US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics

[ccp]

instead we need to focus where the real threat is to us:

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/josh-hawley-nato-china/2022/08/01/id/1081254/

[DougMacG]

I support and applaud Biden for approving the hit on the al Qaida leader, as I did for Obama with regard to bin Laden.

Too bad we don't all agree on more things.

[G M]

I support and applaud Biden for approving the hit on the al Qaida leader, as I did for Obama with regard to bin Laden.

Too bad we don't all agree on more things.

I'm pretty sure this is the 3rd time we've killed him. Maybe he'll stay dead now.

At least our very professional intelligence professionals wouldn't lie to us.

[G M]

I support and applaud Biden for approving the hit on the al Qaida leader, as I did for Obama with regard to bin Laden.

Too bad we don't all agree on more things.

I'm pretty sure this is the 3rd time we've killed him. Maybe he'll stay dead now.

At least our very professional intelligence professionals wouldn't lie to us.

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/08/02/joe-biden-delivers-a-jumbled-word-salad-after-claiming-under-extremely-suspect-circumstances-the-u-s-killed-ayman-al-zawahiri/

[DougMacG]

I meant to say, if true, I support the action.

[Crafty_Dog]

GF is a very shrewd man, but don't know if he is addressing all the variables here.

For example, does America have the bandwidth for this AND China, Iran, North Korea, AQ/ISIS, and Mexico?

And the EU is as big as our economy more or less-- let their blood and treasure be spilt in their defense.




August 5, 2022
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America, War and the Atlantic
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
On Aug. 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. Two days later, Germany declared war on France. The following day, Britain declared war on Germany, and then on Aug. 6, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Russia. Within a week, Britain would declare war on Austria-Hungary.

Germany unified in 1871, and in doing so emerged as an economic powerhouse. It rapidly outstripped France, and by the end of the century it was challenging Britain. With economic growth came power. Germany was aware of the anxiety it was creating in Europe, and it reasonably believed that a simultaneous attack by Britain, France and Russia would crush it. It chose to launch a preemptive war, assuming this would throw them off balance and set the stage for a negotiation guaranteeing Germany’s status. The Austro-Hungarian Empire saw value in its relationship with Germany and opportunities to expand into Russia. The British declared war on Austria-Hungary to give Russia a sense of being part of a powerful coalition and to prevent a Russian truce with Germany.

Which is all to say that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand didn’t trigger the war; the war had been well planned by all the parties over the years. The killing was simply occasion to begin the planned operations. The war was hardwired – like many wars, it was expected to be a short affair. It wasn’t. No one trusted the other enough to make concessions needed to wage peace, and as a result somewhere between 15 million and 20 million people died.

The United States got involved in 1917, after the Russian czar was overthrown. The Americans feared that Russia would abandon the war and that German troops would be massed in the west, with France overrun and Britain facing the German navy. Washington feared that a victorious Germany would come to dominate the Atlantic and threaten the United States. When German U-boats sank the Lusitania, American fears were confirmed. U.S. troops were sent to France, where some 100,000 were killed. The U.S. did not itself win the war, but it prevented the Anglo-French alliance from losing it. Afterward, the U.S. withdrew from Europe, assuming the defeat of Germany had ended the tale.

Of course, European tales do not end so neatly. In the 1930s, Germany rearmed, then conquered France and invaded Russia. The United States followed the World War I strategy, focused on retaining control of the Atlantic. It supplied Britain with the means to wage war in the Atlantic, in return for Britain leasing most of its bases in the Western Hemisphere to the United States and guaranteeing that, in the event of British defeat, the British fleet would sail to North American ports. Washington did not get involved in European operations until 1943, and not in decisive operations until 1944. For the United States, the European peninsula was a means to defend the Atlantic, which could shield it from foreign attacks, not in itself crucial to its national security. About 50 million people died in the war.

This time, the U.S. did not withdraw when the war was over. It saw a threat from Russia forming and, having lost confidence in the ability of the Europeans to defend themselves, saw itself as Europe’s security guarantor, not as an act of chivalry but as a means of maintaining primacy in the Atlantic. Most saw the Cold War as a potential land war against Russia. This misses the strategic point. Europe could not defend itself, and the full force needed to block a Russian attack couldn’t be stationed there. In the event of a Russian attack, the U.S. would send large convoys of men, equipment and supplies, and the convoys would continue to supply NATO forces throughout the war.

The primary Russian strategy would be to destroy or block U.S. shipping across the Atlantic. A submarine force and long-range, supersonic aircraft were deployed to carry out the mission. The U.S. prepared a force of aircraft carriers, anti-submarine systems and anti-air, anti-missile systems to protect the convoys. If the Russians closed the Atlantic, they would win the war. If they did not, they would lose it. The first significant battle would not be in Germany but off the Icelandic coast.

In each of the world wars and then in the Cold War, command of the Atlantic was critical, both to project forces to Europe and to block potential attacks on the American mainland. The fear was that a European power might defeat its enemies and take advantage of European technology and production to create a fleet that could challenge the U.S. in the Atlantic. It seems like a far-fetched threat now, but Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and every president who held office during the Cold War understood that the oceans were American essentials, even in a nuclear war.

The U.S. drew several conclusions from the two world wars. First, Europeans cannot be trusted to create a prudent defense – nor avoid devouring themselves. Second, it learned that in the end, Europe's irresponsibility would force the U.S. to become involved. Third, wars that appear to be short will turn out to be long. Fourth, the possibility of a threat to the Atlantic as a byproduct of continental war is real. Fifth, early intervention in wars will save American lives, while late interventions will cost them. And finally, in all wars there is a threat to the Atlantic and therefore to the homeland.

Once a European power becomes militarily aggressive, it is forced to become even more aggressive after a victory because the next danger is just over the mountain. Ultimately, the U.S. will be forced to be in Europe. Whether leaders see this I don’t know, but if they are acting only by habit in Ukraine, it flows from American grand strategy. Habit is a substitute for strategy when the rules don’t change.

[DougMacG]

Among the lessons:

"early intervention in wars will save American lives, while late interventions will cost them"

Yes.  Intervene against evil earlier.

[G M]

Among the lessons:

"early intervention in wars will save American lives, while late interventions will cost them"

Yes.  Intervene against evil earlier.

Like the illegitimate government in DC?

[Crafty_Dog]

By Laura Secor
Aug. 12, 2022 1:27 pm ET


At 99 years old, Henry Kissinger has just published his 19th book, “Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy.” It is an analysis of the vision and historical achievements of an idiosyncratic pantheon of post-World War II leaders: Konrad Adenauer, Charles DeGaulle, Richard Nixon, Anwar Sadat, Lee Kuan-Yew and Margaret Thatcher.

In the 1950s, “before I was involved in politics,” Mr. Kissinger tells me in his midtown Manhattan office on a steamy day in July, “my plan was to write a book about the making of peace and the ending of peace in the 19th century, starting with the Congress of Vienna, and that turned into a book, and then I had about a third of a book written on Bismarck, and it was going to end with the outbreak of World War I.” The new book, he says, “is a kind of continuation. It’s not just a contemporary reflection.”

All six figures profiled in “Leadership,” says the former secretary of state and national security adviser, were shaped by what he calls the “second Thirty Years’ War,” the period from 1914 to 1945, and contributed to molding the world that followed it. And all combined, in Mr. Kissinger’s view, two archetypes of leadership: the farsighted pragmatism of the statesman and the visionary boldness of the prophet.

Asked if he knows of any contemporary leader who shares this combination of qualities, he says, “No. I would make the qualification that, though DeGaulle had this in him, this vision of himself, in the case of Nixon and probably Sadat, or even of Adenauer, you would not have known at an earlier stage. On the other hand, none of these people were essentially tactical people. They mastered the art of tactics, but they had a perception of purpose as they entered office.”

‘I think that the current period has a great trouble defining a direction. It’s very responsive to the emotion of the moment.’

One never goes long in conversation with Mr. Kissinger without hearing that word—purpose—the defining quality of the prophet, along with another, equilibrium, the guiding preoccupation of the statesman. Since the 1950s, when he was a Harvard scholar writing on nuclear strategy, Mr. Kissinger has understood diplomacy as a balancing act among great powers shadowed by the potential for nuclear catastrophe. The apocalyptic potential of modern weapons technology, in his view, makes sustaining an equilibrium of hostile powers, however uneasy it might be, an overriding imperative of international relations.

"In my thinking, equilibrium has two components,” he tells me. “A kind of balance of power, with an acceptance of the legitimacy of sometimes opposing values. Because if you believe that the final outcome of your effort has to be the imposition of your values, then I think equilibrium is not possible. So one level is a sort of absolute equilibrium.” The other level, he says, is “equilibrium of conduct, meaning there are limitations to the exercise of your own capabilities and power in relation to what is needed for the overall equilibrium.” Achieving this combination takes “an almost artistic skill,” he says. “It’s not very often that statesmen have aimed at it deliberately, because power had so many possibilities of being expanded without being disastrous that countries never felt that full obligation.”


Mr. Kissinger concedes that equilibrium, while essential, can’t be a value in itself. “There can be situations where coexistence is morally impossible,” he notes. “For example, with Hitler. With Hitler it was useless to discuss equilibrium—even though I have some sympathy for Chamberlain if he was thinking that he needed to gain time for a showdown that he thought would be inevitable anyway.”

There is a hint, in “Leadership,” of Mr. Kissinger’s hope that contemporary American statesmen might absorb the lessons of their predecessors. “I think that the current period has a great trouble defining a direction,” Mr. Kissinger says. “It’s very responsive to the emotion of the moment.” Americans resist separating the idea of diplomacy from that of “personal relationships with the adversary.” They tend to view negotiations, he tells me, in missionary rather than psychological terms, seeking to convert or condemn their interlocutors rather than to penetrate their thinking.

Mr. Kissinger sees today’s world as verging on a dangerous disequilibrium. “We are at the edge of war with Russia and China on issues which we partly created, without any concept of how this is going to end or what it’s supposed to lead to,” he says. Could the U.S. manage the two adversaries by triangulating between them, as during the Nixon years? He offers no simple prescription. “You can’t just now say we’re going to split them off and turn them against each other. All you can do is not to accelerate the tensions and to create options, and for that you have to have some purpose.”


On the question of Taiwan, Mr. Kissinger worries that the U.S. and China are maneuvering toward a crisis, and he counsels steadiness on Washington’s part. “The policy that was carried out by both parties has produced and allowed the progress of Taiwan into an autonomous democratic entity and has preserved peace between China and the U.S. for 50 years,” he says. “One should be very careful, therefore, in measures that seem to change the basic structure.”

Mr. Kissinger courted controversy earlier this year by suggesting that incautious policies on the part of the U.S. and NATO may have touched off the crisis in Ukraine. He sees no choice but to take Vladimir Putin’s stated security concerns seriously and believes that it was a mistake for NATO to signal to Ukraine that it might eventually join the alliance: “I thought that Poland—all the traditional Western countries that have been part of Western history—were logical members of NATO,” he says. But Ukraine, in his view, is a collection of territories once appended to Russia, which Russians see as their own, even though “some Ukrainians” do not. Stability would be better served by its acting as a buffer between Russia and the West: “I was in favor of the full independence of Ukraine, but I thought its best role was something like Finland.”


He says, however, that the die has now been cast. After the way Russia has behaved in Ukraine, “now I consider, one way or the other, formally or not, Ukraine has to be treated in the aftermath of this as a member of NATO.” Still, he foresees a settlement that preserves Russia’s gains from its initial incursion in 2014, when it seized Crimea and portions of the Donbas region, though he does not have an answer to the question of how such a settlement would differ from the agreement that failed to stabilize the conflict 8 years ago.

The moral claim posed by Ukraine’s democracy and independence—since 2014, clear majorities have favored EU and NATO membership—and the dire fate of its people under Russian occupation fit awkwardly into Mr. Kissinger’s statecraft. If the avoidance of nuclear war is the greatest good, what is owed to small states whose only role in the global equilibrium is to be acted upon by larger ones?


“How to marry our military capacity to our strategic purposes,” Mr. Kissinger reflects, “and how to relate those to our moral purposes—it’s an unsolved problem.”

Looking back over his long and often controversial career, however, he is not given to self-criticism. Asked if he has regrets from his years in power, he replies, “From a manipulative point of view, I ought to learn a great answer to that question, because it’s always being asked.” But while he might revisit some minor tactical points, on the whole, he says, “I do not torture myself with things we might have done differently.”

Appeared in the August 13, 2022, print edition as 'Henry Kissinger'.

[Crafty_Dog]

I would note the Kissinger has made a ton of money consulting for the Chinese.

I would note that it is CHINA that has changed regarding Taiwan, and that China blew off its written commitments to Hong Kong's separate way.

[Crafty_Dog]

Third

August 16, 2022
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China and Russia’s Strategic Problem
By: George Friedman

The war in Ukraine, now about 6 months old, is strategically important for a variety of reasons. If Russia defeats Ukraine and takes control of the country, its forces will be on the border of Eastern Europe. A Russian presence on Europe’s border would transform the balance of power in the Atlantic, and would thus inevitably compel the U.S. to deploy forces in Europe’s defense.

