Author Topic: Russia/US-- Europe  (Read 197513 times)

ya

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Re: Russia/US-- Europe
« Reply #1100 on: October 24, 2024, 05:08:33 AM »
The list of countries (global south) queing up to join BRICS keeps increasing. Amazingly US policies brought Russia and China together and now China & India trying to improve relations with each other. US hegemony is based on the carrot and stick approach, BRICS on mutual respect. Even Turkey has applied !, more EU countries would join if allowed. Mark my words, EU countries will join sooner or later.
« Last Edit: October 24, 2024, 05:12:33 AM by ya »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Black Sea region divided, not quite conquered
« Reply #1101 on: November 01, 2024, 08:08:35 AM »
November 1, 2024
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Black Sea Region: Divided, Not Quite Conquered
The clash between East and West is on full display in Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Recent elections in Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova signal a shifting power balance in the Black Sea region, where a clash between Western and Russian interests is fueling instability across Eurasia. Even if the struggle for influence in these countries is contained to Europe’s borderlands, it offers a warning for the rest of the Continent.

Moldova’s pro-Western leanings could advance NATO and EU interests, enhancing regional stability and countering Russian military and economic ambitions. Conversely, Georgia’s recent tilt toward Russia and Bulgaria’s mixed allegiances complicate NATO's Black Sea strategy, undermining security cohesion and increasing regional vulnerability. The positions of all three countries also affect energy security and trade corridors, with Bulgaria's energy dependency, Georgia's transit routes and Moldova's location critical for Western relations with Russia and China. Ultimately, these elections will shape the Black Sea’s security dynamics, determining whether the region aligns more closely with Western allies or drifts into Russia’s sphere of influence.

Bulgaria, Moldova & Georgia

(click to enlarge)

Bulgaria

Bulgarians are increasingly frustrated by the country’s fragmented politics. Its coalitions inevitably comprise many small parties or alliances with little in common except a temptation to withdraw their support and bring the government down. After seven elections in less than four years, voters are disillusioned with the process, and voter turnout has suffered as a result. (Turnout rose 4.5 percent from previous elections, but it is still at just 38.9 percent. While the increase is encouraging, the low turnout indicates voters are tired of continuous elections.) On top of this, Bulgaria is a member of NATO and seems perpetually locked in a debate over its role in regional security.

In this week’s elections, a record eight parties cleared the threshold to make it into the parliament. The center-right GERB party (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), led by Boyko Borissov, who served as prime minister from 2009 until 2021, secured the most votes, but at just over 26 percent it is well short of a majority. In fact, GERB would need the support of at least four other parties to govern. Among its potential allies are PP-DB (We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria), a pro-European liberal coalition that finished second with 14 percent; the radical pro-Russian Revival party, which placed third with 13 percent; and the centrist party that supports the rights of ethnic Turkish and Muslim communities, DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms – A New Beginning), whose 11 percent landed it in fourth place. Most important, about a third of the votes went to populist parties, so compromise will likely be hard to come by.

While issues like political stability, anti-corruption policies and economic reform also featured in the campaign, the election results underscore Bulgaria’s indecision over Russian influence and supporting Ukraine. The leaders of GERB support Bulgaria’s alignment with the European Union and NATO but also balance their Western ties with pragmatic relations with Russia. They have given their rhetorical support to Ukraine in its fight to defend its sovereignty against the Russian invasion, but when it comes to delivering weapons, ammunition or aid to Ukraine, they have been much more circumspect. Since the start of the war, GERB has cautiously supported energy diversification, though Borissov previously enabled Russian interests, notably by facilitating the TurkStream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine to deliver Russian gas to Europe.

Historically, Bulgaria has contributed to Black Sea security through NATO, participating in initiatives like the NATO Maritime Coordination Center in Varna and multinational naval drills. However, at times Russian pressure has limited Bulgaria’s commitments, exemplified by past refusals to support a permanent NATO Black Sea presence. GERB’s cautious approach, led by Borissov, prioritizes diplomacy over military build-ups to avoid escalating regional tensions, though this risk-averse stance may hinder NATO’s strategic objectives at a time when Russian influence in the Black Sea is growing.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria faces deep structural challenges, namely economic inequality, corruption and a shrinking workforce. These factors, along with political fragmentation and pro-Russian sentiment, weaken Bulgaria’s reliability as a NATO and EU partner in the Black Sea, complicating Western efforts to counter Russia’s hybrid and military threats in the region.

Georgia

In Georgia’s parliamentary elections, the incumbent party had no problem winning a majority – but it faces widespread questions about the vote’s legitimacy. The Georgian Dream party, led by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and supported by billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in office since 2012. The party was originally pro-European but started aligning itself with Russia in recent years while also consolidating its rule. Even though nearly 90 percent of Georgians favor EU membership, Georgian Dream has remained neutral on the Russia-Ukraine war and refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow. Instead, the Georgian government has maintained and even strengthened economic ties with Russia. The Georgian tourism sector received a boost in 2023 when the country resumed direct flights with Russia at a time when other countries were cutting ties. Georgian Dream also permitted large numbers of Russians fleeing war mobilization to relocate to Georgia.

