Author Topic: The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR  (Read 425646 times)

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Opportunities Arise!
« Reply #1450 on: October 10, 2024, 03:34:25 AM »
October 10, 2024
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In the Middle East Conflict, Opportunities Arise
Iran’s losses could be Turkey’s gains.
By: Kamran Bokhari

The conflict between Iran and Israel has set the Middle East down a path toward a slow but significant strategic shift. Iran’s flagging influence has created an opportunity for the region’s Sunni Arab states to tip the balance of power in their favor, but they will likely be unable to do so. The one country that possibly can is Turkey, mired though it is in its own domestic problems. Either way, the change underway will be a long, messy process.

Iran and Turkey in the Middle East

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As of Oct. 9, several escalatory elements are in play. U.S. President Joe Biden is slated to speak on the phone with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to discuss how he plans to respond to Iran’s recent missile bombardment. This follows a last-minute decision by Netanyahu to cancel a trip by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to Washington to discuss Israel’s war plans. Elsewhere, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is due to arrive in the Saudi capital of Riyadh to discuss regional security in light of the conflict.

The Biden administration is, of course, on its way out, and it is trying to leverage Israel’s dependence on U.S. military aid to shape the response to Iran. Its goal is to keep Israel from targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities and oil infrastructure, as an attack of that kind would create even more problems for the United States and its allies in the region. Israel simply wants Washington to go along with as many of its plans as possible.

Regardless of how severely Israel responds, the reality is that Iran has already sustained heavy blows to its regional position. Its premier proxy, Hezbollah, has been decimated, its leadership and offensive capabilities greatly degraded. It took years for Tehran to build Hezbollah, using resources made scarce by a grueling sanctions regime against it. The group is the foundation of Iranian power projection capability in the Arab world, and it is central to Tehran’s plans to create an arc of influence stretching to the Eastern Mediterranean. For its part, Hezbollah is trying to mitigate the political fallout of the destruction of its military capabilities. It knows it is no longer the weapon it once was, so it needs to preserve its position at home. Iran’s other regional proxies – its militias in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen – are not as powerful as Hezbollah and are no doubt considering their future, especially as Israel plans to punish their patron.

So far, Iran has managed to maintain a perception of power because it has yet to be hit inside its borders. But the fact that Hezbollah is bearing the brunt of the Israeli assault exposes the limits of Iran’s reliance on proxy warfare and likely undermines the morale of the so-called axis of resistance. Sensing this, Iran’s many regional competitors may be emboldened to take advantage of the situation, which is nothing short of historic. The founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 – itself a consequence of post-world war Sunni fragmentation – ushered in a new era of geosectarian rivalries that had been dormant for centuries. Tehran had already been cultivating ties with Shiite actors throughout the Arab world by the time the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. That war merely accelerated Iran’s proxy project, which enabled Tehran to deeply penetrate the Arab world. The last time Shiites posed a major challenge to a Sunni-majority Middle East was during the early 16th century with the rise of the Safavid Empire. (The Ottomans were in control of Syria and Iraq at the time, so in some ways modern Iran has achieved what no other government has.)

Iran’s regional strategy demanded that it block Turkey where it could. Frustrated, Turkey watched with dismay at how Iran exploited the conflicts in the Arab world, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to advance its ambitions and create crises on Turkey’s southern flank. Iran’s losses in the region, then, are Turkey’s gains. Turkey has already begun to improve its relations with Syria after more than a decade of hostility. The Assad regime has been trying to rehabilitate itself for years. Toward that end, it is happy to reduce its dependence on Iran, Hezbollah and other militias, and it has every interest in distancing itself from the Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Here is where the interests of Ankara and Damascus converge. The only constraint Syria has in pulling away from Iran is the fear of a revived Sunni rebellion. Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah are likely emboldening Sunni rebel groups, but if Turkey, which has backed them in the past, is willing to restrain these groups, then an understanding can be reached.

Turkey and Syria also have overlapping interests in limiting the growth of Syrian Kurdish separatists. Syrian President Bashar Assad wants to regain control of the territory he lost in the northeast, and Ankara wants to weaken Kurdish separatism in Syria because it poses a threat to Turkey. Clearly, Ankara has its work cut out for it, and Tehran will not give up without a fight.