What Russia's intentions were at the outset of the invasion matters little. Intentions change, and strategy must not be optimistic. So what is at stake in the Ukrainian war is the possible resurrection of the Cold War, with all the attendant risks. From the American point of view, engaging Russia through Ukrainian troops in Ukraine is far less risky than another Cold War.

The Cold War did not result in a full-scale war, only the fear of war. Western fears of Soviet intentions outstripped Soviet capabilities. Their fear, in turn, kept NATO together, much to the chagrin of the leaders in Moscow. Neither of their worst fears came to pass, and therefore the collapse of the Soviet Union had more to do with internal rot than external threat. It is not clear that any future Cold War would play out like the last one, but one thing is likely: Given the existence of nuclear weapons, the front line of a new Cold War would remain static, and the status quo on each side would remain intact so long as neither side fragmented. It would be a costly and dangerous outcome, since history need not repeat itself. But the collapse of Ukraine would pose threats that could be contained, however expensively and dangerously. The global pattern would remain intact.

China’s vulnerabilities, and its attempts to overcome them, are potentially more dangerous. As with Russia, the core issue is geography. For Russia, the problem is that the Ukrainian border is less than 300 miles from Moscow, and Russia has survived multiple invasions only by virtue of Moscow’s distance from invaders – a distance that the collapse of the Soviet Union closed. Russia’s obsession with Ukraine is intended to rectify that problem. China's geographic problem is that it has become an exporting powerhouse, and as such it depends on its access to the Pacific Ocean and adjacent waters. The United States sees free Chinese access to the Pacific as a potential threat to its own strategic depth, something fundamental to the United States since the end of World War II. Chinese access to the Pacific is blocked by a series of island states – Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia, indirectly supported by nearby powers such as Australia, India and Vietnam. Not all of them are American allies, but all have common interests against Chinese naval expansion. China wants to defend its strategic depth by seizing and controlling it. The United States wants to defend its strategic depth by defending it.

The geographic dimension is compounded by an economic dimension. China’s economy depends on exports, and the United States is its largest customer. Beijing also needs continued U.S. investment, as its financial system is under intense pressure.

Russia is attempting to reclaim strategic depth, and it went into it knowing full well the financial consequences it would create. In other words, it put up with financial damage in exchange for strategic security. So far, it has not gained strategic security and has absorbed significant financial damage while meting out some of its own to Europe.

China is searching for a strategic solution while avoiding the economic damage that further expansion would likely invite. Its primary adversary on both fronts would be the United States. So China is probing the U.S., trying to understand its potential responses. The response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit pressed the limits of an invasion of Taiwan. What China learned about the U.S. military is unclear, but it learned that the trigger for American economic actions lies beyond the Chinese demonstration.

America’s goal in Ukraine, then, is to deny Russia the strategic depth it wants in order to limit the Russian threat to Europe. With China, its goal is to retain American strategic depth in order to prevent China from threatening the U.S. or obtaining global reach.

The issues are similar in principle, but the stakes for the United States are not. For Washington, the China question is much more important than the Russia question. A Russian victory in Ukraine would redraw unofficial boundaries and increase risks. A Chinese success would create a more global power that challenges the U.S. and its allies around the world.

The consequences of war are always significant. U.S. involvement adds economic costs to the equation. So far, Russia has absorbed the costs. China may not be able to, considering its economy is currently vulnerable. But nations live on economics and survive on safety. In that sense, it would appear that Russia is less interested in negotiations than China is.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden are scheduled to meet in mid-November, at a conference in Indonesia or in Thailand. If the meeting takes place, it will be the first since their teleconference in May. Only informal and back-channel talks are happening between the U.S. and Russia. China reeds a stable economy now more than it needs command of the seas. Russia seems able to survive what it has been dealt economically, but it has not broken the back of Ukrainian forces. China is nearer an economic crisis than Russia, and is thus unwilling to risk war with the United States. It will speak, if not settle. Russia’s economic and military situation is murky in the long run. The United States is dealing with China and Russia at a fairly low price and can handle both right now. Russia and China must try to raise the cost to the U.S. but can’t afford to raise their own.

It is a dizzying equation but not an uncommon one. China needs to reach an understanding with the United States. Russia does not have that need. The U.S. is flexible.

[Crafty_Dog]

GF is a super smart guy, but in reading the preceding I am left with the sense that he has not engaged with the true underlying issue with China-- that it has taken advantage of America playing "win-win" and by going "zero-sum".

[Crafty_Dog]

August 17, 2022
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The Scalable World War Ahead
The world has become more complex but no less deadly.
By: Jacek Bartosiak

U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan begins a new era of confrontation between the U.S. and China and marks a new stage in the ongoing conflict over Eurasia, this unique landmass where world history takes place and world wars are fought. What distinguishes this episode from previous world wars is that this one is scalable – the existence of thermonuclear weapons greatly raises the stakes of escalation and demands each side to be circumspect before escalating. In a scalable clash, each side tries to force its interests through various domains of contemporary dependencies in a densely globalized world – a world that will be violently split open before our eyes.

Pelosi’s visit accelerates the process of sharp and violent deglobalization – the breaking, for geopolitical reasons, of all financial, trade, information, communication and human connections that resulted from Pax Americana over the past 30 years. It turns out that the great powers do not agree on the principles that define how the world operates and how they cooperate with each other. China, the U.S. and Russia believe the existing global order no longer serves their interests. Only Europe still wants everything to stay the same, naively thinking that the “old” ways will come back. Completely unprepared for the return of geopolitics, Europe is on course to become the subject of the game of the three aforementioned powers – a place of struggle and kinetic wars and not a main actor, with ambitions and strategic initiative.

The Shape of the War to Come

Dangerous times lie ahead. Conflict will be a constant in many domains: trade, technology, finance, raw materials, currency markets, data and internet, and infrastructure. There will be kidnappings and assassinations, information warfare, fighting for oceans and lands, and fighting to control communication nodes, even in outer space. Finally, there will be hot proxy wars, coups, revolutions and government collapses, and probably a direct clash between China and the U.S. in the Western Pacific, or a war in Europe involving some NATO countries and Russia.

The main focus of this global conflict, however, will be the manipulation of strategic flows to influence the opponent’s stability and social contract. Examples include banning the sale to China of Taiwan's microprocessors necessary in a modern economy and, in response, China’s banning of exports of sand to Taiwan necessary for construction; or bans on capital investments in China and, in response, the expropriation of large U.S. companies with production in China.

In addition, there will be sanctions, blockades, embargoes on trade and raw materials, manipulation of energy transmission systems, attacks on infrastructure and military demonstrations intended to disrupt the enemy’s economy. A good example is the effective sea and air quarantine of Taiwan in the course of China’s sea-air exercises, or the unilateral ban on Russian flights over Lithuania or Poland, which may be broken one day if Moscow wants to contest Europe’s ability to limit where its planes fly.

Kinetic War

In this global struggle, a kinetic war between the U.S. and China in the Western Pacific becomes very likely, possibly sooner than later, given the irreconcilable structural differences of interest between the two powers. For a critical imbalance in the world system has already arisen that will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to correct in the foreseeable future without resorting to force, and such an escalation naturally leads to war. The situation around Taiwan in connection with Pelosi’s visit, and before that Russia’s ultimatum toward Ukraine, is clear proof of this.

Fortunately, the existence of thermonuclear weapons lowers the willingness of each side to enter into an uncontrolled conflict without reflection. It forces each side to be selective about what it seeks to obtain through the threat or use of violence, without stupidly starting a thermonuclear war. This makes the coming world war scalable, and this is what sets it apart from previous world wars.

At the start of the hot phase of past system wars, such as the Napoleonic wars or World War I or II, the attacking side immediately sent corps, fleets, infantry divisions, artillery, armored divisions and air assets, all that was necessary to defeat the enemy and conquer the capital by maneuvering to paralyze the decision-making and political system. For then there were no weapons that could destroy entire cities, states and nations. Strategic nuclear weapons obliterate the political goal of war, which is the loser’s submission to the victor’s will. (Tactical nuclear weapons may be a different matter, something we will learn to live with.) Above all, strategic thermonuclear weapons could trigger automatic retaliation.

None of this was present in previous world wars. There was no need to think about calibrated actions and the opponent’s potential responses on the multilevel escalation ladder, because both sides wanted immediately to take a dominant position in the application of violence. This was the way of the German Blitzkrieg, whose initial phenomenal operational efficiency diminished over time, leaving Hitler to look for a variety of Wunderwaffen (wonder weapons) at the end of the war.

This does not mean that nuclear weapons will not be used in the coming war. There are many indications, especially in Russian strategic and military literature, that it is possible to “disenchant” the use of nuclear weapons. However, even then the warring parties will always remember the risk of mutual annihilation, which hampers the decision-making process and emphasizes the management of the escalation ladder. This is already evident in Washington’s dealings with Ukraine and the Americans’ reservations about providing Kyiv with equipment that could be used to attack targets in Russia, which would be a step up the escalation ladder.

The existence of thermonuclear weapons, in other words, means the war must be scalable. Neither side can immediately reach (or threaten to reach) for the highest rung on the escalation ladder.

At the same time, the accumulation of mutual interactions between states is greater today than in the world wars of the past, meaning there are plenty of means of applying pressure. Likewise, there are more cases where violence can be used: destruction of transshipment terminals, attacks on U.S. natural gas terminals and Russian refineries, the kidnapping of decision-makers, destruction of satellites, acts of sabotage to cut off raw materials, and even terrorist attacks. Therefore, there will be more need to inoculate the state against manipulation of strategic flows, and less discussion of the number of soldiers compared with the 20th century. What matters is the military’s capabilities to wage modern war, often remotely, and the state’s resilience.

Europe in Denial

The scalable war has already begun. It is already changing the global system. As in the last world war, new methods and technologies will emerge. Innovation accelerates during war. This is the dark nature of man – militant and competitive. During World War II we saw the first German maneuvering and ballistic missiles. At the end, we saw the first primitive guided missiles, the jet engine, the technological miracle that was the American B-29 strategic bomber, and the Allied computer needed to constantly break the German Enigma. In this war, automation and robotics will certainly develop. Personally, I’m betting that artificial intelligence developed for war and human competition will change our civil lives beyond recognition before the war is over.

In all of this, Europe still refuses to accept that the war is already underway. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the uproar it caused, and the imminent U.S. congressional elections will lead the U.S. to focus on the Pacific. Therefore, I believe that Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was a mistake, very unfavorable for Poland, because it accelerates the Americans’ perspective of a war on two fronts in Eurasia, which must always be avoided. And it pushes China into helping Russia on the European front, even if this aid is or will be hidden for some time, just as Roosevelt’s decision to help the British was hidden from world opinion, made after the fall of Paris in 1940, and therefore long before America’s open entry into the war.

For Central and Eastern Europe this means being left with Russia, largely alone, with the only outside protection coming from other Europeans who lack significant military capabilities or excessive determination to confront Russia, apart from Finland, Sweden and Britain. As the war for Eurasia will be scalable, the wider European conflict does not have to be the same as with Ukraine. It can involve terrorism, destruction of infrastructure, kidnappings and killings, and destabilization. However, there can also be a full war like in Ukraine, depending on the capabilities of the Russians and the geopolitical situation, as well as on Europe’s own capabilities, resilience and preparations. The Russians will adjust their strategy to this. Russia wants to gain agency in Europe, and it will do this by pushing the Americans out of Europe and weakening Europe’s cohesion as part of the trans-Atlantic world.

What is happening in the Pacific is therefore of paramount importance for Europe. The world system has become unstable. A new equilibrium will arise after the war that seems inevitable today. Somewhat comfortingly, it seems to be a scalable war. In Poland’s case, located at the junction of the World Ocean and the Continent, it can be anything, including terrorist attacks, manipulating the supply of raw materials (which may end in rationing and the destruction of the Polish economy and competitiveness), kidnappings, destroying infrastructure and even conventional war – even with the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The world has become more complex but no less deadly.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kK2_IicRzX0

[Crafty_Dog]

As always, GF is very bright and insightful, but I think the MY theory of things gets closer to what is coming down the pike at us:
==========================

August 23, 2022
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The Permanence of War and Peace
By: George Friedman
Last week my friend and colleague, Jacek Bartosiak, wrote a piece for GPF titled “The Scalable World War Ahead,” in which he warned that the world is descending into the abyss of near-global war. The most important argument he made was that there was a new dynamic in the world in which wars will grow as a cancer, with cells dividing until the world is fully consumed.

I disagree with what I will call the theory of war as metastasis generally, and particularly in our time. Wars occur between nation-states, rising from the particular interests of each nation-state. In general, wars originate from fear or greed. A nation calculates that the threat from another nation is best met by preemptive action. This occurs in the particular circumstance in which a nation fears what another nation will become, and risks war on the assumption that going to war will prevent the rise of another nation. The fear could be of the not-yet-harnessed power of the opponent or the possibility of the power of an ally. War can also arise from greed, or the desire to acquire something of strategic value from another nation – in which case the calculation of power assigns a probability of success on the nation initiating the war.

The decision to go to war is initiated by one party that tends to want to avoid an expansion of the war, or will at least wait until the first war is settled before expanding the war and increasing the chance of failure. The defending country tends to seek allies, if the attacker’s calculation of relative power is correct. The cost of alliance is normally high, and the desire to intervene exists only under particular circumstances. Cascading wars are thus possible but not likely. In this sense, most wars are self-limiting.

