Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 263442 times)

G M

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ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1301 on: July 10, 2021, 02:40:47 PM »
https://nypost.com/2021/07/09/psaki-claims-biden-didnt-discuss-business-with-hunter-despite-docs-that-show-otherwise/

Just like nancy did not tell paul anything

so he could INSIDE trade

( " I have nothing to do with his stock trades )

not mentioned is she only comes home and just happens to mention legislation that would affect certain stocks

he goes out calls his broker and she can make the absurd claim she
 had nothing to do with it.

no shame
because NO punishment .

NOT even the media who covers for all the Dems

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: A look back at the landmark South China Sea Ruling, five years on
« Reply #1302 on: July 12, 2021, 07:32:19 PM »
A Look Back at a Landmark South China Sea Ruling, Five Years On
7 MIN READJul 12, 2021 | 17:34 GMT





An aerial photograph taken by the Philippine Air Force in November 2003 shows Chinese-built structures near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
An aerial photograph taken by the Philippine Air Force in November 2003 shows Chinese-built structures near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

(STR/AFP via Getty Images)

On July 12, 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague effectively ruled that China’s sweeping nine-dash line in the South China Sea had no international legal standing under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), siding with the Philippines. Ahead of the fifth anniversary of that landmark ruling, I had the opportunity to take part in a semi-formal dialogue between researchers and officials from both the United States and China (notably, Philippine delegates were not invited). The Chinese side set the tone of the meeting. They considered the Philippine case without merit (China boycotted the tribunal), reasserted their historical claims to much of the South China Sea, and not so subtly told the United States to stay out of regional Chinese affairs. There was no dialogue. The meeting was intended to deliver a message that China would continue to assert its sovereignty over several built-up artificial islands and that it saw U.S. moves to challenge these claims or support regional counterclaimants as interference and acts of aggression against China and its core interests.

In the five years since the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled on the case brought by the Philippines, China’s response has highlighted the challenges of maritime claims in the region, as well as the limitations of international law. Without willing compliance or international enforcement, relative power remains the true arbiter — allowing for Beijing to gain an advantage in the disputed waterway.

A Look Back

Five years on, China continues to ignore the U.N. tribunal ruling, has hardened its positions in the South China Sea, formalized its administrative claims to the territory, and expanded its maritime patrols and exercises. In part, this was facilitated by the Philippines itself. Just two months before the tribunal issued its ruling, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office and rapidly distanced himself from the tribunal ruling and his predecessor’s China policies. In return, Duterte sought Chinese investment and stable relations, which would enable him to focus on his domestic priorities, including his anti-drug campaign and his push for greater federalism as a way to manage the restive southern provinces.


Manila’s shift in tone regarding China also comes amid Duterte’s frequent threats to distance the Philippines from the United States, as well as end the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which is a 70-year-old framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in the Philippines. This means that even if the United States sought to challenge China’s claims on the basis of the tribunal ruling, Washington would find little support from the very country that had brought the case against Beijing to begin with. The negative U.S. response to Duterte’s anti-drug campaign, which was reportedly rife with extrajudicial killings, added to tensions between the two erstwhile allies. While the U.S. Navy continued to carry out Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) around the Chinese-occupied islets, it did little more to try and dislodge the Chinese forces. Tribunal ruling or not, Beijing remains the de facto controlling power over the disputed islets, and also retains control of related fishing grounds. 

The Challenges of International Law

One of the frequent arguments Duterte has made for his China policy and his reluctance to press the tribunal ruling is that Manila simply does not have the capacity to enforce the ruling, and that Washington has failed to step up and shoulder the responsibility. In short, Duterte has essentially said that, while he still holds that the islands and other landmasses in the South China Sea are Philippine territory, Manila is incapable of asserting its claims, and thus it is near futile and self-defeating to undermine relations with China over something that cannot be altered any time soon.

In a similar vein, Duterte has blamed both the previous Philippine administration and the United States for failing to dislodge China in 2012, when Washington helped ease rising tensions around the disputed Scarborough Shoal. Duterte and his supporters have questioned why the United States failed to push Chinese ships out of the shoal after the Philippine ships withdrew. The crux of the argument is that, despite the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty and the superiority of the U.S. Navy at the time, Washington failed to fulfill its responsibilities to its ally. Thus U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) are disruptive and cause problems for Manila, but do not include any real benefit.