After all, Syria is critical to Iran’s connection with Hezbollah and key to the survival of the pro-Iranian Shiite-dominated regime in Iraq. The presence of a Sunni Arab majority on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi frontier is a threat to Iranian ambitions and a potential asset for Turkey to roll back Iranian influence in the northern rim of the Middle East.


Crafty_Dog

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GPF
« Reply #1452 on: October 14, 2024, 06:41:06 PM »
Saving Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on Russia, Iran and Syria to work together to defend the region against Kurdish terrorism and what he called Israel’s “efforts to spread the war” throughout the Middle East. Erdogan accused the U.S., Britain and Germany of threatening Syria’s territorial integrity through their support of Kurdish militias and said a similar situation was developing in Iraq. Meanwhile, after a nine-month pause, Russia announced preparations for an international meeting on Syria, to be held in Astana, Kazakhstan.

ccp

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Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Iraq in the Crosshairs
« Reply #1455 on: November 11, 2024, 07:33:46 AM »
BTW, in the context of this article, note Trump's recent call to Turkey.  Could this, as much as Ukraine, have been part of the convo?
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November 11, 2024
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Iraq in the Crosshairs of the Israel-Iran War
The conflict between Israel and Iran is spreading to Iraq.
By: Kamran Bokhari

After its premier proxy Hezbollah suffered unprecedented losses in the war with Israel, it is time to reevaluate the state of Iran’s disproportionate influence in the Middle East. Continuing to project power along the region’s northern rim will become challenging for Tehran. The issue isn’t just Lebanon but also Syria – which is why Iraq will become even more critical to Iran, a country that is well beyond the limits of its power.

Last week, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken each spoke to Iraq's prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, about Iranian efforts to use Iraqi territory to mount a strike on Israel. Their message, in so many words, was clear: If Iran uses Iraq to launch an attack on Israel, Israel is liable to attack Iraq on its territory. These conversations come amid reports that Iran is planning a “strong and complex” response to Israel’s recent attack on Iranian soil – for which Iraq will be a key element.

History shows that major military threats to Iran have largely emanated from the west. Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Achaemenid Empire from this route in the 3rd century B.C. In the 7th century, the Persian Sasanid Empire was gravely wounded by the Byzantine Empire, which was based in modern-day Turkey but came down through Iraq. In the 16th century, the Safavid Empire similarly fought the Ottomans along this path. And a little over a year after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iraq invaded Iran on its western flank leading to a devastating eight-year war. This explains why Iraq has been so fundamental to the Islamic Republic’s national security strategy.

To that end, Iran has leveraged its ideological (Islamist) and sectarian (Shiite) bona fides to pursue imperial ambitions in the Arab world – even if much of its pursuit was opportunistic. The 1991 Gulf War, in which a U.S.-led coalition weakened the Iraqi regime, gave Iran the chance it needed to begin the process of turning Iraq from a strategic liability into a strategic asset. Thus, it began to support the Shiite majority and the Kurdish minority against the Baathist regime. By the time Washington invaded Iraq again in 2003, Iran was well positioned to become the biggest beneficiary of U.S. regime-change efforts. The eight-year U.S. occupation, during which Iraq fell into the Iranian orbit, was a boon to Iranian regional influence. The U.S. withdrawal in 2011, such as it was, allowed Tehran to consolidate its control over Iraq. Having created Hezbollah in the 1980s and forged closer ties to Syria in the 1990s, Iraq was the final piece of the puzzle that gave Iran uninterrupted influence stretching across to the Mediterranean Sea. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the 2014 seizure of Mosul by the Islamic State allowed Tehran to wield this influence at will.

Iran's Sphere of Influence in the Middle East

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The defeat of the Syrian rebels in late 2016 and the 2018 destruction of the Islamic State, then, made a confrontation with Israel inevitable. Israel was monitoring how Iran, in conjunction with Hezbollah, had established a presence on its northern flank, especially in Syria. Thus by 2017, the Israel Defense Forces had established a cadence of periodic airstrikes on facilities and supply lines of the Quds Force, the overseas operations arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. IDF strikes largely focused on Syria and were designed to prevent Iran from threatening Israel in the Golan region.

Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 attacks has further disrupted Iran’s regional strategy. Tehran now has to focus on rebuilding Hezbollah and at a time when it cannot rely on its erstwhile ally Syria, which has no interest in involving itself in the war. Iran has no choice, then, but to make sure it can maintain its grip over Iraq. This is especially the case since Iran has no answer to Israeli attacks on its assets in Lebanon and Syria. Iraqi airspace has become an avenue through which Israel can conduct airstrikes on Iran. Now, Iran hopes to use Iraqi soil to launch missiles at Israel.

If the war escalates and spreads to Iraq, Tehran’s entire western sphere of influence will become a battlespace. The fighting will likely loosen Iran’s grip on power in both places and leave it vulnerable to countries such as Turkey, which would like to expand its geopolitical footprint in Syria and Iraq, after decades of being blocked by Tehran.

Crafty_Dog

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George Friedman: War without Decision Part 2
« Reply #1456 on: November 12, 2024, 08:23:37 AM »


   
War Without Decision: Consequences – Part 2
By: George Friedman

We tend to view unrest as an internal event, usually contained in a given nation or region. But sometimes there are cases in which unrest spreads through fear or greed beyond a nation’s terminus, thereby changing the region and even the world beyond. Such is the case in the Middle East.

The process goes something like this: Internal unrest in a country creates fear in another country that the unrest will spread there. The fear then is that the unrest will generate military action in the other country. Both nations may adopt a defensive posture or be frightened enough to act aggressively. Fear and hope are the foundation and engine of war. Unrest is the generator.

Russia in Relation to the Middle East

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It is commonly said that war is unlikely in this region because its nations are weak. Strength and weakness are relative, and these nations should be compared not to the United States but to each other. How strong one nation is relative to the other determines the outcome. Terrain and geography are constants, but fear has a remarkable historical ability to overcome them and does not make war impossible. Wars are the most possible human thing.

Iran, which lies in the middle of the Middle East, is a country at distant war with the United States and Israel. Iran has the largest army in the Middle East, a substantial armored force and what appears to be a significant missile arsenal. It has been argued that it doesn’t have the ability to move its armored forces into combat because of the surrounding terrain, the distance to its enemies and its inability to supply fuel to the battlefield. (I am skeptical; Iran is a major oil producer and I expect it has enough refining capabilities to deliver fuel where it needs to go.) In looking at Iran’s terrain and road access with neighboring states, I think the obvious conclusion is that Iran does, in fact, have the ability to project power in the region and strike with missiles effectively. At a minimum, planners must assume that Iran’s military can operate at distance. Its strategic position may allow it to strike in multiple directions, including northward to Russia, and face a possible Russian move south.

The risk of a major war in the heart of the Middle East, a critical and strategic region, is not trivial, nor is the prospect of Iran starting a war at distance. The ability of the United States to quickly deploy a blocking force to defend, say, Saudi Arabia is dubious and thus creates a dangerous situation. The U.S. has a vital interest in maintaining a stable world, so leaving some countries to the mercy of others would create long-term pain, even if in the short term it wouldn’t.

ccp

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Iran continues to back down
« Reply #1457 on: November 13, 2024, 08:25:34 AM »
https://www.breitbart.com/middle-east/2024/11/13/iran-israel-attack-deal-trump/

reminds me of the Dirty Harry scenes:

"Do you feel lucky punk!"

I guess the Iran leadership is NOT feeling so lucky.

We will need to dismantle their nucs one way or the other in my o




Crafty_Dog

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GPF: The Elusive Middle Eastern Balance of Power
« Reply #1458 on: November 21, 2024, 02:47:45 PM »


November 21, 2024
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Trump and the Elusive Middle Eastern Balance of Power
The incoming administration will have to handle Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey simultaneously.
By: Kamran Bokhari

Much of the public discussion about U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s forthcoming strategy for the Middle East, especially in light of the nominees to his national security team, is binary. In this oversimplified view, which reduces the complexities of the region into a struggle for supremacy between Israel and Iran, Trump is expected to strongly support the Israeli government and get tough on the Iranian regime. However, the second Trump administration’s attempts to deal with the extraordinary scale of conflict in the region and end the United States’ “forever wars” must also take into account the Middle East’s present imbalance of power. To this end, the U.S. will have to deal simultaneously with the Israelis, the Iranians, the Saudis and the Turks.