In addition, the Georgian government's legislative agenda has resembled Russian measures. In 2023, Georgian Dream proposed legislation that would compel nongovernmental organizations and media that get more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as "foreign agents." The bill, which bore similarities to legislation Russia has used to stifle dissent, was withdrawn in the face of large protests, only to be reintroduced and signed into law (over a presidential veto) in 2024. Also this year, the country placed the electoral commission under government control, restricted voting rights for Georgians living abroad and abolished gender quotas for parliament.

Unsurprisingly, the country’s Oct. 25 parliamentary elections – which saw Georgian Dream win with 53 percent of the vote – were marred with claims of fraud and foreign interference. The pro-Western president, Salome Zourabichvili, accused Russia of meddling in the vote, rejected the results and encouraged citizens to protest. Several international bodies, including the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, alleged numerous irregularities, including voter intimidation and violence at polling stations, vote-buying and misuse of state resources. The EU and several European officials called for an independent investigation. The government ordered a recount, but a few days later the country’s electoral commission said a partial recount had confirmed Georgian Dream’s victory.

With Georgian Dream securing another term, the country’s EU ambitions are likely on hold. Although the bloc granted Georgia candidate status in late 2023, concern in the EU has been growing for some time about Georgia’s democratic backsliding and anti-Western rhetoric from Georgian Dream’s leaders. Instead, Russia and China will probably gain ground. The government has welcomed Chinese investments in strategic ports, the latest being the Anaklia deep-sea port, where a Chinese consortium now holds a 49 percent stake.

Moldova

On Nov. 3, Moldova will hold a presidential runoff between the pro-European incumbent, Maia Sandu, and Alexandr Stoianoglo, a pro-Russian former prosecutor general. In the first round on Oct. 20, Sandu secured approximately 42 percent of the vote compared with Stoianoglo’s 26 percent. On the same day, Moldovans narrowly approved a measure to embed the goal of EU membership in the constitution, with 50.4 percent in favor and 49.6 percent opposed. Despite the double-digit margin in the first round of the presidential race, voters will likely turn the runoff into an unofficial second referendum on the country’s pro-EU trajectory, resulting in a tight finish.

Western media have largely framed Moldova’s close EU referendum result as evidence of Russian-backed disinformation swaying public opinion against EU integration. However, the vote also reveals a pronounced societal divide within Moldova. Support for EU integration splits geographically, with Moldova’s north and south voting overwhelmingly against the EU, while central regions, particularly Chisinau, strongly supported EU membership. This divide reflects not only political but also economic divisions: Rural and peripheral areas, more dependent on Russian resources, view EU integration as a threat to their stability. Economic hardship compounds these divisions, as low wages and meager pensions leave many Moldovans vulnerable to influence and frustrated with perceived government neglect.

Moldova’s population also includes both Romanian- and Russian-speaking communities, with significant Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauz minorities. Russian-speaking regions, particularly semi-autonomous Gagauzia, where 94 percent voted against the EU referendum, lean toward Russia due to shared language and historical ties. Romanian-speaking communities and urban regions, more exposed to Western culture, are generally more EU-oriented, creating a cultural and linguistic divide that informs political preferences. Generational divides further shape perspectives. Younger Moldovans, especially those living in cities or abroad, favor EU integration for its economic opportunities and political reforms. In contrast, older Moldovans, especially in rural areas or those who have worked in Russia, often feel nostalgic for Soviet stability and fear that EU integration could erode traditional values and pull Moldova into conflicts like the Ukraine war.

Moreover, Transnistria remains a decisive factor in Moldovan elections. This breakaway region, with a predominantly Russian-speaking population, operates under de facto Russian control, supported by a Russian military presence. Moscow uses Transnistria’s “frozen conflict” status as leverage, implicitly threatening activation if Moldova aligns with the West. Some factions fear that EU integration could provoke conflict with Transnistria or even Russia. Similar concerns extend to semi-autonomous Gagauzia, amplified by Russian propaganda warning that EU alignment could lead to military escalation, as seen in Ukraine.

Regardless of the election outcome, Moldova’s internal divisions will probably deepen. A narrow win by Sandu or Stoianoglo would likely trigger a prolonged political standoff, especially with parliamentary elections set for next year. This scenario could heighten clashes between pro-Russian and pro-European factions, delay policy implementation and increase the risk of social unrest, particularly if economic conditions worsen. Such instability would invite further interference from Russia or the EU, polarizing society and complicating Moldova’s path forward.

Conclusion

With Bulgaria taking a pragmatic approach between Western and Russian interests, Georgia leaning pro-Russian and Moldova in political gridlock, the Black Sea region faces increasing geopolitical instability. This situation undermines the formation of a cohesive pro-Western security coalition, limiting NATO and EU capacity to establish a robust regional deterrent against Russian actions. China, meanwhile, is set to expand its influence in the region, pursuing both political and economic goals.

Russia and China have distinct but complementary objectives in the Black Sea area. Russia prioritizes strategic dominance and uses its presence to manage regional security dynamics and resist NATO influence. In contrast, China’s interests are economically driven, seeking to establish infrastructure footholds, such as in Georgia's Anaklia port and others, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. This economic investment provides China with trade routes to Europe that bypass Russian territory, subtly expanding its influence in Eurasia. Together, Russian military and Chinese economic activities challenge Western influence, positioning both countries as influential, albeit in different spheres, in the Black Sea’s geopolitics.

