Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 398021 times)

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #600 on: January 18, 2018, 11:44:35 AM »
Exactly so.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF echoes my ideas about Trade War with China
« Reply #601 on: January 20, 2018, 10:51:50 AM »
With US Trade, China Plays a Dangerous Game

January 19, 2018

The U.S. has promised to get tougher on China for almost a year now. On the campaign trail, presidential candidate Donald Trump promised that, under his administration, China would not be allowed to take advantage of the U.S. through its trade practices. The tough talk ended once Washington realized it needed China’s help resolving the North Korea crisis. And now that that appears to have hit a dead end, Trump may soon make good on the threats he issued during the presidential campaign.


(click to enlarge)

The United States would have the upper hand in a trade war, but Beijing is not without weapons of its own. U.S. companies have made a fortune in China over the past 20 years, and they would like to make more over the next 20 years. Beijing knows this and is sending a message to those companies that they access the Chinese market at the pleasure of the Chinese Communist Party. Last week, the Shanghai branch of the state cyberspace administration shut down Marriott International’s website in China because the hotel chain listed Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau as separate countries in a customer questionnaire. The questionnaire set off a firestorm on Chinese social media that eventually made its way to China’s Foreign Ministry. A spokesperson for the ministry said that if foreign businesses wanted to continue to do business in China, they should “respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by Chinese law, and respect the Chinese peoples’ feelings.”

Then, on Jan. 12, China’s aviation authority singled out the second-largest U.S. airline, Delta, for listing Taiwan and Tibet as countries on its website. It called for an investigation and an immediate apology.

The businesses were not chosen randomly. Marriott owns 569 properties in the Asia-Pacific region, 300 of which are in China. The chain plans to build or acquire at least 300 more hotels there, which would mean nearly 10 percent of its properties would be located in China. For its part, Delta is in the midst of a multi-year restructuring of its Asia-Pacific operations. It plans to move its main hub in the region from Tokyo to Shanghai – the “hub of the future” in the words of Delta’s CEO.

The significance of U.S.-China trade relations shouldn’t be understated. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, economic dependence has been the only thing tying U.S. and Chinese interests together. China sees the coming storm and is demonstrating what it can do if the Trump administration gets tough on trade, the area where the U.S. can hurt China the most. China is playing a dangerous game, but at this point it has no other choice

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: Japan-Australia VFA
« Reply #602 on: January 21, 2018, 04:49:43 AM »
Australia: Australia’s prime minister is visiting Japan, where he is expected to sign a visiting forces agreement. Some reports say this is a prelude to a formal alliance. How long has this been in the making? Is it a stark change of policy, or is it the formalization of aligned Australian-Japanese interests? How will China respond?
•   Finding: Talks on a VFA have been ongoing since 2014 but picked up steam early last year following Donald Trump’s election. This is a landmark step for Japan, since it would be its first VFA (its agreement with the U.S. is somewhat different) and one that would add further momentum to its remilitarization. Notably, Japan is also negotiating a VFA with the United Kingdom, with which it is also eager to more regularly conduct joint drills. But it’s not a shift in trajectory; both Japan and Australia have gradually been building toward this. The basic utility of a VFA is to put formal structures in place that make it easier to conduct joint drills, position materiel at each other’s bases and so on. The functional goal of the emerging “quad” framework (involving the U.S., Japan, Australia and India) is to have these sorts of technical matters ironed out so that the quad can be elevated into a more formal alliance quickly should the need arise.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
WSJ: China's startup founders unimpressed by Silicon Valley
« Reply #603 on: January 21, 2018, 05:27:18 AM »
second post



For These Young Entrepreneurs, Silicon Valley Is, Like, Lame

China’s startup founders used to see a pilgrimage to tech’s mecca of innovation as a rite. Now, not so much.
By Li Yuan 
Updated Jan. 18, 2018 11:39 p.m. ET

Last week, a group of Chinese startup founders and investors made a pilgrimage to Silicon Valley. They toured a Tesla assembly line, complained to senior Apple executives about its slow app-reviewing process in China and brunched on baked eggs and avocado at Russian billionaire investor Yuri Milner’s hilltop mansion.


