Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 262456 times)

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1250 on: April 15, 2021, 10:15:01 AM »
"- Right, so it gets easier each year that he waits."

Not really. China has serious internal issues and debt problems. Waiting means China's demographic problems get much worse (China getting old before it gets rich).

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-09/china-taiwan-aggression-fallout-for-united-states-australia/100056942

Keep in mind PLA Generals have openly stated they plan on trading 100,000 troops to kill 10,000 Americans. They know that the American public won't accept WWII level casualties.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_qr-4AKM18

Note nothing about college or gender "confirmation" surgery in the above recruiting video, just a message of leave your family behind and prepare for war.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1251 on: April 15, 2021, 10:55:54 AM »
SITUATION REPORT
U.S., China: Biden Sends Unofficial Delegation to Taiwan
2 MIN READApr 14, 2021 | 21:33 GMT





What Happened: U.S. President Joseph Biden sent an unofficial delegation of three former senior officials to Taiwan on April 13, calling the visit a “personal signal” of the strong U.S. commitment to Taiwan, the South China Morning Post has reported.

Why It Matters: As Biden attempts to prove the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, China will likely continue to use shows of force to counteract U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic entreaties. Chinese incursions into Taiwanese airspace are thus likely to grow in frequency and size, which will increase the risk of China-Taiwan military incidents and the diplomatic fallout that would follow. The timing of the U.S. visit to Taiwan may also further hinder Chinese officials’ willingness to cooperate in scheduled April 14-17 talks on climate initiatives with the United States and South Korea.

Background: On April 13, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson stated that the recent incursion of 25 Chinese aircraft into Taiwanese airspace was a signal that China contests U.S. efforts to grow closer to Taiwan. On April 9, the U.S. State Department released new guidelines designed to ease U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic meetings.

G M

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Crafty_Dog

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Japan ramping up
« Reply #1253 on: April 16, 2021, 04:42:03 PM »
Japanese drills. Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) announced plans to conduct nationwide exercises involving all of its units between September and November of this year. The drills, the first on this scale since 1993, will focus on boosting deterrence, transporting supplies and improving communication systems. The GSDF also said joint drills with the U.S. and France could take place as early as May in Japan.

DougMacG

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« Last Edit: April 18, 2021, 07:46:18 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Duterte pressured to man up against China 2.0
« Reply #1255 on: April 20, 2021, 09:22:03 PM »
The Philippine president is threatening to send warships to confront Chinese vessels in Philippine-claimed waters.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Philippine threats. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is threatening to send warships to confront Chinese vessels in Philippine-claimed waters in the South China Sea – but only if China starts drilling for oil and gas there. China has been blocking the Philippines from developing much-needed gas reserves in its exclusive economic zone, but there haven’t been any attempts yet by the Chinese to take the gas for themselves. What they are taking is fish – an enormous amount of it. This comes as Philippine defense officials are having to publicly deny speculation that the military is souring on the president over his relatively accommodative policies toward China.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: US-Vietnam
« Reply #1256 on: April 20, 2021, 09:25:05 PM »
Second

U.S. support for Vietnam. The U.S. has handed over coast guard training facilities it built for Vietnam. Coast guard training and assistance is becoming an increasingly important way for the U.S. to show its support for South China Sea littoral states, but the U.S. Coast Guard itself is poorly equipped to play a much more robust role in the region.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1257 on: April 20, 2021, 09:26:18 PM »
third

Military developments in East Asia. Taiwan is seeking approval from Washington to buy long-range cruise missiles from the U.S. China has reportedly deployed long-range artillery launchers in the Himalayas. Japan is developing a nifty new long-range surveillance drone. The U.S. has returned a batch of B-52 long-range bombers to Guam.

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1258 on: April 21, 2021, 06:35:14 AM »
third

Military developments in East Asia. Taiwan is seeking approval from Washington to buy long-range cruise missiles from the U.S. China has reportedly deployed long-range artillery launchers in the Himalayas. Japan is developing a nifty new long-range surveillance drone. The U.S. has returned a batch of B-52 long-range bombers to Guam.

I hope that US made weapons to be sold to Taiwan have a remote shutoff switch to deactivate when control of Taiwan is ceded to China.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1259 on: April 21, 2021, 07:38:01 AM »
".I hope that US made weapons to be sold to Taiwan have a remote shutoff switch to deactivate when control of Taiwan is ceded to China."

good point

how many times have we seen our own weapons used against us?


