Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 335090 times)


DougMacG

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Re: May be nothing...
« Reply #1101 on: July 22, 2020, 06:51:34 AM »
"I see a scenario where the 3 Gorges collapses, the PRC blames Taiwan and/or US and launches strikes on Taiwan and/or US.
It's 2020, why not?"


https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/three-gorges-dam-deformed-but-safe-say-operators/

It's as strong as an I-35 bridge.  I'm sure no government engineer took a shortcut to meet a budget or a deadline.

Didn't all the climate sayers forecast drought?  (except on the forum). You should be able to plant cacti by now where the Yangtze used to flow.

G M

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Re: May be nothing...
« Reply #1102 on: July 22, 2020, 10:48:30 AM »
"I see a scenario where the 3 Gorges collapses, the PRC blames Taiwan and/or US and launches strikes on Taiwan and/or US.
It's 2020, why not?"


https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/three-gorges-dam-deformed-but-safe-say-operators/

It's as strong as an I-35 bridge.  I'm sure no government engineer took a shortcut to meet a budget or a deadline.

Didn't all the climate sayers forecast drought?  (except on the forum). You should be able to plant cacti by now where the Yangtze used to flow.

Oh no. All the top experts have assured me that any weather can be explained by Global Warming Climate Change!

At least we can take comfort in knowing that this was built with the finest Chinese craftmanship and quality control respected worldwide.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Duterte says no US bases
« Reply #1103 on: July 28, 2020, 11:23:08 AM »
By: Geopolitical Futures
South China Sea moves. During his annual state of the union address on Monday, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte ruled out allowing the U.S. to set up military bases in the country, arguing that China is “in possession of” the disputed waters and that allowing U.S. base access would lead to nuclear war on Philippine soil. This leaves the fate of the landmark 2014 basing agreement with the U.S., implementation of which has stalled under Duterte, further in doubt.

(Possibly related: He also said that he had pleaded with Chinese President Xi Jinping to think of the Philippines first if and when it developed a COVID-19 vaccine.)

Other littoral states, apparently, disagree with Duterte on the question of whether might makes right in the South China Sea. Vietnam, for example, is mulling following the course set by Duterte’s predecessor, Benigno Aquino, and initiating international legal action against Chinese claims. Indonesia, meanwhile, has been ramping up maritime drills around the Natuna Islands. Perhaps most notably, Australia and the U.S. are expected to hold talks Wednesday on ramping up joint drills in the South China Sea.



Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Taiwan ain't flinching
« Reply #1106 on: August 05, 2020, 09:27:21 PM »
    Daily Memo: Taiwan Deploys Troops to the South China Sea
This is the second such deployment over the past couple of months.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Taiwan deploys troops to the South China Sea. Taiwan is deploying a company of some 200 marines to reinforce a coast guard garrison in the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands, located around 275 miles (440 kilometers) to the south in the South China Sea. This is the second such move by Taiwan over the past couple of months. Both have been made amid reports that China was planning massive military exercises in nearby waters simulating an amphibious landing and occupation of islands like the Pratas.

Beijing is under increasing pressure, both from internal political forces and from gradually increasing U.S. support for the self-ruled “renegade province,” to reverse Taiwan’s slow drift away from the mainland’s grasp. China is keen to achieve two things on the military front: One is to make Taipei conclude that a Chinese takeover, whether by force or negotiation, is inevitable. The second is to sow doubt in Taipei about the U.S. willingness to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a conflict. China cannot yet invade and hold Taiwan itself – at least not without incurring costs on a scale that Beijing could not stomach. But it can manufacture a crisis on Taiwan’s periphery, say, by seizing the Pratas or perhaps Taiping Island farther south. If it's really ambitious, China can also try to impose some sort of limited blockade. Both options would carry immense risks for Beijing, but less so for the former. Add in the fact that Beijing is keen to get the People’s Liberation Army more real operational experience one way or another, and it’s easy to see why Taiwan is taking these threats seriously.

Crafty_Dog

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G M

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Signs of the PRC's collapse?
« Reply #1108 on: August 07, 2020, 05:03:27 PM »
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j656W9sMAuA

Internal instability makes the PRC more dangerous.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Japan responding to China
« Reply #1109 on: August 14, 2020, 09:25:48 AM »
A More Assertive China Drives Japan to Respond in Kind
Rodger Baker
Rodger Baker
Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
7 MINS READ
Aug 14, 2020 | 15:56 GMT
Japanese Self-Defense Forces stand guard at a park in Tokyo on Oct. 22, 2019.
Japanese Self-Defense Forces stand guard at a park in Tokyo on Oct. 22, 2019.

(CHARLY TRIBALLEAU/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Japan has long operated beyond the pacifist constraints of its post-war constitution, but a growing and more assertive China is accelerating Tokyo's development of offensive its capabilities. Japan's core strategic imperatives are shaped by economic concerns -- the islands are resource-poor and thus import-dependent. This shaped its post-World War II Yoshida Doctrine, in which Japan largely outsourced its national security to the United States while focusing its energy on economic development at home. With Japan less confident in its dependence on the United States, the same vulnerability is now driving Tokyo to take on a more active role in its neighborhood. Japan's increased economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific provides a regional alternative to China for Southeast Asian nations, but may raise tensions with neighboring South Korea. ...

Japan has long operated beyond the pacifist constraints of its post-war constitution, but a growing and more assertive China is accelerating Tokyo's development of offensive its capabilities. Japan's core strategic imperatives are shaped by economic concerns — the islands are resource-poor and thus import-dependent. This shaped its post-World War II Yoshida Doctrine, in which Japan largely outsourced its national security to the United States while focusing its energy on economic development at home. With Japan less confident in its dependence on the United States, the same vulnerability is now driving Tokyo to take on a more active role in its neighborhood. Japan's increased economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific provides a regional alternative to China for Southeast Asian nations, but may raise tensions with neighboring South Korea.

Moving Beyond the Yoshida Doctrine
Just as Chinese President Xi Jinping has moved China past Deng Xiaoping's doctrine, which called for China to avoid showing its strength while it rebuilt internal power, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sought to move beyond the strategy Japan adopted under its postwar prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida. Though several factors have shaped Japan's defense evolution, today Tokyo is driven by the changes in Chinese international behavior and the growth of Chinese power. China's economy has far surpassed Japan's, leaving the island nation a distant third behind the United States and China in national GDP. China is rapidly increasing its technological capabilities, challenging Japan in traditional areas of strength, from semiconductors to high-speed rail. China has increased its investment and trade footprint throughout the region via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), supplanting earlier Japanese soft power gains.