Silicon Valley has loomed large in China’s tech world in the past two decades. China’s internet industry started by copying Silicon Valley technologies and business models. That’s why there’s the Google of China ( Baidu  Inc. ), the Uber of China (Didi Chuxing Technology Co.) and the Groupon of China (Meituan-Dianping). Some of the biggest Chinese internet companies, such as e-commerce giant Alibaba Group Holding  Ltd. , were funded by Silicon Valley money. Translations of best-selling books by Silicon Valley sages, such as “Zero to One” by Peter Thiel and “The Hard Thing About Hard Things” by Ben Horowitz, became instant best sellers in China too.



 
Fast Money

China leads the world in e-commerce and mobile payments—far surpassing the U.S., the world's largest economy.



For These Young Entrepreneurs, Silicon Valley Is, Like, Lame


So the trip to Silicon Valley is something of a rite for ambitious Chinese startups and investors looking for inspiration in global tech’s mecca of innovation.

But for most of the 18 entrepreneurs and investors, and especially for those in their 20s and 30s, last week’s visit largely failed to impress. To many in the group, northern California’s low-rise buildings looked shabbier than the glitzy skyscrapers in Beijing and Shenzhen. They can’t believe Americans still use credit cards and cash while they use mobile payment for almost everything back home, including settling bets for their Texas Hold’em games one night in Palo Alto.


Google and Intel Beware: China Is Gunning for Dominance in AI Chips

Chinese companies want to take the lead in building processors that use artificial intelligence to make phones, cars and home appliances interact with us more seamlessly. And they have a lot going in their favor.
Click to Read Story
 

In 2018, Tech’s Cowardly Lions Need Courage

In 2017, Silicon Valley did some soul-searching about tech’s role in spreading fake news that exacerbated social divisions in the U.S. Chinese tech firms should do some soul-searching too, given they work with an authoritarian government skilled in using technologies to try to control society.

Click to Read Story
 



 



They didn’t see the shared bikes that are ubiquitous in China’s cities nor could they order meal-delivery service at any hour. Office buildings don’t use facial recognition to gain entry.

As China’s internet industry has grown larger and its companies have become more competitive and confident, Silicon Valley’s allure is fading.

“The age that Silicon Valley serves as the teacher and China follows step by step is becoming the past, at an accelerating pace,” Li Gen, founder of online media startup QbitAI in Beijing, wrote about the trip on his company’s official WeChat social-media account.

That feeling was reinforced throughout their trip. Mr. Milner, an early Facebook investor who has also backed big Chinese startups, told his brunch guests that China leads the world in mobile payments, e-commerce and online services.

At several meetings, presentations included slides showing the volumes of China’s online meal delivery and mobile payments are many times that of the volumes in the U.S. Their slides also said e-commerce makes up more than 20% of China’s retail revenue while making up about 10% in the U.S.

“I’ve read about this before from the media and wasn’t sure if it’s for real,” says Ding Jichang, founder and chief executive of Mobiuspace, a mobile app developer. “Now I know we’re not self-delusional.”


That Chinese entrepreneurs had to travel to the U.S. for a shot of confidence about their tech prowess isn’t so strange. China blocks Facebook, Google’s search engine and some other U.S. internet services while Chinese companies are hitting barriers in the U.S. too. As a result, the biggest companies in the two markets rarely compete head-to-head.

One startup founder didn’t recognize the famous “like” button in the Facebook giftshop. On a giant digital world map showing where Facebook’s two-billion-plus monthly active users are, China is a big black blotch. A company employee told them that the only other country strangling access to Facebook is Iran (North Korea is largely disconnected from the global internet).

Last week’s tour was put together by Kai-Fu Lee, chief executive of Beijing-based venture firm Sinovation Ventures and former head of Google China. Mr. Lee believes that China has the talent and competitiveness to go head-to-head with the U.S. in the next important tech frontier—artificial intelligence.





Still, Mr. Lee thinks Chinese tech entrepreneurs have much to learn and should be less focused on financial results and on going public. He tried to expose the group to the more creative side of Silicon Valley, arranging for them to spend an afternoon listening to futuristic ideas at Singularity University. The think tank’s co-founder Peter Diamandis wowed the group with his asteroid-mining venture, Planetary Resources Inc., in which Sinovation Ventures is an investor.

