Russia/US-- Europe

[G M]

Is Germany our ally?

In theory, yes. But not really.

[Crafty_Dog]

WW1:  Germany and Russia fight over East Europe

WW2:  Germany and Russia fight over East Europe

WW3:  Germany and Russia fight over East Europe

[G M]

WW1:  Germany and Russia fight over East Europe

WW2:  Germany and Russia fight over East Europe

WW3:  Germany and Russia fight over East Europe

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/04/americans-and-germans-disagree-on-the-state-of-bilateral-relations-but-largely-align-on-key-international-issues/

https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/579307/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.reuters.com/world/german-government-distances-itself-navy-chiefs-comments-putin-2022-01-22/?fbclid=IwAR3ihFlgJ7XXlxPSQ0cZMf1clqrupkBf15AEdoyhoYL5Ba8CuEyxfjWXC9w

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-will-not-supply-weapons-kyiv-now-defence-minister-says-2022-01-22/?fbclid=IwAR2Jj6MTty1MseOoOWwfIycpM8AwKq3l5QdBuuHeKS1MgI-OOsBuAXahyzY

[Crafty_Dog]

Is Germany a Reliable American Ally? Nein
Berlin goes its own way, prizing cheap gas, car exports to China, and keeping Putin calm.
By Tom Rogan
Jan. 23, 2022 5:00 pm ET
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ILLUSTRATION: DAVID GOTHARD

As Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine looms, most Western allies are acting to support Kyiv and reassure vulnerable members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Germany is taking a different approach, putting Russian interests before those of the West.

Berlin reveals a serious reality: Facing the two most consequential security threats to America and to the post-World War II democratic international order—China and Russia—Germany is no longer a credible ally. For Germany, cheap gas, car exports to China and keeping Mr. Putin calm seem to be more important than allied democratic solidarity. Ukraine’s fate will convey on Germany a heavy burden of responsibility.

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Berlin refuses to supply Ukraine with weapons, and it is actively preventing Estonia from doing so. In recent days, Britain has airlifted antitank weapons to Ukraine and conducted Ukraine-related intelligence-gathering flights. But while the intelligence flights have transited German airspace—the most direct route between Britain and Ukraine—the weapons flights have been making detours around Germany. Britain’s Defense Ministry played down the detours, confirming that it didn’t seek overflight permission. But that’s the point: Britain didn’t ask because that would have forced Germany to grant or reject the request. Britain believed the decision would be difficult for Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s new government.

Another illustration is Berlin’s approach to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which will send gas to Europe from Russia. German regulators say the pipeline can’t start working until it meets corporate compliance standards. That has rankled Mr. Putin, who wants it pumping now. In turn, the Russian president’s Gazprom puppet company has reversed gas flows through the existing Yamal-Europe pipeline for more than four weeks. Russia also has cut off thermal coal supplies to Ukraine for more than three months. Mr. Putin’s message is clear: Ukraine better roll over, and Germany better approve Nord Stream 2.

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The energy blackmail underlines why Republicans, and until this month Democrats, had supported sanctions on Nord Stream 2. They knew Mr. Putin would use the pipeline to extract political fealty in return for heating supplies during the cold European winter. They feared he would use Nord Stream 2 to offset gas supplies—and billions of dollars in transit fees—that currently flow through Ukraine. But because of German pressure on the Biden administration and Senate Democrats, Nord Stream 2 and Mr. Putin gained a lifeline. A majority of Democrats last week rejected a bill from Sen. Ted Cruz to reimpose sanctions on the pipeline, denying it the 60 votes it needed to pass. Germany scored a major win at U.S. expense. Considering the alliance principle of reciprocity, it isn’t clear what President Biden has received in return.

Democrats say sanctions on Nord Stream 2 aren’t necessary because Germany won’t operate the pipeline if Russia invades Ukraine. But Germany isn’t on the same page. Asked about suspending Nord Stream 2, Mr. Scholz’s defense minister responded, “We should not drag [Nord Stream 2] into this conflict.” The ruling Social Democrat Party’s general secretary allowed that “everything in me resists the idea of conflicts being conjured up just to bury a controversial project.” Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock might oppose the pipeline, but she is a voice in the cabinet wilderness. And Mr. Scholz has called for a “qualified new beginning” with Mr. Putin.

Germany has also abandoned the NATO defense-spending target of 2% of gross domestic product, spending only 1.5% of GDP, and it allows Russian chemical-weapons research on its soil. Such research supports assassination campaigns like the one that targeted Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and a former British agent. Mr. Scholz also has committed to pursuing observer status in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and only vaguely to supporting NATO’s nuclear deterrence. This concession has been long sought by Mr. Putin.

Then there’s Germany’s stance on China. Shortly before entering office, the Biden administration requested that then-Chancellor Angela Merkel delay a European Union-China trade deal. She responded by speeding up negotiations to reach a deal before Mr. Biden took office. This was rude but not surprising. So great was the Chinese Communist Party’s affection for Ms. Merkel that her departure saw the party’s propagandists design a digital tapestry in homage. Mr. Scholz seems determined to earn a similar honor.

Asked recently whether he would support a diplomatic boycott of February’s Beijing Winter Olympics, Mr. Scholz mused, “We think it’s important to do everything you can to make the world work together internationally, and any actions you take in each case need to be carefully weighed.”

“No” would have been a simpler answer.

Mr. Scholz appears committed to preserving Germany’s $150 billion a year exports to China at all costs. This was made clear recently to Lithuania, which is suffering a Chinese trade war for letting Taiwan open a representative office. German businesses, rather than supporting their democratic neighbor, are warning Lithuania to give in to China’s demands or see German investment suspended. That lack of democratic solidarity stems from the Federal Chancellery. This is a realm where Volkswagen exports talk and the Uyghur genocide, destruction of Hong Kong democracy and military imperialism walk.

Even when Germany pretends that it cares about the democratic international order, its lack of genuine interest quickly becomes obvious. Germany recently deployed a warship in the South China Sea, which China claims as its own private swimming pool. Simultaneously, however, Berlin begged Beijing to let its ship make a Shanghai port call. China denied the request. Contrast Germany’s South China Sea experience with that of France, which has sent nuclear attack submarines to train with U.S. Navy counterparts for battle with an advanced adversary.

Mr. Biden suggests that Germany is one of America’s most important allies. Given Berlin’s policies toward the nation’s two pre-eminent adversaries, it’s hard to see how Mr. Biden’s claim holds up.

Mr. Rogan is a national-security writer for the Washington Examine

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/germany-roiled-political-earthquake-navy-chief-resigns-after-saying-putin-deserves-respect?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=435

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.axios.com/eu-gas-scramble-russia-ukraine-crisis-d8402d82-0888-47b2-a89d-6586c4eb2013.html?fbclid=IwAR2PCM21igMmVNcTz5z9MGYiTdsxAopK0K3WAYrZX2xz4hDj2NPQUKCXw2M

[G M]

https://www.axios.com/eu-gas-scramble-russia-ukraine-crisis-d8402d82-0888-47b2-a89d-6586c4eb2013.html?fbclid=IwAR2PCM21igMmVNcTz5z9MGYiTdsxAopK0K3WAYrZX2xz4hDj2NPQUKCXw2M

Europe deserves everything it’s getting. Shiver in the dark and think of Greta, you morons.

[Crafty_Dog]

To be fair, the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Lithuania, Latvia, etc have not been slackers at all.

[G M]

To be fair, the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Lithuania, Latvia, etc have not been slackers at all.

If you went to “green energy”, or dependence on Russia, you get what you deserve.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 24, 2022
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The Russian Mystery
By: George Friedman
In looking at Russian strategy in Ukraine, and indirectly toward the United States, there is a mystery that seems to have an obvious answer but that is difficult to simply accept.

Moscow started with a relatively slow deployment of forces along the Ukrainian border. It appeared to be in a position to invade Ukraine with minimal opposition. Rather than attack, though, Russia engaged in a diplomatic confrontation with the United States, demanding that Ukraine never be admitted into NATO, and that NATO limit its deployment of weapons in Eastern Europe.

Russian negotiators knew full well that the U.S. would never agree to these terms. For one thing, it’s a decision for NATO, not Washington. For another, NATO members in the region are at the easternmost frontier of the alliance. They are the most exposed to potential Russian actions, particularly if Russia takes control of Ukraine. In short, capitulating to Russian demands would leave Eastern Europe open to Russian attacks. Most important to Washington, though, is that its credibility would be mortally wounded, not just in Europe but around the world. Allowing the Russians to force the United States to agree on future relations with a sovereign state was simply a nonstarter. The consequences would be global, and not for nothing, it would create a political crisis in the United States the administration could not manage.


(click to enlarge)

It doesn’t make sense for Russia to delay military operations while making demands it knew were going to be rejected, especially since its military was already deployed. Why would Russia, if fully committed to entering and occupying Ukraine, give the West time to prepare military countermeasures? Moscow understands that its actions would be seen as a threat because that is how they were meant to be seen. It understands there would be a response, but it also understands it can’t be certain what the response would be. Air and naval forces and anti-tank weaponry, for example, could dramatically complicate the invasion.

An invasion of Ukraine is difficult in the best conditions. The country is roughly the size of Afghanistan, and coordinating a complex armored operation presents untold opportunities for failure. The Russian army has not carried out an armored operation since World War II, so the troops are inexperienced. Minimizing the possibility of an anti-Russian buildup would increase the risk to the operation. In an operation of this magnitude, the attack should be made as early as possible. By waiting, Russia increased the risk of failure.

It’s possible, then, that Moscow wanted to float an impossible proposal for propaganda purposes. But the value of world public opinion compared to a successful military operation is minimal. After an invasion, public opinion would be against Russian aggression regardless of diplomatic niceties. The value of public opinion, in other words, only takes you so far.

The only conclusion to be drawn is that Russia has no intention of invading Ukraine, as Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has repeatedly said. Given that Russia failed to act when it could and arguably should have, it seems to me that he might have been telling the truth. On the other hand, we have seen the Russians be active, albeit more subtly, in Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Logic dictates that Russia must rebuild its historic buffer zone and that Ukraine is essential in this regard. Moscow has done everything in its power to create an atmosphere of crisis. Perhaps it had intelligence that the U.S. and NATO would fold their cards. But the U.S. can’t afford to do nothing. President Joe Biden’s threat to the Russian banking system is either far more devastating than I can fathom or simply a cover for military action. So in this sense, the U.S. is being coy as well, just not nearly as confusingly as the Russians.

My best guess is the Russians have set up negotiation with the most extreme demands as a normal negotiating strategy. But the fact remains that Russian forces are deployed, and resistance is being strengthened. It may be that the Russians are simply confident that their force is still able to win. But a rule of war is that you strike at maximum advantage, and give away no advantage. The rule of diplomacy is to make a lot of threats before making a deal. Right now, it’s one or the other.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 14, 2022
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From the European Buffers to the Intermarium
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman


Russia has been in the process of reclaiming its buffer zones – the areas in its periphery such as the Caucasus, the Baltics, Central Asia and Eastern Europe that give Moscow strategic depth from potential enemies – for some time. But the problem of strategic depth runs both ways. At the end of World War II, the Russians occupied the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the eastern half of Germany. None of them had been occupied by the Soviet Union before the war. The conquest of this area was the result of defeating Germany and dividing Europe with the West based essentially on the areas each held at the end of the war.

With this, Russia expanded its strategic depth dramatically. The distance it would take from the Fulda Gap to Moscow was so great that a NATO offensive designed to break Russia was impossible. As important, it reduced the strategic depth of the Anglo-Americans to just a few hundred miles. Forward deployed Soviet forces were, for example, 200 miles (320 kilometers) from Hamburg, a major German port. It was accepted that Western Europe could be defended only by massive reinforcement and resupply from the United States. With the western ports under attack or captured, the ability to support forces trying to hold the west would collapse.

The Anglo-Americans, and later NATO, faced a massive Soviet force occupying Eastern Europe and the eastern part of Germany without strategic depth and with fewer troops. The West had air and naval forces, well-trained troops and, most important, nuclear weapons. The U.S. had a massive bomber force that could deliver a nuclear strike to the Soviet Union, but the Soviets had no equivalent ability to strike the United States until much later in the Cold War. Thus, the Soviets’ strategic force and American nuclear bombers canceled each other out.

Even so, Soviet control of Eastern Europe provided a degree of defense Moscow never had previously. It was a profound problem for the U.S. and NATO. Washington had never intended a nuclear exchange for Europe, and it had what was likely a sufficient air-land capability to break the first wave of a Soviet attack and threaten the next. But for leaders in Western Europe, Eastern Europe was a geographic nightmare that facilitated a Soviet attack on a line from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea.

For this reason, the collapse of the Soviet Union relaxed the West. Until 1991, NATO had been a formidable force. After Eastern Europe broke from the Russians, the West had gained strategic depth. This meant that the ready-alert status of NATO and the U.S. nuclear arsenal was no longer relevant. The added distance of a Soviet attack, ignoring the shambles of the former Soviet Union, made conventional attack impossible. Of all the reasons offered for NATO’s operational decline, this is the most persuasive: that the strategic reality of the Continent had simply changed, and that the threat from the Soviet Union was no longer there. This was later consummated by the integration of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania into Western institutions.

This, in turn, created the problem Russia faces today. From Moscow’s point of view, the expansion of NATO eastward might eventually ensnare countries like Belarus and Ukraine, and even Georgia in the Caucasus. The Maidan revolution of 2014 only worried Moscow more. If NATO integrated Ukraine, it is reasonable to believe that Moscow would be indefensible. For Russia, hoping for the extended restraint of the United States is not a good bet.

At the same time, if Russia were to control both Belarus and Ukraine, an assault on Eastern Europe, coupled with subversion operations, could recreate in Russia’s favor the geography of the Cold War. NATO is a shadow of what it once was. The U.S. no longer guards the Fulda Gap. If Ukraine is taken, then conventional and even advanced technology might not be able to limit a Russian advance to the east.

In that sense, one of the West’s greatest problems is that the former Soviet satellites, especially those in Eastern Europe, lack the strength to deter a Russian advance. Size is not the issue. Russia’s population is about 145 million. The population of the countries above is about 84 million. Given that they would be in defensive positions, and if properly armed and organized, they do not have to be a negligible force. The problem is twofold. First, most have taken NATO membership too seriously, not considering that NATO is hollowed out. They see themselves as too weak to defend themselves and expect an American miracle. The miracle could come, but not without a united, armed and motivated Intermarium, a term I have used for the alliance of the states between the Black and the Baltic seas. Ultimately, this group of countries was unable to envision the force it could bring to bear, and therefore psychologically was incapable of united action, but always waited for another country to protect it.


(click to enlarge)
The true weakness is not only that these countries don’t trust themselves but also that they don’t trust each other. Centuries of war have made them tired, even bitter enemies. I believe the Intermarium, armed and committed, would deter Russia even without massive American assistance. I advocated this a decade ago. Now, it is too late to implement except as an emergency force.

Thus we can understand the present situation in Ukraine. The Eastern European borderland lacks the ability to, as Charles de Gaulle said, at least tear an arm off. Russia cannot live with a U.S.-occupied Ukraine. The U.S. cannot live with Russia that far into Eastern Europe. Russia is not ready for a war, and the U.S. might be ready but doesn’t want it. The Russians will fight for Ukraine if terms are not reached. The Americans may fight but only through air power for the eastern borderland as it will be much cheaper now than later. The Eastern Europeans will fight, too little, too late and too disorganized. The British will be there, but I have no idea what each NATO country will do.