China's navy development over the past decade has outstripped Japan's, and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now operates freely in the East and South China Seas, as well as into the West Pacific. Chinese construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, along with the Philippines' rebalance away from the United States toward China, raises the risk of interrupting vital Japanese maritime supply lines. Chinese port development and investment stretching through Southeast and South Asia and into East Africa also create additional areas where China could interfere with Japanese supply lines.

Japan's Economic and Diplomatic Response
Japan uses its identity as both a democracy and the second-largest regional economy to strengthen its position as a viable alternative for regional leadership. Despite its wartime history, Japan is largely seen as a non-threatening partner throughout much of Asia, except of course by neighboring China and the Koreas.


In response to China's growing global presence, Prime Minister Abe traveled to Kenya to launch his "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" initiative in 2016, which emphasizes building economic, social and security connections from East Africa through Asia to Japan. Abe's declaration had followed China's 2015 launch of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and while Tokyo toyed with also joining China's initiative, it ultimately decided to offer an alternative source of development loans and aid. Japan also took a leading role in revising the Trans-Pacific Partnership after the United States pulled out in 2017, strengthening its regional trade arrangements through the re-named Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Tokyo has stepped up diplomacy, aid and cooperation across Southeast Asia, among the Pacific Islands and into the Indian Ocean Basin, with the intent of countering Chinese advances and strengthening Japan's economic and security position. In 2017, Japan helped revive the defunct Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the "Quad") comprising Japan, Australia, India and the United States. Japan is supplying the Philippines and Vietnam with new coast guard ships, and has eased its self-imposed restrictions on arms exports. Tokyo is actively incentivizing Japanese companies to reduce their supply chain dependencies on China and move operations to Southeast Asia, with Vietnam currently standing out as a preferred spot.

Redefining Self-Defense
Japanese governments have frequently reinterpreted Article 9 of the country's post-war constitution, which renounces war and nominally requires Japan to possess only a defensive military capacity to avoid a repeat the imperial actions that led to World War II. Abe has sought to formally change Article 9 by rewriting the constitution, but his attempts have continuously been sidelined by more immediate priorities or a lack of consensus. But despite his failure to amend Article 9, a more liberal interpretation of "self-defense" has allowed Japan to still make substantial strides in reorienting its military toward emerging geopolitical threats.

Over the years, Japan has revised what it considers "offensive" versus "defensive" weapons systems. Japan has added in-air refueling capabilities, approved the acquisition of long-range cruise missiles, and is now discussing the development of anti-satellite systems to protect its space-based assets. Following Japan's June announcement that it was canceling its plans for purchasing and deploying the U.S.-made Aegis Ashore missile defense system, elements of Abe's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have revived discussions around Japan acquiring the capability to strike at foreign missile sites — something once taboo under the constitution.

Japan has already begun the process of updating its Izumo-class helicopter destroyers to take on F-35 joint strike fighters. In June, the United States approved the sale of 105 such aircraft to Japan, including 42 short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variants, which would bring Japan's total to 147 — the second-largest F-35 fleet in the world. Japan is also building an airbase on Mage Island off Kagoshima Prefecture for field carrier landing practice for the U.S. Navy and Japanese pilots.

In addition to its aircraft carrier development, Japan carried out its largest scale amphibious training drill since World War II in November 2019, honing its ability to retake island territory in case of war. Japan has also stepped up space cooperation with the United States, and is slated to lead a major multi-national cyber defense exercise later this year. Japan has an overseas base in Djibouti and has eased restrictions on the use of arms abroad by the country's Self-Defense Forces. Japan is expanding its basing through the Ryukyu Islands (bringing it closer to Taiwan), and is increasing regional port visits along and joint training exercises with the United States, Australia, India and other regional partners.

Regional Implications
Japan is positioning itself as a regional alternative to China for economic, political and security relations. While its pockets are not as deep as China's, Tokyo leverages assertions of better quality in both development and financing. Japan offers an alternative to China's BRI financing, both alone and in conjunction with partners including Australia and the United States. Japanese financing may require more careful considerations and planning by recipients than Chinese financing, but it also comes with fewer political strings, less fear of becoming a "debt trap" and with a higher level of trust in the technical acumen and quality of infrastructure.

A growing and more assertive China is now accelerating Tokyo's development of its offensive capabilities beyond the pacifist constraints of its post-World War II constitution.

Tokyo is also emerging as an alternative supplier of defense equipment, though primarily focused on maritime defense. Japan's involvement gives countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam greater confidence in standing up to Chinese challenges for their maritime territory, particularly as Japan's own reliance on the South China Sea represents a clear shared interest in ensuring open transit. Japan continues to enhance its regional security relationships, both in concert with its U.S. defense ties and independently, but has also maintained dialogue and cooperation with China and Russia, even as it sees China as the primary regional security threat. This balancing act enables Japan to simultaneously be a critical component of U.S. regional security and avoid a Cold War-type rift with China.

Japan's re-emergence as a regional military power, even without formally changing its constitution, is largely seen in a positive light as a local counterbalance to China (though China and the Koreas, of course, see this differently). The slow revision of the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces over the last several decades, as well as Japan's lack of territorial disputes (aside from those with China and the Koreas), has engendered little overt concern of any new Japanese imperialism from Southeast Asia, and none from South Asia and East Africa. Tokyo's tensions with South Korea, however, remains a major complication, both for Japan's regional position and for the trilateral relationship between Japan, the United States and South Korea.

G M

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DougMacG

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« Last Edit: August 19, 2020, 07:17:42 AM by DougMacG »



DougMacG

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Re: US loses wargames over and over....
« Reply #1115 on: August 20, 2020, 06:47:44 AM »
https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the_scary_war_game_over_taiwan_that_the_us_loses_again_and_again_124836.html

From the article:
"a war over Taiwan would most likely begin with a massive attack by advanced Chinese missiles against three American targets: its bases on Okinawa and Guam, its ships in the Western Pacific, including aircraft carrier groups, and its air force squadrons in the region. ...Taiwan would fold in a week or two.”
...
"Other experts, however, believe that the situation is not quite as bleak as the war games would indicate, or at least that it can be remedied. They argue: 1) that the American deterrent even now is still strong enough to make China very hesitant to use force on Taiwan, and 2) that the U.S. can and should adapt to China's capacity with new weapons and new tactics that would enable the country to prevail if it did come to an armed confrontation."
----------------------------------

It would seem to me that the outcome would depend on the willingness of the US ,via its President, willingness to use force, on what scale.  The scenario above of China taking Taiwan begins with destroying 3 US bases, in other words starting a war with the US. 

