Taiwan

[DougMacG]

More than market criteria are involved here.

Right.  But 4-fold higher in costs means only government money or mandate can make them build here.  Will people pay 4-fold more for devices? (No.)  Gone is the market.

Weren't almost all of those devices they are building invented here?

[Crafty_Dog]

Don't know about four fold, but granted the greater cost here.  That said, the question remains:  How do we have production secure from hostile actors?

[G M]

Don't know about four fold, but granted the greater cost here.  That said, the question remains:  How do we have production secure from hostile actors?

While we worry about chips, the PRC produces most of our pharmaceuticals.

[Crafty_Dog]

Funny you should mention that-- not twenty minutes ago I was having a REALLY interesting geopolitical conversation with a REALLY interesting person (will tell you next time we talk-- no need to name drop here on the forum) in which it came up that I was no longer a Libertarian.

"Why?"

"A) Immigration
 B)  Trade-- national security implications, e.g. witness how we now depend on China for our pharmaceuticals."

[Crafty_Dog]

How to avoid war over Taiwan
A superpower conflict would shake the world

Mar 9th 2023

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Europe is witnessing its bloodiest cross-border war since 1945, but Asia risks something even worse: conflict between America and China over Taiwan. Tensions are high, as American forces pivot to a new doctrine known as “distributed lethality” designed to blunt Chinese missile attacks. Last week dozens of Chinese jets breached Taiwan’s “air defence identification zone”. This week China’s foreign minister condemned what he called America’s strategy of “all-round containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death”.

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As America rearms in Asia and tries to galvanise its allies, two questions loom. Is it willing to risk a direct war with another nuclear power to defend Taiwan, something it has not been prepared to do for Ukraine? And by competing with China militarily in Asia, could it provoke the very war it is trying to prevent?

No one can be sure how an invasion of Taiwan might start. China could use “grey-zone” tactics that are coercive, but not quite acts of war, to blockade the self-governing island and sap its economy and morale. Or it could launch pre-emptive missile strikes on American bases in Guam and Japan, clearing the way for an amphibious assault. Since Taiwan could resist an attack on its own only for days or weeks, any conflict could escalate quickly into a superpower confrontation.


Rather than the trenches and human-wave attacks seen in Ukraine, a war over Taiwan could involve a new generation of arms, such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, causing untold destruction and provoking unpredictable retaliation. The economic fallout would be devastating. Taiwan is the world’s essential supplier of advanced semiconductors. America, China and Japan, the three largest economies, and among the most interconnected, would deploy sanctions, crippling global trade. America would urge Europe and its other friends to impose an embargo on China.

War is no longer a remote possibility, because an unstated bargain has frayed. Since the 1970s America has been careful neither to encourage Taiwan formally to declare independence nor to promise explicitly to defend it. While not ruling out force, China has said it would favour peaceful reunification. But those positions are changing. President Xi Jinping has told the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for an invasion by 2027, says the cia. President Joe Biden has said that America would defend Taiwan if China were to attack (aides say policy is unchanged). The military balance no longer so clearly favours America as it did in the 1990s. And public opinion has shifted in Taiwan, not least because of how China has snuffed out freedoms in Hong Kong. Only 7% of Taiwanese favour reunification.

Read more of this package
America and China are preparing for a war over Taiwan
Special report: Frontline Formosa

Both sides are shoring up their positions and trying to signal their resolve, with destabilising consequences. Some acts generate headlines, as when Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Taipei last year; others are almost invisible, such as the mysterious severing of undersea internet cables to remote Taiwanese islands. Diplomacy has stalled. Top American and Chinese defence officials have not spoken since November. During the recent spy-balloon incident, a “hotline” failed when China did not pick up. Rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences has grown more martial, whether on the American campaign trail or from China’s top leaders. What one side sees as a defensive act to protect its red lines, the other sees as an aggressive attempt to thwart its ambitions. Thus both sides are tempted to keep hardening their positions.


It is unclear how far America would go to defend Taiwan. The island is not a domino. China has some territorial designs beyond it, but does not want to invade or directly rule all of Asia. And as our special report explains, it is unclear how many Taiwanese see China as a real threat, or have the stomach for a fight.

The Taiwanese, like the Ukrainians, deserve American help. The island is admirably liberal and democratic, and proof that such values are not alien to Chinese culture. It would be a tragedy if its people had to submit to a dictatorship. If America walked away, the credibility of its security umbrella in Asia would be gravely in doubt. Some Asian countries would accommodate China more; South Korea and Japan might seek nuclear weapons. It would boost China’s worldview that the interests of states come before the individual freedoms enshrined in the un after the second world war.

But the help Taiwan receives should aim to deter a Chinese attack without provoking one. America needs to consider Mr Xi’s calculus. A blanket American security guarantee might embolden Taiwan to declare formal independence, a red line for him. The promise of a much larger American military presence on Taiwan could lead China to invade now, before it arrives. A botched invasion, however, would cost Mr Xi and the Communist Party dearly. America needs to calibrate its stance: reassure Mr Xi that his red lines remain intact, but convince him that aggression carries unacceptable risks. The goal should not be to solve the Taiwan question, but to defer it.

Taiwan has avoided provocation. Its president, Tsai Ing-wen, has not declared independence. But it needs to do more to deter its neighbour, by boosting defence spending so that it can survive longer without American help, and by preparing its citizens to resist grey-zone tactics, from disinformation to vote-rigging. For its part, America should try harder to reassure China and to deter it. It should avoid symbolic acts that provoke China without strengthening Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself. It should keep modernising its armed forces and rallying its allies. And it should be prepared to break a future blockade, by stockpiling fuel, planning an airlift, providing backup internet links and building an allied consensus on sanctions.

America and today’s Chinese regime will never agree about Taiwan. But they do share a common interest in avoiding a third world war. The first 15 years of the American-Soviet cold war featured a terrifying mixture of brinkmanship and near-catastrophic mistakes, until the Cuban missile crisis prompted a revival of diplomacy. This is the terrain the world is now on. Unfortunately, the potential common ground between America and China on Taiwan is shrinking. Somehow, the two rival systems must find a way to live together less dangerously. ■

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[Crafty_Dog]

Mar 6th 2023

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In 2021 lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under its own name, not “Chinese Taipei”, as most de facto embassies are called. An infuriated China shut the Lithuanian embassy in Beijing, revoked its diplomatic visas and stopped trade. Lithuania’s economy suffered. But it did not change course. In November 2022 it opened a trade representative office in Taipei. Taiwan said it would invest €10m ($9.9m) in Lithuania’s chip industry. Some west Europeans complained about a lack of warning. But the Czech president, Petr Pavel, wants to meet Taiwan’s president. Joseph Wu, the foreign minister, says most people do not see Lithuania as a warning against upsetting China. “They look at Lithuania and think, ‘China shouldn’t have done that.’ ”

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That is the change in thinking Taiwan needs. For decades China has tried to isolate it, keeping the roc out of international institutions and regional trade pacts. China has used its economic power to scare firms and governments from even using the name “Taiwan”. That may be understandable for poor countries in need of Chinese money. But rich, democratic countries should not let China dictate their relations with Taiwan. Doing so only strengthens China’s belief that it will enjoy impunity if it invades.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call. Nearly 200 foreign officials came to Taiwan in 2022, many eager to discuss how to contain Chinese aggression. Such visits have accelerated since Nancy Pelosi’s trip of August 2022, despite China’s show of force that followed. Ms Pelosi’s successor as house speaker, Kevin McCarthy, has promised to go to Taiwan. That could provoke China again. Mr Wu promises a welcome for Mr McCarthy—and indeed anyone else. “They cannot dictate how we make friends with the international community,” he says. Such visits boost confidence, which is what the Taiwanese need most. “Any kind of gesture, however symbolic, allows Taiwanese people to understand that we are not alone,” he adds.

A visitor walks pass by Lithuanian Products Center at Taipei World Trade Center where many products are presented for local agents, in Taipei, Taiwan, February 15, 2023
Analysts are divided over how best to help Taiwan. Some actions are symbolic not substantive, says Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund. The national defence authorisation act of 2018 allowed American warships to call at Taiwan’s ports, for example. Yet that would provoke a punitive response without improving Taiwan’s defences, says Ms Glaser. Renaming Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington or designating it as a non-nato ally, both of which were proposed but dropped from a congressional bill in 2022, might create openings for Beijing to change the status quo in the Taiwan strait more in its favour.


“Of course we should not let Beijing define what we do and don’t do,” says Ms Glaser. But foreign governments should balance how China responds to acts of support against how they will bolster Taiwan’s security. The most important way to do this is military help. Aside from arms sales, America is trying to improve training. European countries could do the same. If Taiwan decided to form territorial defence forces, they could learn from European experience. Asian countries might provide real-time intelligence to Taiwan in war, especially if undersea cables were cut.

The least confrontational yet most underutilised tools to strengthen Taiwan are economic. “I’d rather see a bilateral trade agreement than any of the sexiest, biggest weapons systems the United States could come up with to sell Taiwan,” says Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the us-Taiwan business council. Despite resistance to free-trade deals in America, there is rare bipartisan consensus on the need to support Taiwan. A study by the Heritage Foundation finds that a free-trade agreement would benefit both economies. More important, it would set a precedent for other countries.

The other form of messaging that matters is to China. America and its allies should clearly communicate the cost of any use of force against Taiwan. They should let China know it will be isolated and subject to sanctions just as Russia was after its attack on Ukraine. Some say America should end its strategic ambiguity altogether and tell China it will fight for Taiwan. Others argue that greater clarity might merely heighten the risk of war. The Biden administration has chosen to let actions speak louder than words. The formation in 2021 of aukus, a security pact between Australia, Britain and America, was a signal of stronger military determination in the Indo-Pacific. So was the expansion of American military co-ordination with Japan and the Philippines announced earlier this year.


This special report has argued that Taiwan’s own people must determine their future. But many of the actions they take on the economy, identity, politics and defence need to be bolstered by greater support from the rest of the world. Taiwan should be included in trade pacts, allowed into international institutions and given greater military and diplomatic assistance.

Taiwan endures China’s economic, military, and psychological threats, as well as social fissures from its own history. This is a moment for Taiwanese democracy to prove its resilience. Its people overcame an authoritarian past. They now have to ward off an authoritarian future. They should not be left to stand alone. ■

photos: i-hwa cheng

[Crafty_Dog]

second

How to avoid war over Taiwan
A superpower conflict would shake the world

Mar 9th 2023

Share
Europe is witnessing its bloodiest cross-border war since 1945, but Asia risks something even worse: conflict between America and China over Taiwan. Tensions are high, as American forces pivot to a new doctrine known as “distributed lethality” designed to blunt Chinese missile attacks. Last week dozens of Chinese jets breached Taiwan’s “air defence identification zone”. This week China’s foreign minister condemned what he called America’s strategy of “all-round containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death”.


As America rearms in Asia and tries to galvanise its allies, two questions loom. Is it willing to risk a direct war with another nuclear power to defend Taiwan, something it has not been prepared to do for Ukraine? And by competing with China militarily in Asia, could it provoke the very war it is trying to prevent?

No one can be sure how an invasion of Taiwan might start. China could use “grey-zone” tactics that are coercive, but not quite acts of war, to blockade the self-governing island and sap its economy and morale. Or it could launch pre-emptive missile strikes on American bases in Guam and Japan, clearing the way for an amphibious assault. Since Taiwan could resist an attack on its own only for days or weeks, any conflict could escalate quickly into a superpower confrontation.



Rather than the trenches and human-wave attacks seen in Ukraine, a war over Taiwan could involve a new generation of arms, such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, causing untold destruction and provoking unpredictable retaliation. The economic fallout would be devastating. Taiwan is the world’s essential supplier of advanced semiconductors. America, China and Japan, the three largest economies, and among the most interconnected, would deploy sanctions, crippling global trade. America would urge Europe and its other friends to impose an embargo on China.

War is no longer a remote possibility, because an unstated bargain has frayed. Since the 1970s America has been careful neither to encourage Taiwan formally to declare independence nor to promise explicitly to defend it. While not ruling out force, China has said it would favour peaceful reunification. But those positions are changing. President Xi Jinping has told the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for an invasion by 2027, says the cia. President Joe Biden has said that America would defend Taiwan if China were to attack (aides say policy is unchanged). The military balance no longer so clearly favours America as it did in the 1990s. And public opinion has shifted in Taiwan, not least because of how China has snuffed out freedoms in Hong Kong. Only 7% of Taiwanese favour reunification.


Both sides are shoring up their positions and trying to signal their resolve, with destabilising consequences. Some acts generate headlines, as when Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Taipei last year; others are almost invisible, such as the mysterious severing of undersea internet cables to remote Taiwanese islands. Diplomacy has stalled. Top American and Chinese defence officials have not spoken since November. During the recent spy-balloon incident, a “hotline” failed when China did not pick up. Rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences has grown more martial, whether on the American campaign trail or from China’s top leaders. What one side sees as a defensive act to protect its red lines, the other sees as an aggressive attempt to thwart its ambitions. Thus both sides are tempted to keep hardening their positions.

It is unclear how far America would go to defend Taiwan. The island is not a domino. China has some territorial designs beyond it, but does not want to invade or directly rule all of Asia. And as our special report explains, it is unclear how many Taiwanese see China as a real threat, or have the stomach for a fight.

The Taiwanese, like the Ukrainians, deserve American help. The island is admirably liberal and democratic, and proof that such values are not alien to Chinese culture. It would be a tragedy if its people had to submit to a dictatorship. If America walked away, the credibility of its security umbrella in Asia would be gravely in doubt. Some Asian countries would accommodate China more; South Korea and Japan might seek nuclear weapons. It would boost China’s worldview that the interests of states come before the individual freedoms enshrined in the un after the second world war.