G M

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Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Japan shows its cards
« Reply #1261 on: April 22, 2021, 07:34:11 PM »
Japan's combat hesitancy. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said Thursday that Japanese troops would not get involved if China invaded Taiwan. Suga was clarifying the intent of a joint statement released last week following his meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden that mentioned, for the first time since Sino-Japanese relations were normalized in 1972, Taiwan by name. It’s a curious thing to say, since even the possibility of Japanese intervention is a deterrent to Beijing – and since a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would pose a huge strategic problem for Tokyo. But it speaks to the enduring power of domestic opposition to Japanese involvement in foreign wars.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Concerns about Taiwan's defensive capabilities
« Reply #1262 on: April 23, 2021, 03:52:56 AM »
U.S. Concerns About China Put Focus on Taiwan’s Defensive Weakness
As Chinese military activity near the self-ruled island increases, security experts say it must do more to prepare for possible conflict

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has raised Taiwan’s military budget by 10% this year to $15.4 billion.
PHOTO: WALID BERRAZEG/SOPA IMAGES/ZUMA PRESS
By Alastair Gale
April 22, 2021 1:40 pm ET

An increase in Chinese military activity near Taiwan and U.S. concerns about Beijing’s intentions are putting a new focus on the island’s capabilities to deter any future invasion.

While there are no signs of an imminent move by Beijing to take the self-ruled island, which China claims, U.S. officials have said they believe the odds of conflict have gone up, especially since China’s crackdown on Hong Kong showed it could assert its authority without major international repercussions.

U.S. officials, former Taiwanese military leaders and security experts say they believe that means Taiwan needs to do more to ensure it can inflict enough damage to discourage an invading force or hold it off until the arrival of help—possibly from the U.S. After years of increases in military spending, China now has around 100 times as many ground force personnel as Taiwan and a military budget 25 times as large, according to Pentagon data.


Taiwan and China have had an unstable coexistence for more than seven decades. But concerns are rising that China may move against Taiwan to force a unification.
WSJ’s Gerald F. Seib explains some of the causes for worry. Photo illustration: Laura Kammermann

“From my perspective, we are really far behind what we need,” said Lee Hsi-min, chief of the general staff of Taiwan’s military until 2019. Mr. Lee said Taiwan needed to invest more in military assets that raise its ability to wage guerrilla-style warfare such as sea mines, missile attack boats and portable rocket launchers.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said earlier this month that the U.S. was committed to ensuring Taiwan has the ability to defend itself, a reference to an American law that has allowed for arms sales to the island. But Mr. Blinken declined to say what the U.S. would do if China attacked Taiwan, keeping to a longstanding U.S. government stance of ambiguity intended to deter conflict.

Some U.S. foreign policy experts advocate the U.S. making an explicit commitment to intervene if China attacks Taiwan. The Defense Department is studying hypothetical scenarios to counter a Chinese blockade or attack on Taiwan—from sending in American troops and Navy vessels to missile attacks—but one recent opinion poll showed the U.S. public wouldn’t support the deployment of American troops to defend Taiwan.

Military drills in Taiwan scheduled to start Friday are meant to sharpen Taipei’s responses and show allies the Taiwanese military isn’t falling behind.

The annual Han Kuang exercises begin with a week of computer simulations of Chinese actions, including electronic and cyberattacks, psychological warfare and uprisings among pro-China groups inside Taiwan. Taiwan’s defense minister said this week the simulations were lengthened this year to allow more time to fully review all scenarios of Chinese attack.

The drills shift to live-fire exercises in July, which are also intended as a show of force to deter Beijing from aggression.

“It’s not in our consideration how long it would take for others to arrive. I will fight on as long as you want,” Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said at a recent press conference.

Taiwan’s military ranks, however, have fallen over the last decade with the phasing out of conscription in response to public pressure, with many young Taiwanese more interested in pursuing other careers. Compulsory military service now consists of four months of basic training, down from two years maintained for decades.

Although salaries have been improved as Taiwan tries to build an all-volunteer force, the number of active-duty soldiers fell to 165,000 last year from 275,000 three years earlier. More than 2.5 million reservists only receive a handful of days of training every couple of years.