In the simplest terms, would the US at that time be led by Trump or Biden?  Trump has maintained a peace through strength deterrence stance that would make any adversary think twice.  We don't know what Trump would do in a Taiwan attack but for an attack on the US we would expect a major response.  That response would need to be disproportional from the start, attack ALL known Chinese military bases in the first retaliation as a priority ahead of a naval operation defending Taiwan.  Sink all ships that are not part of the operation, all nuclear sites, all air bases.  If they attack the US first, this isn't a Taiwan war; it's more like a world war.  The need would to defeat them on all fronts as fast as possible including every possible effort to topple the head of the beast.

China has the enormous advantage of willingness to take casualties.  They can't be fought on their terms.

In a Biden administration, they might calculate the US won't intervene.  In that case they would not attack the US bases first, just swarm the island.

Would Japan, Korea or anyone else join in?  Would that change anything?

I see this conflict deterred also by economics.  Things have changed under Trump and during coronavirus, but the US is still roughly their largest customer.  The regime's 'legitimacy' to rule a billion and a half people is held together partly by their ability to provide internal security and increasing prosperity.  In a twisted way, their behavior has been intensely logical, not suicidal like a bin Laden type enemy.  They have a historic need to recapture Taiwan but they have a higher need not rock their own boat.

Chinese Communist Party is fighting on a longer time frame than us.  I think they would prefer to have this operation later after they build their own forces bigger, after they pass up our economy and after the US implodes from within.  Oops, that time may be near.
« Last Edit: August 20, 2020, 06:55:39 AM by DougMacG »

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1116 on: August 20, 2020, 07:14:26 AM »
seems inevitable China will take over Taiwan doesn't it

does anyone really think we would have the will to take on CCP in their own turf?

And with the likes of the Bloombergs of the world etc
forget it.

we would need Japan Phillipines Vietnam Australia etc to arm and together we take them on.

Even H Bush , the globalist even before Clinton , who was the hero in forming an alliance against the Iraq Kuwait takeover

would not have done that - ( I don't think)

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1117 on: August 20, 2020, 07:41:28 AM »
They have cultural, regional, historic interests in those countries.  They will stop there.  Why would they go further?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anschluss
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_occupation_of_Czechoslovakia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_invasion_of_Poland
Etc.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1118 on: August 20, 2020, 01:35:19 PM »
Given Hunter "Snorty" Biden's time in the PRC, I would bet the Chinese MSS has compiled some very interesting blackmail material.

G M

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Scenarios
« Reply #1119 on: August 26, 2020, 11:50:46 AM »

ccp

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gertz : china claims of carrier killers
« Reply #1120 on: August 30, 2020, 11:11:57 AM »
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/aug/30/highway-danger-zone-china-taunts-us-carrier-killer/

my understanding from the international military intelligence sources into armchair at home  :wink:
is that the missiles could be intercepted

as long as they are not hypersonic

and I read conflicting things about this ;
whether china can really put to affect hypersonic missiles
or if these other missiles sink or make a carrier inoperable.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: US-Taiwan
« Reply #1121 on: August 31, 2020, 10:40:01 AM »
Particularly interesting in light of YA's post of two days ago on the India thread.
================================

Washington's commitment to Taiwan. The U.S. is reportedly set to declassify documents providing clarity on the “six assurances,” a set of security commitments made to Taiwan in 1982 by the Reagan administration. This is notable because with Taiwan, as with many of its friends and allies, the U.S. generally prefers to keep its security commitments as vague as possible to avoid getting entangled in a conflict not of its choosing. The downside, naturally, is that it reinforces doubts abroad about just how much support the U.S. would provide in a crisis, forcing partner governments to hedge their bets and incentivizing potential adversaries to manufacture crises meant to add to local anxieties. In other words, there can be value in making U.S. red lines more explicit.

This comes on the heels of several other notable developments in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Taiwan is seeking to purchase additional U.S. mines, surveillance drones and anti-ship missiles. Last week, Taiwan formally opened an F-16 maintenance hub. Also last week, Taiwan started the process of rolling back regulations that have been impeding trade talks with the U.S. And today, yet another U.S. warship sailed through the Taiwan Strait in a show of solidarity as Chinese forces conducted maritime drills on nearly every side of the self-ruled island.
« Last Edit: September 01, 2020, 08:24:30 AM by Crafty_Dog »

DougMacG

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Re: GPF: UA-Taiwan
« Reply #1122 on: August 31, 2020, 01:06:47 PM »
"And today, yet another U.S. warship sailed through the Taiwan Strait in a show of solidarity as Chinese forces conducted maritime drills on nearly every side of the self-ruled island."

God Bless Pres. Donald Trump.  US armaments without leadership are worth nothing.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1123 on: September 01, 2020, 06:16:06 AM »
Doug on May 17. ->

"My reaction to these types of analyses is that I assume this type of conflict would not involve the US alone vs. China.  How do these simulations come out if Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, India(?), others, side with the US?  Secondly, like NATO issues, if these potential allies don't add much power, they need to step up their capabilities too."

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Pentagon assessment of China
« Reply #1124 on: September 02, 2020, 09:19:57 AM »
What the Pentagon is most worried about with China. The U.S. Defense Department on Tuesday released its annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments. The sections on China’s breakneck missile, nuclear and warship buildups are getting the most attention, and for good reason. The Pentagon now estimates the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has more than 200 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (with a range of 3,000-5,000 kilometers, or 1,900-3,100 miles), and an estimated 200 IRBM mobile launchers. A year ago, the Pentagon estimated that China had just 80 launchers. Altogether, the Pentagon estimates that the Chinese arsenal now features some 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges of up to 5,500 kilometers.

China’s growing ability to put U.S. warships and bases at risk with ever-expanding reach is the single biggest threat to the U.S. Navy’s ability to operate in the South and East China seas. Shorter-range missiles have long worried U.S. defense planners about their ability to, say, come to Taiwan’s defense. (Relatedly, a Taiwanese Defense Ministry report released over the weekend is still bearish on whether China could actually conduct an amphibious invasion.) But the increasing range of the Chinese arsenal could theoretically make it more costly for the U.S. to cut off Chinese sea lanes at one of the many chokepoints along the first island chain and Strait of Malacca – the U.S.’ biggest point of leverage against China.