It is clear that there will be no war now. It is equally clear that this is the festering world of Europe. The borderlands will be perpetually contentious, and the balance of forces will shift over time, as they always do. Which way they will shift is, of course, less clear. But the old distrust between the U.S. and Russia remains, and that makes any lasting settlement impossible, because any settlement requires a degree of trust. The formation of the Intermarium alliance, which might include Belarus and Ukraine but which would exclude NATO and Russia, would work but won’t be tried. Everyone is waiting for the great powers, never believing that they might have other things to do with their time.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jan/25/biden-administration-moves-cover-european-gas-shor/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=evening&utm_term=evening&utm_content=evening&bt_ee=wpnf7J1C7zgl%2B%2FMna4UH4GaUW1vEDPfTxhF1QEP7XVkb6KwyfR%2FSU5hu7v4SQX1%2B&bt_ts=1643145917492

[Crafty_Dog]

How Will the EU Respond to Russian Aggression in Ukraine?
5 MIN READJan 25, 2022 | 21:28 GMT





European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gives a statement on Ukraine at the EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on Jan. 24, 2022.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gives a statement on Ukraine at the EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on Jan. 24, 2022.

(JOHN THYS/AFP via Getty Images)

The European Union will likely impose robust economic sanctions if Russia invades Ukraine, but the bloc will struggle to come up with high-impact punitive measures in response to other, more likely acts of Russian aggression. In recent days, EU governments have intensified their debate over how to deal with a potential escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. While member states agree that a formal Russian invasion would trigger economic and political sanctions against Moscow, the bloc is internally divided over how to react to disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, attempts to destabilize the Ukrainian government or interruptions in natural gas supplies to Ukraine, which are some of Russia’s many options. Eastern European and Baltic governments believe that a cyberattack or a disinformation campaign should be enough to trigger sanctions against Russia, but some Western European governments have defended a more cautious approach, arguing it would be hard to identify the perpetrators behind such actions.

Considering Russia’s multiple options to attack Ukraine, the European Union is likely to consider several alternatives and make a decision only after Moscow makes a move. According to media reports, the European Commission is currently working on a list of potential sanctions, but will not reveal it unless Russia displays direct aggression against Ukraine. The European Union’s options include imposing export controls on Russian goods, targeting Moscow’s ability to convert foreign currency, implementing tighter sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas industry (likely focused initially on technology transfers), imposing restrictions on Russia’s access to Western semiconductor technology, banning Western funds from buying Russian sovereign debt, and adding more individuals close to Russian President Vladimir Putin to the bloc’s list of travel bans and asset freezes. However, more drastic actions — such as cutting off Russia’s access to the SWIFT global financial messaging network, or imposing broad Iran-style sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector — are unlikely without an actual invasion due to the economic blowback such actions would have on the bloc. The European Union’s close trade and investment ties with Russia also explain why the bloc will be more reluctant than the United States (which has comparatively weaker economic ties with Russia) to impose painful sanctions. But the probability of stronger EU sanctions will increase significantly if Russia launches a full-blown military invasion in Ukraine.

Russia is a large supplier of products including fertilizers, aluminum, steel and nickel to Europe, which means that strict export controls would also disrupt European supply chains. Large European companies in sectors from banking to automobiles are active in Russia and would be negatively affected by financial and export bans.

Russia is the European Union’s main supplier of natural gas, which gives Moscow some leverage in its dealings with Brussels. Russia’s natural gas exports to Europe have been at reduced levels for several months, which has contributed to rising energy prices across the Continent at a time when inventories are at unusually low levels.

The German government remains internally divided over whether to block the Russia-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline from becoming operational. In late 2021, the government put the decision in the hands of Germany’s energy regulator, which is currently assessing whether the pipeline complies with EU rules. A formal military invasion of Ukraine would severely increase the probability of the German government blocking the pipeline, but other less aggressive Russian actions could enable Berlin to preserve its current ambiguous position on the issue.
The European Union’s internal divisions could convince Russia that any aggressions against Ukraine that fall short of a military invasion will have tolerable economic consequences. Brussels is likely to adopt a progressive approach to sanctions, adapting them to the severity of Moscow’s actions and making them subject to modifications. According to media reports, some EU governments are already asking to exempt certain companies or existing contracts (such as on energy supplies) from potential sanctions. In addition, EU-wide sanctions require unanimous support from the 27 members of the bloc, which could result in watered-down measures to appease some member states. Against this backdrop, Russia is more likely to increase support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, launch cyberattacks against the Ukrainian government and/or conduct destabilization campaigns targeting Kyiv — all actions that would likely trigger a milder reaction from the European Union compared with a full-blown invasion. Moscow will likely also keep natural gas exports to Europe relatively low and refuse to lower prices for prospective buyers in order to keep its leverage in negotiations with the European Union and discourage Brussels from imposing economically painful sanctions.

The European Union is also internally divided on the issue of arms exports to Ukraine, a decision that member states will continue to make at an individual level. Granting additional financial assistance to Kyiv is less controversial, and the bloc is likely to increase grants and loans for the Ukrainian government in the coming weeks.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Worst Ally
By RICH LOWRY
January 25, 2022 6:30 AM


German Bundeswehr army soldiers at the Kaserne Hochstaufen mountain infantry military barracks in Bad Reichenhall, Germany, in 2016. (Michaela Rehle/Reiters)
Germany, the laggard of NATO with a deep conflict of interest regarding Russia, is the weak link.

NRPLUS MEMBER ARTICLE
President Joe Biden’s press conference last week was atrocious, but one of his worst missteps amounted to telling the truth about Germany, if not by name.

Biden said there’d be divisions within NATO over a “minor incursion” by Russia into Ukraine. This is true enough, and the chief cause would be a Germany that is staking a strong claim to being our worst European ally.

If NATO is hollowed out over time, Germany will have much to do with it. The country is too guilt-wracked over its enormities in World War II to contribute rigorously to the defense of the West, and too cynical to allow anything to interfere with its selfish interests, both in Russian energy and the Chinese export market. It is attempting a kind of de facto economic alliance with the revisionist autocratic powers, China and Russia, at the same time it is allied politically with the foremost defender of the democratic West, the United States.

Its defense spending is inching upward but is still short of the 2 percent of GDP pledged by NATO countries. It stands now at 1.5 percent of GDP. This is an economic powerhouse that has been shirking its responsibilities, in part because it has been able to rely on the United States — and its vast military might — as a crutch.

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Germany imagines its unique contribution is a commitment to soft power and peace through diplomacy. It’s hard to credit German idealism, though, when it has tethered itself to Russian gas over the long-standing objections of its allies. They warned that this would inevitably increase the geopolitical sway of Vladimir Putin, and so it has.

In a fit of self-sabotage, Germany is closing the last three of its nuclear power plants this year and is scheduled to close down its coal plants by 2038. No one buys more gas from Russia, where Germany now gets more than half of its supply. The country has been hell-bent on the development of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to bring gas directly from Russia to Germany, bypassing Ukraine and making it even more vulnerable to Russian coercion.

Germany has to be calculating that if it participates in harsh sanctions against Russia, it makes itself vulnerable to Russian countermeasures. Already, Russia has been squeezing Europe’s gas supplies. It’s not at all clear that Germany would give up on the pipeline even if Russian tanks roll for Kyiv.

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The Germans, meanwhile, aren’t willing to make even the slightest gesture toward deterring Russia. They are blocking Estonia, a fellow NATO ally, from sending howitzers to Ukraine that originated in Germany.

Germany has no problem selling weapons all around the world, including to the perpetually troubled, Taliban-supporting government in Pakistan and the dictatorship in Egypt.

The justification for blocking the Estonia-to-Ukraine transfer is that Germany was responsible for unspeakable horrors in that part of Europe in World War II, so it has to be especially sensitive to German weapons going there.

Needless to say, there’s a categorical difference between the depredations of the Nazis and providing weapons to a plucky independent nation in fear of being dismembered by a neo-imperialist country to its east (a country, by the way, that once was allied with the Nazis).

Not to worry, though; Germany is pledging to open a field hospital in Ukraine.

When we talk about European divisions over Russia’s menacing of Ukraine, we are mostly talking about Germany (although France is always a nettlesome partner). The British have taken a hard line. Sweden and Finland have been stalwart. Spain is deploying ships to the Black Sea. The Dutch have said they are open to providing weapons to Ukraine.

All that is heartening and appropriate. It is Germany, the laggard of NATO with a deep and growing conflict of interest regarding Russia, that is the weak link — and Putin, unfortunately, knows it

[Crafty_Dog]

It’s Macron’s Moment to Move Europe Beyond NATO
Russian threats, Normandy talks, and the EU presidency give the French leader a golden chance to advance his new European security arrangement.
Kevin Baron
BY KEVIN BARON
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
JANUARY 25, 2022 05:50 PM ET

While the world is waiting to see if Russia will invade the rest of Ukraine, some national security leaders are keeping an eye on Paris. Can French President Emmanuel Macron use this crisis to realize his vision of European security?

On Wednesday, negotiators from Russia and Ukraine are to meet with counterparts from France and Germany. It’s called the Normandy Format; the group of four first met on the sidelines of the 70th anniversary of the D-Day invasion in 2014. It may be a waste of time. But it may be the start of something much more, no matter what Putin decides.

First, President Joe Biden and the Americans won’t be there, by design. Though U.S. media have focused much attention on the U.S. reaction to Moscow’s buildup, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is largely a European one. In November, Ukraine’s top spokesman called the Normandy Format “the only platform for negotiation.”

Second, all parties have largely ignored the United Nations in New York, and tried to keep NATO out of it. Alliance leaders have rejected Putin’s assertions that this is a fight between Moscow and NATO over Ukraine’s potential membership, although they offered to join direct Russia-NATO talks. Putin has not responded, and this week several alliance members are promising to send thousands of additional NATO troops into Eastern Europe as buffers if needed, but still not into Ukraine.

“How does it stop Putin from going into Ukraine” if U.S. troops are sent on defensive-only missions into neighboring NATO states? Fox’s Pentagon reporter asked U.S. officials at a Monday press conference.

After a video conference of some world leaders on Monday, Biden asserted total unity among the allies. But even Americans aren’t unified. Hawks in Congress have called on Biden to send U.S. troops to Ukraine’s front lines before Russia advances.

European governments have acted both collectively and independently toward Russia, but Germany has hardly played along, refusing overflight rights for allies to deliver even ammunition and breaking with allies on other issues, like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Its Navy chief resigned over the weekend after embarrassing remarks that appeared to concede to Putin. “Germany is no longer a credible ally,” declared one columnist in the Wall Street Journal.

In comes France

For the last five years, Macron has repeatedly proposed a new non-NATO, Europe-only security architecture: a “strategic autonomy” intended to be more flexible and responsive to continental Europe’s needs, and independent of America’s isolationist whims. In other words, something made for exactly this kind of moment.   

Now a coincidence of timing has installed France as the six-month president of the Council of the European Union, and Macron promised to continue pushing for a new “collective security framework” for the continent and “strategic rearmament.”

Can the Normandy Platform, the EU presidency, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict be the triple springboard Macron needs to launch a new European defense?

Scholars and professionals of European and transatlantic security have long debated whether security issues in Europe should be handled without the United States or NATO. Will a more independent Europe give openings to adversaries on issues as diverse as Huawei’s Chinese telecom hardware, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, migrants, nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism? On the other hand, U.S. leaders have called for stronger European defenses for decades and Macron’s pitch really does nothing to weaken NATO’s defensive treaty pact, so why should Europe need Washington’s permission (or any involvement) in regional disputes?

“I think that it is good for there to be coordination between Europe and the U.S., but it is vital that Europe has its own dialogue with Russia,” Macron said last week, in calling for a continuation of the Normandy Format. The French president repeated his familiar calls for a European “collective resilience.”.

“The security of our continent requires strategic rethinking, strategic rearming of Europe as an area of balance and peace,” he said.

Like clockwork, an essay titled “Macron’s Flawed Vision for Europe” appeared that same day in the journal Foreign Affairs. Noting that French leaders have been calling for strategic autonomy from the United States since Charles de Gaulle and John F. Kennedy, the piece is a prime example of academic hand-wringing over the idea, both chiding and thanking the French for it. The authors argue that Macron is not wrong to want autonomy for Europe. “Developing its own grand strategy and providing for its own security would be a natural next step,” write Frank Gavin, professor at Johns Hopkins, and Alina Polyakova, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. But they warn that Macron has not yet fully articulated how to do it, and Europe may not be quite ready. “This vision assumes that a continent with a long history of divisions is now united on its defense and foreign policy. But a cursory look at the recent debates on Russia, China, and even the United States shows a lack of strategic coherence among European states.”

They argue that Macron is wrong to assume that France actually can lead, or that Europe is able to handle all of its problems. “Rather than going it alone, Europeans would be better off working together with the United States on a few key priorities,” they write. “Macron’s approach would result in a Europe that, instead of doing one or two things well, might do everything poorly.” It’s a jarring and arrogant criticism, as if the existing toolbox of security arrangements—including the American and European publics who voted in their recent governments—have done much better leading the world in recent times.

“To be fair,” they write, “Macron recognizes the desultory state of European affairs, and much of his strategy is a call for the continent to ‘wake up.’ Yet his recommendations risk further fracturing Europe.”

Does it, though? We know Europe is not a nation, but if Europeans can survive being lumped together under NATO, the EU, and the euro in the last century then perhaps they can survive in the new one with a new arrangement whose sole purpose is to improve their collective security and power with greater autonomy from Washington.

Macron’s critics here and elsewhere say he needs to do more to unify Europeans, get them to agree on their security priorities, sell his idea as theirs, and be sure to include the United States and not undermine NATO. That’s all true, and it’s no small task.

But by Macron’s own words, that’s exactly what he’s trying to do, and he’s not backing down. One year ago, the French president welcomed Biden into office not with deference, but with a blunt message that global security will require more than shoring up the old transatlantic NATO alliance. Now he is seizing an opportunity to advance European strategic autonomy by broadening its constituency and consensus. It’s worth a shot. NATO will survive, and the Western world likely will survive or perish for many other reasons. With Macron at the bully pulpit during this latest crisis, perhaps these are the first steps toward giving everyone what they want: a stronger Europe.
=============================
And this from 9/2021

Biden Just Gave France Something More Valuable than a Submarine Contract
The White House endorsement of European defense apart from NATO is worth more than a $66 billion deal with Australia.
Kevin Baron
BY KEVIN BARON
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
SEPTEMBER 22, 2021

The $66 billion submarine deal with Australia is lost, but France’s President Emmanuel Macron may have won something far more valuable from President Joe Biden.

For several years now, Macron has pitched the idea that Europe needs to boost its military spending and capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. U.S. and NATO leaders have largely responded politely but dismissively to a concept they argue could subvert the 71-year old alliance. Europe? Defend itself? Says France? Okay. But did the United States just come around?

The break came on Wednesday, after a week of Franco-American diplomatic faux pas from both sides over the surprise (to Paris) revelation that Australia would purchase American- and British-made nuclear-powered submarines instead of French diesel boats. Macron recalled his U.S. ambassador over it, and Biden had spent days trying to get his French counterpart to talk about it. When Macron finally picked up the phone, it’s unclear whether he got an apology from Biden. But buried inside the joint U.S.-French readout of their call came news of a major policy concession.

“The United States also recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to NATO,” says the joint statement.

That’s big. The part that matters most is the phrase “and is complementary to NATO.”


Recall that nearly two years ago, Macron called NATO a “brain-dead” organization. He has since argued in many venues that while NATO’s nuclear umbrella remains essential, Europe cannot and should not rely on outsiders— meaning the U.S., UK, Canada—for safety and security. Just weeks after Biden took office, Macron told the Atlantic Council think tank, “My mandate has been to try to reinvent or restore an actual European sovereignty.” Of late, he has argued that a stronger and independent European defense would make NATO stronger by relieving some of the burden on the larger defensive nuclear pact and allowing Europeans to think, plan, and act more quickly and independently.

It’s quite a turn after two decades in which U.S. officials have gently and not-so-gently prodded NATO’s European members to shoulder more of the burden of collective defense. Of course, that was always meant to take place within the construct of an alliance in which America is the big dog. The NATO supreme allied commander is an American military four-star officer, not French, German, British, or North Macedonian.