In retrospect, World War II appears to be a cascading war, but it was so only in a limited sense. There were two separate wars, one in the Pacific and one in Europe. The former did not cascade. The participants at the beginning defined the war until its end. In Europe, the war was really two wars, both involving Germany. One was Germany against the Anglo-French alliance, the other against the Soviet alliance. Neither the Pacific nor the European war metastasized far beyond the core powers.

The Cold War pitted NATO against the Warsaw Pact, and it had a distinctly nuclear flavor. The Cold War in Europe never turned into war because nuclear weapons increased the potential cost of war enormously. The war did spread to parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but these were non-critical conflicts for both sides.

One of the limiters of war involving major powers is the fact that most have nuclear weapons. A war between China and the United States would be possible only if one side were confident it could neutralize the other’s weapons. Absent that, the danger would be in winning the war. In extremis, where the nation’s fundamental interests were threatened by conventional forces, the nation might choose a nuclear option. The potential winner would have to assume that a nuclear response is possible, and would have to calculate whether the potential risks of victory would be worth the prize. Pre-nuclear limits on cascading wars would have a nuclear response added to the equation. Notably, the notion of tactical nuclear weapons creates the illusion of utility. The most widely available tactical nuclear weapons have a lethality of a large fraction of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima. There are smaller ones, but they are either so small as to not justify their use relative to conventional weapons or sufficiently devastating to make a large city uninhabitable.

War is possible between nuclear powers when at least one is acting through proxies able to carry the battle. Vietnam is a classic example. North Vietnam and the United States clashed with each other, with China and the Soviet Union providing logistical support. The U.S. never seriously considered the use of nuclear weapons in the confrontation. Nor did Israel in 1973 when it was attacked by Egypt. The Cuban missile crisis never really came close to nuclear exchange, as the release of papers and tapes by both sides shows. In Ukraine, Russia has threatened a nuclear strike. However, as in Vietnam, one side is conducting direct warfare, while the other is acting by proxy. Nothing is significant enough on either side to risk a nuclear exchange.

The situation between China and the United States is similarly limited. Neither nation has any interest worth a nuclear exchange, and neither side is certain what the other might do if facing an extreme risk of defeat. We have seen endless maneuvering and rhetoric from both sides, but at the moment the uncertainties involved in risking a conventional war are intact. Neither side is confident enough in its position in initiating combat, and neither is certain whether nuclear weapons might be used if it were winning a conventional war. Being almost certain is not the basis for rising national annihilation.

From my point of view, we see in Ukraine a classic uncertainty on both sides as the war progresses. In the Western Pacific, we have had many years of saber-rattling but little action. China is in the throes of a financial crisis that cannot be solved by engaging its largest customer and major investor in war. The U.S. has no desire to change the status quo.

There are, my mind, too many obstacles to a cascading war. The closest to a cascading war we have seen was World War II, but even then the participants were fairly stable after the war started. In the Cold War, the center never destabilized, the smaller skirmishes elsewhere notwithstanding. Cascading wars may happen over decades and with intervening political agreements. There will always be wars, and some will be terrible. But there are too many breakers to allow for cascades

[G M]

GF also said Russia wouldn't go into Ukraine, right?

As always, GF is very bright and insightful, but I think the MY theory of things gets closer to what is coming down the pike at us:
==========================

August 23, 2022
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The Permanence of War and Peace
By: George Friedman
Last week my friend and colleague, Jacek Bartosiak, wrote a piece for GPF titled “The Scalable World War Ahead,” in which he warned that the world is descending into the abyss of near-global war. The most important argument he made was that there was a new dynamic in the world in which wars will grow as a cancer, with cells dividing until the world is fully consumed.

I disagree with what I will call the theory of war as metastasis generally, and particularly in our time. Wars occur between nation-states, rising from the particular interests of each nation-state. In general, wars originate from fear or greed. A nation calculates that the threat from another nation is best met by preemptive action. This occurs in the particular circumstance in which a nation fears what another nation will become, and risks war on the assumption that going to war will prevent the rise of another nation. The fear could be of the not-yet-harnessed power of the opponent or the possibility of the power of an ally. War can also arise from greed, or the desire to acquire something of strategic value from another nation – in which case the calculation of power assigns a probability of success on the nation initiating the war.

The decision to go to war is initiated by one party that tends to want to avoid an expansion of the war, or will at least wait until the first war is settled before expanding the war and increasing the chance of failure. The defending country tends to seek allies, if the attacker’s calculation of relative power is correct. The cost of alliance is normally high, and the desire to intervene exists only under particular circumstances. Cascading wars are thus possible but not likely. In this sense, most wars are self-limiting.

In retrospect, World War II appears to be a cascading war, but it was so only in a limited sense. There were two separate wars, one in the Pacific and one in Europe. The former did not cascade. The participants at the beginning defined the war until its end. In Europe, the war was really two wars, both involving Germany. One was Germany against the Anglo-French alliance, the other against the Soviet alliance. Neither the Pacific nor the European war metastasized far beyond the core powers.

The Cold War pitted NATO against the Warsaw Pact, and it had a distinctly nuclear flavor. The Cold War in Europe never turned into war because nuclear weapons increased the potential cost of war enormously. The war did spread to parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but these were non-critical conflicts for both sides.

One of the limiters of war involving major powers is the fact that most have nuclear weapons. A war between China and the United States would be possible only if one side were confident it could neutralize the other’s weapons. Absent that, the danger would be in winning the war. In extremis, where the nation’s fundamental interests were threatened by conventional forces, the nation might choose a nuclear option. The potential winner would have to assume that a nuclear response is possible, and would have to calculate whether the potential risks of victory would be worth the prize. Pre-nuclear limits on cascading wars would have a nuclear response added to the equation. Notably, the notion of tactical nuclear weapons creates the illusion of utility. The most widely available tactical nuclear weapons have a lethality of a large fraction of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima. There are smaller ones, but they are either so small as to not justify their use relative to conventional weapons or sufficiently devastating to make a large city uninhabitable.

War is possible between nuclear powers when at least one is acting through proxies able to carry the battle. Vietnam is a classic example. North Vietnam and the United States clashed with each other, with China and the Soviet Union providing logistical support. The U.S. never seriously considered the use of nuclear weapons in the confrontation. Nor did Israel in 1973 when it was attacked by Egypt. The Cuban missile crisis never really came close to nuclear exchange, as the release of papers and tapes by both sides shows. In Ukraine, Russia has threatened a nuclear strike. However, as in Vietnam, one side is conducting direct warfare, while the other is acting by proxy. Nothing is significant enough on either side to risk a nuclear exchange.

The situation between China and the United States is similarly limited. Neither nation has any interest worth a nuclear exchange, and neither side is certain what the other might do if facing an extreme risk of defeat. We have seen endless maneuvering and rhetoric from both sides, but at the moment the uncertainties involved in risking a conventional war are intact. Neither side is confident enough in its position in initiating combat, and neither is certain whether nuclear weapons might be used if it were winning a conventional war. Being almost certain is not the basis for rising national annihilation.

From my point of view, we see in Ukraine a classic uncertainty on both sides as the war progresses. In the Western Pacific, we have had many years of saber-rattling but little action. China is in the throes of a financial crisis that cannot be solved by engaging its largest customer and major investor in war. The U.S. has no desire to change the status quo.

There are, my mind, too many obstacles to a cascading war. The closest to a cascading war we have seen was World War II, but even then the participants were fairly stable after the war started. In the Cold War, the center never destabilized, the smaller skirmishes elsewhere notwithstanding. Cascading wars may happen over decades and with intervening political agreements. There will always be wars, and some will be terrible. But there are too many breakers to allow for cascades

[Crafty_Dog]

https://plus2.credit-suisse.com/shorturlpdf.html?v=5amR-YP34-V&t=-1e4y7st99l5d0a0be21hgr5ht

 Hat tip to YA

Forgive me the vanity, but I would note the not insignificant overlap with some of the points I have been making , , ,

[Crafty_Dog]

Some of the snark here is well wide of the mark, but there is a lot that pithily presents important questions:

========================


SEPTEMBER 15, 2022
Russia’s Underperforming Military (and Our Own)
BY ANDREW BACEVICH


In Washington, wide agreement exists that the Russian army’s performance in the Kremlin’s ongoing Ukraine “special military operation” ranks somewhere between lousy and truly abysmal. The question is: Why? The answer in American policy circles, both civilian and military, appears all but self-evident. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has stubbornly insisted on ignoring the principles, practices, and methods identified as necessary for success in war and perfected in this century by the armed forces of the United States. Put simply, by refusing to do things the American way, the Russians are failing badly against a far weaker foe.

Granted, American analysts — especially the retired military officers who opine on national news shows — concede that other factors have contributed to Russia’s sorry predicament. Yes, heroic Ukrainian resistance, reminiscent of the Winter War of 1939-1940 when Finland tenaciously defended itself against the Soviet Union’s more powerful military, caught the Russians by surprise. Expectations that Ukrainians would stand by while the invaders swept across their country proved wildly misplaced. In addition, comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the West in response to the invasion have complicated the Russian war effort. By no means least of all, the flood of modern weaponry provided by the United States and its allies — God bless the military-industrial-congressional complex — have appreciably enhanced Ukrainian fighting power.

Still, in the view of American military figures, all of those factors take a backseat to Russia’s manifest inability (or refusal) to grasp the basic prerequisites of modern warfare. The fact that Western observers possess a limited understanding of how that country’s military leadership functions makes it all the easier to render such definitive judgments. It’s like speculating about Donald Trump’s innermost convictions. Since nobody really knows, any forcefully expressed opinion acquires at least passing credibility.

The prevailing self-referential American explanation for Russian military ineptitude emphasizes at least four key points:

* First, the Russians don’t understand jointness, the military doctrine that provides for the seamless integration of ground, air, and maritime operations, not only on Planet Earth but in cyberspace and outer space;

* Second, Russia’s land forces haven’t adhered to the principles of combined arms warfare, first perfected by the Germans in World War II, that emphasizes the close tactical collaboration of tanks, infantry, and artillery;

* Third, Russia’s longstanding tradition of top-down leadership inhibits flexibility at the front, leaving junior officers and noncommissioned officers to relay orders from on high without demonstrating any capacity to, or instinct for, exercising initiative on their own;

* Finally, the Russians appear to lack even the most rudimentary understanding of battlefield logistics — the mechanisms that provide a steady and reliable supply of the fuel, food, munitions, medical support, and spare parts needed to sustain a campaign.

Implicit in this critique, voiced by self-proclaimed American experts, is the suggestion that, if the Russian army had paid more attention to how U.S. forces deal with such matters, they would have fared better in Ukraine. That they don’t — and perhaps can’t — comes as good news for Russia’s enemies, of course. By implication, Russian military ineptitude obliquely affirms the military mastery of the United States. We define the standard of excellence to which others can only aspire.

Reducing War to a Formula

All of which begs a larger question the national security establishment remains steadfastly oblivious to: If jointness, combined arms tactics, flexible leadership, and responsive logistics hold the keys to victory, why haven’t American forces — supposedly possessing such qualities in abundance — been able to win their own equivalents of the Ukraine War? After all, Russia has only been stuck in Ukraine for six months, while the U.S. was stuck in Afghanistan for 20 years and still has troops in Iraq almost two decades after its disastrous invasion of that country.

To rephrase the question: Why does explaining the Russian underperformance in Ukraine attract so much smug commentary here, while American military underperformance gets written off?

Perhaps written off is too harsh. After all, when the U.S. military fails to meet expectations, there are always some who will hasten to point the finger at civilian leaders for screwing up. Certainly, this was the case with the chaotic U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Critics were quick to pin the blame on President Biden for that debacle, while the commanders who had presided over the war there for those 20 years escaped largely unscathed. Indeed, some of those former commanders like retired general and ex-CIA Director David Petraeus, aka “King David,” were eagerly sought after by the media as Kabul fell.

So, if the U.S. military performance since the Global War on Terror was launched more than two decades ago rates as, to put it politely, a disappointment — and that would be my view — it might be tempting to lay responsibility at the feet of the four presidents, eight secretaries of defense (including two former four-star generals), and the various deputy secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and ambassadors who designed and implemented American policy in those years. In essence, this becomes an argument for sustained generational incompetence.

There’s a flipside to that argument, however. It would tag the parade of generals who presided over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (and lesser conflicts like those in Libya, Somalia, and Syria) as uniformly not up to the job — another argument for generational incompetence. Members of the once-dominant Petraeus fan club might cite him as a notable exception. Yet, with the passage of time, King David’s achievements as general-in-chief first in Baghdad and then in Kabul have lost much of their luster. The late “Stormin’ Norman” Schwarzkopf and General Tommy Franks, their own “victories” diminished by subsequent events, might sympathize.

Allow me to suggest another explanation, however, for the performance gap that afflicts the twenty-first-century U.S. military establishment. The real problem hasn’t been arrogant, ill-informed civilians or generals who lack the right stuff or suffer from bad luck. It’s the way Americans, especially those wielding influence in national security circles, including journalists, think tankers, lobbyists, corporate officials in the military-industrial complex, and members of Congress, have come to think of war as an attractive, affordable means of solving problems.