The Pentagon also sees China as having already achieved parity with or passed the U.S. on shipbuilding and integrated air defense systems.

China’s military modernization drive still has all sorts of deficiencies, especially on long-range power projection capabilities. But in its littoral waters, at least, China is turning into a formidable force.

=========
Also see
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/09/china-rapidly-increasing-nuclear-naval-and-next-gen-tech-pentagon-warns/168166/
« Last Edit: September 02, 2020, 09:22:15 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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US expands SCS fight to Chinese firms and officials
« Reply #1125 on: September 02, 2020, 09:49:38 AM »
second

The U.S. Expands Its South China Sea Fight to Chinese Firms and Officials
4 MINS READ
Aug 26, 2020 | 21:36 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS

New U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies and individuals involved in supporting Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea still fall short of more extreme options, demonstrating Washington’s desire to avoid derailing outreach to China, even as overall U.S.-China tensions continue to mount. On Aug. 26, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 24 Chinese companies to its entities list, which increases U.S. export controls, for supporting the militarization of China's maritime claims in the South China Sea, specifically citing the violation of Philippine sovereignty as upheld by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. The list of entities includes five subsidiaries of the massive state-owned enterprise China Communications Construction Company, as well as one shipbuilding group and numerous telecommunications and electronics companies. The new export controls coincide with the U.S. State Department announcing it would also impose a visa ban on Chinese nationals found to be...

New U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies and individuals involved in supporting Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea still fall short of more extreme options, demonstrating Washington’s desire to avoid derailing outreach to China, even as overall U.S.-China tensions continue to mount. On Aug. 26, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 24 Chinese companies to its entities list, which increases U.S. export controls, for supporting the militarization of China's maritime claims in the South China Sea, specifically citing the violation of Philippine sovereignty as upheld by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. The list of entities includes five subsidiaries of the massive state-owned enterprise China Communications Construction Company, as well as one shipbuilding group and numerous telecommunications and electronics companies. The new export controls coincide with the U.S. State Department announcing it would also impose a visa ban on Chinese nationals found to be responsible for militarization, land reclamation or construction supporting Chinese outposts in the contested waterway.

The companies added to the entities list will be restricted from purchasing goods from the United States, with a particular focus on dual-use technology that could have a military use or threaten national security.

This is the first time the Commerce Department has used its entities list to target South China Sea activities. The listing, however, is far less severe than being listed by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which would jeopardize all international financial transactions and be far more devastating.

In recent months, the U.S. Commerce Department has also added companies involved in China's Uighur crackdown in Xinjiang to its entities list, along with Huawei and other Chinese tech companies in an effort to restrict their ability to acquire sensitive technology.

The U.S. export controls and visa restrictions are a response to China’s continued buildup of its military presence and infrastructure in the South China Sea, where Beijing has asserted sweeping claims that jeopardize freedom of navigation.

On July 13, the U.S. State Department officially rejected specific Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, referencing disputes by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei with specific mention of Chinese unilateral energy exploration activities. The day after, David R. Stilwell, the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, suggested it was possible that the United States would sanction Chinese companies or individuals for South China Sea activities.

Washington has also been upping the frequency of its Western Pacific naval operations in recent months, expanding facilities and aiming to increase overall spending as part of its Pacific Deterrence Initiative.

Counter-claimants to China in the South China Sea — including Vietnam, Malaysia and even the Philippines — have begun adopting a more confrontational stance towards Chinese claims as well, although these neighbors are still cautious given their deep economic ties to Beijing.

For now, the White House remains unlikely to impose severe sanctions on a Chinese company related to activities in the South China Sea for fear of jeopardizing its trade deal with Beijing ahead of the 2020 presidential election. However, a key watch item will be whether U.S. targeting of Chinese entities extends to energy exploration activities in the waterway, which were mentioned in the July State Department announcement.

Targets for such U.S. sanctions could include China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) due to its involvement in oil exploration standoffs with both Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea, as well as the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), which has a major role in port construction across China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Sanctioning CNOOC, in particular, would be particularly significant. In addition to having assets in North America, the Chinese oil giant is also a major investor in energy projects across the world, including some with U.S. oil companies, such as the project with ExxonMobil in the Stabroek Block off the coast of Guyana.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: US-Taiwan
« Reply #1126 on: September 02, 2020, 10:17:23 AM »
September 1, 2020   View On Website
Open as PDF



    Nothing Has Changed With Taiwan
By: George Friedman

On Aug. 17, 1982, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sent a memo via an American diplomat to the Taiwanese government. On Monday, just over 38 years later, the memo was declassified. Its contents were “secret” in that they were not publicly available, but the gist has been well known for some time; these points had to be part of U.S. relations with Taiwan and China because without them, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China made no sense.
The decision to make public a document after nearly 40 years comes at a time of rising tensions, military drills and Chinese threats in the Taiwan Strait, and is meant to stave off more escalation by clarifying its position. The memo outlines the following:

That the U.S. had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. had not agreed to consult with China on arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. would not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
That the U.S. had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
That the U.S. had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
That the U.S. would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China

In other words, the United States was not prepared in any substantial way to abandon Taiwan, and by releasing the memo, Washington confirmed that the position it has held since 1982 has remained in place, and that China should understand as much.

The original context for the memo had to do with Richard Nixon’s visit to China, a groundbreaking trip born of mutual concern. Russian-Chinese relations were bad after the bloody conflict on the Ussuri River. China was afraid that the Soviets could defeat it. Meanwhile, the U.S., emerging bloodied from Vietnam, had weakened its position in Western Europe and feared the Soviets might take advantage of this opening. By restoring ties with the Chinese, the United States balanced this threat and opened a new threat against the Soviets if both attacked simultaneously.

It made no ideological sense but perfect geopolitical sense. Yet, it left open the status of Taiwan. The Chinese insisted that Taiwan was part of China, and Nixon agreed with them in principle so long as it was understood that it meant nothing in practice. The Soviet Union was the central issue.

By the 1980s, the Soviets were weakening a bit, the Chinese were increasing their power, and the Taiwan issue became more important. Ronald Reagan, of course, wouldn’t budge, so the memo – which was and remains the U.S. policy on China – slammed shut the door on modifying its Taiwan policy. It may not have explicitly said that the U.S. would intervene if China invaded Taiwan, but it left little to the imagination.