Recall that in February, Biden’s first transatlantic coming-out speech as president was filled with niceties that slighted Macron’s ideas by not even acknowledging them. Read aloud today, those remarks to the Munich Security Conference should be embarrassing for this White House. “I know the past few years have strained and tested our transatlantic relationship, but the United States is determined — determined — to re-engage with Europe, to consult with you, to earn back our position of trusted leadership,” Biden said.

Ha, some trust. September’s submarine scandal torpedoed that sentiment. The French were given no notice, much less consultation, about the coming deal, according to the New York Times and other newsrooms. So French leaders are furious while American and British leaders are hardly apologetic. Biden hasn’t taken a single question about the deal; in his public opening remarks with the leaders of Australia and the UK at the United Nations this week he made no mention of submarines; only the other leaders did.

So let’s take this for what it’s worth, no more or less. The Biden White House’s one-line acknowledgement that a European defense capability that is separate but complementary to NATO is “important” was buried in a diplomatic readout of a private conversation. That is hardly a ringing endorsement. But it’s new, and rest assured Paris will use those words to continue making their case. Macron can now say he moved Biden further toward Paris’s position. And Biden can say he’s open to European defense evolution. Both can say they still love NATO. But none of us yet knows how far Biden is really to go down this path with Macron, if at all.

They won’t have too much time to lurk behind vagaries. Biden and Macron agreed to meet in late October. If we don’t know more by then whether these world leaders are serious about creating a new European defense and security autonomy, that’s the question I would ask first

[Crafty_Dog]

Practice. Meanwhile, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet started exercises involving more than 20 ships in the Black Sea. Russia also started exercises in the Arctic focused on protecting communications along the Northern Sea Route. Those drills involve up to 1,200 personnel and up to 20 aircraft and 30 ships.

MARC:  Besides the obvious implications of this, also keep in mind the specifics of the Sea of Azov!  IIRC it contains Ukraine's main port to the Black Sea, but its' use requires going through narrow straights controlled by Russian Crimea.

[Crafty_Dog]

Restoring American Credibility to Defend Taiwan, by Way of Ukraine and Poland
Worried about Taiwan? Try reinforcing Poland.

 January 27, 2022 Updated: January 27, 2022biggersmaller Print



The most recent crisis in Ukraine and simmering tensions in Taiwan are the result of America’s fallout from Afghanistan. But building a base in Poland is a simple but effective way to mitigate both situations.

The fall of Kabul and the disgraceful and disorganized withdrawal of U.S. soldiers and many civilians from Afghanistan has drawn comparisons to the fall of Saigon. The abandonment of so many Afghani green card and SIV holders and allies has also led to legitimate questions about American credibility.

It has been a few months, but the consequences are present to this day. There are allies around the world that rely on America. They often have a smaller military than the threats they face, and rely on American promises as a deterrent, and count on quick American support in the case of an attack. In the most recent case, Russian aggression against Ukraine seems like one of many instances in which U.S. allies will question the utility of American help.

It may be too late to deter war in Ukraine, but there are still steps the president can take to strengthen American credibility. It is important to know how trust in America and its credibility can be restored when allies from Poland to Taiwan are questioning Washington’s promises. This comes as the Chinese regime flew over 39 warplanes in Taiwan’s air identification zone on Jan. 24 and its carrier task force just returned from the open sea.

The most dangerous weakness of the United States is the strategic perception of an isolationist America unwilling to use force, such as quick support for Taiwan in the case of Chinese aggression or serious decisions to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine. As a result of that perception, America needs something much bigger or bolder to help change it. Bold is usually a Washington term that suggests massive spending. But here I am talking about better strategic military decisions to compensate for the cause of the loss of confidence.


The answer to the danger in the Taiwan Strait and Ukraine, ironically enough, is found in a commitment to another ally. America should build a base in Poland. This is more than sending aid or placing a few units that can be also withdrawn more easily. Building a base is more permanent and will anger Russia. This is a concern that should be noted and assessed.

But while it’s true we shouldn’t needlessly antagonize Russia, we also shouldn’t give them a veto against self-defense of us and our allies. Considering Russian seizure of the Crimea, intimidation of countries like Montenegro and Macedonia, the active undermining and possible war in Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin’s aggressive nationalist rhetoric, the United States has a much more solid case for needed defense in the region.

Poland wanted this base so badly they requested it during the Trump administration and offered to name it Fort Trump! Honoring their request, especially when it seems like America is in retreat, would make this an important sign of friendship. Beyond the symbolism, this decision addresses important operational concerns.

War gaming analysts have noted that the Baltics could fall to a speedy Russian invasion! And Ukraine is facing attack from a much larger force that can be launched from three different directions. Ukraine’s only friendly border is Poland! American forces have practiced moving forward to provide support to the Baltics, but they lack heavy ground elements. And the existing U.S. forces stationed there, without a base, would wither in the face of heavy Russian fire on a narrow front like the Suwalki gap or Polish Ukrainian border.

In short, the base would provide a sign of commitment, and the units stationed there are elements that would provide a better response to either region. Both of which would signal American commitment and possibly a deterrent.

This commitment is the most important point. It directly addresses the strategic perception that might cause Taiwan to question American commitment. In both World War I and II, Poland relied on Western allies like France and Great Britain to protect it from Eastern threats such as Germany and Russia. But the allied commitment to Poland was so sparse that after Germany invaded Poland, which invoked declarations of war from Britain and France, the Western European conflict with Germany was called the “Phony War.”

TAIWAN Air Force
A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) H-6 bomber flies on a mission near the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which serves as an unofficial buffer between China and Taiwan, on Sept. 18, 2020. (Taiwan Ministry of National Defense via Reuters)
Besides current concern over Russia, China’s aggression is the leading concern. A bold, concrete commitment to an American ally can address both concerns. A long-term base repudiates the disasters of America abandoning long-term allies in Afghanistan, and dithering while Ukraine is invaded. And sends a signal to other free countries around the world. It has the added benefit of not being directly related to China in any way and, thus, Beijing’s propagandists can’t complain that it’s a sign of American aggression. For example, Beijing often complains that America’s freedom of navigation patrols, which are allowed under international law, are irritating and unlawful. However, an indirect message, after building a base in Poland, can’t be said to destabilize the East China Sea, but still sends a message that America will help its allies, like Taiwan, with long-term planning.

America can’t change its past, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan will remain a black eye for years to come. And the Biden administration will likely be unwilling to commit to a base in Poland for all the reasons it decided to leave Afghanistan. It seems to be doing little to help Ukraine. But American policymakers and generals should consider the idea, so when a president that is serious about restoring American credibility is elected, he or she can make that quick decision.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

[G M]

Worried about Taiwan? Get Zhou Bai-Den out of office.

Restoring American Credibility to Defend Taiwan, by Way of Ukraine and Poland
Worried about Taiwan? Try reinforcing Poland.

 January 27, 2022 Updated: January 27, 2022biggersmaller Print



The most recent crisis in Ukraine and simmering tensions in Taiwan are the result of America’s fallout from Afghanistan. But building a base in Poland is a simple but effective way to mitigate both situations.

The fall of Kabul and the disgraceful and disorganized withdrawal of U.S. soldiers and many civilians from Afghanistan has drawn comparisons to the fall of Saigon. The abandonment of so many Afghani green card and SIV holders and allies has also led to legitimate questions about American credibility.

It has been a few months, but the consequences are present to this day. There are allies around the world that rely on America. They often have a smaller military than the threats they face, and rely on American promises as a deterrent, and count on quick American support in the case of an attack. In the most recent case, Russian aggression against Ukraine seems like one of many instances in which U.S. allies will question the utility of American help.

It may be too late to deter war in Ukraine, but there are still steps the president can take to strengthen American credibility. It is important to know how trust in America and its credibility can be restored when allies from Poland to Taiwan are questioning Washington’s promises. This comes as the Chinese regime flew over 39 warplanes in Taiwan’s air identification zone on Jan. 24 and its carrier task force just returned from the open sea.

The most dangerous weakness of the United States is the strategic perception of an isolationist America unwilling to use force, such as quick support for Taiwan in the case of Chinese aggression or serious decisions to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine. As a result of that perception, America needs something much bigger or bolder to help change it. Bold is usually a Washington term that suggests massive spending. But here I am talking about better strategic military decisions to compensate for the cause of the loss of confidence.


The answer to the danger in the Taiwan Strait and Ukraine, ironically enough, is found in a commitment to another ally. America should build a base in Poland. This is more than sending aid or placing a few units that can be also withdrawn more easily. Building a base is more permanent and will anger Russia. This is a concern that should be noted and assessed.

But while it’s true we shouldn’t needlessly antagonize Russia, we also shouldn’t give them a veto against self-defense of us and our allies. Considering Russian seizure of the Crimea, intimidation of countries like Montenegro and Macedonia, the active undermining and possible war in Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin’s aggressive nationalist rhetoric, the United States has a much more solid case for needed defense in the region.

Poland wanted this base so badly they requested it during the Trump administration and offered to name it Fort Trump! Honoring their request, especially when it seems like America is in retreat, would make this an important sign of friendship. Beyond the symbolism, this decision addresses important operational concerns.

War gaming analysts have noted that the Baltics could fall to a speedy Russian invasion! And Ukraine is facing attack from a much larger force that can be launched from three different directions. Ukraine’s only friendly border is Poland! American forces have practiced moving forward to provide support to the Baltics, but they lack heavy ground elements. And the existing U.S. forces stationed there, without a base, would wither in the face of heavy Russian fire on a narrow front like the Suwalki gap or Polish Ukrainian border.

In short, the base would provide a sign of commitment, and the units stationed there are elements that would provide a better response to either region. Both of which would signal American commitment and possibly a deterrent.

This commitment is the most important point. It directly addresses the strategic perception that might cause Taiwan to question American commitment. In both World War I and II, Poland relied on Western allies like France and Great Britain to protect it from Eastern threats such as Germany and Russia. But the allied commitment to Poland was so sparse that after Germany invaded Poland, which invoked declarations of war from Britain and France, the Western European conflict with Germany was called the “Phony War.”

TAIWAN Air Force
A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) H-6 bomber flies on a mission near the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which serves as an unofficial buffer between China and Taiwan, on Sept. 18, 2020. (Taiwan Ministry of National Defense via Reuters)
Besides current concern over Russia, China’s aggression is the leading concern. A bold, concrete commitment to an American ally can address both concerns. A long-term base repudiates the disasters of America abandoning long-term allies in Afghanistan, and dithering while Ukraine is invaded. And sends a signal to other free countries around the world. It has the added benefit of not being directly related to China in any way and, thus, Beijing’s propagandists can’t complain that it’s a sign of American aggression. For example, Beijing often complains that America’s freedom of navigation patrols, which are allowed under international law, are irritating and unlawful. However, an indirect message, after building a base in Poland, can’t be said to destabilize the East China Sea, but still sends a message that America will help its allies, like Taiwan, with long-term planning.

America can’t change its past, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan will remain a black eye for years to come. And the Biden administration will likely be unwilling to commit to a base in Poland for all the reasons it decided to leave Afghanistan. It seems to be doing little to help Ukraine. But American policymakers and generals should consider the idea, so when a president that is serious about restoring American credibility is elected, he or she can make that quick decision.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/01/business/russia-oligarchs-uk-sanctions/index.html?fbclid=IwAR36--_5y25XeejTcuqmGFHmtobQBEyZJJXrjMpTpyxig3u2Lti1ynUxjb4

[ccp]

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/cord-cutting-russian-style-could-the-kremlin-sever-global-internet-cables/

[Crafty_Dog]

That would be a super powerful OODA loop disruption for us.

Suppy lines would cease immediately so would social order in much of the country and other countries as well.  China takes Taiwan as Russia takes Ukraine and ??
 

[Crafty_Dog]

February 1, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

 
    
Russia’s True Strategy Shows Itself
 
By: George Friedman
 

If you look at the whole of Russia’s behavior around Ukraine, its strategy becomes clear – or as clear as clear gets in geopolitics. The buildup of troops started months ago. In time, it dawned on the U.S. and its NATO allies that something might be happening. The Russians issued their demands a few weeks ago, asking that NATO not grant Ukraine membership into the alliance and that it withdraw weapons from Eastern Europe. Put differently, Moscow wanted to return to a status quo that it had held before the Soviet Union fell.

One explanation for Russian behavior thus emerged. Moscow's demands made it seem as though Ukraine and Eastern Europe posed a unique threat to Russia that would abate if NATO abandoned ship. That is simply untrue; missiles no longer need to be close to be a target in order to be a threat. That demand therefore made little sense except in the case I have been pressing: Russia needs strategic depth against a ground assault. However unlikely this threat may be, it is primal and visceral. That threat would be abated some if NATO retreated westward, but it would be all but removed if Russian troops eventually were deployed westward.

The problem with this line of thinking is that Russia knew full well that the U.S. and its allies would reject its demands.

Another theory was that Russia always intended to invade Ukraine. It wanted the United States to reject its offer to justify a war. The Europeans generally don’t want a war, nor do many in the United States. The Russians may have believed the rejection of their demands would have created serious concern in Europe but no more than interested awareness in the United States. So if we shift the focus away from Ukraine, Russia’s intention might have been to simply divide NATO so deeply that it could never be repaired. Considering the Europeans are unwilling to financially sustain the alliance, the U.S. doesn’t trust its members to share all the risks, and with the general economic forces driving Europe apart, Russia doesn’t have to try all that hard to divide the alliance.

On this point, Germany, the de facto leader of Europe, is essential. Its economy is currently weakened by limits on its export market and internal imbalances from the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the stabilizing factors of its economy has been the reliability of Russian natural gas exports, a reliability that was to be enhanced by the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Russia needs the revenue from selling to Europe in general and Germany in particular. Russia’s actions near Ukraine have thus created a conundrum. Germany – and really, all NATO members – needs Russia’s energy but does not trust Russia. A war might force Russia to stop exports to Europe, giving Germany and others the choice between internal mayhem and long-term security from Russia. Russia has made no overt move because the idea of an attack is more powerful than an actual attack.

This would explain why Russian demands were meant to be rejected, holding off an invasion while the fear of war grows. It would trigger German gestures of solidarity with NATO while urgently searching for a solution that would compel Russia to desist. It would explain Moscow’s extraordinary patience with the U.S. response, and it would explain the promise that in spite of massed forces, there will be no war. If NATO essentially breaks up, Russia will be in a position to create a neutral military zone and an economic zone that it is an integral part of and chief energy supplier to.

The one counter to all this is something we don’t usually pay attention to in geopolitics: public opinion. The outright rejection of the Russian offer should have divided the U.S. and created general anti-American feeling in Europe. So far, this has not happened, despite the fact that Russia is generally pretty good at using social and political divisions to shape the behavior of countries to its benefit.

Moscow’s actions and offers were meant to cast the U.S. as unreasonable. Yet no powerful anti-war movement has arisen in Europe as yet, and the division in Washington remains in place. Driving Europe in the direction the Russians want would seem to require public support. That would deny governments room for maneuver, which is precisely what Russia needs to do.

This is a complex explanation for a very complex set of maneuvers. If NATO shatters, the Russians think they will take control of Ukraine without risk. From the viewpoint of Germany at least, the benefits of NATO do not compare with the benefits of access to natural gas. Germany, for one, cannot value NATO over gas. Russia has adopted a strategy of indirect attack, first weakening NATO, perhaps mortally, then expecting Ukraine to fall in its lap. That is its expectation but Russia, as other nations, has been frequently wrong. The Russians were utterly honest when they said that they were not intending to attack Ukraine. They have bigger fish to fry before that.

[Crafty_Dog]

By the way: The U.S. thinks it might have a blueprint for ending Russia's manufactured crisis with Ukraine. And according to language in a leaked U.S. document (via Spanish newspaper El Pais) sent to Russia last week, that American plan involves "conditions-based reciprocal transparency measures and reciprocal commitments by both the United States and Russia to refrain from deploying offensive ground-launched missile systems and permanent forces with a combat mission in the territory of Ukraine."