Military theorists have long emphasized that by its very nature, war is fluid, elusive, capricious, and permeated with chance and uncertainty. Practitioners tend to respond by suggesting that, though true, such descriptions are not helpful. They prefer to conceive of war as essentially knowable, predictable, and eminently useful — the Swiss Army knife of international politics.

Hence, the tendency, among both civilian and military officials in Washington, not to mention journalists and policy intellectuals, to reduce war to a phrase or formula (or better yet to a set of acronyms), so that the entire subject can be summarized in a slick 30-minute slide presentation. That urge to simplify — to boil things down to their essence — is anything but incidental. In Washington, the avoidance of complexity and ambiguity facilitates marketing (that is, shaking down Congress for money).

To cite one small example of this, consider a recent military document entitled

“Army Readiness and Modernization in 2022,” produced by propagandists at the Association of the United States Army, purports to describe where the U.S. Army is headed. It identifies “eight cross-functional teams” meant to focus on “six priorities.” If properly resourced and vigorously pursued, these teams and priorities will ensure, it claims, that “the army maintains all-domain overmatch against all adversaries in future fights.”

Set aside the uncomfortable fact that, when it counted last year in Kabul, American forces demonstrated anything but all-domain overmatch. Still, what the Army’s leadership aims to do between now and 2035 is create “a transformed multi-domain army” by fielding a plethora of new systems, described in a blizzard of acronyms: ERCA, PrSM, LRHW, OMVF, MPF, RCV, AMPV, FVL, FLRAA, FARA, BLADE, CROWS, MMHEL, and so on, more or less ad infinitum.

Perhaps you won’t be surprised to learn that the Army’s plan, or rather vision, for its future avoids the slightest mention of costs. Nor does it consider potential complications — adversaries equipped with nuclear weapons, for example — that might interfere with its aspirations to all-domain overmatch.

Yet the document deserves our attention as an exquisite example of Pentagon-think. It provides the Army’s preferred answer to a question of nearly existential importance — not “How can the Army help keep Americans safe?” but “How can the Army maintain, and ideally increase, its budget?”

Hidden inside that question is an implicit assumption that sustaining even the pretense of keeping Americans safe requires a military of global reach that maintains a massive global presence. Given the spectacular findings of the James Webb Telescope, perhaps galactic will one day replace global in the Pentagon’s lexicon. In the meantime, while maintaining perhaps 750 military bases on every continent except Antarctica, that military rejects out of hand the proposition that defending Americans where they live — that is, within the boundaries of the 50 states comprising the United States — can suffice to define its overarching purpose.

And here we arrive at the crux of the matter: militarized globalism, the Pentagon’s preferred paradigm for basic policy, has become increasingly unaffordable. With the passage of time, it’s also become beside the point. Americans simply don’t have the wallet to satisfy budgetary claims concocted in the Pentagon, especially those that ignore the most elemental concerns we face, including disease, drought, fire, floods, and sea-level rise, not to mention averting the potential collapse of our constitutional order. All-domain overmatch is of doubtful relevance to such threats.

To provide for the safety and well-being of our republic, we don’t need further enhancements to jointness, combined arms tactics, flexible leadership, and responsive logistics. Instead, we need an entirely different approach to national security.

Come Home, America, Before It’s Too Late

Given the precarious state of American democracy, aptly described by President Biden in his recent address in Philadelphia, our most pressing priority is repairing the damage to our domestic political fabric, not engaging in another round of “great power competition” dreamed up by fevered minds in Washington. Put simply, the Constitution is more important than the fate of Taiwan.

I apologize: I know that I have blasphemed. But the times suggest that we weigh the pros and cons of blasphemy. With serious people publicly warning about the possible approach of civil war and many of our far-too-well armed fellow citizens welcoming the prospect, perhaps the moment has come to reconsider the taken-for-granted premises that have sustained U.S. national security policy since the immediate aftermath of World War II.

More blasphemy! Did I just advocate a policy of isolationism?

Heaven forfend! What I would settle for instead is a modicum of modesty and prudence, along with a lively respect for (rather than infatuation with) war.

Here is the unacknowledged bind in which the Pentagon has placed itself — and the rest of us: by gearing up to fight (however ineffectively) anywhere against any foe in any kind of conflict, it finds itself prepared to fight nowhere in particular. Hence, the urge to extemporize on the fly, as has been the pattern in every conflict of ours since the Vietnam War. On occasion, things work out, as in the long-forgotten, essentially meaningless 1983 invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada. More often than not, however, they don’t, no matter how vigorously our generals and our troops apply the principles of jointness, combined arms, leadership, and logistics.

Americans spend a lot of time these days trying to figure out what makes Vladimir Putin tick. I don’t pretend to know, nor do I really much care. I would say this, however: Putin’s plunge into Ukraine confirms that he learned nothing from the folly of post-9/11 U.S. military policy.

Will we, in our turn, learn anything from Putin’s folly? Don’t count on it.

This column is distributed by TomDispatch.

 

Andrew Bacevich is the author of America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, which has just been published by Random House.

[Crafty_Dog]

Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia

The PRC and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other but the challenges they pose are, in important ways, distinct. We will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over the PRC while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia.

China

The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries. It benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world. The PRC is

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 23


also investing in a military that is rapidly modernizing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength and reach globally – all while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the region and around the world.

At the same time, the PRC is also central to the global economy and has a significant impact on shared challenges, particularly climate change and global public health. It is possible for the United States and the PRC to coexist peacefully, and share in and contribute to human progress together.

Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. The first two elements— invest and align— are described in the previous section and are essential to out- competing the PRC in the technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains.

Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, but it is also increasingly global. Around the world, the contest to write the rules of the road and shape the relationships that govern global affairs is playing out in every region and across economics, technology, diplomacy, development, security, and global governance.

In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the decisive decade. We stand now at the inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future.

Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the frontlines of the PRC’s coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity. We will support their ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their interests and values, free from external pressure, and work to provide high-standard and scaled investment, development assistance, and markets. Our strategy will require us to partner with, support, and meet the economic and development needs of partner countries, not for the sake of competition, but for their own sake. We will act in common purpose to address a range of issues – from untrusted digital infrastructure and forced labor in supply chains and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. We will hold Beijing accountable for abuses – genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms – even as it seeks to pressure countries and communities into silence. We will continue prioritizing investments in a combat credible military that deters aggression against our allies and partners in the region, and can help those allies and partners defend themselves.

We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence. We remain committed to our one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.

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24 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY


Though allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC, our diplomatic approach, and the PRC’s own behavior, has produced significant and growing opportunities to align approaches and deliver results. Across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, countries are clear-eyed about the nature of the challenges that the PRC poses. Governments want sustainable public finances. Workers want to be treated with dignity and respect. Innovators want to be rewarded for their ingenuity, risk-taking, and persistent efforts. And enterprising businesses want open and free waters through which their products can be traded.

While we compete vigorously, we will manage the competition responsibly. We will seek greater strategic stability through measures that reduce the risk of unintended military escalation, enhance crisis communications, build mutual transparency, and ultimately engage Beijing on more formal arms control efforts. We will always be willing to work with the PRC where our interests align. We can’t let the disagreements that divide us stop us from moving forward on the priorities that demand that we work together, for the good of our people and for the good of the world. That includes on climate, pandemic threats, nonproliferation, countering illicit and illegal narcotics, the global food crisis, and macroeconomic issues. In short, we’ll engage constructively with the PRC wherever we can, not as a favor to us or anyone else, and never in exchange for walking away from our principles, but because working together to solve great challenges is what the world expects from great powers, and because it’s directly in our interest. No country should withhold progress on existential transnational issues like the climate crisis because of bilateral differences.

While we have profound differences with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government, those differences are between governments and systems – not between our people. Ties of family and friendship continue to connect the American and the Chinese people. We deeply respect their achievements, their history, and their culture. Racism and hate have no place in a nation built by generations of immigrants to fulfill the promise of opportunity for all. And we intend to work together to solve issues that matter most to the people of both countries.

Russia

Over the past decade, the Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. This culminated in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to topple its government and bring it under Russian control. But, this attack did not come out of the blue; it was preceded by Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, its military intervention in Syria, its longstanding efforts to destabilize its neighbors using intelligence and cyber capabilities, and its blatant attempts to undermine internal democratic processes in countries across Europe, Central Asia, and around the world. Russia has also interfered brazenly in U.S. politics and worked to sow divisions among the American people. And Russia’s destabilizing actions are not limited to the international arena. Domestically, the Russian government under President Putin violates its citizens’ human rights, suppresses its opposition, and shutters independent media. Russia now has a stagnant political system that is unresponsive to the needs of its people.

The United States, under successive administrations, made considerable efforts at multiple points to reach out to Russia to limit our rivalry and identify pragmatic areas of cooperation. President Putin spurned these efforts and it is now clear he will not change. Russia now poses an immediate and persistent threat to international peace and stability. This is not about a struggle between the West and Russia. It is about the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, which

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 25


Russia is a party to, particularly respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition

against acquiring territory through war.

We are leading a united, principled, and resolute response to Russia’s invasion and we have rallied the world to support the Ukrainian people as they bravely defend their country. Working with a broad and durable international coalition, we have marshalled near-record levels of security assistance to ensure Ukraine has the means to defend itself. We have provided humanitarian, economic and development assistance to strengthen Ukraine’s sovereign, elected government and help the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes. We will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine as they fight back against Russia’s naked aggression. And we will rally the world to hold Russia accountable for the atrocities they have unleashed across Ukraine.

Alongside our allies and partners, America is helping to make Russia’s war on Ukraine a strategic failure. Across Europe, NATO and the European Union are united in standing up to Russia and defending shared values. We are constraining Russia’s strategic economic sectors, including defense and aerospace, and we will continue to counter Russia’s attempts to weaken and destabilize sovereign nations and undermine multilateral institutions. Together with our NATO Allies, we are strengthening our defense and deterrence, particularly on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve our security and capabilities. And we are renewing our focus on bolstering our collective resilience against shared threats from Russia, including asymmetric threats. More broadly, Putin’s war has profoundly diminished Russia’s status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. Moscow’s soft power and diplomatic influence have waned, while its efforts to weaponize energy have backfired. The historic global response to Russia’s war against Ukraine sends a resounding message that countries cannot enjoy the benefits of global integration while trampling on the core tenets of the UN Charter.

While some aspects of our approach will depend on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, a number of elements are already clear. First, the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its fight for its freedom, we will help Ukraine recover economically, and we will encourage its regional integration with the European Union. Second, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory and will continue to build and deepen a coalition with allies and partners to prevent Russia from causing further harm to European security, democracy, and institutions. Third, the United States will deter and, as necessary, respond to Russian actions that threaten core U.S. interests, including Russian attacks on our infrastructure and our democracy. Fourth, Russia’s conventional military will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning. The United States will not allow Russia, or any power, to achieve its objectives through using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. America retains an interest in preserving strategic stability and developing a more expansive, transparent, and verifiable arms control infrastructure to succeed New START and in rebuilding European security arrangements which, due to Russia’s actions, have fallen in to disrepair. Finally, the United States will sustain and develop pragmatic modes of interaction to handle issues on which dealing with Russia can be mutually beneficial.

The United States respects the Russian people and their contributions to science, culture and constructive bilateral relations over many decades. Notwithstanding the Russian government’s strategic miscalculation in attacking Ukraine, it is the Russian people who will determine Russia’s future as a major power capable of once more playing a constructive role in

26 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY


international affairs. The United States will welcome such a future, and in the meantime, will

continue to push back against the aggression perpetrated by the Russian government.

Cooperating on Shared Challenges

The United States must maintain and increase international cooperation on shared challenges even in an age of greater inter-state competition. In an ideal world, governments would compete responsibly where their interests diverge and cooperate where they converge—but things have not always worked out this way in practice. The United States, for example, has made clear that we will not support the linkage of issues in a way that conditions cooperation on shared challenges, but some in Beijing have been equally clear that the PRC should expect concessions on unrelated issues as a prerequisite to cooperation on shared challenges, such as climate change. We have also seen how the PRC chose not to cooperate adequately with the World Health Organization and the international community on the global response to COVID-19, including on the investigation into its origins. It also continues to endanger the world with inadequate action on climate change domestically, particularly regarding massive coal power use and build up.

Our strategy to tackle the shared challenges that require global cooperation involves two simultaneous tracks: on one track, we will fully engage all countries and institutions to cooperate on shared threats, including by pressing for reforms where institutional responses have proven inadequate. At the same time, we will also redouble our efforts to deepen our cooperation with like-minded partners. Across both tracks, we will also seek to harness the positive effects of competition, promoting a race to the top, to increase international efforts on these challenges.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Sentences%20October%2012&utm_term=Sentences

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ET

‘The Post-Cold War Era Is Over’: White House National Security Advisor
By Andrew Thornebrooke October 12, 2022 Updated: October 12, 2022biggersmaller Print

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The international order has entered a new epoch and the United States will need to vigorously defend its way of life from encroaching authoritarianism from China and Russia, according to a senior U.S. official.

How the United States acts over the course of the next decade will make or break its efforts to preserve a liberal international order against the autocratic advances of China’s communist regime, said White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan.

“We’re in the early years of a decisive decade,” Sullivan said at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security and the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington.

“The terms of our competition with the People’s Republic of China will be set. The window of opportunity to deal with shared challenges like climate change will narrow drastically even as the intensity of those challenges grows.”

