The War's Pivotal Impasse Crystallizes as Russia Cements Negotiation Terms
Simplicius
Oct 8
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Increasingly the lens is being narrowed onto territorial concessions as Ukraine’s end game. Behind the scenes, all Ukraine’s Western allies now understand that it’s impossible to compete with Russia and the only way they can salvage some of their blood-investment is by freezing the conflict under the false promise that Ukraine can regain its lost territories at some future date, after a few years of rebuilding.
https://archive.ph/mTiBHKey summary:
‼️Kiev is holding closed talks on a peace deal that would see Russia retain control over Ukrainian territories it controls but not recognise its sovereignty over them, - Financial Times
▪️ “Behind closed doors, there is talk of a deal in which Russia controls about 1/5 of Ukraine, although Russian sovereignty is not recognized - while the rest of the country is allowed to join NATO or receive equivalent security guarantees.”
▪️The publication describes a scenario similar to how West Germany restructured and integrated with the EU during the Cold War.
RVvoenkor
The article opens by acknowledging that behind the scenes the mood is “darker than ever” and that Ukraine faces a devastating winter of power shortages. What’s extremely interesting, to digress briefly, is how they acknowledge that a settlement of the conflict which is ‘adverse’ to Ukraine in favor of Russia would pose grave security risks to Europe and the US.
So, are they admitting that a non-neutral Ukraine is a key linchpin buffer state that poses massive risks to one side or the other, depending on its alignment? If that’s the case, why the hysterical denial of Russia’s justified concerns about Ukraine’s shifting alignment to the West after the CIA-sponsored coup in 2014? Surely they can see Russia is likewise due the same allowance of concern they now profess for themselves.
They go on to land their key thesis:
Some Kyiv officials, too, fret in private that they lack the personnel, firepower and western support to recover all territory seized by Russia. There is talk behind closed doors of a deal in which Moscow retains de facto control over the roughly one-fifth of Ukraine it has occupied — though Russia’s sovereignty is not recognised — while the rest of the country is allowed to join Nato or given equivalent security guarantees. Under that umbrella, it could rebuild and integrate with the EU, akin to West Germany in the cold war.
But they explain that even the optimistic deal above relies entirely on two improbable scenarios:
That the US and allies would even allow the remaining rump-state Ukraine to enter NATO. This is problematic because it would require the mass-deployment of US trips upfront as a Cold War-style ‘tripwire’ in accordance with Article 5.
That Putin would agree to such a ceasefire deal to begin with, particularly given the fact that one of the primary stated reasons for the SMO being launched was the prevention of Ukraine joining NATO. We will address this point specifically later.
They do also mention that Putin doesn’t quite have the incentive for a ‘land for peace’ deal when his troops are essentially winning and making active advances. Why settle for some land now when he can take the whole thing? Of course, one of the answers to this lay in Zelensky’s Kursk gambit, which was partly designed to capture an amount of territory that would induce Putin to exchange it for what Russia captured in Donbass and elsewhere. But this has no chance, as Russian troops are shrinking Ukraine’s Kursk holdings daily, including some gains yesterday and today, and it will all be recaptured in due time.
The article concludes with the groping sentiment that Russia can only be forced into these demands if Russia feels the costs of the war have become too high. This could not be a more preposterously frivolous idea. Russia has shown nothing other than iron-clad determination for total victory, with its economy going to a war-footing, particularly with next year’s mass defense spending surges, and its population—which includes previously frayed elites—increasingly patriotic. Any inconvenient ‘thorn’ Ukraine manages to rib into Russia’s side only amplifies Russia’s resoluteness and solidarity. There is no possible event that can even conceivably cause Russia to decide “enough is enough, we must back down”.
In this game of Chicken, the West will have to veer first or simply accept that nukes will fly at the height of the escalation ladder.
