What To Watch For as Russia Launches Its Next Major Offensive in Ukraine
12 MIN READFeb 15, 2023 | 22:54 GMT
While Russia's upcoming winter offensive is unlikely to gain enough ground to significantly alter the trajectory of the war, it could complicate Ukraine's offensive in the spring, the success of which will depend on Western weapons deliveries. The Institute for the Study of War, an independent U.S.-based research group, claimed on Feb. 8 that ''Russian forces [had] begun their next major offensive'' in Ukraine, citing ''the commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations'' around the eastern town of Kreminna in Luhansk (one of the territories that comprise the Donbas region). NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg then appeared to confirm this assessment on Feb. 13 by saying ''the reality is that we have [already] seen the start'' of a renewed Russian thrust into Ukraine.
High-ranking Ukrainian and Western officials have also indicated that Russia is preparing to launch a larger-scale attack, possibly in the coming days. These claims come amid reports that mobilized Russian soldiers training in Russia, Belarus and occupied Ukraine have moved closer to the front line and the Ukrainian border in recent days, along with large amounts of military equipment including aircraft. Over the past month, Russian forces have also been encircling the strategic eastern city of Bakhmut, and have increased attacks along the front. Taken together, these developments indicate that the accelerated Russian assault Ukrainian officials have warned about for months is underway — and likely only beginning.
On Feb. 12 the British defense intelligence agency assessed that over the past two weeks, Russia had likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the first week of the Feb. 24 invasion, underscoring the unprecedentedly high intensity of Russia's recent efforts. This was supported by Mediazona and the BBC News Russian service's running tally of confirmed Russian deaths, which on Feb. 12 recorded the highest biweekly rise in deaths since the tally was last updated on Jan. 27.
Russia is attacking first to disrupt Ukraine's preparations for its own offensive, precede Western weapons deliveries, establish defensive positions farther forward to protect the Crimea land corridor, and gain ground toward a major political justification for the war (the seizure of the Donbas). But Moscow is unlikely to fully accomplish these objectives. In recent weeks, Russia has resumed probing attacks in not only Kreminna but farther south in Vuhledar and numerous other disparate places along the front. This is likely an attempt to test Ukrainian formations in several places so that they cannot leave their positions or concentrate where larger Russian breakthrough attempts may be made. But there is currently little information regarding where and if Russia is concentrating armored vehicles for a breakthrough. Russia's current attacks of various scale suggest Moscow is seeking to seize the initiative to push the frontline deeper into Ukraine. Russia believes that Ukraine is motivated to attack sooner rather than later before Russia's troops become more deeply entrenched. But Moscow would prefer to entrench its forces for the long haul only after pushing the frontline deeper into Ukraine. This is because the Crimea land corridor – Russia's only real prize from the invasion so far — is still well within the reach of the long-range strike systems Ukraine has received from its Western allies, making greater buffer space invaluable to securing the strategic viability of sustaining the corridor. No less importantly, the Kremlin will also be even more politically motivated to secure one of the most prominent remaining goals of the war — to ''liberate'' the Donbas (particularly after failing to ''demilitarize'' and ''denazify'' Ukraine, which President Vladimir Putin originally claimed was the main objective of his ''special military operation''). Finally, Russia would prefer to push its advantage before larger quantities of the new Western equipment recently promised to Ukraine (such as modern tanks) reach the front. In its efforts toward these goals, Moscow hopes to use Russia's manpower advantage to simultaneously attrit the forces Ukraine needs for its own offensive.
On Feb. 13 Andriy Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, asserted Russia's looming new assault would only constitute an intensification of the attacks already underway, arguing that Russian command does not currently have enough resources to launch more large-scale offensive actions.
Putin will likely make his intentions for the future of the war clearer in an upcoming speech, in which he could prepare a new round of mobilization. Months prior to the recent uptick in fighting, Russian forces and mercenaries from the Wagner group launched a campaign to encircle the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, where on Feb. 12 they claimed to capture the nearby village of Krasna Hora. The push toward Bukhmut is likely driven by the Kremlin's desire to show that progress is still being made in Ukraine before Putin's constitutionally-mandated annual speech to Russian parliamentarians on Feb. 21 and the first anniversary of the war on Feb. 24. The speech is likely to provide the greatest insight into Putin's plans for the future of the war since his last address to lawmakers in September, in which he claimed to have annexed four regions of Ukraine (none of which Russia now fully controls). During a Feb. 2 speech in Volgograd commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, Putin also appeared to compare today's conflict over Ukraine and World War II by alluding to war with the West, and has also returned to using nuclear threats. If Putin draws further connections to World War II in his Feb. 21 speech, it would provide insight into Kremlin's plans for mobilization and escalating the war, and suggest the Russian people should expect even greater sacrifices going forward. It would also contradict the Kremlin's current insistence that its ''special military operation'' is not a war and is going according to plan, and that Western weapons deliveries are incapable of changing the outcome of the conflict. Should Putin use the speech to prepare the Russian people for a new wave of mobilization in the coming weeks, his logic would likely be to have more Russian forces on the battlefield to oppose a Ukrainian offensive in the late spring, though there are for now few signs this scenario is likely.
Lawmakers in Russia's parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Feb. 22, where they will reportedly move forward with legislation that Putin calls for in his Feb. 21 speech. Such legislation is expected to pertain to the Ukrainian territories Moscow claims to have annexed, but speculation persists that it could pertain to future mobilization measures. There is also speculation that Putin could announce steps toward the annexation of the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would need approval by lawmakers.
U.S. President Joe Biden will likely respond to Putin's address during his visit to Poland Feb. 20-22, where Biden is scheduled to discuss both bilateral cooperation and collective efforts to support Ukraine and bolster NATO's deterrence.
