Author Topic: Russia/US-- Europe  (Read 192827 times)

ya

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Re: Russia/US-- Europe
« Reply #1100 on: October 24, 2024, 05:08:33 AM »
The list of countries (global south) queing up to join BRICS keeps increasing. Amazingly US policies brought Russia and China together and now China & India trying to improve relations with each other. US hegemony is based on the carrot and stick approach, BRICS on mutual respect. Even Turkey has applied !, more EU countries would join if allowed. Mark my words, EU countries will join sooner or later.
« Last Edit: October 24, 2024, 05:12:33 AM by ya »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Black Sea region divided, not quite conquered
« Reply #1101 on: November 01, 2024, 08:08:35 AM »
November 1, 2024
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Black Sea Region: Divided, Not Quite Conquered
The clash between East and West is on full display in Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Recent elections in Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova signal a shifting power balance in the Black Sea region, where a clash between Western and Russian interests is fueling instability across Eurasia. Even if the struggle for influence in these countries is contained to Europe’s borderlands, it offers a warning for the rest of the Continent.

Moldova’s pro-Western leanings could advance NATO and EU interests, enhancing regional stability and countering Russian military and economic ambitions. Conversely, Georgia’s recent tilt toward Russia and Bulgaria’s mixed allegiances complicate NATO's Black Sea strategy, undermining security cohesion and increasing regional vulnerability. The positions of all three countries also affect energy security and trade corridors, with Bulgaria's energy dependency, Georgia's transit routes and Moldova's location critical for Western relations with Russia and China. Ultimately, these elections will shape the Black Sea’s security dynamics, determining whether the region aligns more closely with Western allies or drifts into Russia’s sphere of influence.

Bulgaria, Moldova & Georgia

(click to enlarge)

Bulgaria

Bulgarians are increasingly frustrated by the country’s fragmented politics. Its coalitions inevitably comprise many small parties or alliances with little in common except a temptation to withdraw their support and bring the government down. After seven elections in less than four years, voters are disillusioned with the process, and voter turnout has suffered as a result. (Turnout rose 4.5 percent from previous elections, but it is still at just 38.9 percent. While the increase is encouraging, the low turnout indicates voters are tired of continuous elections.) On top of this, Bulgaria is a member of NATO and seems perpetually locked in a debate over its role in regional security.

In this week’s elections, a record eight parties cleared the threshold to make it into the parliament. The center-right GERB party (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), led by Boyko Borissov, who served as prime minister from 2009 until 2021, secured the most votes, but at just over 26 percent it is well short of a majority. In fact, GERB would need the support of at least four other parties to govern. Among its potential allies are PP-DB (We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria), a pro-European liberal coalition that finished second with 14 percent; the radical pro-Russian Revival party, which placed third with 13 percent; and the centrist party that supports the rights of ethnic Turkish and Muslim communities, DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms – A New Beginning), whose 11 percent landed it in fourth place. Most important, about a third of the votes went to populist parties, so compromise will likely be hard to come by.

While issues like political stability, anti-corruption policies and economic reform also featured in the campaign, the election results underscore Bulgaria’s indecision over Russian influence and supporting Ukraine. The leaders of GERB support Bulgaria’s alignment with the European Union and NATO but also balance their Western ties with pragmatic relations with Russia. They have given their rhetorical support to Ukraine in its fight to defend its sovereignty against the Russian invasion, but when it comes to delivering weapons, ammunition or aid to Ukraine, they have been much more circumspect. Since the start of the war, GERB has cautiously supported energy diversification, though Borissov previously enabled Russian interests, notably by facilitating the TurkStream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine to deliver Russian gas to Europe.