"We did not make this document public," Kirby said at the Pentagon Wednesday. "But now that it is…this document makes clear that there is a path forward" to diplomatically end the current tensions.

Meanwhile in Moscow, Putin has a thought experiment about Crimea, the peninsula Russia illegally annexed in 2014, and which he clearly is very nervous about one day having to give back. "Let's imagine Ukraine is a NATO member and starts [an operation to retake Crimea]. Are we supposed to go to war with the NATO bloc? Has anyone given that any thought? Apparently not," Putin said Tuesday at a press conference with Hungary's leader. Reuters has more from that messaging, here.

Related reading: "U.S. Sends Top Security Official to Help NATO Brace for Russian Cyberattacks," via the New York Times reporting Tuesday.

[Crafty_Dog]

Also, note the part about prior Chancellor Schroeder being part of the Nord Stream 2 swamp.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/06/world/europe/olaf-scholz-biden-ukraine-russia.html?fbclid=IwAR3NPLDNJyfvFUsLp6Fd0nUTcjZvHqb15BUnCshq_Ng2A0d7LSfeDiIlFXI

[ccp]

can't read without signing
in
so POTH can track me [and sell the info. to the DNC  ]

[Crafty_Dog]

Germany’s ‘Invisible’ Chancellor Heads to Washington Amid Fierce Criticism
Olaf Scholz will try to repair Germany’s credibility in the Ukraine crisis when he meets President Biden on Monday. Next on his agenda: Kyiv and Moscow.




Chancellor Olaf Scholz, center, on Wednesday in Berlin. He has been mocked as “nearly invisible, inaudible.”
Chancellor Olaf Scholz, center, on Wednesday in Berlin. He has been mocked as “nearly invisible, inaudible.”Credit...Florian Gaertner/Photothek, via Getty Images
Katrin Bennhold
By Katrin Bennhold
Feb. 6, 2022
BERLIN — One headline asked, “Where is Olaf Scholz?” A popular magazine mocked the German chancellor’s “art of disappearance.” And his ambassador in Washington wrote home that Germany was increasingly seen as an unreliable ally in a leaked memo that was all the buzz this past week and began with the words: “Berlin, we have a problem.”

With the threat of war hanging over Europe and rising tensions in the standoff with Russia over Ukraine, Mr. Scholz is headed to Washington on Monday for his first meeting with President Biden since taking over as chancellor in December. Foremost on his agenda: Show the world that Berlin is committed to the Western alliance — and, well, show his face.

Less than two months after taking over from Angela Merkel, his towering and long-serving predecessor, Mr. Scholz is drawing sharp criticism at home and abroad for his lack of leadership in one of the most serious security crises in Europe since the end of the Cold War.

His Social Democrat-led government, an untested three-way coalition with the Greens and Free Democrats, has refused to send arms to Ukraine, most recently offering 5,000 helmets instead. And it has been cagey about the type of sanctions that could be imposed in the event of a Russian invasion.

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As for the chancellor, he has made himself conspicuously scarce in recent weeks — so scarce that the newsmagazine Der Spiegel described him as “nearly invisible, inaudible.”

While President Emmanuel Macron of France and Prime Minister Mario Draghi of Italy have been busy calling President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, Mr. Scholz has so far neither picked up the phone to Moscow nor visited. He has not gone to Kyiv, Ukraine, yet, either, and his visit to Washington, some note, took almost two months to organize.


Image
Ukrainian soldiers  on Saturday on the front line in eastern Ukraine. While the United States and other NATO countries rushed military aid to Ukraine, Germany offered 5,000 helmets.
Ukrainian soldiers on Saturday on the front line in eastern Ukraine. While the United States and other NATO countries rushed military aid to Ukraine, Germany offered 5,000 helmets.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
Last week, Emily Haber, Germany’s ambassador to the United States, sent a memo to Berlin, warning of “immense” damage to Germany’s reputation. It was not just the news media but many in the U.S. Congress who questioned Germany’s reliability, she reported. In the view of many Republicans, she wrote, Berlin is “in bed with Putin” in order to keep the gas flowing.

It has not helped that since then, Gerhard Schröder, a former German chancellor from Mr. Scholz’s Social Democrats, accused Ukraine of “saber rattling” and just on Friday announced that he would join the board of Gazprom, Russia’s most prominent energy company.

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“Scholz’s central mission for his Washington visit has to be restoring German credibility,” said Thorsten Benner, a founder and the director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.

“It’s not how Mr. Scholz envisaged his first U.S. trip as chancellor,” Mr. Benner added. “But international security was never near the top of his agenda.”

Mr. Scholz, 63, has been a familiar figure in German politics for more than two decades. He was general secretary of his party and mayor of the northern port city of Hamburg before serving in two governments led by Ms. Merkel’s conservatives, most recently as her finance minister.

A labor lawyer and lifelong Social Democrat, Mr. Scholz narrowly won the election last fall on a platform promising workers “respect” and a higher minimum wage, while nudging Germany on a path to a carbon-neutral future.

Foreign policy barely featured in his election campaign, but it has come to dominate the first weeks of the new administration. Rarely has a German leader come into office with so many burning crises. As soon as Mr. Scholz took over from Ms. Merkel in early December, he had to deal not just with a resurgent pandemic but with a Russian president mobilizing troops on Ukraine’s borders.

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Russian infantry vehicles during drills in January in the Rostov region of Russia. The standoff with Russia over Ukraine has proved particularly vexing for Mr. Scholz.
Russian infantry vehicles during drills in January in the Rostov region of Russia. The standoff with Russia over Ukraine has proved particularly vexing for Mr. Scholz.Credit...Sergey Pivovarov/Reuters
“It wasn’t the plan,” said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, the vice president of the Berlin office of the German Marshall Fund. “This is a government that has huddled around an ambitious plan of industrial transformation, but the reality of a crisis-ridden world has interfered with their plans.”

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Of all of the crises, the standoff with Russia has proved particularly uncomfortable for Mr. Scholz. His Social Democrats have traditionally favored a policy of working with Moscow. During the Cold War, Chancellor Willy Brandt engineered “Ostpolitik,” a policy of rapprochement with Russia.

The last Social Democratic chancellor, Mr. Schröder, is not just a close friend of Mr. Putin’s,  he has also been on the payroll of various Russian energy companies since 2005, notably Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, the two gas pipelines connecting Russia directly with Germany under the Baltic Sea.

Live Updates: Russia-Ukraine Tensions
Updated
Feb. 7, 2022, 3:52 p.m. ET1 hour ago
1 hour ago
Putin and Macron meet in a diplomatic bid to resolve Russia’s standoff with Ukraine.
Blinken defends the exposure of alleged Russian plans as pre-empting Moscow’s disinformation.
See how Russia’s troops are nearly ready to mount an attack.
It was not until last week, after Mr. Schröder’s comments about Ukraine,  that Mr. Scholz felt compelled to publicly distance himself from the former chancellor.

“There is only one chancellor, and that is me,” he told the public broadcaster ZDF.

His party’s divisions over Russia are one way to explain why Mr. Scholz has shrunk away from taking a bolder lead in the standoff with Russia, prompting some to lament the loss of leadership of his conservative predecessor.

Mr. Scholz won the election last year primarily by convincing voters that he would be very much like Ms. Merkel. Terse, well briefed and abstaining from any gesture of triumph, he not only learned to sound like the former chancellor, he even emulated her body language, holding his hands together in her signature diamond shape.

But now that he is running the country, that is no longer enough. German voters are hungry for Mr. Scholz to reveal himself and increasingly impatient to learn who he is and what he actually stands for.


Image
The receiving station for the $10 billion Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which connects Russia directly with Germany. If Russia invades Ukraine, Mr. Scholz will be under enormous pressure to close it down.
The receiving station for the $10 billion Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which connects Russia directly with Germany. If Russia invades Ukraine, Mr. Scholz will be under enormous pressure to close it down. Credit...Sean Gallup/Getty Images
As the current crisis unfolds, Mr. Scholz’s imitation of Ms. Merkel is also less and less convincing. She was understated and studious, and often kept her work behind the scenes, but she was not invisible.

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In the spring of 2014, after Mr. Putin invaded Crimea, Ms. Merkel was on the phone to him almost every day. It was Berlin that united reluctant European neighbors behind costly sanctions and persuaded President Barack Obama, distracted by domestic affairs, to focus on a faraway conflict.

At that point, of course, Ms. Merkel had already been chancellor for nine years and knew all of the protagonists well.

“The crisis came very soon for Scholz,” said Christoph Heusgen, a veteran diplomat and Ms. Merkel’s foreign policy adviser during the last Ukraine crisis.

Understand the Escalating Tensions Over Ukraine
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A brewing conflict. Antagonism between Ukraine and Russia has been simmering since 2014, when the Russian military crossed into Ukrainian territory, annexing Crimea and whipping up a rebellion in the east. A tenuous cease-fire was reached in 2015, but peace has been elusive.

A spike in hostilities. Russia has recently been building up forces near its border with Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s messaging toward its neighbor has hardened. Concern grew in late October, when Ukraine used an armed drone to attack a howitzer operated by Russian-backed separatists.

Ominous warnings. Russia called the strike a destabilizing act that violated the cease-fire agreement, raising fears of a new intervention in Ukraine that could draw the United States and Europe into a new phase of the conflict.

The Kremlin’s position. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has increasingly portrayed NATO’s eastward expansion as an existential threat to his country, said that Moscow’s military buildup was a response to Ukraine’s deepening partnership with the alliance.

Rising tension. Western countries have tried to maintain a dialogue with Moscow. But administration officials recently warned that the U.S. could throw its weight behind a Ukrainian insurgency should Russia invade.

Mr. Scholz’s advisers have been taken aback by the level of criticism, arguing that Mr. Scholz was merely doing what Ms. Merkel had so often done: Make yourself scarce and keep people guessing while engaging in quiet diplomacy until you have a result.

When Mr. Scholz has spoken up on the current crisis — referring to the Russia-owned gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 as a “private-sector project” before pivoting to saying that “everything” was on the table — he has conspicuously recycled language that Ms. Merkel used before.


Image
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Deauville, France, in June 2014. In the spring of 2014, after Mr. Putin first invaded Ukraine, Ms. Merkel was on the phone to him almost every day.
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Deauville, France, in June 2014. In the spring of 2014, after Mr. Putin first invaded Ukraine, Ms. Merkel was on the phone to him almost every day.Credit...Sasha Mordovets/Getty Images
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But given the escalation in the current crisis, that language is long outdated, analysts say.

“He’s overlearned the Merkel style,” Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff of the German Marshall Fund said. “He’s Merkel-plus, and that doesn’t work in a crisis.”

After facing mounting criticism from Kyiv and other Eastern European capitals, Mr. Scholz’s leadership is increasingly being questioned at home, too.

In a recent Infratest Dimap poll, Mr. Scholz’s personal approval rating plummeted by 17 percentage points, to 43 percent from 60 percent in early January, the sharpest decline for a chancellor in postwar history, the firm says. Support for his Social Democrats fell to 22 percent, lagging the conservatives for the first time since last year’s surprise election victory.

Mr. Scholz’s team announced that after returning from Washington, the chancellor will pivot to a full schedule that he hopes will shift German diplomacy into high gear. Following his meeting with Mr. Biden, he will meet with Mr. Macron; the Polish president, Andrzej Duda; and the three leaders of the Baltic States. The week after, he will travel to Kyiv and Moscow, in that order.

Senior diplomats say it is high time for such a pivot, starting with Monday’s visit to the White House.

Mr. Scholz has a seeming center-left ally in Mr. Biden, who has so far refrained from publicly criticizing Berlin. Not since President Bill Clinton’s second term have both the White House and the German chancellery been in the hands of center-left leaders, and for all of the wavering on the German side, the two administrations have been in close contact throughout.


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Mr. Scholz, right, listening to President Biden, onscreen, at the start of the virtual Summit for Democracy in December. Mr. Biden has so far not publicly criticized Berlin.
Mr. Scholz, right, listening to President Biden, onscreen, at the start of the virtual Summit for Democracy in December. Mr. Biden has so far not publicly criticized Berlin.Credit...Michele Tantussi
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But patience is running thin, and Mr. Scholz will have to bring something to the table.

“There has to be a visible sign of commitment to the alliance,” Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff said. “That’s what other allies are doing: The Spanish, the Baltic countries, the Poles, the Brits — everyone has offered something to strengthen deterrence on the eastern flank.”

In a televised interview before leaving for the United States on Sunday, Mr. Scholz hinted that Germany might beef up its troop presence in Lithuania. He also mentioned the possibility of additional air patrols in eastern and Central Europe.

As important as any material commitment may be the words Mr. Scholz uses — or does not use — to publicly communicate that commitment.

“Maybe for the first time he could mention Nord Stream 2 by name when talking about possible sanctions,” Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff said.

“He needs to make a clear statement that Germany gets the situation and will stand with its allies.”

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/07/politics/us-intel-russia-doubts-invasion-ukraine/index.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin Says the West Is Goading Russia Into War With Ukraine—and Many Russians Agree
State propaganda is driving home Russian President Vladimir Putin’s explanation of why he has massed troops near Ukraine
Anastasia Bukhteyeva, a 24-year-old graduate student in Fryazino, a small town outside Moscow, says Russia isn’t at fault for the Ukraine standoff.
By Evan Gershkovich and Matthew Luxmoore | Photographs by Oksana Yushko for The Wall Street Journal
Feb. 8, 2022 5:30 am ET


Like many Russians, graduate student Anastasia Bukhteyeva hopes the current standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine doesn’t erupt into a full-scale war.

But if fighting does break out, the 24-year-old is sure of one thing: It won’t be Russia’s fault.

“I have a feeling that someone is trying to provoke Russia,” said Ms. Bukhteyeva, who is studying to be an elementary school teacher. “I don’t understand who this would be good for, but I feel like it would be good for America.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that Western powers are goading Moscow into attacking Ukraine. He says the U.S. and its allies are threatening Russia’s security with their military support of Kyiv and military exercises in the Black Sea. Moscow has amassed more than 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s border.

The West counters that Russia is illegally occupying part of Ukraine, that it is arming and financing proxy Russian forces that have occupied swaths of its industrial east, and that its troop buildup is aimed in part at pressuring Ukraine to return to Moscow’s sphere of influence.

With the Kremlin having stifled political opposition in Russia after a year-long crackdown on dissent, there are few voices left to challenge Mr. Putin’s hard-line message, which, according to pollsters and analysts, is key to winning the tacit support of a Russian population worn down by the Covid-19 pandemic and a stagnant economy.


People enjoying the weekend in Red Square in Moscow on Saturday.
In recent weeks, state-run media has increasingly echoed Mr. Putin’s depiction of Russia as a victim in the standoff. Television has accused Washington of bringing Ukrainians for military training run by the Central Intelligence Agency, sending U.S. mercenaries to Ukraine and helping transport chemical weapons to the Donbas, an area in eastern Ukraine where Russia fomented a separatist uprising against Kyiv in 2014.

Moscow, which denies backing the rebels, says it is coming to the aid of Russian speakers who suffer discrimination by Kyiv.

“Ukraine is being pumped with lethal weapons and whipped into a mass psychosis while Russia is cast as the main aggressor,” Dmitry Kiselyov, host of a prime-time news broadcast, said last week. “All possible provocations can be expected at any moment.”

In December, Mr. Putin compared events in the Donbas region to a “genocide,” playing on public prejudice and fears. Days later, the popular Russian TV talk-show 60 Minutes amplified the claim, suggesting that CIA operatives had flown in from the U.S. to sow discord in Ukraine.


The U.S., NATO and Russia are caught in a diplomatic standoff over Moscow's buildup of troops at the border with Ukraine. WSJ looks at what Russia wants and how Ukraine and its allies are preparing for a potential crisis. Photo: Andriy Dubchak/Associated Press
The U.S. warned in November that Russia could launch false flag operations to justify an attack, and last week officials said they had intelligence that Moscow was planning to release a video featuring a staged attack by Kyiv’s military forces.