Bulgaria’s accommodating stance toward Russia – evident in its fragmented coalition politics and energy policies – further weakens NATO’s Black Sea cohesion. Though a NATO member, Bulgaria’s political instability and dependence on Russian energy complicate its commitment to regional security measures, such as NATO-led demining and Black Sea defense protocols. This tepid support reduces NATO’s operational flexibility against Russian assertiveness.

Russia now stands poised to strengthen its foothold along Georgia’s coast, with Georgia’s pivot toward Moscow likely to limit its cooperation with NATO and the EU, thus diminishing Western influence along the eastern Black Sea. Russia, which already controls Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, could use a friendlier Georgian administration to expand its military and intelligence presence in the country. Meanwhile, Georgia’s openness to China provides Beijing with a strategic Black Sea maritime entry point.

In Moldova, internal fractures and the unresolved Transnistria conflict enable Russia to sustain hybrid pressure through disinformation, economic leverage and influence operations aimed at undermining pro-Western governance. This strategy not only complicates Moldova’s EU integration but threatens broader Western relations in the Black Sea region. The disunity among Black Sea states weakens collective regional defense, giving Russia greater latitude to influence these states economically and politically and distancing them from the West. And as Black Sea cohesion falters, NATO’s leverage in countering Russian threats declines, affecting maritime security, energy trade routes and the security framework of Eastern Europe – heightening security challenges for NATO’s eastern flank.

Body-by-Guinness

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Your Daily Rations of Post Election Neocon Handwringing
« Reply #1102 on: November 08, 2024, 01:42:35 PM »
A fine, woebegone neocon unleashing his inner TDS demons in the most passive/aggressive manner he can get away with and still sound like he knows what he’s talking about. Likely presages the general neocon reaction to Trump assuming power and telegraphs their foreign policy doomsaying and utter inability to remember that Trump actually did a pretty good job of managing despots around the planet despite sundry Russian agent fictions, but why let reality get in the way of a good public snit?

How to start World War III in 8 easy steps
The Hill News / by Alexander J. Motyl / Nov 8, 2024 at 1:05 PM

No one wants World War III, of course. But, ironically, the policymakers and pundits who say they want it least are those most likely to start it.

Call it the law of unintended consequences, or think of the road to Hell as being paved with good intentions.

There are eight steps that are pretty much guaranteed to lead to a monumental Western war with Russia. Judge for yourself just which step we’re on at present.

First, start by ignoring the fact Vladimir Putin has, over the last quarter-century, progressively dismantled all of Russia’s democratic and semi-democratic institutions. Ignore that he has replaced them with one-person rule, abetted by a criminal and corrupt elite that qualifies as fascist by any reasonable definition. Instead of focusing on Russia’s transformation into a fascist state and regarding it as a worrisome phenomenon, excuse Putin’s behavior on the grounds that he’s only doing what the Russian people want and that Russian fascism poses no threat to Russia’s neighbors or to the West.

Second, continue by ignoring the clear signals of imperialist intent emanating from the Kremlin since the USSR fell apart in 1991. Downplay the striking similarity between the Kremlin’s concern for Russian-speakers living in the former Soviet republics and Adolf Hitler’s concern for the rights of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Completely ignore the central place that imperialism and territorial expansion have played in the political agendas, self-legitimation strategies and propaganda of every Russian state for centuries.

Third, ignore history, ignore regime type and ignore personality. In other words, ignore Russia; ignore Russian politics, society and culture; and, above all, ignore Putin and his criminal past and present. Arm yourself only with the half-baked theories of the “realist school” of international relations. Pretend that this school of thought holds all the answers to all the questions because its gross simplification of reality is in fact accurate.

Then excuse Putin’s aggressive behavior toward Ukraine on the grounds that he was terrified of the possibility of Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO in 2045. Pretend that he was somehow compelled to forestall that theoretical eventuality by launching a full-scale genocidal war more than two decades in advance. Reinforce this belief by electing European prime ministers — and an American president — with openly Russophile stances.

Fourth, regard Ukraine as a big place with nice people and corrupt leaders, and not as a strategically important component of Western security. Ignore that its continued existence as a sovereign state ensures the West’s survival as a community of nations. Pretend that Putin’s obsession with Ukraine has no geopolitical implications, either now or in the future, and that the West need not worry about what he would do next were Russia to defeat and swallow Ukraine. Reinforce this belief by supporting policymakers with openly pro-Putin stances.

Fifth, regard Putin as a run-of-the-mill rational leader who desires only to stay in power and maintain Russia’s security and who therefore acts in accordance with universally shared rationality assumptions and not with Russian imperial ideology and fascism. Explain his destruction of the Russian military and economy by arguing that his idea of rationality sometimes differs from that held by the West, without explaining why, how and when these differences manifest themselves.

