Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 285818 times)

ya

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1500 on: July 16, 2022, 09:03:41 AM »

ccp

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1502 on: July 20, 2022, 10:16:00 PM »
Looks like the ChiComs are pretty confident Nancy is their hag.

ccp

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Biden to speak with Xi and straighten this all out
« Reply #1503 on: July 27, 2022, 04:53:08 AM »

DougMacG

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Re: Biden to speak with Xi and straighten this all out
« Reply #1504 on: July 27, 2022, 07:06:09 AM »
https://www.dailywire.com/news/top-federal-reserve-officials-with-known-links-to-china-still-have-their-jobs-senate-republican-report-says

Says WH

lets see if they lift all tariffs maybe CCP will be nice to us............. :roll:

Negotiate from a position of weakness.

Where do they teach that?

The real question is, how do we shut this down without violating everyone's liberties.

(Start by telling us who the Supreme Court leaker was.)
--------
The article starts with:

"The report found that China — which holds nearly $1 trillion in Treasury securities —..."

What an insignificant amount that is, out of 30 trillion (?), and it hasn't gone up in how long, a decade or two? They aren't financing our deficits and if they were and threatened to stop, it would be a good thing. We spent 7 trillion last year, most of it on nothing, just mailing pretend money around.
---------
The strangest part of this story is that the communist government of China knows what is going on inside the Fed and we the people don't.

There (The Fed) is a branch of government that should be reformed, redefined and downsized, while we clean house and clean it up.
« Last Edit: July 27, 2022, 07:20:39 AM by DougMacG »

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1505 on: July 27, 2022, 08:04:38 AM »
"(Start by telling us who the Supreme Court leaker was.)"

I can't believe we know nothing about the "investigation"

How long does it take to "investigate "

Roberts ....

 :x

ccp

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pentagon "preparing for war" if needed
« Reply #1506 on: July 27, 2022, 02:32:42 PM »
https://dailycaller.com/2022/07/27/us-military-prep-war-pelosi-taiwan/

I like THIS MESSAGE better
then

"we don't need to escalate this....."

scumbags have been robbing us, bribing our institutions, sending spies over here ,
sent us the damn virus and
using every means of to undermine  our country for decades

we are at war already





G M

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Re: pentagon "preparing for war" if needed
« Reply #1507 on: July 27, 2022, 05:16:26 PM »
https://dailycaller.com/2022/07/27/us-military-prep-war-pelosi-taiwan/

I like THIS MESSAGE better
then

"we don't need to escalate this....."

scumbags have been robbing us, bribing our institutions, sending spies over here ,
sent us the damn virus and
using every means of to undermine  our country for decades

we are at war already

Are you talking about our feral government or China?

It's hard to tell at this point.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1508 on: July 27, 2022, 07:28:33 PM »
GM:

Thought experiment for you:

What does the world, America's place in it, and Americans place in America look like if China takes Taiwan?

G M

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Thought experiment China
« Reply #1509 on: July 27, 2022, 08:26:37 PM »
GM:

Thought experiment for you:

What does the world, America's place in it, and Americans place in America look like if China takes Taiwan?

If the PRC takes Taiwan, it's the final nail in the coffin of Pax Americana and the rise of Pax Sinica.



This will only increase the world's contempt for the rotting hulk that once was America. Whatever value the dollar holds at that point will plummet and any fantasy of reserve currency status will be as dead as the freedoms of the Taiwanese people.

China needs land and resources for it's population:





Our economy and rapidly degrading infrastructure need chips:







Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1510 on: July 28, 2022, 03:29:28 AM »
Very well done!

So, what are the implications for our Ukraine policy?

Can the Chinese takeover of Taiwan be stopped?

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1511 on: July 28, 2022, 06:52:13 AM »
Very well done!

So, what are the implications for our Ukraine policy?

Any pain we have inflicted on Russia will be returned to us and our allies tenfold. Historians will see our Ukraine idiocy as the end of NATO and the EU.

Can the Chinese takeover of Taiwan be stopped?

