors, which have already attracted foreign and domestic investment despite Argentina's overall negative business climate.


U.S. Outreach to Venezuela Will Help Some International Oil Companies
U.S. outreach to Venezuela may result in a narrow agreement allowing exemptions for debt-for-oil swaps, allowing some companies to partially recover their losses. As Washington seeks to mitigate the oil shortages and subsequent price increases created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States may temporarily ease its formerly hard-line approach of demanding regime change in Venezuela in favor of selective engagement with the Maduro administration. This calculation is likely part of a broader push by the White House to increase the oil and gas supply in the United States amid the crisis in Ukraine. Negotiations could lead to progress toward exchanging oil cargoes to settle the debts of state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela. This could allow a limited number of companies (U.S.'s Chevron, Italy's ENI and Spain's Repsol, among others) to recover some of their losses in the country. In an effort to achieve broader sanctions relief, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro will likely reenter Mexico City negotiations with the opposition, where he will likely have to make credible but limited political concessions (such as releasing political prisoners or ending discriminatory practices against the opposition).
 


Key Dates to Watch
April 22: Second-round vote in Costa Rica's presidential election
May 29: Colombian presidential election
June 5: Gubernatorial and local elections in six Mexican states
June: Summit of the Americas hosted in Los Angeles
 

FORECAST
South Asia
5 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:26 GMT

An employee of a fuel station updates the latest fuel price list in Islamabad
Key Trends for the Quarter
India's Economy Struggles With High Inflation
In order to mitigate the risk of social unrest at a time of global uncertainty, the Indian government will refrain from implementing substantial economic reforms, a decision that could undermine long-term economic growth. The economic shocks caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine — including higher energy prices likely to result in rising food prices and supply chain disruptions for goods such as Russian fertilizers on which India depends — are likely to force the Indian central bank to change its growth-oriented strategy and prioritize reducing consumer prices. While this could help India reduce inflation (which was above 6% in January and February), it could also result in slowing economic growth in 2022. While the governing Bharatiya Janata Party performed strongly in the state assembly election in March, giving Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi political room to implement economic reforms, the government will avoid any controversial policies such as agriculture and electricity sector reforms in the quarter in order to prevent social unrest. The government likely will implement some reforms, however, including leasing out state properties, the privatization of the state-owned Life Insurance Corp. (LIC) and two public sector banks, to increase state revenue. Reforms to simplify labor laws and enable easier compliance by companies and improve India's ease of doing business are also likely since the government now has the political capital to undertake them. Similarly, negotiations over a free trade agreement with Australia will proceed, and an interim trade deal is possible during the quarter

Political Uncertainty Deepens in Pakistan
Political uncertainty will worsen Pakistan's economic situation, reduce the room for an agreement with the IMF, and see the business climate deteriorate. High oil and commodities prices will probably force the Pakistani government to implement additional subsidies and aid programs for low-income households and the industrial sector, which will result in a pervasively high fiscal deficit. In addition, foreign reserves could fall as import bills rise, which will reduce the government's resources to pay for coal and liquified natural gas imports, increasing the probability of power outages that further undermine economic activity. Recent steps to alleviate the economic crisis (which included granting tax breaks to the industrial sector and measures to lower electricity and gasoline prices) failed to prevent the opposition from triggering a vote in Parliament to oust the prime minister, highlighting the political uncertainty in the country. Against this backdrop, Pakistan will struggle to negotiate with the IMF to clear the next tranche of $1 billion as part of its bailout package because the government's recent relief measures breached the terms of the deal with the IMF. On the security front, Pakistan will likely seek to maintain its relationship with the Taliban government in Afghanistan as it continues cease-fire negotiations with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and seeks to avoid a possible spillover of instability from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The likely continuation of attacks in Pakistan by multiple militant groups (some of which have targeted or affected civilians), however, will contribute to perceived and real instability, further worsening investor and business confidence in the country.

Afghanistan's Instability Persists
Worsening economic and humanitarian crises, persistent disunity within the Taliban and the arrival of the fighting season could worsen instability in Afghanistan in the coming quarter. The Taliban will continue to struggle with balancing internal, domestic and foreign expectations and interests, which will sustain ineffective governance and instability in Afghanistan. The arrival of the fighting season (which is marked by the end of winter and of the poppy growing season) will likely escalate Taliban attempts to consolidate power across the country, but persistent disunity and the drain of resources from increased fighting will challenge these attempts. The Taliban's frequent abuses will sustain the international community's distrust of the Taliban's expressed commitment to human rights, keeping the chances for international recognition of, and direct foreign economic aid to, the Taliban government low. The likely increase in violent resistance to the Taliban government over the coming quarter and the indiscriminate nature of the Taliban response will also challenge the group's legitimacy among Afghans, further limiting its ability to effectively govern. To facilitate trade and economic activity, the Taliban will engage with neighboring countries to negotiate deals involving mining or gas pipelines, though progress will depend on the evolution of the security situation. Because Pakistan remains a strong advocate for humanitarian assistance and aid for Afghanistan, the Taliban will likely seek to limit tensions related to the contested Afghan-Pakistani border and continue to mediate cease-fire negotiations between the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani government, allowing the Taliban to balance its strategic partnership with Pakistan and its loyalty to the TTP.


Key Dates to Watch
April (date unspecified): China hosts meeting of the six countries that border Afghanistan
April (date unspecified): Sri Lanka-IMF meeting to discuss a potential support package
May 18: Likely date for Nepalese local elections

FORECAST
Sub-Saharan Africa
5 MIN READMar 21, 2022 | 17:27 GMT

'Africa's Best Mineral' quarry near Carletonville, some 40kms west of Johannesburg
Key Trends for the Quarter
Revenue Windfalls Won’t Dull Social Discontent
South Africa will benefit from high global commodity prices, but continued welfare spending will not dull the social discontent caused by power outages, high inflation and unemployment. In the second quarter, South Africa will gain increased revenue from high global commodity prices resulting in part from the crisis in Ukraine. Coal, platinum group metals, gold, iron ore, manganese and chrome exports, among others, will add to South Africa's recent budget surplus through royalties and export duties. Despite revenue windfalls, state-owned power company Eskom will likely institute rolling blackouts at times due to dilapidated infrastructure, insufficient capacity and high diesel prices. In addition to stoking public discontent and resistance to the ruling African National Congress and President Cyril Ramaphosa's administration, the power crisis will continue to harm the business environment. Meanwhile, the extension of the R350 (about $23) monthly welfare payment will not compensate for exorbitant consumer prices or high unemployment. This means that unrest is probable, with potential flare-ups occurring in reaction to former President Jacob Zuma's ongoing legal woes and contentious wage negotiations with labor unions scheduled to begin at the end of March.

Insecurity in the Sahel Could Expand Throughout West Africa
While France's withdrawal from Mali will leave a void that will harm regional security, the war in Ukraine will limit Russia's diplomatic and security influence, giving local militant groups an opportunity for expansion. French troops will continue to withdraw from Mali and relocate to southern Niger, likely completing their reorganization by the end of the second quarter or the beginning of the third. France will likely continue to carry out airstrikes in Mali from its base outside of Niamey, Niger, and potentially alternate regional bases, which may result in limited tactical successes. Malian security forces will be incapable of independently combatting insurgent groups, including Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State (IS). While the Malian junta planned to have Russian paramilitary forces partially offset the loss of French capabilities, the war in Ukraine means that Russia will likely divert its attention and resources from conflicts in Africa. Without significant third-party intervention to support Malian forces, groups like JNIM and the Islamic State have a window for expanding their attacks from north and central Mali into neighboring states. Because of this situation, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and Togo are likely to see more violent attacks on security forces.


A Humanitarian Catastrophe in Tigray Will Have Economic Implications
The lingering Tigray conflict will extend the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia and derail central government efforts to attract foreign direct investment. While Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly acknowledged in January that the government would be willing to negotiate with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the two sides signed a conditional cease-fire March 24, the presence of numerous ethnic militias with disparate interests will complicate the implementation of the cease-fire and any negotiations that follow. While the government will seek to attract investment in the banking, logistics and telecoms sectors, international investors are unlikely to be interested given the uncertainty associated with the ongoing Tigray conflict. Additionally, members of pro-government Amhara militias will continue to call on the government to root out all TPLF fighters from the region, adding pressure on Abiy to appear tough on Tigray and forcing him to balance these domestic demands with international calls for peace. Even if negotiations begin between government and TPLF elites, it will likely take weeks if not months to reestablish the aid supplies and resources needed to alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Drought and rising fertilizer prices will exacerbate existing food insecurity.


High Commodity Prices Threatens Economic Stability
High food, fuel and fertilizer prices following the Russian invasion of Ukraine will threaten the stability of fragile sub-Saharan African economies. Most African countries will struggle to cope with price shocks during the quarter, which in some cases will lead consumers to protest exorbitant prices of everyday goods. Consumers in Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria have a strong history of protesting high fuel prices, and these countries are likely to see protests again as households struggle to buy basic goods. Additionally, the global attention on the crisis in Ukraine means that the international community will likely focus less on sub-Saharan Africa, which may result in decreased funding for aid and development projects. Alternatively, producers of oil, gas food and minerals (such as Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea for oil and South Africa and Ghana for minerals) will reap the rewards of high prices, and it is possible that countries that produce commodities exported by Russia and Ukraine will see increased investment in extractives (like palladium and nickel) and gas. But even for these countries, the short-term gains are unlikely to completely offset the negative impact of food and fuel inflation. Over the course of the year and beyond, countries that attempt to reduce consumer hardship with food and fuel subsidies will face rising deficits, which means that other areas, like social welfare and/or infrastructure investment, are likely to suffer. Additionally, increases in global fertilizer prices will mean lower crop yields in 2022 and for seasons to come, especially for smallholder farmers in places that currently import fertilizer, like South Africa, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria, likely worsening existing food insecurity.

Key Dates to Watch
Unspecified: Adjusted wage negotiations between a coalition of South African labor unions and the government occur
April 11: Former South African President Jacob Zuma's trial over alleged corrupt arms deals resumes

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The case for and against industrial policy to beat China
« Reply #1207 on: April 11, 2022, 01:36:56 AM »
Not that I agree, but a thought challenging read:

1) https://americanmind.org/memo/beating-china/?fbclid=IwAR24lHbboOitRrBkzeXj94o1QSLZgcYT9hMNi_KV8ninD76p_NMAerEKz0A


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2)

We’re better than communist China Not the time to abandon what has made us great By Michael McKenna S

ometimes Americans’ competitive nature requires that we think of our current rivals as much more impressive than they actually are. As difficult as it is to imagine now, in the 1950s and 1960s, many thought that Soviet Russia would overtake us. They turned out to be wrong.

In the 1970s, the Arabs were going to run the world because of their perceived hegemony in oil. Didn’t happen. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, the United States was fixated on the idea that Japan, Inc. was the new, better model.

Now, we face communist China, whose impressive and bloody 50-year run has transformed them from a mostly poor and rural farm economy to the world’s factory floor. Many, including some in the United States (looking at you, Larry Fink), believe that the communist model emphasizing conformity, the collective, and the unquestioned authority of the state is superior to our own.

Let’s take a look at our new rival and how we compare.

First, the economy. Depending on how you count, China is either the largest or the second-largest economy in the world. Yet, Americans make between four and six times more than the Chinese per capita.

As always, aggregated numbers hide important information. America is already much wealthier than China, mostly because of the efficiency of the American economy and American businesses — U.S. GDP per worker is 6 times greater than China’s. In the last 20 years, the American economy has generated $12 trillion more in wealth for American consumers than the Chinese economy has created for Chinese consumers.

Since 2019, 257,000 more people (in a population of nearly 1.4 billion) in China have become millionaires, while an additional 1.75 million Americans (in a population of about 330 million) have become millionaires.

We also have an enormous economic advantage because the dollar is the reserve currency for the world. This is primarily because of the American commitment to private property, the rule of law, and a relative lack of corruption. If you invest in the United States, there is little chance that the government will nationalize or otherwise materially degrade the investment.

How about demographics? By 2031, the population of China will peak and then start a slow and steady drop for the remainder of the century. China’s population will also age; by 2040, they will have 317 million people over the age of 65 (compared to 81 million in the U.S.).

More ominously, by 2040, there will be 50 million more men than women in China. This imbalance, created primarily by the one-child policy (and Chinese families’ preference for male children), ensures delayed and suboptimal family formation and attendant social unrest.

The size and composition of the population in the U.S., on the other hand, are limited only by our willingness to accept and assimilate immigrants. If necessary, we could accept millions of immigrants in a short period of time. The desire to become American and the struggles that people endure to get and stay here are the best evidence that the communist Chinese model is in no way superior or ascendant.

Each year, more than a million people immigrate into the United States legally, and probably another million make it into the country illegally. More than a half-million people (net) escape from China each year.

For good or ill, we also dominate the culture. For 100 years, since screens (TVs, computers or cell phones) became ubiquitous, we have been the largest and most significant provider of cultural content provider to the globe. If you don’t think that is important, imagine if your child’s or grandchild’s favorite movie or singer was from China.

One obvious result of this dominance is that the English language is now the planet’s reserve language. While English colonialism was essential in the linguistic colonization of the world, the U.S expanded and completed the process. About 1.35 billion people speak English, most of them (about 1 billion) as a second language. By comparison, about 1.1 billion people speak Mandarin, almost all of them as a first language.

We also dominate education. According to the Center for World University Rankings, 29 of the top 50 universities globally are found in the United States. The highest-rated Chinese university is #58.

How about national security? The United States enjoys two of the longest peaceful borders on the planet and leads multiple networks of alliances. In comparison, the Chinese have few friends, are surrounded by hostile neighbors, including India, Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines, Japan and, most importantly, Taiwan, and use half of their military resources to ensure their border security. Given all of this, it is obvious that the best way to approach the threat posed by communist China is to build on our strengths. We did not become the world’s dominant economic, educational, linguistic, cultural and military force by worrying about every new contender. We achieved that dominance by emphasizing personal liberty and resisting collectivism, keeping government involvement in our lives to a minimum, valuing creativity and innovation in all their forms, recognizing and defending private property, and respecting the rule of law.

To win this new contest, we need to keep doing what has made us the leaders of the world for the last 150 years. Michael McKenna, a columnist for The Washington Times, is the co-host of “The Unregulated” podcast. He was most recently a deputy assistant to the president and deputy director of the Office of Legislative Affairs at the White House
« Last Edit: April 11, 2022, 02:23:20 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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GPF: Russia and the First Economic World War
« Reply #1208 on: April 11, 2022, 06:27:21 AM »
April 11, 2022
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Russia and the First Economic World War
The Kremlin has prepare
 
As momentous as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, the most strategically important event in recent weeks was the global economic war between Russia and the U.S. and its allies. Russia, however, has been preparing to confront the West and challenge the Western socio-economic model for a long time.

The Putin Era to the Pandemic

Russia’s strategic interests in Ukraine are well-known. The geography and history of Russia compel its leaders to create and preserve a buffer between Moscow and the major powers in Western Europe, and to ensure access to the Black Sea. Ukraine is crucial to both goals. But beyond Ukraine, the Kremlin perceives the eastward expansion of Western influence, including into Russia, to be a modern invasion by stealth that threatens the Russian regime.

It is not Western organizations like NATO and the European Union that challenge the Kremlin, but the socio-economic model that enabled the West to win the Cold War and that enticed Eastern Europeans to want to join the West. When he became president of Russia in 2000, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the economic crisis of the 1990s, Vladimir Putin inherited a broken country. Many Russians contemplated joining the European Union, hoping that alignment with the West would bring a better life.

The priority for the Russian establishment was to stabilize and rebuild the country. Putin just wanted to survive politically. Following the example of past successful Russian leaders, he centralized power. Knowing he needed stability and growth to slow the rate of emigration and address Russia’s poor demographics, he sought to make Europe economically dependent on Moscow. And looking back at history and the current power balance, he identified Germany as the lynchpin of his strategy of dependence.