Alexander Huang, a former deputy minister in Taiwan’s mainland affairs council, which coordinates policy toward China, said an underlying factor affecting Taiwan’s preparedness was that most Taiwanese don’t believe China would attack.

“Even in the past two years, when we started to see the trade war and U.S.-China strategic competition, (and) shows of force by (China’s military) around our air defense identification zone, poll numbers tell us that Taiwan’s perception in a general sense is that China won’t do it,” he said.


The head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phil Davidson, recently forecast that China could attempt to take over Taiwan within the next six years.

In testimony to Congress’s U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in February, Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on the Chinese military at Stanford University, said she had been told by Chinese military leaders that they believe they will have the capabilities to force unification with Taiwan within a year.

The Chinese military has flown more than 260 sorties near the island’s southwest coast so far this year, according to a Wall Street Journal tally of disclosures from Taiwan’s Defense Ministry. A record of about 380 similar sorties from China were tracked by Taiwan in all of last year.


Beijing committed to a policy of “peaceful unification” in 1979, and has offered to assimilate Taiwan under the “one country, two systems” framework applied to Hong Kong, while stressing that a military takeover remained an option.

Some security analysts say the threat of Chinese action is overstated. An all-out invasion across the 110-mile Taiwan Strait wouldn’t be easy because the sea is often rough and Taiwan’s built-up coastlines and mudflats make it hard for ships to land, said Scott Harold, an expert on Taiwan at the Rand Corp.


China also has other options to exert pressure, including imposing some form of blockade on Taiwan, or seizing any of the small islands controlled by Taipei close to the Chinese mainland.

Taiwanese experts still worry about worst-case scenarios. James Huang, a retired Taiwanese army lieutenant colonel, said Taiwan would quickly be plunged into chaos in any Chinese attack, as control centers and other targets would be destroyed. War games have shown that China could neutralize Taiwan’s air power in minutes, he said.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has said Taiwan would look for other countries’ support in the event of any attacks. She also has raised Taiwan’s military budget by 10% this year to $15.4 billion. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan last year included weaponry for so-called asymmetrical warfare, including drones, antiship missiles and truck-based rocket launchers.

In a speech at a U.S.-Taiwan defense-industry conference last year, David Helvey, acting assistant secretary of defense for East Asia in the Trump administration, called for Ms. Tsai to go further.


Recent spending increases, while a step in the right direction, “are insufficient to ensure that Taiwan can leverage its geography, advanced technology, workforce, and patriotic population to channel Taiwan’s inherent advantages necessary for a resilient defense,” Mr. Helvey said.

Some analysts point to Taiwan’s years of trying to foster closer ties with Beijing as the period when the balance of power shifted decisively in China’s favor. During the administration of previous Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou, who emphasized building economic links with mainland China while in power from 2008 to 2016, China’s annual military spending doubled, while Taiwan’s edged up 3.5%, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

“The Ma years were a bit of a loss because in terms of preparedness and in terms of signaling to the Taiwanese military, they were not putting as much emphasis on countering a Chinese attack as they currently are,” said Michael Cole, a Taipei-based policy analyst.

—Joyu Wang contributed to this article.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1263 on: April 28, 2021, 07:21:29 AM »
   
Daily Memo: Britain in the Indo-Pacific, Chinese Military Spending in 2020
The United Kingdom is increasing its presence in the region.
By: Geopolitical Futures

The U.K.'s new deployment. The United Kingdom will deploy a carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific next month to participate in a series of military exercises and other operations. The group, led by the HMS Queen Elizabeth, will visit India, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Supply chain resilience
« Reply #1264 on: April 28, 2021, 10:26:37 AM »
second

Australia, India and Japan formally launched their Supply Chain Resilience Initiative.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Bypassing China. Australia, India and Japan formally launched a so-called Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, an effort to present a supply chain alternative to China in the Indo-Pacific. The three countries will cooperate on trade, investment promotion and buyer-seller matching to help countries and companies diversify their supply chains. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned the initiative, saying it does not support the stability of global supply chains and economic recovery.


Australian base expansions. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the expansion of four military training bases in the country’s Northern Territory. The government has allotted 747 million Australian dollars ($580 million) for the project, whose goal is to enable more wargaming exercises with the United States. Morrison emphasized Australia’s interest in a “free and open” Indo-Pacific and in protecting Australia’s national interests amid high uncertainty in the region. The announcement comes against the backdrop of souring Australian-Chinese ties.