If they had the weapons and equipment we left the Taliban? If they had the weapons and money we wasted in Ukraine? Quite possibly.

They better get nukes soon.

DougMacG

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Biden-Xi call
« Reply #1512 on: July 28, 2022, 07:05:16 AM »
https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-looks-tamp-down-taiwan-tension-during-china-xi-call-2022-07-28/

Tamp down tensions? They don't have tensions.  The larger one wants to swallow the smaller one, like Russia and Ukraine.

The don't need a phone call to ease 'tensions'.  The need real reasons to not do it.
« Last Edit: July 29, 2022, 07:50:46 PM by Crafty_Dog »


G M

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Crafty_Dog

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FA: China on the Offensive
« Reply #1515 on: August 01, 2022, 12:14:38 PM »
China on the Offensive
How the Ukraine War Has Changed Beijing’s Strategy
By Bonny Lin and Jude Blanchette
August 1, 2022
Chinese President Xi Jinping delivering a virtual speech in Boao, China, April 2022
Chinese President Xi Jinping delivering a virtual speech in Boao, China, April 2022
Kevin Yao / Reuters

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-offensive

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing was on the back foot. For weeks after Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s border, China’s messaging was stilted and confused as Chinese diplomats, propagandists, and foreign ministry spokespeople themselves tried to figure out Chinese President Xi Jinping’s line on the conflict. Xi’s “no limits” partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin was incurring growing reputational costs.

Almost six months after the war’s outbreak and with no end in sight, Beijing has largely regained its footing. Its early concerns that the war would significantly increase overall European defense spending have yet to materialize. Although China would prefer the war to end with a clear Russian victory, a second-best option would be to see the United States and Europe exhaust their supplies of military equipment in support of Ukraine. Meanwhile, rising energy costs and inflation are threatening the resolve of European governments to hold the line on sanctions, signaling to Beijing a potential erosion in transatlantic unity. And even though in advanced democracies public opinion about China has clearly deteriorated, throughout the “global South,” Beijing continues to enjoy broad receptivity for its development assistance and diplomatic messaging.

At the same time, Beijing has concluded that regardless of the war’s outcome, its own external environment has become more dangerous. Chinese analysts see a growing schism between Western democracies and various nondemocratic countries, including China and Russia. China is concerned that the United States may leverage this growing fault line to build economic, technological, or security coalitions to contain it. It believes that Washington and Taipei are intentionally stirring up tension in the region by directly linking the assault on Ukraine to Taiwan’s safety and security. And it is concerned that growing international support for Taiwan will disrupt its plans for “reunification.”

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These perceptions of Western interference have put Beijing once again on the offensive. Moving forward, China’s foreign policy will increasingly be defined by a more bellicose assertion of its interests and the exploration of new pathways to global power that circumvent chokepoints controlled by the West.

WHO TELLS YOUR STORY
Beijing’s reorientation since the invasion is evident in several areas. At the highest level was China’s unveiling earlier this year of a new strategic framework, which it dubbed the “global security initiative.” Although it is still in its early stages, the GSI consolidates several strands of Beijing’s evolving conceptualization about global order. More important, it signals Xi’s attempt to undermine international confidence in the United States as a provider of regional and global stability and to create a platform around which China can justify augmenting its own partnerships. The GSI also counters what Beijing perceives to be false portrayals of China’s aggressiveness and revisionism.

Xi first outlined the GSI during a virtual speech in April. Strictly speaking, there was little new content in Xi’s speech. But in announcing the GSI, Xi was seeking to wrest narrative control on global security away from the United States and its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and discourage countries from joining U.S.-led military blocs or groupings. With this initiative, Xi has put something else on the table to compete with a U.S.-led discussion about what an international order should look like after the war in Ukraine. Core to Beijing’s broader story is that China is a force of stability and predictability in the face of an increasingly volatile and unpredictable United States.