“Putin’s policy is to keep all doors open, to keep all possibilities open,” said Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “But if Russia feels it necessary to attack, then it needs a pretext.”

Independent Russian pollster Levada Center found in December that two-thirds of respondents blame Ukraine, the U.S. or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the escalating tensions. Just 4% blamed the Kremlin.

Ilya Shepelin, who analyzes government-run media on the independent Dozhd television channel, said airtime devoted to Ukraine is now at its highest level since Moscow seized Crimea in early 2014 and began backing the rebellion in Donbas.

“The main point is that we don’t want to attack Ukraine,” Mr. Shepelin said of the view advanced on state media. “We are peace-loving, but Western media are making us the aggressors.”


Ilya Shepelin, host of the ‘Fake News’ program on Dozhd television channel, at work on Friday in Moscow.
Russian propaganda has also fueled the continued armed conflict over Donbas. In one oft-cited incident early in the war, Russian state television aired a report alleging Ukrainian forces had publicly crucified a three-year-old child. The story turned out to be fake.

By then, a surge of patriotism inspired by the seizure of Crimea and the narrative around the Donbas uprising helped to boost Mr. Putin’s popular support.

This time, however, a mood of mobilization is absent in Russia.

Mr. Putin is simply “displaying his strength” to boost his approval ratings, said Ivan Mertsalov, an 18-year-old university student. “He doesn’t need an invasion.”

Many Russians have also opted out of closely tracking politics after a year that saw the opposition dismantled, independent media hounded and prominent rights groups closed, said Sergei Belanovsky, a sociologist.

Instead, Russians are more concerned about Covid-19 and their own finances, he said. At the end of December, state pollster VtSIOM found that rising inflation, the pandemic and falling standards of living after years of Western sanctions were bigger concerns than politics or the threat of war.

Since he first started hearing about Russian troop movements last fall, Ivan Popov, a bartender at a popular Moscow bar, has only overheard customers discuss the crisis a couple of times. “Our patrons mostly discuss the virus, who’s gotten sick,” he said.


Ivan Popov, a 30-year-old bartender in the Moscow metro on his way to work last week, says he hasn’t followed events too closely.
Mr. Popov, 30, believes “geopolitical games” are at fault for the tensions but he hasn’t followed events too closely because, he said, “It’s not my war.” For him, the pandemic and the economy were more important concerns.

Denis Volkov, director of Levada, said that, in focus groups, participants say they immediately change the channel on television or radio when they hear about Ukraine. That means most Russians haven’t actively tried to understand what has caused the escalation, Mr. Volkov said.

Ms. Bukhteyeva, the graduate student, gets her news from state television. Her view, she said, is that the U.S. “wants to undermine Russia’s reputation.”

“But people don’t want to go to war over this,” Mr. Belanovsky said. “And if there are real losses, there will be a real protest against the Kremlin.”


Olga Mazurova, a doctor and organizer of antiwar picketing, on Arbat Street in Moscow on Saturday.
Russian authorities have banned large demonstrations. And public opposition to a possible conflict has been muted. Leading artists, intellectuals and activists wrote a letter at the end of January to the Kremlin urging Russian leaders not to go to war with Ukraine and the West.

“The policy based on promoting the idea of such a war is immoral, irresponsible, and criminal, and cannot be implemented on behalf of Russia’s peoples,” they wrote.

The letter, which was posted as an online form open for anyone to sign, has garnered 5,000 signatures in less than two weeks.

One of those who signed, 62-year-old doctor Olga Mazurova, said she doesn’t think protests will sway Mr. Putin. Still, since December, she has rallied a group of two dozen mostly elderly journalists, academics and lawyers for the only kind of antiwar demonstrations now possible.

On weekends at several squares and pedestrian arteries in central Moscow, they take turns standing alone to circumvent Russia’s ban on mass gatherings and hold posters displaying the slogan: “No to war.”

“This won’t stop unless every one of us little guys in Russia who cares puts in at least a minimal contribution,” Dr. Mazurova said. “Or at least isn’t an accomplice to this crime.”

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin Is Operating on His Own Timetable, and It May Be a Long One
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine could turn into a drawn-out and dangerous diplomatic slog toward a difficult settlement.


A Ukrainian soldier on the front in southern Ukraine. It is likely that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia will seek to keep tensions high for the foreseeable future.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times
Anton Troianovski
By Anton Troianovski
Feb. 8, 2022
Updated 3:53 p.m. ET
MOSCOW — The Ukraine crisis is here to stay.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia is increasingly staking his legacy on reversing Ukraine’s pro-Western shift. Even if he does not order an invasion this winter, he is making clear that he will keep the pressure on, backed by the threat of force, for as long as it takes to get his way.

But Ukraine’s leaders have so far refused to compromise on Mr. Putin’s terms, and the West sees the Kremlin’s demand for a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as a nonstarter. That leaves the best-case scenario as a long and dangerous diplomatic slog toward a difficult settlement — a process that could consume Western resources and attention for many months.

President Emmanuel Macron of France, shuttling from Moscow to Kyiv to Berlin on Monday and Tuesday, described the coming days as crucial in the West’s bid to avert war. Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, in some of his strongest comments yet, insisted that Russia would suffer “far-reaching consequences” if it attacked Ukraine.

Mr. Putin has countered with a pledge to keep the “dialogue” going. It is a message that implies he would be deliberate in using his levers of influence and coercion to deal with the longstanding Russian grievances that the Kremlin appears newly determined to address.

Russia’s current military buildup around Ukraine is so extensive that Mr. Putin will have to decide in the coming weeks whether to order an invasion or pull some troops back, analysts say. But even if he draws them down, he will have other means to keep his adversaries on edge, like exercises of his nuclear forces, cyberattacks or future buildups. And if he does attack, the West’s current diplomatic scramble is likely to only intensify.

“I expect we’ll have this crisis with us, in various forms, for all of 2022, at least,” said Andrei Sushentsov, dean of the school of international relations at MGIMO, the elite Moscow university run by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

He described the current standoff as only the first step in a drawn-out Russian effort to force the West to agree to a new security architecture for Eastern Europe. It was a characterization of the start of a more high-stakes phase in Russia’s yearslong conflict with the West that is gaining currency in Moscow’s foreign-policy circles.

Russia’s aim, according to Mr. Sushentsov: keep the threat of war ever-present, and thus compel negotiations that Western officials have avoided until now.


For too long, he said in an interview, people in Western Europe have been lulled into thinking that a new war on the continent was impossible. For Mr. Putin, that point of view needs to be changed, Mr. Sushentsov said, to compel the West to accept Russia’s demands.


“What’s important is this suspense, this feeling of a prewar situation,” Mr. Sushentsov said. “People are spoiled by an overly long peace. They think of security as a given, as something that is attained for free, rather than something that must be negotiated. This is a mistake.”

For the West, that approach could mean being drawn into a new sort of “forever war” — a conflict consuming ever more time and treasure, with no clear exit strategy. The lesson of the chaotic Afghan withdrawal last summer, to Mr. Putin, may have been that the U.S. has no stomach for a distant conflict — and Ukraine is distant to the U.S. but not to Russia.

President Biden came to office determined to focus the U.S. and its allies on the long-term threat of managing a rising China — a technological, military and economic competitor. But now it is Mr. Putin who has seized the administration’s attention.

One senior European diplomat said in Washington recently that six months ago, no one was discussing a threat to the fundamental order that was created after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

“Now we all are,’’ he said.

Mr. Biden on Monday characterized a Russian invasion of Ukraine as “tanks or troops crossing the border.” But American officials say that there remain numerous lower-grade options that Mr. Putin is considering that could touch off a less deadly but still costly conflict.

Mr. Biden’s deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, Anne Neuberger, was at NATO last week trying to shore up the alliance’s defenses in case Mr. Putin decides that the least costly way to destabilize the Zelensky government is by turning off the power or communications.


Even if Mr. Macron, working with Mr. Biden and other Western leaders, were to help secure a temporary relaxation of tensions, Mr. Putin’s demands are so expansive — and his disdain of Ukraine’s pro-Western leaders so great — that analysts struggle to imagine a grand bargain being struck.

Ruslan Pukhov, a Russian military analyst, said that even if the West and Ukraine were to make sufficient concessions in the coming weeks to avert an armed conflict, they would be unlikely to satisfy Russia in the longer term, adding that a renewed threat of war could come next year.

“The West just doesn’t understand how much this is a question of life or death for us,” said Mr. Pukhov, who runs the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a privately owned think tank in Moscow. “Ukraine in NATO, from my point of view or Russia’s, would be the equivalent of nuclear war.”


Mr. Putin made the threat of war over Ukraine between nuclear superpowers explicit twice in recent days — in news conferences after his meetings with Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary last week and with Mr. Macron on Monday. Both times, Mr. Putin described a scenario in which Ukraine would join NATO and then, with the Western alliance’s backing, try to recapture Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula that Russia annexed in 2014.

A brewing conflict. Antagonism between Ukraine and Russia has been simmering since 2014, when the Russian military crossed into Ukrainian territory, annexing Crimea and whipping up a rebellion in the east. A tenuous cease-fire was reached in 2015, but peace has been elusive.

A spike in hostilities. Russia has recently been building up forces near its border with Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s messaging toward its neighbor has hardened. Concern grew in late October, when Ukraine used an armed drone to attack a howitzer operated by Russian-backed separatists.

Ominous warnings. Russia called the strike a destabilizing act that violated the cease-fire agreement, raising fears of a new intervention in Ukraine that could draw the United States and Europe into a new phase of the conflict.

The Kremlin’s position. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has increasingly portrayed NATO’s eastward expansion as an existential threat to his country, said that Moscow’s military buildup was a response to Ukraine’s deepening partnership with the alliance.

Rising tension. Western countries have tried to maintain a dialogue with Moscow. But administration officials recently warned that the U.S. could throw its weight behind a Ukrainian insurgency should Russia invade.

Dmitri Kiselyov, one of Russian state television’s leading anchors, on Sunday detailed what would happen next: a nuclear war in which Russia, faced with its own destruction, would take the West with it.

“Let’s remember that Russia doesn’t need a world without Russia,” Mr. Kiselyov intoned at the beginning of his weekly prime-time show, paraphrasing a 2018 line by Mr. Putin. “And then not just America, but also Europe, will turn into radioactive ash.”


Western officials describe NATO membership for Ukraine as unrealistic anytime in the near future, but the Kremlin insists that even the possibility poses an existential threat. On the ground, analysts see preparations gaining pace for a possible military solution to preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO.

Researchers monitoring satellite imagery and footage of troop movements posted to social media say that Russia is deploying personnel and equipment to within miles of the border with Ukraine. The forces have been filmed setting up tents in the mud and snow, adding to fears that Mr. Putin could order an attack as early as this month.

“It’s safe to say that this is not a force posture that Russia is going to maintain for an extended period of time,” said Michael Kofman, the director of Russia studies at CNA, a research institute based in Arlington, Va. “They are entering a go/no-go posture, and they’re going to make that decision in the coming weeks.”



But even if an attack were to happen, touching off what would most likely be enormous human suffering in Ukraine, the diplomatic scramble would continue — with Russia exercising even more leverage, Mr. Kofman argues.

“Diplomacy continues throughout war,” he said. “Ultimately, there would need to be some sort of agreement.”

Despite the worrying troop movements, many analysts inside Russia continue to doubt that Mr. Putin will actually order a full invasion. The risks would far exceed any of Mr. Putin’s prior military pushes, like the five-day war against Georgia in 2008 or the still-simmering proxy war in eastern Ukraine that he started in 2014. Russian missiles could miss their targets, causing civilian casualties; Ukraine could respond by attacking Russian targets across the border.


“I think most military officials understand that any operation would be rife with great difficulties,” Mr. Pukhov, the Russian military analyst, said. “One has to understand that even in the event of limited military action, you won’t be able to avoid a major escalation and it won’t conclude in five days.”

The Kremlin said on Tuesday that Russia would withdraw the thousands of troops it had sent to Belarus, Ukraine’s northern neighbor, after large-scale joint exercises concluded there on Feb. 20. Whether the Russian troops indeed leave will be one closely watched signal of Mr. Putin’s military intentions. Even if they do, Russia’s newfound appetite for attention-grabbing military pressure against Ukraine and the West is likely to remain.

“Russia has departed from the tactic of simply asking to be listened to,” Mr. Sushentsov, the university dean, said. “Russian leaders have seen that this does not work and that it is necessary to make clear the risks of the Russian position being ignored.”

David E. Sanger contributed reporting from Washington.

[Crafty_Dog]

Too bad we are not the ones selling to Germany , , ,


February 9, 2022
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How Germany’s Energy Needs Limit Sanctions on Russia
There’s a limit to how much German manufacturing can phase out its use of natural gas.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Russia’s ongoing troop buildup near the Ukrainian border has led to more than a month of intense diplomacy as well as new U.S. military deployments in Eastern Europe. The West typically responds to Russian aggression with economic sanctions. But since the West has already been sanctioning Russia for years following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and its role in the war in eastern Ukraine, to have an impact any new sanctions would need to tackle Russian energy supplies to Europe – especially the forthcoming Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea.

In the current environment, this will be complicated if not impossible. The Ukraine crisis comes as Europe is dealing with soaring gas prices and internal divisions over how to reduce its usage of fossil fuels over the long term. The Kremlin knows this – and it has made the most of this chance to test the West. Moscow wanted to see if NATO (and the European Union) would stick together, and if so, what their response would be. While the discussions take place between the West and Russia and between Western allies, understanding what’s at the core of the crisis can help us anticipate the economic steps the players could take next.

Germany Is the Key

An agreement within the EU to sanction Russian energy flows is an impossible task. Such sanctions need unanimous support among the 27 EU member states. More than a third of Europe’s gas comes from Russia, and some countries, like the Baltics, Bulgaria and Austria, get more than 70 percent of their gas from their big eastern neighbor. What’s more, there are few alternative suppliers who could quickly meet Europe’s needs. This means Brussels is very limited in how aggressive it can be against Russia’s energy sector.

European Union Countries Most Dependent on Russian Energy
(click to enlarge)

A more likely approach would be for Europe to sanction the crown jewel of Russia’s energy strategy toward Europe: the not-yet-operational Nord Stream 2. Cognizant of Russia’s energy strategy and the EU’s limitations, the United States for years has warned that the 750-mile (1,200-kilometer) Nord Stream 2 – by bypassing Ukraine and thus depriving it of leverage as well as transit fees – could further diminish Ukraine’s security. Washington’s allies in Eastern Europe saw things similarly. Poland and the Baltics noted that, once Nord Stream 2 is operational, Russia could better use energy as a geopolitical tool to influence and divide Europe. Moreover, Moscow could cut off supplies to Ukraine and, indirectly, to Eastern Europe, forcing those states to become more dependent on Western European energy infrastructure. But efforts to block construction of Nord Stream 2 failed and attempts to find alternative gas sources foundered over delays and cost. All the while, Europe’s dependence on Russian gas grew.

The pandemic closed off the opportunity for Europe to find alternatives to Russian energy. The supply chain crisis, followed by the energy crisis in 2021, has forced Europe to scramble to ensure it has enough stored gas to last through the winter. No matter how promising, investments in new technologies – be they batteries or hydrogen – will bear fruit only in the long term. To avoid further economic disruption, Europe needs to make the most of its existing contractual relationships and the existing energy infrastructure.

Since European energy prices started soaring late last year, many voices in the bloc and in the U.S. have accused Russia of market manipulation. Moscow has dismissed the charges, but the Ukraine crisis only made things worse. As a result, the U.S. joined in trying to secure alternative gas suppliers for Europe. On Jan. 7, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell and Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson in Washington. Talks are underway to increase liquefied natural gas supplies to the EU from Norway, Qatar, Azerbaijan and Algeria. LNG isn’t a perfect replacement for Russian gas, but it can help. Another change over the past month or so is that the U.S. has insisted that Nord Stream 2 will not move forward if Russia invades Ukraine. In a more measured response, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said the pipeline could be up for discussion as part of sanctions measures.