Historically, Bulgaria has contributed to Black Sea security through NATO, participating in initiatives like the NATO Maritime Coordination Center in Varna and multinational naval drills. However, at times Russian pressure has limited Bulgaria’s commitments, exemplified by past refusals to support a permanent NATO Black Sea presence. GERB’s cautious approach, led by Borissov, prioritizes diplomacy over military build-ups to avoid escalating regional tensions, though this risk-averse stance may hinder NATO’s strategic objectives at a time when Russian influence in the Black Sea is growing.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria faces deep structural challenges, namely economic inequality, corruption and a shrinking workforce. These factors, along with political fragmentation and pro-Russian sentiment, weaken Bulgaria’s reliability as a NATO and EU partner in the Black Sea, complicating Western efforts to counter Russia’s hybrid and military threats in the region.

Georgia

In Georgia’s parliamentary elections, the incumbent party had no problem winning a majority – but it faces widespread questions about the vote’s legitimacy. The Georgian Dream party, led by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and supported by billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in office since 2012. The party was originally pro-European but started aligning itself with Russia in recent years while also consolidating its rule. Even though nearly 90 percent of Georgians favor EU membership, Georgian Dream has remained neutral on the Russia-Ukraine war and refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow. Instead, the Georgian government has maintained and even strengthened economic ties with Russia. The Georgian tourism sector received a boost in 2023 when the country resumed direct flights with Russia at a time when other countries were cutting ties. Georgian Dream also permitted large numbers of Russians fleeing war mobilization to relocate to Georgia.

In addition, the Georgian government's legislative agenda has resembled Russian measures. In 2023, Georgian Dream proposed legislation that would compel nongovernmental organizations and media that get more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as "foreign agents." The bill, which bore similarities to legislation Russia has used to stifle dissent, was withdrawn in the face of large protests, only to be reintroduced and signed into law (over a presidential veto) in 2024. Also this year, the country placed the electoral commission under government control, restricted voting rights for Georgians living abroad and abolished gender quotas for parliament.

Unsurprisingly, the country’s Oct. 25 parliamentary elections – which saw Georgian Dream win with 53 percent of the vote – were marred with claims of fraud and foreign interference. The pro-Western president, Salome Zourabichvili, accused Russia of meddling in the vote, rejected the results and encouraged citizens to protest. Several international bodies, including the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, alleged numerous irregularities, including voter intimidation and violence at polling stations, vote-buying and misuse of state resources. The EU and several European officials called for an independent investigation. The government ordered a recount, but a few days later the country’s electoral commission said a partial recount had confirmed Georgian Dream’s victory.

With Georgian Dream securing another term, the country’s EU ambitions are likely on hold. Although the bloc granted Georgia candidate status in late 2023, concern in the EU has been growing for some time about Georgia’s democratic backsliding and anti-Western rhetoric from Georgian Dream’s leaders. Instead, Russia and China will probably gain ground. The government has welcomed Chinese investments in strategic ports, the latest being the Anaklia deep-sea port, where a Chinese consortium now holds a 49 percent stake.

Moldova

On Nov. 3, Moldova will hold a presidential runoff between the pro-European incumbent, Maia Sandu, and Alexandr Stoianoglo, a pro-Russian former prosecutor general. In the first round on Oct. 20, Sandu secured approximately 42 percent of the vote compared with Stoianoglo’s 26 percent. On the same day, Moldovans narrowly approved a measure to embed the goal of EU membership in the constitution, with 50.4 percent in favor and 49.6 percent opposed. Despite the double-digit margin in the first round of the presidential race, voters will likely turn the runoff into an unofficial second referendum on the country’s pro-EU trajectory, resulting in a tight finish.

Western media have largely framed Moldova’s close EU referendum result as evidence of Russian-backed disinformation swaying public opinion against EU integration. However, the vote also reveals a pronounced societal divide within Moldova. Support for EU integration splits geographically, with Moldova’s north and south voting overwhelmingly against the EU, while central regions, particularly Chisinau, strongly supported EU membership. This divide reflects not only political but also economic divisions: Rural and peripheral areas, more dependent on Russian resources, view EU integration as a threat to their stability. Economic hardship compounds these divisions, as low wages and meager pensions leave many Moldovans vulnerable to influence and frustrated with perceived government neglect.