Sullivan delivered the remarks hours after the unveiling of the Biden administration’s national security strategy, which designated communist China as the greatest challenge facing the United States.

“The PRC’s assertiveness at home and abroad is advancing an illiberal vision across economic, political, security, and technological realms in competition with the west,” Sullivan said, using the acronym for the regime’s official name.

“It is the only competitor with the intent to reshape the international order and the growing capacity to do it.”

Sullivan said that the world had left the post-Cold War era, often associated with the rise of globalization, international cooperation, and a general lack of military conflict between great powers.

Now, he said, a new era of geopolitical competition has arisen, tied closely to the push by China and Russia towards a multipolar world order. In this burgeoning era, autocratic nations would seek to rewrite the rules of the international system according to their whims, he said.

“The world’s major autocracies believe that the democratic world is in decline,” Sullivan said.

“They seek to advance a very different vision, where might makes right and technological and economic coercion squeezes anyone who steps out of line.”

To that end, Sullivan said that the authoritarian philosophies of Chinese communist leader Xi Jinping and Russian leader Vladimir Putin contained a “fundamental fragility” that could be overcome by a united “free, open, and prosperous international order.”

“Even if our democratic allies and partners don’t agree on everything, they are aligned with us,” Sullivan said. “And so are many countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and help sustain a rules-based international system.”

“They don’t want to see it vanish, and they know that we are the world’s best bet to defend it.”

Whether the United States succeeded or failed in defending that international order, Sullivan said, would determine whether the nations of the world could effectively remain free or even work with one another on transnational issues like disease and climate change.

“The stakes could not be higher,” Sullivan said. “The actions we take now will shape whether this decisive decade is an age of conflict and discord or the beginning of a more prosperous and stable future.”

“The post-Cold War era is over,” he added.

[G M]

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2022/10/misguided-foreign-policies-against-russia-and-others-damage-the-us-and-its-allies.html

[Crafty_Dog]

"the Nazi-controlled Kiev regime"

Seriously?

[G M]

"the Nazi-controlled Kiev regime"

Seriously?

It's an interesting question.

https://jewishstandard.timesofisrael.com/it-was-all-a-lie/

But the remaining fighters inside the plant were a mixed group — Ukrainian soldiers, marines, military police, and members of the country’s National Guard, as well as members of the nationalist Azov Battalion, he explained. The Azov Battalion has its roots in Ukraine’s undeniably Nazi sector, although in recent years, we’ve been told, its members have focused their attention on fighting Russians.

Although the Russians have been losing most of the little territory they’ve gained in Ukraine, they’ve managed to destroy Mariupol. Last weekend, the Russians and the Ukrainians negotiated the surrender of the fighters left in the Azovstal plant, Mr. Smukler said. The Ukrainians, in the understanding that they’d swap their captured Russian prisoners for the Russians’ captured Ukrainians, told the besieged fighters to surrender.

They did. But Putin lied.

They were arrested.

Then they were told to strip to their underwear, and it turns out that the Azov Battalion members are covered in tattoos. Terrible tattoos. Nazi tattoos. They have swastikas, symbols of various SS battalions, and portraits of Stefan Bandera, the World War II Ukrainian leader and Nazi collaborator, and of Hitler inked on their bodies. “One or two of them had slogans from the death camps — Arbeit macht frei” — Work will make you free, from the gate leading to Auschwitz, and “Jedem das Seine,” more or less “To each what he is due,” from Buchenwald, tattooed on their bodies, Mr. Smukler said. The slogans were in their original German, to make their provenance and point as clear as possible. “Other tattoos were quotes from Mein Kampf,” he added.

[Crafty_Dog]

Thank you for that article.

That said, the phrase I contested in the prior article you posted was that the central government was Nazi controlled.  With Zelensky being Jewish, this does trigger substantial cognitive dissonance. 

[G M]

Thank you for that article.

That said, the phrase I contested in the prior article you posted was that the central government was Nazi controlled.  With Zelensky being Jewish, this does trigger substantial cognitive dissonance. 

And the funder/founder of the Azovs being Jewish and currently living in Israel. Unless the tats I have seen in photos are ALL skilled Russian photoshops (In this world of cheap and easy deepfake technology, what can we really trust?) I don't know how to explain the abundance of Nazi symbolism with UKR forces and the Jewish leadership.

Fcuking strange.

[Crafty_Dog]

Good point about strong photoshop motive and capability here.

[G M]

Good point about strong photoshop motive and capability here.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Fe_XMRdWYAAg0dj?format=jpg&name=900x900



Funny how this has all been memory-holed for some reason.

[DougMacG]

We won't have to memory hole it here since there is no mention in 20 long internet pages of any Nazi connection with Ukraine in the last 70 years.

First mention here was March 2022 after the war was well underway and after Russian war propaganda was well underway:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1751.msg143535#msg143535

The report shows one helmet with an unidentified model wearing it, shown on German TV picked up by NBC who never has been duped. (sarc.)

[G M]

We won't have to memory hole it here since there is no mention in 20 long internet pages of any Nazi connection with Ukraine in the last 70 years.

First mention here was March 2022 after the war was well underway and after Russian war propaganda was well underway:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1751.msg143535#msg143535

The report shows one helmet with an unidentified model wearing it, shown on German TV picked up by NBC who never has been duped. (sarc.)

Doug, do you know why most outlaw bikers wear nazi regalia/have nazi tats?

[G M]

https://consortiumnews.com/2022/02/26/robert-parry-the-mess-that-nuland-made/

[Crafty_Dog]

October 18, 2022
View On Website
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Still a Unipolar World
By: George Friedman

In recent weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the United States is trying to impose a new world order, one designed to control Russia, China and Europe, as well as the lesser powers of the world. It’s tempting to write it off as the ranting of a leader at war, but there’s more to it than that. Ignore the fact that Washington’s seeking a unipolar world assumes a level of planning that runs counter to the American reality. What Putin is trying to come to terms with is that in planning for war in Ukraine, Moscow completely misunderstood the nature of the world.

Specifically, Russia misunderstood American subtlety. The United States did not commit major military force to block Russia’s advance, nor did it cede any part of Ukraine. The United States understood the threat posed by Russia on the border with NATO – that is, a new Cold War – and it understood Ukraine better than Russia did. So it sent massive amounts of weapons to Ukraine, the power and sophistication of which could not be matched. It struck blow after indirect blow.

Moscow also failed to understand America’s relationship with Europe. Time and again, Europeans bemoaned that Washington had abandoned its European commitments. That that was never the case didn’t stop U.S. think tanks from validating the idea, nor did it dissuade Russia from believing it. In times of peace, the U.S. could do without the prior relationship with Europe, bickering over trade rules and Russian energy dependence. But when the war broke out, the relationship rapidly transformed. Germany, for example, did not value Russian fuel as much as it valued American security guarantees. The Europeans knew that Russia could hurt them, and they did not really trust the Russians, but when push came to shove, they knew American interests lay in Europe. Putin, I think, was stunned when he learned the Germans stood with the Americans. He lacked a sophisticated understanding that there are different types of power and that the power projected by Russia was too blunt to work. Putin could not understand the power of appearing uncertain.

Still, the worst mistake Putin made concerns the U.S. relationship with China, a country in deep economic crisis. Moscow could neither hurt nor help China. The U.S. can do both – help by increasing investment and buying more goods, and hurt by blocking the sale of, say, certain microchips. China believed it did not need the United States to recover, and it convinced itself that Washington could be intimidated by naval and related power. Instead, Beijing discovered that its threats around Taiwan and other areas simply generated more vessels and weapons to be deployed against it. The utility of an alliance with Russia was shattered by the realization that the U.S. could respond militarily in Ukraine and, simultaneously, in the South China Sea.

All of this should have been obvious, and I think China was more aware of U.S. capabilities than Russia was. Chinese President Xi Jinping knew when to cut his losses. Putin kept doubling down. This seemed to be validated over the weekend by a spokesman for the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, whose statements were paraphrased by China's Global Times newspaper as follows:

“If one of the most important events in international relations in the past 50 years is the restoration and development of China-U.S. relations, which has benefited both countries and the world, then the most important thing in international relations for the next 50 years is that China and the U.S. must find the right way to get along with each other. The key for China and the U.S. to find the right way to get on with each other is mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Common interests between China and the U.S. far outweigh differences, and a sound and stable China-U.S. relationship serves the common interests of the two peoples.”

We are used to China hurling threats at the United States. Now, it is searching for ways to accommodate the U.S. It has noted the American performance in Ukraine, both subtle and brutal, and has decided that an alliance with the U.S., however loosely defined or temporary, is far more attractive.

It’s no surprise, then, that Putin sees the U.S. as a force trying to create a unipolar world, because in some notable ways, it is a unipolar world. The U.S. is the largest economy in the world, its current problems notwithstanding. It also has a sophisticated military, able to bring overwhelming force to bear, train an army at war in new weapons, and use subtle force to shape the world. American power isn’t absolute, and it can be outstripped. But it is sufficiently mobile to act sequentially when simultaneous action is impossible. Put simply, the United States is the most powerful economic and military force in the world – when it chooses to act. Inaction can be confused by men like Putin as weakness. The U.S. has learned that with its inherent power it has time to react.

The American public often sees the United States as weak and mismanaged. There’s a tendency to label Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as criminals or morons or both. The same charges were levied against Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Contempt for the commanders-in-chief is a prerequisite, to prevent tyranny, even if it has its drawbacks. The America First movement opposing U.S. participation in World War II interfered with Roosevelt’s ability to make decisions. It had a direct impact on Pearl Harbor and caused a painful initiation for the U.S. into war by the Japanese, which of course ended in catastrophe for them.

The perception of American weakness is a global one, shared even among Americans. Being underestimated has its uses, as does sporting a public that doesn’t trust its president. But only enormously powerful nations can afford the contempt. The past few months haven’t taught us that the United States is finagling a new world order. It’s taught us that Russia is weakening, that China is managing its relationship with the U.S. carefully, and that the international architecture created after World War II, though more complex, essentially remains in place. It is a unipolar world.

[G M]

Delusional.

The GAE is collapsing from within.

October 18, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Still a Unipolar World
By: George Friedman

In recent weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the United States is trying to impose a new world order, one designed to control Russia, China and Europe, as well as the lesser powers of the world. It’s tempting to write it off as the ranting of a leader at war, but there’s more to it than that. Ignore the fact that Washington’s seeking a unipolar world assumes a level of planning that runs counter to the American reality. What Putin is trying to come to terms with is that in planning for war in Ukraine, Moscow completely misunderstood the nature of the world.

Specifically, Russia misunderstood American subtlety. The United States did not commit major military force to block Russia’s advance, nor did it cede any part of Ukraine. The United States understood the threat posed by Russia on the border with NATO – that is, a new Cold War – and it understood Ukraine better than Russia did. So it sent massive amounts of weapons to Ukraine, the power and sophistication of which could not be matched. It struck blow after indirect blow.

Moscow also failed to understand America’s relationship with Europe. Time and again, Europeans bemoaned that Washington had abandoned its European commitments. That that was never the case didn’t stop U.S. think tanks from validating the idea, nor did it dissuade Russia from believing it. In times of peace, the U.S. could do without the prior relationship with Europe, bickering over trade rules and Russian energy dependence. But when the war broke out, the relationship rapidly transformed. Germany, for example, did not value Russian fuel as much as it valued American security guarantees. The Europeans knew that Russia could hurt them, and they did not really trust the Russians, but when push came to shove, they knew American interests lay in Europe. Putin, I think, was stunned when he learned the Germans stood with the Americans. He lacked a sophisticated understanding that there are different types of power and that the power projected by Russia was too blunt to work. Putin could not understand the power of appearing uncertain.

Still, the worst mistake Putin made concerns the U.S. relationship with China, a country in deep economic crisis. Moscow could neither hurt nor help China. The U.S. can do both – help by increasing investment and buying more goods, and hurt by blocking the sale of, say, certain microchips. China believed it did not need the United States to recover, and it convinced itself that Washington could be intimidated by naval and related power. Instead, Beijing discovered that its threats around Taiwan and other areas simply generated more vessels and weapons to be deployed against it. The utility of an alliance with Russia was shattered by the realization that the U.S. could respond militarily in Ukraine and, simultaneously, in the South China Sea.

All of this should have been obvious, and I think China was more aware of U.S. capabilities than Russia was. Chinese President Xi Jinping knew when to cut his losses. Putin kept doubling down. This seemed to be validated over the weekend by a spokesman for the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, whose statements were paraphrased by China's Global Times newspaper as follows:

“If one of the most important events in international relations in the past 50 years is the restoration and development of China-U.S. relations, which has benefited both countries and the world, then the most important thing in international relations for the next 50 years is that China and the U.S. must find the right way to get along with each other. The key for China and the U.S. to find the right way to get on with each other is mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Common interests between China and the U.S. far outweigh differences, and a sound and stable China-U.S. relationship serves the common interests of the two peoples.”

We are used to China hurling threats at the United States. Now, it is searching for ways to accommodate the U.S. It has noted the American performance in Ukraine, both subtle and brutal, and has decided that an alliance with the U.S., however loosely defined or temporary, is far more attractive.