Why Germany Can’t Give In

Germany’s energy consumption has rebounded from the pandemic, and although Berlin is an avid supporter of green energy, when confronted with the energy crisis it switched coal production back on. Conventional, nonrenewable sources of energy accounted for more than 50 percent of its electricity generation in the third quarter of 2021. The German coal industry association said in January that Germany imported 24.5 percent more coal by volume than in 2020, and it expects that figure to increase by 7.7 percent in 2022. (Even here, Germany relies on Russia: Approximately 53 percent of hard coal that goes into German power generators and steelmakers came from Russia last year, according to the coal industry association.)

German Energy Consumption | 2000-2021
(click to enlarge)

Germany has invested in increasing its renewable energy, but wind and solar can’t yet replace natural gas, which comes almost exclusively from abroad. Germany produces only about 3 percent of the gas that it consumes, and more than one-third of its imported gas comes from Russia. Although natural gas burning accounts for only 15-17 percent of German electricity generation, according to the latest data from utility industry group BDEW, about half of German households rely on gas supplies for heating during the winter. When Germany loses part of its gas imports – for whatever reason and from whatever source – it must increase its coal-fired generation at home or import more power from neighbors to fill the gap.

The U.S. has offered to send Germany more LNG if Nord Stream 2 is abandoned, but Germany lacks LNG infrastructure. A few places in Europe have the port infrastructure to accept LNG, like Britain, northwestern Europe, Poland and the Mediterranean, but the latter two locations are still young in their development. What little LNG Germany imports mostly comes through the Dutch Gate Terminal, which can handle just 12 billion cubic meters per year. This could be expanded but it would take time and investment.

Finally, there’s a limit to how much Germany can phase out natural gas, and that limit is found in German manufacturing. Manufacturing accounts for more than half of the gas that Germany consumes. To consume less, some manufacturing sectors would need to reinvent their production processes and invest in new technologies – all of which is costly. But there are also industries for which hydrocarbons are not only a source of energy but also a raw material. The chemical sector is probably the best example. Chemical manufacturing involves the production of pretty much everything we use today – because (sadly) plastic is part of most things that we consume. The chemical industry also produces fertilizers, which are key to agriculture and thus the food supply chain, and supports the pharmaceutical industry.

The pharmaceutical sector is one reason it is unlikely that Germany’s dependence on natural gas imports will diminish. If anything, it could grow. Sometimes called the world’s pharmacy, Germany is home to more than 500 pharmaceutical companies, including big corporations like Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim and Merck. Germany is also Europe’s largest and the world’s fourth-largest pharmaceutical market, and considering the country’s demographics, it is only going to grow in the coming years.

At the same time, the pandemic brought forth a key security problem for the health sector: the need to limit shortages in the supply of medicines and vaccines. This is why the new German governing coalition has announced that it wants to take steps to relocate the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals back to Germany. This includes reducing the bureaucratic burden, examining investment subsidies for production sites and considering subsidies to ensure security of supply. Moreover, in the field of biopharmaceuticals – the most advanced pharmaceutical production and an area with high growth potential – Germany is the most important player in Europe. In terms of the number of active ingredients produced, Germany ranks second worldwide, behind the U.S., an advantage that it intends to keep – but one that depends on a stable gas supply.

Pharmaceuticals alone are not the reason Berlin can’t say no to Nord Stream 2, but Germany’s strategy to reshore the most important industries from abroad, in an attempt to diminish supply chain shortages, certainly weighs on the decision. To produce more at home Germany needs energy, and with alternative sources expensive or years of research away, conventional energy sources and natural gas in particular remain important. Moscow is very aware of Germany’s threefold dependence on its gas, oil and coal. The reason for Russia’s buildup near Ukraine was in part to test the newly installed government in Berlin on its trans-Atlantic ties. In other words, Moscow stress-tested NATO and the EU. Neither bloc has broken, and in fact NATO has increased its troop presence along its eastern flank.

Creative Solutions

At the same time, the West needs to think about other ways to keep Russia from becoming more aggressive. The effectiveness of sanctions generally turns on two basic variables: domestic market size (the loss of the U.S. or EU as a potential market for one’s exports versus, say, the market of Kyrgyzstan) and global market share (when one country holds a near-monopoly on the production of certain goods, it’s hard to sanction that country). Considering the above, the EU may have reached the limit of using sanctions against Russia due to its near-monopoly position on the European (especially German) energy market.

However, Western countries have some of their own monopolies in the global economic system. A prominent example is SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication network, which ensures the execution of virtually all banking payments. SWIFT is domiciled in Belgium – a member of both the EU and NATO – which makes it relatively simple to leverage it in the event of renewed, targeted sanctions. The U.S. has also threatened to cut Russia off from cutting-edge technologies.

For another example, the U.K. is a dominant player in the shipping insurance industry. In 2010, when the West was seeking to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, maritime insurer Lloyd’s announced that it would stop underwriting gasoline imports to Iran, a move that has had important consequences for Iran’s economy by exacerbating the plunge of Iran’s national currency and triggering a loss in Iran’s foreign reserves. In theory, it could do the same to Russia.

This is just speculation so far, but the point is that unless Berlin can be convinced to take a hard line against Moscow on energy, the West may have to get creative with its economic diplomacy. For now, military posturing is the strongest message the West has sent to Russia. If nothing else happens, NATO’s eastern frontier and Russia’s western border will remain the most militarized in Europe.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1678609/war-with-russia-can-explode-literally-at-the-speed-of-light-heres-why

Michael Yon@MichaelYon
7 hours ago
War with Russia Can Explode -- literally at the Speed of Light: Here's why
10 February 2022
Miami, Florida
Mind Dump, Sans Edit

Watching this all unfold. Like a glacier creeping across an awakening super volcano.

Using FlightRadar24 and other methods, am watching large numbers of American military aircraft -- including B-52s -- moving forward to places like Poland.

If this touches off, it's very difficult to imagine a likely scenario in which this does not quickly spread.

As you know, last year I spent several weeks in Lithuania and warned many times that the Polish and Lithuania borders were being probed using migrants as cover, while developing a migrant-pump and pipeline as a weapon in case of war. The migrants can be used both as human shields and cover to send in spies and special forces.

But that's the small war. The big war can hit the high seas and Americans everywhere in a matter of minutes.

Imagine a simple scenario in which Russia invades beginning with cyberwar, information war, airstrikes, rocket strikes, artillery, and ground invasion. Many of the rockets, artillery, and other weapons are being fired from within the borders of Belarus and Russia.

The US provides direct intelligence or even firepower against Russian ground troops. Russia attacks our space assets, and lights up our aircraft with fire control radar in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, for starters.

Russia loses troops early on, and respond by launching surface-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles from within Belarus/Russia at US forces, and shoots down American aircraft.

Now what are we to do? Russia and Belarus are using electronic warfare, fire control radar, and weapons that are stationed WITHIN their sovereign borders.

How will you respond? Firing back at the fire control radar, artillery, and air bases, would comprise a clear attack on their own people in their own homelands. Remember -- Russia can put people into space more reliably than the US Postal Service can deliver your mail before spying on it.

The Bear has spies working all around America including within the US military, CIA, and the works. We are Woke like that.

If we fire into Russia and Belarus, even by accident, that's the first shot of World War III. You can bet there will not be any commercial air travel within hundreds of miles of the battle zone -- and in fact all air travel to Europe might be closed at the beginning of a cold winter.

Meanwhile, not to target-fixate, Iran and others are eyeing up the region, including Israel. And then there is Taiwan. Our own borders are wide open. Food, fuel, and fertilizer prices are steadily rising.

The Canadian trucker strike -- growing in seriousness by the hour -- and the American truck strike that is forming, and I will join if the Blue Devils and not started World War III yet.

Friends write messages with quips such as, "We will close Nord Stream II." Russia will take the pipeline in Ukraine.

There is every reason to believe that The Beast will create an emergency situation in America and the pretense of a Republic will crumble this year. If you believe the got away with stealing elections the first time, why would they not do it again? Or just cancel elections all together. It's an emergency, after all. Take the jab. March to war. Pay your taxes. And shut up or die.

The war with Russia can explode at the speed of fire control radar. The speed of light.

[Crafty_Dog]

The West’s Dilemma of Sanctioning Russian Aggression in Ukraine
16 MIN READFeb 11, 2022 | 22:44 GMT





The flags of NATO member countries are seen on a billboard in Riga, Latvia, on Nov. 28, 2021, two days before the start of meetings to discuss Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine.
The flags of NATO member countries are seen on a billboard in Riga, Latvia, on Nov. 28, 2021, two days before the start of meetings to discuss Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine.

(GINTS IVUSKANS/AFP via Getty Images)

Less than a month after the United Kingdom’s 1939 declaration of war against Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill famously described Russia’s actions as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Churchill’s quote likely still rings true today in how Western leaders view their Russian counterparts — especially regarding Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine. But it is probably an even more accurate description of the trillion-dollar question North American and European governments are facing if Russia invades Ukraine — that is, how to sanction the Russian economy in a way that maximizes pressure while minimizing blowback.

This dilemma is exposing Western Europe’s incredible dependence on Russian energy supplies, as well as NATO allies’ divergent positions on how far to go in sanctioning Russia. Canada and the United States’ geographic distance from Ukraine and relative independence from Russian energy exports give them the space to take more antagonistic positions with fewer consequences compared with European countries like Germany, which receives more than half of its natural gas from Russia.

As the specter of a Russian invasion grows, Western leaders risk backing themselves into a corner where they are forced to implement sanctions just for the sake of doing something that goes beyond a diplomatic response but falls short of a military intervention. This strategy, however, could backfire as sanctions have proven to be limited in their ability to deter behavior — let alone Russia’s — and are also politically challenging to remove once they’re in place.

The Dilemma of Russian Energy Exports
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has focused on exporting natural gas, oil, defense and minerals to countries around the world, as well as deeply intertwining its economy with those in Europe. This makes carving out the Russian economy — which is the world’s 11th largest — from the global economy via robust and sweeping sanctions a disruptive procedure, particularly at a time when Western countries are dealing with energy price-fueled inflation.

Over the years, the United States has also placed substantial sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela designed to significantly disrupt their economic activity. But compared with Russia, these countries’ economies are far smaller and less interconnected with global markets, which have limited the blowback of such sanctions. Iran and Venezuela, for example, are also two major oil exporters. But Russia alone exported 4.3 million barrels per day in 2021 — a level that neither Iranian nor Venezuelan oil production has reached in 40 years.

In February 2021, a colleague of mine wrote that sanctions are more effective when they “[focus] on the greatest point(s) of leverage.” There’s little disagreement that Russia’s dependence on oil and gas revenue is its Achilles’ heel and where Western sanctions could inflict the most pain. In 2021, the oil and gas industry accounted for 36% of the Russian budget and 49% of Russian exports. But there’s just as little disagreement that Europe’s dependence on Russian energy exports is also its Achilles’ heel and serves as Moscow’s primary leverage point against the West. Russia exported a whopping 185 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Europe in 2020 — equivalent to 38% of all global LNG trade that year.

Sanctioning Russian energy exports (particularly natural gas, due to the difficulty in securing alternatives given infrastructure constraints) would thus have immediate repercussions for Europe, as would imposing other measures (like severing Russia’s access to the SWIFT global financial messaging system) that prompt Russia to cut off its natural gas exports to the Continent. The loss of Russian energy exports — whether through direct sanctions or indirect Russian retaliation — would lead to substantial natural gas shortages in Europe due to the lack of alternatives to replace Russian shipments, causing significant social and economic unrest across the Continent as natural gas (and other) prices rise.

This, in turn, makes targeting Russia’s energy exports a terrible option for Western leaders as they seek to find a strategy designed to maximize economic pressure on Moscow and minimize blowback on European countries.

Central and Eastern European countries are incredibly dependent on Russian natural gas. In 2020, Russian natural gas exports accounted for 34% of natural gas consumed in Europe (including Turkey). Many Western European countries, like Spain and France, import very little Russian natural gas. But countries in Central and Eastern Europe, like Slovakia and Austria, are highly dependent on Russian natural gas. In 2020, Germany imported 56.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia, or approximately 63% percent of its overall consumption.
There is no immediate alternative to Russian natural gas. U.S. and European leaders have approached other large exporters of liquified natural gas (LNG) — including Qatar, whose emir visited Washington earlier this month — about increasing exports to Europe in the event of a gas cut-off or sanctions. But excess gas production is limited. Unlike the global oil market, the LNG market lacks a swing producer like Saudi Arabia that can quickly surge exports in the event of a major disruption of supplies. Russia’s 185 billion cubic meters of natural gas exports to Europe in 2020 was equivalent to a whopping 38% of the globally traded LNG market.
Europe will need to refill gas storage during the summer. Although European countries are coming out of the 2021-22 winter season when natural gas demand peaks due to demand for heating, European natural gas storage levels are just 35% full, and will probably further decline to around 30% by March. This means European countries will need to refill gas storage levels before the 2022-23 winter season, which will require Russian natural gas. Typically, European gas storage levels reach around 100 billion cubic meters when they peak at the start of the winter.
The West’s Options for Retaliation
The United States and Europe have refrained from outlining the specific sanctions that they are considering amid the escalating Ukraine crisis in lieu of broader sanctions that could affect Russian energy exports to Europe. But leaks cited in recent reports suggest the West is considering a host of sanctions that would have a significant medium- and long-term impact on the Russian economy, including barring investment into strategic industries like oil and gas. Western countries have allegedly sparred over the precise details of the sanctions — like which Russian financial institutions, companies or oligarchs would be targeted, or what projects or sectors would be exempted.

The United States can more quickly enact sanctions compared with the European Union, where adopting sanctions requires unanimous approval from member sanctions. Washington is thus likely to take the most aggressive action when it comes to sanctioning Russia over its actions in Ukraine. Home to the world’s largest economy, the United States is also able to leverage its importance in the international financial system to force its sanctions on other countries in a way that no other government can.
Differences between Western countries’ views on Russia will also make sustaining any sanctions policy difficult. While the United States can maintain its sanction policy indefinitely without other countries vetoing it, the EU foreign policy requirement for unanimity means that Russia will try to pick off more vulnerable European countries to vote against European sanctions and any extensions of them.
As evidenced by the long-running split between Berlin and Washington over sanctioning Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, there is unlikely to be full alignment between all Western governments on what a final sanctions package entails in response to a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine. But in addition to less impactful sanctions like asset freezes and travel bans targeting Russian government officials, the final package will likely include a combination of the following measures:

Expanded sanctions on Russia’s financial sector. The United States, United Kingdom and European Union will likely blacklist more Russian financial institutions and impose restrictions designed to limit Russia’s ability to convert rubles to hard currencies, like the U.S. dollar, euro or British pound. One bill proposed in the U.S. Congress would sanction Russia’s three largest banks, including VTB and Sberbank, which are essential to Russian households, pension funds and workers.
Expanded sanctions on Russia’s energy sector designed to reduce long-term investment. The United States and European Union appear likely to place restrictions on financing, technology transfers and other related activities to new Russian oil and gas projects, particularly more technologically challenging that Western companies are participating in. Washington and Brussels could also expand some of the restrictions on Russian Arctic and shale projects they imposed in response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. In addition, the United States and (less likely) Europe could impose broad sanctions on Russia’s newer pipeline projects, including Nord Stream 2, and potential future ones as well.
Expansive controls on exports of high-tech products to Russia. Despite having a large economy, Russia lacks an expansive tech sector that produces and develops the products that will be strategically important in the coming decades, like high-end electronics, biotechnology, semiconductors and green technology. U.S. export controls on Chinese smartphone manufacturer Huawei have shown how effective such measures can be in cutting off a company or country’s access to technology in these key fields. Russia’s small market and the limited direct impact on Russia’s oil and gas exports make export controls an attractive option for retaliating against Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, particularly amid the West’s policy of increasing similar restrictions against China. Sanctions limiting access to foreign-made chips would also hit Russia’s two most popular processors for military and government applications, Elbrus and Baikal, as they are currently manufactured by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and would likely fall under sanctions.
Expanded sanctions on Russian oligarchs viewed as being close to the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other key Russian officials. The United States and European Union relied heavily on sanctioning Russian oligarchs as a part of their response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea in hopes of causing enough economic pain on Putin’s inner circle to informally pressure him to change his policy. While an expansion of this strategy is likely, there are constraints as many of the obvious oligarchs have already been targeted in some fashion. Sanctions on key oligarchs can also lead to significant repercussions across the global economy. U.S. Treasury sanctions targeting Oleg Deripaska and Rusal (the Russian aluminum giant he controlled) led to a 20% spike in aluminum prices in 2018, and remained elevated until Washington eventually reached a deal to reduce sanctions on the company less than a year later.
Russia’s Vulnerability
The sanctions that are being proposed by Western leaders in the case of a Russian invasion of Ukraine are designed to limit the impact on Russia’s oil and gas exports to Europe and do not reach for the proverbial “nuclear option” of SWIFT sanctions. But it is likely that the level of sanctions the West is considering — even if not immediately impactful — will still have dire consequences for Russia by 2030 if they remain in place.