Just as important, Beijing continues to position itself as an innovator and leader in twenty-first-century global governance. Since the GSI’s initial rollout, it has become a standard item to include in meeting readouts from China’s bilateral and multilateral engagements across Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, evidence that Beijing is pushing for the diplomatic normalization of its new initiative, and thus, inclusion in the vernacular of global governance. Although the GSI may not gain much traction in Tokyo, Canberra, or Brussels, it will find resonance in Jakarta, Islamabad, and Montevideo, where frustration with elements of the U.S.-led order is manifest.

Xi’s April speech also confirmed that the strategic alignment between China and Russia continues, despite Putin’s disastrous war in Ukraine. In particular, Xi included a reference to “indivisible security,” a phrase that dates to the early 1970s and negotiations between the Soviet Union and the West known as the Helsinki Process, but under Putin, has become a short-hand for Moscow’s argument that NATO expansion directly imperils Russia’s own sense of security. As Chinese officials have made crystal clear, Beijing sees a direct connection between NATO’s expanding presence in Europe and the United States’ growing coalition of security partners in the Indo-Pacific. As Le Yucheng, then a top foreign ministry official, said in a May speech, “For quite some time, the United States has kept flexing its muscle on China’s doorstep, creating exclusive groups against China and inflaming the Taiwan question to test China’s red line.” He went on: “If this is not an Asia-Pacific version of NATO’s eastward expansion, then what is?” This linkage of the Russian security environment to China’s was also a central component of the joint statement put out by Xi and Putin on February 4.

MORE AND CLOSER FRIENDS
As part of its post-invasion reorientation, China is also rapidly strengthening partnerships with countries that fall outside of the Western camp—that is, most of the “global South.” China has long sought to deepen its friendships abroad, but it is now recognizing that some countries, such as European democracies, will never stand with it when forced to choose. Referencing Ukraine, Le lamented in March that “some major countries make empty promises to small countries, turn small countries into their pawn and even use them to fight proxy wars.” Beijing does not want to face the same fate if it were to find itself in a conflict against Taiwan or any of its neighbors. As the Chinese scholar Yuan Zheng has explained, Beijing believes “that a potential proxy war is what some hawkish individuals and groups back in the U.S. are expecting to take place in China’s neighborhood.” Even if Chinese leaders are still confident about their country’s political system and its growing economic and military power, they recognize that it is still dependent on external goods and resources to fuel its development and growing military capabilities. Accordingly, Beijing is moving fast to both deepen and broaden partnerships to increase its immunity to crippling sanctions and to ensure that it is not alone in hard times. This includes strengthening bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. In August, Venezuela is expected to host a sniper competition as part of Russia-led military exercise in the Western Hemisphere that will likely involve China, Russia, Iran, and ten other countries in a show of force against the United States.

China is also keen to cement exclusive blocs of countries that will support it—or at least not support the United States. Chief among these efforts is China’s attempt to strengthen and expand the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—as an alternative developing world bloc to compete with the Quad, the G-7, and the G-20. In May, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a meeting of BRICS foreign ministers that included an additional nine guests, including from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The next month, as the host of a BRICS summit, Xi advocated expanding the group and proposed new cooperative efforts on the digital economy, trade, and investment, and the supply chain. Xi also invited an unprecedented 13 world leaders to participate in a high-level dialogue on global development with BRICS countries, including Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Not long after, Argentina and Iran officially applied to join the BRICS group, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey expressed interest in doing so, as well. In July, Moscow went so far as to suggest that the group’s members “create a new world reserve currency to better serve their economic interests.”

Perceptions of Western interference have again put Beijing on the offensive.
In addition to BRICS expansion, Beijing is seeking to transform the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, into a powerful bloc that can leverage deep political, economic, and military ties. China has long pushed for more SCO economic cooperation and proposed the establishment of a free trade agreement and creation of a SCO bank. Although these ideas fell flat last year, this year, in May, the SCO discussed the need for increased interactions among member states, particularly on international security and economic cooperation. As SCO formal membership expands to include Iran later this year, and potentially Belarus in the future, the organization is primed to become more assertive on the world stage. Indeed, this June, Tehran proposed that the SCO adopt a single currency and expressed hopes that the group can become a “concert of non-Western great powers.”