Russian ties to Germany were key to establishing ties to the European Union more broadly, but this was only the beginning of Russia’s strategy in Europe. Russia opened up its economy to Western investment, established links throughout the Continent and tried to understand the inner workings of EU bureaucracy. It established close business ties with Italy, France and later Hungary, and built a political network that would help expand its influence in Europe. For Moscow, learning about European vulnerabilities was just as important as building up its economy and growing Russia into a stable economic power.

The Kremlin also campaigned to join the World Trade Organization to establish deeper relationships with the world’s biggest economic players. In the process, it benefited from foreign investments in Russia and learned how the global economy works, building partnerships with not just Western economies but also other economic powers. The only problem was that China, its major ally against the West, was not seeing the accelerated growth it hoped for and was still very much dependent on the U.S. market, giving Beijing limited ability to counter U.S. interests in the world and forcing Russia to keep its focus on Europe.

Average Russians saw improvements in their standard of living under Putin. In major Russian cities, life was similar to that in the West. However, when it became a major player in the energy market, Russia also increased its exposure to global economic cycles. The European economic crisis of the 2010s sent shivers through Moscow. Russia’s economy remained fragile overall, and the gap between urban and rural areas remained dangerously high, potentially threatening Putin’s control.

At the same time, the West offered an attractive model to rival Russia’s. It wasn’t so much the growing Western influence in Russia’s buffer zone that bothered the Kremlin, but the fact that ordinary Russians might look at Eastern Europe and see a better model for political organization and economic growth.

Then the pandemic hit. The Russian president apparently feared that the economic insecurity wrought by COVID-19 could threaten his country’s economic security and stability. As the worst socio-economic effects of the pandemic faded, action against the West became urgent. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this was a unique moment. The U.S. has been trying to reduce its presence in Europe and instead focus on the Indo-Pacific and domestic problems. In other words, from the Kremlin, the trans-Atlantic alliance and the European Union appear weak. Most important, Russia’s leaders believe they have gained sufficient knowledge of the way the West works and can fight it effectively.

Preparing for War

Russia has been preparing to confront the West since at least the early 2000s. Besides stockpiling foreign reserves, Moscow constructed trade blocs and deepened relations with projects like the Eurasian Economic Union. In Europe, it enticed Germany to become dependent on Russian natural gas, which as is clear today made it extremely difficult for Europe to cut off Russian energy imports. Shifting from gas would require Europe to build new infrastructure – a costly, time-consuming process.

The close German-Russian partnership also benefited the Kremlin’s Europe strategy in other ways. To give a practical example, the EU had plans to make the Danube fully navigable through the establishment of additional canals, increasing Central Europe’s connection with the Black Sea. This would have given Europe more leverage against Russia at the moment, when the war in Ukraine has forced the rerouting of commercial flows from the Black Sea to much more expensive land routes. Instead, positive relations with Moscow made the project seem unnecessary, and it faded away.

It is no coincidence that after 2012, the first full year that Nord Stream 1 was operational, Europe became much more reluctant to adopt policies that could be seen as anti-Russian. There was simply no interest in Germany to carry them out. It is also no coincidence that relations between the U.S. and Germany have cooled down over that time. The U.S. needed Germany to lead Europe, or at least maintain neutrality, to prevent Russia from expanding its influence in Europe as the U.S. drew back. The fact that Russia joined the World Trade Organization in 2012 gave it even more leverage in the world economy.

It is also worth noting that the Kremlin used personal relationships to shore up its influence. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was tapped to lead Nord Stream 1. Nord Stream AG also hired former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen as a consultant to speed up the permit process in Finland. Former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi served on the board of Delimobil, a Russian car-sharing service. Former Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho was on the board of Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank. Former Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern resigned from the board of Russia’s state-owned railway company in the early days of the war in Ukraine, while another ex-chancellor, Wolfgang Schussel, remained on the board of Russia’s Lukoil. This is just a short list of top politicians, all of whom had at least some influence over their country’s foreign policy discussions. They have certainly been useful to Russian economic growth and the advance of Russia’s economic strategy in Europe.

Working closely with Europeans for the past two decades has enabled Russia to learn what is important for the stability of their countries. It has also helped the Kremlin better understand their political agendas and support causes that work to its advantage. For example, Russia enthusiastically supported many green policies, like Germany’s decision to give up nuclear power – which translated into greater reliance on Russian gas. And Russia has openly supported populist parties throughout Europe and effectively used information warfare, all in an attempt to destabilize and ultimately divide Europe.

Globally, Russia has maintained close relations with traditional enemies and competitors of the West. Joining the WTO gave it a stronger position on the global stage, which is used to advance the influence and interests of emerging global players, including the BRICS countries, which also include Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Though the results were modest, Russia promoted the group as an alternative to the West and continued to focus on building ties to China and India, establishing links that it hoped would withstand in a potential confrontation with the West, which we’re seeing play out today.

To counter the current sanctions, it has looked to China for help. The Eurasian Economic Union gives it proxies for continuing to do business with the world. At the same time, Russia’s presence in the Middle East and parts of Africa helps it keep the price of oil high – high enough that it can keep paying its bills. Influence in the Middle East and the Sahel, two highly unstable but resource-rich areas, also gives Russia more leverage over the world economy.

In building its network, Russia has tried to focus on economics and enhancing weaknesses in the global network. It expanded its influence abroad, making sure the dependencies it was encouraging were strong enough to give it leverage but lose enough to allow its withdrawal when necessary. Russian strategy certainly has its weaknesses, but Russia has options in countering the West during the current global economic war. Supporting EU fragmentation through its economic ties in Europe and using the knowledge of European politics that it’s gained over the years are likely the most important elements of its strategy. The moment European citizens feel the repercussion of Western sanctions is when the bloc will become more fragile, which will allow Russia to exploit the EU’s weaknesses.

The world is witnessing its first economic world war of the modern era. The rules are undefined, and the global economy is complex, meaning collateral damage is unavoidable and frequently unpredictable. Slowly, we are becoming aware of the repercussions the sanctions on Russia are having on the global economy. Less clear are the instruments that Russia can employ against the West. How this will change the world is a mystery. All we can do is look back at what Russia has prepared for – and guess what could come next. This is only the beginning.

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George Friedman: The Pain and Pleasure of Being Right
« Reply #1209 on: April 15, 2022, 04:51:37 AM »
April 15, 2022
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The Pain and Pleasure of Being Right
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

In 2009, I published a book about the next century called "The Next 100 Years," in which I predicted that Russia would become increasingly aggressive and that, sometime around 2020, its aggression would result in an invasion of Ukraine. It was deemed by many to be absurd, if not impossible. I won’t deny that I felt vindicated. Some men crave money, some crave glory. My desire is to be right. This was a moment in which I was right and could show why I was right.

What dampens my pleasure is that being right means being war. Last week, I wrote about the agony of war through the experience of my father in World War II. It was personal. When I wrote my forecast over a decade ago, it was an impersonal thing. At the time, my purpose was simple: to write a book that accurately mapped out the coming years. I realize now that the passion to be right blinds you to what you are right about.

When I wrote what I did, I wrote heedless to what I was predicting. Even worse, when the Russians crossed the border, my first thought was not for the troops at the crossings that were exchanging fire and trading death. My thought was the pleasure of being right. It required the recollection of my father’s life to grasp the perversion that was embedded in my being right. This did not affect the world, which spins on without concerning itself with me. But it concerns the profession I have entered and in some ways created.

Geopolitics is the science of how nations interact. My most important forecasts are about pain, even when they are not about war. Some, like my forecast on the United States now taking place, is a rare exception to war. Others, like the decline and fragmentation of China, have not yet happened. In the case of the United States, I thought I was offering an element of comfort by arguing that the discord of our time had happened before and that America emerged better for it. Over the past few years, as I have lived, heard and seen the unending rage and mutual loathing within our country, I have realized that the forecast offers little solace.

My goal has been to try to provide a roadmap of the future, one built around the forces that compel and constrain nations. My argument is that individuals may shape their lives within the limits of these constraints, but as individuals, they are trapped in the time and place in which they live. The collective public is trapped in this time and place, and all its collective anger and hope is of little consequence. We are all living our lives, trapped in reality.

I wrote what I did in the hope that my method was right and in the hope that understanding the forces that overwhelm us might in some way mitigate the pain of living through history. I wanted to be right about Ukraine and Russia but at the same time hoped that knowledge of what was coming would, if not prevent it, at least mitigate it. I had foreseen a time when Russia would try to reconstruct its empire, when it had to hold Ukraine again, and when the U.S. and Europe would resist. I also saw that invasion was fated to fail and that the defeat would rip Russia apart.

If I was right, then there was no mitigation possible. Every nation was trapped in its own reality, in what it feared and what it hoped. And the world couldn’t care less about what I thought anyway. So I absolve myself. The men sleeping on the cold ground are not there because of anything I have said. They are there because the Russians were not going to permanently accept their fate, because Ukraine did not want to share Russia’s fate, and because the U.S. dollar is a mighty weapon. If Putin had never been born, someone else would seek to reconstruct the Russian Empire. And failing would reside over another Russian geopolitical catastrophe.

Whether my forecasts are correct or not doesn’t matter to history or to humanity. But it matters to me in that, for unknown reasons, I do want to be right and I have a soul that has to be tended to. Taking pleasure in events that will breed agony does not make it well.

I had a friend once who was a neonatologist, a doctor who treated premature children, many of whom were going to die. My own son was born under his care, and he survived and flourished. I hung around with my friend through some very dark hours, and he explained to me that the most important thing he did was identify the children who would die no matter what. Doing that, he said, gave him the time and strength to deal with the ones who might live.

I take solace in that, even if it is absurd to do so. What he did resulted, hopefully, in good. Nothing I do will save or kill a nation. I am simply trying to call the play by play of a game I barely understand to an audience that isn’t listening. And that is the solace I have. Right or wrong, history is not waiting for my verdict. There is comfort in that.

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics shift
« Reply #1210 on: April 15, 2022, 05:34:06 AM »
Walter Russell Mead:  "We've moved from a post-war era to a pre-war era".

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1211 on: April 15, 2022, 05:35:05 AM »
 :-o :-o :-o

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The Cold War Never Ended
« Reply #1212 on: April 16, 2022, 12:20:31 PM »
The author not infrequently is self-important and hubristic, but IMHO although I disagree with certain points this is an intelligent thoughtful big picture piece:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2022-04-06/cold-war-never-ended-russia-ukraine-war?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=The%20Cold%20War%20Never%20Ended&utm_content=20220415&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017

PS:  He could benefit from George Friedman's analytical framework around geography.

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GPF: India's defiance of Washington's Russia Strategy
« Reply #1213 on: April 18, 2022, 06:03:50 AM »
pril 18, 2022
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India’s Defiance of Washington’s Russia Strategy
New Delhi has resisted calls to stop doing business with the Russian economy.
By: Allison Fedirka

Under normal circumstances, India would have little reason to care about what happens in Ukraine. The current circumstances, however, are far from normal. The war in Ukraine has put U.S.-Indian relations back into the spotlight as Washington lobbies all of its major allies to join its economic assault on Moscow. So far, India has resisted. The U.S. wants to use the Ukraine conflict to bring India into alignment with the West on issues that don’t relate to China, but New Delhi is unwilling to impose its own sanctions on Russia and recently even agreed to purchase millions of barrels of Russian oil. Its defiance is important less because of India’s ability to prop up the Russian economy and more because of what it says about the state of U.S.-Indian relations. Still, strategic constraints will compel Washington not to take punitive measures against New Delhi for its noncompliance and to seek mutually acceptable accommodation instead.

Difficult to Manage

Alliances derive their strength from shared interests among members. For the U.S. and India, their mutual desire to contain Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific is the cornerstone of their partnership. But their lack of alignment on other issues can make it difficult to manage. For India, formalizing military or political alignments is seen as risky because the country fears that doing so could make it vulnerable. For much of India’s modern history, the sub-continent fell under the control of a foreign power. Today, the country finds itself between three major powers (Russia, China and the U.S.) and sharing borders with two formidable enemies (Pakistan and China) – all while trying to find its place as a major player in its own right within the region. And while New Delhi agrees on the importance of containing China, the U.S. and India’s distinct geographies, histories and economics result in diverging interests over secondary issues.

The Ukraine matter is a case in point. For the U.S., the Russian threat didn’t end with the Cold War, and a Russian victory in Ukraine would mean a win over the West. But India sees Russia as much less of a threat than the U.S. does. During the Cold War, Russia was a reliable trade and defense partner for India and helped keep China in check. New Delhi has a pragmatic approach to foreign relations and has managed to maintain ties with various partners without fully committing to any single one. It thus has cultivated good relations with Moscow while attempting to strengthen ties with the U.S. of late – and it’s unwilling to veer too far away from this balance.

But the war in Ukraine has complicated India’s position. The U.S. fears that India’s continued willingness to do business with Russia could undermine the U.S. strategy to force Moscow into concessions through economic isolation. India’s noncompliance can best be seen through its energy sector. Since the start of the invasion, India has been on a spending spree, buying up Russian oil at a discounted price compared to international markets. India has ordered an estimated 13 million to 14 million barrels of oil from Russia since the end of February, compared to the 16 million barrels it purchased from Russia all of last year. As the world’s third-largest oil importer, India relies on foreign supplies to meet approximately 80 percent of its needs. Though Russia supplies only 1-2 percent of the oil consumed in India, the main attraction at the moment is the low price – a key consideration given that India spent approximately $100 billion on oil imports in the last fiscal year. Under the current terms, Indian imports of Russian oil don’t violate U.S. sanctions, but Washington fears New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian exports could prove to be an economic lifeline for Moscow.

India's Top Oil Suppliers by volume
(click to enlarge)

India has had similar problems with other energy suppliers in the past. Iran and Venezuela together accounted for 20 percent of India’s oil imports in 2016, but were both subject to U.S. sanctions in recent years. In these cases, however, Washington issued waivers that allowed India to continue importing from these countries during a transition period and increased its own energy exports to help fill the gap. The U.S. has told India that it will help support its efforts to diversify its suppliers again, but that could prove more difficult this time around. The U.S. government is currently using its strategic reserves to boost its own domestic supplies, and private companies have resisted Washington's calls to increase production. Washington’s urging of Saudi Arabia to increase production hasn’t worked either. And the U.S. has already committed to helping European markets find alternative sources, so whatever supplies it’s able to export will need to be shared among all its partners.


(click to enlarge)

To a lesser extent, the U.S. has also taken issue with India’s purchases of Russian fertilizers and defense equipment. Russia is one of the largest global suppliers of fertilizers, which are exempt from U.S. sanctions because of a global shortage and their importance in food production. Prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia banned the export of fertilizers through the end of June and limited the countries to which its supplies could be sent. India is among the approved destinations – though it received only 8.5 percent of its fertilizer imports by value from Russia in 2020.

Washington had concerns over India’s procurement of Russian defense equipment even before the war in Ukraine began. During the Soviet era, India acquired much of its military equipment from the USSR. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is still India’s top arms supplier, accounting for just under half of all arms imports. But this figure is down from 69 percent between 2012 and 2017, as Russia’s share in India’s arms imports has steadily declined over the past decade. That’s in part because India is developing a national defense industry initiative, which will increase its self-sufficiency in arms, and recently announced it would stop importing over 100 defense-related goods from Russia by the end of this year. Notably, the U.S. has not applied the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to India since its introduction in 2017. Under the act, any country that signs defense deals with Russia, Iran or North Korea may be subject to sanctions.

Levers and Constraints

The U.S. does have some economic levers it can use to influence India’s behavior. Trade between the two countries totaled $113.4 billion in 2021 – one-third U.S. exports to India and two-thirds U.S. imports from India – making the United States India’s largest trade partner. Exports to the U.S. account for 18.9 percent of India’s total exports and the equivalent of 3.5 percent of gross domestic product. The U.S. is also a major contributor of foreign direct investment, spending roughly $41 billion in India in 2020. In 2021, it ranked as India’s second-largest source of FDI behind Singapore. The services sector was the top beneficiary (16 percent), which includes outsourcing, R&D and tech testing. This was followed by computer software and hardware, which receives 14 percent of total FDI. For India, technology remains a top priority for trade and FDI as many of the government’s economic development initiatives rely on getting access to or funding for technology from places like the U.S. and the EU.