But the help Taiwan receives should aim to deter a Chinese attack without provoking one. America needs to consider Mr Xi’s calculus. A blanket American security guarantee might embolden Taiwan to declare formal independence, a red line for him. The promise of a much larger American military presence on Taiwan could lead China to invade now, before it arrives. A botched invasion, however, would cost Mr Xi and the Communist Party dearly. America needs to calibrate its stance: reassure Mr Xi that his red lines remain intact, but convince him that aggression carries unacceptable risks. The goal should not be to solve the Taiwan question, but to defer it.

Taiwan has avoided provocation. Its president, Tsai Ing-wen, has not declared independence. But it needs to do more to deter its neighbour, by boosting defence spending so that it can survive longer without American help, and by preparing its citizens to resist grey-zone tactics, from disinformation to vote-rigging. For its part, America should try harder to reassure China and to deter it. It should avoid symbolic acts that provoke China without strengthening Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself. It should keep modernising its armed forces and rallying its allies. And it should be prepared to break a future blockade, by stockpiling fuel, planning an airlift, providing backup internet links and building an allied consensus on sanctions.

America and today’s Chinese regime will never agree about Taiwan. But they do share a common interest in avoiding a third world war. The first 15 years of the American-Soviet cold war featured a terrifying mixture of brinkmanship and near-catastrophic mistakes, until the Cuban missile crisis prompted a revival of diplomacy. This is the terrain the world is now on. Unfortunately, the potential common ground between America and China on Taiwan is shrinking. Somehow, the two rival systems must find a way to live together less dangerously.

[Crafty_Dog]

Taiwan Will Continue to Vex U.S.-China Ties, Despite Low-Key Tsai-McCarthy Visit
9 MIN READApr 7, 2023 | 20:34 GMT


While China's response to a meeting between high-ranking U.S. and Taiwanese officials was relatively modest, the trajectory of China-U.S. and China-Taiwan relations remains escalatory. This will perpetuate the risk of cross-strait incidents, pose a pervasive threat of Chinese military coercion against Taiwan, and increase constraints on U.S.-China trade ties. On April 5, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy at the Ronald Reagan Library in the Californian city of Simi Valley, marking the first time a sitting Taiwanese president has met with the leader of the U.S. House of Representatives on U.S. soil since 1979. Tsai and McCarthy were joined by 17 other U.S. lawmakers, including 10 members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. In a joint statement released after the meeting, McCarthy reiterated the need for the United States to deliver arms sold to Taiwan on a ''very timely basis'' and strengthen trade and technology cooperation, while Tsai heaped praise on the U.S. partnership. Both sides also emphasized the need to preserve freedom and democracy from outside threats, though neither leader explicitly named China. In response to the McCarthy meeting, China has conducted limited military activities around Taiwan, including a Taiwan Strait patrol and a naval voyage east of Taiwan.

Tsai's recent trip to California was potentially the most high-profile visit by a Taiwanese president to the United States since the island's then-President Lee Teng-hui gave a commencement speech at Cornell University in 1995, which sparked the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. It was also only the third time a Taiwanese president has ever sat down with a U.S. House speaker (regardless of location), with the second being Tsai's meeting with McCarthy's predecessor, Nancy Pelosi, in Taipei just eight months ago.

On April 6, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) of China's Fujian province (which lies just across the strait from Taiwan) announced on its WeChat page that it would be conducting ''on-site inspections'' of cargo and construction ships during patrols of the central and northern portions of the Taiwan Strait, with the MSA's largest ship, the Haixun 06, leading the operations. The Taiwanese military is tailing the Haixun 06 and has advised ships in the strait to ignore any requests from China to board their vessels and notify Taiwan's Coast Guard if they receive such requests.

On April 5, China sailed its Shandong aircraft carrier 200 miles east of the southernmost tip of Taiwan, accompanied by a frigate and a support ship. The USS Nimitz aircraft carrier is in the region as well, sailing 400 miles east of Taiwan according to the island's defense minister, though the U.S. military has not yet associated its presence with that of the Shandong.

There have been few updates from Taiwanese or Chinese authorities following an April 2 pledge by the People's Liberation Army's Eastern Theater Command (PLA ETC) to host live-fire drills in the East China Sea, which involved two destroyers and a frigate.
China's military response to the Tsai-McCarthy has been modest due to a combination of political, diplomatic and economic calculations. In response to the August 2022 Pelosi-Tsai meeting, Beijing pledged to conduct live-fire military drills as soon as Pelosi arrived in Taipei and then fulfilled that pledge after she left, marking the largest live-fire drills around Taiwan in nearly 30 years. Prior to Pelosi's arrival in Taiwan, Beijing had also communicated through backchannels to Washington that it might impose a no-fly zone around Taiwan to stop the visit, though this did not happen. So far, China's response to the McCarthy meeting has been much tamer, with Beijing making no such explicit pledges of military action, although generic threats about ''severe consequences'' abounded. This more muted response is likely the result of several considerations on China's part, including:

The reduced symbolic threat posed to Chinese sovereignty. Beijing views a top foreign official visiting Taiwan (as Pelosi did over the summer) as a much greater affront to China's sovereignty — and thus more worthy of a greater response — compared with the Taiwanese president traveling abroad to meet with such an official (as Tsai recently did to sit down with McCarthy). This is also why it's more common for foreign governments to host Taiwanese delegations, which is less likely to trigger Chinese retaliation than the other way around. Tsai, for example, has visited the United States seven times (including the latest trip to California) since taking office in 2016.

The risk of straining China-EU ties. In addition, the McCarthy-Tsai meeting coincided with visits to China from French President Emmanuel Macron and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Beijing has been on a campaign to repair its diplomatic relations with Europe for at least the last six months in order to prevent the U.S. containment camp from gaining participants, and an aggressive military retaliation against Taiwan during the French and EU leaders' visits would have risked sullying those efforts. However, this also raises the potential of China waging a stronger response in the coming days now that Macron and von der Leyen have left.

The potential for political backlash in Taiwan. An aggressive military reaction to the McCarthy-Tsai meeting would also threaten China's political interests in Taiwan by potentially extending the reign of Tsai's more China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan will hold presidential and legislative elections in January 2024, where Beijing is hoping for a victory by the opposition (and comparatively more China-friendly) Kuomintang party. But any action that boosts the Taiwanese electorate's threat perception of China before then could sway the vote in favor of the DPP — a phenomenon China has already witnessed firsthand, with its heavy-handed crackdown on Hong Kong protesters in 2019, widely believed to have contributed to Tsai's reelection in January 2020.

Despite Beijing's prudence regarding the Tsai-McCarthy meeting, the strategies of China and the United States toward Taiwan will remain escalatory in nature, presenting frequent political crises in cross-strait relations, risks of maritime incidents, and roadblocks to improved U.S.-China economic ties for the foreseeable future. Since Tsai came to power in 2016, China's strategy toward Taiwan has gradually evolved from economic coercion to military coercion. The United States, for its part, has also attempted to change the status quo by pursuing greater unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Together, their actions will drive developments in Indo-Pacific security and China-U.S. economic ties in the coming years. China's latest inspection campaign against commercial vessels transiting the Taiwan Strait — combined with the Chinese military's aerial incursions across the strait's median line (which for decades has served as the de facto maritime border separating Taiwanese and Chinese waters) — raises the chance of a collision and subsequent military standoffs. Such incidents could cause political crises, with each side demanding myriad forms of redress, but are unlikely to escalate into a greater military conflict given both Taiwan and China's hesitance to unnecessarily invoke the high economic and human costs of war. High-level meetings between U.S. and Taiwanese officials will regularly present roadblocks to U.S.-China economic ties, with each visit deepening mutual distrust in the Sino-American relationship in the months leading up to and following the event, while solidifying the long-term perception that non-economic issues cannot be treated separately from the broader U.S.-China relationship. Beijing's military coercion of Taiwan will heighten Europe's threat perception of China as well, particularly regarding peace in the Indo-Pacific and supply chain stability for critical goods like Taiwan's world-class semiconductor chips. This will increase the likelihood of more European trade restrictions on China akin to the Netherlands' recent export ban on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. But new trade deals between China and European countries, like French President Macron's recently signed aerospace and nuclear energy deals in Beijing, will still be possible. And China's relationship with the European Union, in particular, will likely remain deeply nuanced and sometimes contradictory, as the bloc consists of 27 member states and multiple supranational institutions with different strategies and interests regarding Beijing.

China's strategy toward Taiwan since Tsai was elected in 2016 has been to wield coercion to achieve political concessions in Taipei. From 2016 to 2019, Beijing deployed economic tools, like import restrictions and non-tariff barriers, against politically connected sectors of Taiwan's economy (e.g. agriculture), in an effort to erode the electoral support of Tsai and the DPP. But since Tsai's reelection in January 2020, Beijing has shifted to a strategy of military coercion — which has included growing aerial incursions into Taiwan's aerial defense identification zone, more naval deployments off of Taiwan's southeast and northeast coasts, and the live-fire drills in August 2022. Such actions are aimed at demonstrating China's willingness to militarily uphold its views on sovereignty over Taiwan in the hopes of convincing Taipei and Western capitals that supporting Taiwanese sovereignty is not worth risking war with China.

The United States, meanwhile, has slowly attempted to change the status quo in its relations with Taiwan over the past two years. Between Oct. 2021 and Sept. 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden claimed at least three times that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion — a stance not supported by documents that codify Washington's unofficial ties with Taipei, like the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. And McCarthy and his predecessor Pelosi's recent meetings with Tsai show that, amid the current U.S. political environment of bipartisan opposition to China, short-tenured leaders in the House of Representatives are content to use diplomatic visits to gain electoral support, despite the White House's reservations about the escalatory nature of such visits.

While China could temporarily soften its position on Taiwan if the KMT wins the presidency, Beijing will continue to grow impatient with a lack of progress in cross-strait reunification and may still resort to military coercion. China's continued reliance on military coercion will support the DPP's dominance in Taiwanese politics, regardless of the outcome of the 2024 elections. This makes the prospects for improvement in cross-strait ties unlikely, especially as Chinese President Xi Jinping's position on the issue is becoming increasingly intolerant. If the KMT wins the election, U.S. representatives may have to settle for a slower pace of U.S.-Taiwan meetings, and China could temporarily soften its military coercive strategy against Taiwan. But even then, the KMT would have to conduct a balancing act between improving trade ties with Beijing and representing the views of increasingly sovereignty-conscious Taiwanese citizens. Thus, a KMT presidency might look more like the second term of former President Ma Ying-jeou (2012-2016), in which the cross-strait relationship was plagued by political gridlock and Beijing grew increasingly impatient at the lack of progress on peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Given Beijing's heightened willingness to use military coercion since 2020, such gridlock could eventually see Beijing again wield the military against a noncommittal KMT, even if this would happen on a less accelerated timeline than if the DPP stays in power.

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. Navy conducts warship passage in South China Sea

Operation held days after McCarthy-Tsai meeting

BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer sailed through a disputed area of the South China Sea on Monday, pushing back against territorial claims by China amid rising bilateral tensions, the Seventh Fleet said in a statement.

The destroyer USS Milius sailed near Mischief Reef, part of the Spratly Islands where China has built up several military bases and deployed missiles in recent years.

The warship made the “freedom of navigation operation” (FONOP) within 12 nautical miles of the reef and then continued operations nearby, Seventh Fleet spokesman Lt. Luka Bakic said, in a symbolic demonstration to uphold “the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea.”

The USS Milius, he added, “demonstrated that Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation in its natural state, is not entitled to a territorial sea under international law.”

A Chinese military spokesman said the Milius “illegally trespassed” without Chinese government approval. Chinese military aircraft and warships tracked and monitored the Milius, said a spokesman for the PLA southern theater command.

“China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters,” the spokesman said. “The troops of the PLA southern theater command will always stay on high alert and resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty and security, as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea.”

China’s People’s Liberation Army said in a statement the three-day exercises prove Beijing is prepared to do what it takes to back up China’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan.

“The theater’s troops are ready to fight at all times and can fight at any time to resolutely smash any form of ‘Taiwan independence’ and foreign interference attempts,” the Chinese military statement said Monday.

The Navy claims that a submerged reef at high tide is not recognized as a maritime sovereign territory. China’s landreclamation efforts, installations and structures on Mischief Reef “do not change this characterization under international law,” Lt. Bakic said. Satellite photographs of Mischief Reef have shown whaappearrs to be cruise missile deployments as well as a long runway.

The latest FONOP came just as Chinese military forces ended large-scale wargames north of the sea near Taiwan, exercises that state media said simulated multi-directional Chinese military attacks on the island democracy and reflected Beijing’s anger over last week’s meeting between House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in California. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, which monitored the Chinese exercises, said a total of 232 Chinese military aircraft and 32 military vessels were detected near Taiwan between Saturday and the end of the exercises on Monday.

During this period, 134 military aircraft crossed the median line down the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait.

China has limited contacts with U.S. military counterparts as tensions have ramped up over Taiwan and other issues. A Pentagon spokesman said China continued to reject talks with senior U.S. defense and military leaders.

“While we will continue to maintain open channels of communication with the PRC, the PRC continues to decline requests for engagement with the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff,” Pentagon spokesman Chris Meagher told reporters Monday. “Lines between our militaries are particularly important in scenarios like this, and we call on Beijing to engage us in this channel.”

U.S. defense officials have said the planes crossing the media line were violating the fragile status quo between China and Taiwan that has kept the peace between the two rivals since Nationalist forces fled the mainland to Taiwan during a civil war in 1949.