Sixth, compel Ukraine to agree to any kind of cease-fire or peace that precludes a Russian defeat in the hope and expectation that Putin will happily accept it, will recognize Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign state and will abandon all imperialist aspirations in order to rejoin the international community. Dismiss Ukrainian fears of continued Russian aggression as the feverish ravings of nice people in a big place who don’t appreciate the wisdom of realist theory and are suicidally inclined to downplay the likelihood of Putin’s using a nuclear device.

Seventh, complete steps one through six and then patiently wait for Russia to become a soft and cuddly state committed to world peace. Express shock and surprise when Russia reasserts its fascist values, rearms and relaunches its genocidal war — against Ukraine and those countries of the West that dared to agree with Ukraine’s assessment. Then blame the resultant world war on the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO in 2045.

Eighth, repeat steps one through seven, place all your hopes in a newly elected American president with unrealistic expectations regarding the war, and remain puzzled by the fact that all your good intentions didn’t prevent a direct clash between Russian and NATO troops.

Bemoan reality’s unwillingness to act according to your notions — and blame World War III on your critics.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4980828-how-to-start-world-war-iii-in-8-easy-steps/

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Russia/US-- Europe
« Reply #1103 on: November 09, 2024, 07:44:01 AM »
"but why let reality get in the way of a good public snit?"

 :-D

Crafty_Dog

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Trump's approach to Europe
« Reply #1104 on: November 09, 2024, 09:45:45 AM »


November 7, 2024
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Trump’s Approach to Europe
By: George Friedman

I intended to expand on my column from earlier this week on the conflict in the Middle East, but instead I think I’ll address the foreign policy consequences of the U.S. election, which Donald Trump decisively won.

On the campaign trail, Trump focused on ending U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. He has repeatedly said that the war is a European affair and that the responsibility for defending Ukraine is thus a European one, not an American one. He has, however, left open the possibility of extending U.S. support if it’s in the U.S. interest.

The conventional wisdom is that Ukraine is of vital interest to the United States. Trump doesn’t agree with this. Ukraine is of moderate interest but does not affect the future of the United States. For the Europeans, the appearance of Russia in Ukraine is a vital issue since Ukraine is in Europe. The conventional wisdom is not altogether false but does not weigh the necessities effectively.

But Trump considers Ukraine a European war because a Russian victory directly threatens Europe, not the U.S. heartland. Europe has a gross domestic product of over $27 trillion, while the U.S. GDP is just slightly higher at $29 trillion, so why can’t Europe pay for the conflict itself? It’s true that Europe does not possess the military assets needed to do so, but Trump sees this as just another excuse for having the U.S. foot the bill. For decades, this was a feature, not a bug, in the system. The structure of European defenses was created early in the Cold War. It was a time when Europe was shattered by World War II, when the U.S. was concerned that its own interests would suffer if Europe fell to the Soviet Union. The terminus of that train of thought is to pay whatever is necessary to defend Europe.

But time passes. Europe is now prosperous, heavily populated and, in theory, fully capable of defending itself. Yet European countries have not rebuilt their militaries, collectively or individually, to perform that task, and the U.S. continues to bear the financial brunt of the Continent’s defense. Thus is the crux of Trump’s argument: Put simply, he believes Europe is acting in bad faith. It isn’t entirely new – Republicans have made such claims for years, and Trump himself noted it in his first presidency – but it isn’t without merit.

Equally important is something Trump has not said: that there is no such thing as “Europe” except as a geographic concept. It is large, and it contains a multitude of nation-states and nations of people that are linked, sometimes willingly, by a network of transnational organizations. This state of play breeds unpredictability and disunity. The basic idea of relationships between nations is somewhat at odds with the reality of Europe. This is an important point because when Trump talks about Europe and NATO, what he is really talking about is the U.S. relationship with Europe. His stance on Ukraine, then, is meant to force Europe to take responsibility for the war and, if it can’t, to prove that its inability to do so means that the threat Russia poses isn’t real.

Trump is skeptical of other alliances, too, and he said he will likely reexamine all of them, particularly legacy alliances without clear purpose, with the ultimate objective of minimizing U.S. exposure to wars. But changing entrenched policy is extremely difficult. Personally, I don’t believe he will abandon the war in Ukraine outright; I believe he will have the U.S. remain in a supporting role while Europe takes the lead. Time will tell if he can impose his will.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Russia is EU's top natural gas supplier
« Reply #1105 on: November 21, 2024, 02:04:08 PM »
Top supplier. Russia became the top supplier of natural gas to the European Union in September for the first time since May 2022, according to a calculation by Russia’s RIA Novosti using Eurostat data. European purchases of Russian gas in September were valued at 1.4 billion euros ($1.47 billion), an increase of a third over the previous September. Roughly 40 percent of the supplies is liquefied natural gas and 60 percent is pipeline gas.

Crafty_Dog

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RFK's analysis
« Reply #1106 on: November 22, 2024, 09:27:36 AM »
A bit glib in some respects.  It certainly makes sense that after the fall of the Soviet Empire that those countries would never want to be in that position again.   It makes sense that America would not want to have to face Warsaw Pact size capabilities again.   It makes sense that it would be our armaments that would be bought.   Having serious weapon and ammo capabilities is not a bad thing for living in a dangerous world.

https://x.com/i/web/status/1859931875474858248

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Euro views of US Global Posture
« Reply #1107 on: November 22, 2024, 02:39:23 PM »


European Views on US Global Posture
Perceptions aren't consistent with reality.