The first stirrings of what will be a complex diplomatic process are already evident from the negotiations for a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah. Obviously, these efforts are being led by the Biden White House, but not without the critical influence of Trump’s transition team. Likewise, tech billionaire and close Trump associate Elon Musk reportedly met with the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations to discuss ways to deescalate tensions from their dangerously high level. The Iranians denied that such a meeting occurred, but they did so only several days after the initial report, while expressing a keen interest in negotiating with the incoming U.S. administration.

Perhaps the most intriguing recent development from Tehran is the regime’s shifting position on the 2015 nuclear deal, which was nixed by Trump during his first term. Thus far, the Iranians had been pressing – albeit unsuccessfully – for a return to a similar arrangement. But in a Nov. 14 interview on state television, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the defunct nuclear agreement could serve only as a reference and that it had lost its previous significance. Any new deal must be “feasible,” he added.

The U.S. position for some time has been that the nuclear deal is dead. Although Joe Biden was serving as Barack Obama’s vice president when the agreement was concluded, he was reluctant to revive it as president. That Tehran is now assuming the same stance, however, is a function of its deteriorating position in the conflict with Israel, especially the massive losses suffered by its premier proxy, Hezbollah. The Iranians know that the incoming Trump administration will seek to force them not only to accept stricter limits on their nuclear program but also to desist from using militant proxies to destabilize the Middle East.

Iran realizes that its ability to exert influence has peaked. In addition, Israel’s Oct. 26 strikes exposed the weakness of Iran’s conventional military capabilities. Therefore, Tehran is likely ready for a broader negotiation with the U.S. regarding not only the nuclear issue but also its regional assets. From Tehran’s point of view, it may be better to negotiate now and preserve some of its regional influence before it shrinks further amid greater pressure from the Trump administration.

With regard to its nuclear program, Iran will continue to use it as leverage to try to gain respite from sanctions. This is the foremost imperative of the Islamic Republic, which has experienced significant reversals on the foreign policy front and needs financial relief to carry it through its historic and imminent political evolution. Besides, the nuclear issue is less important to the Iranian regime than preserving its regional influence – which will frustrate the Trump strategy for the region.

The central focus of the incoming administration’s approach to the Middle East will be to advance the 2020 Abraham Accords, which saw the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan normalize relations with Israel. Missing from the accords is the region’s leading Arab nation, Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration continued its predecessor’s efforts to bring the Saudis on board – and made considerable headway – until it was torpedoed by the Iran-supported Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7 and the subsequent regional conflict.

Differences in Israeli and Saudi imperatives, especially regarding the Palestinians, will test the diplomatic acumen of the Trump White House. Though a cease-fire in Lebanon could come in the next few months, a cease-fire in Gaza will take much longer. Israeli forces have considerably weakened Hamas, but they have yet to prove to themselves that the group will not reanimate as soon as they leave. Therefore, Israeli troops are likely to remain in Gaza for some time, exacerbating the humanitarian disaster in the strip. Under these circumstances, it will be terribly difficult for the Saudi kingdom to normalize ties with Israel, but Riyadh is hoping that the influence it enjoys with Trump and Israel’s desire to establish relations with the kingdom will enable it to steer the situation in Gaza toward recovery.

Normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel could help to counter Iran’s regional ambitions. However, considering the significant obstacles to such a deal, the Trump team appears to want to deal with Iran separately. Obviously, problems with either of these two diplomatic tracks could bring the whole thing down.

