Fire Hydrant of Freedom

Issues that I flagged years ago.
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December 19, 2022
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Uzbekistan’s Virtue of Patience
Appearing to choose sides in the Ukraine conflict, even if it makes economic sense, is a nonstarter.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Uzbekistan is rich in recoverable hydrocarbons. Natural gas reserves alone are estimated to be close to 2 trillion cubic meters. Oil and gas account for about 16 percent of the country’s gross domestic product and about 20 percent of budget revenue. And although China is its biggest customer, Uzbekistan has been known to ship gas to the West too, using pipelines that traverse Russia and Kazakhstan.

It’s understandable, then, why Russia and Kazakhstan, whose leaders recently met to discuss the creation of a gas union in Central Asia, would want Uzbekistan in their club. But the government in Tashkent isn’t so sure, reportedly saying it would never agree to political conditions in exchange for gas – a not-so-veiled reference to the war in Ukraine. Still, the economic reality in the country demands cooperation with neighbors, even if formal “membership” in a union is a bridge too far.


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Despite its large reserves, Uzbekistan has turned into a net hydrocarbons importer. It is the most populous country in Central Asia, and though its urban population as a percentage of the total population is lower than others, it boasts the region’s most densely populated area in the Fergana Valley. It also has a comparatively well-developed industrial complex, one that is expected to pick back up quickly to offset the economic damages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine, and the Russian sanctions that followed, have made Central Asian industry, with its cheap labor and proximity to Russian and European markets, more attractive. Some European companies are considering relocating to Uzbekistan, while others are thinking about investing in existing facilities there.

Put simply, the country consumes a lot of energy, and there’s only so much it can do to goose production. Pipelines and other infrastructure are in various states of disrepair, sometimes leading to significant losses. Hydropower is problematic because there isn’t that much water in the country, and constructing nuclear plants is expensive and time-consuming. Roughly 90 percent of Uzbekistan’s electricity is produced by thermal power plants, but they run on natural gas. This has cut into government revenue from gas exports, which are three times lower in 2022 than they were in 2021, and has made it more difficult for the country to honor its electricity export contracts. Cold weather, meanwhile, has led to shortages in both electricity and heating.

The government in Tashkent is thus looking for ways to replenish its coffers and strengthen its export positions, all while finding more sources of gas for consumption. Cooperating with other gas exporters seems like a natural solution, especially considering Uzbekistan is a landlocked country that can’t afford to invest in new projects or offer competitive pricing.

Under the circumstances, Uzbekistan is interested in receiving and exporting additional gas or becoming a transit hub, and Russia is a natural fit. Uzbekistan would get access to a ton of surplus gas, while Russia would increase its power in areas it considers its traditional sphere of influence, all while increasing deliveries to China (via Central Asian markets). This kind of potential leverage could be enough to get Russia to negotiate its prices. Moreover, there is already a system of gas pipelines in place that passes from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, where the throughput capacity of Uzbekistan’s gas transmission system is 55 billion cubic meters per year. This gives Tashkent even more opportunities to extract transit fees on gas going to Europe and China.

Indeed, this would be in keeping with broader economic cooperation. Russia is a key partner on trade, investment and remittances. Still, Uzbekistan is hesitant to formally join a gas union for a couple of reasons. The first is the issue of neutrality; Uzbekistan gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it is hypersensitive about maintaining sovereignty. That’s why, for example, the government has halted gas exports. It would rather provide for its citizens itself, even at the expense of the bottom line, than be beholden to someone else. That’s also why it has intensified negotiations with other countries on additional purchases of natural gas, electricity, coal and fuel oil, and why it has banned the use of gas-fired vehicles until next March.

The second (and related reason) is that trade ties and diversification are essential for maintaining independence. Central Asia is marked by a fairly high presence of foreign capital. The gas sector alone is serviced by a state-owned Uzbek company, Russia’s Lukoil, Uzbekneftegaz (with the participation of some Korean companies), Epsilon Development Company, Natural Gas-Stream and New Silk Road Oil and Gas, which are important investors and exporters of technology. There is growing interest – economic and geostrategic – from the United States and the European Union, which often meet with the leaders of the Central Asian countries. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently met with Uzbekistan’s foreign minister on the sidelines of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue, while German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said her recent meeting with Uzbek officials signaled expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan. And this is in addition to, not at the expense of, more traditional partners like Russia and China. Representatives of Beijing recently went to Uzbekistan to discuss the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and Russia is always looking for new points of contact. Tashkent prefers this kind of state of affairs in ordinary times, but it has even more reason to be cautious about Russia now, lest it run afoul of Western sanctions or be seen as too cozy with an increasingly alienated Russia. That could be deadly for Uzbekistan’s economy.

Perhaps the best option for Uzbekistan would be to join a transit zone in which it receives additional payments for the distillation of gas to large Chinese or European markets, where gas consumption is rising, and then redirect its own production to domestic needs. That would solve the problem of internal shortages and even rake in a few dollars. But Uzbekistan’s cautious foreign policy hovers over all. Hence why its statement about not wanting to join Russia and Kazakhstan should be seen not as an outright refusal but as an attempt to signal that it has no political designs of its own and to shield a future arrangement from sanctions. Either way, Uzbekistan will characteristically take its time. It’s in no more a hurry to join a gas union than it is to open, say, branches of European companies within its borders. In the short term, Tashkent seems content to suffer a relatively tight economy while holding out hope that it can meet its gas needs through one-on-one cooperation with its gas-rich neighbors. The other option – choosing sides or appearing to choose sides in the Ukraine conflict – is a nonstarter. It will simply wait for things to die down.

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Electricity for Europe. Azerbaijan, Hungary, Georgia and Romania signed a deal on Saturday to build an underwater electric cable that will help bring green electricity from Azerbaijan to Europe. The project, which is expected to be concluded in three to four years, aims to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.

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Shifting stance. Kazakhstan, a close ally of Moscow that has so far refused to openly support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, voted against a U.N. resolution to condemn Moscow’s actions there and demand its withdrawal. This marks the first time the Central Asian country, which did not recognize Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions earlier this year, has taken such a stance in Moscow’s favor since the beginning of the conflict.