Crafty_Dog

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China-Philippines, Scarborough Shoal
« Reply #1265 on: May 03, 2021, 07:47:38 PM »

    
Brief: China Tests the Philippines and US Red Lines
If Chinese dredgers show up around Scarborough Shoal, things will get complicated quickly.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Background: The Philippines’ importance lies in its geography, located in the middle of what’s known as the first island chain, giving it – or, more likely, any outside naval power that allies with it – the power to disrupt vital Chinese sea lanes through the South China Sea and Bashi Channel. So China has been trying to pull the Philippines into its orbit with both carrots and sticks. But over the past few months, it has been relying more and more on sticks. Beijing has flooded several sensitive areas with Chinese coast guard vessels and armed fishing fleets to block Philippine fishermen from accessing resource-rich waters and impeding the Philippines’ own coast guard patrols.

What Happened: Scarborough Shoal has long been one of the most hotly contested areas between China and the Philippines. In 2012, the two sides engaged in a monthslong standoff over the reef. The U.S. brokered a mutual withdrawal, which China promptly violated. In 2016, the U.S. reportedly told China that it considered any attempt to transform Scarborough Shoal into another of its artificial island military bases as a red line, and China has refrained from doing so.

But Beijing still effectively controls the waters in and around the shoal, and it periodically uses Scarborough to needle Manila. Over the past couple of weeks, for example, Chinese vessels reportedly have harassed Philippine coast guard vessels sent to patrol the area, sparking outrage in Manila. On Monday, Philippine Foreign Secretary Teddy Locsin Jr. uncorked a truly wild, expletive-laden Twitter thread against China. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana was more diplomatic but still drew a hard line and insisted patrols would continue. President Rodrigo Duterte, who has come under withering political pressure over his perceived pro-China policies, has essentially said he’s doing all that he can.

Bottom Line: First of all, Locsin’s rant is hard to ignore. But what really caught our attention is that it’s the Scarborough Shoal at stake this time, making it possible that China is testing the Biden administration’s willingness to enforce the red line set in 2016. The U.S. would rather not get directly involved, and it probably won’t have to unless China signals its intent to start building on the shoal. If Chinese dredgers show up in the area, things will get complicated quickly.


DougMacG

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Re: China-Philippines, Scarborough Shoal
« Reply #1267 on: May 04, 2021, 06:24:04 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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Japan-Taiwan joint operation; Taiwan semiconductors
« Reply #1268 on: May 04, 2021, 01:21:20 PM »
   second post

Daily Memo: Japan and Taiwan's Joint Operation in the East China Sea
It was the first operation of its kind.
By: Geopolitical Futures

East China Sea intel. Japan and Taiwan reportedly conducted a joint surveillance operation over the weekend for the first time, tracking the movements of a Chinese warship tooling around the East China Sea and passing through the Miyako Strait. Newly released satellite images show Japanese and Taiwanese warships in the area. Any signs of closer defense cooperation between Taiwan and Japan are worth noting.

Diplomatic games. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the world’s most important chipmaker, will reportedly expand its plans to build new fabrication plants in Arizona and potentially elsewhere in the United States. TSMC is playing a savvy diplomatic game here, working to assuage U.S. fears about being too dependent on chip factories so close to Chinese shores while still keeping the bulk of its chipmaking capacity at home in Taiwan – a major incentive for outside powers to protect, or refrain from attacking, the self-ruled island.



Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Why China wants the Spratleys
« Reply #1271 on: May 11, 2021, 04:53:39 AM »

    
Why China Wants the Spratlys
The islands could help Beijing secure the Western Pacific without actually fighting for it.
By: Phillip Orchard
For several months, China has been relentlessly asserting its control over disputed parts of the South China Sea. Hundreds of vessels in the Chinese maritime militia – lightly armed fishing fleets that don't so much fish as serve as foot soldiers for the Chinese navy – have been squatting around various reefs in the disputed Spratly archipelago near Philippine and Vietnamese controlled areas. The Chinese coast guard, meanwhile, has apparently been blocking and harassing Philippine patrols around Scarborough Shoal, a flashpoint reef farther north. The United States reportedly warned China in 2015 that turning Scarborough into another artificial island was a red line.