U.S. - India Trade
(click to enlarge)

However, the U.S. faces three strategic constraints that prevent it from bringing its full economic power to bear on India. First, its Indo-Pacific strategy for containing China requires India’s participation. And given that the U.S.-China rivalry will likely remain for years to come, Washington needs New Delhi on its side in the long term. Second, it’s in the U.S.’ interest to maintain a relatively stable and functional India to counter China. Imposing economic punishments for India’s unwillingness to toe the line on Russia could be destabilizing for New Delhi, and that would only benefit Beijing. Last, India plays an important role in the foreign policies of the U.K. and Australia – the former of which is relying on commonwealth states to boost trade to offset the economic losses from leaving the EU. Australia, meanwhile, signed an interim free trade agreement with India earlier this month. The pact, which covers over 90 percent of goods traded between the two countries, is part of Australia’s strategy to reduce its dependence on China. The U.S. wouldn’t want to do anything to weaken these relationships with India, especially because the U.K. and Australia are both members of the Five Eyes, Washington’s most important security alliance.

When it comes to trade with Russia, there’s plenty of space for the U.S. and India to find mutually acceptable accommodation. New Delhi has shown that it’s willing to work toward self-sufficiency in the defense sector, meaning its purchases of Russian military goods will diminish over time – although this will likely be a long process. Besides, Washington has already given New Delhi some leeway here by not imposing sanctions over its Russian arms purchases. India’s other main imports from Russia are fairly low and focus on strategic sectors essential to keeping the Indian economy running – i.e., fertilizers and energy. As long as this remains the case, the U.S. will tolerate the limited commercial exchange between India and Russia.


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George Friedman: Historical Phases and Transitions
« Reply #1216 on: April 23, 2022, 06:29:08 PM »
April 22, 2022
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Historical Phases and Transitions
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

I have said before that 1991 was the year one era ended and another began. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Maastricht treaty was signed. Operation Desert Storm occurred and the Japanese economic miracle collapsed. The previous era had been dominated by the Cold War, a global ideological and strategic confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Most global events fit somewhere in that paradigm.

The new era’s essence was contained in the European Union, which emerged out of the fear of yet another European war and the belief that war was obsolete and that the global system was now primarily about economics. This era had other dimensions as well. Desert Storm energized Islamic fundamentalism and triggered decades of war on terror. Japan’s decline made room for China’s rise. The new era was not about the potential for nuclear war in the bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, but rather about the decline of national boundaries and the primacy of international trade.

In my view, the Russian invasion of Ukraine signals a new era, whose shape is not yet clear. Obviously, war has returned as a primary factor, but perhaps more important, the use of economic warfare by the United States and the resurrection of Cold War institutions signal a new way of using economics – from faith in global economics enriching the world to the use of global economics as an instrument of war. This must be preliminary because we have seen only Ukraine and perhaps COVID-19 as indicators of this shift.

Human life is built on patterns: birth, childhood, adulthood, reproduction and exit. If the life of one human being is orderly in its broad outlines, it seems to me odd to think the life of human society would be random. So, I spend perhaps too much of my time looking for those patterns, a field theory of humanity. In looking at 1991, and what is unfolding now before us, I decided to try to take a quick hand at parsing human history for the past 200 years or so. Below you have my first, and likely half-baked, cut at this. Its use is not in simply finding order in history, although that has importance. Its potential use might be that in finding order, the wrenching and psychologically destabilizing blows dealt out by shifts might be mitigated. Of course, such grandiose thoughts must follow the question of whether the order I am presenting is real or simply an illusion I have created, with boundaries that are clear only in my head. I don’t normally present minimally thought-out ideas (some might argue with that), but in this case I thought it might have some value. It is something I have been playing with for some time, but it seems particularly significant in 2022. I have not tried to include the transitional events as I did in 1991 but simply to identify transitional points.

This is focused heavily on Europe, with minimal mentions of other continents, but that is because global history was forged and dominated by Europe for the past 200 years or so, transiting to other countries as drivers only in later epochs.

Five Epochs of History Since 1789 and the Emerging Sixth

1. 1789-1858 (69 years): Republicanism challenges the kingdoms of Europe

This epoch begins with the French Revolution and the rise of an attempt to reshape Europe into a single entity. A culture emerged of nation-states liberally governed, with the decline of the old European political and social order.

2. 1858-1914 (56 years): European empires dominate the globe

1858 marked the establishment of the British Raj in India and a definitive point in which much of the world, already under European intrusion and assault, found itself enveloped in European imperialism, where previously there were assaults but no systematic imperial system. Where France defined the previous epoch, Britain defined this one.

3. 1914-1945 (31 years): Europe tears itself apart, U.S. emerges

This epoch was dominated by European wars that resulted in the emergence of the United States as a dominant economic and military force, and in the collapse of the British
imperial system.

4. 1945-1991 (46 years): Two ideologies of the Enlightenment become geopolitical

This period was dominated by the U.S.-Soviet struggle centered on Europe but fought globally. The global fear was of nuclear war, but the global reality was that the American economic and technical model dominated much of the world, supplanting the culture of European imperialism.

5. 1991-2022 (31 years): American triumph and the fantasy of global peace and prosperity

6. 2022-????

When we look at the prior epochs, we are struck by discontinuity. European self-absorption is replaced by European obsession with the world. European obsession with the world is replaced by European subordination to the United States. The ideological military confrontation of the Cold War is replaced by a globalist ideology.

In separating the epochs, it is not simply that a conflict ended and a new power emerged but rather that the fundamental reality of the world changed. The most important thing about the Cold War was not U.S. victory but the creation of an entirely new conception of the world. Beginning with the French Revolution, the certainties of the world shifted dramatically every generation or two.

If this is true, then defining which country rises or falls, while necessary, is insufficient. If the Ukraine war defines the end of the fifth era, a return to a multi-generation cold war between the United States and Russia as a defining principle of the epoch is the least likely outcome. The end of the Cold War resulted in very different players playing a very different game.

I keep looking at the sequence, and I realize that each epoch was a fundamentally different reality. And what is most startling is the speed at which it evolves. When I look at other times, shifts on this order after one or two generations don’t happen. Now it appears with regularity. Some would guess it is technology, but I don’t think so. Technology has a base in the Enlightenment, and enlightenment is an unhappy culture, always yearning for something new and better. Technology is simply part of this culture.

The crucial point is that within an epoch there is an overarching theme that is constantly repeating itself. In the fourth epoch, there was the Cold War, the third European and global wars. The fifth saw the decline of nations in favor of economics. The difference between epochs is striking and sudden. If I am right, we are just over the threshold to the sixth epoch, whose shape might be discernable if this model becomes far more comprehensive and significant. In looking at the model, these elements seem obvious and hold no secrets. But it is obvious because we all know this history and have not looked carefully under the hood. I am trying to find the latch on the hood, still far from the careful look. First thoughts, long mumbled about.

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GPF: George Friedman: The Beginning of a New Era
« Reply #1217 on: May 03, 2022, 04:10:45 AM »
May 3, 2022
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The Beginning of a New Era
By: George Friedman

A week ago, I wrote a piece on the stages of history, pointing out systemic shifts that have taken place for more than 200 years. In the last century, these shifts took place roughly 30-40 years apart with the last occurring in 1991, or about 30 years ago. That year, the Cold War ended, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, Operation Desert Storm began, and the Japanese economic miracle ended, opening the door for China’s rise. The world in 1989 was very different from the one in 1992.

We are now in an era in which shifts occur. Being in an era doesn’t necessarily mean the shift will immediately come; the change between the epoch of world wars and the post-Cold War world took almost 50 years, solidified as it had been by the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. It is uncertain why some eras last longer than others. It might well be simply chance. An alternative to consider is that some eras are based on single, very solid realities, while others are based on multiple and more fragile ones. Thus, the 1945-1991 era was based on the solid foundation of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, while 1991-2022 was based on multiple forces – the global war on terror, the European Union, China emerging, Russia asserting itself, and so on. It was less coherent and therefore more fragile. Our current epoch began with more fragmented shifts, creating a less stable platform.

Whatever the reasons, the era that began in 1991 is coming to an end, and a new era is beginning. All the major northern entities or nations – China, the U.S., Russia and Europe – are undergoing profound changes. For Russia, the invasion of Ukraine is only the latest and most important attempt to reverse the events of 1991. But with a per capita gross domestic product ranking of 86, the turn away from communism may not be as profitable as was once thought. And with a military being outperformed by Ukrainian forces, it can hardly be considered a major military power. Put simply, Russia hasn’t lived up to its own expectations, so it will either undergo the revolution expected in the prior period, continue its aggressive moves using limited military capability, or end up as a minor power, albeit one with nuclear weapons.

The war in Ukraine has also changed Europe. NATO has reemerged as a primary, parallel system with the EU, one with somewhat different members, a different agenda and differing budgetary costs. More important, the trans-Atlantic relationship has been given new life, along with a greater commitment to military expenditures. This takes Europe into a fundamentally different configuration. First, as government expenditures rise and economic performance contracts under the pressure of conflict, the stresses within the EU will get worse. And with increased U.S. dependence, Washington may again be seen as an alternative economic partner to Germany. The European Union, already under centrifugal pressures, will have to redefine itself once again.

China is also in transition. It has undergone a period of breakneck economic growth. Like Japan before it, and the United States long before that, China has been in an extraordinary economic expansion. When Japan reached the limits of double-digit growth in 1991, its decline led to its replacement by China. Japan had surged its economy on a combination of low-cost exports, followed by advanced technology growth. It had financed this through a financial system that allocated capital on both an economic and political basis – through keiretsu, or families of companies. It surged on a disciplined workforce. It ran into intensive competition for low-value goods that undersold its own, as well as political resistance by its consuming countries, particularly the United States. This intensified with high-value goods like autos. As volume or margins declined, the fragility of the financial system revealed itself, and in the lost decade, it had to transform itself.

But now China’s low-end exports are eroding under competition, as are its high-end products, to say nothing of resistance to exports by consuming markets. An expansion that began 40 years before can’t sustain its growth rate. Exports come under pressure, and the financial system does too. In China’s case, this happened in the real estate sector, which is used as a failsafe. Failures in this sector, including defaults, inevitably destabilize the economy and thus create political tension. Dramatically slower growth in China is likely, with large numbers of Chinese citizens who never fully benefitted from previous growth, a dangerous situation.

The United States is still the strongest power in the world despite domestic discord and economic pressure. That discord is cyclical, and it presages an economic surge built on new technology. But for now, American economic power, seen most recently through the use of the dollar against Russia, still stands tall. The United States is the least likely of the four majors to require institutional change, which has helped it to maintain its position since 1945.

The prior assumptions about Russia and China as emerging powers are now questionable at best. Things change, but today it’s hard to see a Russian resurgence or a rapid end to China’s economic problems. So if we are at the beginning of a cyclical shift, as I think we are, the U.S. will be one of the pillars of the transition to the new era. It is hard to visualize the rest. Who would have thought in 1991 that China would surge, or in 1945 that Europe would rebuild itself as it did? The easy part of this project is done, I think, and it is time to look for the unimaginable that exists in any epoch


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Kissinger predicts point at which Putin will have to end Uke War
« Reply #1219 on: May 11, 2022, 06:57:10 AM »
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/henry-kissinger-predicts-point-at-which-putin-will-have-to-end-ukraine-war/ar-AAX6XiK?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=767a111e67dc41c49def0c88be3e1e9a

Henry Kissinger believes President Vladimir Putin miscalculated the international situation and Russia's own capabilities when he launched the invasion of Ukraine. He will have to end the war when it effectively kills off any chance of Russia remaining a great power in the future, the former secretary of state predicts.

Kissinger, who served under the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the 1970s, told a Financial Times event over the weekend that he fears the conflict could veer into the nuclear realm.

Kissinger played a key role in shaping American foreign policy during the Cold War, his guidance leading to a relaxing of tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Russia, and especially between the U.S. and China, which led to President Nixon's historic visit to Beijing in 1972.

At the FTWeekend Festival in Washington on Saturday, Kissinger told the paper's U.S. national editor, Edward Luce, about how he managed to split Moscow from Beijing by treating the two enemies differently. Amid hostilities in Europe, Washington should now seek to do the same once again, Kissinger said.

The former secretary warned against taking "an adversarial position" on both China and Russia that could drive them closer together. "After the Ukraine war, Russia will have to reassess its relationship to Europe at a minimum and its general attitude towards NATO," he said.

The war in Ukraine is now in its 11th week, and Russia has so far failed to achieve any major objectives in the country. In early April, Russian troops that were deployed in the areas surrounding Kyiv were redirected by the Kremlin to southeast Ukraine, with the new goal of "completely liberating" the Donbas region. The Ukrainian armed forces were able to regain control of larges part of the north as a result.


Western intelligence and international observers were expecting Putin to make a big announcement on Monday as Russia marked its annual Victory Day parade on May 9, celebrating the Soviet Union's defeat of Nazi Germany. But, surprisingly, the Russian president refrained from declaring all-out war on Ukraine or announcing general mobilization, a move analysts say may be a sign that Putin is wary of the Russian people are willing to endure.

At the current stage, it's hard to predict how the war will end. Asked about its possible conclusion, Kissinger told Luce that Russia would continue fighting in Ukraine until the conflict eats up so much of its military capability and resources that the country risks losing its status as a great power.

"The obvious question is how long will this escalation continue and how much scope is there for further escalation?" Kissinger said. "Or has he reached the limit of his capability, and he has to decide at what point escalating the war will strain his society to a point that will limit its fitness to conduct international policy as a great power in the future?"

At that point, Kissinger said, whether Russia would then turn to its nuclear arsenal in order to end the war was something he couldn't predict. "We are now living in a totally new era" from the Cold War, he said.

As for avoiding a nuclear disaster—Kissinger's goal during the Cold War—circumstances have changed so much in recent decades that there needs to be a whole new discussion about the potential implications of nuclear weapons use, he said.

"As technology spreads around the world, as it does inherently, diplomacy and war will need a different content and that will be a challenge," Kissinger said.

"One thing we could not do in my opinion is just accept it," he concluded.

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Hall Monitor Col. Vindman advocates victory
« Reply #1220 on: May 13, 2022, 04:23:23 AM »
We clearly see here the forces at work behind Vindman's participation in the attempted Impeachment Coup of Trump.

That said, at this point, has he become right?  Should America look for Uke victory?

====================================================

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-05-11/america-embrace-ukraine-victory-goal?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=The%20Coup%20in%20the%20Kremlin&utm_content=20220513&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017

America Must Embrace the Goal of Ukrainian Victory
It’s Time to Move Past Washington’s Cautious Approach
By Alexander Vindman
May 11, 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-05-11/america-embrace-ukraine-victory-goal



For years before Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Ukrainians had been growing frustrated with U.S. leadership. A former high-level Ukrainian official described U.S. policy to the country in this way: “You won’t let us drown, but you won’t let us swim.” Washington has earned this mixed reputation in the decades since Ukraine broke free from the Soviet Union in 1991. Although Ukraine saw the United States as an indispensable partner and greatly appreciated U.S. security and economic assistance, many Ukrainians were aggrieved that the United States remained reluctant to more fully and forthrightly support them in the face of Russian provocations and aggression—even following Ukraine’s pivot toward the West after the tumult of 2014, when protests toppled a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and Russia responded by annexing Crimea and invading the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. With few exceptions, Ukrainian pleas for increased military aid, greater economic investment, and a concrete road map for integration with Europe fell on deaf ears in Washington. The Ukrainians could not understand why the U.S. national security establishment continued to privilege maintaining stable relations with Russia—an irredentist and revanchist authoritarian state—over support for Ukraine, a democratic state that had made important strides in weeding out corruption and implementing democratic reforms.