Uzbek first. Uzbekistan says it sent a container train to Europe along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route last week for the first time. The train passed through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia to reach its final destination in the Bulgarian port of Burgas. Traffic along the corridor, developed as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has increased since the beginning of the year.

Energy in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan signed a memorandum of understanding with the China National Heavy Machinery Corp. on the construction of a 21-megawatt hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan. Less than a year ago, the country signed another agreement with a Chinese state-owned company for the construction of a 500-megawatt hydropower plant. Water supplies remain a concern for such projects in Central Asia, but countries outside the region have shown interest in investing, to the irritation of Moscow, which considers Central Asia part of its sphere of influence.

Disruption. Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry says providers are having trouble servicing some customers amid rising demand for electricity and natural gas due to cold weather. It noted a disruption in supplies from Turkmenistan on Jan. 12 stemming from abnormally cold weather that led to a complete halt in gas imports and a 20 percent drop in electricity imports. In December, Turkmenistan agreed to supply Uzbekistan with an additional 20 million cubic meters of gas per day, part of Uzbek efforts to procure energy outside of Russia. Moscow had proposed creating a gas union with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but Tashkent rebuffed the idea over fears of incurring Western secondary sanctions.

March 13, 2023
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Capitalizing on the South Caucasus
Neither Washington nor Russia is directly stoking regional unrest, but both can benefit from it.
By: Allison Fedirka
As war continues to rage in Ukraine, the wider conflict between Russia and the West is opening new fronts, ones that won’t see actual battle but are nonetheless useful for gaining influence at the other’s expense. One such front is the South Caucasus, which is essential to Russia’s tactical and strategic objectives in Ukraine and is thus a potential distraction for the United States, which would much rather focus on Eastern Europe.

This isn’t exactly a new development; the war implicated countless nations outside Ukraine the minute it began, particularly economically. The U.S. quarterbacked an aggressive sanctions campaign against Moscow, which set up parallel systems to circumvent it. Similarly, Russia and the U.S. have both developed any number of political and security measures to inflict pressure on each other outside Ukraine. Moscow, for example, sent a naval vessel to the Caribbean and conducted high-profile political meetings, replete with political agreements, with Caribbean nations like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. The U.S. initially sent various delegations to improve economic and security ties in Central Asia, which Russia considers its traditional sphere of influence. In neither case did one side go so far as to elicit a direct response from the other.

But the recent activity in the South Caucasus is a little different. Before it invaded Ukraine in 2022, Moscow made a concerted effort to secure its control of the South Caucasus ostensibly to help stabilize the region. In truth, Russia put itself in a position to control a series of frozen conflicts and flashpoints in the region so that it could stabilize or destabilize a country at will. And now that domestic unrest has emerged in the South Caucasus more or less independently of the war in Ukraine, Moscow is poised to take advantage of the situation to its own benefit.

Georgia

On March 7, protesters flooded the streets of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in objection to parliament passing legislation in the first reading that would require nongovernmental and civil society groups to register as having foreign support if they receive 20 percent or more of their funding from abroad. After two days of demonstrations, the ruling Georgian Dream party, the bill’s primary supporter, withdrew its support. The parliament formally rejected the law on March 10, and though it can be revived in 30 days if changes are made to the initial draft, it’s likely dead in the water.

Disputed Regions in Georgia
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At the heart of the matter is Georgia’s foreign alignments. The bill’s supporters (and Russian media) compared it to lobbying legislation in the U.S. that seeks only to boost transparency. There are notable differences that these advocates overlook, but the bottom line is that it would have allowed the Georgian government to control the funds that enter the country from abroad. It’s no secret that the U.S. government and associated aid groups give upward of $50 million per year to Georgian NGOs and civil society groups that are active in local politics and to even political parties. (Washington said it would have to reconsider funding if the legislation were passed.)

Protesters saw the bill as an expression of Russian influence. They argued it too closely resembled a similar Russian law from more than a decade ago that was used to suppress political opposition against the Kremlin. European and U.S. officials publicly supported the protesters, and because more than 80 percent of the Georgian population supports EU/Western ties, protests like these blur the line between the airing of a certain domestic grievance and a broader referendum on foreign policy preferences.

It’s unclear whether the protests in Tbilisi will continue. Demonstrators returned to the streets on March 8, after the government announced its plans to backpedal on the legislation and vowed to press on until the bill was officially repealed – which it was on March 10. Still, citizens will likely remain concerned until they are certain the bill can’t be resurrected. There is also the possibility that protests are being orchestrated by outside actors, in which case they may continue under the guise of pro-Europe/anti-Russia protests.

Armenia-Azerbaijan

Then there is Armenia and Azerbaijan. Broadly speaking, Armenia is aligned with Russia, while Azerbaijan maintains stronger ties to the West. But lately, Armenia has been unhappy with the status quo. It wants Russia to take a tougher stance against Azerbaijan, especially with regard to the Lachin corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh, over which the two recently fought a war. Moscow demurred, so Armenia criticized Russia – albeit indirectly, through comments made against the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization’s handling of the issue. It also recently submitted a proposal refusing to appoint a deputy secretary-general to the group and has started to ban certain Russian journalists and media managers from entering the country. However, in early March Russia and Armenia conducted joint air drills involving troops and aircraft from Russia’s air base in Armenia – a notable reminder that cooperation is in each other’s interests.

Nagorno-Karabakh
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But the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict hasn’t gone away. On March 5, fighting broke out between Azerbaijani troops and ethnic Armenian police officers. Two days later, Armenian separatists reportedly blocked a Russian military base in the Khojaly airport. The protesters questioned Russian peacekeeping troops’ capabilities to unblock the road near the city of Shushi and keep the peace in general. They also accused the Russian military of profiting off the food and fuel provided to local populations.