China wagered that the United States would not risk triggering a larger military engagement over a few spots of rock and sand in a distant sea.





Despite his frequent rhetorical flourishes and occasional foul language, Duterte isn’t entirely off the mark. The inconvenient reality of treaties and international law more broadly is that they are only effective so long as they are enforced or willingly adhered to, or at least perceived by third parties to be actually binding. If China truly believed that the United States would risk its own ships, aircraft and personnel to preserve Manila’s claims to the unoccupied shoals and islets, Beijing may have taken a different path. But China’s experience has led it to assess that while the United States would complain, Washington would not take on the risk of a larger military engagement with China over a few spots of rock and sand in a distant sea, no matter how strategic the overall waterway may be. And the United States reinforced this view by frequently claiming it did not take sides in the Philippines' South China Sea dispute with China, thus failing to assertively back Manila’s claims. Not only was this the longstanding U.S. policy, it also matched the tribunal ruling, which did not assess Philippine sovereignty despite rejecting China’s claims. 

The Limitations of U.S. Power

The United States has long had mixed views on treaties, international law and multinational organizations. From its earliest days, U.S. leaders argued against entangling alliances, fearing that such relations could force the United States into economic or military action that would be detrimental to its own domestic interests. Like any large power, the United States has used international systems, laws and organizations when they largely fit U.S. needs and interests, but shied away when they did not. The United States has even failed to ratify UNCLOS, despite that being the basis for the tribunal ruling, as well as part of Washington’s justification for its naval operations in the South China Sea.

For much of the last three decades, even as there were growing voices urging Washington to take heed of China’s rise and its potential challenge to the U.S.-supported international order, U.S. administrations largely sought to entice Beijing through engagement, hoping China would “westernize” by default. While that idea has since lost credence, it does in part explain U.S. reticence in the past to directly challenge China, despite Beijing’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea. In more concrete terms, Washington has also felt that the risk of military escalation with China exceeded the threat posed by each incremental step China took in occupying, building up and arming the islets.

For the past 20 years, the primary U.S. security focus had been on counterterrorism efforts and on the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Great power competition was simply not in vogue, and U.S. training cycles and force deployments reflected the prioritization of non-state actors as the primary security threat. While that pattern is now shifting rapidly, the United States is no longer in a position to prevent Chinese action. Washington must instead either manage the new reality of power in the South China Sea, or take on the cost of trying to roll back Chinese positions. It’s one thing to stop something from happening, but it’s quite another to reverse an existing reality.


Crafty_Dog

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US FONOP irks ChiComs
« Reply #1304 on: July 13, 2021, 12:56:10 PM »
South China Sea: China Warns U.S. Destroyer Operating Near Disputed Islands
2 MIN READJul 12, 2021 | 17:53 GMT





What Happened: The Chinese military said it had warned U.S. guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold to leave Chinese-claimed waters near the South China Sea’s Paracel Islands following a U.S. freedom of navigation operation (FONOP), the South China Morning Post reported July 12. This coincided with the fifth anniversary of an international legal victory by the Philippines that invalidated China's sweeping South China Sea claims, which U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken marked by reaffirming the U.S. position that its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines would come into play in the South China Sea if China attacked Philippine military personnel, vessels or aircraft. 

Why It Matters: Both China and the United States are signaling their resolve to assert their respective positions in the South China Sea, with an eye toward the competing claimants in the waterway — namely the Philippines and Vietnam. In the Philippines, the May 2022 presidential election will see a transition away from President Rodrigo Duterte, who has adopted a softer stance on China and a more hard-line stance on the United States since taking office in 2016. Vietnam is a key potential partner for the United States in Southeast Asia given Hanoi’s interest in defending its South China Sea claims in order to both shore up its national security, as well as access vital natural gas resources to feed Vietnam’s growing industries.

Background: July 12 marks the anniversary of a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favor of the Philippines that struck down China's “nine-dashed line” claims under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States has conducted at least 36 FONOPS since late 2015. The USS Benfold was present in the region following joint training exercises with Singapore in Guam that lasted from June 21 to July 7.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1305 on: July 13, 2021, 02:25:30 PM »
"Both China and the United States are signaling their resolve to assert their respective positions in the South China Sea, with an eye toward the competing claimants in the waterway — namely the Philippines and Vietnam."