In the two months since Russia attacked Ukraine, the United States has thus far lived up to this ambivalent reputation. It has committed aid to Ukraine in fits and starts and has sought to avoid an escalation with Russia at the expense of more uncompromising support for Ukraine’s defense. But Washington can and should do more. The United States can shore up regional stability, global security, and the liberal international order by working to ensure a Ukrainian victory. To achieve this goal, Washington must finally abandon a failed policy that has prioritized trying to build a stable relationship with Russia. It needs to discard the desire—which seems to shape views on the National Security Council—to see Ukraine ultimately compromise with Russia for the sake of a negotiated peace. And the United States must give Ukraine the support it needs to bring this war to a close as soon as possible.

A FIGHTING CHANCE

Thus far, the National Security Council has stubbornly refused to end its policy of incremental assistance and adopt a strategy for supplying continuous aid to Ukraine. Such elevated support could prove to be a deciding factor on the battlefield. As it stands, the United States has missed one opportunity after the other to help precipitate a decisive Ukrainian victory and stop Russia from making gains in the Donbas. Instead of foreclosing the possibility of a Russian success, Washington’s strategy of metering incremental military aid to Ukraine—based on a flawed assessment of the risk of escalation and the potential consequences of a Russian defeat—has provided Moscow with the time and space to continue its war, even as it now shifts to defending the territory it has seized since February 24.


Ukraine has already demonstrated that it can successfully hit operational military targets in Russia, such as rail lines, airfields, depots, and materiel stockpiles, in a restricted and responsible manner. With new long-range firing capabilities delivered by the United States, Ukraine would be able to strike farther into Russia and destroy militarily relevant targets, thus reducing Moscow’s capabilities and limiting its potential for further offensive attacks. Ukrainian forces have given Washington good reason to trust in their restraint and have refrained from conducting strikes on strategic targets or civilian targets that could stoke escalatory tensions with Russia. Given such evidence, the United States has little reason to wring its hands over shipping additional and more powerful weapons to Ukraine that could undermine Russia’s war effort.

The war has reached a critical inflection point, with Russia on its heels after a disastrous start and now seeking to consolidate control over the east of Ukraine. Even in the face of Russia’s humiliating military blunders, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to accept a cease-fire or peace deal on unfavorable terms. He continues to believe that Russia has the resources and equipment necessary to win a war of attrition. He could be wrong—the Ukrainian military has performed masterfully, and the Ukrainians themselves have rallied in extraordinary numbers to repulse the Russian attack—but he may not reach this conclusion until months down the road. By that time, more Ukrainian cities will have been reduced to rubble, and untold numbers of Ukrainians will have been raped, maimed, slaughtered, deported, or displaced.

NO MORE BUSINESS AS USUAL

Short of direct intervention, the United States can prevent further massacres of Ukrainian civilians and further destruction of the country only by supplying more lethal aid. That effort starts at home by training and preparing the Ukrainians to use advanced NATO military equipment and simultaneously replenishing U.S. allies’ capabilities as they transfer Soviet-era systems to Ukraine. The United States must also continue to pressure European leaders who have been overly cautious and indecisive in their military support for Ukraine’s defense, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. They must come to understand that there can be no return to business as usual with Russia as long as Putin rules from the Kremlin. Momentum may be on Ukraine’s side, but Kyiv alone cannot bring an end to this war. Without a steady stream of supplies from the United States and its allies to replace its lost or exhausted equipment, Ukraine may find itself mired in a drawn-out war of attrition. Even if Russia’s ground forces prove ineffective, the Kremlin can still sustain combat operations with air power and long-range shelling over an extended period of time, during which Russia may attempt to regroup for a broader offensive or seek to consolidate its territorial gains. The West must deny Russia that window of opportunity.

Many analysts and advisers believe the United States should stagger its support to Ukraine to encourage Kyiv to make what they see as necessary concessions to Moscow. Overt calls for appeasing Russia have become more muted—especially as Ukraine performs superbly on the battlefield and as many Western observers see the conflict as a battle between democracy and autocracy. But many in Washington still privately express their belief that any peace deal will require Ukraine to cede some territory to Russia. This camp believes that boosting U.S. support may make Ukraine unwilling to compromise. But the fact remains that one or both sides need to think they can lose to pave the way for fruitful negotiations, and neither Kyiv nor Moscow has reached this point, with both states unwilling to accept the other’s demands.


Washington is fretting over how it can prevent a Russian defeat while limiting the scope of a Ukrainian victory.

Why, then, is the United States looking to Kyiv to bend in the face of Russian aggression rather than working to convince the Kremlin that it will lose this war? To avoid destabilizing Russia too much. Some experts fear that a Russian loss—or some other inglorious outcome for Moscow—may precipitate a broader war or nuclear escalation. Washington, in other words, is fretting over how it can prevent a Russian defeat while limiting the scope of a Ukrainian victory. As thousands of Ukrainians die defending their country, and as Putin wields the threat of nuclear escalation to frighten his opponents in the West, U.S. policymakers should move forward with one explicit goal: helping Ukraine win on the battlefield to the fullest extent possible.

This option carries obvious risks, but the alternate scenarios—including a cyberwar between Russia and NATO, Russian conventional attacks on NATO arms shipments to deter external assistance for Ukraine, a NATO intervention in the conflict, and potential accidents or miscalculations that could precipitate a broader war—will grow only more likely the longer the war drags on. The solution to the present crisis is not to wait until the war spills over into the rest of Europe or draws other countries into the conflict. Acting now will reduce the probability of catastrophes further down the line. Moreover, the risk of a nuclear escalation has been overstated and remains exceptionally small: even Putin understands the extraordinary taboo he would be breaking by employing nuclear arms. Rhetorical threats and political theater abound in the Kremlin, but there have been no movements or changes in Russia’s nuclear forces that would indicate that a nuclear strike is under consideration, no matter Russia’s warnings that continued arms shipments to Ukraine from the West could prompt such a response.

Stepping up military assistance for Ukraine would not be a reckless shot in the dark. Rather, it is a risk-informed move that is unlikely to provoke any meaningful retaliation from Moscow. It remains in Russia’s interests to prevent the conflict from escalating. Deploying a nuclear weapon would provoke swift, severe, and unpredictable reactions from the international community. The threshold for Russia’s use of weapons of mass destruction, let alone a nuclear weapon, remains almost impossibly high. Russia cannot use such weapons against NATO and the West without provoking a concomitant response, per the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Even the prospect of the use of weapons of mass destruction against Ukraine seems highly unlikely, as the United States has warned Russia that such an attack may draw NATO into the conflict. Russia is loath to set off a war with NATO, particularly when its military is already experiencing humbling setbacks in Ukraine.

WHAT THE WEST OWES UKRAINE

As the war in Ukraine drags on, Kyiv may ultimately opt for a negotiated settlement. Until such time as Ukraine feels ready to approach the negotiating table on its own terms, however, it is not the West’s place to coerce Kyiv into accepting an armistice, much less a cease-fire, merely for the sake of cooling tensions with Russia. Even if Putin declares victory, the West should not rein in Ukraine’s efforts to liberate occupied regions in the hope that the conflict will fade away. Such an agreement could even prove counterproductive: a pause in the fighting could give the Russian military an opportunity to regroup and rearm for a new push into Ukrainian territory and simultaneously deprive the Ukrainian military of precious momentum on the battlefield. Russia would also get a chance to consolidate its gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. There are already signs that the Kremlin may attempt to stage another referendum on the establishment of the so-called Kherson’s People’s Republic in the territory Russia has newly occupied in southern Ukraine. If any hypothetical agreement were to leave Ukrainians in these occupied territories, then it would be with the full knowledge that torture, rape, killing, kidnapping, and deportation would continue, much as they have in the Russian-occupied territories in the Donbas and Crimea since 2014.

Given these circumstances, peace in Ukraine must—and will—come only through Kyiv’s victory, not its capitulation. Nothing in Putin’s track record suggests that he will voluntarily end the conflict in Ukraine on Kyiv’s terms, and there is no reason to believe that the Kremlin will honor a new agreement any more than it has honored past treaties or cease-fires. The Ukrainians believe in and are fighting for their victory. Despite the toll of the invasion, polling data and anecdotal evidence suggest that morale in the besieged country remains extraordinarily high. On the other hand, some in the West seem to peddle the idea that the United States and NATO are fighting Russia down “to the last Ukrainian.” But the Ukrainians are not fighting the West’s war, and they do not need to be coerced into resisting Russia’s aggression. There is no shortage of fighting spirit in Ukraine—or of faith in the country’s skill and potential. It is the West, apparently, that still needs convincing.

HOW TO BEAT RUSSIA

A Ukrainian victory against Russia will be defined, first and foremost, by the Ukrainians themselves. Ukraine’s triumph will likely entail the liberation of Ukrainian territories occupied after Moscow’s initial assault on February 24. This is entirely within Ukraine’s power: Ukrainian forces already succeeded in expelling Russian forces north of Kyiv in a matter of weeks and are winning back areas around the city of Kharkiv. With a constant flow of Western support and training, they will also succeed in the battle for the east and the south.

This is where Washington can and must do more: although the Biden administration’s recent announcement of $34.7 billion to fund five months’ worth of military aid is welcome, the Ukrainian army increasingly needs new and advanced weapons to fend off Russia’s military, air power, and long-range weapons. The weapons included in current U.S. packages—including towed howitzers, Soviet-era helicopters, tactical vehicles, armored personnel carriers, unmanned coastal defense vessels, and military surveillance and reconnaissance drones—are more of the same. This materiel is merely replacing what Ukrainian forces have lost or used up rather than bolstering Ukraine’s capacities; it will not hasten Russia’s defeat on the battlefield. Ukraine still needs more advanced military technology and the comprehensive training to accompany arms shipments from the West. Moreover, although the United States and its allies have provided assistance that categorically checks boxes in some areas, the total volume of aid has also been insufficient. Ukraine needs squadrons of advanced unmanned combat aerial vehicles, battalions of multiple rocket launchers, and multiple batteries of surface-to-air missile and antiship missile systems.


Peace in Ukraine must—and will—come only through Kyiv’s victory, not its capitulation.

Providing this breadth and depth of support will require institutional changes in Washington to speed up the current incremental approach to lethal aid packages. The U.S. government is already taking some important steps in this direction, albeit too slowly. The president recently signed the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022—a program that I called for in these pages—into law, which will expedite arms transfers and give the president greater authority to enter into agreements with Ukraine to lend or lease defense equipment. This arrangement must be transformed from an ad hoc one to a recurring, continuous supply of arms. Otherwise, piecemeal arms shipments will continue to put out small fires in Ukraine without changing the state of play in the broader conflict. To fully implement a lend-lease program, NATO must begin to consolidate the equipment Ukraine will need for the coming weeks and months of war and establish warehouses for supplies just across the border from Ukraine in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Depots and stockpiles can then be organized for Ukraine to draw whatever it needs without going through a protracted requisition and delivery process. Furthermore, NATO should use its competencies in planning for war to identify what Ukraine needs to sustain the war effort now, rather than waiting for the Ukrainians to make resupply requests themselves. And as for those who are concerned that such efforts will allow Ukraine to beat Russia too soundly, such as the leaders of the National Security Council, they would do well to remember that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has consistently expressed his willingness to resolve these issues diplomatically; any failure in diplomacy thus far falls squarely on the Kremlin.

A long-term Ukrainian victory will also require both the country’s greater integration into Europe and a monumental international campaign to help rebuild Ukraine, akin to the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of World War II. Ukraine is already making swift progress in its campaign to join the EU: the Ukrainian government has submitted a formal questionnaire for EU membership, and the country could be granted candidate status within weeks. The United States admittedly has limited influence over these proceedings, but it can still project soft power—and give diplomatic nudges to allies in Europe—to encourage the expedited conferral of EU candidate status to Ukraine. As for the issue of reconstruction, the EU is planning to establish a so-called solidarity trust fund for Ukraine. The United States—as well as the United Kingdom and any other willing democratic countries—should also rally to the cause of economic revival in Ukraine. Public-private partnerships seeded with a combination of grants, private equity, and asset seizures and forfeitures from Russia could direct funds to rebuild Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure. These funds could be guided and managed by both an EU integration process and a board of directors drawn from Ukraine and the United States to ensure accountability, but Ukrainian oversight would be crucial in shaping an effective economic plan for the country.

This long-term vision for victory will not be realized, however, until security is reestablished and guaranteed in Ukraine. If peace will come only on the heels of a military breakthrough, then the United States has an obligation to help Ukraine win on the battlefield. Those worried about escalation with Russia must understand that the risks of a Ukrainian victory are greatly exaggerated. The risks of a Ukrainian loss are far greater and would entail irreversible damage to the liberal order, international law, security norms, and global stability. That is an outcome that the United States cannot afford and should be doing everything in its power to avoid.

==================

Pentagon mouthpiece D1:

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/does-west-want-ukraine-win-or-not/366820/
« Last Edit: May 13, 2022, 06:16:05 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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Kaplan & Bernard Henri Levy: The opportunity in the Uke crisis
« Reply #1221 on: May 16, 2022, 04:16:19 AM »
For the record, I do not agree with the description of the Kurd events:
==================================================

The Opportunity in the Ukraine Crisis
Biden can revive America’s standing after the Afghan debacle. The first step is to help the Kurds.
By Thomas S. Kaplan and Bernard-Henri Lévy
May 15, 2022 1:32 pm ET

‘A statesman cannot create anything himself,” the “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck, observed. “He must wait and listen until he hears the steps of God sounding through events; then leap up and grasp the hem of his garment.” A century and a half later, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has apparently heard those steps. By canceling a critical gas deal with Russia and overturning a longstanding policy of not sending lethal weapons into war zones, Mr. Scholz has seized the garment and transformed Germany’s role in the world.

Of even greater importance for the global order, Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine could be providential for President Biden too. Like it or not, the retreat of the U.S. has been the big story in the chancelleries and ministries of Europe, Asia and the Middle East for many years. Even before Barack Obama’s failure to follow through on his Syrian “red line” and Donald Trump’s betrayal of Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, the word on the street has been loud and clear: America is faithless to its friends and at serious risk of being challenged by a new axis of China, Russia and even second-tier adversaries like Iran.

This may seem like a bum rap on America, which has been a mostly benevolent hegemon for decades. But as the Ukrainians and the Kurds well know, life is unfair. Nobody likes a loser, especially an arrogant one. One can be arrogant yet magnificent in projecting power and values. One can be ineffectual yet respected if one is at least humble about one’s missteps. To be ineffectual and arrogant simultaneously elicits universal contempt.

The U.S. hit rock bottom with the tragic fiasco of its bungled exit from Afghanistan. America’s natural allies quite reasonably asked if they should hedge their bets with China and Iran.


Then things changed. The debacle in Kabul, which likely emboldened the Kremlin, was spectacularly surpassed by Russia’s serial blunders and war crimes in Ukraine. The U.S. was given a historic chance to turn back years of retreat and reassert the leadership that seemed to have been lost forever. Consistent with Bismarck’s observation, America didn’t create this opportunity. It is owing to the unforeseen bravery and leadership of the Ukrainian people and leadership and their ability to channel resilience and courage into a spectacular success on the battlefield that shamed the world into doubling down on their audacity.

But how can the Biden administration turn this gift into one that keeps on giving? First, continue supplying and supporting Ukraine against Russia. But fashion this new posture into a full doctrine and re-create, for the first time in years, a bipartisan foreign policy committed to enabling those who are willing to bear the burden of fighting for interests and values they share with all Americans.

Begin with the Kurds. Like the Ukrainians, America’s Kurdish allies fought and won battles against a vicious foe that is also an adversary of the U.S.—Islamic State. They paid the price for their victories in blood so that America didn’t have to. Like the Ukrainians—a land of more than 40 million that Russia would have us believe isn’t a real nation—the Kurds face a denial of their identity as a people. They number some 30 million and are the largest stateless ethnic group in the world. Like the Ukrainians, they suffer from challenging geography, straddling the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Yet, also like their counterparts in Ukraine, the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Iraq and the Rojava Kurds in Syria are a case study in the effective implementation of America’s longstanding exhortation that its friends should do more of the actual fighting while the U.S. trains and assists them.