Chinese state media described the exercises as “encirclement combat alert patrols” by PLA forces of the Eastern Theater Command, exercises that “pressured the island from all four directions” using an aircraft carrier, long-range rockets, warships and fighter jets and conventional missiles.

It was the second time the Chinese military conducted aggressive exercises near Taiwan in response to a meeting with a senior House leader. In August 2022, the Chinese conducted the largest military exercises in decades around Taiwan after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and met with Mrs. Tsai.

The Chinese exercises during the weekend practiced seizing control of sea, air and information domains using joint forces. Video posted on Chinese state media showed a graphic with the locations of medium- and short-range missile firings from China that landed in areas around Taiwan.

Actual rocket and missile launches also were shown in videos of the exercises.

The Chinese Communist Party-affiliated outlet Global Times stated that the aircraft carrier strike group led by the carrier Shandong and its jets “practiced assaults on fleeing hostile vessels and a maritime blockade while other forces conducted blockade and joint strike drills.”

Chinese units also practiced electronic warfare operations, including suppression of radar and anti-missile defenses on Taiwan.

• Ben Wolfgang contributed to this report.

[Crafty_Dog]

China Eyes Commercial Ships in a Move to Intimidate Taiwan
An ‘inspection’ flotilla could be the first step in a blockade of the island. The world needs to be ready.
By Elisabeth Braw
April 11, 2023 1:00 pm ET

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Kevin McCarthy and Tsai Ing-wen at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif., April 5.
PHOTO: RINGO H.W. CHIU/ASSOCIATED PRESS

When House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen met in California last week, Beijing expressed its displeasure. It did so by sending patrol vessels to the Taiwan Strait, where Chinese authorities said the vessels might conduct inspections. China could use such inspections to block this vital trade artery. Friendly navies should signal support for Taiwan’s navy. Governments should create an early-warning system for the shipping world, so vessels take alternate routes.

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“A fleet led by the advanced Haixun 06 patrol ship continued to carry out its patrol task in the central part of the Taiwan Straits on Thursday, the second day of its three-day special operation,” the state newspaper China Daily reported April 6. Beijing made clear that the flotilla, which arrived hours before Ms. Tsai met with Mr. McCarthy, might inspect cargo vessels traveling through the Strait.

The Taiwan Strait, the main passage for cargo moving between Southeast Asia and Japan, South Korea and Northern China, is one of the world’s busiest waterways, traversed every year by almost half the world’s container ships. Though the strait is 200 nautical miles wide, only a stretch of 15 miles is deep enough for modern ships. Beijing says it has “sovereignty and jurisdiction” over the strait, which Taiwan and countries including the U.S. consider international waters. Since 1955, coexistence has been possible thanks to the “median line” drawn through the waters by U.S. Air Force Gen. Benjamin Davis, which functions as an unofficial maritime border.

Taiwan instructed shipping lines not to comply with any inspections by the Haixun 06-led flotilla. “This is a virtual blockade,” said retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, a former director of operations at U.S. Pacific Command. “It’s a way for China to make shipping companies and insurers stay away from Taiwan.”

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This time, the fleet reportedly conducted no inspections—but next time it might. Inspections would wreak havoc on the 240 ships that travel through the strait on an average day. “Ten ships an hour in a 15-mile area means they could quickly back up if not carefully managed,” said Neil Roberts, secretary of the Joint War Committee, a maritime-insurance body that classifies risks. Through such maneuvers, China would be marking the Taiwan Strait as its exclusive economic zone and could create a blockade. The strait passage is essential not only for countries in the region but global supply chains, which depend on parts and assembly in Southeast Asia and Northern China.

“It will be a major issue if it escalates, and clearly the war market is keeping watch, but so far the status quo has been maintained,” said Simon Lockwood, a maritime expert with insurance broker Willis Towers Watson. “China may want full control of Taiwan, but it also needs maritime trade.” In 2021—the latest year for which data are available—merchant ships from around the world made 260,464 calls in Chinese ports. Shipping companies’ challenge, though, is that Xi Jinping may need clout more than maritime trade. The Chinese leader has shown he is willing to sacrifice economic success to strengthen his power and has clipped the wings of China’s most prominent tech firms. When Mr. Xi was elected to a third term last fall, shares of Chinese tech giants plunged.

If Ms. Tsai keeps meeting with foreign leaders, Mr. Xi could blockade Taiwan with inspection flotillas. Because it would be ship inspections, not a military assault, neither Taiwan nor its allies would be able to retaliate in a meaningful way. Because China also claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, countries including Vietnam and the Philippines (and the vast amounts of global shipping going to and from them) could risk similar disruption if Beijing feels aggrieved by their governments.

We should prepare for such a scenario. Weeks before acts that might rile Beijing, governments should alert the Joint War Committee and other maritime organizations so that ships can take alternate routes. But because Beijing wants to frighten the shipping industry—which transports 80% of the world’s trade—away from Taiwan, the first step is for friendly navies to signal their support of the island. “The U.S. Navy should conduct joint exercises with the Taiwanese Navy, and we could conduct them near ports,” Adm. Montgomery said. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2023 includes expanded U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation.

China further avenged Ms. Tsai’s meeting with Mr. McCarthy by conducting a simulated military attack on Taiwan. The U.S. military is used to defanging such threats through exercises; it is currently conducting a preplanned one with the Philippines in the South China Sea. But China has been able to sow fear of nonmilitary disruption because other countries have few plans to handle the resulting chaos. Together, governments and the shipping industry can blunt China’s inspection threats. And there would be no point sending an “inspection fleet” to the Taiwan Strait if it couldn’t carry out its mission.

Ms Braw is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an adviser to Gallos Technologies.

[ccp]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/warren-buffett-says-unusually-quick-002444050.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Worth noting!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/opinion/wsj-opinion-the-republican-foreign-policy-threat-to-democracy/vi-AA19N5ed?ocid=winp1taskbar&cvid=83d7aa6ff4f7400c8d12937b96b30fe6&ei=12

[G M]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/opinion/wsj-opinion-the-republican-foreign-policy-threat-to-democracy/vi-AA19N5ed?ocid=winp1taskbar&cvid=83d7aa6ff4f7400c8d12937b96b30fe6&ei=12

WSJoke

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3851350/china-preparing-for-war

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/war-would-bring-disaster-to-china-too-taiwan-presidential-contender-says/ar-AA19U1k3?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=ce954d47775e4afea13f88c710ee9096&ei=55

[Crafty_Dog]

https://dailycaller.com/2023/04/15/leaked-documents-pentagon-chinese-invasion-taiwan/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=7aN.UylCOPwa2KCdpjm3DciS4hmhV5hnNbS1wrBp8BpmI3SHrejFJVRTdX_UibPz456I6qnH

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19581/china-taiwan-invasion-biden

[ya]

https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/war/china-v-taiwan-the-draft-begins/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-says-hopes-believes-germany-will-support-peaceful-reunification-taiwan?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rundown&pnespid=7eZ2DydMPqQRxaSatGS7H83SoA_sTop_fbXlzrI39ABm4VdMshvdyYfjfO0oi80x_Ub_CRAR

[G M]

https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-says-hopes-believes-germany-will-support-peaceful-reunification-taiwan?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rundown&pnespid=7eZ2DydMPqQRxaSatGS7H83SoA_sTop_fbXlzrI39ABm4VdMshvdyYfjfO0oi80x_Ub_CRAR

Well, China hasn't destroyed any of Germany's energy pipelines.

[Crafty_Dog]

Lawmakers’ Wargame Shows ‘Catastrophic’ Results in US-China Conflict

Lawmakers in a new House select committee on China (L-R) Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Mass.), Rep. Haley Stevens (D-Mich.), committee Chairman Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), and Rep. Carlos Gimenez (R-Fla.) gather for a tabletop wargame exercise in the House Ways and Means Committee room in Washington on April 19, 2023. (Ellen Knickmeyer/AP Photo)

Andrew Thornebrooke
By Andrew Thornebrooke
April 24, 2023Updated: April 24, 2023


Lawmakers tasked with overseeing the United States’ strategic competition with China’s communist regime have conducted a wargame simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and the U.S. response.

The House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) participated in the wargame, hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) think tank on April 19.

“We’re going to explore what happens in the very grim scenario in which deterrence fails in the Indo-Pacific,” Select Committee Chair Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) said according to prepared remarks.

“This is not a possibility we wish to contemplate, but one we must.”

‘Sobering Lessons’
The wargame sought to examine the potential course of events that could take place should the CCP invade Taiwan in 2027, with the Select Committee members playing for the United States and CNAS experts playing for China.

Over two and a half hours, the wargame simulated high-level strategic and operational maneuvers from both sides, including diplomatic, economic, and military actions in which the U.S. side sought to counter the CCP invasion.

The game was ultimately cut short because of time constraints, but its conclusions nevertheless presented the Select Committee with a sobering reality: Resupplying Taiwan with arms and other critical supplies after a CCP blockade had been imposed was not possible.

Likewise, without additional basing options with regional allies, the U.S. side risked immense casualties and its stockpiles of long-range missiles being depleted in short order.

Therefore, Gallagher said that the only solution was to arm Taiwan “to the teeth” now, or allow for CCP conquest later.

“We recognize the paradox of deterrence: that to achieve peace, sometimes you must prepare for conflict,” Gallagher said.

“I know the members of this committee will dig into the lessons we can learn from what may be some sobering outcomes of this game.”

China-US War ‘Catastrophic for Humanity’
Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), who also participated in the wargame, said that the experiment allowed the Select Committee to come to better grips with just how devastating a war between the world’s two largest economies would be.

“The overall lesson is that a war with China would be devastating and catastrophic for humanity,” Khanna said during an interview with NBC.

“There is no winner in this.”

Khanna noted that, in the wargame, the United States and China do not have open lines of communication, leading to increased escalations. This reflects the fact that the U.S. and China do not engage in virtually any of the protocols used by the United States and Soviet Union to manage crises during the first Cold War.

Likewise, for every consequence the United States was willing to impose on China in the game, the CCP regime had its own response prepared.

In response to being booted from the SWIFT international banking system, for example, the Chinese side cut the United States off from all Chinese battery technology, used in everything from iPhones to electric vehicles.

“They’re factoring in all of the economic consequences,” Khanna said, adding that the CNAS team did well in accurately portraying CCP decision-making.

CCP Preparing for War
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a part of China that must be united with its rule by any means necessary. CCP leader Xi Jinping has ordered the military wing of the party to achieve the capability to invade and conquer Taiwan by 2027.

That fact, Gallagher said, was reason enough for Congress to begin more seriously contending with the devastating scenario.

“Xi Jinping is not shy about sharing his intentions to take Taiwan—through political warfare if possible, through actual warfare if necessary,” Gallagher said.

“The People’s Liberation Army has been preparing for a Taiwan invasion for decades. The PLA rocket force and PLA Navy are purpose-built for cross-strait battle and for denying regional access to Taiwan’s friends.”

To that end, Gallagher said that the only way to deter a CCP invasion of the island was to arm Taiwan and take other, decisive actions to mitigate the CCP’s ability to wage war.

“We seek peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and the continuation of a relationship that has enabled both Taiwan and China to grow their economies and integrate their societies with the world through high-tech commerce.”

“Deterring war is the only path to peace and stability, and it is incumbent upon elected officials to take decisive action to do so before it’s too late,” Gallagher said.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/03/lower-rhetoric-china-says-milley/384693/

[ccp]

pre Biden $

  Post Biden  $ $   =>   ¥

oh yes , "we're back "

what a joke ...

[Crafty_Dog]

April 28, 2023   
         
China's military just deployed a few drones to harass Taiwan, along with the more typical ensemble of jets and navy ships flying and sailing close to the self-governing island that Beijing's leaders claim as their own.

More than three dozen Chinese aircraft buzzed the island as the sun rose Friday in what the Wall Street Journal calls "biggest deployment since China sent 91 aircraft and a dozen vessels to greet Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen the day after her return from a visit to the U.S. this month."

One of the drones flew around the island, while the other went halfway before doubling back, according to maps provided by Taiwan's military and shared on Twitter. For the record, Chinese combat drone flights near Taiwan have happened at least 16 times this calendar year—out of nearly 112 air and naval harassment operations Beijing has carried out since January; its reconnaissance drone flights near Taiwan have occurred 32 separate times over that same period.

For a sense of how perpetual the harassment is: Chinese aircraft and ships have flown or sailed close to Taiwan on all but six of 118 days this year, according to Taiwan's military. (Beijing took two days off in April, three in March, and one in February.)

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Half of the 38 aircraft deployed Friday "crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait or entered Taiwan's southwest, southeast, and northeast ADIZ," or air defense identification zone, which extends beyond a country's borders for national security alerts, but remains legally international airspace, Taipei's defense ministry said.

Bigger picture: "Two years ago, it would have been a major political event if any Chinese warplane crossed the median line," but now it happens almost every day, which shows China is "chipping away at [international] norms bit by bit," Wen-ti Sung, a political scientist at Australian National University, told the Journal.

Also: The U.S. Navy sent a sub-hunting P-8A Poseidon aircraft through the Taiwan Strait on Friday. "The aircraft's transit of the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States' commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific," the Navy's Japan-based Seventh Fleet said in a statement, and emphasized, "By operating within the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law, the United States upholds the navigational rights and freedoms of all nations."

Another thing: The U.S. and Philippine militaries witnessed some of the limits of HIMARS long-range artillery use in a naval environment this week during joint drills in the South China Sea. The U.S. tried to sink a ship 12 miles away using half a dozen HIMARS rounds, but the artillery missed on all six attempts. The practice ship eventually sank after F-16 jets, A-130U gunships, and F-35 jet fighters all targeted it, the Journal reported separately on Wednesday from the Philippines.