Moldova’s population also includes both Romanian- and Russian-speaking communities, with significant Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauz minorities. Russian-speaking regions, particularly semi-autonomous Gagauzia, where 94 percent voted against the EU referendum, lean toward Russia due to shared language and historical ties. Romanian-speaking communities and urban regions, more exposed to Western culture, are generally more EU-oriented, creating a cultural and linguistic divide that informs political preferences. Generational divides further shape perspectives. Younger Moldovans, especially those living in cities or abroad, favor EU integration for its economic opportunities and political reforms. In contrast, older Moldovans, especially in rural areas or those who have worked in Russia, often feel nostalgic for Soviet stability and fear that EU integration could erode traditional values and pull Moldova into conflicts like the Ukraine war.

Moreover, Transnistria remains a decisive factor in Moldovan elections. This breakaway region, with a predominantly Russian-speaking population, operates under de facto Russian control, supported by a Russian military presence. Moscow uses Transnistria’s “frozen conflict” status as leverage, implicitly threatening activation if Moldova aligns with the West. Some factions fear that EU integration could provoke conflict with Transnistria or even Russia. Similar concerns extend to semi-autonomous Gagauzia, amplified by Russian propaganda warning that EU alignment could lead to military escalation, as seen in Ukraine.

Regardless of the election outcome, Moldova’s internal divisions will probably deepen. A narrow win by Sandu or Stoianoglo would likely trigger a prolonged political standoff, especially with parliamentary elections set for next year. This scenario could heighten clashes between pro-Russian and pro-European factions, delay policy implementation and increase the risk of social unrest, particularly if economic conditions worsen. Such instability would invite further interference from Russia or the EU, polarizing society and complicating Moldova’s path forward.

Conclusion

With Bulgaria taking a pragmatic approach between Western and Russian interests, Georgia leaning pro-Russian and Moldova in political gridlock, the Black Sea region faces increasing geopolitical instability. This situation undermines the formation of a cohesive pro-Western security coalition, limiting NATO and EU capacity to establish a robust regional deterrent against Russian actions. China, meanwhile, is set to expand its influence in the region, pursuing both political and economic goals.

Russia and China have distinct but complementary objectives in the Black Sea area. Russia prioritizes strategic dominance and uses its presence to manage regional security dynamics and resist NATO influence. In contrast, China’s interests are economically driven, seeking to establish infrastructure footholds, such as in Georgia's Anaklia port and others, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. This economic investment provides China with trade routes to Europe that bypass Russian territory, subtly expanding its influence in Eurasia. Together, Russian military and Chinese economic activities challenge Western influence, positioning both countries as influential, albeit in different spheres, in the Black Sea’s geopolitics.

Bulgaria’s accommodating stance toward Russia – evident in its fragmented coalition politics and energy policies – further weakens NATO’s Black Sea cohesion. Though a NATO member, Bulgaria’s political instability and dependence on Russian energy complicate its commitment to regional security measures, such as NATO-led demining and Black Sea defense protocols. This tepid support reduces NATO’s operational flexibility against Russian assertiveness.

Russia now stands poised to strengthen its foothold along Georgia’s coast, with Georgia’s pivot toward Moscow likely to limit its cooperation with NATO and the EU, thus diminishing Western influence along the eastern Black Sea. Russia, which already controls Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, could use a friendlier Georgian administration to expand its military and intelligence presence in the country. Meanwhile, Georgia’s openness to China provides Beijing with a strategic Black Sea maritime entry point.

In Moldova, internal fractures and the unresolved Transnistria conflict enable Russia to sustain hybrid pressure through disinformation, economic leverage and influence operations aimed at undermining pro-Western governance. This strategy not only complicates Moldova’s EU integration but threatens broader Western relations in the Black Sea region. The disunity among Black Sea states weakens collective regional defense, giving Russia greater latitude to influence these states economically and politically and distancing them from the West. And as Black Sea cohesion falters, NATO’s leverage in countering Russian threats declines, affecting maritime security, energy trade routes and the security framework of Eastern Europe – heightening security challenges for NATO’s eastern flank.