But now that we’ve been apprised of the West’s new terms, we also have an interesting new insight into Russia’s terms courtesy of Newsweek’s latest, which has an interview with none other than venerable Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-russias-lavrov-warns-dangerous-consequences-us-ukraine-1964468Lavrov prefaces with this axiomatic condensation of Putin’s stated position on the conflict:
"Russia is open to a politico-diplomatic settlement that should remove the root causes of the crisis," he said. "It should aim to end the conflict rather than achieve a ceasefire."
This is key: Russia seeks to end the broader crisis, which is ideologically larger than the mere physical war itself, rather than merely achieving a shallow ceasefire. In short, Russia wants something permament, not another Minsk-style set of accords.
Lavrov likewise cites the need for the entire world order to recalibrate to modern realities as part of this settlement process—this is a nod to Putin’s Westphalian-redux proposition of a whole new security architecture undergirding any possible settlement.
"What we have in mind is that the world order needs be adjusted to the current realities," he said. "Today the world is living through the 'multipolar moment'. Shifting towards the multi-polar world order is a natural part of power rebalancing, which reflects objective changes in the world economy, finance and geopolitics. The West waited longer than the others, yet it has also started to realize that this process is irreversible."
But the final segment is the most important. Lavrov for the first time finally clearly enunciates Russia’s explicit demands for ending the conflict via ceasefire. For all those wondering amidst the hazy rumors and stitched-together statements, here it is, finally in unvarnished form—Russia’s concrete demands for the settlement of the conflict as of this present time:
Lavrov: Our position is widely known and remains unchanged. Russia is open to a politico-diplomatic settlement that should remove the root causes of the crisis. It should aim to end the conflict rather than achieve a ceasefire. The West should stop supplying weapons, and Kiev should end the hostilities. Ukraine should return to its neutral, non-bloc and non-nuclear status, protect the Russian language, and respect the rights and freedoms of its citizens.
The Istanbul Agreements initialed on 29 March 2022 by the Russian and Ukrainian delegations could serve as a basis for the settlement. They provide for Kiev's refusal to join NATO and contain security guarantees for Ukraine while recognizing the realities on the ground at that moment. Needless to say, in over two years, these realities have considerably changed, including in legal terms.
On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement as follows: complete AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People's Republic], LPR [Luhansk People's Republic], Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; securing the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and removal of all sanctions against Russia
So, we have:
AFU must withdraw from DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye, and Kherson. These republics were all officially annexed by Russia on September 30, 2022 as enshrined in the Russian Constitution, which makes it final. They are now irreversibly part of the Russian state and cannot be negotiated. Again I remind you: this goes for the full pre-war borders of those states—that means Ukraine would have to withdraw from both Kherson city, as well as the huge industrial center of Zaporozhye city, which has a population of nearly 1 million.
Interestingly, Lavrov cites the recognition of these realities as being part of the demand. That means the earlier floated regime in the FT article would not fly, given that it proposes for Kiev to explicitly not “recognize” Russia’s dominion of these territories while still ‘temporarily’ ceding control of them. It’s a small but very significant sticking point that could be a deal-breaker for the whole thing.
Neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine. The problem here is, who would be the guarantor to such a dubious thing? What could possibly entice Russia to trust Western/NATO accomplices in guaranteeing this for the foreseeable future when it’s now known their word is as good as the toilet paper it’s written on? That is obviously another huge sticking point, and could require the inclusion of other major BRICS powers like China as guarantors, which would almost by default turn the proceedings into a kind of newly reimagined global framework, the likes of which Putin talked about.
Securing the rights of all Russian-speakers; this one is self-explanatory.
The big one—it’s still here for those doomers and 5th columnists who claimed Putin had backpeddled on these: demilitarization and deNazification. Since Lavrov cited the Istanbul agreement as a basis, we can infer that the documents on Ukraine’s demilitarization from that meeting can serve as a starting point.