The show of force illustrates how the seven artificial island bases that China has built in the Spratlys since 2013 can be put to good use in scenarios short of war. The surveillance, communications and logistics capabilities they house make it easier than ever for legions of Chinese vessels to occupy disputed areas in perpetuity, swiftly overwhelm interlopers, and assert de facto control over the waters and marine resources claimed by others. But in an actual, prolonged conflict with the U.S. and its allies, the tactical value of the Spratlys would rapidly diminish. And if China's “salami-slicing” campaign pushes the Philippines, in particular, to throw in fully with the U.S., China's biggest strategic challenge – the threat of a U.S.-led blockade – will become an order of magnitude more difficult to solve.

In other words, China is playing a risky game. But it’s worth it, evidently, given the role Beijing thinks the islands could play in the early days of a major conflict. More important is the role they could play in cementing Chinese dominance of the Western Pacific without fighting at all.

Missile Fodder or More?

China has been finding ways to assert its claims over disputed reefs across the South China Sea for decades, particularly around the Paracels in the northwestern part of the sea, where China fought a pair of brief engagements with Vietnam and today has more than 20 military outposts. But it took things to another level beginning around 2013 when dredgers started showing up at a handful of reefs in the Spratlys, located in southeastern waters off the shores of the Philippines, Malaysia and the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. By 2016, China had transformed seven partially- or fully-submerged features into artificial islands, creating some 3,200 acres of new land. Today, these are full-fledged military bases, featuring lengthy runways, deepwater ports, barracks, underground ammunition stores, and a vast array of radar and communications technologies.


(click to enlarge)

And yet, over the course of a long kinetic conflict between China and the U.S., the value of China's bases in the Spratlys would be negligible. Indeed, there's a good chance the bases wouldn’t still be there at all.

There are two main problems that limit their value in a hot war. One, they’re not located particularly close to the chokepoints that the U.S. and its allies would try to control in order to close off vital Chinese sea lanes. Those are located in the Bashi Channel and Miyako and Tokara straits in the East China Sea and, to the south, the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits. Though China could use the Spratlys to threaten naval movements within the South China Sea itself, control of these waters is unlikely to be the main focus of the conflict. The ability to move forces from and through the Spratlys to break a blockade would be only marginally more advantageous than moving them from the Chinese mainland.

Second, and more fundamentally, the bases would be sitting ducks for enemy missiles. Long before major operations moved to the South China Sea – a stage where, theoretically, the bases could aid Chinese carrier operations, augment Chinese cyber and electronic warfare offensives, enhance China's edge in battlespace awareness, and/or facilitate asymmetric swarm attacks – their runways, communications and surveillance infrastructure would likely be rendered unusable. Whatever survived would be extraordinarily difficult to resupply. (There are also major questions about the islands' ability to withstand major environmental degradation, though it seems unwise to bet against China's engineering savvy and willpower.)

Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs are not, in other words, the Spratly equivalents of Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima. There would be no brutal island-hopping campaign where control of the islands was a vital objective. They'd simply need to be neutralized. This could be done from a distance, no bloody amphibious operations required.

But focusing on their (lack of) value in the latter stages of a major conflict would be misguided. A lot would have to go wrong for Chinese forces for things to even get to that point. Rather, in an all-out war with the U.S. and its allies, the main value of the Spratlys would come into play in the very initial stages.

At the most basic level, they would give the U.S. seven more targets to deal with sooner or later. This could matter a lot, depending on how much the U.S. succeeds in its current efforts to find places to deploy land-based missiles across the first island chain. The U.S. has few such options right now. It would have to rely on longer-range (and thus less precise) missiles fired from Guam and other positions farther afield, on the limited arsenals of allies willing to join the fight (which cannot be guaranteed), and on whatever munitions U.S. warships can carry, which is of course limited. So, at worst, the Spratly bases are useful missile sponges.

China's Growing Coast Guard
(click to enlarge)

At best, they dramatically expand the range of Chinese missiles and air power. They give China an ability to try to flood contested spaces with sheer numbers, overwhelming the relatively small number of U.S. or allied assets that would be available in the early days of a conflict, with everything from fishing boats and coast guard vessels to swarms of unmanned aerial and maritime vehicles to, of course, actual warships and fighter jets. Most important, they give China tremendous capacity to dominate the information domain, with the potential to effectively blind or even cripple U.S. assets if caught unaware.