As if this were not complicated enough, Turkey, which has been on the sidelines for much of the current crisis, is hoping to benefit from the weakening of Iran. It is also hoping that Trump’s return to the White House will bring better relations between Ankara and Washington. As Washington works to bring the Saudis and the Israelis closer and at the same time deal with the Iranians one-on-one, it also will need to factor in the Turks as a stakeholder in the region. Achieving a four-way balance of power, though not impossible, will be excruciatingly challenging

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GPF: Implications of Syria for Middle East
« Reply #1460 on: December 12, 2024, 08:22:47 AM »


December 10, 2024
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After the Fall of Assad, the Middle East Braces for Unrest
Regional stability will hinge on what happens next in Syria.
By: Hilal Khashan

Jubilant crowds in some of Syria’s biggest and most politically significant cities toppled statues of former President Hafez Assad over the past week, in a scene reminiscent of the toppling of statues of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 2003. They were celebrating the sudden and stunning ouster of Assad’s son, Bashar Assad, after 24 years in power. But the fall of Bashar Assad will not bring peace and stability to Syria in the foreseeable future. The militant group that led the rebellion, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and its controversial leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, will struggle to convince Syrians, let alone the outside world, that they have abandoned their jihadist past. Though most Syrians are dedicated Muslims, they have little interest in religious dogma. There is little common ground among Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious groups, which will prevent agreement on the fundamentals of a future political system and national identity. Complicating the situation further, the country’s neighbors have set their sights on Syrian territory amid the growing uncertainty there.

The Assad Dynasty

The Assads ruled Syria for decades with an iron fist. Their repression of the Syrian people peaked after November 1970, when Hafez Assad carried out a military coup in which he overthrew his partner in power, Salah Jadid. Official propaganda called Assad the eternal leader, and statues of his image were erected in every city and town throughout the country. His exercise of absolute power and coercion of the Syrian people eventually led to the degradation of Syria’s state institutions. He projected an air of invincibility and permanency. His ability to provide essential welfare services to the Syrian people enabled him to use unprecedented repressive measures against those who opposed his rule – even though per capita income dropped from $1,470 in 1980 to $990 in 1990. The decline of the country’s material resources did not reduce the application of despotic measures against those who dared to challenge his domestic and foreign policies. Corruption, traditionally a common feature of Syria’s public institutions, escalated under Hafez’s reign. He accepted it as a form of patronage. When Hafez died in 2000, Bashar succeeded him at just 34 years of age, in violation of the Syrian constitution, which stipulated that the president should be no younger than 40 years old.

But the Assad dynasty was always bound to fall. Repressive regimes – especially if they are endemically corrupt and fail to provide adequate services to their people and adapt their political systems to changing domestic and external conditions – eventually decay and collapse, often suddenly and unexpectedly. Per capita income in Syria reached $1,500 on the eve of the 2011 uprising but declined to $745 in 2021, after the civil war took a heavy toll on the economy. Bashar Assad’s regime would have collapsed in 2015 were it not for the support of Russian airpower and Iranian proxies.

Al-Golani’s Rise

The insurgency that brought down Assad this past weekend was led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which many Western governments have designated a terrorist group. The head of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has a long history of militancy. After joining al-Qaida, he participated in the fight against U.S. forces that invaded Iraq in 2003. He moved to Lebanon in 2006, where he supervised training for fighters for Jund al-Sham, a Salafist jihadi organization. He then returned to Iraq in 2008 to fight for the Islamic State group. The U.S. Army briefly arrested him, and following his release, he moved to Syria after the 2011 uprising against Assad. He established the transnational jihadi al-Nusra Front, focusing on Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

After Assad regained control of Aleppo in late 2016, al-Golani changed the name of the group to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. He settled in the province of Idlib and established the Syrian Salvation Government, abandoning the doctrine of transnational jihad to focus on Syria instead. He declared that his goal had shifted to eliminating the Assad regime and establishing Islamic rule in Syria, saying that his membership in al-Qaida and association with the Islamic State group were a thing of the past. He consolidated his authoritarian control over Idlib and marginalized other opposition groups, both religious and secular.

Heterogeneous Society

The recent developments shouldn’t be shocking considering Syria’s tumultuous past. After gaining independence in 1943, Syria became an arena of competition as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Britain wrestled for influence. Against all odds, Hafez Assad managed to make Syria a regional power, but Bashar, fearing that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq would eventually lead to his own overthrow, aligned with Iran, which dominated Syria’s political system after the 2011 uprising.