Meanwhile, Washington has been trying to make inroads in the region. Along with the EU, it continues to offer itself as an alternative to Russia for brokering and maintaining peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. On March 6, the U.S. secretary of state’s senior adviser for the Caucasus met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Washington. U.S. officials followed this meeting up with planned visits to Armenia and Georgia. Then on March 10, Azerbaijan’s defense minister received the chief of staff of NATO’s Allied Land Command, who discussed military cooperation and regional instability. The timing of this visit is no coincidence: It was meant to convey to Azerbaijan that it has options and that instability from Georgia need not spill over the border. It also encouraged Azerbaijan not to retaliate to the latest unrest.

The common thread tying all these events together in the South Caucasus is the push and pull between the U.S. and Russia. Geopolitically, the South Caucasus is a region Moscow cannot afford to ignore. It is less strategically imperative to the U.S., even though it provides access to the Black Sea and helps facilitate non-Russian energy exports to Europe. Neither is stoking unrest in the region, but both are trying to capitalize on it. For the West, that means containment and preventing any spillover effects. For Russia, it means using the opportunity to selectively control issues that could stabilize or destabilize the region as needed, even as it maintains a vital buffer zone to its south. The more restless the South Caucasus gets, the more of a problem it will be for Washington – which in turn serves Russian interests.

Caucasus in play. The U.S., meanwhile, is stepping up its involvement in Russia’s own backyard. In the past two weeks, four delegations of high-ranking U.S. officials have visited Armenia, ostensibly to discuss economic, energy and security matters. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Erika Olson is currently in Armenia for talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. (On that subject, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Yerevan was ready to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within the borders of the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, adding that mutual recognition of borders was the main condition for a peace treaty.) In addition, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister spoke by phone with Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Derek Hogan and met on Monday with U.S. State Department Senior Adviser on Caucasian Negotiations Louis Bono.

 

ya just can't get rid of these people and they will not simply go away:

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/28/turkeys-president-erdogan-seals-election-victory-to-enter-third-decade-in-power.html

we see this a lot .
this leader that leader is in political trouble and yet when the "election " comes out
they win.

OPOLITICS
The Plight of Central Asian Migrants in Wartime Russia
14 MIN READAug 17, 2023 | 21:40 GMT


Editor's note: The primary author of this column, Kurtis Yan, is a summer fellow at RANE.

As its war in Ukraine rages on, Russia is finding itself in need of increased manpower to sustain a war with no clear end in sight. And to address this challenge, Moscow is increasingly turning to its growing population of Central Asian migrants.

Though estimates are difficult to discern due to frequent exit and reentry, at least 6 million migrants in Russia officially hail from Central Asia, with millions more likely working and residing in the country illegally. This large pool provides the Russian Armed Forces with an important source of infantry, as well as an influx of desperately needed workers in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. Many of these migrants already work in low-paying unskilled positions, making potential war service all the more attractive, given the lucrative financial compensation — and even suggestions of an expedited path to citizenship — offered to those willing to serve Russia in Ukraine.

But Russophilic and nationalist attitudes subject them to racism, xenophobia, and politicization that demeans them and their native countries. One would expect that Central Asian states would disapprove of their citizens being used as cannon fodder in Russia's war, as political punching bags for nationalist and populist voices, and that this would, at a minimum, harm Russia-Central Asia relations. On the contrary, however, a deeper look into the current state of migrant affairs reveals the drivers for Moscow and Central Asia to overcome these tensions over migration to maintain close ties.

The Role, Perception and Politicization of Central Asian Migrants in Russia
In Russian society, Central Asian migrants are often treated as second-class citizens. For instance, announcements for the sale or leasing of living space often ask that buyers be of ''Slavic appearance.'' A more concrete recent example was on July 20, when Sergei Mironov, the leader of Russia's pro-Putin ''A Just Russia - For Truth'' party, proposed a bill that would increase the cost of a work permit for migrants from 1,200 rubles (around $12) to 4,800 rubles (around $48). Mironov's justification dubiously claimed, without evidence, that migrant workers are paid too much, despite the majority of them working in very low-paying jobs; the explanatory note from the Duma, however, argued that migrants have issues adapting ''to Russian society,'' suggesting the goal of the legislation was to benefit politically from migrant-bashing rather than generate significant new revenues for the state. This form of political targeting has grown more prevalent in recent years, especially as the Russo-Ukrainian War continues shaping domestic politics and economics.

The roots of this discrimination can be traced back to the Soviet period. Soviet policy promoted discrimination against Central Asians as Moscow sought to Russify their countries and subjugate non-Slavic peoples to transmigration. For the ethnically Turkic peoples of Central Asia, much of the migration meant moving to an urban center within their respective country in an effort to find better work, but this has led to the loss of their traditional languages and cultures, as higher-paying employment opportunities and life in the more industrialized cities of Soviet Central Asia required knowledge of the Russian language. But even so, the Soviet government often prioritized ethnic Slavs for Communist Party memberships and better-paying posts. Shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the propiska migratory regulation system was abolished, which loosened restrictions on migration from more rural areas to larger cities and allowed for freer movement across the former empire. However, much like people migrating to the Russified capitals of their respective countries throughout the Soviet period, many migrants in the post-Soviet space now make the trek to Russia. Though years of forced Russification and Russian-language knowledge help them integrate and survive in Russia, it has always been challenging for Central Asian migrants to obtain the same quality of life as the average ethnic Russian.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has continued to promote discriminatory policies against Central Asian migrants and incite public distrust of them. High-ranking officials regularly allege that Central Asia is the gateway for Islamic radicalism into Russia. Russia's police also perpetuate this xenophobia: Migrants are viewed as easy targets for bribes and extortion. Torture and inhumane detainment are rampant, with numerous human rights cases tried over violations and systemic abuse in past years. Institutional tactics are working, as opinion polls show that most Russians favor crackdowns on Central Asian migration as well as increased deportation. As the Islamic and Central Asian share of Russia's population rises because of increased immigration and birth rates, nationalist figures are likely to increasingly bash Central Asian migrants for the alleged degradation of traditional Russian society.