The Kurds accepted that bargain. During the conflict with ISIS, which began in 2014, fewer than two dozen U.S. soldiers have been killed. The Kurds bravely and stoically bore the brunt of a successful campaign in which they lost some 11,000 men and women and suffered another 23,000 wounded.

What were the wages of this exceptional case study in “burden sharing”? Betrayal. First in Iraq after the 2017 referendum in which the Kurds voted for independence, then in Syria when American troops were ordered to step aside in 2019 so that Turkish forces and their Islamist proxies could invade and slaughter our comrades-in-arms.

Both Mr. Biden and Kamala Harris spoke out against this travesty against the Kurds. Practically all their fellow Democrats agreed. Most Republicans have also shown themselves to be vehemently pro-Kurd in their expressions of gratitude and admiration for a people who have fought and won brutal struggles so that terrorism doesn’t visit our towns as well as theirs.

Americans of all political stripes are rallying around Ukraine, and Mr. Biden is right to call on Congress to pass $40 billion in aid. Americans of all stripes would support the Kurds too if presented the opportunity. It’s up to the president to give them one.

One bipartisan win in today’s America may be seen to be an accident. But two would be cause for a celebration—and a chance for Mr. Biden to make good on his promise that “America is back.”

Mr. Kaplan is chairman and CEO of The Electrum Group LLC. Mr. Lévy is author, most recently, of “The Will to See: Dispatches from a World of Misery and Hope.” They are founders and board members of Justice for Kurds, a New York-based nonprofit.



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George Friedman on Henry Kissinger
« Reply #1224 on: May 27, 2022, 08:14:14 AM »
May 27, 2022
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Why I Disagree With Henry Kissinger
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
Henry Kissinger recently spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where he made two significant statements. One was that Ukraine must be prepared to cede some territory to Russia in order to reach a peace treaty, and in doing so allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold on to his position, which Kissinger regards as essential. He also said that Taiwan should not be allowed to become a major issue between the U.S. and China, implying that the U.S. was making it an issue, and by my inference that the Chinese seizure of Taiwan should not trigger a U.S. response.

In both cases, Kissinger believes it is in Washington’s interest to accommodate its adversary. He’s arguing that America’s utmost concern should be global stability, which requires accommodating the interests of nations that want to shift the regional balance of power. In other words, the stability of the former Soviet Union, including the political survival of Putin, will stabilize the region and increase global stability. Likewise, ceding Taiwan to China would stabilize the Western Pacific and increase global stability.

Kissinger held this view when he was advising presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. During the Vietnam War, the goal was not to win the war – he correctly regarded it as unwinnable – but to avoid a confrontation with China and the Soviet Union. In order to do that, he retained U.S. forces in Vietnam in an unwinnable war to give Moscow and Beijing a sense of American inflexibility, even as he carried out intense bombing in the north to demonstrate America’s willingness to wage aggressive warfare. The ultimate goal was to force the North Vietnamese and its allies to reach an agreement that would allow the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam in due course and thereby stabilize relations with the Soviet Union. He wanted to show the U.S.' mettle while maintaining a degree of flexibility. In this convoluted fashion, the war was extended, even lost, but the fundamental goal of a detente with Russia was achieved.

Likewise, his mission to China in the early 1970s had a strategic payoff. The Soviets and the Chinese had fought battles along the Ussuri River. The Russians were considering strikes on China’s nuclear facility at Lop Nor, and China was challenging Russia for leadership of the communist world. Kissinger approached the Chinese with the offer of an understanding between the U.S. and China. The strategic concern of the United States was a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Aligning with China created the possibility of a two-front war. Kissinger had no interest in a war, but the threat would reduce that danger by creating an unacceptable risk for Russia, which paradoxically helped the U.S. reach an understanding on coexistence, reduced the risk of war and stabilized the global system. It also laid the groundwork for the emergence of contemporary China.

Kissinger’s thinking was complex, sometimes seemingly heading away from his ultimate goals, but he focused on a single issue: the threat of the Soviet Union, and thus the threat to the global order. The Soviets threatened Europe, they threatened China, they fished in the Caribbean Sea, and they were a nuclear power. He was prepared to pay any price for that because he saw the Soviets alone as a threat to the global system.

The Soviets postured as though they were willing to risk up to and including nuclear war. In my opinion, they used this posture as a cape to goad the bull into spending energy on matters the Soviets were not interested in. For all his subtlety, Kissinger had a very simple end: avoid direct war with the Soviets and allow them the initiative so that the U.S. could respond and thus demonstrate its will to Moscow. Kissinger was obsessed with the Soviet Union, so when it started to support groups in Latin America, the U.S. responded. The Soviets did not see themselves as nearly as powerful as Kissinger did, but learned that if the main was quiet, Chile, Syria or Angola could be agitated.

Kissinger’s response to the Russian attack on Ukraine flows from the same logic. He sees a conflict between Iraq and Syria as frightening the Russians concerning U.S. intentions. He sees Putin as he saw Leonid Brezhnev: as a potentially stabilizing force that is less dangerous than a power vacuum filled by a less flexible person. In that sense, defending Ukraine could simply make things worse.

With China, I think a different but related dynamic was at play. Kissinger’s greatest achievement was opening China and making it an ally. In his mind, he achieved it through accommodation, but in fact it was because China never lost its fear of the United States. After the U.S. inflicted massive casualties on the Chinese army, Mao saw the U.S. as powerful, the U.S. saw China as a possible ally, and each went away relieved by the deal.

It is good to overestimate your enemy so that you are prepared for the worst. But excessive miscalculation will blind you to opportunities and make you beholden to moves by the other side. I think that for Kissinger the failure of the British and French to understand how powerful Germany was drove him to fear repeating their mistakes. This informs his positions on ceding territory to Russia and China. The weaker party must be the cleverer one and approach the obvious with utter caution. Global stability is at stake. In my view, Russia and China are declining powers, while the U.S. is the surging one. This is where you nail the door shut on your adversary.

I will confess, of course, that in the 1970s, as I rose to awareness, my fears of the Russians were as intense as anyone. But over time, as I studied their military and spoke to expatriates, I came to see them differently. That was a long time ago, and I have little right to criticize a man I admire. But thinking him wrong is not the same as being reckless. He played the game he thought he had to. He still is.

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George Friedman: America's interests in Ukraine
« Reply #1225 on: May 31, 2022, 05:38:35 AM »
High regard for GF, but disagree that agreeing to neutral Ukraine would risk Russian conquest of Europe

===================================

May 31, 2022
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America’s Interests in Ukraine
By: George Friedman

Nearly every time Russia has been invaded, it has been saved by its strategic depth. Russia can’t truly be defeated without first taking Moscow, and it is a long way to Moscow. From Napoleon to Hitler, invaders from the west had to try to reach the capital city before the brutal winter came – indeed, it helped to arrive before the rains of autumn choked the roads with mud. Russia must therefore keep the starting point of an attack as far away as possible and use its army to delay its advance as much as possible.

Thus is the strategic value of Ukraine to Russia. If Ukraine remains intact, and if it becomes a part of NATO, Moscow would be less than 300 miles (480 kilometers) from the attackers. Many argue that NATO has no intention of invading. I argue that nothing is less reliable than intentions. War planners must plan on capabilities, which are much slower to change than intentions. Considerations such as the rights of sovereign nations have historically always taken a back seat to the need to guarantee the security of a nation.

Some have argued that the U.S. has no interest in Ukraine, or if it does then it’s a moral interest. The moral argument is not sufficient in the hard realities of geopolitics. I think the U.S. has a fundamental national interest in the war. The United States is secure from land invasion, so the only threats that can arise come from the oceans. Securing the seas has thus been the foundation of U.S. national security since 1900.

History backs this up. It entered World War I after the sinking of the Lusitania. The attack wasn’t the basis for entering the war, of course, but it drove home the point that the conflict would be a naval war too, and that a naval war could threaten fundamental U.S. interests. If Germany had won, it would have controlled the Atlantic, putting the eastern United States at risk.

World War II resurrected the problem. The United States was sufficiently alarmed that it agreed to the Lend-Lease Act, whereby Washington would lend the United Kingdom much-needed supplies in exchange for leasing most British bases near North America to Washington. But in a then-secret addendum, London agreed that if it was forced to surrender to Germany (not a far-fetched notion at the time) the British Navy would sail to North America. Put differently, America would help, but its help was contingent on forcing British power away from North America, as well as on a commitment, in the worst-case scenario, to turn the British navy over to the United States.

The Cold War also had a major if overlooked naval component to it. All the land-based conflicts that took place required the infusion of supplies to local forces. NATO supplies, for example, were promised by the United States, and the Soviet Union had an overwhelming interest in stopping them. In a war, Soviet submarines would pass through the GIUK gap (Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom), and Soviet bombers would come out of the Kola Peninsula, hitting air bases in Norway, while also shooting through the GIUK toward convoys containing aircraft carriers and massive anti-air and anti-missile capabilities. For the U.S., the Cold War was as much a naval war as a land war.

To Washington, Soviet expansion into Europe was the same as Soviet expansion into the Atlantic. If the European Peninsula were ever dominated by a single power that could consolidate its human and material resources, it might construct a naval force that could threaten North America.

For the U.S., preventing domination of the European Peninsula by any single power stops a threat before it happens. And this is the crux of its interest in Ukraine. Among other reasons, Russia invaded to limit the threat posed by NATO. Even if Russia subjugates Ukraine, there is yet another NATO ally to its west. A quick victory in Ukraine therefore raised the possibility of more military movement farther west. Russia’s handling of the war has made this outcome more unlikely, of course, but unlikely isn’t the same as impossible.

That’s because for a country like Russia there is safety in distance. It’s reasonable to assume Moscow will push as far west as it reasonably and safely can. And that is very much a threat to U.S. national security. Stopping Russia in Ukraine, with Ukrainian troops doing the fighting and the U.S. providing weapons while waging a parallel economic war, is an efficient check on Russian ambition.

Crafty_Dog

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Hard thoughts about geopolitics, post Ukraine
« Reply #1226 on: June 26, 2022, 02:39:14 PM »
HT GM for this very interesting piece-- quite a bit of which agrees with points I have been making here for years haha.

(For the record, IMO there are also passages with serious jumps in logic.)

https://grahamefuller.com/some-hard-thoughts-about-post-ukraine/

Question:  How might we summarize what he would like to see us do now?
« Last Edit: June 26, 2022, 03:25:43 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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Re: Hard thoughts about geopolitics, post Ukraine
« Reply #1227 on: June 26, 2022, 08:12:00 PM »
HT GM for this very interesting piece-- quite a bit of which agrees with points I have been making here for years haha.

(For the record, IMO there are also passages with serious jumps in logic.)

https://grahamefuller.com/some-hard-thoughts-about-post-ukraine/

Question:  How might we summarize what he would like to see us do now?

Could you flesh out what you agree/disagree with?

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1228 on: June 27, 2022, 12:43:23 AM »
You force me to reread.  Not sure what the hell I had in mind. :-D

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GPF: G7 vs. BRICs
« Reply #1229 on: June 29, 2022, 08:22:31 AM »
June 29, 2022
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G-7 versus BRICS
Most countries would rather not choose sides.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
The first half of 2022 is ending with a string of major summits. Meetings of national leaders aren’t usually fateful, but the G-7 summit in southern Germany and the BRICS summit in Beijing are different this year. Amid the Russian-Ukrainian war, surging inflation globally and a looming food crisis, leaders started in earnest the process of redrawing economic alliances and reshaping the world order for years to come.

The G-7

The Group of Seven consists of the world’s wealthiest democracies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States – plus the European Union. Since Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, these countries have coordinated to support Kyiv in various ways while launching an economic war against the Kremlin. However, sanctions and Russian countermeasures have helped to drive up energy prices, exacerbating already high inflation and creating serious social and economic risks in much of Europe, which depends heavily on Russian energy. The war has also severely hampered Ukrainian grain production and exports, while high energy and fertilizer prices affect production elsewhere. The scale of these crises calls for high-level, coordinated solutions. The G-7 hopes to mitigate the economic pain on everyone except Russia while turning up the pressure on Moscow to end the war.

Member Countries of G-7 and BRICS
(click to enlarge)

One element of that pressure campaign is a gold embargo, which was agreed to on Tuesday. Russia has used its enormous stockpile of gold to blunt the effect of sanctions and support its currency. With the West searching for new ways to pressure the ruble and the Russian economy without European energy sanctions, banning Russian gold imports is a logical step. The U.S. has prohibited gold-related transactions involving Russia since March.

Another measure, far from finalized, concerns a cap on the price of Russian oil. Revenues from energy exports have helped fund the war, and sanctions to date have only forced the price higher. The U.S. and others have already banned imports of Russian oil, but much of Europe is too reliant on Russian supplies and thus resistant to adopting similar bans. A price cap would in theory ensure that flows continue – Russia willing – while eating into Russia’s revenues. However, many questions remain about implementation, and Moscow has meaningful leverage. For instance, it could refuse to sell its oil at the mandated price, or it could shut more natural gas pipelines to Europe under dubious pretenses, as it is threatening to do with Nord Stream 1 to Germany. These countermeasures would come with their own costs for Russia, and it’s simply impossible to know which side could tolerate the pain for longer. What is clear is that the West has struggled to secure alternative energy supplies and is thus in a tough spot.

Zooming out, something more important is happening. The G-7, and the so-called West more generally, needs allies to help it defend existing international rules and norms and to help it reduce its reliance on Russian energy. It also needs allies against the potential food crisis, which is orchestrated by Russia – itself a massive food producer – via its destruction of Ukrainian grain storage facilities and a Black Sea blockade. To that end, the German hosts of the G-7 summit invited Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal and South Africa to join. In a statement, the G-7 countries announced their intention to pursue so-called Just Energy Transition Partnerships with the guest countries, indicating that all or some of them may help the West decouple from Russian energy. In the meantime, Germany and Senegal are discussing ways to jointly explore and develop Senegalese natural gas reserves. Argentina formally offered to become “a stable and reliable substitute supplier of Russian gas to Europe and of food to the world.” And India announced the relaunching of free trade talks with the European Union after a nearly decadelong freeze.

At the same time, there’s plenty of reason for caution. For example, most of Argentina’s gas reserves are undeveloped, and it needs significant investment to live up to its promises. For its part, India has yet to condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. Tough discussions lie ahead. Not all players have chosen a side, and convincing the convincible will require compensation.

Russia’s Summits

While the West is recruiting allies, Russia seems to be having problems keeping its partners together. Earlier this month, Russia held its St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, gathering government and business leaders interested in working with Russia. The number of participants has declined significantly since Russian operations first began in Ukraine in 2014, but the forum still included leading figures from the Eurasian Economic Union as well as China, India, Venezuela, Cuba and Serbia.

During the event, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made headlines when he said Kazakhstan would not recognize the breakaway Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk republics. He also said most non-G-7 countries preferred not to choose a side, while arguing that Russia has much to offer “friendly” countries. Over the weekend, apparently trying to limit the damage from deviating from the Kremlin’s script, Tokayev called Russia an important ally and said he had had a “nice meeting” with President Vladimir Putin. Russian repairs on a Kazakh oil pipeline will probably be completed this week, he added. (Western officials doubt that the pipeline is undergoing needed maintenance.)

The St. Petersburg forum followed the 14th annual summit of leaders from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), a “southern” rival to the G-7 and U.S.-led blocs generally. At the summit on June 23, Putin asked his counterparts for support and closer economic ties to counteract Western sanctions.

So far, his calls have fallen on muffled ears. Though only Brazil voted to condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine at a U.N. vote in March, the other BRICS members have stalled for time and avoided clearly choosing sides. They have taken advantage of Russia’s willingness to do business, while staying open to Western trade and investment. India has significantly increased purchases of Russian energy since the war started, but it also attended the G-7 and restarted trade talks with the EU. South Africa typically aligns with Russia, but it too attended the G-7, where it discussed energy projects with Germany. And Argentina, as mentioned, sought energy and agricultural investment from the G-7.