Within both blocs and beyond, it will be increasingly important to observe how much China, Russia, and Iran are able to deepen relations with one another and drive broader alignment among countries that are dissatisfied with U.S. leadership. Similarly, the extent to which China can leverage its close relationship with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to build support among Muslim countries, including with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Gulf Cooperation Council, is another variable affecting support for China among developing countries.

BACKING UP WORDS WITH FORCE
A final component of China’s foreign policy rethink concerns military force. Beijing believes that the West is incapable of understanding or sympathizing with what it views as legitimate Russian security concerns. There is no reason for China to assume that the United States and its allies will treat China’s concerns any differently. Because diplomacy is not effective, China may need to use force to demonstrate its resolve.

This is particularly true when it comes to Taiwan, and Beijing is now more anxious than ever about U.S. intentions toward the island and what it perceives to be increasing provocations. This has led to discussion among some Chinese foreign policy analysts about whether another Taiwan Strait crisis is imminent and, if so, how China should prepare. Yang Jiechi, a diplomat who serves on China’s Politburo, has stated that China will take “firm actions”—including using the military—to safeguard its interests. At the same time, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has engaged in more exercises near Taiwan in an effort to deter potential third-party intervention. These dynamics likely explain why Beijing is issuing unusually sharp warnings over the visit to Taiwan that Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, is planning, saying that such a trip would “have a severe negative impact on the political foundations of China-U.S. relations.”

It would be a mistake to brush aside China’s warnings—and its threats of military action—simply because prior warnings have failed to materialize. Although the prospect of an invasion of Taiwan remains remote, Beijing has numerous paths to escalate short of outright conflict, including sending jets to fly over Taiwanese territory. And if Beijing did take more drastic action out of frustration with recent U.S. behavior, this could easily provoke a full-blown crisis. 

IT’S UP TO XI
Will China’s recent efforts to shift the balance of momentum and power in its direction work? It remains to be seen if the GSI will fundamentally alter the international order, or even become a key pillar of China’s approach to global governance. China has tried and failed before to drive the discussion on global security, as was the case with its New Security Concept, a security framework that sought greater economic and diplomatic interactions, which was first articulated in 1996. Back then, of course, China had far less economic and diplomatic leverage. And regardless of its ultimate success, the GSI is an important window into how Beijing will seek to steer the conversation on regional and global security after the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which is expected to be held in the fall.

Beijing’s efforts to revitalize and expand existing organizations such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also face obstacles. India, for instance, is a member of both blocs and may constrain any openly anti-American efforts. But even marginal improvements in the capabilities and cohesion of these groupings would help Beijing blunt any coercive or punitive moves that the United States and its allies may make against China in the years ahead.

But perhaps the biggest factor shaping China’s strategic environment moving forward is Beijing itself. On paper, one can begin to glimpse the initial outlines of China’s readjusted game plan. Deeper ties with the “global South.” A repurposing of existing Beijing-led institutions like the SCO. New concepts of security that align with its own vision for international order. Implemented well, this strategy would no doubt complicate U.S. foreign policy. But these efforts take considerable time, and they could unravel if Beijing’s increasingly aggressive and coercive behavior against its neighbors generates international pushback or reticence to work with China. Xi’s penchant for “own goals” and his dramatic overreach have proved to be the single biggest inhibitor for China’s grand strategy. His hunger for power could well doom Chinese foreign policy.

ccp

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electromagnetic catapult
« Reply #1516 on: August 01, 2022, 08:55:51 PM »
I thought this was a big technological jump for latest US carriers

funny the ccp came up with it too on its 3rd carrier:
 
Fujian

https://eurasiantimes.com/deflating-chinas-3rd-aircraft-carrier-us-names-pla-navys-most-dangerous-warships/

how many spies do they have here?

ccp

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Pelosi to Taiwan
« Reply #1517 on: August 02, 2022, 09:00:22 AM »
 :-o

I didn't think she had it in her!