One reason it matters: The CEO of HIMARS-maker Lockheed Martin said in March that several unnamed countries in the Pacific have shown interest in acquiring the U.S.-made artillery system after its performance in Ukraine striking Russian ammo depots in occupied territory over the summer.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/05/blame-global-demand-parts-shortages-taiwans-tardy-f-16s-us-says/386134/

[Crafty_Dog]

Seems to me like several passages here get cause and effect reversed.  Nonetheless, plenty of interesting info.

===============================================

The Evolving Taiwan-China Relationship, Part 4: Diplomatic Relations
May 19, 2023 | 17:17 GMT





Then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (center left) walks alongside Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after arriving at the president's office in Taipei on Aug. 3, 2022.
Then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (center left) walks alongside Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after arriving at the president's office in Taipei on Aug. 3, 2022.

(Chien Chih-Hung/Office of The President via Getty Images)

Editor's Note: This assessment is the fourth and final part in a series exploring China-Taiwan relations through the lens of economics, politics, military affairs and diplomatic relations.

Taiwan's shifting diplomatic ties hold great potential to accelerate China's military and economic coercive efforts and catalyze the decoupling of global supply chains, though they're unlikely to spur a Chinese invasion any time soon. Over the past five decades, most countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, partly in order to gain access to the Chinese market (which Beijing still predicates on diplomatic non-recognition of Taipei). Now, only 13 small nations in the Pacific Islands, the Caribbean and Latin America formally recognize Taiwan, and even these relations are under threat. Taiwan has also been excluded from participation in most international institutions, including the World Health Assembly (WHA). But in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West appears to be reconsidering the value of preventing revanchist military aggression against smaller nations, especially those that are strategically located like Taiwan. The trade disruptions caused by the ongoing war in Ukraine have also renewed the United States and its allies' focus on bolstering supply chain resilience, even if it means putting them on an economic collision course with China. This has resulted in growing political support for Taiwan from the United States, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Europe.

Many Western legislators have expressly stated that "Taiwan is the next Ukraine" and have thus called for a reexamination of ties with China, as happened for Europe's ties with Russia in the wake of last year's Ukraine invasion. However, in countries that are deeply dependent on Chinese trade, many leaders (including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz) and business lobbies have expressed concerns about a hasty reorientation away from the Asian superpower.
In the developed world, there is growing momentum to pass policies focused on supply chain security, which may include reducing trade reliance on China. For advanced economies, the strategic importance of Taiwan's independence is also becoming more apparent due to the sheer volume of global trade (particularly of high-end semiconductors) that flows from and around the island and the wide-scale destruction of a would-be Chinese invasion. Nonetheless, most governments remain mum about their willingness to support Taipei militarily in such a scenario.
The U.S. relationship with Taiwan has for decades been based on a gentleman's agreement to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression, and this relationship has frequently stirred U.S.-China tensions. Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with its most important partner, the United States, has been complicated since Kuomintang (KMT) forces first administered the island in 1945. Washington and Taipei signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955, after China's attempted aggression against Taiwan during the Korean War. But starting with U.S. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, Washington aimed to improve relations with China to counter the Soviet Union amid the Cold War. In January 1979, the United States officially recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China, including Taiwan. But driven by concerns for Taiwan's security, Congress simultaneously passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a framework for U.S.-Taiwan unofficial relations to this day. The TRA establishes de facto embassies and pledges that Washington will provide Taiwan with the means necessary (including arms) to defend itself and maintain the capacity of the U.S. military to protect the people of Taiwan. But the TRA critically does not promise that the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of war with China. Though the United States pledged to China it would not officially recognize Taiwan, Washington liberally interprets the scope of its ties with Taiwan, while Beijing interprets them more rigidly, and this difference of opinion has prompted cross-strait action in the past.

In recent years, the United States has expanded its informal legislative, military and trade ties with Taiwan, which has been the primary external driver of China's latest military activity against Taiwan. The United States has begun to send stronger signals about its commitment to Taiwan as its threat perception of China has grown alongside Beijing's expanding military brinkmanship in the Indo-Pacific maritime space. Perhaps most notably, the last two U.S. House Speakers have met with Taiwan's leader: Kevin McCarthy sat down with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in April 2023, as did his predecessor Nancy Pelosi in August 2022. While domestic political jockeying partly drove these meetings, both McCarthy and Pelosi affirmed their support for democracy and peace in the Indo-Pacific in their discussions with Tsai. In addition, between October 2021 and September 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden contradicted U.S. commitments in the TRA on three separate occasions by saying the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Each time, his words prompting diplomatic protests from Beijing and clarifications from the White House that the U.S. position on Taiwan hadn't changed. On November 2022 and January 2023, Washington and Taipei also held rounds of negotiations to discuss a potential trade agreement, with a preliminary agreement expected to be signed in the coming weeks. Furthermore, on May 9, the U.S. State Department for the first time since 1994 did not add the caveat "where statehood is not a requirement" in its annual announcement pushing for Taiwan's participation in international institutions. These expanding U.S. interactions, particularly the legislative component, are the main external driver of China's recent uptick in military coercion against Taiwan, along with internal drivers like Beijing’s growing impatience with the lack of political reunification negotiations with the government in Taipei.

Since 2020, in response to Tsai's presidency and U.S. interactions with Taiwan, China has swapped out economic coercion for military coercion as its primary tool for political leverage against Taiwan. The primary goal of this strategy is to send a message to Taipei, Washington and the developed world at large that China's military power in the strait reigns supreme, and that supporting Taiwan's continued de facto independence and growing diplomatic engagement with the world is not worth sparking a global war. This military coercion has taken the form of increasingly frequent and high-tech aerial and naval incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as well as occasional live-fire drills around the island. The Chinese military Aug. 2022 live-fire drills also constituted a de facto (if partial) two-week blockade against Taiwan, following Pelosi's trip to Taipei.
Following the United States, Taiwan's next most important relationship is with Japan, mainly due to the two countries' shared history. But Japan has traditionally tried to avoid interactions with Taiwan that would provoke a response from China. Though Taiwan was a Japanese colony between 1895 and 1945, Japan's legacy in the country is not as controversial as in other Southeast and East Asian countries (such as Korea) and Taiwan-Japan relations are exceptionally good. Though their occupation was far from controversy-free, the Japanese colonizers built highways and railways and established a modern school system, and to this day Japanese culture holds a large sway in Taiwan, including in the architectural, culinary and fashion realms. After the U.N. General Assembly passed a motion to recognize China instead of Taiwan on the world stage in 1972, Japan established diplomatic ties with China, partly because China offered to renounce its demand for World War II reparations from Japan. This involved claiming Taiwan was a part of China, but Tokyo has since maintained informal relations with Taipei, primarily through economic and cultural exchanges. Like most countries, however, Japan's trade with Taiwan is limited by a lack of a free trade agreement. This is because Beijing has for decades wielded market access to China as a sword of Damocles that hangs over any country considering negotiating trade and security pacts directly with Taiwan. Japan has had little in the way of an outward-facing military in the last 75 years and thus has not wielded its military to prevent China from aggressing against Taiwan, unlike the United States. The Japanese government has been careful to minimize tensions with China over Taiwan, as seen following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, when Tokyo explicitly thanked every nation that supported the disaster relief and recovery efforts, except for Taiwan, despite Taiwan being the top donor of earthquake aid. Due to this low-profile approach, Japan-Taiwan relations have not been a major driver of Beijing's coercive efforts against Taiwan.

Japan, however, has begun slowly shifting away from its low-profile approach to Taiwan, raising the prospect that Tokyo could spur more Chinese military coercion against Taiwan, as well as provoke legal retaliation against Japanese companies and citizens. Japan's increasing wariness of China's assertive maritime presence around Taiwan and in the East China Sea has recently seen Tokyo's legislative engagement, rhetoric and military stance on cross-strait tensions become more overtly pro-Taipei. Over the past few years, Japan has committed itself to rebuilding its army and becoming a military power in its own right in the Western Pacific, rather than just a staging ground for U.S. troops. Current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has pitched this military normalization as necessary amid changing security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, including North Korea's nuclear expansion and China's threats toward Taiwan. Kishida on May 5 claimed that ''stability in the Taiwan Strait is critical not only for Japan's security, but also for the stability of international society'' and that Japan's fellow Group of 7 (G-7) nations must ''never tolerate a unilateral attempt to change the status quo by the use of force in the Indo-Pacific.'' In addition, on Dec. 10, the chairperson of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council met with Tsai in Taipei, the highest level Japan-Taiwan diplomatic meeting since 2003. If Tokyo expands the scope of its diplomatic interactions with Taiwan (e.g. with a Pelosi-level visit), takes its rhetoric about the importance of Taiwan to more global fora, and/or expands its economic or military cooperation with Taipei, China may wield military coercive tools against Taiwan (akin to the live-fire drills it conducted in August and April). Beijing could also target more Japanese firms or individuals with fines, import restrictions, or arbitrary detentions.

Europe's informal engagement with Taiwan is also growing, but is less likely to prompt Chinese military action around Taiwan. Though not as dynamic as U.S. and Japanese relations with Taiwan, other nations, particularly in Europe, are slowly changing their approach toward the island nation, mainly via high-level rhetoric and legislative visits, and by establishing new diplomatic missions. These moves are driven by a desire to deter China (which European countries increasingly see as a military threat), as well as a growing recognition that a Chinese invasion could jeopardize global supply chains, given around half of the world's container fleet and 88% of the world's largest container ships sailed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022. But while parliamentary leaders of some smaller nations (like the Czech Republic) have visited Taiwan, the larger, more powerful nations in Europe — namely, Germany, France and the United Kingdom — have refrained from replicating U.S. high-level legislative visits and have not suggested significant changes to their trade or defense ties with Taiwan. In China's eyes, Europe's informal attempts to move closer to Taiwan are thus not as escalatory as those of the United States or Japan, and are in turn less likely to trigger a forceful response from Beijing.

Many European leaders have warned China against using force against Taiwan in recent years, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen doing so just last month. European parliamentary delegations continue to visit Taiwan, including delegations from the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic in November and February, respectively.
In November 2021, Lithuania established a Taiwan (not ''Taipei'') Representative Office in Vilnius. In response, China silently slashed trade with Lithuania by 80% over 2022, which also impacted shipments from other European nations en route to China via Lithuania. The European Union is now suing China through the WTO for this move.
As foreign ties with Taiwan deepen, Beijing will similarly expand its tools for coercion, including demonstrations of force and expanding economic channels of retaliation, with a number of events in the coming years serving as likely triggers of Beijing's retaliation. The most obvious of China's retaliatory methods include incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ — including more platforms and new geographical areas — and occasional demonstrations (if not full use) of its blockade capabilities. So far, Beijing has largely avoided retaliating against Western companies operating in Taiwan and China in an attempt to preserve China's business environment. But if increased military coercion fails to deter countries from further deepening ties with Taiwan, China may start to target Western firms doing business in Taiwan and China via fines, court cases, visa revocations and exit bans. There are a number of diplomatic triggers that could prompt Beijing to take such escalatory steps, including: more high-level diplomatic meetings with Taiwan's leaders; expanded U.S. military involvement with Taiwan (including training and arms sales); the election of a Republican president in the United States in November 2024; a formal trade agreement between Taiwan and the United States or Canada; and more explicit commitments to defend Taiwan by Washington or other capitals (e.g. Tokyo).

The outcome of Taiwan's January 2024 presidential election could act as a catalyst or an inhibitor for China's retaliations to Taiwan's diplomatic interactions. If the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins, the severity of China's responses to foreign interactions with Taipei will grow and Beijing's threshold for retaliation will decrease. Conversely, a win by the opposition KMT would decrease China's reactivity and the severity of its responses. A win by the third-party Taiwan People's Party (TPP), however, would be uncharted territory for China, and so Beijing would likely act with restraint early on to test the new administration, but could turn to military and economic coercion if the TPP's stance toward diplomatic interactions begins to resemble the ruling DPP's.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://themessenger.com/news/the-u-s-is-preparing-evacuation-plans-for-american-citizens-in-taiwan-exclusive

[Crafty_Dog]

EXCLUSIVE: Republican Letter Asks Blinken to Visit Taiwan En Route to China
Andrew Thornebrooke
By Andrew Thornebrooke
June 16, 2023Updated: June 16, 2023

A group of Republican lawmakers is urging Secretary of State Antony Blinken to visit Taiwan as he travels to communist China.

The lawmakers, led by Rep. Tom Tiffany (R-Wis.), say that the stopover is necessary to demonstrate that China’s communist regime cannot dictate the terms of U.S. alliances and partnerships, according to a copy of the letter obtained by The Epoch Times.

“As you prepare for your trip to the People’s Republic of China, we are writing to once again request that you consider adding a stopover in Taiwan to your itinerary,” the letter says.

“It would send a clear message that the United States does not need a permission slip from the Chinese Communist Party to meet with our friends and allies in Taiwan—or anywhere else.”

The letter, which was also signed by Republican lawmakers Buddy Carter (Ga.), Dan Crenshaw (Texas), Byron Donalds (Fla.), Nancy Mace (S.C.), Andy Ogles (Tenn.), and Scott Perry (Penn.), further encourages Blinken to assuage both Taiwanese and American concerns about delays in shipments of weapons to the island.

Taiwan Key to US Security in Indo-Pacific
Asked about the letter, Tiffany said the Biden administration needed to increase engagement with Taiwan or else risk damaging vital U.S. interests in favor of appeasing China without apparent benefit.