Putin also promoted the idea of a BRICS basket-based currency and alternative to the SWIFT interbank messaging system, noting that Russian trade with the BRICS group had increased by 38 percent in the first quarter of 2022. The effort is intended to help Russian trade partners avoid becoming subject to Western sanctions, which remains a significant concern for them. For example, cargo dispatchers in China that want to send goods to Europe need to choose whether to do so via Russian or Kazakh territory.

Based on available data, more and more are choosing the latter. The Kazakh national railway company reports that the Aktau Sea commercial port, the Kuryk port and the Aktau Marine North Terminal have doubled their shipping volume since the beginning of the year. China’s Belt and Road Initiative already envisaged Kazakhstan as a transit zone for trade to and from Europe. The war in Ukraine is only accelerating the process and augmenting Kazakhstan’s regional importance. The strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Turkey also supports this new transport map. On May 10, Tokayev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met to discuss diversifying oil export routes to China and Europe, “including the use of Turkish transport corridors.”

This is important context for Tokayev’s remarks in St. Petersburg. More than ever, the Kazakh president has important leverage in his relationship with Putin. This also helps to explain why Putin is attending the Caspian Summit in Ashgabat on Wednesday, where investment projects will be further discussed. The Kremlin doesn’t think proposed new corridors will be effective – the Caucasus is too unstable – but worries about the development of regional initiatives without its participation.

The concluding BRICS statement referred to members’ positions expressed at the U.N. Security Council and U.N. General Assembly, and reiterated their support for U.N. humanitarian assistance to the region. Such nebulous statements only reaffirm the hesitation countries have in siding outright with Russia. However, neither are they eager to side with the West. In an economic environment ruled by uncertainty, flexibility is priceless.


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Stratfor: NATO's new strategic concept in context
« Reply #1231 on: June 30, 2022, 06:51:48 PM »
Second

SSESSMENTS
Placing NATO’s New Strategic Concept in Context
7 MIN READJun 30, 2022 | 20:52 GMT





Heads of state pose for a group photo at the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, on June 29, 2022.
Heads of state pose for a group photo at the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, on June 29, 2022.

(CHRISTOPHE ENA/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

NATO’s first update to its Strategic Concept in 12 years underscores the foundational shifts in the Western security alliance’s priorities and threat perceptions as the Russia-Ukraine war rages on, China expands its reach in Asia, and temperatures rise across the world. On June 29, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unveiled its new Strategic Concept outlining the alliance’s guiding principles, purpose and goals. The document, which was last updated in 2010, identifies Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to NATO members’ peace and security amid Moscow’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine. NATO lists China as a strategic “challenge” for the first time as well, citing Beijing’s “coercive policies.”

The updated Strategic Concept was announced during the June 29-30 NATO summit in Madrid. The Madrid summit was the first held since the alliance’s March 24 extraordinary meeting to coordinate a response to Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.
In response to these changing priorities and threat perceptions, NATO also announced changes in its force posture, including the expansion of its rapid reaction force and new U.S. deployments on Russia’s borders. NATO plans to increase the size of its rapid reaction force nearly eightfold by next year, from 40,000 to 300,000 troops, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States, in particular, plans to significantly expand its military presence in Europe. On June 29, President Joe Biden announced Washington will establish a permanent headquarters in Poland for the U.S. 5th Army Corps, send 5,000 additional troops to Romania, and increase rotational deployments in the Baltic states (namely, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The United States will also send two additional squadrons of F-35 fighter aircraft to the United Kingdom, station additional air defense systems at bases in Italy and Germany, and increase the number of naval destroyers in Rota, Spain, from four to six.

NATO’s so-called Response Force includes land, sea and air assets that are designed to be deployed quickly and wherever necessary in the event of an attack. The force numbered just 13,000 troops prior to Russia’s initial aggression against Ukraine in 2014.
Despite identifying Russia as a “direct threat,” NATO declined even stronger action to deter and defend against Moscow. The updated Strategic Concept describes Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, as Moscow seeks to “establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation,” using “conventional, cyber and hybrid means against NATO and [NATO’s] partners.” The only other “direct threat” identified in the document is terrorism. This harsh language represents a fundamental reversal from the document’s previous iteration in 2010, when NATO said it sought “a true strategic partnership” with Russia and would “act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.” The updated Strategic Concept also removes any mention of the 1998 Russia-NATO Founding Act governing relations between the alliance and Russia, which the 2010 version reaffirmed. But in the 2022 document, NATO says it is willing to “keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency,” which indicates a desire to maintain the spirit of and compliance with the 24-year-old pact. The new NATO troops that will soon be deployed to Poland and the Baltic states will also continue to rotate throughout the alliance’s Eastern European members to avoid running afoul of the Founding Act, in which NATO pledged not to permanently station combat troops on the Russian border.

On June 29, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste Wallander said the U.S. 5th Army Corps’ permanent stationing in Poland will be staffed by headquarters officials, not combat troops, and would thus not violate the U.S. understanding of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Officials in countries such as France and Germany have said the Founding Act should be preserved, while some, particularly in Eastern Europe and the United States, had called for the alliance to consider formally disavowing or suspending the agreement to remove restraints on NATO force posture.

But the new strategy will still fuel Russia’s concerns about NATO’s expansion and prompt Moscow to increase its military presence in the Baltic region. NATO's impending troop movements do not contradict the alliance’s stated desire to maintain the possibility of dialogue with Moscow. They do, however, contradict Russia’s desire for a decreased NATO presence on its periphery, which Moscow expressed prior to invading Ukraine in February. Increased NATO forces in Poland and the Baltic states — not to mention Sweden and Finland’s impending admission to the alliance — will thus still push Russia to increase its nuclear and nuclear-capable weapons systems in the Baltic area and eventually base many more conventional forces there as well. The 2022 Strategic Concept also reaffirms the decision of the 2008 Bucharest Summit that said Ukraine and Georgia will one day be NATO members, adding that “decisions on membership are taken by NATO allies and no third party has a say in this process” in a clear jab at Russia. While this does not portend any concrete or imminent action regarding Georgia and Ukraine’s membership aspirations, it will still increase tensions with Russia, which could use the reaffirmation of the policy to help justify an escalation of the war in Ukraine and/or destabilization measures in Georgia or Moldova.

China’s first-ever mention as a strategic “challenge” also reflects NATO’s new concerns with Beijing’s growing influence in Asia. The 2010 Strategic Concept did not once mention China nor the Indo-Pacific region, but the 2022 document devotes significant space to China, whose “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO interests, security and values”, and says “the Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” This represents a long-awaited change of tone toward China. The alliance’s statement in the 2022 document that it will “strengthen cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests” will likely raise eyebrows in Beijing. However, the updated Strategic Concept also makes clear that it “remains open to constructive engagement to build reciprocal transparency” with China.

The 2022 Strategic Concept highlights new cybersecurity, climate change, authoritarian governance and other non-military threats as well. Climate change was mentioned only once in the 2010 Strategic Concept. But in the 2022 version, it is mentioned 11 times, including the ambitious statement that NATO should “become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Additional attention is also given to cyberattacks. The alliance reaffirmed its longstanding policy that a “single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space” could prompt NATO to trigger its Article 5 mutual defense clause — another measure directed first and foremost toward Russia and China and intended to deter cyberattacks causing physical damage, as otherwise the alliance would be skeptical of triggering Article 5 because of a cyberattack. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept on several occasions notes the challenge to the alliance’s interests and values posed by advancing authoritarianism — a threat not acknowledged directly in 2010.

NATO’s updated Strategic Concept acknowledges non-military threats such as identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. These new threats underscore the increasing importance of reliable partners in geographies outside the NATO alliance such as in Asia, from where the alliance must ensure the stability and security of supplies of critical components and resources.


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Stratfor on America
« Reply #1233 on: July 14, 2022, 08:16:35 AM »
ASSESSMENTS
Considering America on Independence Day
8 MIN READJul 4, 2022 | 10:00 GMT





The Boston Pops Orchestra rehearses for a Fourth of July fireworks show on July 3, 2015, in Boston, Massachusetts.
The Boston Pops Orchestra rehearses for a Fourth of July show on July 3, 2015, in Boston, Massachusetts.
(Paul Marotta/Getty Images)

Editor's Note: To commemorate July 4th this year, Stratfor offers a sampling of past analyses that examine how the United States came to dominate the global system — and where the American empire might be headed next.

The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1: The Inevitable Empire
The American geography is an impressive one. The Greater Mississippi Basin together with the Intracoastal Waterway has more kilometers of navigable internal waterways than the rest of the world combined. The American Midwest is both overlaid by this waterway and is the world's largest contiguous piece of farmland. The U.S. Atlantic Coast possesses more major ports than the rest of the Western Hemisphere combined. Two vast oceans insulated the United States from Asian and European powers, deserts separate the United States from Mexico to the south, while lakes and forests separate the population centers in Canada from those in the United States. The United States has capital, food surpluses and physical insulation in excess of every other country in the world by an exceedingly large margin. So like the Turks, the Americans are not important because of who they are, but because of where they live. Read the full article here.

Listening to the Echoes of the American Revolution
The world is a complicated, interconnected and volatile place. No country has the singular power to intervene for national, economic or even moral reasons everywhere. For Britain, a small rebellion, driven by distance, fiscal policy and changing culture, escalated from a localized police action to a global crisis that dragged on for nearly a decade. In the process, old foes were reawaked and unforeseen challenges to British forces at the far reaches of the empire emerged. On America's Independence Day (a day marking more the start than conclusion of hostilities with the mother country), it is worthwhile reflecting on the ideas and complexities of global capabilities and responsibilities as well as considering the nature of independence and freedom. Read the full article here.

Coming to Terms With the American Empire
The geography of the American empire was built partly on military relations but heavily on economic relations. At first these economic relations were fairly trivial to American business. But as the system matured, the value of investments soared along with the importance of imports, exports and labor markets. As in any genuinely successful empire, it did not begin with a grand design or even a dream of one. Strategic necessity created an economic reality in country after country until certain major industries became dependent on at least some countries. The obvious examples were Saudi Arabia or Venezuela, whose oil fueled American oil companies, and which therefore — quite apart from conventional strategic importance — became economically important. This eventually made them strategically important.

As an empire matures, its economic value increases, particularly when it is not coercing others. Coercion is expensive and undermines the worth of an empire. The ideal colony is one that is not at all a colony, but a nation that benefits from economic relations with both the imperial power and the rest of the empire. The primary military relationship ought to be either mutual dependence or, barring that, dependence of the vulnerable client state on the imperial power.

This is how the United States slipped into empire. First, it was overwhelmingly wealthy and powerful. Second, it faced a potential adversary capable of challenging it globally, in a large number of countries. Third, it used its economic advantage to induce at least some of these countries into economic, and therefore political and military, relationships. Fourth, these countries became significantly important to various sectors of the American economy. Read the full article here.

The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 2: American Identity and the Threats of Tomorrow
What happens when something goes wrong, when the rest of the world reaches out and touches the Americans on something other than America's terms? When one is convinced that things can, will and should continually improve, the shock of negative developments or foreign interaction is palpable. Mania becomes depression and arrogance turns into panic.

An excellent example is the Japanese attack on American forces at Pearl Harbor. 70 years on, Americans still think of the event as a massive betrayal underlining the barbaric nature of the Japanese that justified the launching of a total war and the incineration of major cities. This despite the fact that the Americans had systemically shut off East Asia from Japanese traders, complete with a de facto energy embargo, and that the American mainland — much less its core — was never threatened.

Such panic and overreaction is a wellspring of modern American power. The United States is a large, physically secure, economically diverse and vibrant entity. When it acts, it can alter developments on a global scale fairly easily. But when it panics, it throws all of its ample strength at the problem at hand, and in doing so reshapes the world. Read the full article here.

How the Plight of a Heartland Could Upset America's Balance
Societal, economic or cultural change is not always immediately reflected in the halls of Washington, D.C. Some of the change at the political level can be delayed due to the fundamentals of the U.S. political system. Changes in population due to the rise and fall of local state economies will only result in changes in representation every decade and even then, they will be gradual. After each census, the House of Representatives recalculates the number of seats allocated to each state proportionally, meaning that the population declines in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, West Virginia and Michigan that have occurred over the past decade will have a delayed effect on overall political power within the House. In the meantime, traditionally powerful states that see waning power and influence ahead will seek to hold onto influence in other ways and in other branches of the government. See the 2016 presidential elections, when many states that have been facing long-term economic decline gravitated to the candidate who promised a return to former glory. However, the growth of urban areas as economic hubs could slowly change the social and political profiles of the states that host them. Ultimately, the lag between demographic and economic changes and its formal reflection at the level of political representation leaves the U.S. political system in a state of limbo.

Against this backdrop, the United States is witnessing the growth of ideological divides stemming from generational shifts, urbanization, internal migration and economic inequalities. Without a unifying culture, economy and geography knitting the core together, the new ecumene — fiscally robust as it may be — will not help an already fraying populace mend itself. After all, many of the cultural concerns and economic priorities of Los Angeles still have little in common with those in Raleigh. Instead, we are more likely to witness states push more heavily for their own regional, rather than national, interests as a result of the lag of national representation behind economic realities. Read the full article here.

China, the U.S., and the Geography of the 21st Century
The United States and China will sit at the forefront of the 21st-century geography, with the United States remaining a traditional maritime power, as China works to bridge a continental and maritime role. Europe and Russia will both retain power and influence, though to a lesser degree, and while they may lean toward the larger poles, they will not fall into locked alliances. Russia may align with China, but Chinese initiatives in the Arctic, Central Asia and into the Indian Ocean and Middle East are all encroaching on areas of traditional Russian interests. While Europe and the United States may align on many issues, Europe is also increasingly integrated into transcontinental land-based trade routes and at odds with the United States on regulatory fronts, from taxation to cyberspace to environmental regulations. Read the full article here.

Will Biden Be the Last U.S. President To Champion Global Trade?
In his famed 1918 Fourteen Points speech, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson laid out a vision of a liberalized global order that promoted free trade, freedom of navigation on the seas, open agreements (i.e. no secret treaties) between governments, and the League of Nations to champion world peace. But the United States never joined the ill-fated League of Nations, which Woodrow helped create in the face of growing domestic opposition against his interventionist foreign policies. And in 1920, just two years after Woodrow made that speech, the United States went on to reject the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I, and then entered a depression. Wilson’s vision of free trade was then rejected again (and again) over the next 15 years as the United States went into an extended period of economic protectionism that included the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act (which raised tariffs by 25% and triggered a trade war with Western Europe) followed by the even more extreme 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (which raised tariffs by another 20%).

Fast forward to today, and growing domestic support for protectionist policies is once again constraining the United States’ global trade strategy. U.S. President Joe Biden recently unveiled two economic initiatives: the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity. Some have criticized both deals for being too narrow in scope, as neither is a free trade agreement. Such agreements, however, are now no longer en vogue in Washington, where an increasingly polarized political environment — along with longstanding accusations that trade has hollowed out America’s industrial and manufacturing base — has left more lawmakers in support of protectionist policies (or hesitant to say otherwise). Read the full article here.

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Bolton says he planned coups
« Reply #1234 on: July 14, 2022, 04:33:08 PM »
John Bolton said he planned foreign coups. The global outcry was swift.
By Adam Taylor and Ana Vanessa Herrero
July 13, 2022 at 3:14 p.m. EDT

National security adviser John Bolton listens as President Donald Trump speaks with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari during a meeting at the White House on April 30, 2018. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)


When a former White House national security adviser and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations says he was involved in planning coups abroad, the world takes notice.

John Bolton, speaking to Jake Tapper live on CNN’s “The Lead” on Tuesday afternoon, said that the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol was not a “carefully planned coup d’etat” — and that he would know.