Russia’s economic model is already undergoing significant structural changes. The country is entering a period of prolonged demographic decline and its economic dependence on emissions-intensive natural resources will struggle to maintain relevance in a greener economy. Russia’s technological capabilities continue to wane amid its struggles to shift toward a digital economy that manufactures high technology goods. The technology areas where Russian companies are still globally competitive are chiefly in Soviet-era legacy industries like aerospace and defense. But in even these sectors, Russian firms are falling behind their competitors in the West and, increasingly, China. Simply put, it is likely that the level of sanctions the West is considering — even if not immediately impactful — will still have dire consequences for Russia by 2030 if they remain in place. These economic weaknesses mean the sanctions measures the West is considering would likely still have a significant impact over the medium- and long-term for Russia.

Nonetheless, Russia has been able to weather Western sanctions put into place since 2014 over Crimea and other issues without a visible impact thus far, which could make Moscow overconfident in its ability to withstand additional economic pressure. Russia has spent the last decade making their economy more insulated from Western sanctions. As a result, the Kremlin may feel it has taken enough steps to weather new Ukraine-related sanctions from the United States and Europe. However, Western sanctions may be far more aggressive than anything Russia's stopgap measures are designed to protect against — thus creating the possibility of a miscalculation on Russia’s part if it decides to invade Ukraine.

The Issue of ‘Sticky’ Sanctions
Without a dramatic turn of events in Russia, Ukraine or Europe, it is difficult to imagine a series of events that would prompt the West to relax whatever sanctions it imposes over the current Ukraine crisis. It has been proven to be politically difficult for Western governments to actually remove sanctions against non-democratic countries without a significant change in policy, as acutely illustrated by the United States’ 60-year-old sanctions on Cuba. Clearly, Cuba is no longer the same national security threat it was back when the sanctions were first enacted in 1962 — when the island nation hosted Soviet ballistic missiles and served as a central part of the Cold War. But the inertia of U.S. sanctions policy has never really made it politically feasible for the United States to relax and suspend the embargo on Cuba, as there has not been a change of government in Cuba, even though the United States does not have sanctions on at least a dozen countries that have worse human rights and rule of law records.

More recently, the political inertia behind the U.S. sanctions policy on Iran showed how, even if a country negotiated a deal with the United States to relax sanctions, that deal may not be permanent if there’s a change of U.S. administration, even though Iran was following through with its end the bargain. Given the current political environment in the United States (and parts of Europe), such challenges will likely also plague any new U.S. sanctions placed on Russia over the Ukraine crisis – making the sanctions policy “sticky.”

An effective sanctions strategy will include clear and concrete strategic objectives in their design and attach conditions for their removal to those objectives. If the United States and European Union place sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine, those concrete objectives could either be:

Entering negotiations for a cease-fire and the end of the Russian invasion. Russia will almost certainly have the upper hand in any invasion of Ukraine and it is hard to imagine the Russian military getting bogged down to the point where it would want to enter negotiations to end the conflict. That would be tantamount to Russia admitting defeat and allowing a pro-Western government to remain in Ukraine.
Deterring Russia from broader military action beyond Ukraine. The problem with using sanctions as a form of deterrence is that deterrence needs a level of permanence. Sanctions as a form of deterrence, in this case, would be problematic because if Russia “wins” in Ukraine and installs a pro-Russian government, Moscow risks seeing the cost of sanctions as worthwhile and is less likely to change its future behavior beyond Ukraine. Moreover, in the case of such a Russian “victory” in Ukraine, there would also not be a clear point where the Western governments could politically justify suspending or removing sanctions on Russia like they could if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine failed and sanctions removal was a part of a peace settlement.
A High-Stakes Situation
Western leaders are more likely to design a sanctions policy with domestic political objectives in mind and the need to punish Russia for invading Ukraine in the first place. The most realistic way for sanctions to be removed would either involve Russia making significant concessions (and it remains unclear what those would be) or a significant mea culpa by the West to end the sanctions due to them being ineffective or, worse, causing more significant harm.

A scenario in which Western sanctions make matters worse could transpire if the Kremlin feels that, in order for sanctions to be removed, it must escalate tensions elsewhere in Europe — whether through saber-rattling in the Baltics or threatening to cut off gas to European markets. Regardless of veracity, Russian leaders may perceive that further destabilizing behavior elsewhere in Europe may ironically give Moscow the leverage it needs to force the West to remove sanctions once a pro-Russia government is set up in Kyiv or the conflict in Ukraine becomes even more deadlocked than it already is.

If the new sanctions persist indefinitely, there could be long-term strategic repercussions, as it would represent a significant first step in isolating the Russian economy from that of the West. This would thereby result in Moscow, Beijing, and other non-Western countries accelerating efforts to create alternatives to the Western-led and developed financial system that can give Western sanctions so much bite. Such an outcome risks Russia becoming more insular and resulting in a turn to neo-Cold War dynamics where economic relations between Russia and the West are reduced substantially, leading to more hostility on numerous friction points.

It will also force Russia to become more dependent on China as a partner. Although recent media attention has focused on Moscow and Beijing’s apparently budding ties, China has incentives to not fully embrace Russia. Given that Russia needs China more than the reverse, China may initially respond by keeping Russia at an arm's length in order to avoid disrupting its own economic relationship with Western countries. But even if it doesn’t more closely align with Russia, China could still view an aggressive sanctions package from the West as a sign of possible risks in the event of future conflict in Taiwan or the South China Sea. As a result, Beijing would likely only increase its efforts to create international financial mechanisms globally that could operate regardless of U.S. sanctions policy and limit the extraterritorial impact of Western sanctions on its non-Western trading partners.

As questions remain about the long-term impact of new sanctions on China and Russia’s relationships with each other and with the West, so will the strategic risk that Western countries incur by going down the sanctions path. Western sanctions strategies have long been criticized for being strategically ineffective in achieving their objectives. And that strategy will face the most significant test yet if Russia invades Ukraine

[Crafty_Dog]

I've commented on Schroder previously.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/11/germany-russia-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR3PAjBj4TOa17BW5fI9tb3uY9C1iuBVw9ixj3to3VeCVrD3JC1JWthdGxc

The former chancellor and friend of Putin’s at the heart of Germany’s Russia struggle

Former chancellor Gerhard Schröder, flanked by the German flag, attends a 2019 soccer match against Serbia. (Alex Grimm/Getty Images)
By Loveday Morris
February 11, 2022 at 11:28 a.m. EST



BERLIN — For Germany’s new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, a former leader has become a headache.

As Russian troops massed on the borders of Ukraine, Gerhard Schröder — who led Germany from 1998 to 2005 for Scholz’s Social Democrats — accused Kyiv of stoking tensions by “saber-rattling.” He called out “Russia-bashing” in the media.

The ensuing furor only grew when the 77-year-old former chancellor was nominated Feb. 4 to the board of Russia’s state-owned energy giant Gazprom, cementing his place as the personification of Germany’s deep energy ties with Russia, and of President Vladimir Putin’s expanding reach into European politics through Moscow’s natural gas riches.

The move has raised concerns that Putin could be using his longtime friend to drive a wedge into Germany’s governing party as it struggles to formulate a coherent policy toward Moscow as Russian troops gather near Ukraine’s borders. And Scholz’s party has been left scrambling to distance itself from Schröder, amid questions about how much influence the former chancellor-turned-Russian energy lobbyist still wields.

In showdown with Russia, Germany struggles over economy, politics and history

Schröder was instrumental in giving birth to the project that has been the biggest sticking point between the German government and Washington during the current crisis: Nord Stream 2, the yet-to-be operational natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany.

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Despite pressure from the United States, Scholz has been reluctant to join President Biden in unequivocally stating that the pipeline will not be switched on in case of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, citing “strategic ambiguity.”


President Biden meets with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the Oval Office on Feb. 7, 2022. (Al Drago/Pool/EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock)
Although Schröder holds no political position in Germany, his links to the Russian energy sector in such a sensitive period have sparked condemnation from across the political spectrum, including calls to strip him of his taxpayer-funded perks.

“In these times of escalation, this is really wrong,” Roderich Kiesewetter, a Christian Democratic lawmaker on parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said of Schröder’s decision to increase his ties to the Russian energy sector.

At best, Kiesewetter said, Schröder is acting “completely inappropriately” and hurting the image of Germany. But the lawmaker also fears that the former chancellor is part of a Putin “chess game” to try to divide Scholz’s Social Democratic Party, which leads a three-party coalition formed after elections in September that marked the end of Angela Merkel’s stewardship of the country at 16 years.


“He’s a tool,” Kiesewetter said.

As tensions rise between Russia and West, a quiet back channel flows from Finland's president

The former chancellor is not alone in what has been dubbed an increasing “Schröderization” of European politics as Moscow tries to gain political influence via the revolving door between business and the halls of power.

There is the former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl, who last year was appointed to the board of Russia’s state-controlled oil giant Rosneft and was famously photographed in 2018 dancing with Putin at her wedding. Also, former French prime minister François Fillon was nominated last year to the boards of the Russian state oil company Zarubezhneft and the Russian petrochemicals giant Sibur. A former Austrian chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel, was made a board member of the Russian oil firm Lukoil in 2019.

But none of their ties come close to Schröder’s in scope and influence. The former chancellor declined an interview request and did not respond to questions sent to his office.


“[Putin’s] aim is to damage Germany’s credibility among it’s partners, whether its the United States or E.U. partners,” Sudha David-Wilp, deputy director of the Berlin office of the German Marshall Fund, said of Putin’s intentions with Schröder’s new nomination. “Perhaps it’s working.”

But more important, she said, is the question of how the Social Democrats solve their disagreements over their party’s Russia policy.

Biden vows to stop Nord Stream 2 pipeline if Russia invades Ukraine

For the Social Democrats, dealing with Schröder has become like “dealing with the strange uncle that’s coming over to dinner, you don’t want embarrassing everybody,” she said.

Senior party officials have distanced themselves from Schröder and emphasized that he no longer has major influence in the party. The way Schröder mixes business interests with his role as a former chancellor is “not only wrong” but “even sad,” the general secretary of the Social Democrats, or SPD, Kevin Kühnert, said in a recent interview with the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel.

“I don’t know anyone in the party who shares his views,” the Social Democratic premier for Rhineland-Palatinate, Malu Dreyer, told the Rheinische Post.


Putin and then-Chancellor Schröder at a news conference in Berlin in September 2005. (Andreas Rentz/Photographer: Andreas Rentz/Gett)
And Scholz has emphasized in interviews in the United States and Germany that the former chancellor does not speak for the party.


“If I understand the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany correctly, there is only one federal chancellor and that is me,” Scholz told the German broadcaster ZDF when asked about the fact that there were two Social Democrat chancellors giving contradictory statements on the crisis.

But it emerged this week that a member of Scholz’s government had met with Schröder last month to discuss the “future of German-Russian relations and civil society in Russia” in the thick of the Ukraine crisis, sparking a new round of criticism.

“The protestations of the SPD leadership to distance themselves from Gerhard Schröder are refuted by the fact that the former chancellor and a top Russia lobbyist continues to maintain close contact with the Scholz government,” said Matthias Hauer, a parliamentarian with the Christian Democrats who had requested information from the federal government on Schröder’s contact with officials.


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According to the information Hauer said he received, Schröder met with Johann Saathoff, the parliamentary secretary of state in the Interior Ministry on Jan. 5. Until December, Saathoff had been the foreign office’s point person on Russia. Also present was Heino Wiese, a former Social Democrat parliamentarian and lobbyist who also is Russia’s honorary consul in Hanover, and Matthias Platzeck, former Social Democrat leader for the state of Brandenburg.

Saathoff did not respond to requests by The Washington Post for comment. But he told the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung that he had requested the meeting to discuss “civil society” and that Schröder did not try to influence government action.

The pro-Kremlin leanings of the former chancellor have long been known. While still chancellor in 2004, Schröder famously described Putin as a “flawless democrat.” The same year, Putin traveled with a Cossack choir to Schröder’s home in Hanover for the chancellor’s 60th birthday.

Opinion: Germans ask: Where is Chancellor Olaf Scholz?

He used his last few days in office to set the wheels in motion for the first Nord Stream pipeline. It was 10 days before the 2005 elections — which he looked set to lose — when he left the campaign trail to sign a letter of intent with Putin on the pipeline. It gave Russia a way to send natural gas to Europe that bypassed Belarus, Poland and Ukraine — and weakened those countries’ leverage against Moscow.


Less than three weeks after Schröder left office, he was appointed head of the shareholders committee at Nord Stream. He has since used his connections to lobby on behalf of the new sister project, Nord Stream 2, opening the door for Gazprom chief executive Alexey Miller to meet with officials in Berlin.

In the thick of the last conflict in Ukraine, Schröder celebrated his 70th birthday in St. Petersburg at a Nord Stream-hosted event that Putin attended. They greeted each other with a warm hug, just two months after Russian forces annexed Crimea. In 2017, he took up the position of chairman of Rosneft, which is under U.S. and European Union sanctions for Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and for other acts.

“Sure, he’s just a former chancellor, but he of course has a huge network in Germany,” said Timo Lange, a campaigner with LobbyControl, a Berlin-based lobbying watchdog. “In public discourse, he always speaks with the authority of a former chancellor. It gives a lot of politicians in the Social Democrats a lot of headaches.”


A recent article by Germany’s T-online news website outlined Schröder’s meetings with Manuela Schwesig, the prime minister of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state, where the Nord Stream 2 pipeline makes landfall in Germany. Schwesig also is a Social Democrat and known for her staunch backing of business links with Russia, including the pipeline.

“They have a pretty huge economic interest that Nord Stream happens,” Lange said of the state government. “Schröder uses his influence where he can.”


The receiving station of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline near Lubmin, Germany. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)
The former chancellor has said he is working in the interests of Russian-German ties.

It’s “my life,” he said in response to criticism as he took up his $600,000-a-year position at Rosneft in 2017, saying it wasn’t up to the German media to decide what he does with it.

When asked whether he feared being used by Putin, he said: “I am not usable.” The salaries for his positions with Nord Stream are not public.


But during the current crisis, outrage has reached a new peak. “Why does he do this?” read a headline in Germany’s Süddeutsche Zeitung on Wednesday.

“The former head of government is Vladimir Putin’s best man in Germany,” it added.