Soon after the rebellion began last month, the Syrian regime’s demoralized forces, who had been fighting a war for more than 13 years, collapsed. The rebels decided to continue their offensive after capturing Aleppo, seizing Hama despite heavy Russian air raids, and moved south to Homs, which they took without a fight. Members of the Druze religious sect in Sweida province launched a separate campaign, which led regime officials to flee without much resistance. The rebels there carried the five-color Druze flag, rather than the flag of the Syrian uprising. In Daraa, the site of the 2011 protests that launched the civil war, other rebel factions seized the area that straddled the borders with Israel and Jordan following the army’s withdrawal.

Syria | States of the French Mandate, 1921-1922

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Rebel forces in Daraa who operate under a different command reached Damascus as al-Golani’s battalions were still clearing Homs of regime forces. As the rebels continued their offensive, they avoided venturing into the Alawite-held coast, the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region called Rojava or the Druze majority Sweida province. Despite al-Golani’s statements that he wants to unite Syria, the country’s political landscape is highly polarized, and the factions that overthrew Assad’s regime will likely soon splinter and fight among themselves.

Meanwhile, an arson attack in Damascus’ central military intelligence building, perpetrated by former regime operatives masquerading as rebels, destroyed vital documents implicating the regime in the killing of thousands of activists during the country’s 13-year civil war. Assad succeeded in suppressing the 2011 uprising by arresting more than 200,000 Syrians in the years that followed, and the fate of many of the detainees remains unknown. Over the past week, the rebels have released many inmates from the country’s prisons, but most of those let loose were ordinary criminals. Observers widely believe that Assad’s regime had already liquidated most political prisoners. Now that their relatives are aware of their fates, it’s doubtful that al-Golani can fulfill his promise that the opposition will not seek revenge.

Implications for the Region

Syria’s neighbors will most likely take advantage of the fluid political and security situation there. Just a few hours after the fall of the regime, the Israeli army captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon. It told the inhabitants of five villages near the 1974 ceasefire line to stay home or evacuate because of possible fighting. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the region and announced that the 1974 agreement that forced Israel to withdraw troops from the region was no longer relevant. The Israeli air force raided several military sites in Greater Damascus, allegedly because they contained strategic military assets. In the north, the Turkish air force bombed Kurdish positions amid reports that fighting had flared up again.

It’s very likely that the instability, chaos and absence of order in the country will continue for a long time, threatening Syria’s neighbors, especially Jordan, which shares a 200-mile (320-kilometer) border with Syria. The Jordanian army is monitoring events closely. Jordan fears that the situation will evolve into something similar to the chaos in Libya, if not worse.

Jordan has for years complained about the Syrian regime’s involvement in the illicit smuggling into its territory of Captagon, a cheap and highly addictive amphetamine. Production plants in Syria are still in business, and the trade is likely to resume with other manufacturers. In addition, Syria’s Daraa province, which neighbors Jordan, could become a battleground between competing armed factions and the close-knit Druze in next door Sweida province, with the fighting potentially spilling over into Jordan. King Abdullah II is aware of Israel’s likely plan to annex the West Bank after U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January, which could lead many Palestinians to flee to Jordan. Given the king’s opposition to such a move, Jordan might receive the go-ahead from the Trump administration to annex a part of Syria, namely Damascus and the country’s southwest territory that borders Jordan. The Hashemites in Jordan have always wanted Damascus to become the capital of their kingdom because their ancestors established the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750) there. They view Damascus as the jewel of the Hashemite crown.

The demise of Assad’s regime might also inspire militant groups in other Arab countries. Lebanese Christians and Sunni Muslims, for example, could try to disarm Hezbollah, which has already received a stunning blow by Israel, threatening to drag Lebanon into a renewed wave of sectarian conflict. Christians who have insisted on introducing a federalist system in Lebanon will become more vociferous in their demands. In Iraq, Assad’s overthrow might renew the hopes of anti-government protesters, whose movement was crushed in 2019 by Iranian-backed militias. And in Egypt, President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, who staged a 2013 coup that ended the Muslim Brotherhood’s control of Egyptian politics, also has reason to worry. The Arab region is bracing for unrest as it witnesses the dramatic developments in Syria. The country’s turmoil often reverberates across the Middle East, so regional stability will hinge on what happens there next.