I must admit

for the first time in my life I am actually proud of what Pelosi did

just surprised

since she and her party spend more time bashing the USA then standing up for it.


ccp

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PS
« Reply #1518 on: August 02, 2022, 09:02:33 AM »
cow towing to China has not worked

they take advantage every which way but loose

so maybe standing up to them for a change will work

 8-)

DougMacG

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Re: Pelosi to Taiwan
« Reply #1519 on: August 02, 2022, 09:22:27 AM »
:-o

I didn't think she had it in her!

I must admit

for the first time in my life I am actually proud of what Pelosi did

just surprised

since she and her party spend more time bashing the USA then standing up for it.

I'm not sure what she's up to but yes, stand up to them.

A wants to visit B and C objects.  C has nukes.  So what. We have a little firepower too (and missile defense - and can't use our arsenal unless they strike first.

Looks like no WWIII yet.
https://apnews.com/article/china-asia-beijing-malaysia-a5a6acc391511c99b1b4c2d69e67b133

If I was selling to the Chinese, culture and 'face' matter. But these people, they are in open warfare against us. All they understand is appeasement and resolve.  Which should we show?

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/nikki-haley-says-chinas-temper-tantrum-wont-dictate-us-foreign-policy-pelosi-touches-down-taiwan

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1520 on: August 02, 2022, 10:40:52 AM »
"I'm not sure what she's up to but yes, stand up to them."

this is surely a head scratcher

truly defending democracy is not likely the real reason
other then for show

divert attention away from her corruption?

a pre midterm election gimmick?

 :|

G M

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Re: Pelosi to Taiwan
« Reply #1521 on: August 02, 2022, 12:22:45 PM »
:-o

I didn't think she had it in her!

I must admit

for the first time in my life I am actually proud of what Pelosi did

just surprised

since she and her party spend more time bashing the USA then standing up for it.

I'm not sure what she's up to but yes, stand up to them.

A wants to visit B and C objects.  C has nukes.  So what. We have a little firepower too (and missile defense - and can't use our arsenal unless they strike first.

Looks like no WWIII yet.
https://apnews.com/article/china-asia-beijing-malaysia-a5a6acc391511c99b1b4c2d69e67b133

If I was selling to the Chinese, culture and 'face' matter. But these people, they are in open warfare against us. All they understand is appeasement and resolve.  Which should we show?

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/nikki-haley-says-chinas-temper-tantrum-wont-dictate-us-foreign-policy-pelosi-touches-down-taiwan

It does appear at this point that the PRC blinked.

We should formally recognize the Republic of China and open an Embassy in Taipei.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1522 on: August 02, 2022, 01:32:13 PM »
We should formally recognize the Republic of China and open an Embassy in Taipei

agree

offer them 51 st statehood?  :-D


G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1523 on: August 02, 2022, 01:36:09 PM »
We should formally recognize the Republic of China and open an Embassy in Taipei

agree

offer them 51 st statehood?  :-D

I wouldn't want them to take on the national debt.

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1524 on: August 02, 2022, 02:48:25 PM »

"offer them 51st statehood?"  :-D."


Our own ccp hits another home run!   )

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1525 on: August 02, 2022, 04:47:58 PM »
Pompeo, whom I hold in high regard, says this.

"We should formally recognize the Republic of China and open an Embassy in Taipei".

Big Picture I agree, but we need to get our military shit together and harden up our many vulnerabilities (military and economic) first.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1526 on: August 02, 2022, 05:01:04 PM »
Pompeo, whom I hold in high regard, says this.

"We should formally recognize the Republic of China and open an Embassy in Taipei".

Big Picture I agree, but we need to get our military shit together and harden up our many vulnerabilities (military and economic) first.

We've already lit the fuse. China wasn't parking tanks outside of banks for no reason. Xi has a real internal crisis on his hands.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1527 on: August 02, 2022, 05:37:59 PM »
Pompeo, whom I hold in high regard, says this.

"We should formally recognize the Republic of China and open an Embassy in Taipei".

Big Picture I agree, but we need to get our military shit together and harden up our many vulnerabilities (military and economic) first.