For those wondering, here are the very documents Putin presented, showing precisely what demilitarized limits Russia sought to impose on Ukraine:
Pasted from a previous article:
Bold type indicates the number of troops and equipment defended (wanted to have) by Kiev, and italics - Moscow's version(demand how much military equipment Ukraine to have).
Russian offers, as a rule, are 2-3 times less. For example, Ukraine wanted 800 tanks, while Russia offers 342.
Ukraine wanted 2400 armored fighting vehicles, Russia - 1029.
Kiev also planned to keep 1900 artillery pieces, Moscow - 519.
In terms of personnel - Ukraine offered 250 thousand, Russia - 85 thousand people, not counting the National Guard(National Guard up to 15 000 people).
It follows from the passage that the parties did not agree on this issue.
But it is generally confirmed that Ukraine was ready to discuss with Russia the size of its armed forces. If, of course, this document is genuine(which it looks it is geniuine).
Ukraine has not yet confirmed its authenticity.
▪️ Tanks - 342
▪️ BBM(Armoured fighting vehicles ) - 1029
▪️ Artillery pieces - 519
▪️ Mortars - 147
▪️ MANPADS - 608
▪️ Combat support aircraft - 102
▪️ Number of combat troop(soldiers) up to 85,000 people
▪️ National Guard 15,000 people
So, the demilitarization is clear, as per the above. DeNazification is less clear but we can only assume it would be the outlawing of various ideologies and nationalist groups, and the subsequent audited enforcement of this; that’s not to mention the removal of many known personalities from office/government, as well as their surrender to Russia for prosecution.
Finally, the last item:
The removal of ALL SANCTIONS against Russia.
If you thought the previous demands might have precluded negotiations from ever having a snowball’s chance in hell, this last doozy would be the final nail in the coffin. What do you reckon is the bloodthirsty, arrogant West’s appetite for removing every single last sanction from the most sanctioned country on this green Earth? The chances are probably not high unless Trump wins and truly embodies the savior-like figure he’s made himself out to be by living up to his wildest promises.
So, there you have it: the full Russian demands are given and clearcut. You can make up your own mind as to how closely the new Western spitballed ideas come to the above.
The way I see it is, the West’s entire current model relies on the crux point of rump state Ukraine being promised NATO entry—Zelensky would not consider anything less than that, as it’s the only ‘carrot-on-a-stick’ big enough to sell to his public as excuse for capitulation. But as stated earlier, Russia cannot possibly allow an aggressively antagonistic NATO state on its newly expanded border. By the same token, NATO cannot possibly admit Ukraine if it’s in the middle of a conflict which Russia refuses to pause because it would bring up the intractable issue of Article 5 bearing the impression of being applied offensively rather than defensively: because it would seem like NATO arbitrarily added a nation at war, just to immediately join in and declare war on that nation’s opponent. That cannot fly.
Thus, we’re at an impasse. Russia cannot allow a non-demilitarized NATO member, but NATO cannot admit Ukraine in the midst of conflict—all the while Ukraine cannot submit to Russia’s demands without a major concession from the West, the only which exists is NATO membership.
It’s like a three-way high-noon showdown, with neither side an inch to give. So, the solution? More war.
As mentioned Russia is gearing up for the long haul. Another of FT’s latest sheds light on this:
https://archive.ph/AmzBBIt opens:
As the Kremlin rolls out a new budget for 2025, gone are hopes that this year’s unprecedented levels of military spending represent a peak of what Vladimir Putin can afford to spend on his ugly war of conquest against Ukraine.
They glumly report that Russia’s massive increases of defense spending for next year clearly represent that “Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine remain as entrenched as ever. Far from scaling back, the Russian president appears willing to absorb rising costs in his fight, which he views as existential to his regime’s survival.”