It’s no surprise, then, that Putin sees the U.S. as a force trying to create a unipolar world, because in some notable ways, it is a unipolar world. The U.S. is the largest economy in the world, its current problems notwithstanding. It also has a sophisticated military, able to bring overwhelming force to bear, train an army at war in new weapons, and use subtle force to shape the world. American power isn’t absolute, and it can be outstripped. But it is sufficiently mobile to act sequentially when simultaneous action is impossible. Put simply, the United States is the most powerful economic and military force in the world – when it chooses to act. Inaction can be confused by men like Putin as weakness. The U.S. has learned that with its inherent power it has time to react.

The American public often sees the United States as weak and mismanaged. There’s a tendency to label Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as criminals or morons or both. The same charges were levied against Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Contempt for the commanders-in-chief is a prerequisite, to prevent tyranny, even if it has its drawbacks. The America First movement opposing U.S. participation in World War II interfered with Roosevelt’s ability to make decisions. It had a direct impact on Pearl Harbor and caused a painful initiation for the U.S. into war by the Japanese, which of course ended in catastrophe for them.

The perception of American weakness is a global one, shared even among Americans. Being underestimated has its uses, as does sporting a public that doesn’t trust its president. But only enormously powerful nations can afford the contempt. The past few months haven’t taught us that the United States is finagling a new world order. It’s taught us that Russia is weakening, that China is managing its relationship with the U.S. carefully, and that the international architecture created after World War II, though more complex, essentially remains in place. It is a unipolar world.

[G M]

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/10/18/massive-clusterfook-americas-electric-grid/#more-282364

Our cities are disgusting, dangerous shitholes and our infrastructure is collapsing around us.

But we're doing awesome!

Delusional.

The GAE is collapsing from within.

October 18, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Still a Unipolar World
By: George Friedman

In recent weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the United States is trying to impose a new world order, one designed to control Russia, China and Europe, as well as the lesser powers of the world. It’s tempting to write it off as the ranting of a leader at war, but there’s more to it than that. Ignore the fact that Washington’s seeking a unipolar world assumes a level of planning that runs counter to the American reality. What Putin is trying to come to terms with is that in planning for war in Ukraine, Moscow completely misunderstood the nature of the world.

Specifically, Russia misunderstood American subtlety. The United States did not commit major military force to block Russia’s advance, nor did it cede any part of Ukraine. The United States understood the threat posed by Russia on the border with NATO – that is, a new Cold War – and it understood Ukraine better than Russia did. So it sent massive amounts of weapons to Ukraine, the power and sophistication of which could not be matched. It struck blow after indirect blow.

Moscow also failed to understand America’s relationship with Europe. Time and again, Europeans bemoaned that Washington had abandoned its European commitments. That that was never the case didn’t stop U.S. think tanks from validating the idea, nor did it dissuade Russia from believing it. In times of peace, the U.S. could do without the prior relationship with Europe, bickering over trade rules and Russian energy dependence. But when the war broke out, the relationship rapidly transformed. Germany, for example, did not value Russian fuel as much as it valued American security guarantees. The Europeans knew that Russia could hurt them, and they did not really trust the Russians, but when push came to shove, they knew American interests lay in Europe. Putin, I think, was stunned when he learned the Germans stood with the Americans. He lacked a sophisticated understanding that there are different types of power and that the power projected by Russia was too blunt to work. Putin could not understand the power of appearing uncertain.

Still, the worst mistake Putin made concerns the U.S. relationship with China, a country in deep economic crisis. Moscow could neither hurt nor help China. The U.S. can do both – help by increasing investment and buying more goods, and hurt by blocking the sale of, say, certain microchips. China believed it did not need the United States to recover, and it convinced itself that Washington could be intimidated by naval and related power. Instead, Beijing discovered that its threats around Taiwan and other areas simply generated more vessels and weapons to be deployed against it. The utility of an alliance with Russia was shattered by the realization that the U.S. could respond militarily in Ukraine and, simultaneously, in the South China Sea.

All of this should have been obvious, and I think China was more aware of U.S. capabilities than Russia was. Chinese President Xi Jinping knew when to cut his losses. Putin kept doubling down. This seemed to be validated over the weekend by a spokesman for the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, whose statements were paraphrased by China's Global Times newspaper as follows:

“If one of the most important events in international relations in the past 50 years is the restoration and development of China-U.S. relations, which has benefited both countries and the world, then the most important thing in international relations for the next 50 years is that China and the U.S. must find the right way to get along with each other. The key for China and the U.S. to find the right way to get on with each other is mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Common interests between China and the U.S. far outweigh differences, and a sound and stable China-U.S. relationship serves the common interests of the two peoples.”

We are used to China hurling threats at the United States. Now, it is searching for ways to accommodate the U.S. It has noted the American performance in Ukraine, both subtle and brutal, and has decided that an alliance with the U.S., however loosely defined or temporary, is far more attractive.

It’s no surprise, then, that Putin sees the U.S. as a force trying to create a unipolar world, because in some notable ways, it is a unipolar world. The U.S. is the largest economy in the world, its current problems notwithstanding. It also has a sophisticated military, able to bring overwhelming force to bear, train an army at war in new weapons, and use subtle force to shape the world. American power isn’t absolute, and it can be outstripped. But it is sufficiently mobile to act sequentially when simultaneous action is impossible. Put simply, the United States is the most powerful economic and military force in the world – when it chooses to act. Inaction can be confused by men like Putin as weakness. The U.S. has learned that with its inherent power it has time to react.

The American public often sees the United States as weak and mismanaged. There’s a tendency to label Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as criminals or morons or both. The same charges were levied against Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Contempt for the commanders-in-chief is a prerequisite, to prevent tyranny, even if it has its drawbacks. The America First movement opposing U.S. participation in World War II interfered with Roosevelt’s ability to make decisions. It had a direct impact on Pearl Harbor and caused a painful initiation for the U.S. into war by the Japanese, which of course ended in catastrophe for them.

The perception of American weakness is a global one, shared even among Americans. Being underestimated has its uses, as does sporting a public that doesn’t trust its president. But only enormously powerful nations can afford the contempt. The past few months haven’t taught us that the United States is finagling a new world order. It’s taught us that Russia is weakening, that China is managing its relationship with the U.S. carefully, and that the international architecture created after World War II, though more complex, essentially remains in place. It is a unipolar world.

[Crafty_Dog]

That would be better on the WW3 and/or Electricity threads.

[Crafty_Dog]

To Change the World, China Must Change
The economic world war is heating up, and both top contenders are in disarray.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
Over the past month, I have spoken at several conferences about the challenges that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent economic war pose for the global economy and the Black Sea region, the area where I live. At each event, the audience set the debate topics. In Washington, the main topics were Black Sea shipping, the region’s economic dependencies on Russia, European energy security and the likely European response to another economic crisis. The focus in Europe was slightly different. For instance, at the Clube de Lisboa (Club of Lisbon) – which gathered speakers from Europe, the U.S., Asia and Africa – discussions about the war in Ukraine were global in scope.

However, a common theme at every event was China – the challenges it faces, and what they mean for the world. The most urgent question was about the possibility of a Sino-Russian alliance against the West. The more interesting questions concerned this week’s National Congress and Beijing’s future economic model, which will determine its relationship with the West and Russia. The fact that China’s problems are significantly shaping the global economy is not new; in fact, I previously listed it among the world’s major challenges in the coming months. But the model’s continued ability to promote prosperity and internal stability, as well as how it is perceived in the rest of the world, are critical questions that will affect the whole world.

The Making and Breaking of a Global Order

China is under pressure not only because of its dependencies on the United States but also because of changes in its relationship with developing countries. Emerging economies in Africa and South Asia are no longer looking for help from more developed countries like China, the U.S. and others. Instead, they are biding their time and watching the global economic war evolve to ensure they do not overcommit to the losing side and make the best choice for their nations. For them, Washington’s recently passed CHIPS and Science Act – intended to preserve U.S. technological leadership, including by restricting exports to China – is a reminder that conflict between the West and the East involves more than just Russia.

The first skirmishes in the economic world war started years ago as a U.S.-Chinese trade war. The two countries’ mutual dependencies had created socio-economic problems for both. Protectionism gained favor in both countries. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent supply chain crisis made these problems much worse. This year, the relationship broke beyond repair – or so it seems now.

The current struggle is not between two states but between two governing systems. Both originate in 1944, near the end of World War II, though both have transformed since then (and arguably need to change further to remain effectual). One is the market capitalism model as articulated in “The Road to Serfdom,” published in 1944 by Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek. It asserts that central planning and public ownership lead to oppression, while free markets maximize profit and the general welfare. The other model was put forth in the same year by American-Hungarian economic historian and anthropologist Karl Polanyi in “The Great Transformation.” Polanyi argues that capitalists exploit society through free markets, and a market economy imposes regulations and politics on society that engender division and eventually crisis. Instead, he argues for a compromise between liberal economic policies internationally (such as free trade and economic openness) and domestic social stability, secured mainly through the welfare state. For Polanyi, the social agenda should set economic rules, not vice versa.

The West adopted Hayek’s model of regulated but basically free markets and democracy, while China broadly followed Polanyi’s “great transformation.” China’s system of governance aims at delivering benefits to most of the population while attempting to control most of its activities. The West, on the other hand, sets the rules of the market and defines individual rights, and then generally lets the market run itself, checked by electoral democracy.

Despite being completely different, these two systems complemented one another during the Cold War and early 2000s. China’s model eradicated absolute poverty in the country and made it the economic powerhouse it is today. The U.S. played a critical role in enabling and sustaining worldwide trade and investment. The stable dollar, American technology and U.S. military power increased global security, making it easier for China to use its low labor costs to become the world’s cheapest manufacturer. Moreover, by engaging China directly, the U.S. won the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Both models succeeded, inspiring developing economies everywhere at the turn of the millennium.

While many of the former Soviet states and satellites in Eastern Europe adopted the Western capitalist model, Russia took up a hybrid of the two. At the same time, large emerging economies like Indonesia, Brazil and India have struggled to deal with the consequences of market failures, such as income and wealth inequality, and have tried to adapt Hayek’s model to Polanyi’s. In Latin America and Africa, the places most dependent on foreign investment for development, most states accommodated the economic model of their most generous investor. The explosion of trade and investment made it possible for the two systems to coexist peacefully.

The Race to Rewrite the Rules

The financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession marked the end of their peaceful cohabitation. When global markets failed, states urgently needed to limit failures in their own markets, minimize harm, and generally fulfill the public’s expectations of prosperity and security. They have not succeeded. The Western and Chinese systems had become too dependent on each other to provide unique answers to global problems while also protecting their publics. As societies and nations polarized, each state developed strategies to limit the fallout of future global crises.

In the process, cooperation between the U.S. and China – between Hayek’s and Polanyi’s models – was replaced by competition and confrontation. Though both talked of structural reform, neither model was actually updated. Instead, the pandemic-induced supply chain crisis accelerated implementation of protectionist measures, from reshoring or friend-shoring business investments to export restrictions. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western sanctions have further accelerated this process and, through the weaponization of media, finance and trade, made escalation and greater uncertainty inevitable.

Both the U.S. and China are now scrambling to save and reform their governing models, the foundation of their development and their influence over the global economy. In fact, it is striking that Americans and Chinese are both experiencing very negative feelings about their personal well-being. (In China, negative feelings about personal well-being are at a record high.) Both are worried about the future, and confidence is broken. All of this indicates that their respective socio-economic models need to adapt. The West (especially the U.S.) is experiencing high inflation and faces the prospect of an unprecedented energy crisis beginning this winter, given European dependence on Russian piped natural gas. The U.S., Europe and Japan are attempting to tackle their economic problems together, gathering in the G-7 and EU formats, which may serve as a basis for common solutions.

Stress, Worry and Negative Experiences in the U.S. and China
(click to enlarge)

China, on the other hand, finds itself relatively isolated. The most urgent task of this year’s party congress is to restore economic growth. But China depends too much on the U.S. market to risk Western sanctions if it gets too close to Russia. At the same time, the U.S. is no friend either, recently tightening its grip on the semiconductor industry. The biggest obstacle to China’s recovery is its zero-COVID policy, but because of its association with President Xi Jinping, it can’t be openly questioned. In addition, the poor quality of China’s COVID-19 vaccines and low vaccine uptake among the most vulnerable cohorts complicate reopening. (Beijing may turn to even greater coercion to vaccinate the population, a potential threat to regime stability.)

While the U.S. (and the West generally) dumps military and financial aid into Ukraine and distributes money at home to address soaring energy prices, China is limiting its external funding to projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, the keystone of China’s strategy to build up its influence in Eurasia and beyond. Xi unveiled his Global Security Initiative, a plan for a new global order, earlier this year, but it is heavy on principles and light on details about how to achieve them. Beijing can try to shape global and regional institutions to serve Chinese interests – by, for example, lobbying for more state sovereignty over the internet – but it is not clear that its ideology would have the same appeal without massive funding to back it up.

The struggle between the American and Chinese socio-economic models will continue over the coming months as the global economic war intensifies. China understands the risks of a direct confrontation with the U.S., and so it will avoid it. In its attempt to rewrite the global rules, Beijing prefers subtlety (such as working within the United Nations) over Russia’s more direct approach. For example, China successfully lobbied to have the U.N. Human Rights Council begin to prioritize collective rights, such as guarantees of economic subsistence, over individual liberties like freedom of speech and association. At the same time, China could look to ensure a greater role for itself in the Indian and/or Arctic oceans, where norms are more pliable than in the Atlantic or Pacific. In this way, China can set its own boundaries for international trade and investment, and thus for the global economy.