We've already lit the fuse. China wasn't parking tanks outside of banks for no reason. Xi has a real internal crisis on his hands.

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/18968094/us-lose-war-china-week-taiwan/



ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1529 on: August 03, 2022, 04:31:37 PM »
"https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/pelosi-departs-taiwan-after-president-tsai-bestowed-highest-medal-china-preps-largest"

 :roll:

right our military needs divisions of gays, feminists trans, and race baiters

to dox the CCP off the face of the battlefields.

that should work.    :roll:


G M

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We are all riding this tiger
« Reply #1531 on: August 05, 2022, 10:38:57 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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China-Philippines
« Reply #1532 on: August 15, 2022, 11:33:03 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1534 on: August 17, 2022, 06:59:54 AM »
well we have legal pot
and are on the frontiers or psychedelics  :roll:

and the concept of the metaverse

to me sounds like we will be able to experience our lives in a fantasy world
not the real world

plus if you ever watch Shark Tank
we might be leaders in ridiculous products
   like a better fishing lure , more perfume , make up , new clothing ideas or better cupcakes
    no drinks or wine in a bottle
    or fandango mango soup etc ....

plus we are innovators of WOKISM
the new Christianity that will threaten the Western World

while Chinese CCP laugh their heads off

yes we are fuct

Crafty_Dog

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FA to the contrary, this sounds like we have already lost
« Reply #1535 on: August 18, 2022, 03:24:37 PM »
Beijing’s Upper Hand in the South China Sea
Why Time Is Running Out to Secure U.S. Interests
By Gregory Poling
August 18, 2022


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/beijing-upper-hand-south-china-sea

Since the 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has sought to be the dominant power in the South China Sea. China has not yet accomplished that goal, but it is much closer than Washington cares to admit. China’s artificial island building and its expansion of military capabilities in the area, combined with a massive naval and air force modernization program, raise serious questions about the U.S. military’s ability to maintain primacy in the area. Admiral Phil Davidson, then commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, testified before the Senate in 2018 that China “is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” In reality, the balance has shifted even more than that. The truth is that the United States would likely have little choice but to cede the South China Sea in the opening stages of any conflict with China.

But China isn’t looking for a fight with the U.S. Navy. Even if China won, the costs for Beijing would outweigh the benefits. What China really wants is to convince the rest of Asia that the contest for primacy is already over. The greatest danger for U.S. military power in the South China Sea is not China’s preparations for war but its peacetime machinations. By using the China Coast Guard and maritime militia—state-funded and -controlled paramilitary forces that operate from fishing vessels—to steadily erode its neighbors’ access to their own waters, China hollows out the value of the United States as a regional security provider.

U.S. “forward presence,” the strategy of constantly having American forces deployed abroad to reassure allies and deter enemies, rests on the access provided by partners. In the South China Sea, that means Singapore and the Philippines. And those countries increasingly wonder what they’re getting from the United States in exchange for that access. The U.S. Navy might be free to sail the South China Sea, but Southeast Asians are being excluded from their own waters by the constant harassment of Chinese forces during peacetime. The more Chinese pressure builds, the more support for the United States seems like a bad bet—one that benefits Washington but not its partners.


UPPER HAND

If there were a military confrontation in the South China Sea, Chinese forces would have clear advantages, ones they have been building up for years. The United States might be able to neutralize the air and naval bases China built on artificial islands in the Spratlys, a disputed island chain. But the effort would be costly, time-consuming, and uncertain since U.S. forces are too far from the area and the military capability China has constructed on the islands have helped shift the balance of power in China’s favor. The closest U.S combat aircraft are based in Okinawa and Guam, 1,300 and 1,500 nautical miles from the Spratlys, respectively. China has four air bases in the South China Sea, not counting smaller installations or those along its coast. It could deploy combat aircraft to the islands for short tours of duty at the drop of a hat. Given its current force structure, China would have control over the airspace above the South China Sea during the early stages of any conflict. And its considerable advantage in missile forces would turn the South China Sea into a shooting gallery. It would quickly become clear that the United States could not protect American naval warships operating in the area.