At the same time, the Kremlin understands it can use Central Asian migrant flows to alleviate its own demographic crisis. Russia's population has steadily declined over the past two decades, a trend that will deepen in the coming years. Promises of citizenship can be a useful tool in reducing Russian labor shortages and filling labor in key sectors, particularly now as Russia's demographic issues worsen. Between 2022 and 2023, for example, the number of Tajik migrants who received Russian citizenship skyrocketed from 104,000 to 174,000.

At present, most migrants are male and come from the Central Asian states with lower-than-average wealth — Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — in order to find new better-paying labor opportunities compared to those at home. The money made in Russia translates into remittance flows that help their families back in Central Asia. Migrants often come to Russia to fill positions in the construction and service sectors or other physical labor (partly because discrimination locks them out of certain jobs) and receive very low pay on average. Despite the low pay and overall harsh living conditions for immigrants, migrant flows from Central Asia have not faltered in recent years. Reasons for this include slower economic development and natural resource scarcity. Labor migration plays a further role in stymying local economic growth, as migrants make more money working in Russia as opposed to working at home, which ultimately perpetuates a cycle of over-dependence on remittances. Remittances comprise around a third of Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's GDPs, making them some of the most dependent on remittances in the world, while over 10% of Uzbekistan's wealth comes from money flowing from Russia.

The Symbiotic Relationship Between Moscow and Central Asian Governments
Despite Russia's exploitative treatment of its citizens, Central Asian states generally maintain favorable relations with Russia. This is in part because the region's autocratic governments actually benefit from transferring a large portion of their labor force to Russia. The states that send the largest migrant flows have less developed infrastructure and struggle to alleviate poverty. By allowing their citizens to work in Russia, these states do not have to improve their local infrastructure, while their departure alleviates unemployment and stabilizes wages. Thus, Central Asian autocrats are less inclined to worry if high percentages of their respective GDPs are made up of remittances; as long as the local population does not put a strain on their local infrastructure, and there is less unemployment and downward pressure on wages, they can have fewer concerns regarding public dissatisfaction and instability. Relatedly, when Central Asian harmony is disrupted, Russia can be a useful tool to strengthen a grip on power and quell the masses, as shown during the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan.

For Russia, hosting such vast migrant numbers augments its leverage over its Central Asian partners to ensure that their governments do not act out of line with Moscow's interests. With Russia providing remittance opportunities, the disruption of migrant flows or any disruptions of key economic stability would rupture societal harmony and threaten the power of Central Asia's autocrats. Understanding this, Moscow uses its leverage to prevent Central Asia from leaving its sphere of influence and adopting a pro-Chinese, pro-Turkish or pro-Western platform. China, in particular, is likely to become an increasingly attractive location for Central Asian migrants due to its close physical proximity and aging population.

Additionally, the Kremlin has worked with Central Asian governments to reduce Central Asia's risk of being a gateway for Islamic radicals into Russia. Like Russia, Central Asian autocrats also fear the radicalization of their populations. As migrant flows can reduce the chances of economic dissatisfaction in Central Asia, the hope is that accepting such large numbers of migrants into Russia's more Christian and secular society can help reduce Islamic fundamentalist sentiments, which ultimately reduces the risk of radical Islamic terrorism returning to Central Asia. It's a fundamentally sound strategy, but potentially risky because it involves bringing large numbers of people to Russia, some of whom may have already been radicalized, and also because they may radicalize in response to the discrimination and xenophobia they encounter in Russia.

Central Asian Migrants on the Russian Homefront and in Ukraine
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Central Asian migrants have been pressured to join the Russian army, with officials, politicians and regime commentators weaponizing citizenship and passportization to push the migrants to the front lines. Migrant centers are filled with Russian army recruiters and advertisements, and recruiters have even targeted mosques often frequented by Central Asian migrants. Given the sheer number of undocumented workers in Russia and the tedious length of the citizenship process, recruiters use promises of legalized status or expedited citizenship to convince migrants to join the Russian army by, for example, forcing them to choose between signing an enlistment contract or facing deportation. This also pertains to the Wagner Group, which has targeted Central Asian prisoners in Russia to join the private military company's efforts.

The growing number of Tajiks and other Central Asians living in Russia and receiving Russian residence (and even citizenship) provides the Kremlin with an expanded pool to draw potential soldiers from. Even Russian politicians who criticized Central Asian migrants for overloading Russia's infrastructure and taking jobs are now using the same rhetoric to criticize them for not joining their Russian counterparts on the front lines. On May 6, Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev questioned where Russia's ''Tajik battalions'' were, advocating for compulsory military service for migrants aspiring for citizenship. He added that Russians are dying and being ''replaced'' by ''Asians'' at home. In a similar vein, on April 16, Investigative Committee Chair Aleksandr Bastrykin accused Central Asian migrants of increased murders, saying that ''while Russians are at the front, migrants are attacking our rear.'' This rhetoric may very well support the increased use of Central Asians in Ukraine as Moscow tries to avoid unpopular new mobilization efforts ahead of the March 2024 presidential election. As ''real'' Russians continue dying on the battlefield, efforts to send Central Asians to the front lines in greater quantities may sufficiently appease nationalist fervor and quell fears of new conscription.

But despite Russia's wartime conditions and intensified anti-migrant rhetoric, migrant flows from Central Asia have not fallen. 1.3 million migrants entered Russia in just the first quarter of 2023, with around half hailing from Uzbekistan. With the war causing a labor shortage in Russia, Central Asian migrants are seen as the source to fill the workforce gaps now more than ever. Russian companies have also sent migrant workers to occupied territories in Ukraine, in order to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and start new construction projects. Other migrants work in factories or even collect dead soldiers and bury them. Despite the dangers, these job prospects are considered more prosperous compared to opportunities in their home countries. Central Asian governments cannot do much to prevent these outflows, but they are attempting to crack down on migrants joining the war. Kazakhstan promised jail time for those who fight for either Russia or Ukraine, including those who sign financial contracts with Wagner Group. While Russian recruitment ads continue targeting Kazakhstan, many are unlikely to risk jail time. But in the near-to-medium term, these efforts will not override the drivers of continued migration because they are relatively halfhearted and only target those who want to leave Central Asia for the purpose of enlistment, as opposed to preventing migrants already in Russia from joining the army,