By Antonia Colibasanu -April 24, 2024
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The notion that all countries operate within constraints is one of the main pillars of geopolitics. It came up repeatedly during my recent visit to the United States, where I attended several talks on European and Russian affairs. Though we at GPF try to stay out of the D.C. bubble, it’s nonetheless important for us to know what those in the bubble are saying, especially since Europe right now appears so consumed by what’s happening in Washington.

I traveled to the U.S. with a delegation of experts and policymakers from Romania. Analysts and officials from other parts of Europe, including Germany and Poland, were also in attendance. The main topics on the agenda were security and, of course, Ukraine. The event coincided with heated discussions in the U.S. Congress over aid packages for Ukraine and Israel. Though the situation in Israel is potentially hugely impactful for American politics, the conflict in Ukraine is the main focus for many policymakers in Europe. After all, the war there has shifted NATO’s containment line and transformed Eastern Europe into a literal battleground.

Considering that Kyiv is hugely dependent on military aid from Washington, European lawmakers are making concerted efforts to learn more about the constraints within which U.S. politics and politicians operate. Europeans typically have a narrow view of U.S. politics, mainly focusing on the presidency and the administration, which they perceive as ultimately responsible for maintaining the United States’ global leadership role and, by extension, the Western security structure.

That’s because the Europeans tend to believe the U.S. political system mirrors those in Europe, where foreign policies are forged by governments and primarily driven by urgent security threats to their borders. The Europeans thus get either nervous or excited every time another U.S. presidential election comes around, believing that a change in the presidency could alter how Washington interacts with the world. In doing so, they misjudge the way U.S. politics works, believing falsely that the presidency overrides every other institution in the United States, especially when it comes to strategy and foreign policy.

In fact, the U.S. president isn’t as powerful as many assume – and that’s by design. The nation’s founders didn’t want to assign too much authority to one person in the political hierarchy. They instead built a system of checks and balances, splitting power among three branches of government: the legislative (Congress), the executive (the president) and the judiciary (the courts). This division of powers guarantees that no branch can overpower the others. Congress enacts legislation, which the president can veto, which Congress can in turn override with two-thirds majorities in both houses. Congress also controls the federal budget, and thus can limit funding for the president’s agenda. The president is commander-in-chief of the military but cannot declare war; that power belongs to Congress. The president also appoints federal judges and other officials, but the Senate must confirm the appointments. The courts, meanwhile, interpret laws and can strike down legislation that they rule unconstitutional. All this means that a president’s powers are limited by the legislative and judicial branches of government – even if his party holds a majority in Congress.

The president thus has a limited ability to wield power over U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the United States’ global posture isn’t a product of its politics or policymaking to begin with. America’s evolution as the leader of the Western world was largely driven by economic interests and the idea that global markets, mobility and interconnectivity would bring profit to U.S. businesses and drive economic growth and development. The role of the private sector – sometimes in coordination with the government – is central to the country’s global standing. Though interactions between companies and politicians are complex, one of the ways in which businesses influence foreign policy is by lobbying representatives in Congress to pursue policies that meet their interests abroad. This pressure resulted in legislation that made it possible for administrations to implement strategies that, over time, turned the U.S. into an economic leader and superpower. This role enabled the government to maintain domestic stability and pursue growth.

Still, the United States’ approach on Ukraine is often perceived in Europe as a reflection of the administration’s global priorities. During my visit to Washington, Congress was discussing a new Ukraine aid package, which was finally passed on Saturday. Many of the Europeans present at the talks tied the matter to America’s leadership role in the world. To many Americans, however, aid for Ukraine is treated more as a matter of domestic politics than foreign affairs. Recent polls indicate Americans are equally split between thinking the U.S. is doing too much for Ukraine and wanting the U.S. to do more.

Another topic of discussion was the security situation around the Black Sea. In 2022, a bill was introduced in Congress that would authorize the National Security Council to direct an interagency strategy to increase coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties, and strengthen the security and democratic resilience of partners in the Black Sea region in accordance with U.S. values and interests. The bill was passed in 2023 and has become of increasing interest to the business community in both the U.S. and the Black Sea region.

Western businesses increasingly see opportunities here, especially with the Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia disrupting more traditional routes through which they conduct trade around the world. The Danube has become an alternate trade route linking the so-called Middle Corridor (which connects Southeast Asia to Europe through Central Asia and Turkey instead of Russia) to Germany’s North Sea coast. New rail and road projects linking Romania’s port of Constanta to Gdansk in Poland also have been discussed to help integrate European markets and build a strong containment line in Eastern Europe.

The future of these and other infrastructure projects will depend on how states and businesses address the fallout of the war, its duration and the strategies of both Russia and Ukraine for rebuilding after its conclusion. Any investment plans in Ukraine will need to take into account Russia’s long-term strategy, announced in 2023, to counter Western influence around the world. Thus, the Black Sea region can’t be decoupled from the future of Ukraine – as some suggested during my trip to Washington. Should Ukraine be forced to negotiate ceding parts of its territory to Russia, Kyiv could fall under Russian influence in the longer term – which wouldn’t require a massive investment from Moscow considering the socio-economic realities in Ukraine today. The biggest risk many grappled with was that Ukraine could become a failed state, a black hole between Europe and Russia that Moscow could eventually control.