China’s radar and signals intelligence capabilities in the islands are extensive and, most important, redundant. They couldn’t be easily blinded by U.S. forces, which means China would see the United States coming. And thanks to their surface-to-air, antiship, jamming, and other weapons systems, the islands are more defensible than many believe.

Sheer size also presents complications: The Pearl Harbor naval base could fit inside the lagoon at Subi Reef, the second largest of China’s bases in the Spratly Islands. Mischief Reef, its largest, is roughly the size of the I-495 Beltway around Washington, D.C. Plus, much of China’s military infrastructure has been buried or hardened against attack. This combination of size and fortification means that neutralizing the bases could require hundreds of missiles. And U.S. Indo-Pacific Command doesn’t have the ammunition to spare, especially when any U.S.-Chinese conflict is unlikely to be limited to the South China Sea. Anything thrown against the Spratlys would have to be taken away from the defense of Tokyo or Taipei. The math is already brutal and getting worse: the stronger China’s position becomes, the harder it gets to imagine U.S. forces operating in the South China Sea during a conflict.

The United States needs a small but capable force of air and missile assets in the Philippines.

Neither side wants such a fight, but that doesn’t make one impossible. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jung Pak said last month that Washington is increasingly worried about a sharp uptick in unsafe intercepts of American and Australian military planes by People’s Liberation Army aircraft over the South China Sea. A ship from China’s navy came within 45 yards of hitting the USS Decatur, a guided missile destroyer, during a freedom of navigation operation in 2018. Chinese militia boats have behaved even more aggressively. Miscalculations are plausible. And although there are mechanisms to prevent incidents and de-escalate those that occur, Chinese ships rarely follow the bridge-to-bridge protocols that are intended to prevent misunderstandings at sea, and calls on military hotlines to de-escalate crises often go unanswered.

Another potential risk is that something could go wrong during one of the many occasions when Chinese boats play chicken with their counterparts from other countries in the region. In April 2020, a China Coast Guard vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in the Paracels, another disputed island chain in the South China Sea. A ship that likely belonged to the Chinese maritime militia did the same to a Filipino fishing boat in October 2019, leaving the crew members to their fate until a passing Vietnamese boat rescued them. In many other cases, especially when Chinese ships harass Philippine government boats delivering supplies to that country’s outposts in the Spratlys, collisions have been avoided by the narrowest margins. Given how many vessels China has deployed to its neighbors’ waters and how aggressively the Chinese government encourages them to behave, a loss of life seems inevitable. Were that to involve the Philippines, the United States might be called upon to respond under the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. Failure to do so would only accelerate the expansion of Chinese control over the South China Sea. But armed intervention would probably require the United States to jump several rungs up the escalation ladder, putting it closer to war with China. And if both sides felt compelled to posture rather than de-escalate, things could get out of hand. No matter how such a conflict ended, each would lose more than it gained.

BUYING TIME FOR VICTORY

Besides a military conflict that would likely be lose-lose, there are two other possible outcomes. The first is the one that Beijing seeks and toward which the region is drifting. In this scenario, China’s peacetime coercion would continue to raise the risks to neighbors undertaking normal activities in their own waters. It would become impossible to attract foreign investment in offshore oil and gas exploration and other commercial activity. Fishers would lose their livelihoods, either because the Chinese militia and coast guard make life too difficult or because overfishing and reef destruction wipe out stocks.

Most other claimants to the South China Sea would eventually hold their noses and take whatever deal Beijing puts on the table. The U.S.-Philippine alliance would likely end as Manila concluded that it provided little benefit while irritating Beijing. U.S. ability to project power in the South China Sea would steadily decline as China’s grew. Other states would more aggressively assert their own excessive maritime claims, further undermining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This would start with bad actors such as Russia and Iran but would eventually spread as rule-abiding states saw themselves disadvantaged by the excessive claims of their neighbors. And China, confident in the United States’ inexorable decline, would challenge other rules and institutions, especially in Asia. The net effect would be a regional and global order that is less stable and much more threatening to the interests of the United States and its remaining allies.