“Taiwan is a key U.S. economic and security partner in the region,” Tiffany told The Epoch Times.

“Avoiding high-level coordination and communication to try and appease Beijing doesn’t reduce tensions in the region, it only encourages more Chinese bullying and brinksmanship.”

The issue of U.S. communications with Taiwan has been a sticking point in Sino-American relations since then-President Richard Nixon first visited China in 1972.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which rules China as a single-party state, claims democratic Taiwan is part of its territory. The regime has never controlled any part of Taiwan, but CCP officials have nevertheless vowed to start a war to ensure the island’s de facto independence is not recognized internationally.

Since 1979, the United States has maintained an uncomfortable balance in its relations with China and Taiwan.

On the one hand, the United States formally recognizes but does not endorse the CCP’s claims to Taiwan. As such, it does not maintain formal ties with the island government, though it does have deep economic ties there.

On the other hand, the United States does maintain legal obligations to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to defend its de facto independence from CCP aggression. Washington also maintains agreements with Beijing that neither side shall attempt to unilaterally change this status quo.

Despite the lack of formal ties, the United States and Taiwan have enjoyed robust informal dialogues for decades. Tiffany believes the Biden administration is overly eager to appease the CCP by slowing down such informal ties.

“It has been U.S. policy for many years to encourage and facilitate meetings between senior U.S. officials and their counterparts in Taiwan,” Tiffany said.

“By ignoring that policy and operating under outdated, self-imposed restrictions, the Biden administration is allowing the CCP to dictate who American leaders can and can’t talk to, and that is wrong.”

The letter also encourages Blinken to visit Taiwan to assuage any unease arising from U.S. failures to deliver weapons systems that the island has purchased.

There is currently a $14 billion backlog of weapons systems that Taiwan has purchased from the United States but has still not received. Some of those orders go as far back as 2019.

For Tiffany, a Blinken stopover in Taiwan would greatly ease Taipei’s worries and could go a long way in creating transparency for Taiwanese and American officials regarding what the Biden administration is doing to solve the problem.

“Taiwan has demonstrated an enduring commitment to their own national defense through regular arms purchases, so when the deliveries of those systems are delayed, that’s deeply concerning,” Tiffany said.

“Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific deserve a clear explanation about what is holding up these transfers, and what the Biden administration is doing to solve the problem.”

Epoch Times Photo
L-R) Then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi participates in a ceremonial swearing-in with new Rep. Tom Tiffany (R-Wis.), with wife Christine, at the U.S. Capitol in Washington on May 19, 2020. (Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
Blinken Trip ‘Counterproductive and Dangerous’
Blinken is currently scheduled to meet with senior Chinese officials during a series of talks in Beijing on June 18 and 19. He will seek to reestablish regular communications between the United States and the CCP regime.

The visit is part of a larger effort by the Biden administration to erect guardrails around the two powers’ increasingly bitter competition, according to State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller.

“Intense competition requires intense and tough diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict, and that’s what we intend for this visit,” Miller said during a June 14 press briefing.

Miller added that Blinken would seek to achieve three broad objectives in Beijing: reestablishing normal communications, championing U.S. values and interests, and identifying potential avenues for mutual cooperation.

The visit comes during a CCP-imposed blackout of military-to-military communications between the two powers, which U.S. officials say risks a catastrophic miscalculation that could lead to conflict.

Some in Congress, like Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), believe that the Blinken trip could do well in resetting those lines of communication and easing tensions.

“I hope that we can create some level of communication, particularly on the defense side, so that we can deconflict,” Menendez told The Epoch Times.

“Right now, the Chinese military leadership is unwilling to engage with ours, and that’s a problem, especially with the risky behavior that they’ve taken.”

Many in Congress, however, consider the administration’s push for talks without preconditions to be ill-advised, particularly given the rise in CCP military aggression in the region and the regime’s continued campaign of spying and repression against ethnic Chinese living in the United States.

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), who chairs the bipartisan Select Committee on the CCP, is among them.

“The attempts by the administration to revive engagement after it’s failed for 20 years, I just don’t know what that achieves other than to force us to slow walk certain defensive actions,” Gallagher told NTD, a sister media outlet of The Epoch Times.

“My view is [Blinken] shouldn’t be going right now, particularly in light of the revelations we saw last week about a CCP investment in Cuba for a massive spying station right in our own neighborhood.”

To that end, Gallagher said the Blinken-China visit would not do anything to meaningfully help the United States in its competition with China and could even set U.S. security back.

“Time and time again, engagement, particularly engagement just for the sake of engagement, has undermined the urgency we need to actually win the competition,” Gallagher said.

“The fact that the Biden administration is revising diplomatic and economic engagement as a core pillar of our grand strategy, I think, is counterproductive and dangerous.”

Others in Congress view the trip as a wasted opportunity. Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), for example, told The Epoch Times that Blinken’s visit had great potential but would likely amount to nothing more than the administration “kowtowing to China.”

“I hope that what [Blinken] accomplishes is he goes over there and tells them that the trade deficit is unacceptable. We’re not going to allow them to cheat anymore on trade, we’re not gonna allow them to steal our jobs, and we’re gonna get that deficit down to zero,” Hawley said.

“But that’s not what he’s going to do. He’s going to go over there and beg and grovel.”

A State Department official declined to comment on the letter, saying the department does not comment on Congressional correspondence.”

Jackson Richman and Melina Wisecup contributed to this report.

[Crafty_Dog]

My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait
As Beijing ratchets up military and economic tensions, we can never take our democracy for granted.
By Lai Ching-te
July 4, 2023 3:39 pm ET




My defining moment came as China’s military adventurism disrupted commercial shipping to Taiwan and threatened our shores with live fire exercises and missiles. I decided I had a duty to participate in Taiwan’s democracy and help protect this fledgling experiment from those who wished it harm.

That was 27 years ago.

I was a doctor at National Cheng Kung University Hospital when news broke of the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This was during the runup to a presidential race, the first free election after decades of martial law during which activists had fought for democracy and freedom. Beijing wanted to send a message to those who supported Taiwan’s democratic reforms, preferring candidates more receptive to their authoritarian tendencies.

Thankfully, those candidates lost by a landslide. Our democracy has since flourished, but history has a way of repeating itself. After hanging up my white coat, I served in successive roles as an elected official—premier, vice president and now presidential candidate. I find myself in the same position as my predecessors. Consequently, my commitment to defending peace, our democratic achievements and the cross-strait status quo is stronger than ever.

A lot is at stake. President Xi Jinping has quashed dissent in Hong Kong, established “re-education” centers in Xinjiang, fomented conflict in the South China Sea, and stepped up military adventurism across the Taiwan Strait.

It’s unsurprising that in recent years there has been an outpouring of global support for peace in the Taiwan Strait. The invasion of Ukraine and growing strains of authoritarianism around the world have awakened the international community to the fragility of democracy. It can wither and die without proper care and attention.

Care must start at home. As a doctor, I never left patients without a treatment plan. As president, I will implement a four-pillar plan for peace that is clear-eyed about the challenges we face and ensures continued stability in the region.

First, we must build up Taiwan’s deterrence. Defense is the bedrock of our national security. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, we have increased defense budgets, reformed conscription and the reserve system, and supported new practices and capabilities within our military. These measures reduce the risk of armed conflict by raising the stakes and costs for Beijing. I will also expedite our transition into an asymmetric fighting force, focusing on cost-effective and mobile capabilities. I will seek greater cooperation with partners and allies, particularly in training, force restructuring, civil defense and information sharing.

Second, economic security is national security. In the years since democratization, Taiwan has become a high-tech powerhouse. As a former mayor of Tainan, I am proud to see semiconductors made both in the city and around Taiwan driving the next generation of technology. As premier, I spearheaded efforts to increase salaries, cut taxes and attract new investment.

Our economic achievements, however, have brought both opportunity and challenge. Trade dependencies toward China have created vulnerabilities that can be exploited through economic coercion. We must foster secure supply chains while pursuing trade agreements that encourage trade diversification. I will support innovative indigenous industries, cut unnecessary regulation, and strive to ensure that the fruits of economic growth are more evenly enjoyed.

The third pillar is based on forming partnerships with democracies around the world. This year Taiwan sent the first medical team from Asia to Ukraine, assisting war-wounded personnel and residents. Record numbers of parliamentarians, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks and official delegations have visited Taiwan, showing that despite Communist Party pressure, we do not stand alone.

The fourth pillar is steady and principled cross-strait leadership. In recent years, China has cut off exchanges in line with its insistence on the “1992 consensus” and the “one China” framework that Mr. Xi himself has called a road map for unification. Military tensions are rising, fueled by coercive People’s Liberation Army actions against Taiwan, Japan and our neighbors in the South China Sea.

Despite increased military and economic challenges, my top priorities remain pragmatism and consistency. I will support the cross-strait status quo—which is in the best interests of both the Republic of China, as Taiwan is formally known, and the international community. I will never rule out the possibility of dialogue without preconditions, based on the principles of reciprocity and dignity.

Much has changed since 1996, yet much remains the same. People’s Liberation Army fighter jets and naval vessels continue to move around Taiwan in a bid to influence our democratic elections. Economic tensions persist. We are reminded daily that we can never take our freedom and democracy for granted. But my commitment is as clear today as it was 27 years ago: I will always work toward peace and stability for the people of Taiwan and the international community.

Mr. Lai is vice president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate for the 2024 presidential election

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/world/analysis-another-milk-tea-alliance-as-india-taiwan-deepen-ties-in-face-of-china-threat-5414134?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-07-26&src_cmp=uschina-2023-07-26&utm_medium=email

[Crafty_Dog]

FRIDAY, JULY 28, 2023
7/28/2023 5:33:00 AMShare This Episode
Taiwan Is Key to Xi’s Chinese Dream
A.M. Edition for July 28. The second in our four-part series on China: “The State of Xi’s Chinese Dream.” Wall Street Journal deputy China bureau chief Josh Chin and reporter Joyu Wang trace the rapid growth of China’s military under Xi Jinping and how officials in Taipei and Washington are preparing for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Plus, Donald Trump is indicted on more charges in the classified documents probe. And the Bank of Japan jolts markets after hinting it would tolerate higher interest rates. Luke Vargas hosts.



FULL TRANSCRIPT
This transcript was prepared by a transcription service. This version may not be in its final form and may be updated.

Luke Vargas: Trump is indicted on more charges in the classified documents probe, plus the Bank of Japan jolts markets after hinting it would tolerate higher interest rates, and our look at how far China is willing to go to retake Taiwan.

Josh Chin: It's one of the central contradictions of the China dream. Xi wants China to be seen as a responsible and respected global power, but he also wants China to be whole. And if you were to launch military action against Taiwan, he may or may not succeed on the first goal.

Luke Vargas: It's Friday, July 28th. I'm Luke Vargas for the Wall Street Journal, and here is the AM edition of What's News, the top headlines and business stories moving your world today. Donald Trump has been indicted on additional charges related to his handling of classified documents, including that he ordered a worker at his Mar-a-Lago resort to delete camera footage so that it couldn't be turned over to a grand jury. The additional charges from special counsel Jack Smith broadened an indictment that was brought by a Florida grand jury in June and come as Trump braces for separate federal charges over efforts to undo his 2020 election loss. A Trump spokesman described Smith as leading a witch hunt and called the new indictment part of a Department of Justice campaign to harass the former president. A spokesman for Smith declined to comment. The Democratic-led Senate has passed an $866 billion defense bill with broad bipartisan support. That puts the legislation on a collision course with the Republican controlled house, which narrowly voted earlier this month to add provisions to the bill restricting abortion access and transgender healthcare for troops. The Senate's National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 does share some central similarities with the House passed version; however, senators largely sidestepped the social issues that polarized the house a few weeks earlier. A surprise announcement by the Bank of Japan has roiled markets and sent treasury yields surging. The bank this morning said it would keep interest rates unchanged, but in a market shift to the BOJ's longstanding ultra loose monetary policy, new governor Kazuo Ueda said it would take a more flexible approach to yield curve control. And here to explain what that means is Wall Street Journal deputy finance editor, Quentin Webb. Quentin, what does yield curve control entail and what is the BOJ actually changing here?

Josh Chin: Hi there. So yield curve control entails controlling longer dated borrowing costs by keeping the 10-year yield of the equivalent of the treasury in a range. Until recently, the Bank of Japan has kept that in a range of up to 0.5%. And what the Bank of Japan has done now is said, actually while it retains that top level as a guideline, it won't buy bonds until they hit 1%. So effectively, it's gently raised the cap towards 1%, if you like, which represents a tightening of monetary policy in a country that has long been notable for its ultra loose policy.

Luke Vargas: That in some ways sounds like an incremental move, Quentin, and yet it's led to a pretty significant market reaction today. Why is that?

Quentin Webb: Part of the thinking here from investors is that as Japan allows yields to rise a bit further, you might see some of the huge holdings of foreign stocks and bonds that Japanese investors have being liquidated and some of that money repatriates to Japan. Don't forget that Japan holds more than a trillion dollars of US treasuries for instance. Many investors have funded international investments by borrowing in yen in what's called the carry trade. So they borrowed cheaply in yen and used the proceeds to invest overseas. So we may see some of that unwinding as well. The other part of the thinking is that this could be the first of several steps to normalize policy in Japan, not least because actually after many years of subpar inflation or outright deflation, in fact as well, Japan is finally seeing some signs that inflation is running at or above targets. So maybe in the medium term, Tokyo will shift towards more normal monetary policy.

Luke Vargas: That was Wall Street Journal Deputy Finance editor, Quentin Webb. Quentin, thanks.

Quentin Webb: Thanks a lot.