Body-by-Guinness

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Your Daily Rations of Post Election Neocon Handwringing
« Reply #1102 on: November 08, 2024, 01:42:35 PM »
A fine, woebegone neocon unleashing his inner TDS demons in the most passive/aggressive manner he can get away with and still sound like he knows what he’s talking about. Likely presages the general neocon reaction to Trump assuming power and telegraphs their foreign policy doomsaying and utter inability to remember that Trump actually did a pretty good job of managing despots around the planet despite sundry Russian agent fictions, but why let reality get in the way of a good public snit?

How to start World War III in 8 easy steps
The Hill News / by Alexander J. Motyl / Nov 8, 2024 at 1:05 PM

No one wants World War III, of course. But, ironically, the policymakers and pundits who say they want it least are those most likely to start it.

Call it the law of unintended consequences, or think of the road to Hell as being paved with good intentions.

There are eight steps that are pretty much guaranteed to lead to a monumental Western war with Russia. Judge for yourself just which step we’re on at present.

First, start by ignoring the fact Vladimir Putin has, over the last quarter-century, progressively dismantled all of Russia’s democratic and semi-democratic institutions. Ignore that he has replaced them with one-person rule, abetted by a criminal and corrupt elite that qualifies as fascist by any reasonable definition. Instead of focusing on Russia’s transformation into a fascist state and regarding it as a worrisome phenomenon, excuse Putin’s behavior on the grounds that he’s only doing what the Russian people want and that Russian fascism poses no threat to Russia’s neighbors or to the West.

Second, continue by ignoring the clear signals of imperialist intent emanating from the Kremlin since the USSR fell apart in 1991. Downplay the striking similarity between the Kremlin’s concern for Russian-speakers living in the former Soviet republics and Adolf Hitler’s concern for the rights of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Completely ignore the central place that imperialism and territorial expansion have played in the political agendas, self-legitimation strategies and propaganda of every Russian state for centuries.

Third, ignore history, ignore regime type and ignore personality. In other words, ignore Russia; ignore Russian politics, society and culture; and, above all, ignore Putin and his criminal past and present. Arm yourself only with the half-baked theories of the “realist school” of international relations. Pretend that this school of thought holds all the answers to all the questions because its gross simplification of reality is in fact accurate.

Then excuse Putin’s aggressive behavior toward Ukraine on the grounds that he was terrified of the possibility of Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO in 2045. Pretend that he was somehow compelled to forestall that theoretical eventuality by launching a full-scale genocidal war more than two decades in advance. Reinforce this belief by electing European prime ministers — and an American president — with openly Russophile stances.

Fourth, regard Ukraine as a big place with nice people and corrupt leaders, and not as a strategically important component of Western security. Ignore that its continued existence as a sovereign state ensures the West’s survival as a community of nations. Pretend that Putin’s obsession with Ukraine has no geopolitical implications, either now or in the future, and that the West need not worry about what he would do next were Russia to defeat and swallow Ukraine. Reinforce this belief by supporting policymakers with openly pro-Putin stances.

Fifth, regard Putin as a run-of-the-mill rational leader who desires only to stay in power and maintain Russia’s security and who therefore acts in accordance with universally shared rationality assumptions and not with Russian imperial ideology and fascism. Explain his destruction of the Russian military and economy by arguing that his idea of rationality sometimes differs from that held by the West, without explaining why, how and when these differences manifest themselves.

Sixth, compel Ukraine to agree to any kind of cease-fire or peace that precludes a Russian defeat in the hope and expectation that Putin will happily accept it, will recognize Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign state and will abandon all imperialist aspirations in order to rejoin the international community. Dismiss Ukrainian fears of continued Russian aggression as the feverish ravings of nice people in a big place who don’t appreciate the wisdom of realist theory and are suicidally inclined to downplay the likelihood of Putin’s using a nuclear device.