Crafty_Dog

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ccp

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Re: Russia/US-- Europe
« Reply #1112 on: November 27, 2024, 10:26:05 AM »
Europe, again may drag us into a war!   :roll:

Nazis, Communists, Fascists never ends

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WSJ: Chinese Ship drags anchor for 100 miles to cut Baltic Cables
« Reply #1113 on: November 29, 2024, 05:58:19 AM »

Chinese Ship’s Crew Suspected of Deliberately Dragging Anchor for 100 Miles to Cut Baltic Cables
NATO warships surround Yi Peng 3, a Chinese bulk carrier at the center of an international probe into suspected sabotage
By
Bojan Pancevski
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Updated Nov. 29, 2024 4:31 am ET


A Chinese commercial vessel that has been surrounded by European warships in international waters for a week is central to an investigation of suspected sabotage that threatens to test the limits of maritime law—and heighten tensions between Beijing and European capitals.

Investigators suspect that the crew of the Yi Peng 3 bulk carrier—225 meters long, 32 meters wide and loaded with Russian fertilizer—deliberately severed two critical data cables last week as its anchor was dragged along the Baltic seabed for over 100 miles.

Their probe now centers on whether the captain of the Chinese-owned ship, which departed the Russian Baltic port of Ust-Luga on Nov. 15, was induced by Russian intelligence to carry out the sabotage. It would be the latest in a series of attacks on Europe’s critical infrastructure that law-enforcement and intelligence officials say have been orchestrated by Russia.

“It’s extremely unlikely that the captain would not have noticed that his ship dropped and dragged its anchor, losing speed for hours and cutting cables on the way,” said a senior European investigator involved in the case.

The ship’s Chinese owner, Ningbo Yipeng Shipping, is cooperating with the investigation and has allowed the vessel to be stopped in international waters, according to people familiar with the probe. The company declined to comment.

The damage to undersea cables occurred in Swedish waters on Nov. 17-18, prompting that country’s authorities to open a sabotage investigation. Russia has denied wrongdoing.



Investigators suspect the Yi Peng 3 cut the BCS cable by dragging its anchor

They say the ship continued on this path with its anchor dropped, cutting the C-Lion 1

The position of Yi Peng 3 surrounded by NATO vessels as of Nov. 27

2

3

Source: Marine Traffic; Kpler; staff reports, Dr Benjamin Schmitt
Daniel Kiss/WSJ
Investigators have established that the ship dropped anchor but remained under way in Swedish waters on Nov. 17. The dragging anchor cut the first cable between Sweden and Lithuania shortly afterward, according to two people familiar with the investigation. The company that operates the cable in Lithuania said the outage took place at around 10 a.m. local time.

During that time, the ship’s transponder, which charts its movements on the so-called Automatic Identification System, shut down in what is known as a “dark incident” in marine traffic jargon. The ship then continued even as the dragging anchor greatly reduced its speed, according to satellite and other data reviewed by investigators.

Investigators say that at around 3 a.m. the following day, having traveled about 111 miles, the Yi Peng 3 cut the second cable between Germany and Finland. Shortly afterward, the ship started zigzagging, raised anchor and continued. Danish Navy ships then set out to pursue and intercept the Yi Peng 3, ultimately forcing it to anchor in the Kattegat Strait, which connects the Baltic and the North seas.

A review of the vessel’s anchor and hull showed damage consistent with having dragged its anchor and severed cables, people familiar with the investigation said.

“Given the mild weather conditions and manageable wave heights, the likelihood of accidental anchor dragging appears minimal,” according to an analysis prepared for The Wall Street Journal by Kpler, an analytics company that provides real-time data on international shipping.

While such incidents have been handled confidentially in the past, the damage to the internet cables last week quickly prompted public interventions from top European leaders.


The Yi Peng 3, left, is monitored by a Danish naval patrol vessel. Photo: mikkel berg pedersen/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The crew of Yi Peng 3, which is captained by a Chinese national and includes a Russian sailor, hasn’t so far been questioned, according to people familiar with the probe, but a member of a Danish pilot ship briefly boarded the ship before it was anchored in the Kattegat Strait.

Several Western law-enforcement and intelligence officials said they didn’t think the Chinese government was involved in the incident but that they suspected Russian intelligence agencies were behind the sabotage.

“These are absurd, unsubstantiated accusations,” the Kremlin press office told the Journal. The same Western officials who point fingers at Russia were silent when Ukraine blew up the Nord Stream gas pipelines, the press office said in reference to the 2022 sabotage of the conduit for Russian gas to Europe.

“I would like to reiterate China’s consistent support working with all countries to maintain the security of international submarine cables and other infrastructure in accordance with international law,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters on Wednesday.

The Chinese bulk carrier is now guarded by a small flotilla of North Atlantic Treaty Organization ships belonging to Denmark, Germany and Sweden.