Moreover, there are already clear signs that Central Asians will continue to migrate to Russia and subsequently participate in Moscow's war efforts in Ukraine. Russia's Labor Ministry estimates the country will need 400,000 more migrant workers by 2030, on top of those already in the country. Currently, foreigners make up 4.2% of all workers employed by Russian companies. But according to the ministry's forecast, that number should increase to 4.7% over the next seven years. As migration continues and Russia's war recruitment intensifies, opportunities arise for bailiffs and creditors to impose exit bans and debt recovery claims that prevent foreign nationals from leaving at the expiration of their legal residence. Over 100,000 migrants are expected to become undocumented by 2024, with exit bans playing a large role in restricting migrant movement. Thus, debts are an important factor that could ultimately pressure more migrants into joining the Russian army or labor projects in Russian-occupied territories. Without legal status and the necessary income to pay off debts, Russian recruiters can capitalize on this and pressure migrants into wartime service.

Migrant Affairs on Regional Geopolitics Going Forward
In the coming months and years, two outstanding and interrelated factors will significantly influence regional geopolitics: The extent to which Moscow discourages migration flows and the extent to which it attempts to draw more Central Asians into participation in the Ukraine war.

The Kremlin's safest course of action is to maintain migrant flows to increasingly draw upon the existing pool of migrants for mobilization purposes, while also marginally limiting the growth of migration to avoid the subsequent backlash. It's a safe course of action because it helps Russia continue the Ukraine war without over-exposing the Kremlin to the socio-political consequences of growing Central Asian migration, as opposed to overly investing in their use in the war or limiting their entry into Russia to score political points from migrant bashing. Therefore, in the long run, Central Asian migrant affairs will likely hold at the status quo of large flows into Russia and moderate politicization within Russia. The Kremlin will look to balance nationalist fervor against Central Asian migration while enabling the potential of migrant populations as the next pool to draw manpower from. Though Central Asian countries have remained neutral in the war and looked to prevent their citizens from joining, it is more likely that Central Asians will continue fighting in the Russian army or working in Russian-occupied territory. For survival and stability, Central Asia's autocrats will continue to accept the racism and poor labor conditions their citizens face in Russia, so long as Russia remains an attractive source for remittance flows. The dependence on Russian employment opportunities is too great to risk rupturing.

But there are low-likelihood, high-impact alternatives to be aware of. For example, the Kremlin could cave into ultranationalist sentiments and drastically limit migration flows. This would not only severely harm Russia's economy, but it would also help bolster the Kremlin's popularity among a key constituency in the near term. For Central Asia, migrants returning to or being forced to stay in their home countries would lower wages, accentuate Central Asia's shortage of natural resources, and increase the chances of domestic instability. Central Asian leaders would warn Moscow that this move would damage their economies if not compensated for, and if Moscow proceeds, then regional leaders would turn to China, Turkey and the West to secure investment.

Alternatively, Moscow could drastically expand the mobilization of Central Asian migrants for labor and infantry in Ukraine while continuing to encourage migration flows from Central Asia. This would work to appease ultranationalists by sending the migrants to the front lines, with the expectation that many will die, and allowing ethnic Russians to avoid mobilization. However, Central Asian autocrats would also be dissatisfied with the clear funneling of their own citizens to the battlefield, which they have tried to restrict.

In any case, to some extent, Central Asians may themselves increasingly choose to work in places other than Russia. Particularly as the Russian Ruble continues to slide on global markets, they may find Russia an increasingly less attractive place from which to send home remittances. New opportunities are opening up for them in, for example, construction in South Korea and for agricultural work in the United Kingdom. But more likely, proximity and cheaper transport costs would motivate migrants to find alternative work in Turkey and China. Turkey already hosts hundreds of thousands of Central Asian migrants, particularly women, and pan-Turkic ties can augment Turkey's image for those seeking work. Likewise, higher-paying labor opportunities can encourage increased migration to China, which could provoke Moscow and increase Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia.

September 7, 2023
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Turkey’s Resurgence in the Black Sea Basin
Ankara is seeking to re-establish leadership over a former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Russia’s weakening, especially following its invasion of Ukraine, has serious implications for its southern flank. In the years ahead, Moscow’s ability to project power in the Black Sea basin will decline, and one of the main beneficiaries will be Turkey. Though currently overwhelmed by political and economic problems at home, in the medium to long term Turkey can be expected to fill the strategic vacuum left by Russia’s receding footprint in the Caucasus region.


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The countries of the region are even starting to publicly acknowledge Russia’s decline. In a Sept. 4 interview with Italian paper La Repubblica, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russia had failed to ensure his country’s security from an increasingly aggressive Azerbaijan, which since late 2020 has gained the upper hand in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Responding to the claims, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that his country continues to be the “guarantor of security” in the region. Peskov also insisted that Moscow has played a consistent role in stabilizing the region and will continue to do so. Separately, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called Pashinyan’s comments “public rhetoric verging on rudeness” and said that, rather than blaming others, the Armenians should take responsibility for their own actions. A day earlier, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it had replaced the head of its peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus, the second change in recent months.

The Armenian prime minister’s comments were extraordinary, especially considering that Yerevan has long been a close ally of Moscow and dependent on the Kremlin for its security and economic well-being. Russia’s reaction was equally telling, reflective of just how weak its position has become – at least in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics that have maintained ties with Russia. Pashinyan explained Moscow’s inability to provide for Armenia’s security as a result of the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. But the fact is that the situation in the South Caucasus predates the conflict in Ukraine.

In the summer of 2020, fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted once again. Azerbaijan retook territories that Armenia had controlled since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended in 1994. The Azerbaijanis were able to force a major reversal in the regional balance of power in large part due to military and intelligence support from their ally Turkey. The Turks took advantage of an opening in what was unquestionably part of Russia’s sphere of influence.

For decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Moscow had been the security guarantor of the region – which explains why the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was left frozen in Armenia’s favor for a quarter of a century. Turkey and Azerbaijan saw an opportunity in Russia’s focus on its western neighbor since the ouster in February 2014 of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Ankara and Baku realized that Moscow was distracted and unlikely to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh – despite the fact that it had, and still has, troops stationed in the area. Their bet paid off. When the fighting in 2020 escalated, the most that the Russians could do was formally preside over the cessation of hostilities later that year.

Russia’s peacekeeping operation, which began following the conflict in 2020, was ineffective because Moscow was likely already preparing for the war in Ukraine, which it believed would strengthen its position relative to the West or at least prevent its further decline. Nineteen months into the Ukraine campaign, the Russians find themselves in a far weaker position given the terrible performance of Russian forces on the ground, the economic toll of Western sanctions and, more recently, the infighting within the Kremlin exemplified by the Wagner crisis.

Though Pashinyan only recently expressed it in public, he’s been watching the Russians flounder for some time now. His comments show that he realizes his country can no longer rely on Russia and that he needs a new strategy. He also understands that, despite the U.S.’ official recognition in April 2021 of the 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, Washington has done very little to challenge the Turkish-Azerbaijani alignment in the South Caucasus. Indeed, it’s becoming increasingly clear that U.S. and Turkish interests are converging, particularly given the situation in Ukraine. This is why, despite facing opposition at home, Pashinyan has been trying to work with the Turks to insulate his country from an increasingly assertive Azerbaijan.

The Armenians aren’t the only ones in Russia’s near abroad to realize the tectonic shifts underway. The Georgians are also closely watching the situation. They have a lot at stake with the presence of Russian forces in two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Any further weakening of Moscow could allow them to regain control over these two territories. With signs of growing closeness between Ankara and Tbilisi, Georgia certainly wouldn’t decline Turkey’s help if it was offered.

For now, the Turks are focused on leveraging the Ukraine conflict to enhance their influence in the northern Black Sea basin, which the Russians seized from the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century. Since 2014, the Turks have opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, whose Tartar population they view as their ethnic kin. More recently, Ankara’s role in brokering the now-defunct Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine and its efforts to revive it are a small but key part of Turkey’s strategy here. Ultimately, the Turks are seeking to re-establish leadership over their former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.

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Daily Memo: Turkey's Economy, Escalation in the Caucasus
Ankara has a new plan to spur growth.
By: Geopolitical Futures
New plan. The Turkish government unveiled a package of economic reforms that it hopes will launch a structural transformation of the economy over the next three years. A key goal of the plan is to reduce inflation to single digits by 2026 through tight monetary policies and fiscal discipline. Ankara will also encourage investment, especially in technology related to semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries and critical technology products.

Serious situation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said at a Cabinet meeting that Azerbaijan has been massing troops along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for several days. He also said the situation is so serious that the U.N. Security Council needs to take action to avoid an “explosion” in the region.

Surging population. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi said his country needs to lower its birth rate to avoid a “catastrophe.” He suggested that 400,000 births per year would be more sustainable than the current 2.2 million. He also objected to remarks by Egypt’s health and population minister that having children is “a matter of complete freedom,” arguing that leaving the choice up to individuals has implications for society as a whole. Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle East, with roughly 113 million people.

Infrastructure in the Caucasus. Following a Chinese-organized conference in Tbilisi, China’s ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Jian, said Beijing is interested in developing infrastructure projects through the so-called Middle Corridor, a broadly defined trade route that runs through the Caucasus. China has particularly shown interest in Georgia’s deepwater port of Anaklia. The ambassador noted that the Middle Corridor is an important link between the Chinese and European markets.

September 25, 2023
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Daily Memo: Nagorno-Karabakh Fallout
Turkey and Russia are among the countries that have reacted to the breakaway region's agreement to disarm.
By: Geopolitical Futures

International reaction. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived on Monday in Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. He held talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on bilateral and regional issues, about a week after Azerbaijan conducted a military operation in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh that led ethnic Armenian authorities there to agree to disarm. Meanwhile, over the weekend, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh were partly responsible for the situation in the disputed territory, where thousands of ethnic Armenians have reportedly fled from their homes since last week. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Moscow rejected the criticism. Russia’s internal affairs minister arrived in Yerevan on Monday to meet with officials from Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. U.S. Agency for International Development chief Samantha Power is also in Armenia.

More fallout. Relatedly, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said at a press conference that what has happened in Nagorno-Karabakh has strengthened his country’s resolve to never recognize Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo declared independence in 2008. It has been recognized by many Western nations but not by Russia.

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/20123/new-war-armenia-azerbaijan 

Moving forward. Armenia and Azerbaijan expressed their intention to normalize relations and sign a peace deal in a joint statement on Thursday. They also announced a prisoner exchange and said they would work on more confidence-building measures, two months after Azerbaijan’s recapture in September of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. A U.S. statement said Secretary of State Antony Blinken looks forward to hosting the foreign ministers of both countries in Washington soon for peace talks. It also said Azerbaijan’s central bank governor and energy minister will visit the United States, though no date was provided.

March 21, 2024
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Geoeconomic Integration of Central Asia
The U.S. sees regional integration and global connectivity as the way to loosen the grip of Russia and China.
By: Kamran Bokhari

In a hyperconnected world, Central Asia is the final frontier, a vast region with few links to the international community. In the more than three decades since the end of the Cold War, the region’s remoteness and lack of oceanic access have benefited its gigantic neighbors, Russia and China. But now the United States and its allies are undertaking an ambitious strategy to foster Central Asian integration. The key challenge is how to form a regional bloc from the five nations, which are still defining themselves politically and economically and remain entangled in the geopolitical architectures of Moscow and Beijing.