Does anyone really believe we will do anything if CCP invades Taiwan?

Yes big man JOE who can scream Jim Crow and fight for our democracy and inherent rights to vote !!!!    :wink:

We know his response - > sanctions!
                                       confer with our friends and allies!



DougMacG

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Re: US-China, Hong Kong
« Reply #1306 on: July 14, 2021, 09:29:33 AM »
One country, two one system.

https://freebeacon.com/media/china-hong-kong-journalists/

NBA, Nike, Apple, Google Silent on China’s Crackdown on Journalists in Hong Kong

At least seven journalists arrested in Hong Kong since June 17
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Jailed journalists, and no one protests.  Don't tell me these are American companies.  Their loyalties are with China.


G M

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What if?
« Reply #1308 on: July 16, 2021, 10:29:30 AM »

G M

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Crafty_Dog

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Reminders of Taiwan's importance
« Reply #1310 on: July 16, 2021, 04:41:20 PM »
Chip shortage easing? Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the world’s most important chipmaker, said Thursday that the global chip shortage may be starting to ease. The company said it increased output for micro-controlling units – a key automaking input – by 30 percent during the first half of this year and expects production to continue to expand through the next six months.

Mystery package. A U.S. Air Force cargo plane made an unannounced stop in Taipei to deliver a package to the de facto U.S. embassy there, Taiwanese media reported on Thursday. Neither government has confirmed the stop or provided any hints as to what was inside the parcel. Beijing warned that the U.S. is playing with fire. The U.S. has been dropping more than a few hints that a renewed U.S. military presence in Taiwan isn’t unthinkable.

This from Oct. 2020:

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/will-us-troops-return-to-taiwan/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=https%3A%2F%2Fgeopoliticalfutures.com%2Fwill-us-troops-return-to-taiwan%2F&utm_content&utm_campaign=PAID+-+Everything+as+it%27s+published

Will US Troops Return to Taiwan?
Washington appears to be suggesting it would be willing to put boots on the ground again in Taiwan.

By Phillip Orchard -October 21, 2020Open as PDF
For the past several years, China has been going to exaggerated lengths to isolate Taiwan – diplomatically, militarily, even epidemiologically. But Taipei and Washington have been finding some subtle but pointed ways to make clear that the self-ruled island is not exactly alone. There was, for example, the photo Taipei released earlier this month of President Tsai Ing-wen and her Cabinet walking down a hallway at an early warning radar site, with a U.S. military technical officer lurking in the background. In August, there was the U.S.-released photo of a bunch of Taiwanese airmen and, conspicuously, a handful of U.S. avionics advisers, posing in front of a Patriot missile battery in Taiwan. Also in August, there was the first-ever visit by Taiwanese troops to the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei, where Washington has openly discussed stationing troops.

Taiwan and the U.S. have little reason to play coy about traditional means of U.S. support for the self-ruled island. The U.S. is required by U.S. law to sell Taiwan the arms it needs to defend itself, and it doesn’t typically do so covertly. Such arms packages have been getting larger and more frequent over the past couple of years, as have appearances by U.S. warships in the Taiwan Strait. And Washington, which doesn’t have official diplomatic ties with the government in Taipei, has also become less and less inclined to keep playing its game of diplomatic make-believe around Taiwan to please China, as illustrated by a pair of recent senior-level visits by U.S. officials. Still, there’s a world of difference between providing material and diplomatic support for Taiwan and putting U.S. forces in Taiwan.

So are Taipei and Washington signaling that a return of U.S. boots on the ground in Taiwan is on the table? Probably not in a major way. But Taiwan hosting at least a modest U.S. military presence in the not-so-distant future shouldn’t be ruled out.

Foot in the Door

For nearly a quarter century beginning in 1954, Taiwan hosted as many as 30,000 U.S. troops as the U.S. sought to deter the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from attempting to put a decisive end to the Chinese civil war (and to discourage Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang from launching its own mainland invasion). But the U.S. committed to withdrawing all its forces from the island in its breakthrough 1972 joint communique with Beijing, and all were gone by the time the U.S. switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979.