The controversy comes as the Social Democrats struggle to unite on a Russia policy and Scholz tries to bring together a left-leaning wing that espouses detente toward Russia as forwarded by the party’s Cold War-era chancellor Willy Brandt, crafting the approach with the reality of today’s geopolitics in mind.

“The party does not really have a direction or speak with a single voice,” said Peter Matuschek, the head of political and social research at the German polling firm Forsa. “The former chancellor Schröder complicates things even more.”

[Crafty_Dog]

https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/biden-stumbles-toward-war-russians?token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjoyODA4MDM2MiwicG9zdF9pZCI6NDg2NjM1MTUsIl8iOiJzWVVZeCIsImlhdCI6MTY0NDY5NzE0OCwiZXhwIjoxNjQ0NzAwNzQ4LCJpc3MiOiJwdWItNzQ2NTgwIiwic3ViIjoicG9zdC1yZWFjdGlvbiJ9.-Q-jWfoUg8yRQy-f8_9D9ibos9b1s8y01e-WxqV6mL4

[G M]

Corrupt buffoons on the edge of global horror.

So we got that going for us!

https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/biden-stumbles-toward-war-russians?token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjoyODA4MDM2MiwicG9zdF9pZCI6NDg2NjM1MTUsIl8iOiJzWVVZeCIsImlhdCI6MTY0NDY5NzE0OCwiZXhwIjoxNjQ0NzAwNzQ4LCJpc3MiOiJwdWItNzQ2NTgwIiwic3ViIjoicG9zdC1yZWFjdGlvbiJ9.-Q-jWfoUg8yRQy-f8_9D9ibos9b1s8y01e-WxqV6mL4

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18227/russia-sweden-finland-nato

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18232/israel-europe-gas-pipeline

Biden Administration Kills Israel-to-Europe Gas Pipeline
by Soeren Kern  •  February 15, 2022 at 5:00 am

Biden's decision — reportedly coordinated with Turkey but reached without consulting Israel, Greece or Cyprus, the main countries involved in the project — undercuts three of the strongest American allies in the Mediterranean region.

EastMed's cancellation — variously described as a "disastrous decision," a "strategic mistake" and an act of "appeasement" of Erdoğan — represents a major geopolitical victory for the Turkish strongman.

The EastMed pipeline has been in the works for more than a decade. The Israel-Greece-Cyprus project — joined by Bulgaria, Hungary, North Macedonia, Romania and Serbia — has long been seen as a way to diversify natural gas supplies to Europe.

The Turkish government has always insisted that Israeli gas can only be sold to Europe through Turkey.

"The Americans do not want the pipeline because Ankara might 'get angry.'" — Theofrastos Andreopoulos, defense analyst, defensenet.gr.

"If Erdogan perceives the non-paper as some form of appeasement by Washington, he will simply double down on his gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean and play the role of spoiler in the region." — Richard Goldberg, a member of the U.S. National Security Council during the Trump administration.

Is the Biden administration truly concerned about climate change, or does it want to prevent Israel from becoming a strategically important supplier of natural gas to Europe?

"The reversal on the EastMed pipeline becomes only more hypocritical and offensive given the fact that President Biden continues to clear the path towards completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline." — U.S. Representatives Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) and Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY), in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

"This is a disastrous decision that imperils European security and opens the door for further Russian energy hegemony in European gas markets. It should be reversed." — Ariel Cohen, veteran energy analyst, The Hill.

"Turkey is not looking to participate in Eastern Mediterranean initiatives, it wants to dominate them. Ankara's goal is not one of cooperation but of regional primacy if not hegemony." — Endy Zemenides, Executive Director, Hellenic American Leadership Council.


The Biden administration has abruptly withdrawn American support for the Eastern Mediterranean (EastMed) pipeline, a project aimed at shipping natural gas from Israel to European markets. The White House appears to have caved to pressure from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has vociferously opposed the underwater pipeline because it would bypass Turkey. Pictured: Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiadis (left), Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (center) and then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shake hands in Athens on January 2, 2020, ahead of signing the pipeline agreement. (Photo by Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images)

The Biden administration has abruptly withdrawn American support for the Eastern Mediterranean (EastMed) pipeline, a project aimed at shipping natural gas from Israel to European markets. The White House said the project was antithetical to its "climate goals."

In reaching its decision, which effectively kills EastMed, the White House appears to have caved to pressure from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has vociferously opposed the underwater pipeline because it would bypass Turkey.

Biden's decision — reportedly coordinated with Turkey but reached without consulting Israel, Greece or Cyprus, the main countries involved in the project — undercuts three of the strongest American allies in the Mediterranean region.

[Crafty_Dog]

February 16, 2022
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How the Ukraine Conflict Moves Europe’s Front Line
The possibility of war has major implications for countries like Poland and Romania.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
The Ukraine crisis may have caught some off guard, but it didn’t come out of nowhere. The current conflict can be traced back to the Maidan revolt of 2014 and the subsequent annexation of Crimea, or to 2004, when Russia realized it was losing ground to the West in Ukraine, or, really, to the end of the Cold War and beyond. What’s new is that the possibility of war in the region is being taken seriously for the first time since the Soviet Union collapsed, and that has major implications for NATO, Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe.

Bad for Russia

At least part of Russia’s strategy on Ukraine was to use it to divide the West. Poland, for example, is existentially afraid of Russian advances, while Germany, for example, is heavily dependent on Russian hydrocarbons – and both are EU and NATO members. The United States, meanwhile, is focusing on internal problems as the United Kingdom, another European power, just left the European Union. Russia figured now was as good a time as any to highlight European and trans-Atlantic weaknesses.

So far, Russia has achieved the opposite. NATO has increased its military deployments to Eastern Europe, putting forces on standby and deploying additional ships and fighter jets. The U.S. and the U.K. have enhanced their respective presence in the region, while France has sent troops to Romania under NATO command. Spain and the Netherlands have also sent ships and fighter jets to the Black Sea to join NATO forces. Even Germany seems to be on the same page. Last week at a press conference in Washington, Chancellor Olaf Scholz seemed to nod in agreement as U.S. President Joe Biden threatened “there would be no longer a Nord Stream 2” if Russia invaded. In fact, the U.S. has been lobbying other countries to make up for any natural gas shortfall from Russia with liquefied natural gas. (So far, Australia, Japan and Qatar have agreed to help.) Little surprise, then, that German military aircraft carrying troop reinforcements landed in Lithuania on Feb. 15.

Moreover, the threat of a Ukraine invasion galvanized Western countries outside of NATO. Finland and Sweden, for example, are for the first time in years discussing joining the alliance. Both have coordinated with NATO over the past few months. Finland has enhanced its military readiness while Sweden has been reinforcing its military presence on the island of Gotland, the part of the country closest to Russia. Likewise, the Russian threat has revived concerns among NATO members and non-members alike from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

In other words, Russia’s latest push to reclaim the borderlands it lost at the end of the Cold War is bringing its supposed enemies closer together. And at their core is NATO, an alliance many believed had outlived its mandate.

A New Frontier

Clearly, the threat of war has raised concern among a host of nations. But for Romania and Poland – Washington’s operational allies on the front lines – it has raised profound strategic questions.

The first pertains to what a war with Ukraine would actually look like. Some war planners were convinced that a southern route would be Russia’s primary path to invasion, one that would link Odessa to Crimea and give Russia control of all non-NATO ports on the Black Sea. A northern invasion route was deemed less likely. Even so, a northern invasion would require Poland to engage in an active defense against Russian forces to block their advancement, while a southern invasion would require Romania to engage in both amphibious and mountain warfare. All these necessitate different tactics and equipment, and all demand different kinds of coordination and cooperation between Bucharest and Warsaw.


(click to enlarge)

The second is how likely an invasion truly is. Moscow said it needs to fight back against Western encroachment. NATO, after all, eventually absorbed Eastern European countries Russia hoped it wouldn’t at the end of the Cold War. Moscow’s demands made it seem as though Eastern Europe and Ukraine posed a unique threat to Russia that would go away if NATO simply got out of the region. Untrue as that may be, Russia’s message was clear: Eastern European countries are just as much a target as Ukraine is.

Of course, these countries have dealt with Russian assertiveness in all its forms before, and none are eager to fall back into Moscow’s orbit. It’s why they joined NATO and the EU in the first place, and their accession is a big reason that Russia is trying to reclaim influence in the areas it regards as its borderlands: the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The realization of what Russia has said – that Moscow considers them, like Ukraine, a part of its buffer zone – made Eastern European nations realize that they were less a borderland, where East and West collide every day without incident, and more a front line along which they would have to make their own strategic decisions.

To be sure, the countries of Eastern Europe have been doing just that. They have, for example, increased defense and security spending in case Russia decided to move on them. But while this was broadly understood at strategic levels by the governments, the average person didn’t really perceive the threat – that is, not until the current Ukraine crisis, which has convinced many that defense and security are now more urgent than ever.

This is more important than it sounds. A cornerstone of Eastern European strategy has been a focus on resilience to Russian hybrid warfare, making sure they don’t fall victim to disinformation campaigns, economic tampering, etc. It’s a largely proactive and measured strategy that necessarily eschews assertiveness. Active defense of the front line is an entirely different mentality. They have to not only step up when needed – but defend themselves and the NATO (and the EU) frontier at all times.

This mentality will likely spread. Urgency and assertiveness in defense matters translate into effective critical infrastructure development that improves the transportation, energy and health sectors. These developments need more than just investment from Western European countries that want the front line to hold; they need a fundamental change in policy that incorporates military, diplomatic, economic and political aspects. For better or worse, Poland and Romania may soon be responsible for defending NATO and the European frontier. They’ll need to adjust to reality accordingly.

[ccp]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/us-stock-futures-rise-washington-105808409.html

PUTIN ---->> slow Jo and Blinks

 

can anyone imagine how much Putin is raking in through surrogates
in the US market right now?

Hey at least 2 of grandparents are from Ukraine -
can I get in on it. Vlad ?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2022/02/20/ron-klains-domestic-motive-for-ukraine-crisis-surfaces-white-house-to-blame-economic-collapse-gas-prices-and-inflation-on-manufactured-russia-ukraine-conflict/

[ccp]

declares  Biden :

https://www.yahoo.com/news/biden-ukraine-russia-invasion-putin-us-sanctions-195703429.html

[DougMacG]

declares  Biden :

https://www.yahoo.com/news/biden-ukraine-russia-invasion-putin-us-sanctions-195703429.html

That'll stop 'em!  Take that Vlad!  Toe to toe combat.

Maybe Xi will just attack a couple of 'breakaway' areas of Taiwan - and face limited sanctions!

I wish that whoever wrote Biden's speeches would read them.

[ccp]

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/with-ukraine-debate-over-trump-effect

on top of all this the Left can now claim gas prices are up because of Vlad .
Infuriating how Biden now tells Americas we will have to undergo more pain

at the pump because of what is going on in Russia- Ukraine

see we just don't know this is really good for us - the high gas prices

we just have to endure pain while we wean off carbon and switch to wind solar

and save the world from climate change

do we little people understand? 
 

[G M]

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/with-ukraine-debate-over-trump-effect

on top of all this the Left can now claim gas prices are up because of Vlad .

Vlad had the money to spend on military adventurism because Kidsniffer McAlheimer's shut down US oil production.

[DougMacG]

https://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2022/02/the-hot-take-boils-over.php

Republicans committed treason appeasing Putin?  Isn't that ass backwards?

His former student John Hinderaker calls him out on it.

cf. Mike Pompeo, Tom Cotton, Sen Jim Risch, Donal Trup, Ted Cruz

[DougMacG]

If Trump were in Putin's pocket, he would:  [Walter Russell Mead, 2017]

https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/24/trump-isnt-sounding-like-a-russian-mole/

Limit fracking as much as he possibly could
Block oil and gas pipelines
Open negotiations for major nuclear arms reductions
Cut U.S. military spending
Try to tamp down tensions with Russia’s ally Iran.
-----------------------------------------------

He didn't.  Joe Biden did.

[Crafty_Dog]

How to Beat Putin With Natural Gas
America and its allies can wean Europe off its dependence on energy imported from Russia.
By Kenneth C. Griffin and Niall Ferguson
Feb. 23, 2022 6:46 pm ET


On June 24, 1948, Soviet forces blockaded the Allied-controlled areas of Berlin. The U.S. and U.K. responded by airlifting food and fuel from Allied airbases in western Germany. At the height of Operation Plainfare, one plane landed every 45 seconds at Tempelhof Airport. It worked. On May 11, 1949, Moscow lifted the blockade of West Berlin. Stalin blinked.

No such airlift can relieve the pressure being exerted on Ukraine by the huge military force Russia has assembled, with Russian troops entering Donetsk and Luhansk. But the principle can be applied to the broader problem raised by the Ukrainian crisis.

The foundation of Russian power today is the energy industry, which funds Russia’s foreign policy, including its formidable armed forces. Russia is an energy superpower in no small part because European consumers buy Russian gas. Europeans wagered that energy interdependence would temper Russian militarism, but instead Europe has funded the Kremlin’s rearmament. Europe would be safer if it had relied on allies for its gas.

The problem isn’t simply Europe’s energy dependence, but Russia’s use of energy to co-opt European politicians. In early February, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was nominated to join the board of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly. He already sits on the board of Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil giant. These appointments highlight Germany’s dependence on Russian gas. Is it any surprise that Chancellor Olaf Scholz initially sought to exclude energy explicitly from any sanctions on Russia if it invaded Ukraine? He halted Nord Stream 2, the natural-gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, only after Vladimir Putin asserted the “independence” of Donetsk and Luhansk.


Since West Germany launched its Ostpolitik policy in the late 1960s, the bet that energy interdependence would produce peace involved building a network of gas pipelines. Rather than pacifying Europe, however, these pipelines empowered Russia. Without Russian energy, European citizens would struggle to get through winter. Mr. Putin has long understood the leverage this gives him.

The U.S. should encourage its European allies to reduce their reliance on Russian gas exports. The additional sanctions against Russia envisaged by the Biden administration would come at a tremendous cost to Americans without addressing the long-term source of Mr. Putin’s power. Tougher U.S. financial sanctions would only further reduce the attractiveness of the dollar as a reserve currency. Withholding U.S. technology from Russia would inflict both direct and indirect damage on American companies, which have many international competitors, not least in China.

Reducing reliance on Russian gas will require substantial investment and political will. Europe needs to replace as much Russian gas as possible with liquefied natural gas, ideally with long-term contracts to buy gas from allied countries such as the U.S. The American capacity to export liquefied natural gas is growing every year. Some European countries have already begun building substantial infrastructure to take advantage of this growth. Poland and Lithuania now no longer rely on Russian gas because they can import supplies from as far away as Australia.

The biggest laggard is, predictably, Germany. One reason is that the upfront costs of building liquefied natural gas infrastructure can be steep. Yet Russia’s supposed price advantage no longer looks so compelling. European gas currently trades at around $26 per metric million British thermal units. The price of American gas is a little over $4.

Europe could also move itself toward energy independence by adopting a more realistic approach to climate change. Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear power looks increasingly like a historic error. The European Commission’s soon-to-be-announced plan to reduce its reliance on Russian gas is past due, but “doubling down on renewables” for short-term effect is delusional.

The U.S. has a role to play, too. It needs to produce more gas, not less. Washington should recognize that the American gas industry produces a relatively clean-burning fuel that the world will need for decades. Bans on fracking are misguided and neutralize a critical economic and geopolitical advantage. The U.S. should frack more, so it has the gas needed to wean Europe off Russian pipelines.

Green-minded Europeans should also note that buying American gas would be better for the environment. In the U.S., gas companies face stricter regulations for methane capture and other environmental priorities. The Russian energy industry pays little heed to such concerns.

[ccp]

https://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2022/02/20/exp-gps-0220-condi-rice-on-putin.cnn

we did push the ruskis over the edge

we knew the red lines
and stepped over them

I don't know what was gained

and due to the gas stupidity here we allowed russia to build up
like they did

and Europe allowed this too.