U.S.-Chinese relations have since deteriorated, and China has raised the possibility of invasion in various ways. Releasing this memo at this time does not surprise China, but does affirm that any Chinese move must take into account a U.S. intervention. Unlike many China watchers, the Chinese themselves know that an amphibious assault on Taiwan – armed as it is with U.S. aircraft, submarines and missile defense batteries – would likely fail, and that failure would vastly weaken their pretense of being a power on par with the United States.

The memo itself didn’t deter a Chinese invasion at the time; the U.S. alliance structure was such that that would have been a bad idea anyway. Beijing may see the reclamation of Taiwan as inevitable, but the inescapable reality of war is that you can lose, which is a nonstarter for China. The U.S. may have taken a defensive posture on Taiwan, but it’s an inflexible defensive posture. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and the rest of Southeast Asia may have reason to doubt U.S. commitments in the future, but for now the alliance remains very much intact. By releasing the memo, Washington is making it clear that nothing has changed.   




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Re: Chang: China threatens dumping treasuries
« Reply #1129 on: September 10, 2020, 07:08:37 AM »
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16485/china-threatens-dumping-treasuries

China threatens dumping treasuries
Gordon Chang:  "Be my guest."     :wink:

Chang:  "any move to suddenly attack the dollar by selling Treasuries will tend to make the renminbi extraordinarily expensive, thereby killing off the Chinese export sector"
...
"The tenure of China's Communist Party depends on its continual delivery of prosperity to the Chinese people, so that organization exists only with the permission of the United States."    [I would only add some exclamation points to that. !!!!]

----------------------------------
Gordon Chang has this right.  China owns less than 4% of US debt, and a lower share every minute assuming they aren't buying any more.
https://www.thebalance.com/who-owns-the-u-s-national-debt-3306124

They could 'dump' their share or the US could just default on their share, declare it a penalty payment for research and military secrets stolen, patents violated, etc.  Coronavirus damages.  They owe us far more than that.

Reminds of the trade war analogy.  If you shoot a hole in your boat, I will shoot an even larger hole in mine.

War scenarios between these two nations ignore their interconnected economies. What is China without trade and trading partners.  What is China without a thriving economy?  China should be taking or at least faking cooperative actions to slow the decoupling of the economies already in process.

Imagine some other business situation where your obsession is to cripple your biggest customer. 

If both countries take the strategy to destabilize the other's regime, doesn't the Chinese Communist Party politburo have the most to lose?  Trump has between a few months and 4 years left to exercize very limited power over a mostly free country, versus 205 people in CCP China, 1 in particular, viciously and oppressively rule 1.4 billion subjects.  What could go wrong?  I think of the trial and hanging of Saddam and the suicide of Hitler.  What does go wrong when brutal oppressors lose power?

I predict China will be more friendly to US interests in Trump's second term. 

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"I predict China will be more friendly to US interests in Trump's second term."
« Reply #1130 on: September 10, 2020, 07:56:06 AM »
well one thing for  certain,

if Joe Sr. loses , Hunter will be kicked off the Chinese company's boards.

they will no longer need his world class "expertise"


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GPF: China messing with Taiwanese airspace
« Reply #1131 on: September 22, 2020, 08:58:38 AM »
    Daily Memo: Taiwan Won’t Shoot First
The increasing tempo of Chinese airspace incursions has clearly unnerved Taipei.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Eroding barriers to escalation in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan’s government said Monday that its pilots would not be the first to fire on Chinese military assets, but the statement included the critical exception that they would fire if they thought a Chinese attack was imminent. This comes after two Chinese bombers and 16 fighter jets crossed what’s known as the cross-strait median line between China and Taiwan on Friday. The next day, another 19 Chinese warplanes entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in a formation intended to simulate an attack. Taiwan scrambled its own warplanes in response, just as it has done in dozens of similar incidents over the past several months.

But the increasing tempo of Chinese airspace incursions – particularly violations of the median line, which both sides had generally respected until 2019 as a way to limit the risk of conflict, but which Beijing on Friday and Monday basically said it would no longer recognize – has clearly unnerved Taiwan. Over the weekend, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reportedly held a series of briefings with air force leaders to make sure rules of engagement for Taiwanese pilots were crystal clear. In other words, Taipei appears concerned that Beijing is trying to bait it into firing the first shot, ostensibly to give China casus belli.

China’s recent moves make sense from a purely tactical perspective – to probe the other side’s air defenses, to incentivize restraint and to sow confusion. But they’re also the sorts of moves that, if true, would heighten the risk of accident, miscalculation and unplanned escalation that could be extraordinarily difficult to contain, signaling a weakening strategic emphasis on restraint.

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Stratfor: Philippines take a tougher approach to its South China Sea claims
« Reply #1133 on: October 06, 2020, 11:32:36 PM »
The Philippines Takes a Tougher Approach to Its South China Sea Claims
7 MINS READ
Oct 6, 2020 | 10:00 GMT


Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s South China Sea policy is becoming less conciliatory toward China, as he tries to balance growing pressure from within his administration to revitalize Manila’s security cooperation with the United States against the need to preserve his country’s economic ties with Beijing. The Duterte administration has recently made a number of statements emphasizing the Philippines’ extensive maritime dispute with China. This suggests a notable shift in Manila’s approach toward China, as the Philippine government has largely avoided making points of contention with Beijing since 2016. However, there appear to be divisions between the president and key members of his cabinet on the matter.

On Sept. 22, Duterte gave a U.N. General Assembly address that touted the importance of the Philippines’ 2016 arbitration ruling, departing from his past public position by saying the ruling is "now part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond the reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish or abandon.”

The country’s foreign secretary, Teodoro Locsin, has also emerged as a confrontational figure, making statements about China that appeared to contradict the softer approach advocated by Duterte. On Aug. 26, Locsin said that Manila would invoke its Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States if China attacked a Philippine naval vessel. On Sept. 21, he then said that the Philippines would not support China’s stance that an ASEAN Code of Conduct on the South China Sea should keep out third party countries (such as the United States).

Since taking office, Duterte has consistently avoided pursuing the Philippines’ 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration win, a verdict which rejected China's expansive South China Sea claims under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Instead, he has deemphasized the Philippines’ maritime disputes with China in the interest of attracting economic and diplomatic support from Beijing.