Luke Vargas: In the US, three crucial data points this morning are set to shed light on the state of the economy. That would be consumer spending figures, the Fed's preferred gauge for inflation and the employment cost index. And Journal reporter Amara Omeokwe says that last measure of what employers are spending to pay workers' wages and benefits is particularly important for the Fed.

Amara Omeokwe: Economists are expecting a slight slowdown in that index when looking at the second quarter compared with the first quarter. Now, wage growth has been slowing this year, but it is still pretty robust and that is something the Federal Reserve is watching closely because the labor market has been really tight. And so what the Fed is looking for is for that wage growth to kind of slow down as an indication that the labor market itself is slowing down because taken together, a slowdown in the labor market and a slowdown in wage growth would indicate to the Federal Reserve that inflation overall is also easing.

Luke Vargas: Meanwhile, it is a big day for oil companies with ExxonMobil and Chevron set to report second quarter results. And reporter Jenny Strasberg told me that Shell's results yesterday in which the company saw shrinking profits but still announced $3 billion in share buybacks could preview what's to come.

Jenny Strasberg: Exxon has already said that they expect some of the same factors to hit them. Weaker gas prices, lower refining margins, they said would eat about 4 billion off their earnings. Chevron already pre-announced its top line of 6 billion in profit. We're talking about roughly 50% decline from the peaks of record profits last year. So investors are watching to see whether the weaker environment is going to crater any of their pledges around share buybacks in dividends. Investors are still demanding a lot of cash looking for the companies to be very thrifty on their spending, and that is a theme across the industry.

Luke Vargas: In other earnings, Ford has delivered healthy Q2 profits, but is warning of delays to its EV production. The company earlier forecast yearly EV losses of $3 billion, but up that to four and a half billion yesterday amid stiff price competition. And Intel has returned to profitability after two quarters of record losses thanks to a PC rebound that's lifting chip demand. Analysts have been expecting another loss. Coming up, China's Xi Jinping has expanded the power of China's military, but will he risk damaging the country's reputation and potentially sparking a world war in his ambition to retake Taiwan? That's after the break. For the next three weeks, we are taking an in-depth look at China and how Xi Jinping's dream of transforming the country into a global superpower is progressing. This special series has already looked at how slowing economic growth figures into Xi's plans, and this week we're pivoting to geopolitics to look at how a decades long quest to expand the power of China's military is unfolding and how it's leading Xi's attention to focus on Taiwan. And here to do that, I'm joined now by the Journal's deputy China bureau chief, Josh Chin, as well as by reporter Joyu Wong, who's based in Taipei. Josh, we heard last week about how economic growth sits squarely within Xi's Chinese dream, whereas where military prowess fits within his plans as I sense less well understood. How does Xi see the importance of China's military?

Josh Chin: Right. Well, one of the first things Xi Jinping did after taking power in 2012 was order China's military, the People's Liberation Army, the generals to prepare to "fight and win wars". It was one of the earliest orders he gave. There was a common perception in China at the time that the military had grown complacent and corrupt, and Xi basically gradually replaced all of the people he had taken out with loyalists and put them in charge. Then in 2016, he launched the biggest military reorganization that China has seen since the 1950s. He scrambled the command structures, he slashed troops who were part of this sort of bloated bureaucracy, and he put himself in charge of a new joint battle command that was aimed at modernizing operations. For Xi, remaking the military was really important, partly in terms of projecting China's power abroad to help China regain what he sees as its rightful place at the top of the global order, sort of what we think of as the China dream. But it was also important to him in terms of reinforcing his own power at home so he could see that China dream project through.

Luke Vargas: And he's still seeing it through, Josh, our colleague Brian Spiegel reporting a few months ago, that China plans to increase military spending by more than 7% this year, the fastest growth in years. So clearly investments are continuing, which begs the question, where is the Chinese military now in terms of its capabilities?

Josh Chin: Right. So China now has one of the best equipped militaries in the world. It launched its third aircraft carrier last summer. The first one that it designed in China has more naval ships than the United States now, and it's also ahead of the US and the development of hypersonic missiles, which are a new sort of cutting edge missile technology that's really good at evading modern missile defenses. And those are advances that are driven by just huge amounts of spending. Official military expenditures are expected to reach 224 billion this year. That's still behind the US, which spent more than 870 billion in 2022. But military analysts say China likely spends quite a bit more than it actually says it does.

Luke Vargas: Okay. Incredibly well-equipped, but how able to fight and to win wars, those commands basically that Xi gave the military when he took office?

Josh Chin: Well, that's the big question for China, which is experience. China has 2.2 million active troops, but almost none of them have seen live action. The last war that China fought was a border skirmish with Vietnam in 1979. And experience matters, in particular because of the complexity of modern warfare. One example that military experts will point to is aircraft carriers. China now has three of them, but operating just one takes thousands of people. Each one of those people has their own job and they all have to work in concert, and then you add other ships in a carrier group that also have to work together. And then that carrier group, which has to coordinate with the Air Force and the army, the US military has been honing its ability to run these sorts of complex joint operations basically almost constantly since the start of the war on terror. China hasn't, and it's been trying to get experience for soldiers where it can, mainly by having them participate in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and other places. But if you talk to both Chinese and American defense officials and analysts, they will note that it's a big leap from that to say a major military operations like you would have in say a conflict over Taiwan.

Luke Vargas: All right. So speaking of Taiwan then, Joyu, you were there in the capital Taipei. How is Taiwan viewing this Chinese military buildup?

Joyu Wang: Well, we've seen (inaudible), especially for the past year that the Taiwanese government has been taking quite a few concrete step. I mean, one of the most notable example would be the government actually extended the conscriptions from four month to a year. Another thing we can see is they're spending more on the military weapons, and one of the things that they have been spending more would be on missiles. The governments last year approved the special budgets on buying more initial systems, but also on other weapons such as naval ships and also jet fighter. And according to the military analysts, we are expected to see the government will continue to spend more in the years ahead.

Luke Vargas: And Joyu, you have been speaking to members of the Taiwanese military. You've embedded with them even at times. Is it clear if Taiwan could actually take on China militarily were it to come to that?

Joyu Wang: These are questions that everyone here or in Beijing are trying to figure it out, but what we know according to the military analyst that we've spoke to that ... I mean, Taiwan by itself has its own strength in defending a possible invasion from China. One of the thing is geographical, the island itself is separated from the mainland and the oceans are really rough. I mean, that's only a few months of a year that be suitable for a possible landing. But of course at the same time, by being an island itself, Taiwan is also very vulnerable to a blockage. And this is something that the government is also taking notes of and also trying to play catchups on to make sure that its internet connections be working under a situation, and also it's like energy resurface as well. So these are just like a double-edged sort. It can help protecting Taiwan from an invasion, but also would put Taiwan in a kind of a vulnerability positions.

Josh Chin: And Luke, Joyu makes a good point there and probably because of all those factors, we've seen China recently actually start to practice not just for invading Taiwan, but to potentially blockade it. So we saw this last year when Nancy Pelosi was then the House speaker, visited Taipei and China very angrily responded by conducting live fire drills. But those included surrounding Taiwan with ships in a mock blockade. And since then, military analysts in the US and elsewhere have been studying that as a more likely possibility. One that makes it more difficult for the US to respond, because obviously in the case of an invasion, that's a really striking, really violent choice that would anger a lot of people and make it relatively easy for the US politically to get involved. But a blockade is much more ambiguous, it's much less dramatic, and it's much less clear that the American public or American allies will see that as cause to get involved. So that's now become a huge factor in all the strategic thinking around Taiwan.

Luke Vargas: Josh, what is the sense you're getting about Xi's urgency to act here?

Josh Chin: There've been a lot of dates thrown around, 2027, 2035. But one thing that's really important to think about is that there's an important tension at play inside China. Xi has made taking control of Taiwan a part of the China dream. He said it's a task that "should not be passed down from generation to generation", which some people take to mean that he wants to accomplish this before he dies, and he actually faces some domestic pressure to make good on his word. Many Chinese people, even if they're critical of the Communist Party, still feel strongly that China won't have recovered its former greatness unless it's made whole by capturing Taiwan. But it's questionable how eager Xi is actually to take military action in Taiwan, at least in the near future. I mean, it's a big step, right? This could ignite a much bigger conflict. It could involve the US. You could have potentially World War III. So it's a big gamble for him. What you're seeing now is that US is really eager to take advantage of that tension. They're trying to move as aggressively as they can to try to deter China from seriously considering an attack or a blockade. They're doing that by arming Taiwan, lining up support from allies in the region, and political analysts, foreign leaders, the Biden administration, they've all argued that Xi is very likely to damage China's standing globally if he does that.

Luke Vargas: That was Wall Street Journal deputy China bureau chief Josh Chin and reporter Joyu Wang in Taipei. Josh, Joyu, thank you both for the time.

Josh Chin: It's a real pleasure, Luke, thanks.

Joyu Wang: Yep, thank you.

Luke Vargas: And speaking of China's standing globally, on next Friday's episode, we'll look at how Xi Jinping's increasingly authoritarian regime is affecting foreign businesses and their future plans in the country. But until then, that was What's News for Friday morning. We'll be back tonight with a new show. I'm Luke Vargas for the Wall Street Journal. Have a great weekend and thanks for listening.

[Crafty_Dog]

July 31, 2023   
         
The United States will send up to $345 million in unspecified weapons and military aid to Taiwan, the White House announced Friday. The package was authorized under President Biden's drawdown authority, which has been used for Ukraine aid but not yet for Taiwan. (Congress authorized the president to provide up to $1 billion of drawdown assistance to Taiwan in the 2023 budget.)

The package "will "address critical defensive stockpiles, multi-domain awareness, anti-armor, and air defense capabilities," a Defense Department spokesperson told the Washington Post. Reuters reported Saturday that four unarmed MQ-9A reconnaissance drones might be included; however, "their inclusion could fall through as officials work through details on removing some of the advanced equipment from the drones that only the U.S. Air Force is allowed access to."

"I strongly support President Biden's long-delayed choice to exercise the authority Congress provided him to arm Taiwan with real capabilities to defend itself," Republican Sen. Roger Wicker of the Armed Services Committee said in a statement. "This is exactly why Congress passed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which allows the administration to transfer substantial amounts of U.S. defense articles and services to Taiwan; I urge the president to make use of the remaining authority as soon as possible," he added.

[Crafty_Dog]

Vivek Ramaswamy Takes Nationalist Logic to Its Obvious, Horrifying Conclusion
By NOAH ROTHMAN
August 15, 2023 3:35 PM

Nationalist Republicans who oppose the continued provision of aid and lethal arms to Ukraine sometimes argue that the West’s commitment to degrading Russia’s capacity to project power abroad comes at a steep cost. America is a strained, reeling great power, they argue, and every dollar devoted to European security is one that is not spent on the more acute threat to U.S. dominance posed by China. Millennial GOP presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy has made many of these now rote arguments, but he has done the public a service by taking the nationalist line to its logical conclusion.

“Xi Jinping should not mess with Taiwan,” Ramaswamy told conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt on Monday. That is, “until we have achieved semiconductor independence,” the candidate continued, “until the end of my first term when I will lead us there.”

“After that,” Ramaswamy inadvisably added, “our commitments to Taiwan — our commitments to be willing to go to military conflict — will change after that, because that’s rationally in our self-interest. That is honest. That is true, and that is credible.”

He’s right about that. When an American president vacillates on his willingness to preserve the deterrent dynamics that make hostile foreign powers think twice about invading their neighbors, the world’s land-hungry despots stand up and take notice. Just ask Joe “minor incursion” Biden.

A purely libertarian conception of maximum economic efficiency would reject the market distortions necessary to repatriate critical defense-related industries back to American shores. Conservatives have traditionally been willing to absorb the economic inefficiency necessary to maintain a strong national defense. But the conceptually desirable effort to create a thriving domestic semiconductor industry has been complicated to the point of failure by this administration’s desire to pair that policy with populist immigration restrictions — a policy with which the populist right agrees. Perhaps the Taiwanese can breathe easier knowing we are so dedicated to self-sabotage that a potential President Ramaswamy will never be in a position to consign the Eastern Pacific to Chinese domination as he might like.

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But his comments are revealing, too, of how Republicans inclined toward nationalist populism invoke the Chinese threat only to bludgeon conventional conservatives with it. The logic of reducing our dependence on foreign manufacturers of defense-related components is that their utility to us diminishes as our dependence is reduced. That message is conveyed as much to our allies as our adversaries. Necessary though it might be, repatriating those industries must be paired with a robust commitment to an indissoluble relationship with our partners abroad, lest those who covet their lands get the wrong idea.

To hear the nationalist right tell it, the only combatants in a fight between the U.S. and China will be the U.S. and China. That is, of course, nonsense. America’s regional partners will man the front lines of that conflict: the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and, yes, Taiwan. They aren’t going to gamble their sovereignty on weak-kneed Washingtonians. Alliance structure suggests they will seek their own accommodations with the aggressor in their neighborhood if they cannot balance against it by aligning with the great power on the other side of the Pacific. China would have a much easier time turning the South China and Philippine Seas into Chinese lakes and putting an end to the U.S.-backed global maritime-trade regime if America signals that its interests are as parochial as Ramaswamy suggests they should be.

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Preserving that alliance structure is a complex task, but it would only become more so if America’s friends in the Pacific witnessed Washington throw its partners in Ukraine to the wolves. Preserving American hegemony means preserving its alliances, the breakdown of which would lead to the restoration of impenetrable spheres of influence. Those alliances are interconnected and interdependent. If a Republican president is willing to sacrifice one to expedience, perhaps he can be convinced or cajoled into giving up others. America’s near-peer competitors abroad would be foolish not to test that proposition.