Central Asia

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Last week, I had the opportunity to participate in the inaugural gathering of the B5+1 Forum in Almaty, Kazakhstan, organized by the Washington-based Center for International Private Enterprise with the support of the U.S. State Department. B5+1 is the business counterpart to the C5+1, a diplomatic framework comprising the United States and the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – established in 2015. Conceived during President Joe Biden’s meeting in New York last September with his five Central Asian counterparts, the B5+1 gathers private and public sector leaders to discuss ways to make Central Asia more attractive for foreign investment. During the March 13-15 gathering, participants identified five economic sectors as development priorities: trade and logistics, agribusiness, e-commerce, tourism and renewable energy.

Washington’s strategy is to facilitate regional economic integration while leaving ownership of the process to the Central Asians, whose region has been subject to Moscow’s influence as far back as the founding of the United States. In the decades following the Soviet Union’s breakup, the region was too distant and isolated – and other global challenges were too great – for the U.S. to exert any control. Russia and China continue to enjoy the advantage of proximity, while Beijing also has heaps of cash to dump into developing the region’s infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative.

What has changed, however, is that Russia, beleaguered by its war in Ukraine, is losing its grip over the region, while China is battling a serious economic slowdown. In this turbulent environment, the Central Asian states cannot assume that Russia will continue to be willing and able to guarantee their security. Nor can they be sure that Chinese investments, while attractive in the short term, will not have deleterious longer-term effects – as they have in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, for example. Therefore, the Central Asian states have each tried to varying degrees to balance relations with Russia and China while also seeking greatly enhanced ties with the United States and the European Union. After all, if they are going to move beyond autocratic governance and embrace economic reforms, only the U.S. and its allies can help.

The U.S. interest is to make these states resilient enough to withstand the upheaval occurring all around them. Their autocratic legacies, inherited from former liege Russia, coupled with the heavy influence of China mean that their path toward political reform is long and tortuous. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have made noteworthy strides, especially in recent years, but Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remain stuck in authoritarianism.

Cognizant of these constraints and the reality that political reform hinges on a decent measure of economic prosperity, Washington is focused on supporting the latter two states. Hence, the establishment of the B5+1 to complement the existing diplomatic track. Considering that three years ago the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document failed to even mention Central Asia, a good deal of progress has been made.

Yet, forging a Central Asian economic union modeled after the European Union or even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a major undertaking. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the region’s connectivity indicator – a measure of how much global gross domestic product is reachable – is among the lowest in the world. In theory, greater regional economic integration will make Central Asia more attractive for Western investments. However, maximizing trade between the five nations would require them to develop transnational mechanisms to harmonize regulations and customs procedures and arbitrate disputes.

Another difficulty is that Russia and China do not wish to see the region more globally connected and will thwart such efforts. Both countries want to limit Western influence in the expansive terrain that separates them. This is particularly important for Russia, which is already battling the West along its western frontier. Moscow also recognizes that it is already losing ground in the region to Beijing, which hopes to fill the vacuum Russia is leaving behind. For China, which aspires to build its Eurasian economic thoroughfare known as the Belt and Road Initiative through Central Asia, any increase in the region’s autonomy is potentially threatening.

But the biggest challenge for U.S. efforts to foster regional integration and enhance Central Asia’s global connectivity is financing. China can pour tens of billions of dollars into infrastructure projects for geopolitical reasons, but the U.S. and its allies must rely on the private sector to do most of the heavy lifting. Western firms are motivated by returns on their investments, which is why Washington is urging the Central Asian governments to implement political and economic reforms that render their region attractive to investors.

For a region that is trying to put its Soviet past behind it and has been doing more and more business with the Chinese, the challenge of forming a regional bloc is about transforming norms as much as it is about structural change.

Palestinian supporters. The Russian republic of Chechnya is creating a community for Palestinian refugees, according to an aide for the head of the region. The official stated that 209 Palestinian refugees currently live in Chechnya. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared his support for the Palestinians shortly after the war in Gaza began and has indicated that his government will help accommodate civilians fleeing the fighting.

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September 12, 2024
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The Corridor Dividing Russia and Iran
Moscow’s endorsement of a new route through the South Caucasus sparked a fierce backlash in Tehran.
By: Kamran Bokhari
The Ukraine war has brought Russia and Iran closer, but the full scope of their evolving relationship is more complicated. Until last year, Tehran was the junior partner. But as Moscow’s reliance on Iranian drones and missiles for the war against its neighbor has grown, so has Iran’s leverage. A strategic divergence is now emerging: Iran needs to negotiate with the United States, while Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus conflicts with Iran’s interests.

Strategic Divergence

When the U.S. accused Iran this week of sending Russia short-range ballistic missiles to use against Ukraine, it obscured a far more significant development in Russian-Iranian relations. Recently, several senior Iranian officials have publicly criticized Russia for supporting Azerbaijan’s plan to establish a corridor in Armenia along the border with Iran. Iran’s new foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, described the so-called Zangezur corridor as a “redrawing of boundaries” and said it was “totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.” Earlier, the head of the ministry’s Eurasia Directorate warned the Russian ambassador to Iran not to encourage a conflict on its borders. Additionally, Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Expediency Council and formerly the longest-serving head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Russia’s behavior stood in “clear contradiction” to its professed friendship with Iran.

Iran’s concerns over its northern border have increased since Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory over Armenia, an Iranian ally, in the second war for Nagorno-Karabakh. Administered by Armenia since their first war in 1994, the region’s fall to Azerbaijan significantly extended the Azerbaijani-Iranian border. Azerbaijan’s push to secure the Zangezur corridor, connecting it with its Nakhchivan exclave, threatens to create a contiguous Turkic belt along Iran’s northwestern border. This is a major security threat for Tehran, compounded by the country’s enormous ethnic Azeri population (which constitutes almost a quarter of the total population and is concentrated in the country’s northwest), its ongoing domestic political transition and its high-risk campaign to expand its influence in the Middle East.

Iran-Russia Borderlands

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For years, Iran felt secure because Armenia had the upper hand over Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus was firmly under Russian influence. Over the past four years, however, the region has undergone a strategic shift. For starters, massive Turkish support enabled Azerbaijani forces to overwhelm their Armenian rivals to capture Nagorno-Karabakh, overturning the balance of power that had existed since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. Despite their alliance under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Moscow failed to come to Yerevan’s aid, prompting Armenia to threaten openly to leave the security pact and pursue partnerships with the likes of France and the United States. Meanwhile, over the past two and a half years Turkey has exploited Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine to expand its influence in the region even more and strengthen its connectivity with Central Asia.