These reversals suggest that Duterte’s slipping popularity amid the COVID-19 crisis has made him more willing to address the concerns of his administration’s more military-focused elements. Throughout Duterte’s tenure, Philippine security officials have consistently pressed behind the scenes for the country to maintain its U.S. alliance and shore up its South China Sea maritime claims. Leaks suggest that the military has been dissuaded from patrols in the South China Sea to avoid inflaming tensions, and has expressed concern that buildups by both China and Vietnam outpace those of the Philippines on disputed features.
While still touting his nationalist credentials, Duterte has argued that China’s military preeminence in the South China Sea, combined with the U.S. failure to defend the Philippines under previous administrations, left Manila little choice but to compromise with Beijing. Duterte’s South China Sea policy has long been difficult to stomach for both military leadership and rival political players, but his high levels of domestic political popularity had enabled him to resist calls for change. Political setbacks due to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, however, appear to have now changed Duterte’s calculus on the matter.

With under two years left before the expiration of his single term, Duterte’s approval ratings have dropped from nearly 90 percent in 2019 to under 65 percent. As a political outsider, Duterte faces uncertainty in terms of anointing his successor, and risks becoming a lame-duck president if he cannot cement the position of an ally such as his daughter, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio, ahead of 2022 elections,

The Philippines is still battling the largest COVID-19 outbreak in Southeast Asia, with over 309,000 total cases and nearly 5,500 deaths as of Sept. 29. Philippine economic growth in 2020 will show a sharp reversal from 2019’s nearly 6 percent growth. The Asia Development Bank projects the Philippine economy will shrink by 7.3 percent this year, which would mark the country’s worst economic contraction since World War II, as well as the second-most severe region behind Thailand.

In February, the Philippine government notified the United States that it planned to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), a key pillar of their military alliance. But in June, the Duterte administration reversed course by announcing it would delay any consideration of suspending the agreement until February 2021, with the potential for another six-month extension.
On Aug. 28, Locsin recommended that the Philippines follow Washington'ss lead and blacklist certain Chinese firms directly involved in Chinese military projects in the South China Sea, including subsidiaries of the massive China Communications Construction Company. On Sept. 1, however, the president’s office announced it would not stop domestic infrastructure projects that involve these Chinese companies, saying Manila is "not a vassal state of any foreign power.”

On June 10, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana traveled to the disputed Thitu Island in the South China Sea alongside top military officials for a ceremony to launch a $26 million beach ramp at the strategic feature. However, on Aug. 3, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said that Duterte had issued a standing order that the Philippine navy would not participate in any U.S.-led South China Sea exercises and would refrain from any drills outside of 12 nautical miles from Philippine shores.

Tangible shifts in Philippine behavior in the South China Sea will nonetheless occur slowly, as Manila recognizes that the United States would not necessarily back up efforts to antagonize China in the South China Sea. The Philippines also sees little value in chasing its South China Sea arbitration victory in an international arena where China has massive support and could retaliate economically — or even militarily. Manila also recognizes that the United States would not necessarily back up efforts to overly antagonize China in the South China Sea, setting up a tripartite dynamic of action and reaction between the Philippines, the United States and China. Even as the United States increases pressure on China on a range of fronts, including the South China Sea, Washington has no interest in defending maritime counterclaimants to China outright. Instead, the United States is playing a more reactive role to China’s already-in-place military positions, working to shore up claimants’ military capabilities and to increase U.S. presence in the waters.

Duterte’s South China Sea policy is becoming less conciliatory toward China amid growing political pressure to shore up Manila’s maritime claims, as well as its U.S. security alliance.

This will set up a tripartite dynamic of action and reaction between the Philippines, the United States and China that will prompt Manila to reemphasize its U.S. relationship while maintaining less robust outreach to China. Such moves would leave China with less support in its negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its efforts to keep third countries such as the United States out of the disputes to deal with claimants one-on-one. Beijing can counter by expanding economic outreach, even as Philippine politics might tilt the balance in one direction or the other.

With a return to economic growth critical for the Philippines as a whole and for Duterte’s political fortunes, in particular, China represents a major driver of growth, particularly given its early exit from COVID-19 and its economic recovery. China is a key trading partner at over 17 percent of the Philippines’ trade, compared with the U.S. share of 10.3 percent. And although massive flows of Chinese investment have not yet lived up to expectations, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and deep pockets mean it is far more likely than the United States, or even other allies such as Japan, to help the Philippines overcome its infrastructure deficit and development gaps.

Even when the Philippines made harsh rhetorical statements about the United States, it still maintained a strong security relationship with Washington. Although Duterte threatened to cancel all military exercises with the United States in September 2016, the two sides have continued to carry out drills, with over 300 U.S.-Philippine exercises in 2019 along. The siege of Marawi City by Islamic State-aligned terrorists in 2017 required critical U.S. counterterrorism support for the Philippines. Since then, the United States has continued to provide military support amid the chronic and open-ended unrest in the Southern Philippines, which China cannot replace. The Philippines' first guided-missile frigate also participated in the U.S. Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2020 (Rimpac20) from Aug. 17-31 in Hawaii.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1134 on: October 07, 2020, 06:30:12 AM »
We've been waiting for Philippines to come back to our side.
https://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=2134.msg127076#msg127076
Now it really is China vs the world, at least in their backyard, except for rogue nations.

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Stratfor: Hong Kong
« Reply #1137 on: November 12, 2020, 09:46:31 AM »
Without Legislative Seats, What’s Next for Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Camp?
6 MINS READ
Nov 11, 2020 | 20:42 GMT
Pro-democracy lawmakers join hands during a press conference at Hong Kong’s Legislative Council after city officials ousted four of their colleagues on Nov. 11, 2020
Pro-democracy lawmakers join hands during a press conference at Hong Kong’s Legislative Council after city officials ousted four of their colleagues on Nov. 11, 2020

(Anthony Kwan/Getty Images)

HIGHLIGHTS

On Nov. 11, the 15 remaining pro-democracy lawmakers in Hong Kong's legislature said they will resign from their posts Nov. 12 after authorities disqualified four of their colleagues for allegedly advocating for U.S. sanctions. By leaving the legislature, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp has lost its only remaining official platform to express discontent with Beijing's encroachment -- setting the stage for a potentially volatile dynamic. However, the threat of the national security law and COVID-19 restrictions will leave many Hong Kongers wary of launching disruptive protests against the government, granting Beijing more freedom to rein in Hong Kong’s political crisis without damaging the city’s status as a global financial hub. ...