In the coming months, Russia will focus on consolidating its territorial control of eastern Ukraine and is unlikely to attempt risky operations in other parts of the country of lower strategic value. While the invasion is not progressing as initially planned, Moscow continues to believe that Western support for Ukraine's defense will wane with time, and is increasingly preparing for a prolonged conflict that it believes it has a greater chance of winning. In addition, Russia already occupies sufficient territory — most importantly, the Crimea land corridor — for Russian elites and the general public to see the invasion as a success. Russian forces thus have little need to engage in riskier, resource-intensive actions, making it unlikely that Russia will reopen a second front (by, for example, launching an attack from Belarus). For similar reasons, a renewed Russian offensive toward Kharkiv also remains relatively unlikely, as such a thrust would not get closer to seizing the city than Russia's initial invasion did. Instead, Russia is more likely to concentrate its human and material resources on preserving its gains in the eastern Donbas region, where Russia seeks to achieve control over as much territory as it can. In the next stage of its war, one of Russia's primary goals will be to seize Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — the largest cities in the Donbas that are still under Ukrainian control. The cities are just over 40 kilometers (roughly 25 miles) away from the frontline — meaning Russia would only need to advance around 15 km (roughly 10 miles) to put them into the range of its many artillery systems, which Moscow hopes will undermine the strategic value of Ukraine's continued defense of the cities, and therefore the rest of Donbas. Bakhmut is the doorstep to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, which is also why the Wagner group's push around Bakhmut is significant. Should Bakhmut fall, Ukraine's troops will likely maintain defensive lines very close to minimize the strategic impact of the city's loss on the war.
Ukraine will conduct its own offensive later in the spring, the success of which will largely hinge on deliveries of ammunition from the West. Despite the recent announcement of increased Western military support for Ukraine, logistical constraints mean that it may take three months or more before tanks and critical ammunition reach the battlefront. In addition, Kyiv is concerned that Western military support will not be large enough, come fast enough and/or include the type of equipment needed to force Russian troops out of the Crimea land corridor — and that Ukraine will then miss its window of opportunity to retake the strategic region amid a politically fatigued West and increasingly entrenched Russia. This makes a Ukrainian offensive in the late spring imperative. Successfully beating off Russia's current offensive while minimizing losses of its own men, territory and equipment is important for Ukraine's offensive in the coming months. But by far the more important factor in determining its offensive's success will be the quantity, quality and timing of Western arms deliveries to Ukraine. Tanks and jets have been the primary subject of recent announcements and headlines, given that Ukraine seeks to launch its offensive as soon as it has the weapons to successfully do so. But even more crucial will be sufficient deliveries of ammunition, about which Ukrainian and NATO officials have increasingly sounded alarms.
Speaking at NATO headquarters on Feb. 13, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned that the current rate of Ukraine's ammunition expenditure is many times higher than the West's current rate of production, and even suggested artillery and other munitions manufacturers offer more shifts and keep the factories running on weekends to produce as much ammo as possible sooner rather than later. Specifically, he suggested the current production rate of 155 mm artillery ammunition is not sufficient – or on a trajectory to become so. The same is also true for high-precision and long-range systems such as HIMARS. Ukraine will likely need time to stockpile large quantities of these and other resources and move them to the front.
Ukrainian forces are estimated to be firing more than 5,000 artillery rounds every day, roughly equal to a smaller European country's orders in an entire year in peacetime. But Russia is currently estimated to be firing three to four times that amount each day amid its latest attacks.
The delivery of modern Western aircraft to Ukraine may only materialize in the second half of the year, but this delay will not deter Kyiv's plan for an offensive in the spring. On Feb. 8, the United Kingdom announced it would begin training Ukrainian pilots on NATO-standard aircraft. This strongly indicates that Ukraine will eventually receive modern Western jets, despite recent statements from U.S. President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz rejecting the idea of providing Kyiv with such aircraft at this time. Reports also suggest that some U.S. Pentagon officials have already been advocating for the United States to directly send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine or, at a minimum, approve their transfer by other countries. Western jets are necessary for Ukraine to independently secure its skies in the long term because procuring older Soviet and Russian aircraft for Ukraine is not a viable or effective option. But because the jets could significantly help the country defend itself from Russia's still constant missile and drone attacks, it would be strategically expedient for the West to push for their provision as soon as Ukrainian pilots are trained. British officials have indicated their training program could take between four-to-six months, possibly within the window for Ukraine's impending new offensive. But modern Western aircraft are not strictly necessary for Ukraine to conduct successful offensives against Russia in the coming months, meaning Kyiv's plan is unlikely to be derailed if it doesn't receive these new jets until after the start of its offensive. While the tanks the West is providing Ukraine will be more effective when they have air support from modern aircraft, the Ukrainian soldiers who will ultimately fly these Western jets will likely spend much of their time conducting Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) against Russia's vast array of anti-air complexes.
The latest Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at NATO headquarters on Feb. 14 did not result in major new concrete disclosures regarding Western weapons support for Ukraine. But in his nightly address to the Ukrainian people later that evening, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky insisted that while ''not everything can [and should] be reported publicly…I can say with confidence: the basic trends remain unchanged.''
F-16s are likely the most practical aircraft for Ukraine's needs, but a specific program to train Ukrainians on how to fly the U.S.-made fighter jets has yet to be announced. Over 4,600 F-16s have been produced since 1975. Despite the U.S. Air Force ceasing purchases of the jet in 2005, F-16s are still being built, as the plane is used by over 20 other operators. European countries such as the United Kingdom are likely to eventually transfer smaller quantities of other aircraft.