Credit is due to Ramaswamy for articulating the logic of the nationalist position in ways more experienced and prudent political navigators have avoided. He said the quiet part out loud. It’s unlikely that China needed to hear the populist right’s logic spelled out in such unambiguous terms, but the populist right’s voters most certainly do.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19946/china-preparing-for-war

[Crafty_Dog]

Taiwanese army. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry released a report on the state of the self-ruled island’s military. The report indicates that, as a result of low recruitment and a low birth rate, problems have arisen with “unfitness for military service.” It proposes increasing quotas for enrollment in military schools to compensate for staffing shortages.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://amgreatness.com/2023/10/17/lessons-for-taiwan-u-s-capabilities-are-needed-now-to-defeat-intelligence-failure/

[Crafty_Dog]

How Joe Biden Can Deter China
Here are some ways Congress can prevent a war in the Pacific over Taiwan.
By
The Editorial Board
Follow
Nov. 17, 2023 6:41 pm ET


Whatever else came out of this week’s meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping, there was no sign that China intends to cease its military aggression in the western Pacific. That raises the stakes for Mr. Biden to offer at long last a plan to deter an attack on Taiwan.

Mr. Biden has asked Congress for more than $105 billion in emergency funding for Ukraine and Israel, but Pacific deterrence is an afterthought. He is seeking a mere $2 billion in military sales for partners across the region. There’s also some money for American submarines and U.S. financing alternatives for developing countries pondering a loan from China.

Mr. Biden low-balled Taiwan and friends to try to conciliate Mr. Xi ahead of handshakes in San Francisco. But Beijing is responding to U.S. restraint by harassing American aircraft and unleashing water cannons on allied vessels from the Philippines. Mr. Biden’s diplomacy would be stronger if backed up by hard power. Here’s what a Pacific deterrent package might look like:

• More authority for Taiwan to buy weapons and draw down U.S. stocks. The U.S. has propped up Ukraine’s fight against Russia by pouring weapons over friendly borders for nearly two years. America will have no such strategic luxury in Taiwan. The window to arm the island is before sparks go up in the Strait. The $2 billion for regional friends isn’t sufficient for a fight that could happen at any time, and a serious request would add at least $2 billion more—directly for Taiwan.

These sales can be complemented by money for direct drawdowns from U.S. inventory. Eric Sayers and Dustin Walker of the American Enterprise Institute note that $650 million of such drawdown authority for Taiwan expired in fiscal 2023. Congress can approve more and include funding to replenish U.S. military stocks with newer weapons.

• A road map to speed up weapons deliveries. As a letter from Congress recently noted, the U.S. announced the sale of 400 Harpoon antiship missiles to Taiwan in October 2020. But the Navy didn’t enter a contract until April 2023. Press reports say deliveries may not be complete until 2029. One helpful item at the margin could be codifying that Taiwan can cut in line ahead of other partners for weapons deliveries.

• Buying bombs and missiles for U.S. forces in bulk. The first obligation of a Commander in Chief is to make sure U.S. forces are never unprepared for a fight. The U.S. doesn’t have enough long-range fires to prevail decisively in the Pacific, which weakens America’s ability to deter the Chinese Communist Party.

The U.S. still produces excellent weapons—such as the long-range antiship missile, which can skim the sea to elude missile defenses. The job now is to make thousands. Another crucial munition is Patriot interceptors, as air defense is now in high demand from the Middle East to Europe. Larger buys of everything from Stingers to the Army tactical missile system are insurance against another surprise like Ukraine and Israel.

• A plan to get the U.S. Navy to 66 attack submarines. Mr. Biden proposed $3.4 billion for the U.S. submarine industrial base, and the Australians are chipping in as part of the Aukus agreement. But the Biden Administration touts Aukus as a great success even as it’s at risk of collapsing absent a plan for the U.S. submarine fleet.

The U.S. Navy has only 49 attack hulls even as it says it needs 66, and the 30-year shipbuilding plan doesn’t expect the fleet to reach even 54 hulls until 2036. What’s missing as much as money is a Commander in Chief who tells voters why these stealthy subs are vital to deterring war with China.

Some in the Administration will argue that stiffening the U.S. Pacific deterrent is provocative. But the empirical record is the opposite: Beijing exploits U.S. timidity, whether by militarizing islands in the South China Sea or routinely crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait to menace Taipei.

The Pacific is a higher-risk theater than the public appreciates, but the U.S. can still prevent a war over Taiwan. Mr. Biden doesn’t want to be remembered as the President who squandered America’s precious time to prepare.

[Crafty_Dog]

How Xi Could Get Taiwan without Firing a Shot

China's president Xi Jinping speaks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, Calif., November 15, 2023. (Carlos Barria/Pool via Reuters)
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By HENRY OLSEN
November 17, 2023 5:55 PM
A political development on the other side of the Pacific could be more consequential on this question than the Chinese leader’s summit with President Biden.
The recent meeting between President Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping has been touted as one that could reduce tensions between the two powers. Another meeting that took place on the other side of the Pacific, however, holds greater promise to reduce the risk of war in the near future: the agreement between two Taiwanese opposition parties to run a joint ticket in January’s presidential election. That decision might be better news for China than for America.

Taiwan’s vibrant democracy is often praised but more often misunderstood. Taiwanese voters have recently been supporting the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the large party most vocally supportive of Taiwanese de facto independence. But that has only developed since 2012.

That’s where the opposition announcement comes in. The DPP’s presidential candidate, Vice President Lai Ching-te, has been leading in the polls. Candidates for the two main competitors trail but, when combined, outpoll Lai by ten points or more. Taiwan’s president is elected by popular vote with no runoff; the person with the most votes, no matter how few, wins. If the joint ticket could hold onto that polling support, the opposition candidate would easily win the presidency.

The two parties involved, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), have not chosen which of their parties’ nominees would head their joint ticket. But both have signaled a more conciliatory approach to managing relations with China than Lai Ching-te has. A victory by the KMT–TPP alliance would likely reduce the odds of President Xi’s ordering an invasion of the island nation in the near future and thus reduce the chances of a U.S.–China war.

Paradoxically, however, that might work to China’s long-term advantage. Its long-stated goal is to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, preferably peacefully but by war if necessary. A Taiwanese leader whose primary goal is to avoid invasion could thus be open to making significant concessions to China to prevent that calamity.

[Crafty_Dog]

Posting  CCP's article here as well:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-decadent-west-has-come-face-to-face-with-the-future-and-the-end-of-its-dominance/ar-AA1k9mrA?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=d9e18810c3854fbbb576f90a4654a65e&ei=9 

For the purpose of this thread, this passage caught my attention:

"From the Chinese perspective, though, all that was fluff. The real business of the summit, as they saw it, was to make plain that they intended to annex Taiwan. Sure, they would rather do so without a war. To win without fighting is, as Sun Tzu says, the ultimate achievement. But Xi left Biden in no doubt that reunification is not some vague aspiration, but the policy on which he has staked his leadership.

"The Chinese autocrat is aware of American concerns about the economic impact. Taiwan produces most of the world’s semiconductors, especially the advanced models on which the global economy depends. How long, Xi asks, would it take the United States to build up a domestic manufacturing capacity? Five years? Fine, then use it. But understand that, after that, Taiwan will be reabsorbed."


This strikes me as a very penetrating observation that presents a very penetrating question:

Why aren't the hell we doing precisely that?!? 

Isn't that what Vivek has proposed?

Yes we have taken some steps in that direction, but would it not make sense to commit to it full bore?

or would we rather play chicken with ou rstrategic ambuity as a strategy to back them off from a war which with ample reason they think they will win?

[Crafty_Dog]

Third

https://www.youtube.com/watch?si=lrlmdwOUSjIwtSGa&fbclid=IwAR1VBjEf6uq_Hu0LKmDH9TdPgiXLy2zAfBGI-gczO9WlZ-vmafekTctGABM&v=TyadJ6Ky3WU&feature=youtu.be

[Crafty_Dog]

Can we say that given American weakness, this is what happens?

TAIWAN

Cross-strait bonds hinge on election outcome

Challengers take softer China stance

BY ANDREW SALMON THE WASHINGTON TIMES SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA | A potentially game-changing linkup between two Taiwanese opposition parties to challenge the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has foundered — for now.

The alliance could have instantly made the forces favoring improved ties with China the front-runner in the coming vote, significantly impacting Taiwan’s future. During the eight-year rule of the DPP in Taipei, cross-strait relations have sharply deteriorated and Chinese military intimidation has escalated.

Voters on the democratic island, which lies in the shadow of China and is a critical hub in the global high-tech supply chain, go to the polls on Jan. 13 to elect their next president. President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, now completing her second four-year term, is constitutionally unable to run for a third.

The DPP’s presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, leads polls with around 32% of voter support. He is seen as a hard-liner toward China.

The two opposition parties seeking

to win the presidency are considered more accommodating toward Beijing. Mr. Lai’s leading opponents are each polling at around 22%, suggesting a Lai victory unless they join forces.

Opposition hopes soared after the announcement of a plan Wednesday for Hou Yu-ih of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) to agree to a joint campaign united behind a single candidate. The preliminary announcement of the alliance and the prospect of reduced friction between Beijing and Taipei sent the New Taiwan dollar to its highest price in a year in foreign currency markets.

According to Taipei media Taiwan News, the two opposition leaders could not agree Saturday on using polls to select the more promising presidential candidate.

Hopefuls must register their candidacies by Friday, giving Mr. Ko and Mr. Hou just days to find a compromise.

As the opposition unity drive foundered, Mr. Lau’s campaign steamed ahead. The DPP is expected to announce Monday that Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s popular diplomatic envoy to Washington, would join the party ticket as a vice presidential candidate.

U.S. united on Taiwan, Taiwanese divided With Washington deeply concerned that China will attempt to take over the democratic island, Taiwan is a linchpin of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the security front, U.S. forces and their allies have established defenses in the northern Philippines and Japan’s southern islands to prevent China’s navy from blockading or surrounding Taiwan.

On the economic security front, Taiwan is a critical hub in the supply chain for cutting-edge semiconductors. Washington has identified chips as the key component to maintain the high ground over China in the competition for technological superiority.

In Washington, a strong posture against China is among the few political positions that Democrats and Republicans widely share.

Taiwan’s population, however, is divided. Critics of Ms. Tsai and Mr. Lai say they have gone too far in provoking Beijing.

“Lai’s support comes primarily from the more radical wing of the DPP, which favors a more insistent approach to Taiwan’s self-determination and national sovereignty,” according to the Asia Society Policy Institute. The KMT’s Mr. Hou has called Mr. Lai’s stance on China relations “reckless.”

The TPP’s Mr. Ko is seen as more middle of the road but has proposed building a bridge from one of Taiwan’s outlying islands to the nearby Chinese mainland.

China isn’t the only issue in the campaign. Voters are focused on a smorgasbord of domestic issues: stagnant wage growth, a sluggish economy, energy security and affordable housing for the younger generation.

Defending its record in these areas is more difficult for the two-term government. Mr. Koh is especially popular with younger voters, who consider the DPP the establishment and are put off by the even more establishmentarian KMT, whose roots date back to the first government of Chiang Kai-shek.

For the Biden administration and countries across the region also feeling the pressure of a more assertive China, the Taiwanese vote is attracting attention because of relations across the flashpoint Taiwan Strait. Chinese strategy toward Taiwan is hotly debated.

Multiple U.S. security figures, citing the buildup of Chinese naval and air forces, say China is amassing the capabilities and the will to attack the island. Chinese President Xi Jinping has reportedly told his commanders to build up the People’s Liberation Army to be strong enough to carry out a military operation against Taiwan by 2027.

Critics point to aggressive maneuvers by Chinese naval and air assets around Taiwan, which have increased massively since House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, California Democrat, infuriated Beijing with a visit to the island in 2022.

Others suggest that Beijing, which has not fought a hot war since 1979, has a regional “salami-slicing” strategy from the Himalayas to the South and East China seas. That strategy focuses on minimalist, gradual gains — more hybrid war than hot war.

At sea, it deploys undergunned vessels such as the coast guard and “maritime militias,” rather than its battle fleet, into tense waters. In the air, it probes and pilots aggressively but does not shoot.

Western arms executives have told The Washington Times of their frustration with Taipei, which they say is unwilling to do what is necessary to defend itself.

They also cite Taiwan’s short military conscription period — just one year — and its refusal to create a regular militia. Militias were critical to the defense of northern Ukraine in 2022.

“Any complacency or nonchalance on the part of the Taiwanese is maybe because they are reassured,” said Alexander Neill, a regional defense expert with the Pacific Forum. “Underpinning this is the Taiwan Relations Act: The U.S. is mandated to provide sufficient capability to defend Taiwan.”

At times, to the consternation of his aides, President Biden has stated repeatedly that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese military action. Yet Washington has customarily been reluctant to have Taiwan acquire top-line military hardware.

“The DPP were constantly lobbying for new F-16 variants, and they complain about getting U.S. castoffs,” Mr. Neill said. “But as soon as Taiwan starts developing something that looks like a good offensive capability, the U.S. gets unnerved.”

For the Taiwanese, it’s a dilemma. “Some say we should not become a chess piece in the hands of America, but in reality, we need support as we are not powerful like Israel,” said one Taiwanese, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he did not have permission to speak to media. “Because of the U.S. trade war with China, we have to choose a side.”

China’s harsh crackdown on Hong Kong in 2019 shocked Taiwanese, but memories are short and youths do not necessarily share the older generation’s distrust of Beijing.

“The Hong Kong situation changed the game. It made us feel more at risk,” said the source. “But this mindset is now evaporating.”