Power Imbalance in the South China Sea
(click to enlarge)

Each of these elements would be invaluable in helping China maintain the element of surprise, gain the initiative from the outset of a conflict, and put the U.S. back on its heels. Even if the bases don't last long after that, the tactical advantages of being able to set the terms in a conflict from the first shot can be decisive.

Winning Without Fighting

The main reasons for China's commandeering of the Spratlys have little to do with worst-case scenario war-planning, though. Realistically, war with the U.S. is still only a remote possibility, even if the apocalyptic risks of one are such that both sides have to prepare as if it may be inevitable. There’s a reason there hasn't been a great power war since the 1940s. The damage from one today could be even more catastrophic.

Some of China's objectives in the Spratlys, then, are much more straightforward. Shipping to and from China through the South China Sea is so vital to the Chinese economy that any threat of prolonged disruption could be existential to the Communist Party’s hold on power. It makes perfect sense for Beijing to want to have coast guard bases as close as possible to ward off potential threats before they become a reality. There are also basic material gains at stake. For example, fishing stocks in Chinese waters have been deteriorating at an alarming rate, and China has a lot of mouths to feed. Whether China's apparent determination to dictate who can fish and where is motivated more by distrust of its neighbors’ ability to prevent overfishing, or simply by the desire to grab what it can for itself, is a major driver of Chinese policy.

Even so, China can't ignore a potential conflict with the U.S. altogether. And it's making a big bet that dominating the Spratlys will ultimately help it prevail not only in the South China Sea but in the broader Western Pacific as well.

Put simply, China needs the Philippines on its side to truly deal with the threat of a U.S. and allied blockade on its access to the Western Pacific. So China has been employing a carrot-and-stick strategy to win Manila over, pairing military pressure with hefty amounts of aid and investment. In truth, it's always been more of a “bitter pill” strategy, using aid and investment to make it somewhat easier for Manila to swallow the reality that it doesn't exactly have a lot of options in the matter. China has made it clear that it's not about to back off, and, in doing so, has deepened suspicions in Manila that the U.S. isn't about to risk war with China in defense of Philippine material or sovereign interests. Eventually, China believes, Manila will conclude that its best long-term option is to flip into the Chinese camp. And in the meantime, Beijing can use its leverage to at least weaken the U.S.-Philippine alliance and discourage Manila from, for example, implementing a key 2014 agreement with the U.S. giving it rotational access to several Philippine bases. On these fronts, the strategy has been pretty successful.

Still, antagonizing the Philippines at a time when the U.S. is shedding distractions elsewhere in the world and getting serious about stitching together a robust alliance structure in East Asia is a risky bet, to say the least. The Duterte administration, which has bent over backward to stay on friendly terms with China, appears to be reaching something of a breaking point, with Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin Jr. lashing out at Beijing in a manner typically reserved for those on the president's list of enemies (drug dealers, Barack Obama, the pope, et al.). It's not unreasonable to wonder, then, if China is at risk of forcing Manila to go all-in on its alliance with the U.S. and greenlight, say, the reestablishment of U.S. bases throughout the country. This would be a monumental strategic setback.

But China pushed its chips in long ago. The Spratlys are too valuable in too many ways to back off now. Beijing is done biding time and hiding its capabilities. Under Xi Jinping, the strategic calculation is starting to look a whole lot like action for action's sake.

ccp

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just wondering
« Reply #1272 on: May 11, 2021, 07:33:31 AM »
if we had a military war with China (not just the one we were in )

could we count on people of this country
to come together to defend ourselves?

would it pull us together like 9-11 mostly did?

not so sure ........  :|


DougMacG

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Re: just wondering
« Reply #1273 on: May 11, 2021, 09:07:38 AM »
if we had a military war with China (not just the one we were in )

could we count on people of this country
to come together to defend ourselves?

would it pull us together like 9-11 mostly did?

not so sure ........  :|

No. 

A real war with the US is unthinkable for China as well.  The goal seems to be, how much can they take without war. 

On the current path, they will pass the US militarily soon enough if they haven't already.  I think they would like to drive us out of our military presence in Asia but keep us as a customer.