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“As somebody who has helped plan coups d’etat — not here but, you know, other places — it takes a lot of work, and that’s not what [President Donald Trump] did,” Bolton, who served as the top national security official in the Trump administration for 17 months before a bitter exit in 2019, told Tapper.

In CNN interview, John Bolton says he has planned foreign coups

It was a passing reference, apparently meant as a stinging criticism of the former president rather than a bombshell admission of responsibility.


But clips of the remarks went viral online, drawing millions of views from all corners. Within hours, they had sparked official condemnation and unofficial speculation from foreign observers, especially in parts of the world where decades of U.S. intervention remain fresh memories.

Evo Morales, the former president of Bolivia who was ousted from office in 2019 by the military amid murky election claims, tweeted Wednesday that the remarks showed that the United States was “the worst enemy of democracy and life.”

Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, called on Thursday for an international investigation into Bolton’s remarks.

“It is important to know in which other countries the United States planned coups d’etat,” Zakharova told Radio Sputnik.

Was Bolton serious? Though some in the United States had their doubts, far-flung rivals suggested this was just further confirmation of what they already knew.


“This is no surprise,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at a daily news conference on Thursday. “The admission simply shows that interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and overthrowing their governments have become the standard practice of the U.S. government.”

“This is very much part of the U.S. rule book,” Wang said.

Bolton did not specify what coups he had been involved in planning, if any, during the interview. When Tapper pressed him, he pointed to the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in 2019 but added that the United States did not have “all that much to do with it.”

That was a strange example. For one thing, Bolton had said the attempt to oust Maduro was “clearly not a coup” in 2019.

Maduro’s government has accused the United States of helping promote political instability in Venezuela.


Maduro did not offer a response after Bolton’s comments Tuesday. But Samuel Moncada, Venezuela’s permanent representative to the United Nations, jumped on Twitter to respond that Bolton was correct: Coups did take a lot of work. “For this reason, he also failed with his local agents in Venezuela,” Moncada wrote.

Some international affairs experts said Bolton’s comments could be a setback for well-intentioned U.S. policies.

“It’s damaging to our efforts to advance and support democracy,” Stanford University-Hoover Institution scholar Larry Diamond said. “We have enough trouble already countering Russian and Chinese propaganda.”

Bolton could not be reached for immediate comment.

For America’s foreign critics and foes, Bolton often plays the role of a boogeyman, representing the worst of U.S. foreign policy and neoconservative interventionism.


As an official, his hard-line views have made him few friends internationally. But he appeared to relish his reputation, writing in one book that being labeled “human scum” by North Korean state media in 2003 was “the highest accolade” he had received.

Bolton had two stints in high positions. Under President George W. Bush, he served in senior arms control roles before becoming ambassador to the United Nations in 2005. He was a major backer of the 2003 invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein.

After Bush, Bolton spent years in the foreign policy wilderness — though he hardly went hungry, accepting positions at right-wing think tanks in Washington, working with a global private equity firm and serving as a Fox News contributor.

He returned to government office in April 2018 as the Trump White House’s national security adviser — its third in less than 18 months.


He didn’t last long, leaving the administration in September 2019. Foreign policy appeared to be one major source of dispute, with Trump later tweeting that despite Bolton’s reputation as a hawk, Trump actually had “stronger” views on Cuba and Venezuela.

So what coups might John Bolton have been involved in, exactly?

In Turkey, local media supportive of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan linked Bolton’s latest remarks to the failed attempt to overthrow the Turkish government in July 2016. Bolton, who was not then in government, was a critic of Erdogan at the time.

Takvim, a pro-government tabloid, printed an article Wednesday pointing to statements Bolton made in 2016 in support of the “treacherous” coup attempt. The newspaper noted that Bolton had spoken in support of Kurdish groups in Turkey and neighboring countries.

Takvim pointed to a 2016 appearance on Fox News, during which Bolton argued that Erdogan had been seeking to “re-create the Ottoman caliphate” with an Islamist government. Bolton criticized Erdogan for not supporting the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.


“If he goes down, I don’t shed any tears,” Bolton said. “I don’t think he’s been a friend of the United States.”

Bolton has been supportive of coups in the past.

In a 2008 interview with Al Jazeera, he said coups can sometimes be “a necessary way to advance American interest” and defended the 1953 overthrow of the democratically elected leader of Iran, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

“I think the U.S. should have that capability,” Bolton said, referring to Iran and North Korea as two areas that the United States should focus on toppling hostile regimes.

But despite the speculation, a number of former U.S. intelligence operatives on Tuesday responded with derision to Bolton’s remarks.

“Bolton never touched a coup,” Milton Bearden, a former CIA station chief who oversaw U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s, wrote on Twitter. “And anyone who thinks fomenting coups is a good idea just doesn’t get out enough.”

Julian Mark contributed to this report

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Re: Bolton says he planned coups
« Reply #1235 on: July 14, 2022, 08:53:35 PM »
The coup was the stolen election. It was so successful, people still think they are going to vote their way out of it.


John Bolton said he planned foreign coups. The global outcry was swift.
By Adam Taylor and Ana Vanessa Herrero
July 13, 2022 at 3:14 p.m. EDT

National security adviser John Bolton listens as President Donald Trump speaks with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari during a meeting at the White House on April 30, 2018. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)


When a former White House national security adviser and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations says he was involved in planning coups abroad, the world takes notice.

John Bolton, speaking to Jake Tapper live on CNN’s “The Lead” on Tuesday afternoon, said that the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol was not a “carefully planned coup d’etat” — and that he would know.

Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for the latest updates on Russia's war in Ukraine.
“As somebody who has helped plan coups d’etat — not here but, you know, other places — it takes a lot of work, and that’s not what [President Donald Trump] did,” Bolton, who served as the top national security official in the Trump administration for 17 months before a bitter exit in 2019, told Tapper.

In CNN interview, John Bolton says he has planned foreign coups

It was a passing reference, apparently meant as a stinging criticism of the former president rather than a bombshell admission of responsibility.


But clips of the remarks went viral online, drawing millions of views from all corners. Within hours, they had sparked official condemnation and unofficial speculation from foreign observers, especially in parts of the world where decades of U.S. intervention remain fresh memories.

Evo Morales, the former president of Bolivia who was ousted from office in 2019 by the military amid murky election claims, tweeted Wednesday that the remarks showed that the United States was “the worst enemy of democracy and life.”

Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, called on Thursday for an international investigation into Bolton’s remarks.

“It is important to know in which other countries the United States planned coups d’etat,” Zakharova told Radio Sputnik.

Was Bolton serious? Though some in the United States had their doubts, far-flung rivals suggested this was just further confirmation of what they already knew.


“This is no surprise,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at a daily news conference on Thursday. “The admission simply shows that interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and overthrowing their governments have become the standard practice of the U.S. government.”

“This is very much part of the U.S. rule book,” Wang said.

Bolton did not specify what coups he had been involved in planning, if any, during the interview. When Tapper pressed him, he pointed to the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in 2019 but added that the United States did not have “all that much to do with it.”

That was a strange example. For one thing, Bolton had said the attempt to oust Maduro was “clearly not a coup” in 2019.

Maduro’s government has accused the United States of helping promote political instability in Venezuela.


Maduro did not offer a response after Bolton’s comments Tuesday. But Samuel Moncada, Venezuela’s permanent representative to the United Nations, jumped on Twitter to respond that Bolton was correct: Coups did take a lot of work. “For this reason, he also failed with his local agents in Venezuela,” Moncada wrote.

Some international affairs experts said Bolton’s comments could be a setback for well-intentioned U.S. policies.

“It’s damaging to our efforts to advance and support democracy,” Stanford University-Hoover Institution scholar Larry Diamond said. “We have enough trouble already countering Russian and Chinese propaganda.”

Bolton could not be reached for immediate comment.

For America’s foreign critics and foes, Bolton often plays the role of a boogeyman, representing the worst of U.S. foreign policy and neoconservative interventionism.


As an official, his hard-line views have made him few friends internationally. But he appeared to relish his reputation, writing in one book that being labeled “human scum” by North Korean state media in 2003 was “the highest accolade” he had received.

Bolton had two stints in high positions. Under President George W. Bush, he served in senior arms control roles before becoming ambassador to the United Nations in 2005. He was a major backer of the 2003 invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein.

After Bush, Bolton spent years in the foreign policy wilderness — though he hardly went hungry, accepting positions at right-wing think tanks in Washington, working with a global private equity firm and serving as a Fox News contributor.

He returned to government office in April 2018 as the Trump White House’s national security adviser — its third in less than 18 months.


He didn’t last long, leaving the administration in September 2019. Foreign policy appeared to be one major source of dispute, with Trump later tweeting that despite Bolton’s reputation as a hawk, Trump actually had “stronger” views on Cuba and Venezuela.

So what coups might John Bolton have been involved in, exactly?

In Turkey, local media supportive of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan linked Bolton’s latest remarks to the failed attempt to overthrow the Turkish government in July 2016. Bolton, who was not then in government, was a critic of Erdogan at the time.

Takvim, a pro-government tabloid, printed an article Wednesday pointing to statements Bolton made in 2016 in support of the “treacherous” coup attempt. The newspaper noted that Bolton had spoken in support of Kurdish groups in Turkey and neighboring countries.

Takvim pointed to a 2016 appearance on Fox News, during which Bolton argued that Erdogan had been seeking to “re-create the Ottoman caliphate” with an Islamist government. Bolton criticized Erdogan for not supporting the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.


“If he goes down, I don’t shed any tears,” Bolton said. “I don’t think he’s been a friend of the United States.”

Bolton has been supportive of coups in the past.

In a 2008 interview with Al Jazeera, he said coups can sometimes be “a necessary way to advance American interest” and defended the 1953 overthrow of the democratically elected leader of Iran, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

“I think the U.S. should have that capability,” Bolton said, referring to Iran and North Korea as two areas that the United States should focus on toppling hostile regimes.

But despite the speculation, a number of former U.S. intelligence operatives on Tuesday responded with derision to Bolton’s remarks.

“Bolton never touched a coup,” Milton Bearden, a former CIA station chief who oversaw U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s, wrote on Twitter. “And anyone who thinks fomenting coups is a good idea just doesn’t get out enough.”

Julian Mark contributed to this report


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Kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/the-last-days-of-joe-biden
« Reply #1237 on: July 18, 2022, 09:17:53 PM »
https://kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/the-last-days-of-joe-biden/


The Last Days of “Joe Biden”
Whose idea was it to send the wind-up doll president called “Joe Biden” to Saudi Arabia…?
Clusterfuck Nation
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It’s like our country is trapped on one of those swirling carnival rides beloved of the county fairs… only, the felonious mutt who runs the ride has nodded off in a fentanyl delirium with the motor running at maximum speed… and the children-of-all-ages locked in the pods of this infernal machine shriek and vomit with each sickening rotation… as the half-century-old swing arms groan and wobble from metal fatigue on their squealing pivots… and suddenly comes a deafening crunch of gnashed gears, the smell of burning oil, and the pathetic whimpering of the nearly dead.

That’s us. Some terrible midsummer accident-of-state has befallen the USA Carnival, and most are too dazed to know it. Whose idea was it to send the wind-up doll president called “Joe Biden” to Saudi Arabia? I can just imagine what went on in the chamber in private with “JB” and MBS (Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman), virtual autocrat of the oil-soaked desert land. The American visitor muttered something about wanting an ice-cream cone before dropping into a catatonic thousand-yard stare.

“How does this thing work?” MBS asks his chief vizier, the foreign minister (in Arabic, of course), gesticulating disdainfully at the ghostly figure sunk in the plush camel-hair armchair yards away. “Joe Biden” sits motionless. Someone has forgotten to rewind him, some “aide” who carries the president’s Adderall. Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud tells the boss, “We’ll make up some camel-dung for release to CNN and friends. They’ll fall for anything.”

It’s like a crime scene where the forensic experts have entered. The Saudi leader and his entourage only hang around the room for three minutes until the US State Department shoots enough photos to prove that “JB” was there and not stuffed in the basement of his Delaware beach house for the weekend, as usual. The American news media gets briefed: Saudi Arabia graciously agrees to bump up its oil production somewhere in the 2025-2027 time-frame — a triumph for US diplomacy, the networks are informed. Air Force One wings home through clouds of despair. The White House team members spend the flight updating their resumés.

I think we have witnessed “Joe Biden’s” final appearance at any world-stage event. He can do no more for the Party of Chaos. It has done what it can to wreck the joint with him as the pretend head-of-state. The Ukraine gambit is a bust, a foolish miscalculation that was obvious from the start. All it accomplished was to reveal the pitiful dependence of our European allies on Russian oil and gas, leaving their economies good and truly scuppered without it. The Russians end up with control of the Black Sea and probably the Ukraine bread-basket as well. So, now, Europe will starve and freeze.

Did they really want to commit suicide like that? Do the populations of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the rest just aim to roll into oblivion? Probably not. Rather, we are entering the season of upended governments. The Schwabenklausian stooges implanted everywhere will be overthrown, NATO and the Euro Union will dissolve in impotent ignominy, and the various countries involved will have to renegotiate their destinies, forgoing US advice and coercion. They might even become adversaries of the USA, not allies. Did you forget we fought two wars against Germany not so long ago? And all those countries have been fighting each other since the Bronze Age, too.

History never stops reminding us what a prankster it is. A strange and terrible inversion has occurred in this Fourth Turning. Somehow, Mr. Putin’s Russia is left to represent what remains of international rule-of-law while the western democracies sink deeper into a morass of deranged despotism. Anyway, they are too busy conducting war against their own people to even pretend to assist their Ukrainian proxies. “Joe Biden” crammed nearly $60-billion into the Ukraine money laundering machine since February, which will just spew hallucinated capital back out into increasingly disordered financial markets. Look: the indexes are up world-wide this morning. Why? Because global business is so good? I don’t think so.

Moving toward autumn, what we have to look forward to is the blatant desperation of the claque behind “Joe Biden.” Their propaganda machine is going all-out on climate change and renewed Covid hysteria. There are always heat-waves in midsummer. CNN acts shocked that it’s over 100-degrees in Texas. Really? Never seen that before? Meanwhile, behind the news about emerging Omicron sub-variants, the vaccine injuries and deaths mount and the CDC pretends not to notice. They are just lying as usual. You’re used to it. You pretend it’s to be expected. You’ve forgotten that it wasn’t always so. Soon, it will matter.

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Re: Kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/the-last-days-of-joe-biden
« Reply #1238 on: July 18, 2022, 09:48:31 PM »
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/400075.php


https://kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/the-last-days-of-joe-biden/


The Last Days of “Joe Biden”
Whose idea was it to send the wind-up doll president called “Joe Biden” to Saudi Arabia…?
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It’s like our country is trapped on one of those swirling carnival rides beloved of the county fairs… only, the felonious mutt who runs the ride has nodded off in a fentanyl delirium with the motor running at maximum speed… and the children-of-all-ages locked in the pods of this infernal machine shriek and vomit with each sickening rotation… as the half-century-old swing arms groan and wobble from metal fatigue on their squealing pivots… and suddenly comes a deafening crunch of gnashed gears, the smell of burning oil, and the pathetic whimpering of the nearly dead.

That’s us. Some terrible midsummer accident-of-state has befallen the USA Carnival, and most are too dazed to know it. Whose idea was it to send the wind-up doll president called “Joe Biden” to Saudi Arabia? I can just imagine what went on in the chamber in private with “JB” and MBS (Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman), virtual autocrat of the oil-soaked desert land. The American visitor muttered something about wanting an ice-cream cone before dropping into a catatonic thousand-yard stare.

“How does this thing work?” MBS asks his chief vizier, the foreign minister (in Arabic, of course), gesticulating disdainfully at the ghostly figure sunk in the plush camel-hair armchair yards away. “Joe Biden” sits motionless. Someone has forgotten to rewind him, some “aide” who carries the president’s Adderall. Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud tells the boss, “We’ll make up some camel-dung for release to CNN and friends. They’ll fall for anything.”