To succeed, however, China must remain stable internally, and that requires a reform of its Polanyi-style model. This is why the current Communist Party congress is important. Whoever China appoints as its leaders at the end of the week, the success of the party to reform the Chinese socio-economic model will determine the country’s role in shaping the global system

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.revolver.news/2022/10/shocking-1993-george-soros-book-predicted-gae-proxy-war-in-ukraine/

HT to GM!

Let's discuss!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CoRovwemSYo

[Crafty_Dog]

Distinctly too sanguine from my point of view, but it is George Friedman, so here it is:

November 15, 2022
View On Website
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The Future of US-China Relations
By: George Friedman

Earlier this week, the G-20 summit opened in Indonesia, during which the long-awaited meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping took place. That they met at all means the meeting was a success. That it was three hours long is encouraging too, since unsuccessful meetings tend to end quickly and are followed by inconsequential joint statements, which so far has yet to be issued. This suggests honesty, substance and the promise of future substantive talks.

Indeed, early reports from the meeting corroborate as much. The two were apparently agreeable on topics such as the dangers of nuclear weapons and the prospect of Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting China in the future, even as they reiterated the fact that they are competitors with different views on issues such as Taiwan. Xi allegedly even said the American model of democracy is obsolete.

As I have argued for a year, progress on this front owes not to the virtue of either side but to the geopolitical realities in which they operate. For the United States, the confrontation was anchored in economics. From the U.S. perspective, China has yet to provide ready access to its market for American goods and has been manipulating the value of the yuan to maximize trade and investment – a charge levied years ago by the Obama administration. Washington argued that given the amount of investment and technology provided by American firms, China needed to be forthcoming, especially since public sentiment suggested the U.S. had been exploited by China. China was in no position to comply with American demands without undermining its own economy. Thus was the American foundation laid.

For China, American economic demands signified a military threat. Beijing could not accommodate the United States and feared an American military response. China is an exporting power, and its well-being depends on the ability of its goods to pass from its east coast ports to the South China Sea into the Pacific and then into the world. The United States could, in theory, mine or close those ports by other means. China’s response to this possibility was to appear as aggressive as possible to convince the U.S. that its economic demands could mean war and that China could defeat the U.S. Navy.

It never meant to break China’s economy; it meant to use the threat of breaking it to influence Beijing’s response. Likewise, China never intended to go to war with the United States; it wanted to convince the U.S. it was a real enough possibility to induce a policy change. Each appeared ferocious, but each was careful not to push the other too hard.

Two things brought this to a head. The first was Russia’s attack on Ukraine. The willingness of Washington to wage a clever war, marrying U.S. weapons to Ukrainian forces, demonstrated a capability China did not believe the United States had in its repertoire. China’s alliance with Russia, which was designed to confront the United States in two theaters, collapsed before it was put in place. China reevaluated America’s military power, will and alliance structure and saw a military conflict as more dangerous to China than to the U.S.

The second was the continued deterioration of the Chinese economy. A long-term cyclical force created a massive downturn that has threatened social stability. Regulations on imports from and investment in China could make a bad situation worse. Put differently, China has a lot at stake in their relationship. The United States doesn’t. Absent a military threat, the U.S. benefitted from low-cost Chinese products. The U.S. has little to gain from a military confrontation and plenty to gain from economic cooperation. China had no desire for a war it might lose, and the U.S. had no interest in an economic crisis in China. Economic amelioration is very tempting, so long as it’s possible. The meeting this week shows it may well be possible.

[Crafty_Dog]

What the Midterm Results Mean for U.S. Foreign Policy
10 MIN READNov 16, 2022 | 21:21 GMT


The United States' return to a divided Congress will significantly limit its response to more politically-charged foreign policy issues, like immigration and climate change. But the impact on Washington's approach to critical issues — like containing China's influence and helping Ukraine fend off Russia's invasion — will be more modest. The Nov. 7 midterm elections have left the United States with a divided government and Congress, with the Democratic Party retaining control of the Senate and the Republican Party gaining control of the House of Representatives. While Republicans performed below expectations, the overall outcome was largely expected, as such a split result has become typical in recent years after midterm elections.

Nevada Senator Catherine Cortez Masto's victory (which was confirmed only on Nov. 12) has given Democrats at least a 50-50 split control of the Senate, where Vice President Kamala Harris has the tiebreaking vote. One more Senate seat remains up for grabs in Georgia, which will hold a runoff election on Dec. 6 between incumbent Democrat Raphael Warnock and his Republican challenger, Herschel Walker.

As of Nov. 16, Republicans had been declared winners of 217 seats in the House of Representatives. The races for 11 House seats remain too close to call, but Republicans are highly likely to win at least one of those seats, which is all they need to hit the 218-seat threshold to control the chamber.

The election results confirmed the United States' deep domestic polarization, which will further draw Washington's attention inward and limit its assertiveness abroad over at least the next two years. The election reaffirmed the long-term trend of polarization in the U.S. political system that is occurring not only between Democrats and Republicans, but also between progressive and moderate Democrats and between former President Donald Trump and the rest of the Republican Party. This growing polarization (and rising political violence associated with it) will continue to force the U.S. government to focus its attention inward, which will constrain the country's foreign policy. For one, the close balance of power between Democrats and Republicans will force both the White House and Congress to take into account the impact of foreign decisions on the domestic political environment. The deep polarization in a divided Congress means most major legislation will also fail to pass. Since the 1990s when the Republican party has controlled the House, it has largely abided by the so-called Hastert Rule, the informal governing principle where the House Speaker doesn't bring legislation to the floor unless a majority of his or her party supports it. The Republicans will likely again use this informal rule once it retakes control of the House in January. This will curtail Democrats' ability to pass legislation with a small cohort of Republicans, despite the latter only having a majority in the House by a couple dozen seats. Unilateral executive action in other areas (such as climate policy) will face heavy scrutiny in Congress and more legal challenges as well.

Policy Implications

At a high-level strategic level, this inward focus of the U.S. government will grant other countries more space internationally to shape global policy – including U.S. rivals like Iran, China and Russia, as well as U.S. allies like France, Germany and Japan. But at a more nuanced level, the outcome of the U.S. midterms will also have specific implications for a number of key geopolitical areas:

Ukraine: The outgoing Congress will likely approve a large aid package for Ukraine for 2023. But once they take control of the House in January, Republicans have promised to increase scrutiny on President Biden's support of Ukraine through their subpoena power and the budget legislation, with future Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy hinting in October that his party will not ''write a blank check to Ukraine'' while the United States is facing an economic slowdown. But while GOP demands for more concessions (like more funding for border security) will probably slow the approval process for additional aid, Republicans ultimately remain split on the matter — meaning such aid will likely still be approved, even if at lower amounts. House hearings and increased scrutiny on the Biden administration's Ukraine policy will thus likely amount to very few real consequences in the immediate term.

Climate change: Climate and energy-related policies are among the most divisive issues in U.S. politics at the moment. At the state level, Republicans have criticized the rising role of environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) considerations in the investment strategies of asset managers, banks and other institutions. With control of the House, the Republicans are likely to open investigations and inquiries into various climate change commitments and carbon-cutting targets. They will also use Congressional hearings to put pressure on financial companies to reduce or explain ESG-related investment strategies. In addition, they will likely increase scrutiny on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulatory agencies that are imposing more rules and regulations around climate change and emissions target disclosures. Over the next two years, such efforts could tarnish some companies' reputations in the eyes of Republican voters, and will widen the greater ideological split between Americans who think fiduciary responsibilities include ESG considerations versus those who do not. Ultimately, however, control of the House alone will not give the Republican Party significant power to actually change U.S. policy on climate- and energy-related issues over the next two years.

Immigration: The worsening humanitarian crisis in nearby Haiti — along with the recent influx of northbound migrants reported at the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama (which saw a record 150,000 migrants in October) — signals that 2023 will be another year of significant migration to the United States. Republican lawmakers campaigned heavily on curbing immigration from Central America, which will remain their primary focus during the next legislative session. When the new Congress takes office in January, McCarthy said that the first bill Republicans will put forth when will be one to secure the border. This bill will likely include many of the same proposals the Republicans made during the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump, such as increasing funding for the border wall and border patrols. Given how the issue resonates with their voters, Republicans may threaten to shut down the U.S. government over funding or connect border security issues to appropriation bills and the annual must pass National Defense Authorization Act.
Republicans may also demand additional border control funding in exchange for supporting Democrats' budget resolutions and other policy proposals. But while immigration will emerge as a major political issue on Capitol Hill, it will have little impact on the actual situation at the U.S. border because the fundamental drivers causing people to flee their home countries in Latin America (i.e. political repression, economic uncertainty and widespread violence) remain unsolved. Over the next two years, this could see officials in Arizona and Texas (the two Republican-led states that border Mexico) increasingly take matters into their own hands to curb migration flows. More incidents like that seen earlier this year in Texas — where Governor Greg Abbott closed certain border crossings to drum up pressure on the federal government — could, in turn, cause more delays and interruptions to goods moving from Mexico to the rest of North America.

China: Broadly speaking, both major U.S. political parties support taking a hard-line approach to China and further curbing the development of the Asian country's technology sector. This is one of the few areas that could see productive bipartisan negotiations, with Republicans and Democrats agreeing to impose more restrictions on  China's tech sector and potentially even a new mechanism for reviewing overseas investment into China's technology sector. Any such legislation passed by a Republican-controlled House, however, may be narrower in scope or have certain carve-outs to protect U.S. businesses interests, given that Republicans have generally taken positions aligning more closely to that of corporations. Biden's push to reduce the United States' greater economic dependence on China by boosting public finance for domestic manufacturing is also less likely to gain bipartisan support. Many fiscally conservative Republicans have criticized Biden's Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act as exemplifying the ''big government'' spending they oppose, since both bills include billions of financial support for the semiconductor and other sectors.

Venezuela and Cuba: Florida Governor Ron DeSantis' landslide victory was one of the most striking results of the U.S. midterm election. DeSantis won by nearly 20 points and became the first Republican governor to carry Miami-Dade county in two decades — revealing that Florida is now a more squarely Republican state than it has been in recent years. U.S. policies toward Cuba and Venezuela are major political issues in Florida — especially in Miami-Dade county, which has a large population of Cuban- and Venezuelan-Americans who often support hard-line policies against Havana and Caracas. The outcome of the latest U.S. midterm election, however, has shown Florida to be a more squarely Republican state than it has been in recent years. Democrats may, in turn, decide that appealing to Cuban- and Venezuelan-American voters — who overwhelmingly supported Republicans in the last race — is a lost cause. In Venezuela, the Biden administration has been offering limited sanctions relief in exchange for President Nicolas Maduro's regime resuming negotiations with the political opposition. But without the pressure of needing to appease Florida voters, the White House may accept weaker concessions in talks to maintain relief, which could see an easing of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela's oil sector. And when it comes to Cuba, the Biden administration may also take more steps toward normalization, such as easing travel restrictions and removing Cuba from the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Iran: House Republicans will likely demand that Congress be granted the power to review and/or vote on any agreement that comes out of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, should those talks resume. While this would complicate negotiations, the United States and Iran appear unlikely to return to the table anytime soon — especially amid Tehran's brutal crackdown on ongoing protests over women's rights and growing military support to Russian troops in Ukraine, which likely see the United States impose more sanctions on Iran in the short term. Republican and Democratic lawmakers may work together to craft those new sanctions, but the Iran hawks in the Republican Party will likely also try to add poison pills that make it more difficult for a future agreement to suspend sanctions in exchange for nuclear concessions.

Big tech: With control of the House, Republicans will hold a number of hearings on the tech sector and perceived bias by social media companies against conservative ideologies. But this is unlikely to result in any significant reforms on regulating the tech sector and social media. The Republicans and the Democrats both have an interest in curbing the power of these companies but have very different views on how to do it. The former is more concerned about stifling conservative voices while the latter is more concerned about the rising market dominance of companies like Amazon, Apple and Google.

[ya]

Just leaving this out there

[Crafty_Dog]

Who is the middle guy in red?

[ya]

Rishi Sunak, UK prime minister. He is of Indian origin, his wife is the daughter of the founder of Indian tech giant Infosys, and a billionaire.

[Crafty_Dog]

Ah.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8TLGaSPOzY

[Crafty_Dog]

November 29, 2022
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Eurasia in Crisis
By: George Friedman

Demonstrations against Beijing’s zero-COVID policy have surged in the past week, with people voicing their frustration at not only the lockdown measures but also the government and President Xi Jinping himself. This kind of unrest is nearly unprecedented in the modern Chinese era and certainly cause for concern among the ruling elite.

Since the pandemic began, Beijing has consistently sought to contain COVID-19 by imposing city-wide lockdowns in which entry and exit were limited, if not forbidden, and in which activities were severely constrained. Why the government adopted such strict measures is unclear. No other countries imposed this degree of containment, largely because the costs of doing so were so high. Shanghai, the country’s most important financial hub, was shut down for weeks, while similar shutdowns occurred in smaller cities. And this is to say nothing of the impossibility of hermetically sealing large, densely populated and otherwise bustling Chinese cities.