Since then, like the State Department and every other U.S. government agency with an interest in Taiwan, U.S. military engagement in Taiwan has largely had to rely on unofficial or civilian workarounds. When Taipei in August opened a “U.S.-backed” F-16 maintenance center in the western Taiwanese city of Taichung, for example, technically it was done in partnership with Lockheed Martin Corp., not the U.S. military itself. Otherwise, U.S. forces have generally steered well clear of the island in the interest of managing latent tensions with Beijing – or so it was thought until the past couple of years.

In 2018, the U.S. State Department stirred up a minor cross-strait kerfuffle by requesting a routine deployment of U.S. Marines to provide security for the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis reportedly decided against the move after talks with Beijing. But last year, an institute spokesperson said that, actually, active U.S. military personnel have been stationed there since 2005 – and not just Marines but personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force as well.

Also in 2018, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act authorized port calls by U.S. Navy ships, and the Navy followed through shortly thereafter by dispatching a research vessel to the island. Meanwhile, there’s been a marked increase in discussion in U.S. and Taiwanese defense policy circles, and even the Taiwanese parliament, about a return of more substantial U.S. forces to Taiwan. There’s little evidence that any formal discussions on the matter have taken place. Still, the rumors have sparked no small amount of consternation in Chinese state media, with the Global Times warning that such a move would trigger “reunification by force.”

Why Taipei Might Be Interested

The increase in chatter about U.S. troops returning to Taiwan makes sense. Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has surged over the past year or so. The PLA isn’t capable of launching an amphibious invasion of Taiwan yet – at least not at an acceptable cost. But the PLA’s breakneck buildup of naval, air and missile capabilities is rapidly turning the cross-strait balance of power in the mainland’s favor. And while Taiwan has enormous geographical advantages working in its favor, there’s growing concern in Taipei about just how optimized the military is for deterring an invasion given the growth in Chinese anti-access/area-denial firepower, much less countering a Chinese blockade or, say, a seizure of one of Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The Communist Party of China, moreover, has a political imperative to reunify on its terms. Thus, China must make Taipei think reunification – whether peacefully or by force – is a matter of when, not if. Toward this end, China also needs to sow extreme doubt in Taipei about the United States’ willingness to intervene on its behalf – something that would expose U.S. forces to substantial losses.

From Taipei’s perspective, U.S. arms sales may not be enough to keep China at bay indefinitely. Taiwan doesn’t have the budgetary capacity to build or acquire the level of firepower the U.S. could bring to bear. And since the U.S. is leery of handing over its most sophisticated weapons and surveillance systems to a government so vulnerable to Chinese espionage and potentially capture, Taiwan is at increasing risk of losing what’s left of its technological superiority over the PLA. Thus, bringing back U.S. troops and U.S.-controlled assets could reasonably be considered a fine way to preserve the cross-strait status quo.

Realistic Possibilities

For the U.S., Taiwan’s geographic position offers innumerable advantages. Strategically, so long as the U.S. can pair its superior naval and aerial capabilities with bases and allied support along what’s known as the first island chain – Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia – it poses a threat to block sea lanes that are critical to China’s export-dependent economy. And more than any other island in this chain, Taiwan could be used by a foreign power to threaten the Chinese mainland itself. Since, with the U.S. basing agreement with the Philippines still stalled, the only existing major U.S. bases in the Western Pacific are thousands of miles away in Japan, South Korea and Guam, Taiwan could ostensibly also facilitate a more active U.S. presence in the South China Sea. More broadly, given China’s expanding arsenal of sophisticated precision-guided anti-ship missiles, the U.S. is keen to adopt a more distributed force posture in the region. The more places from which it can station and dispatch forces, the better.


(click to enlarge)

In truth, the U.S. probably isn’t interested in basing large numbers of troops, warplanes and warships in Taiwan. The geographic benefits provided by the island probably are outweighed by the risks of putting U.S. forces so close to Chinese firepower. The U.S. can also exploit its main point of leverage over China – its ability to cut off chokepoints along the first island chain and egresses into the Indian Ocean like the Strait of Malacca – without Taiwan.

