What to Make of Xi's Russia Trip and China's Growing Involvement in Ukraine
12 MIN READMar 22, 2023 | 21:38 GMT
Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow confirms the two leaders' mutual desire for deeper economic and political cooperation, as well as Beijing's desire to position itself as a viable mediator in Ukraine and Moscow's desire to freeze the war along current battle lines. Xi arrived in the Russian capital on March 20 for a three-day state visit to Russia. Informal talks between the Chinese president and his Russian counterpart that night lasted nearly five hours. And on March 21, Xi continued talks with Putin in an expanded format, including high-ranking officials from both sides. The two leaders signed joint statements on their comprehensive partnership and their plans to develop key areas of Russian-Chinese economic cooperation by 2030, along with documents on cooperation in various areas, most notably a memorandum of understanding on industrial and infrastructural cooperation in the Russian Far East. Putin and Xi discussed the war in Ukraine, increasing military-technical cooperation between their countries and deepening economic ties, particularly in the energy sphere.
This was Xi's first trip to Russia and his second in-person meeting with Putin since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Among the agreements Putin and Xi signed was an updated protocol to their 1997 bilateral agreement on regular meetings of the heads of government. Updating and enshrining agreements for regular high-level contact may be part of an effort to solidify the increasingly close trajectory of Russia-China relations beyond the country's current two leaders and their personal relationship.
Writing in the Russian government's state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Xi said his visit to Russia was aimed at ''strengthening friendship, cooperation and peace,'' adding that he was ''ready, together with [Putin], to outline new plans and measures in the name of opening up new prospects for China-Russia relations.''
On March 20, Xi told Putin that Russia had ''made great strides in its prosperous development'' under his ''strong leadership,'' and that he was ''sure'' Russians would ''strongly support'' Putin in the country's presidential election next year. These remarks suggest that Beijing views Putin's claimed territorial acquisitions in Ukraine as laudable and make the Russian leader particularly worthy of reelection.
While the relationship between China and Russia is mutually beneficial, Moscow is increasingly tying its economic and political fate to Beijing and the power imbalance is deepening. The personal rapport between Xi and Putin, built up over the course of these many years, has facilitated the countries' ever-deepening relations. Since becoming China's president in 2013, Xi has visited Russia eight times and has met with Putin in-person 40 times, more than any other world leader. But more importantly, China views Russia as its only major ally that both shares its desire to erode the Western-led world order, and is willing to take significant diplomatic and economic risks in pursuit of that goal. Beijing also sees Russia as a critical source of cheap energy and natural resources that could help fuel China's economic advancement — and Moscow, likewise, sees China as a massive market for its economically crucial exports of raw materials. In addition, Russia similarly views China as a key strategic partner in its growing strategic competition with the West, as well as a lifeline for imports of crucial technology and goods. But Moscow's growing international isolation in the wake of the February 2022 Ukraine invasion and the West's subsequent sanctions campaign has started to skew the power balance in the relationship by increasing Russia's political and economic reliance on China. This was made evident during Xi's visit on March 21, when Putin floated the idea of using the Chinese yuan for ''payments between Russia and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,'' which contrasts with Putin's initial efforts following the invasion to promote his own country's currency — the now toxic ruble — for greater use abroad. Turning the yuan into a widely-used international currency is vital to China's push to replace the United States as the world's superpower and erode the U.S. dollar's dominance in global transactions. By proposing an initiative that would further that goal, the Kremlin is likely trying to signal its ardent support for Beijing and, in turn, solidify the case for more robust Chinese economic support and possibly military aid in Ukraine, based on the assumption that Xi would not want to see such a profusely pro-Beijing regime as Russia's destabilized by further setbacks on the battlefield. But Putin's proposal to use the yuan in Russia's transactions will nonetheless likely fuel growing claims that Moscow is increasingly assuming subordinate status in its relationship with China.
In his March 21 remarks summing up the visit, Xi noted that ''Chinese-Russian ties have gone beyond bilateral relations and are of vital importance for the modern world order and the fate of mankind.''
China has been Russia's largest trading partner for the past 13 years, but the two countries' trade ties have only grown since the Ukraine invasion. According to Chinese customs data, Russia-China mutual trade turnover rose by 30% in 2022 to $190.27 billion, with China accounting for 40% of Russia's imports and 30% of its exports last year.
In January, Russia for the first time became the top natural gas supplier to China in terms of total exports both by pipeline and in LNG form. Russia's LNG deliveries to China in 2022 rose by 43.9%. On March 21, Russia's state-owned gas giant Gazprom announced it had reached a record level of daily gas volume supplied to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline. Putin recently emphasized that negotiations on the Power of Siberia-2 project, which aims to connect the gas fields in western Siberia to China (fields that, prior to the Ukraine conflict, supplied gas to Europe), were in the final stages.
China used the meeting in Russia to promote its ''peace plan'' for Ukraine, an effort that is not necessarily meant to end the war but to position Beijing as a credible mediator and divide the West. During their recent meeting in Moscow, Xi and Putin also discussed China's 12-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine (which Beijing first unveiled on Feb. 24, the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion).The disruptions caused by the ongoing war have rattled both China's economy and the global economy, with the world's grain and fuel supplies being hit particularly hard due to Ukraine and Russia's previous dominance over each market, respectively. To mitigate these economic shocks, China probably wants the war to end, and Beijing knows Moscow can cast its current territorial gains in Ukraine as a victory. Its so-called ''peace plan'' will also enable China to justify its continued deepening of relations with Russia, including potentially future Chinese weapons sales to Russia, as Beijing would argue any support for Moscow is insignificant given what the West is already supplying Ukraine. Ukraine, for its part, will probably say it isn't inherently opposed to China's proposal, at least in spirit, to avoid spoiling relations with a potential intermediary and the global superpower most capable of influencing Moscow. Beijing will then claim that, since Moscow and Kyiv support its ''peace plan'' in spirit, it is the United States that is serving as the major obstacle to peace in Ukraine —- an argument intended to turn Europe against Washington and fuel war fatigue in the West, as well as in developing countries around the world where China is seeking to expand its influence.