We are left, then, with two possible explanations. One is that the government is trying to contain a mutation that the outside world is unaware of. This is self-evidently dubious, and in any case there hasn’t been the kind of body count one would expect from a new, deadlier strain. The second and more reasonable explanation is that Beijing instituted draconian policies to assert control of places that were already restive or unstable. COVID-19 was, in this scenario, merely a pretext.

Hong Kong is instructive in this regard. It wasn’t that long ago that China experienced a rebellion there. Authorities clamped down on the city, but not before the world saw the deep anger felt by many against Beijing. Indeed, Hong Kong taught the mainland three things: that open unrest was possible; that uprisings could spread and should thus be hidden or downplayed at all costs; and that a country dependent on international trade and investment could not afford a trial in the court of public opinion. If a city like Shanghai had to be slammed shut, so be it. Financial operations had to take a backseat to widespread unrest, or so the thinking went.

If this was indeed the strategy, then the strategy has broken down over the past few days. The precipitating event was a fire in an apartment building that went untended. Public sentiment morphed, as it often does, into a broader anti-government movement. The slogans of the dissidents centered on the loss of freedom imposed by lockdowns before escalating into condemnations of the president and the Communist Party, calling on both to step down.

By no means does this suggest there were demonstrations everywhere, nor does any of this mean the regime is in danger of falling. So far, it’s unclear if this is predominately a youth movement; if it is, it is far less consequential than one led by older, middle-class professionals. Nor is it clear exactly how widespread and intense the protests are – how many cities are involved, how many are calling for a new government, how organized they are, how much the police and the army have had to intervene, etc.

Bear in mind these protests did not erupt overnight. The Chinese economy has performed very poorly in recent years. As exports met resistance, the economy came to depend increasingly on domestic consumption – and on domestic investment. The transition has been rough, as it usually is for countries in this situation. It inevitably raises the question, particularly among the young, of what sort of life lies ahead. After decades of explosive growth, the reversal of expectations can be wrenching.

But banking protests in Henan province are one thing; open, generalized political anger is another. Calling for an end to Communist leadership is extraordinary, and frankly it’s hard to take seriously, especially if it is coming from anyone aside from disaffected youths. Or, put differently, I’ll believe it when I see it. The government almost certainly has the ability to crush this would-be rebellion if it deems it necessary. It’s entirely possible that the government believes the movement will die out on its own accord.

From a broader geopolitical standpoint, if this is in any way the beginning of something more, the power of China becomes questionable. To have this happen at the same time the power of Russia has become perishable, and at the same time the EU is more and more uncertain about its unified direction, suggests the whole of Eurasia is in crisis. In turn, that means the relative power of the United States is rising dramatically. The usual caveats apply, but it’s important to note that if Russia doesn’t stabilize its position in Ukraine, if the EU doesn’t cohere as it needs to, and if Chinese demonstrations are more than a flash in the pan, then a very new world could emerge.

[Crafty_Dog]

December 22, 2015
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It is always fair to ask critics "Well then, what would you do?"
Among my recommendations in the past are recognizing that previous borders no longer apply (indeed abandoning Sykes-Picot lines and the Durand line altogether) and recognizing the Kurds-- both of which appear in the Ralph Peters piece that follows.
How to crush ISIS
By ret. Col. Ralph Peters
December 20, 2015 | 8:49pm
Why ISIS is still winning

An American president with no military experience, little grasp of history and an outdated mental map of the Middle East.
Obama today? Yes, but potentially a Republican next year.

Ideology isn’t a strategy, and sound bites don’t win wars. The Islamic State caliphate (ISIS) and its rivals can be annihilated, but only if we have a clear objective, a realistic assessment of the means needed to achieve it and — above all — a president with the vision, courage and fortitude to lead.

What will it take? Here are the requirements for a serious military effort (only a military approach will stop ISIS):
Congress must declare war.

Congress needs to face up to its constitutional responsibilities with a declaration of war against “the Islamic State, al Qaeda, their affiliates and imitators and their supporters, wherever they are found.” War is no longer restricted to state-on-state violence, nor should its conduct depend on a president’s whimsy.

Define the mission.

The goal should be the uncompromising destruction of violent jihadi organizations. It shouldn’t include the reconstruction of artificial borders imposed on the Middle East by long-dead Europeans. Don’t cling to doomed governments.

Say less, do more and keep secrets.

Don’t announce operations or troop deployments for domestic political advantage. In the jihadi World Series, our team has to show up unexpectedly. Crack down on Pentagon leaks.

Stop pretending that war can be waged gently.

Kill the enemy. Accept that there will be civilian casualties and collateral damage. Get the lawyers out of the targeting process and off the battlefield. Rules of engagement should empower our troops, not shield our enemies.

The morbid “humanitarianism” of the left ignores the proven principle that winning fast spares lives. As a result of our reluctance to fight promptly, powerfully and ruthlessly, there are now 300,000 dead in Syria, untold numbers dead in Iraq and rising body counts elsewhere, with millions of refugees. And because our enemies know that we don’t strike populated areas, they base themselves in crowded neighborhoods, guaranteeing more civilian deaths.

Concentrate on effects, not numbers.

Our obsession with troop numbers is political, not practical. In a global war against Islamist fanatics, the troop strength required for missions will fluctuate. A vital operation in one country might require a few dozen special operators for one night, while an operation in another might demand 30,000 troops for three months. Anyway, the resolve with which force is applied is far more important than numbers.

Accomplish the mission and leave.

No nation-building. No occupations-by-another-name. Go in, do the job, get out. If you have to go back and do the job again later on, that’s still cheaper in blood and treasure than hanging around. What are called for are old-fashioned punitive expeditions, not nation-building where there are no nations. Surprise them; slaughter them; leave.

Conventional forces must think unconventionally.

Our forces must become more agile and operate under more-austere conditions. More bullets, fewer bases, no Baskin-Robbins. Mobility, speed and firepower are crucial. Think cavalry, not constabulary; saddle bags, not shipping containers.

Hyperexpensive weapons can be the enemy within.

At present, we’ll use a million-dollar precision-guided munition to take out two low-level terrorists at a checkpoint. As a result, we’ve drained our arsenal. While this is good news for the defense industry, it exposes the fallacy of a weapons-procurement process that assumes a short, decisive war against a compliant enemy.

Don’t make fun of the Russians for using cheap bombs on easy targets. We should be doing it, too. And inexpensive, old-fashioned napalm would be poetic justice for apocalyptic jihadis who burn captives to death.

Choose allies for their utility, not from habit.

In the broken territories formerly known as Syria and Iraq, we need to support those whose interests converge with ours, while cutting our losses where our largesse only helps other enemies. That means tacitly backing a Kurdish state; accepting a new Sunni-Arab (but non-Islamist-extremist) state straddling the old border; and cutting all support for the Iranian-dominated Baghdad government President Obama’s incompetence facilitated.

From Libya to Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not let ill-drawn lines on old maps tyrannize our foreign policy.

Presidential support of our military.

This is the most important factor of all. Our troops and their leaders need to know that their commander-in-chief won’t betray them based on spurious claims from the media or anti-war activist groups; that he won’t lose his courage and resolve when things get ugly; and that he’ll be our military’s advocate, not its adversary.

Of course, there are myriad practical details to be addressed, from basing rights and overflight issues to the conflicting goals of third parties, such as Iran or Russia. Even in lean operations, logistics rule. And our military must relearn how to fight and win, escaping the thrall of political correctness.

We can defeat ISIS, but first we have to stop defeating ourselves.

Ralph Peters is a retired US Army colonel (military intel) and the author, most recently, of “Valley of the Shadow.”

[Crafty_Dog]

Kissinger Sees a Global Leadership Vacuum
A dearth of statesmen has left the world misruled by populists and technocrats.
Walter Russell Mead hedcutBy Walter Russell Mead


Dec. 26, 2022 12:06 pm ET

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Henry Kissinger speaking in Berlin in January 2020.
PHOTO: CHRISTOPH SOEDER/ZUMA PRESS

Is the quality of world leadership declining just as humanity’s need for great leadership has become more urgent than ever? As I learned over a long lunch this month, Henry Kissinger thinks that is exactly where things stand, and he worries that civilization may be imperiled as a result.

Worry comes naturally to Mr. Kissinger. His first book, “A World Restored” (1957), laid out some basic ideas that dominate his thinking to this day. Mr. Kissinger believes that only a handful of people at any given time understand the complicated architecture of a viable world order, and that an even smaller number have the gifts of leadership required to create, defend or reform the delicate international framework that makes even partial peace possible.

Worse, it is not enough for an effective leader to understand the international system. Mr. Kissinger believes that there is an immense gap between the kind of world the citizens of any given country want to see and the kind of world that is actually possible. The world can’t be as Sinocentric as Chinese public opinion wants it to be, as democratic or woke as many Americans would like, as Islamic as many Muslims would wish, as responsive to development concerns as some African and Latin American countries want, or as awed by French grandeur or admiring of British moral leadership as people in those countries want.

Great leaders must bridge the gap between public opinion in their own countries and the compromises inseparable from international diplomacy. They must see the world clearly enough to understand what is possible and sustainable, and they must be able to persuade their fellow citizens to accept outcomes that are, inevitably, often disappointing. Paradoxically, this task is often harder in a powerful state such as America, which is often able to get much of what it wants in the world. Small and weak countries understand the need for compromise; great and powerful ones often think they can have it all.

READ MORE GLOBAL VIEW
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This kind of leadership involves a rare mix of intellectual ability, deep education and the kind of intuitive understanding of politics given to few. Mr. Kissinger’s most recent book, “Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy,” singles out six leaders (Germany’s Konrad Adenauer, France’s Charles de Gaulle, America’s Richard Nixon, Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, Britain’s Margaret Thatcher and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew) who achieved great things at home and abroad. But the book looks forward, not back. As Mr. Kissinger emphasized at our lunch, he fears that the exceptional conditions that enabled these leaders to appear may be fading away.

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The six leaders Mr. Kissinger profiled were all born outside the social elite. They were middle-class children from ordinary families. That background gave them an ability to understand how their fellow citizens saw the world. Selected into meritocratic educational institutions, they received a disciplined and demanding education that prepared them psychologically, intellectually and culturally to operate effectively at the highest levels of national and international life.

A question that troubles Mr. Kissinger is whether this pipeline is breaking down—whether elite institutions no longer offer this rigor and discipline, and whether the culture of “deep literacy,” as he calls it, has eroded to the point where society no longer has the wisdom necessary to prepare new generations for leadership.

This isn’t merely about woke college professors dumbing education down or superficial left-wing ideologues driving complex and subtle ideas out of university teaching. It’s about whether the depth and rigor of classic scholarship can withstand the challenge of the more visual culture and the shorter attention spans promoted by electronic media.

Now in his 100th year, Mr. Kissinger has been pondering the problems of leadership for longer than most Americans have been alive. When he entered public life in the 1960s, the old WASP elite still dominated the field of American foreign policy. But the old Brahmins like the Achesons, Bundys and Alsops, who brought America both the Marshall Plan and the Vietnam War, faded away. The Nixon, Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations achieved important successes, but the 21st-century track record of American statecraft is less inspiring.

Today, Mr. Kissinger warns, the problem of world order is growing harder. Great-power rivalries intensify, China is a more complex challenge than the Soviet Union ever was, and international trust diminishes as the potential for global conflict steadily grows. We need wisdom more than ever, Mr. Kissinger says, but it is not so easy to find.

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It is hard to disagree. American debates today, over domestic as well as foreign policy, often feature a sterile competition between technocrats immersed in conventional groupthink on the one side and populist demagogues armed with superficial slogans on the other. Henry Kissinger thinks we need to do better. I fear he is right, and I hope that “Leadership” gets the wide readership it deserves.

[ccp]

"Mr. Kissinger warns, the problem of world order is growing harder. Great-power rivalries intensify, China is a more complex challenge than the Soviet Union ever was, and international trust diminishes as the potential for global conflict steadily grows. We need wisdom more than ever, Mr. Kissinger says, but it is not so easy to find."

Now  we have SoS Antony Blinken.
And we were blessed with another renowned  thinker - Hillary Clinton

I wonder if there is anyone he does appreciate who is out there.

And exactly how can one deal with China?

[ccp]

More on Henry K's views

Ukraine :

The "internet does not make great leaders ":

https://time.com/6193035/henry-kissinger-leaders/

[Crafty_Dog]

"I wonder if there is anyone he does appreciate who is out there."

I suspect he respects Pompeo.

"And exactly how can one deal with China?"

As the architect of Nixon going to China and pealing China away from the Soviet Union, and as a man who has made a shitload of money explaining America to the ChiComs, HK may well have irremediable biases , , ,

[ccp]

very good point; I forgot.

HK is a swamp creature after all:

https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/kissinger-sold-american-business-to-china-and-chinese-interests-to-us-policymakers-4044953.html

promoting Chinese exports to us as strengthening *our leverage over them *

when indeed they worked it to leverage over us and at the same time steal everything they could

and the rest we see today

indeed one could easily argue China out maneuvered HK and the DC swap
including H Bush who persisted in thinking that China could be brought into the "league of nations"

when instead they want to lead all nations.