With Turkey challenging its monopoly around the Caspian and Azerbaijan emerging as the top power in the South Caucasus, the Kremlin had no choice but to extend a hand to Baku, whose relationship with the West is still chilly. To secure a seat at the table where Turkey and Azerbaijan were redrawing the region’s security and economic order, Russia needed to endorse the Zangezur corridor. However, this put Moscow at odds with Tehran, which fears that such changes will sever Iran’s access to its landbridge to Eurasia.

Turning Point

Since the early 16th century, the Persians controlled much of the South Caucasus and large parts of the North Caucasus (including Dagestan and parts of Chechnya). Starting in 1801, however, czarist Russia began capturing these territories from the Qajar Empire. In 1813, under the Treaty of Gulistan, the Persians ceded Dagestan, eastern Georgia, most of Azerbaijan and parts of northern Armenia to the Russians. Qajar Iran retained much of Armenia, Nakhchivan and southern Azerbaijan until the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, which established Iran’s current northwestern border along the Aras River. Moscow controlled the South Caucasus until the Soviet Union’s breakup, when Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan gained their independence, though the Russian Federation continued to enjoy unchallenged influence in the region. From Iran’s perspective, not much had changed about the status quo that had existed for well over a century and a half, except that history and ethnicity made a sovereign Armenia a natural ally of the Iranians.

Newly independent Armenia controlled Nagorno-Karabakh, a 1,700-square-mile (4,400-square-kilometer) area inside Azerbaijan, for nearly three decades – which suited Iran just fine. Through an aggressive foreign policy in the Arab world, Iran had succeeded in blocking Turkey, which no Persian power had accomplished since the rise of Islam in the seventh century. However, the 2020 Azerbaijani-Armenian war was a turning point. Turkey, which had never controlled the bulk of the South Caucasus, even at the height of the Ottoman Empire, now had a strong presence on Iran’s northern border. This was a major affront to Iran, whose heavy focus on dominating the northern rim of the Middle East had made Turkey’s advances possible. And with Russia joining Turkey in aligning with Azerbaijan, Iran is further constrained.

What’s more, Iran recognizes that with Russia in long-term decline, Turkey is best positioned to fill the vacuum. Turkey enjoys ethnic ties not only with Azerbaijan but also with most Central Asian states east of the Caspian. Historically, Persian empires, particularly since the fall of the Timurid Empire in the early 16th century, controlled large parts of what is now Turkmenistan, with influence extending into present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Iran's current border with Turkmenistan was established by the 1881 Treaty of Akhal, which saw the Qajar Empire lose its Central Asian territories to Russia.

In the 19th century, as Iran lost control of large parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia to Russia, its historical rival, the Ottoman Empire, was losing the Middle East to the British and French. Effectively cut off from the north by Russia’s conquest of much of Eurasia, Iran reoriented its strategic focus westward and southward. Meanwhile, the discovery of oil in the Middle East, the rise of Arab states and the Cold War's onset forced Iran to concentrate on new regional dynamics.

The Iranian monarchy aligned with the West to counter Soviet influence in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. But then the 1979 revolution brought an anti-U.S. regime to power with imperial ambitions, particularly in the Arab world. The 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran sparked an eight-year war, resulting in a million deaths and billions of dollars in economic damage, further cementing Iran's geopolitical orientation toward its western and southern frontiers.

The Gulf War in early 1991 and the Soviet Union’s collapse later that year set the stage for closer Russian-Iranian relations. This relationship deepened after the 9/11 attacks, with Iran relying on Russia for support against the United States. The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings further solidified their alliance as both backed the Assad regime in Syria, with Iran leading ground operations and Russia providing air support. Thus, by the time Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Moscow and Tehran had an established model for cooperation. The Ukraine conflict also made Russia more and more reliant on Iranian weaponry, particularly drones.

Iran will maintain its relationship with Russia, but it recognizes Russia’s declining geopolitical power. After the Ukraine war, Moscow will likely remain preoccupied with its European front. Meanwhile, Iran faces growing tensions with Israel and needs to consolidate its influence in the Arab world, which requires some form of understanding with the United States. This need for a rapprochement with the West helps to explain why the regime permitted the election of the pragmatist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in Iran’s recent elections.

Given these trajectories, Iran will see diminishing returns from its relationship with Russia. A weakened Russia, grappling with the fallout from its Ukraine invasion, is likely to grow more dependent on Iran, which could lead to conflicts, as seen in the South Caucasus. And as Russia's position weakens, Turkey's ambitions in Eurasia will become increasingly significant.

Makes clear the motivations behind the recent and ongoing brouhaha about identifying foreign donations , , ,
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Strong accusations. Just days ahead of parliamentary elections in Georgia, the founder of Georgian Dream, the country’s ruling pro-Russian party, accused an unnamed high-ranking Western official of suggesting that Georgia start a war with Russia. The official supposedly said the conflict would last only three to four days and then spiral into guerrilla warfare with the support of the West. Georgian Dream's founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, said that former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili told him about the comment and that the incident compelled the party to get tougher with the West. No evidence was provided to support the claim. Since the Ukraine war began, Georgian officials have repeatedly accused “forces” of trying to drag Georgia into a military confrontation with Russia.

EU involvement. Azerbaijani media reported that an increasing number of EU observers have been visiting the Azerbaijani-Armenian border since October. Azerbaijan’s Report news agency said it obtained footage showing a French flag flying on one of three cars that recently brought these observers to the border area. The outlet concluded that the individuals in the car worked for French intelligence.

GPF

NATO in the South Caucasus. A NATO delegation held talks with Armenian defense officials in Armenia this week. Headed by the deputy chief of staff of the Supreme Allied Command Europe, the delegation met with Armenia’s top military officials to discuss prospects for further cooperation. It also received an update on the progress of Armenian defense reforms.