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-opposition-alliance-collapses-terry-gou-quits-race/ar-AA1krwpY?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=0fc549737f004ba9a53b60c68aaf7c88&ei=12

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-draws-clear-us-versus-china-battle-lines-in-key-election/ar-AA1kxHWJ?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=a9e88fb76d25452b82219e534da5b005&ei=13

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-soldiers-promising-surrender-to-china-among-10-charged-for-spying/ar-AA1kIZAd?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=077fcbe7471f46f8bdb83cec91203c3b&ei=18

[Crafty_Dog]

China Confronts a New Political Reality in Taiwan: No Friends
Interviews with top candidates in volatile three-way presidential race point to rising skepticism toward Beijing—whatever the outcome
By
Josh Chin
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Joyu Wang
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Updated Dec. 29, 2023 12:08 am ET


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TAIPEI—A drawing of Taiwan at the presidential campaign headquarters of the island’s ruling party shows strikingly little concern for north and south. Instead, the island is shown turned on its side, with China and the Taiwan Strait conspicuously absent.

The drawing reflects the worldview of the Democratic Progressive Party, which over the past eight years has sought to carve out an identity for the self-ruled island that is separate from mainland China. But it also represents a broader change in Taiwan that sits uneasily with Communist Party leaders 1,000 miles to the northwest in Beijing.

With voters set to cast their ballots for a new leader in a volatile three-way election next month, Taiwanese politics has shifted decisively, and perhaps irrevocably, away from China. The change in mood is evident in public-opinion polls—and even in the campaign of the opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang.

Once an aggressive promoter of closer political and economic ties with Beijing, the KMT is striking a markedly different tone these days.


“I’ve never had an unrealistic idea about mainland China’s attitude toward us,” the party’s presidential candidate, Hou Yu-ih, said in an interview, one of three that The Wall Street Journal recently conducted with the leading candidates. “The most important thing is to handle our defense and economy in a way that at least prevents the other side from casually launching a war.”

At the campaign headquarters of the ruling party’s candidate and the current leader in the polls, Vice President Lai Ching-te, the word “China” is nowhere to be seen at all.

Instead, on a recent visit, volunteers from Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party beckoned passersby to witness denim-clad members of a local line-dancing team step, kick and spin to American country music under a green LED sign reading “TEAM TAIWAN.” Further back, a cartoon mural told the story of Lai’s adventures with his pet dog.


Taiwanese politics has shifted decisively away from China, according to opinion polls. PHOTO: YAN ZHAO/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Taiwan’s election next month has drawn nervous attention from capitals around the world for its bearing on the most sensitive point of friction between the U.S. and China.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made taking control of Taiwan a centerpiece of his quest to restore his country as a great power. It is a task, the 70-year-old Xi has said, that “should not be passed down from generation to generation.” On Tuesday, Xi told senior officials “We will resolutely prevent anyone from making Taiwan secede from China by any means.”

During a summit between Xi and President Biden in California last month, the two leaders spent substantial time discussing Taiwan.

In Taipei, Lai paints a picture of a Taiwanese public far less preoccupied with Beijing’s designs than political leaders in the Western world. Despite three years in which China’s military has sent jet fighters—often in the dozens—on nearly daily sorties in the airspace around Taiwan, many on the island have come to greet it all with a shrug.

“Taiwan is relatively calm—the stock market is going up and everyone’s living a normal life,” Lai said in an interview. “People view this situation with calmness and reason.”

Taiwan’s election has drawn nervous attention around the world for its bearing on the most sensitive point of friction between the U.S. and China. PHOTO: ANN WANG/REUTERS
The shifting political winds in Taiwan represent a cold new reality for Communist Party leaders in China. After Beijing crushed dissent in Hong Kong, there is little appetite in Taiwan for an arrangement in which China would peacefully assume political control of the island in exchange for a high degree of autonomy.

The proportion of people in Taiwan who identify primarily as Chinese has plummeted to below 3%, prompting even the party that had most ardently pursued peaceful political union with Beijing to do everything it can to shed its “pro-Beijing” label.

“Young people in Taiwan neither feel they are Chinese, nor do they have affection for anything Chinese—quite the contrary,” said Andrew Hsia, deputy head of the KMT.

While past Taiwan elections have turned on the question of whether to move toward or away from eventual unification with China, the candidates in January’s contest all agree that Taiwan’s only choice with China now is to play for time. The debate is over how.

In an interview in the southern city of Kaohsiung, home to Taiwan’s largest naval base, the KMT’s Hou accused the DPP of underplaying the deterioration of cross-strait ties and the risk of war.

“It wasn’t until the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza that people started paying attention,” he said. “Taiwan needs to prepare—quickly.”

Hou, a charismatic former head of Taiwan’s national police agency, leans on his police experience in describing how he would use the party’s credibility with Beijing to buy time for Taiwan to build up its military deterrence.

“Facing an opponent, on the one hand, you have to be able to negotiate, while on the other hand, you need the power to fight,” he said.

KMT officials concede that the party is seen as old-fashioned by Taiwanese youth, who turned away from the party in 2014. That is when the last KMT president in office put his support behind a trade agreement with China that would have bound the two sides even more closely together—to a degree that turned off many younger voters.


Now, a new generation of younger voters has gravitated toward a third-party candidate, Ko Wen-je, whose views on China fall somewhere in the middle.

Ko, a doctor and former mayor of Taipei, has capitalized on disillusionment with the two traditional parties by positioning himself as a pragmatic politician focused on bread-and-butter issues such as high home prices and low wages. He described the KMT as “too submissive to China,” but, like Hou, he said that he thinks most Taiwanese underestimate the risks of war.

Even with hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese working in China—a legacy of last decade’s era of cross-strait engagement—official communication between Beijing and Taipei is virtually nonexistent, Ko said, adding: “This is really weird.”

Strong support from young people gives Ko some heft, but he has lost ground since an incipient deal to team up with Hou fell apart last month. In a Dec. 22-26 survey conducted by Formosa, a DPP-leaning pollster, 38.7% of respondents said they would vote for the DPP’s Lai, versus 29.7% saying they prefer the KMT’s Hou and an additional 16.6% backing Ko.

Lai was once an open supporter of Taiwanese independence—a history that makes leaders in both Beijing and Washington nervous—but has said he would stick to the status quo established over the past eight years under his boss, President Tsai Ing-wen, which rests on cultivating closer economic and military ties with the U.S. and other “like-minded countries” as a form of deterrence. Like Tsai, who can’t run again because of term limits, Lai holds open the possibility of communication with Beijing, though with caveats.

“In the interest of global peace and the mutual benefits of all countries in the world, Taiwan is willing to engage with China,” Lai told the Journal, as long as that dialogue is carried “under the premise of equal dignity and through the procedure of democracy.”

Under Tsai, the DPP has tried to calibrate its warnings about the threat from China to avoid scaring away international investors and otherwise undermining the Taiwanese economy. Some critics have said that the strategy contributes to a sense of complacency among Taiwanese people about the threat from China, which Lai denies.

None of Taiwan’s presidential candidates said how long they thought the island might need to hold out for the Chinese threat of forceful unification to dissipate.

Peace ultimately requires commitment from both sides, Lai said. “It’s not just Taiwan. China is also responsible.”

[Crafty_Dog]

Taiwan Says Chinese Lip-Syncing Probe Aims to Pull Rock Band to Beijing’s Side
Investigation into Mayday’s Shanghai concerts sparks accusations of political interference as Taiwanese election approaches
By
Joyu Wang
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Dec. 30, 2023 8:06 am ET


TAIPEI—A Chinese investigation into purported lip syncing by a rock band from Taiwan is aimed at pressuring the band into supporting Beijing’s stance on the island and is part of a broad effort to interfere in its politics, Taiwanese officials said.

Mayday, one of Taiwan’s most commercially successful rock bands, is under scrutiny from authorities in Shanghai after the band declined to publicly back the view that Taiwan is a part of China, the officials said.

Taiwanese officials made the allegation as the island prepares to hold a volatile three-way election next month to determine who will succeed President Tsai Ing-wen, a leader who has sought to carve out an identity for the island that is distinct from Beijing.

Taiwan’s government has accused Chinese authorities of using a range of tactics to interfere in the island’s politics in the run-up to the Jan. 13 election, including spreading disinformation on social media and using subsidized trips to mainland China to sway Taiwan’s voters.

“China always interferes in our elections, but this time is notably intense,” Vice President Lai Ching-te, the ruling party’s candidate, said at Saturday’s presidential debate in Taipei.


China has denied that it is trying to interfere in Taiwan’s elections. A spokeswoman for Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office has accused Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party of distorting the facts to gain political advantage. The office didn’t respond to a request for comment for this article.

In November, the head of Taiwan’s National Security Council said a series of investigations into Apple supplier Foxconn Technology was politically motivated, aimed at dissuading the company’s founder, Terry Gou, from running for the presidency as an independent candidate. Gou, who has since dropped out of the race, was seen as a candidate who could split the opposition vote, hurting the chances of defeating the ruling-party candidate. China said the investigations were a part of routine law enforcement.

“This time, the intensity is actually no less than that of Foxconn,” one of the Taiwanese officials said, referring to the accusations of lip syncing against Mayday. This is the first time Taiwanese authorities have seen such a top-down effort targeted at people in the entertainment industry, the official said.

The Shanghai Municipal Administration of Culture and Tourism started investigating eight performances by the band in Shanghai in November, according to a Chinese state media report on Dec. 4. The investigations came after posts appeared on Weibo, a Chinese social-media platform, accusing the band of lip syncing.

Lip syncing is considered a “deceitful act” under Chinese regulations. Violators can be fined up to 100,000 yuan, or about $14,000, or have their performing license revoked on a second offense.


Mayday, a pop-rock band from Taipei, has gone on several world tours and played some of the world’s biggest concert venues, including New York’s Madison Square Garden and Beijing’s “Bird’s Nest” National Stadium.

The five-piece band performs predominantly in Mandarin and has a huge fan base across the Chinese-speaking world. The band generates much of its revenue from mainland China. In one of the band’s longest world tours, about 40% of its shows were performed in Chinese cities.

Mayday’s record label, B’in Music, has rejected the lip-syncing accusations, describing them as malicious attacks and defamation. “Please believe in Mayday, believe in music,” the record label said in early December. The label didn’t respond to requests for comment for this article

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/opinion-the-us-and-china-win-no-matter-who-takes-taiwan-s-helm/ar-AA1myMTD?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=b46565adabc245d1b3b33eff049778df&ei=29

[Crafty_Dog]

Why Taiwan’s Election Matters
Voters on the island are united in support of democracy, no matter who wins.
By
The Editorial Board
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Jan. 8, 2024 6:20 pm ET


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The '2023 Reagan National Defense Survey' highlights China as the greatest national security threat to the U.S. and finds strong support for arming Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. Images: Zuma Press/AFP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly
Taiwan’s voters head to the polls Saturday in a presidential election that could echo far beyond its shores. The echoes will have more to do with the island’s commitment to its democracy than with the policies of any particular candidate.

This is an unusually consequential election because the Taiwan Strait has become one of the world’s geostrategic flash points. The mainland People’s Republic of China has been committed to absorbing Taiwan for decades, and President Xi Jinping has grown more aggressive in pressing Beijing’s claims. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan has come into focus as the other place where a large autocracy could be tempted to overrun a smaller, democratic neighbor.

Little wonder, then, that cross-Strait issues have swamped concerns such as inflation during Taiwan’s campaign. The front-runner in opinion polls, Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party, promises to continue the DPP’s tradition of assertiveness in defense of Taiwan’s democratic autonomy. Mr. Lai is vice president to term-limited incumbent Tsai Ing-wen, whose policy has been to let relations with Beijing cool somewhat while cultivating closer ties with allies such as the U.S.

There are important differences between Taiwan’s parties on these issues, but one shouldn’t exaggerate the gaps. Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), currently running second, promises a more conciliatory approach toward Beijing. The KMT’s previous stints in power were marked by warmer trade ties with mainland China and less rhetoric likely to inflame Beijing.

Yet Mr. Hou insists he and the KMT aren’t pursuing a policy of unification with the mainland. He’s trying to present himself as the best candidate to maintain Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty while boosting the economy with better trade and investment ties to China. The same goes for third-party candidate Ko Wen-je, a doctor who says he can achieve better domestic governance and cross-Strait relations with a more technocratic approach and whose fresh presence is attracting younger voters.

The common theme is the desire of Taiwan’s voters to preserve their democracy even as they debate how. They understand the stakes after witnessing Hong Kong’s fate. Beijing has proven with its crackdown on freedom in that territory that “one country, two systems” really means the end of democracy. The Communist Party will always impose its own system.

If Mr. Lai wins as expected, Beijing is likely to go into blustering overdrive as it always does when Taiwan voters refuse to cooperate with the Party’s will. Commentators may present such a vote as a provocation. China already has stepped up threatening actions, including the dispatch of spy balloons over the island as Mr. Lai’s lead has firmed in opinion polls.

The affront to the Party isn’t Mr. Lai’s policies, and Taiwan’s voters won’t have stoked tensions with Beijing by electing him. The problem is that Beijing can’t tolerate Taiwan’s example of a thriving Chinese-speaking democracy in which voters settle political differences at the ballot box. If a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, this will be why. And Taiwan’s voters know it as they head to the polls

[DougMacG]

"They understand the stakes after witnessing Hong Kong’s fate. Beijing has proven with its crackdown on freedom in that territory that “one country, two systems” really means the end of democracy. The Communist Party will always impose its own system."

  - The most underreported story of the century.

I hope Taiwan can stand strong.