It’s like a crime scene where the forensic experts have entered. The Saudi leader and his entourage only hang around the room for three minutes until the US State Department shoots enough photos to prove that “JB” was there and not stuffed in the basement of his Delaware beach house for the weekend, as usual. The American news media gets briefed: Saudi Arabia graciously agrees to bump up its oil production somewhere in the 2025-2027 time-frame — a triumph for US diplomacy, the networks are informed. Air Force One wings home through clouds of despair. The White House team members spend the flight updating their resumés.

I think we have witnessed “Joe Biden’s” final appearance at any world-stage event. He can do no more for the Party of Chaos. It has done what it can to wreck the joint with him as the pretend head-of-state. The Ukraine gambit is a bust, a foolish miscalculation that was obvious from the start. All it accomplished was to reveal the pitiful dependence of our European allies on Russian oil and gas, leaving their economies good and truly scuppered without it. The Russians end up with control of the Black Sea and probably the Ukraine bread-basket as well. So, now, Europe will starve and freeze.

Did they really want to commit suicide like that? Do the populations of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the rest just aim to roll into oblivion? Probably not. Rather, we are entering the season of upended governments. The Schwabenklausian stooges implanted everywhere will be overthrown, NATO and the Euro Union will dissolve in impotent ignominy, and the various countries involved will have to renegotiate their destinies, forgoing US advice and coercion. They might even become adversaries of the USA, not allies. Did you forget we fought two wars against Germany not so long ago? And all those countries have been fighting each other since the Bronze Age, too.

History never stops reminding us what a prankster it is. A strange and terrible inversion has occurred in this Fourth Turning. Somehow, Mr. Putin’s Russia is left to represent what remains of international rule-of-law while the western democracies sink deeper into a morass of deranged despotism. Anyway, they are too busy conducting war against their own people to even pretend to assist their Ukrainian proxies. “Joe Biden” crammed nearly $60-billion into the Ukraine money laundering machine since February, which will just spew hallucinated capital back out into increasingly disordered financial markets. Look: the indexes are up world-wide this morning. Why? Because global business is so good? I don’t think so.

Moving toward autumn, what we have to look forward to is the blatant desperation of the claque behind “Joe Biden.” Their propaganda machine is going all-out on climate change and renewed Covid hysteria. There are always heat-waves in midsummer. CNN acts shocked that it’s over 100-degrees in Texas. Really? Never seen that before? Meanwhile, behind the news about emerging Omicron sub-variants, the vaccine injuries and deaths mount and the CDC pretends not to notice. They are just lying as usual. You’re used to it. You pretend it’s to be expected. You’ve forgotten that it wasn’t always so. Soon, it will matter.

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Kissinger warns against endless confrontations
« Reply #1239 on: July 20, 2022, 06:21:34 AM »
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/kissinger-warns-biden-against-endless-confrontation-with-china/ar-AAZL2VS

I like listening to his opinions

but I don't know enough to agree or disagree

though the general principal here is sound


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Re: Kissinger warns against endless confrontations
« Reply #1240 on: July 20, 2022, 05:19:47 PM »
Right or wrong, he always sounds important.

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This is why we see the feral gov cutting off both
« Reply #1241 on: July 20, 2022, 05:26:05 PM »
“Control oil and you control nations; control food and you control the people.”
— Henry Kissinger

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1243 on: July 21, 2022, 05:54:03 AM »
I remember reading several years ago in Investor Business Daily that Kissinger was profiting quite heavily from advising the Chinese.



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The Wrecking Crew Will Be Overcome
« Reply #1248 on: July 26, 2022, 06:23:18 PM »
https://kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/the-wrecking-crew-will-be-overcome/



CLUSTERFUCK NATION – BLOGJuly 25, 2022

The Wrecking Crew Will Be Overcome
In keeping with the principles of mass formation psychosis, the maliciously insane people in charge of national affairs will expect you to swallow ever-greater absurdities to maintain their control (and protect themselves).
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We stumble into the horse latitudes of summer feeling trapped in the stillness. The heat disorders minds — and these are minds already scrambled by official propaganda. We are this close to a general recognition that the Covid vaccines were a deadly scam, even while Rochelle Walensky of the CDC keeps pushing boosters on TV and the entire public health bureaucracy stands by silently behind this murderous fakery. When their trials finally come, will they plead that they just didn’t know? How is that possible? (It’s not.)

The crisis of the vaccinated is coming and there won’t be any hiding it. Anyway, nobody expects actual news reporting out of the legacy media. It will get around through the alt.media for sure, and already is, but the real spread will proceed when all the everyday people see themselves and those around them get sick, and realize they have one thing in common: those vaxxes they submitted to. It’s already happening.

In keeping with the principles of mass formation psychosis, the maliciously insane people in charge of our nation’s affairs will expect you to swallow ever-greater absurdities to maintain their control (and protect themselves). But we’re way beyond the “women-with-penises” stage of the mind-fuckery program. Nobody with a functioning brain believes that bullshit anymore — except the people who run the California prison system. Next up, apparently, is a hot little war with Russia or China, a useful distraction from the systematic self-dismantling of Western Civ.

“Joe Biden” has sent troops from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to Europe, supposedly to “train” the NATO forces of Euroland. Is this some kind of bluff? Or does “Joe Biden” and Company imagine that they’ll pull off some blitzkrieg counter-offensive on-the-ground in Ukraine and recapture territory secured by Russia painfully since February? If we send troops into Ukraine proper, it would amount to a deliberate sacrifice of our supposedly best soldiers in a meat-grinder. Maybe the purpose is simply to further weaken the US military, humiliate NATO,  and hasten the death of the West.

Of course, we have no real strategic national interest in Ukraine. We had no quarrel all the years that the Russian Soviets owned and operated it. We set in motion the current conflict by cooking up the 2014 color revolution. (There followed the fat years for Hunter Biden converting US aid money into revenue for his many shell corporations.) I doubt that a plurality of Americans will fall for another such stupid Hate Russia ploy. We’ve had enough pointless and costly foreign misadventures. This would be a war exceeding the unpopularity of Vietnam and could easily unleash widespread street protests. Only this time the Left will be pro-war and the Party of Chaos will send out its ragtag army of Antifa trannies to make the street protests bloodier. It will be seen for what it is: the ruling regime’s war on its own people. And it will be overcome.

Vying in the absurdity Olympics, the World Health Organization (WHO) just declared Monkeypox a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) — but only after the outfit’s chief, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, overruled a WHO committee that voted against such a move. Monkeypox, you understand, is a disease spread almost exclusively among the gay population, that is, men having sex with men, exchanging bodily fluids. Outbreaks have been keyed to gay orgies, especially during the recent  June “Pride Month” festivities. Do you think it might be more appropriate for the WHO to issue an advisory against gay orgies?

But, really, it’s just another obvious power-grab, an attempt by the Schwabenklausian maniacs to push people around and wreck the economy in order to Build Back Better — that is, to orchestrate a program of severe digital social control for managing its depopulation event. The US Department of Defense (DOD) is now authorized under the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to administer a mandatory vaccine program, while the CDC has bought millions of doses of supposed monkeypox vaccine.

Knowing how deadly the Covid vaxxes were, do you really think that masses of Americans who happen to not engage in gay sex might line-up willingly for these new shots? I kind of doubt it. The idiotic war provocations, the renewed climate hysteria, and dishonest health scares are devices for postponing, cancelling, or screwing around with the US midterm election. If the Left loses the US Congress, then the globalists will lose their main weapon: the Party of Chaos. Meanwhile, Euroland leaders are already falling and whole governments over there will crash and burn in the months to come.

All of this is happening against the background of a wobbling financial system that is making life unaffordable for what’s left of the middle-classes. One way or another, they will be sharply motivated to rescue their own livelihoods and recreate a country under real rule-of-law in the service of liberty. We await “Joe Biden” and Company’s most desperate move: to turn off the Internet so that Americans won’t be able to communicate easily or remain informed about anything. Of course, if they try that, they’ll also destroy everything that is managed automatically by computers in this land and plunge America into battle against the demented bureaucracy that rules us.

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WSJ: Rimland Alliance
« Reply #1249 on: August 01, 2022, 12:50:46 PM »
A new Western global strategy is taking shape. Its development was evident during President Biden’s tour in the Middle East—specifically at the July 14 online summit with the quadrilateral I2U2 Group: Israel’s Prime Minister Yair Lapid and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi (the I’s) and the United Arab Emirates’ president Mohamed bin Zayed and Mr. Biden (the U’s).

I2U2 launched in October 2021 to promote cooperation on economic and technological issues. A joint declaration shortly before the July virtual summit promised “to harness the vibrancy of our societies and entrepreneurial spirit . . . with a particular focus on joint investments and new initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security.”

Yet geopolitics loom behind economics. Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, compared I2U2 to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the embryonic Indo-Pacific alliance of the U.S., Japan, Australia and India. Indian and Emirati media routinely refer to I2U2 as the “Western Quad.” U.S., Indian and Emirati media all see it as an extension of the 2019 Abraham Accords, which outline both economic and military cooperation. Even in purely economic matters, the “security” angle is apparent: I2U2 repeatedly mentions “energy security” and “food security.”

The longer view is even more pertinent. Beyond I2U2, the Quad and the Abraham Accords, one must consider many analogous developments: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization re-energized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and about to expand to include long-neutral Finland and Sweden; a semiformal Eastern Mediterranean security alliance bringing together France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt; the Negev Summit architecture that provides for tight security cooperation between Morocco, Egypt, Israel, the U.A.E. and Bahrain; the reinvigoration of an Anglo-Pacific defense community Australia, the U.S. and the U.K., or Aukus; the upgrading of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship; the rise of Japanese and South Korean military efforts and cooperation despite an acrimonious history.

A U.S.-supported arc of strategic cooperation now stretches from Western to Eastern Eurasia, as a defensive oceanic “Rimland” against the hostile continental powers of Eurasia—China and Russia. Such an approach has a historical pedigree in the grand strategies of Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) and Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943), which underpinned British, American and global Western defense policies during World War I, World War II and the Cold War.

Mackinder, a British geographer, famously suggested in a 1904 paper, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” that world geopolitics was leading to a clash between continental empires based in Eurasia (which he called “the World-Island”) and maritime powers located in non-Eurasian islands, archipelagoes or smaller continents. He elaborated on these intuitions in his 1919 book, “Democratic Ideals and Reality.” Primarily concerned by the rise of Russia under the czars and then the Bolsheviks, he also pointed to a potential German-Russian condominium.

Spykman, a Dutch-born American professor of international relations at Yale, warned in the early 1940s against isolationism and then, after Pearl Harbor, against the long-term viability of the war alliance with the Soviet Union. His books, “America’s Strategy in World Politics” (1942) and “The Geography of the Peace” (1943), helped shape the Cold War doctrine of containment, which remained in force until 1989.

The difference between Mackinder and Spykman lies with the Rimland, the sea-accessible periphery of Eurasia. “Who rules the World Island rules the World,” Mackinder asserted. The strategic priority is thus to prevent the emergence of a single dominant power in continental Eurasia. Such a power, should it materialize, would be close to world domination, no matter what.


Spykman took the opposite view: “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia.” Continental empires, including the Soviet Union or an alliance between Moscow and Beijing, can be checked by an American-controlled crescent spreading from the European coast (Western and Mediterranean Europe) through the Middle East (the Arab-Turkish-Persian world) to the monsoon lands (South and East Asia).

Spykman’s grand strategy proved highly effective, and highly compatible with such additional strategic dimensions as nuclear deterrence or access to oil, even if it was subject to revision time and again. It initially translated into four regional alliances, complemented by bilateral U.S. alliances or agreements with Spain, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea.

Among the regional alliances, only NATO was so successful as to continue in operation and be enlarged after the Cold War’s denouement. The Central Treaty Organization—formed in 1955 by the U.K., Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey—never took off. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—also established in 1955, and including the U.S., U.K., Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand—faltered in 1975. Anzus—the alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.—is technically still in force despite differences between Wellington and Washington, but it may be supplanted by Aukus.


In the Middle East, plans for a strong postwar Anglo-Arab or American-Arab partnership were thwarted by a succession of pro-Soviet Nasserist and Baathist revolutions from 1952 to 1970. Non-Arab and pro-Western Iran then succumbed to a fanatical anti-Western revolution in 1979. On the other hand, Israel, which American strategists originally saw as an encumbrance, was reappraised as a valuable strategic player after the 1956 and 1967 wars, and finally recognized as the most reliable regional ally. The apparently vulnerable conservative Arab regimes of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Gulf states endured as Western allies, and so did Egypt once it rejected the Soviet embrace under Anwar Sadat. A different but more reliable Middle Eastern Rimland took shape. Non-Arab, Europeanized and secularized Turkey, a member of both NATO and Cento, was an essential Rimland partner throughout the Cold War.

In the Far East, the initial Rimland strategy targeted a Soviet-Chinese communist empire that briefly existed until the Korean War but gave way in the 1960s to a fierce “communist civil war.” Unfortunately, the U.S. failed for too long to perceive the Soviet-Chinese rift’s implications and was accordingly drawn into the Vietnam quagmire. It took Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to approach China and turn it into a partner, thus ending the Soviet bid to rule the “World Island.”

The emerging 21st-century Rimland strategy raises several questions. First, is the present continental Eurasian menace real? Yes, without a shadow of a doubt. China and Russia are both major military powers, nuclear and conventional. Both are authoritarian, hypernationalist, revisionist imperial states, bent on destroying the Western-centered world order. Both suppress domestic ethnic, religious and political dissent. Both are planning and training for regional confrontations with neighboring countries and ultimately a global confrontation with the West. Both have already engaged in unilateral military interventions abroad (including in the South China Sea, Syria and Ukraine). Both have heavily invested in soft power to anesthetize world opinion, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, the Okhrana and the KGB, and both largely succeeded until the past few years.

The 21st-century Beijing-Moscow axis has already proved more durable and internally reliable than its 20th-century forerunner. The two nations have closely cooperated over the past quarter-century, either within such partnerships as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or through bilateral agreements.

Even more worrisome is the present Eurasian axis’ power base. The Soviet-Chinese partnership in the 1950s could boast of its massive area (two thirds of the Eurasian landmass) and population (more than one billion, or 40% of the world) and its natural resources. But the Soviet economy and technology lagged behind the West’s in every field except weaponry and space. China was an underdeveloped country. Today, China is close to economic and technological parity with the global West (which includes Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and could plausibly replace America as the world’s economic epicenter in a generation.

The second question is whether Mackinder’s and Spykman’s insistence on geographic constraints and Spykman’s more focused insistence on the Rimland are still valid in the age of planes, satellites and internet. The Chinese certainly think so, as evidenced by their Belt and Road Initiative, which would open up all of Eurasia to commercial and military circulation and bring the Eurasian coastlines into the sphere of the inland empires.

The third question is whether all potential Rimland partners fully agree on a coordinated containment strategy against China and Russia. That is so far unresolved. Europe may be more wary of Russia than of China, whereas the contrary might be true in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. Some Western strategists think it would be a Vietnam-style blunder not to attempt to decouple Russia, the weaker Eurasian partner, from China. And some countries that formally belong to the Rimland alliances are tempted to stay neutral in the new Cold War: Turkey, still a NATO member but also a nationalist-Islamist regime since 2002, joined a July 22 strategic Russia-Iran summit in Tehran intended as a response to Mr. Biden’s tour.

The fourth and final question is whether the new Rimland strategy is a conscious one. Did Western leaders decide at some point to revive Mackinder and Spykman, or is the present strategic turn a cumulative result of multiple ad hoc initiatives?

The available evidence—books, op-eds, reports—suggests that scholars have rediscovered the classic Anglo-American geopolitists since the early 2000s in the context of increasing Chinese and Russian aggressiveness but failed to elaborate it fully until recently. At the government level, the Trump administration laid the foundations of a new containment strategy once it overcame its early neo-isolationist temptation, and the Biden administration was wise enough to keep up the momentum. What is still lacking is the equivalent of George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of 1946 and the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which turned Spykman’s insights into policies.

Mr. Gurfinkiel, a French author, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum and a contributing editor of the New York Sun.