Previously neutral, Sweden is one of the newest members of NATO, having joined the military alliance in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Under international maritime law, NATO ships can’t force the Yi Peng 3 to sail into one of their ports. Swedish and German authorities are negotiating with the ship’s owner to obtain access to the vessel and question its crew.

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German police also dispatched the Bamberg, a patrol vessel, to investigate one of the incidents with underwater drones. Swedish and Danish ships have also examined the sites on the seabed.

European authorities must tread carefully because of their commitment to the freedom of navigation and upholding international law that underpins global trade, according to several European politicians, as well as security and law-enforcement officials familiar with the probe.

Since the launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has been accused by Western officials of waging a shadow war on NATO territory in Europe to destabilize the West, including orchestrating attacks on undersea pipelines and data cables in the Baltic and the Arctic.

In October last year, a Chinese-registered vessel called Newnew Polar Bear cut the Balticconnector gas pipeline and a telecommunication cable connecting Finland and Estonia with its anchor, according to people familiar with the investigation into the case. Some officials briefed on the investigation said Russian sailors were aboard the Chinese ship at the time of that incident.

Newnew Polar Bear was allowed to proceed toward Arctic Russia because authorities in Sweden, Denmark and Norway didn’t want to halt the ship without sound legal backing, according to officials.


The Chinese ship made calls at Russian ports such as Nakhodka. Photo: tatiana meel/Reuters
But in the case of Yi Peng 3, the Danish Navy decided to intervene quickly to stop the ship after the second cable was damaged, people familiar with the investigation said.

Yi Peng 3 had operated solely in Chinese waters from December 2019 through early March 2024, when it suddenly changed its pattern of operation, said Benjamin L. Schmitt, senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Kleinman Center for Energy Policy.

The Chinese ship then started carrying Russian coal and other cargo, making calls in Russian ports such as Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan, several trips to the Port of Murmansk in the Barents Sea and a trip to the Baltic Sea. At present, the ship is loaded with Russian fertilizers, according to Kpler data.

“While this alone is not enough to provide evidence of Russian involvement, the fundamental change in the ship’s operating region to Russian ports after years operating solely in Chinese waters should be a key area of investigation for European authorities,” Schmitt said.

The cable connecting Sweden and Lithuania was repaired on Nov. 28, said a spokesman for Arelion, the company that operates it. The second cable, connecting Finland and Germany, was restored on Nov. 29, according to Cinia, the owner.
« Last Edit: November 29, 2024, 07:33:52 AM by Crafty_Dog »




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« Reply #1117 on: December 12, 2024, 09:10:55 AM »


December 12, 2024
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Romania Takes an Election Mulligan
Foreign interference aggravated political divisions but didn’t create them.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Romania’s 2024 presidential election was annulled earlier this month due to foreign interference. In the first round, held on Nov. 24, independent candidate Calin Georgescu led with 23 percent of the vote, followed by Elena Lasconi of the Save Romania Union with 19 percent. But certain irregularities and intelligence reports revealed hybrid mis- and disinformation attacks that favored Georgescu. By Dec. 4, President Klaus Iohannis declassified reports identifying a “foreign nation” as the culprit, later confirmed to be Russia. On Dec. 6, the Constitutional Court annulled the results under Article 50 of the Constitution, citing significant amounts of fraud, and ordered a rerun. Both Georgescu and Lasconi criticized the decision, but preparations for a new election are underway, with Iohannis remaining in office for now.

It is reasonable to believe that Russia has supported disinformation campaigns in Romania, a strategically important state on NATO’s frontline and a key U.S. partner in the Black Sea region. As a host of U.S. troops and a staunch supporter of Ukraine, Romania plays a vital role in regional stability. U.S. forces stationed in Romania operate from key locations, including the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base near the Black Sea, a critical hub for NATO operations and logistics. These deployments are, in no uncertain terms, meant to deter Russia.

Its U.S. partnership aside, Romania has indigenously fashioned itself into a security hub for Eastern Europe. Hosting one of NATO’s new multinational battlegroups, which was established in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania plays a vital role in bolstering the alliance's defense architecture. The country is a key location for NATO’s ballistic missile defense system and a hub for enhanced air policing missions, with allied air forces operating from Romanian bases to secure Eastern European airspace. Its contributions to NATO's integrated air and missile defense are equally critical in integrating advanced capabilities such as multirole F-16 fighter jets, Patriot missile systems, and the Control and Reporting Center in Bucharest through NATO's southern Combined Air Operations Center in Torrejon, Spain.

In recent years, Romania has significantly increased its defense expenditures, committing 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product to defense for 2025 and investing in modernization initiatives to address pressing security challenges, particularly along the Black Sea coast. As part of these efforts, Romania has upgraded its naval capabilities by acquiring two minesweepers from the United Kingdom, retrofitting four missile ships and signing a $128 million contract with Raytheon for four naval strike missile systems to enhance coastal defense. Furthermore, Romania plans to acquire 54 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers from South Korea in a $920 million deal, marking a major upgrade in its artillery capabilities. These efforts are supported by a direct loan agreement with the United States to further modernize military infrastructure and equipment.