Still, establishing at least a modest military footprint in Taiwan could serve U.S. interests in a couple of key ways. One is by countering China’s creeping superiority in regional information operations (i.e., its communications, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities – the main benefit of its island bases in the Spratlys and Paracels). Another is by aiding the U.S. search for land-based missile sites in the Western Pacific. The U.S. is very keen to deploy land-based, intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles to the region to avoid being fully dependent on overstretched U.S. warships, which inherently carry limited magazines and would be difficult to resupply during combat. But the U.S. has had a devil of a time finding anyone willing to host such missiles. U.S. missiles in Taiwan would have the range to reach certain flashpoints in the East and South China seas, to say nothing of ports, airfields and anti-ship missile sites on the mainland itself.

Second, the U.S., of course, also has a strong interest in making it excessively risky for China to make a move on Taiwan – and thus incentivize Beijing to be content with less aggressive ways to meet its own strategic and political needs. It wouldn’t take a huge U.S. force to raise such costs. Even the presence of a relatively small number of U.S. military personnel at Taiwanese bases, radar sites and so forth would function as a tripwire and make it abundantly clear to Beijing that an attack on Taiwan – and thus on U.S. personnel – would very likely lead to war with the United States. Indeed, this may have been the intent behind the release of the photos of U.S. personnel at Taiwanese radar and anti-missile sites, which would be the initial targets in a Chinese “shock and awe” attack aimed at forcing Taipei to the negotiating table.

The political and diplomatic risks of such a move, though, are real and may quite likely be intolerable to Taipei and/or Washington. Despite the recent surge in tension with Beijing, both Washington and Taipei have every interest in avoiding backing China into a corner and in keeping a lid on the potential for conflict. So for now, think of any move dangling the possibility of a return of U.S. forces to Taiwan as merely a play for leverage – something intended to make clear to Beijing that its continued coercion could backfire. But if the two sides conclude that Beijing’s strategic and political imperatives make conflict inevitable, and that the best way to preserve the cross-strait status quo is to make an attempt at forceful reunification too risky for Beijing to stomach, then things might just get interesting.


Crafty_Dog

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GPF Chinese amphib drills in Taiwan Straight
« Reply #1312 on: July 19, 2021, 12:44:04 PM »
Chinese drills. China held drills simulating an amphibious assault off the coast of Fujian province in the Taiwan Strait. This comes amid yet another broader uptick in naval and air force activity near Taiwan – something of a reversal from the historical trend of China expanding its reach farther from mainland shores. Taiwan held its own artillery drills, possibly in response.



Crafty_Dog

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US-Vietnam
« Reply #1314 on: July 22, 2021, 12:36:58 PM »
Economy for Growth

5 MIN READJul 21, 2021 | 21:04 GMT



Stratfor

(MANAN VATSYAYANA/AFP via Getty Images)

An agreement with the United States on Vietnam’s exchange rate management removes a potential bilateral irritant, returns the United States to a traditional view of foreign currencies and global trade, and sets Vietnam up for a return to export-driven high growth in 2021. On July 19, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) and the U.S. Treasury Department announced a joint agreement on exchange rate policy according to which Vietnam will not engage in competitive devaluations of its currency. In the long-term, by not imposing retaliatory tariffs on imports from Vietnam, the United States will make it easier for companies to begin to shift their supply chains away from China, while also giving Vietnam clarity on the external environment as Hanoi begins to plan economic development for the next five years.

The U.S. Treasury Department designated Vietnam a “currency manipulator” in December 2020, but the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden reversed that decision in April.

As a part of the July 19 agreement, Vietnam will provide the Treasury Department with data needed to analyze its economic fundamentals and determine if the exchange rate is appropriate. SBV Governor Nguyen Thi Hong acknowledged that the focus of monetary policy is to promote macroeconomic stability and control inflation.

The agreement reinstates the U.S. government’s conventional view of bilateral trade deficits as not alone being enough evidence to prove unfair trading practices by trade partners. The U.S. position is that economic policies can distort exchange rates from underlying fundamentals and enforcement action may be necessary, but that comparative advantage and macroeconomic factors are principal in assessing international trade on a global basis and bilateral trade deficits should be viewed in the broader context.

The agreement puts in abeyance potential U.S. tariffs on imports from Vietnam under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which would have severely disadvantaged the competitiveness of Vietnam’s exports.