The act of war they perpetrated on us so subtly is the Joe Biden presidency.  Now there is no resolve to build our military or counter any move they make.
https://www.hngn.com/articles/234996/20210318/china-interference-elections.htm

Crafty_Dog

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GPF
« Reply #1274 on: May 12, 2021, 10:39:53 AM »
No retreat around the Spratlys. The number of Chinese maritime militia and coast guard vessels around the hotly disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea has increased by more than a third in recent months, since Manila began filing diplomatic protests, according to Philippine Foreign Secretary Teddy Locsin Jr. The Spratlys are too valuable for China to back off now.

China is breaking records. Bond defaults by Chinese firms are reaching a record pace, according to new data from Bloomberg. Already this year, companies have failed to make payments on an estimated 99.8 billion yuan ($15.5 billion) of onshore bonds. In previous years it’s taken until September to top the century mark.

The fate of Hong Kong. Nearly half of U.S. firms in Hong Kong are considering pulling up stakes within 3-5 years, according to the latest survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong of its members. Eroding Hong Kong's elite status as a financial hub and investment gateway to the mainland was a major risk Beijing was evidently willing to take when it accelerated its takeover of Hong Kong politics last year.



DougMacG

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Gordon Chang, Biden's worst move yet
« Reply #1277 on: May 22, 2021, 12:24:20 PM »
Not sure hoe to say that in stronger terms, a guy smarter than me, knows more than me, sees all Biden has done wrong and says this is the worst yet.  He already destroyed our country , what could be worse?  Giving our vaccine technology to the CCP bioweapons group aiming to destroy us.

Will add link.

Crafty_Dog

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« Last Edit: May 22, 2021, 02:36:01 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: US-Philippines SOF negotiations
« Reply #1279 on: May 24, 2021, 07:27:39 AM »
Closer to a deal. The U.S. and the Philippines are nearing a deal to extend the all-important 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, according to Foreign Policy magazine. The VFA, which Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has taken steps to scrap over the past two years, is indispensable to giving the bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty any weight. Without it, a still-unimplemented U.S.-Philippines basing deal signed in 2014 will not move forward. It’s unclear whether this extension will be yet another short-term stopgap measure or something that solidifies the alliance for many more years to come.

G M

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Re: GPF: US-Philippines SOF negotiations
« Reply #1280 on: May 24, 2021, 08:24:51 AM »
Anyone have any faith that China Joe will stand up to Xi?


Closer to a deal. The U.S. and the Philippines are nearing a deal to extend the all-important 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, according to Foreign Policy magazine. The VFA, which Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has taken steps to scrap over the past two years, is indispensable to giving the bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty any weight. Without it, a still-unimplemented U.S.-Philippines basing deal signed in 2014 will not move forward. It’s unclear whether this extension will be yet another short-term stopgap measure or something that solidifies the alliance for many more years to come.

Crafty_Dog

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Sec Def Austin dissed
« Reply #1281 on: May 25, 2021, 05:23:55 AM »
Cold shoulder. The U.S. and Chinese militaries apparently are barely on speaking terms. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has reportedly made three requests to speak to his Chinese counterpart and been rebuffed three times. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, hasn’t spoken to his Chinese counterpart since January.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1282 on: May 25, 2021, 05:35:47 AM »
".U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has reportedly made three requests to speak to his Chinese counterpart and been rebuffed three times."

What we need is *MORE DIPLOMACY!*

yeah right

we could offer them military secrets if they will only meet with Biden's crew
or send kerry over with loads of cash.......

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: China-Malaysia
« Reply #1284 on: June 03, 2021, 09:11:11 AM »

    
Brief: Chinese Warplanes in Malaysian Airspace
Beijing is keen to get its air force some practice conducting logistics operations over long distance.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: China's biggest strategic challenge is preventing foreign powers from using the first island chain to box in Chinese forces or blockade vital Chinese sea lanes. To address this, China has focused on steadily pressuring weaker littoral states around the South China Sea with both economic and military moves, so that they’ll conclude that China’s rise to regional hegemony is inevitable. It has also invested heavily in power projection capabilities. However, lacking a network of overseas bases in the region, China has yet to prove it has the logistics capacity to back up its power projection.