Romania has also taken steps to become a regional center for defense innovation. South Korea's Hanwha Aerospace plans to build an armored vehicle production facility in partnership with Romanian state-owned defense firm Romarm and aerospace research company INCAS to support systems like K9 howitzers and Redback vehicles. Germany's Rheinmetall has expanded its operations in Romania by acquiring a majority stake in Automecanica Medias SRL for local production of Lynx armored fighting vehicles.

In short, Romania is a strategic pillar along the new Western containment line – which explains why Moscow would see it as hostile to its interests and why it would be a target for disinformation campaigns. A politically destabilized Romania, where public trust in the government is low, would weaken its commitment to Western policies, ultimately undermining the U.S.-Romania partnership and thus the broader Western alliance.

Russia has an urgent need now more than ever to intensify its efforts to disaggregate its enemies to the west. With its military struggling to win the war in Ukraine, destabilizing Romania serves two purposes: It undermines Romania’s ability to support Ukraine logistically and politically, and it disrupts alternative trade routes such as the Danube and Black Sea corridors that are vital to sustaining Ukraine’s economy. Backing candidates who promote isolationist or anti-Western policies aligns with Russia’s broader objective to fracture NATO and the European Union and thus weaken regional resistance to its efforts in Ukraine.

However, Moscow’s disinformation efforts are more about emphasis than they are about wholesale lies. The Kremlin has been amplifying issues that already resonate with the public. By focusing on topics that are inherently appealing or contentious, Russia ensures its propaganda is both subtle and believable, making it far easier for the general public to accept and internalize. This approach significantly enhances the effectiveness of its campaigns, especially among groups that are eager to consume them.

One such group is the anti-establishment, extremist and sovereigntist movement. In Romania, social distress and political polarization have created a fertile environment for these kinds of movements to gain traction. (It’s a similar story throughout much of Europe.) There is widespread perception that the country's institutions are fragile and largely dysfunctional, with leadership dominated by clientelists rather than civil servants. Many believe the state is controlled by politicians who prioritize their own economic interests over public welfare, fueling further disillusionment and creating an opening for anti-establishment narratives to thrive.

The COVID-19 pandemic, meanwhile, aggravated social disparities and amplified frustrations over inequality. Political discourse increasingly emphasized the influence of the "global elite" in setting rules for everyone. This narrative, adopted and amplified by anti-establishment movements, became a cornerstone of insurgent political campaigns, resonating strongly with a disenchanted electorate. Notably, communist nostalgia remains a potent force in Romanian society, providing another layer of support for these movements. By framing their messages around themes of social injustice and inequality, these groups tap into the lingering sentiment about the communist era, a time perceived by some as marked by security and stability.

For instance, they have criticized the privatization of state-owned industries, arguing it undermines the country's self-sufficiency – a key priority during communist times. By reminding people of the common perception that communism allowed the state to provide jobs and control prices, these campaigns appeal to segments of the electorate that feel left behind in the transition to a market economy. Both Georgescu and the other main populist, anti-establishment leader, George Simion, frequently allude to Ceausescu-era rhetoric about national pride and independence, particularly in criticizing foreign influence in the Romanian government's economic and political decisions.

Georgescu's political platform thus aligns rhetorically and thematically with other anti-establishment movements across Europe. But it also stands apart in a few important ways. First, it draws heavily on the Christian nationalist rhetoric of Romania’s interwar Iron Guard, a far-right movement banned in Romania, similar to how fascist groups are outlawed in Germany. Georgescu’s rhetoric emphasizes traditional values, nationalism and a return to Romania’s cultural roots. This has appealed to a certain segment of voters.

Second, Georgescu incorporates language and ideas reminiscent of Ted Kaczynski’s critiques of industrial capitalism and modern technology. Better known as the Unabomber, Kaczynski was an American anti-technology theorist who carried out a terrorist bombing campaign between 1978 and 1995 that targeted academics, business people and airlines, killing three and injuring 23 others. In his book “The Great Renaissance”, Georgescu repeatedly cites Kaczynski’s manifesto, “Industrial Society and Its Future,” and adopts similar critiques of the "hypercomplexity" of modern society and the industrial capitalist system, which he views as incompatible with human freedom and autonomy. In his presidential campaign, Georgescu often blamed the Western elite for the people’s problems, positioning himself as a messianic figure meant to liberate the Romanian nation.

Georgescu's emergence also marks a first for European anti-establishment movements. Unlike the other populist and nationalist movements, Georgescu’s platform embodies a neo-Marxist and extreme-left platform that has gained traction in Romania over the past decade. And because his critiques are not exactly unique to Romania alone, it’s possible that other populist movements across Europe may draw inspiration from his platform, potentially fueling the rise of extremist ideologies that incorporate the fringes of both far-left and far-right perspectives.

Romanian authorities might successfully counter foreign electoral interference in this instance, but the entire episode shows two things. First, it doesn’t erase the extremist platform existing in Romania, and the way the government handles the current crisis could reveal how democracies will tackle similar circumstances in the future. Second, and perhaps more important, this incident reveals that there is fertile ground in Europe for such ideologies to take root and grow. It not only threatens to weaken the Western alliance but also poses a significant challenge to its foundational liberal values.