Ukrainian figures likewise continue to predict a coming collapse of some kind. Oleg Soskin, advisor to previous Ukrainian presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma, recently stated again that a military coup will soon rise up:
Meanwhile Arestovich again reiterated his views from the other interview I posted last time, that he believes a frontline collapse will ensue in the medium term future for the AFU:
Ultimately, though, it’s easy to cherry-pick a few favorable sentiments from the Ukrainian side to sculpt a particular narrative. Many understand that it’s possible Ukraine could continue slogging on and merely shouldering the vast losses, depending on how a few converging elements happen to fall into place.
So that brings us to the final question: Given the developments outlined at the onset of the article, with Russia’s concretely restated position, and the Ukrainian allies’ materializing acknowledgment of the war’s true vector, what is the likely outcome once this ‘impasse’ finally comes to a head?
When we put all the elements together, including the potential for an accelerated collapse of the Donbass front as outlined by Arestovich and others, what we can guess may happen is that over the course of the winter, as Ukraine’s situation deteriorates in the aftermath of the electric grid being finished off, some major official gestures—rather than backroom chatter and sidelong innuendoes—will be made from the Western side toward Russia in stopping the conflict. After it becomes completely apparent that Russia is unwilling to do so—as it’s already slowly coming to pass—the West may have no choice other than to draw a red line at the Dnieper River.
They know they cannot stop Russia from taking Donbass in any way, whether by coercion or force, so their only ‘fallback’ would be Macron’s old plan of potentially putting together a coalition of some troops to ‘symbolically’ to do the Dnieper what Russian forces once tried to do to Pristina airport. At the same time, Ukraine’s only last hope of buoying the military’s spirits is by finalizing the 18+ mobilization, perhaps sometime by spring. This will be some kind of ‘message’ from Zelensky, meant to show the indefatigable mettle to ‘take it to the end. There have been recent rumors that Zelensky’s team is putting together a Plan C to take the war to 2027 and beyond even when it goes past the Dnieper. In short, Zelensky ostensibly is signaling that he’s ready to retreat and resist even deep into western Ukraine, if need be.
The problem is, even Borrell again reiterated yesterday that if Europe stops supporting Ukraine “the war will end in 15 days.”
https://www.rt.com/news/605347-borrell-ukraine-fate-west/That is to say, as gung ho as Zelensky wants to appear, the truth is all the talk of retreating and ‘resisting’ perpetually is in fact entirely contingent on European support. If that support dries up, whether by intention or by virtue of Europe literally running out of arms, money, or even consensus, then Zelensky will be S.O.L. And the latest headlines continue to hammer home the news that Europe is falling further and further under Putin’s spell, rather than Zelensky’s:
https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/putin-finds-surprising-help-in-brussels-but-worries-mount-at-home-htprn6cjhMark Galeotti’s latest above says that Putin reiterated Lavrov’s words that all objectives will be achieved, pointing to no compromise, while toasting the September 30 ‘reunification day’, when Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson rejoined Russia:
Last Monday was “Reunification Day”, a holiday President Putin declared in 2022 to commemorate Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russia still doesn’t even control them all, but nonetheless, Putin asserted the “genuinely liberating nature” of his invasion and crowed that “all the goals we have set for ourselves will be achieved”.
The article cites the rise of Russia-friendly parties in Europe, from AfD in Germany, to FPÖ in Austria, to Le Pen’s RN in France, and even within the European parliament itself:
The Patriots for Europe bloc, which is often regarded as, if not always pro-Putin, at least Ukraine-sceptic, is now the third largest in the European parliament. With still just 84 of the parliament’s 720 members, there is a limit as to quite what the bloc can do, but it is being hailed by Moscow’s propagandists as a sign that the tide is turning Putin’s way.
Here’s the critical paragraph:
Robert Fico even called to shoot ATACMS missiles on Brussels instead of Russia:
For those interested, here was Putin’s address a week ago on September 30th, 2024 for Reunification Day:
In conclusion, several things are clear:
Russia has made its demands known, and these demands appear unlikely to be tenable within the scope of the West’s current political atmosphere. The West on the other hand is incapable of matching Russia’s pivot to a wartime footing, nor is Ukraine capable of forcibly effecting Russia’s submission or concession in the form of negotiating away any of the captured territories, or any of the other points of Russia’s demands for that matter.