China believes it could be a credible mediator in the war, primarily because there aren't many alternative candidates for the role.
Turkey hosted earlier peace talks and helped broker the grain export deal between Moscow and Kyiv in July. But Turkey is also a NATO member, major arms supplier to Ukraine, and fully supports Ukraine's positions at international bodies such as the United Nations. Other potential candidates, such as the Persian Gulf states, either don't have a big enough stake in the Ukraine war to want to serve as a mediator, or lack the diplomatic heft to take on such a role. Beijing, by contrast, is a major investor and trading partner with both Ukraine and Russia, and has always framed its stance on the two countries' conflict as neutral, regardless of the veracity of this statement.
By taking a greater diplomatic role in the Russia-Ukraine war, China may also be trying to capitalize on its recent success in brokering the March 10 normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran that ended the powerful Persian Gulf neighbors' seven-year rift. The historic pact, which Saudi and Iranian officials signed in Beijing, also further highlights China's growing ability to mediate global conflicts where the United States is either unwilling or unable to do so.
China's 12-Point 'Peace Plan' for Ukraine
The first point of China's plan reads that the ''sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld,'' in line with the ''purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.'' This statement is primarily intended to be in line with Beijing's position on Taiwan, but Russia and Ukraine will interpret it in opposite ways. For Russia, this represents the recognition of the legality of its annexations in eastern Ukraine that took place in 2022. For Ukraine, this means the recognition of its internationally recognized borders prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The first point would be extremely contentious if China-mediated peace talks ever take place, and makes it highly unlikely that the 12-point plan would actually end the war. Points two, three and four (titled ''Abandoning the Cold War mentality,'' ''Ceasing hostilities'' and ''Resuming peace talks, respectively) aim to further the narratives justifying Russia's invasion, as well as enable the Russian military to regroup in Ukraine by solidifying its gains along current battle lines — goals shared by both Moscow and Beijing. Most of the later points, such as point eight on ''Reducing strategic risks'' and point nine on ''Facilitating grain exports,'' are largely geared toward furthering China's economic goals and giving voice to the concerns of states of the developing world.
The trip's timing raises questions regarding Beijing and Moscow's expectations for the coming months, most notably regarding Ukraine's likely spring offensive, additional Chinese military-technical support for Russia, and the West's efforts to counter Beijing and Moscow's partnership. Reports in February indicated Xi's visit was being planned for April or May, suggesting the summit may have been moved up to better promote Beijing's ''peace plan.'' This possibility is supported by other circumstantial evidence. For one, the exact timing of the visit was kept highly secret and did not become available until about a week before Xi's arrival. In another potential sign that the trip was initially scheduled for another date, Putin and other top Russian officials — including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Foreign Sergei Lavrov — all had other significant engagements on the day that Xi arrived in Moscow that left them unable to greet the Chinese president on the tarmac on March 20 (Xi was instead greeted and sent off two days later by Dmitry Chernyshenko, Russia's deputy prime minister for tourism, sport and culture). Some of the potential reasons why Xi's trip may have been moved up include:
Recent leaks that China plans to send Russia weapons threw a wrench in Beijing's plan to cast itself as a ''peace broker'' in Ukraine. A potential explanation is that Beijing originally set out to pair its peace proposal for Ukraine with joint meetings with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but was then surprised by Western intelligence leaks in recent weeks that China was planning to sell drones to Russia as soon as April. If Beijing did have plans to start offering significant covert weapons assistance to Moscow, the accelerated timeline of Xi's visit could have been an adjustment in plans to enable Beijing to go through the motions of proposing a "peace plan" (and having the West summarily shoot it down) before committing to offering Russia weapons support. This way, Beijing could at least say it attempted peace prior to stepping up support for Moscow, and claim that the West's refusal to negotiate gave China no choice but to come to Moscow's aid and provide it with defense-technological support to sustain the war. Even if Beijing didn't plan to provide significant weapons aid to Russia, the intelligence leak of the potential Chinese drones sales could have threatened to let the narrative of China's potential role in a peace settlement for Ukraine run away from Beijing.
Russia is about to make a major move in Ukraine, and wanted to talk it over with China first. If Xi's trip to Moscow was, in fact, moved forward, it could indicate Russia is preparing to significantly escalate its war in Ukraine in the coming weeks and months (like mobilizing more troops in response to an expected Ukrainian attack), and that Putin wanted to personally discuss his strategy and receive assurances of China's continued support before making such a major move.
Russia and China wanted to start sowing divides in the West before a major U.S.-hosted international summit. On March 29-30, the United States will co-host the second Summit for Democracy, which Beijing and Moscow see as a potential architecture for an international coalition to oppose them on the world stage. Beijing's ''peace plan'' and Xi's promotion of the strategy during his trip to Moscow could help create division among summit participants regarding the West's stance on the Ukraine war.