A far preferable alternative outcome would secure U.S. interests at an acceptable cost by pushing China toward a compromise that its neighbors and the international community could live with. As U.S. officials have been saying since the 1990s, any agreement between the stakeholders must be consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. That means China must recognize all the freedoms of the seas: unimpeded navigation for commercial traffic, access for foreign navies, and resource rights for coastal states. And any such agreement between China and the other South China Sea claimants must be reached without force or coercion. Luckily, the convention provides plenty of opportunities for compromise if all sides are serious about it.

The details of the arrangements between China and its neighbors shouldn’t matter to the United States. The goal of U.S. policy should be to cajole China into seeking compromise and then support Washington’s allies and partners in whatever they decide, so long as it is legal and peaceable. Doing so will require a years-long effort to impose costs on and shape incentives for China. The United States cannot do this alone: it must involve a coalition of Asian and European partners. That coalition must impose diplomatic and economic costs, as well as strengthen Southeast Asian military capabilities, to help deter outright aggression from China. Since 2016, Beijing has been running away with the game and has had little reason to want a deal. But that could change if a critical mass of states began treating China the way they do other bad actors—Russia, for instance. That would make it apparent that Beijing’s policies in the South China Sea undermine its larger goals. It would signal that China can be a global leader or a regional bully, but not both.

Anything thrown against the Spratlys would have to be taken away from the defense of Tokyo or Taipei.

There are no military solutions in the South China Sea, but American hard power will play an indispensable role in any successful strategy. A multilateral campaign to change Beijing’s calculus through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure will take years. And in the meantime, China’s military power will continue to grow. Pressure on its neighbors will build. The only thing that will buy those countries the space and time they need to see through a long-term strategy is U.S. military support.

The United States and other security partners must continue to provide capacity-building assistance to the region. But the most important role the U.S. military can play is direct deterrence on behalf of the Philippines, keeping U.S. forces close enough to credibly threaten China with retaliation should it use force against Manila. As Chinese strength grows, it will test the seams of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. And without access to rotate U.S. assets through the Philippines, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to credibly respond to provocations. For instance, if China opts to use force to remove the Sierra Madre, a grounded Philippine warship that Manila has turned into an outpost on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys, U.S. power in Okinawa and Guam won’t matter. The United States needs a small but capable force of air and missile assets in the Philippines, close enough to put Chinese surface ships at risk and to respond to small provocations before they escalate. Manila and Washington recently launched long-overdue efforts to modernize their alliance, but time is short.

The South China Sea isn’t lost to the United States and its partners yet. No other government has endorsed China’s interpretation of maritime law; no country has accepted Beijing’s territorial claims. The United States is still the preferred security partner for most of the region. And the U.S.-Philippine alliance is still alive and overwhelmingly popular. There continues to be a path to secure U.S. national interests at an acceptable cost. It is narrower and more uncertain than it was a few years ago. But that should be cause for urgency, not resignation

ccp

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china export of fentanyl part of WW3
« Reply #1536 on: September 17, 2022, 12:37:30 PM »
http://www.learningaboutelectronics.com/Articles/Mini-mental-state-examination.php

this is obvious

what I am waiting for is some elite "historian" or university professor to link this to the trade of opium to China......

Some Ivy leaguer will somehow use this history to then turn around and blame us....

ccp

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Senate intll committee
« Reply #1537 on: September 21, 2022, 03:44:50 PM »
US is  f****d



https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/sep/21/senators-warn-us-incapable-protecting-american-inn/

thanks for telling us 30 yrs too late while any idiot could see CCP is ripping us off!

 :x

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1538 on: September 25, 2022, 10:35:30 AM »
read somewhere on my I phone news that us
using phishing trojan horse techniques
NSA
hacked into Chinese military hardware and successfully obtained there satellite and space and other data

I cannot find it now though
Maybe this is what I was reading :

https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/china-accuses-nsas-tao-unit-of-hacking.html

If true it is good start