Thus, we can only determine that for at least the next six months the conflict must continue without any major changes, other than Ukraine’s continued parabolically-shaped deterioration which will lead to the acceleration of Russia’s advances and territorial captures. As one last example: a new report last week had claimed Ukraine is preparing a new “offensive” for 2025—but this was quickly retracted when it was acknowledged that Ukraine does not even have the heavy armor or equipment necessary for any kind of offensives anymore.
From Legitimny:
#hearings
Our source reports that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will most likely not be able to go on the offensive in 2025, as they have a huge shortage of heavy weapons, equipment and air defense.
It is worth understanding that the loss of Ugledar buried even the theoretical chances of moving into an offensive in the Mariupol direction. The Armed Forces lost one of the most important defense nodes, Russia has additional opportunities for logistics maneuver, including the transfer of troops and equipment.
It is worth expecting that the next 7 months of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will come across the entire front and the only question is that Ukraine can hold on.
Ukraine has thrown away a lot of its remaining gear in Kursk and is said to be critically low on some important systems like notably air defense—and that is exactly one of the systems not being actively manufactured in almost any number across the West. Thus, there is nothing whatsoever that can change the tide even temporarily or “slightly” in Ukraine’s favor. At the same time, if Ukraine finally calls up the 18+ generation, it can theoretically hold out on the defensive, albeit with high casualties, for quite a bit longer, all the while retreating at the kind of regular cadence now common across the front.
Thus, the only question that remains on my mind is what happens to the war once Russia gets to the Dnieper. That will be the next big critical turning point that is difficult to predict—but until that point, the conflict seems slated to continue as is without much surprises, particularly now that all wunderwaffen have been exhausted. Granted, I do not think Russia can get to the Dnieper as quickly as Arestovich’s “fast collapse” theory seems to suggest—for now it’s still not likely even for 2025; but it’s hard to say because if the collapse goes ‘parabolic’ enough in its acceleration, then anything’s possible.
From Rezident channel:
#Inside
Our source in the OP said that Zelensky received from the General Staff an analysis and forecast of the situation at the front for 2025, in which the entire Donbass is lost by the Armed Forces, and the Russian army can reach the Dnieper while maintaining a situation with a shortage of weapons. This document was shown at Bankova in the White House, but the Biden Administration did not respond to the information in any way, but only advised to look for formats for freezing the war.
For now it seems the Pokrovsk battle could be this winter’s Avdeevka that alone could run into the spring. Although it must be recalled that Ukraine is only able to subsist on a strong lease of propaganda waves and victory narratives. But soon, there may be no visible hope at all—how can Ukraine sustain politically for the entire duration of 2025 when there is no longer even a single ‘light’ on the horizon, like a new wunderwaffe, or a potential NATO invitation, etc.?
Once the ‘impasse’ discussed earlier is fully aired out and accepted, Ukraine will have to endure the entire next year under potentially-catastrophic conditions vis-a-vis the electric grid, mass losses of both troops and territory as a daily constant, with no further political succor to be gained. As such, under these conditions it’s simply impossible to envision Zelensky’s regime or the political status quo surviving. This is why I’ve personally always predicted the war would end with some political turmoil rather than a merely kinetic military victory: for instance an overthrow, etc.
There’s some small wildcard chance that Trump cashes in his promise by turning ultra-hawk and massively funding Ukraine after being spurned and having his ego bruised by a recalcitrant Russia—that’s one of the few things I can think of that could put new wind in Ukraine’s sails for a while. Apart from that, next year can only be one of mounting political crisis and potential collapse for Ukraine.
Stay tuned for another paid report coming in the near future which will be a more data-driven continuation elaborating on precisely how Europe stands no chance at keeping up with Russia militarily over the coming years, in terms of arming and supporting Ukraine.