By leaving the legislature, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp has lost its only remaining official platform to express discontent with Beijing's encroachment — setting the stage for a potentially volatile dynamic. However, the threat of the national security law and COVID-19 restrictions will leave many Hong Kongers wary of launching disruptive protests against the government, granting Beijing more freedom to rein in Hong Kong’s political crisis without damaging the city’s status as a global financial hub. On Nov. 11, the 15 remaining pro-democracy lawmakers in Hong Kong's legislature said they will resign from their posts Nov. 12 after authorities disqualified four of their colleagues for allegedly advocating for U.S. sanctions.

On Nov. 11, China's National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed a resolution allowing the Hong Kong’s chief executive to expel lawmakers if they took actions deemed against the Hong Kong Basic Law and their oath of allegiance, including advocating for independence, declining to support Chinese assertions of sovereignty over Hong Kong, calling for sanctions or threatening national security. Shortly thereafter, Hong Kong authorities announced the removal of the four pro-democracy lawmakers, retroactively effective to July 30.

Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp has since called the move the end of China’s "one country, two systems" policy, arguing that the resolution effectively abolishes the separation of powers under the city's Basic Law by granting the chief executive power over the legislature.

The Disqualified Lawmakers: How We Got Here

In July, these four sitting lawmakers were disqualified from standing in planned September 2020 legislative council elections for calling on foreign sanctions related to Hong Kong, alongside eight other pro-democracy candidates. After those elections were delayed due to COVID-19 and the legislative term extended by a year, China’s parliament granted Hong Kong authorities the power to decide the fate of these legislators. The Hong Kong government ultimately allowed them to keep their seats for the extended term, with leaks indicating that the chief executive and pro-Beijing moderates had decided this in part to avoid overly provoking tensions both within the city, as well as with the United States ahead of November elections. 

Hong Kong and Beijing see constant disruptions in the legislative council as no longer acceptable, particularly ahead of the early 2021 budget passage process. The current dampened protest environment in the city, along with the uncertain political climate in the United States following the presidential election, may also have given authorities the confidence to make this move without the fear of sparking an unmanageable response from Hong Kongers or the United States. The Chinese government may also be seizing on the opportunity to further clamp down on any potential legislative disruptions in Hong Kong ahead of upcoming events that could raise the risk of high-profile protest activity, including the legislative council elections in September, followed by the 100-year anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in July and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games.

Moderates and more hardline pro-democracy politicians were already divided on whether to participate in the extended legislative term, with polls of supporters showing an even split that justified moderates remaining.

Without a legislative majority, the pro-democracy camp had planned on using the extended term to slow the pro-Beijing policy agenda via filibustering tactics. It was also planning to leverage its presence in the legislature as a high-profile platform to highlight the growing encroachment of the mainland into Hong Kong affairs.


The pro-Beijing camp, however, has been increasingly advocating for official moves to halt such disruptive tactics by the pro-democracy lawmakers since the start of the current session on Oct. 14. On Oct. 23, pro-Beijing lawmaker Alice Mak called on Legislative Council President Andrew Leung to look into whether the pro-democracy camp's tactic of filibustering violated the new national security law. Earlier, Leung had also warned that some pro-democracy discussions in the legislature may not be protected under parliamentary immunity.

The pro-democracy camp now lacks an official foothold in the Hong Kong power structure, with the exception of a large presence in the relatively powerless district councils. The legislative council resignations will help unite the pro-democracy camp by forcing its moderate wing to also operate outside Hong Kong’s official power structure alongside its more radical wing. Without legislative seats, however, the pro-democracy camp has few options for dissent. This will likely spur more Hong Kongers to leave the city altogether, although such an exodus would too be partly blocked off by Beijing. With the more moderate camp now equally marginalized as the radical camp, there will be more energy behind mounting protests as well, though government restrictions will make mobilizing large swaths of the public difficult. More radical, disaffected members of the opposition may, in turn, be among the few to brave street demonstrations, increasing the risk of violence against official targets.

Pro-Beijing lawmakers, meanwhile, will now be free to pass a raft of legislation, potentially including long-term bans on filibustering tactics to shield it against any future opposition disruptions. Following the disqualification of the four lawmakers, Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam said there would be no by-elections to fill the seats and that the next elections would not take place until the already-planned Sept. 2021 polls. In the meantime, the legislature could also pass laws allowing Hong Kongers in mainland China to vote, as well as potentially more controversial measures such as a robust extradition law and patriotic education. The pro-Beijing camp, however, may first focus most on proving its value to the sharply polarized Hong Kong public by focusing on measures to control the spread of COVID-19 and get the city’s economic growth back on track.

Despite Beijing’s increasing encroachment in Hong Kong, authorities still appear focused on preserving the city’s standing as a global economic hub by prioritizing political stability while preserving business continuity. In response to the recent legislative council development, the United States could impose additional sanctions, though the transition to a new administration under President-elect Joe Biden may make this difficult. Regardless, any new U.S. sanctions would likely target more Hong Kong and Chinese officials, as Washington will remain wary of targeting the city’s major entities or its financial sector. The tightly controlled Hong Kong government and its backers on the mainland are also unlikely to engage in efforts that would jeopardize continuity for foreign businesses, seeking instead to preserve the value of the city as a gateway to China.

Foreign financial institutions in Hong Kong will face less risk of being squeezed between Beijing and Washington, given recent Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission guidance saying implementing U.S. sanctions would not violate the national security law.

Hong Kong regulators have also reportedly dropped that would have forced cloud technology providers to agree to a data-sharing scheme granting them access to client information.

Media outlets and internet/social media platforms, however, still risk getting caught up in the city’s increasingly polarized political environment.

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The China Challenge, free markets unfree people
« Reply #1138 on: November 17, 2020, 07:50:37 AM »
https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-promise-a-free-market-for-unfree-people/

The nature of this ideological challenge merits special attention. China has the wherewithal to become the first high-tech totalitarian state in history. This would allow it not just to control its citizens, but also information flows within and across other countries, targeting Washington’s allies and the U.S. itself.
« Last Edit: November 17, 2020, 07:52:11 AM by DougMacG »

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1140 on: November 24, 2020, 02:45:50 PM »
e U.S. in Taiwan. A two-star U.S. Navy admiral in charge of U.S. military intelligence for Indo-Pacific Command reportedly made an unannounced visit to Taiwan on Sunday. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver said the Pentagon has been quietly sending one-star flag officers to Taiwan on a routine basis over the past few years.

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House passes bill requiring Chinese compliance with auditing rules
« Reply #1144 on: December 03, 2020, 09:02:14 AM »
More China measures. The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that will boot Chinese companies from U.S. exchanges if they don't comply fully with U.S. auditing rules. Chinese law forbids Chinese firms from complying with some such rules. U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to sign the bill into law.