What Happened: Malaysia on Tuesday said it had scrambled fighter jets to intercept 16 Chinese military aircraft flying in formation in Malaysian airspace off Sarawak, the easternmost part of Malaysian Borneo. China makes airspace incursions around Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands all the time. And it routinely sends coast guard and maritime militia vessels to harass Malaysian energy exploration operations off Sarawak and Sabah. But airspace incursions that far from the Chinese mainland are a little bit unusual. Curiously, moreover, each of the 16 warplanes was reportedly one of two types of military transport aircraft deployed by the People’s Liberation Army. Again, it's not unusual for such planes to take part in larger incursions closer to mainland shores. But for them to fly so far from home, unaccompanied by fighter jets, seems a bit odd.

Bottom Line: This is a minor and probably marginally significant deviation from the pattern of Chinese incursions and other military pressure tactics in Southeast Asia. But it makes enough sense: China presumably is keen to get its air force some practice conducting logistics operations over long distance. It's also typically keen to show off advancements in its capabilities – especially to blocking states like Malaysia – even if flying large cargo planes a couple thousand miles isn't really going to impress anyone all that much.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: New stage in US-China competition
« Reply #1285 on: June 08, 2021, 11:21:59 AM »
Daily Memo: New Stage in US-Chinese Competition
Washington also announced plans to launch trade and investment talks with Taiwan.
By: Geopolitical Futures

U.S.-Chinese competition. The U.S. Senate is inching closer to finalizing legislation worth at least $200 billion aimed at boosting U.S. competitiveness against China. The Biden administration also announced a “strike force” to combat unfair Chinese trade practices. China, meanwhile, is pushing forward with a new law aimed at making it easier to retaliate against Western sanctions.

U.S.-Taiwanese trade talks. The United States will launch trade and investment talks with Taiwan, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told a U.S. House committee on Monday. Blinken didn't provide additional details, and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai's office said there were no formal meetings to announce at the moment. Diplomatic isolation and economic coercion are two core Chinese tactics toward Taiwan.
==============================

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-08/schumer-seeking-endgame-on-200-billion-plus-anti-china-bill

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-08/china-moves-forward-with-law-aimed-at-countering-u-s-sanctions

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-taiwan-to-launch-trade-talks-11623097659

2019:  https://geopoliticalfutures.com/taiwan-us-friend-convenience/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=https%3A%2F%2Fgeopoliticalfutures.com%2Ftaiwan-us-friend-convenience%2F&utm_content&utm_campaign=PAID+-+Everything+as+it%27s+published
« Last Edit: June 08, 2021, 11:25:26 AM by Crafty_Dog »


DougMacG

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Re: US-China
« Reply #1287 on: June 15, 2021, 10:21:01 AM »
People are asking and answering the question of how the US should get tough on China.  Suggestion:  Pres. Biden should appoint Donald Trump (or Mike Pompeo) Ambassador to China. Seriously.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1288 on: June 15, 2021, 10:47:42 AM »
Off the top of my head:


Apply our debts to China towards the damages they caused us by their bad behavior spreading the Wuhan Virus.

Relevant military build up.

Eliminate vulnerabilities such as reliance upon China for antibiotics, semi-chips, REEs, etc

Go for removing China from the WTO.

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1289 on: June 17, 2021, 07:48:07 AM »
Off the top of my head:


Apply our debts to China towards the damages they caused us by their bad behavior spreading the Wuhan Virus.

Relevant military build up.

Eliminate vulnerabilities such as reliance upon China for antibiotics, semi-chips, REEs, etc

Go for removing China from the WTO.

   - I like the way you are thinking.

On the first point, at least freeze assets pending investigation.  Since we are such multi-lateralists now, do it worldwide.


This one should have 100% bipartisan support:

"Eliminate vulnerabilities such as reliance upon China for antibiotics, semi-chips, REEs, etc"

   - Why aren't we working to mitigate all of our vulnerabilities?  We couldn't even make masks, and we are still having supply chain disruptions across our industries.




DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- taiwanese reunification?
« Reply #1291 on: June 19, 2021, 05:06:59 AM »
85% of Taiwanese see themselves as Taiwanese only, not Chinese, reported by Gordon Chang. Low single digits in Taiwan see themselves as Chinese.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1292 on: June 19, 2021, 06:05:41 AM »
G7 backs Taiwan for first time

wow

I like it.