Seventh, complete steps one through six and then patiently wait for Russia to become a soft and cuddly state committed to world peace. Express shock and surprise when Russia reasserts its fascist values, rearms and relaunches its genocidal war — against Ukraine and those countries of the West that dared to agree with Ukraine’s assessment. Then blame the resultant world war on the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO in 2045.

Eighth, repeat steps one through seven, place all your hopes in a newly elected American president with unrealistic expectations regarding the war, and remain puzzled by the fact that all your good intentions didn’t prevent a direct clash between Russian and NATO troops.

Bemoan reality’s unwillingness to act according to your notions — and blame World War III on your critics.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4980828-how-to-start-world-war-iii-in-8-easy-steps/

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Russia/US-- Europe
« Reply #1103 on: November 09, 2024, 07:44:01 AM »
"but why let reality get in the way of a good public snit?"

 :-D

Crafty_Dog

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Trump's approach to Europe
« Reply #1104 on: November 09, 2024, 09:45:45 AM »


November 7, 2024
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Trump’s Approach to Europe
By: George Friedman

I intended to expand on my column from earlier this week on the conflict in the Middle East, but instead I think I’ll address the foreign policy consequences of the U.S. election, which Donald Trump decisively won.

On the campaign trail, Trump focused on ending U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. He has repeatedly said that the war is a European affair and that the responsibility for defending Ukraine is thus a European one, not an American one. He has, however, left open the possibility of extending U.S. support if it’s in the U.S. interest.

The conventional wisdom is that Ukraine is of vital interest to the United States. Trump doesn’t agree with this. Ukraine is of moderate interest but does not affect the future of the United States. For the Europeans, the appearance of Russia in Ukraine is a vital issue since Ukraine is in Europe. The conventional wisdom is not altogether false but does not weigh the necessities effectively.

But Trump considers Ukraine a European war because a Russian victory directly threatens Europe, not the U.S. heartland. Europe has a gross domestic product of over $27 trillion, while the U.S. GDP is just slightly higher at $29 trillion, so why can’t Europe pay for the conflict itself? It’s true that Europe does not possess the military assets needed to do so, but Trump sees this as just another excuse for having the U.S. foot the bill. For decades, this was a feature, not a bug, in the system. The structure of European defenses was created early in the Cold War. It was a time when Europe was shattered by World War II, when the U.S. was concerned that its own interests would suffer if Europe fell to the Soviet Union. The terminus of that train of thought is to pay whatever is necessary to defend Europe.

But time passes. Europe is now prosperous, heavily populated and, in theory, fully capable of defending itself. Yet European countries have not rebuilt their militaries, collectively or individually, to perform that task, and the U.S. continues to bear the financial brunt of the Continent’s defense. Thus is the crux of Trump’s argument: Put simply, he believes Europe is acting in bad faith. It isn’t entirely new – Republicans have made such claims for years, and Trump himself noted it in his first presidency – but it isn’t without merit.

Equally important is something Trump has not said: that there is no such thing as “Europe” except as a geographic concept. It is large, and it contains a multitude of nation-states and nations of people that are linked, sometimes willingly, by a network of transnational organizations. This state of play breeds unpredictability and disunity. The basic idea of relationships between nations is somewhat at odds with the reality of Europe. This is an important point because when Trump talks about Europe and NATO, what he is really talking about is the U.S. relationship with Europe. His stance on Ukraine, then, is meant to force Europe to take responsibility for the war and, if it can’t, to prove that its inability to do so means that the threat Russia poses isn’t real.

Trump is skeptical of other alliances, too, and he said he will likely reexamine all of them, particularly legacy alliances without clear purpose, with the ultimate objective of minimizing U.S. exposure to wars. But changing entrenched policy is extremely difficult. Personally, I don’t believe he will abandon the war in Ukraine outright; I believe he will have the U.S. remain in a supporting role while Europe takes the lead. Time will tell if he can impose his will.