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DNI Ratcliffe
« Reply #1145 on: December 04, 2020, 08:13:45 AM »

Not to worry, Manchurian Joe will be on the job:
https://www.wsj.com/.../china-is-national-security-threat...
China Is National Security Threat No. 1
Resisting Beijing’s attempt to reshape and dominate the world is the challenge of our generation.
By John Ratcliffe
Dec. 3, 2020 1:20 pm ET


As Director of National Intelligence, I am entrusted with access to more intelligence than any member of the U.S. government other than the president. I oversee the intelligence agencies, and my office produces the President’s Daily Brief detailing the threats facing the country. If I could communicate one thing to the American people from this unique vantage point, it is that the People’s Republic of China poses the greatest threat to America today, and the greatest threat to democracy and freedom world-wide since World War II.

The intelligence is clear: Beijing intends to dominate the U.S. and the rest of the planet economically, militarily and technologically. Many of China’s major public initiatives and prominent companies offer only a layer of camouflage to the activities of the Chinese Communist Party.
I call its approach of economic espionage “rob, replicate and replace.” China robs U.S. companies of their intellectual property, replicates the technology, and then replaces the U.S. firms in the global marketplace.

Take Sinovel. In 2018 a federal jury found the Chinese wind-turbine manufacturer guilty of stealing trade secrets from American Superconductor.

Penalties were imposed but the damage was done. The theft resulted in the U.S. company losing more than $1 billion in shareholder value and cutting 700 jobs. Today Sinovel sells wind turbines world-wide as if it built a legitimate business through ingenuity and hard work rather than theft.
The FBI frequently arrests Chinese nationals for stealing research-and-development secrets. Until the head of Harvard’s Chemistry Department was arrested earlier this year, China was allegedly paying him $50,000 a month as part of a plan to attract top scientists and reward them for stealing information. The professor has pleaded not guilty to making false statements to U.S. authorities. Three scientists were ousted in 2019 from MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston over concerns about China’s theft of cancer research. The U.S. government estimates that China’s intellectual-property theft costs America as much as $500 billion a year, or between $4,000 and $6,000 per U.S. household.


China also steals sensitive U.S. defense technology to fuel President Xi Jinping’s aggressive plan to make China the world’s foremost military power. U.S. intelligence shows that China has even conducted human testing on members of the People’s Liberation Army in hope of developing soldiers with biologically enhanced capabilities. There are no ethical boundaries to Beijing’s pursuit of power.




China is also developing world-class capabilities in emerging technologies. Its intelligence services use their access to tech firms such as Huawei to enable malicious activities, including the introduction of vulnerabilities into software and equipment. Huawei and other Chinese firms deny this, but China’s efforts to dominate 5G telecommunications will only increase Beijing’s opportunities to collect intelligence, disrupt communications and threaten user privacy world-wide. I have personally told U.S. allies that using such Chinese-owned technology will severely limit America’s ability to share vital intelligence with them.


China already suppresses U.S. web content that threatens the Communist Party’s ideological control, and it is developing offensive cyber capabilities against the U.S. homeland. This year China engaged in a massive influence campaign that included targeting several dozen members of Congress and congressional aides.




Consider this scenario: A Chinese-owned manufacturing facility in the U.S. employs several thousand Americans. One day, the plant’s union leader is approached by a representative of the Chinese firm. The businessman explains that the local congresswoman is taking a hard-line position on legislation that runs counter to Beijing’s interests—even though it has nothing to do with the industry the company is involved in—and says the union leader must urge her to shift positions or the plant and all its jobs will soon be gone.


The union leader contacts his congresswoman and indicates that his members won’t support her re-election without a change in position. He tells himself he’s protecting his members, but in that moment he’s doing China’s bidding, and the congresswoman is being influenced by China, whether she realizes it or not.


Our intelligence shows that Beijing regularly directs this type of influence operation in the U.S. I briefed the House and Senate Intelligence committees that China is targeting members of Congress with six times the frequency of Russia and 12 times the frequency of Iran.


To address these threats and more, I have shifted resources inside the $85 billion annual intelligence budget to increase the focus on China. This shift must continue to ensure U.S. intelligence has the resources it needs to give policy makers unvarnished insights into China’s intentions and activities.


Within intelligence agencies, a healthy debate and shift in thinking is already under way. For the talented intelligence analysts and operators who came up during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Russia have always been the focus. For others who rose through the ranks at the turn of this century, counterterrorism has been top of mind. But today we must look with clear eyes at the facts in front of us, which make plain that China should be America’s primary national security focus going forward.


Other nations must understand this is true for them as well. The world is being presented a choice between two wholly incompatible ideologies. China’s leaders seek to subordinate the rights of the individual to the will of the Communist Party. They exert government control over companies and subvert the privacy and freedom of their citizens with an authoritarian surveillance state.


We shouldn’t assume that Beijing’s efforts to drag the world back into the dark will fail just because the forces of good have triumphed before in modern times. China believes that a global order without it at the top is a historical aberration. It aims to change that and reverse the spread of liberty around the world.


Beijing is preparing for an open-ended period of confrontation with the U.S. Washington should also be prepared. Leaders must work across partisan divides to understand the threat, speak about it openly, and take action to address it.


This is our once-in-a-generation challenge. Americans have always risen to the moment, from defeating the scourge of fascism to bringing down the Iron Curtain. This generation will be judged by its response to China’s effort to reshape the world in its own image and replace America as the dominant superpower. The intelligence is clear. Our response must be as well.


Mr. Ratcliffe is U.S. director of national intelligence.

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Tucker: Manchurian Joe
« Reply #1147 on: December 08, 2020, 09:04:56 AM »

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Swalwell and Christine
« Reply #1148 on: December 09, 2020, 08:17:36 AM »
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/12/08/mccarthy-swalwell-should-be-removed-from-congress-when-did-pelosi-schiff-know-about-china-spy-issue/

Must be devastating to find out it was not one's good looks charm or prowess in bed as reason why this lady had an interest.

CNN will likely say nothing and reason it would be a national security risk to do so.

Eric the egg (on his face) says it is a classified matter - no comment:

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/12/asked-dem-rep-swalwell-intimate-relationship-chinese-communist-spy-honeypot-office-said-no-comment-classified/
« Last Edit: December 09, 2020, 08:22:01 AM by ccp »