U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said her office “will monitor Vietnam’s implementation of its commitments and work with Vietnam to ensure that it addresses the acts, policies and practices related to the valuation of its currency that were found actionable in the Section 301 investigation.”
According to the Congressional Research Service, Section 301 is “one of the principal statutory means by which the United States enforces U.S. rights under trade agreements and addresses ‘unfair’ foreign barriers to U.S. exports.”

The deal removes a significant source of uncertainty for Vietnam, a small open economy that is heavily reliant on trade. While Vietnam’s currency should somewhat appreciate against the U.S. dollar, the agreement will help maintain the country's external competitiveness and contribute to its attractiveness as an alternative investment destination, with businesses redirecting supply chain links away from China. Vietnam’s dependency on trade makes it vulnerable to trade tensions, especially with large partners such as the United States.

According to World Bank data, Vietnam’s exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP were equivalent to 106.8% in 2020, while its imports of goods and services were equal to 103.6% — making net exports at 3.2% of GDP a significant contributor to economic growth.

The United States is Vietnam’s largest export market, accounting for 25-30% of export receipts. The country is the sixth-largest source of U.S. imports, including shipments of furniture, seafood, computers, electronics, apparel and footwear.

In 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessed Vietnam’s external position to be “substantially stronger than warranted by fundamentals and desirable policy setting,” suggesting the exchange rate was undervalued by slightly less than 7%. In March 2021, the IMF advised that “enhancing [Vietnam’s] exchange rate flexibility would facilitate external adjustment and management of domestic liquidity,” which the recent U.S. agreement is consistent with.

The exchange rate agreement will enable Vietnam to segue to a fresh start for what are likely to be ambitious industrial production targets for the next five years. Vietnam’s 15th National Assembly will set the country’s economic goals for the next five-year period during its first session from July 20-31. The Vietnamese economy was one of the only economies worldwide that grew in 2020, which at 2.9% was still well below its long-term trend of 6-7%. Vietnam should return to high growth this year if it can control its current COVID-19 outbreak, with the IMF projecting a 6.5% increase in GDP in 2021. New economic targets, however, hinge on Vietnam leveraging its export-led growth model with the United States as its number one export destination. Meeting those targets depends on Vietnam continuing to attract manufacturing from developed neighbors like China as well, while also moving up the manufacturing value chain and nurturing domestic high-tech champions in digital services.

Taiwanese firm Foxconn, which assembles Apple’s iPad tablets and MacBook laptops, announced in late 2020 it was building assembly plants in Vietnam that are expected to come online this year.
Samsung already has manufacturing facilities in Vietnam and in 2020 announced it was investing $3 billion in addition to its existing $2 billion in manufacturing facilities.
Vietnam was the world’s 12th-largest electronics exporter in 2019 and the second-largest exporter of mobile phones behind China.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: US-China trade booming; Taiwanese sub?
« Reply #1315 on: July 22, 2021, 01:16:32 PM »
Trade booming. Despite everything, U.S.-China trade is booming, recovering fully from last year’s pandemic lows and widely expected to continue. To an extent, this comes at the expense of Australia; China, which has tightly restricted imports of Australian coal (and myriad other commodities) as part of its wide-ranging campaign to squeeze the country, is getting a lot of what it needs from the U.S.


Taiwan's breakthrough? Taiwan is reportedly set to launch its first indigenously built submarine in the next two years, according to local media. China has been largely successful in blocking Taiwan from getting substantial outside assistance in either buying subs or building its own, so this could be a big breakthrough.



Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1318 on: July 27, 2021, 10:42:03 AM »
Flight suits for the pregnant men and women pilots too.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Good news! Visiting Forces Agreement
« Reply #1320 on: July 30, 2021, 01:24:07 PM »
   
Daily Memo: The US and Philippines Reportedly Reach Key Deal
The Philippine president reportedly agreed to restore the critical Visiting Forces Agreement.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Agreement reached. The U.S. and the Philippines may have finally put to rest concerns over one of the biggest threats to their Mutual Defense Treaty. Following a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Thursday, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte reportedly agreed to fully restore the two sides’ critical Visiting Forces Agreement, which the president had previously repeatedly taken steps to scrap. The loss of the VFA would force the U.S. to pull its troops from the Philippines and dramatically curtail joint exercises. It would also quash any hope of implementing the landmark basing agreement reached back in 2014.