They were wowed again when meeting with two startup founders funded by Coatue Management LLC, a hedge fund. One of the founders, a serial entrepreneur working on an artificial-intelligence chip startup, told the group that his firm has spent $30 million in two years on research and development and won’t have a product until later this year.

While the few older 40-somethings in the group admired Silicon Valley’s idealism, the younger ones were less impressed. They said that moonshot ideas and long development times don’t work in China because investors are less patient and copycats are so rife that businesses have to get products to market superfast.

“China is like a startup. The U.S. is like a big corporation,” says Mr. Ding, whose company is developing an app to improve video-watching even on cheaper smartphones popular in emerging markets. “China runs very fast, tweaking along the way. The U.S. runs at a steady pace, doing a lot of research and development. It’s hard to tell who will win in the end.”

Write to Li Yuan at li.yuan@wsj.com

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF
« Reply #604 on: January 27, 2018, 07:50:08 AM »
U.S., China: The USS Hopper, a guided-missile destroyer, is in the South China Sea. Already there are reports that it has sailed near Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by China, the Philippines and Taiwan. The government in Beijing has vowed to safeguard its territorial claim. Is this routine, or is this the beginning of a change in policy?

•   Finding: This freedom of navigation operation is notable because it is likely the first of its kind. Scarborough Shoal, after all, is perhaps the area most contested by China and the Philippines. Beijing and Manila have abided by a fragile truce for the past year. In 2016, the Obama administration reportedly told Beijing that it considered any attempts to turn the shoal into a man-made island a red line, and the Philippine defense minister has credited this with stopping Chinese plans to build there. The operation may have added significance: It comes amid hints of a growing split between the Philippine Defense Ministry and the president over China’s militarization of the disputed islands – hints that have coincided with an uptick in U.S. criticism of the Chinese activities. The U.S. has little interest in picking a fight on Manila’s behalf; more likely, it is demonstrating that Scarborough is a priority. Still, we need to watch for signs that the U.S. is trying to change the status quo between Manila and Beijing.
U.S., China: The government in Beijing has predictably criticized the United States’ newest National Security Strategy, which names China as Washington’s biggest threat. We need an in-depth study of what is laid out in the U.S. strategy. How does it differ from previous strategies? To which points does China specifically object?

•   Finding: The National Security Strategy articulates a gradual shift in U.S. military focus. It emphasizes that the greatest threat facing the U.S. is great power competition from China and Russia (in that order), while terrorism and threats from “rogue states” like North Korea and Iran are secondary concerns. China’s criticism of the NSS echoes its general, long-standing criticisms of U.S. foreign policy: that the U.S. is stuck in a “Cold War mindset” marked by zero-sum thinking that mischaracterizes Beijing’s ambitions and undermines peace and stability in the Western Pacific. The Chinese would prefer to be treated as an equal power by the U.S., of course, and for Washington to cede dominance in the Western Pacific to Beijing, but there’s no reason to believe they really expected the U.S. to do so. There’s nothing in the NSS that would have caught the Chinese off guard, nor is there anything that could be altered through hearty protest. Their complaints are a matter of course and reflect the emerging strategic paradigm in the region.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Bill to protect US technology from China
« Reply #605 on: January 30, 2018, 06:11:28 AM »

By Heidi Vogt
Updated Jan. 29, 2018 4:12 p.m. ET
WSJ

WASHINGTON—Lawmakers are moving to stanch the flow of U.S. technology to foreign investors, creating potential problems for a number of American companies that have bet big on partnering with China.

The Senate and House, with the backing of the White House, are working on bipartisan legislation to broaden the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a multi-agency body that has oversight of deals that could lead to the transfer of sensitive technology to rival countries. The current CFIUS statute doesn’t single out any country, but in recent years, the committee has often been focused on deals involving China.

Currently, CFIUS can recommend the president block foreign entities from buying majority stakes in U.S. companies; the new bill would let the committee make similar recommendations for deals involving minority investments and joint ventures, along with transactions that it determines involve “emerging technologies.”

The scope of the proposed legislation is broad. China requires foreign investors to form ventures with local partners, and Washington law firms say they are receiving a surge in inquiries over what it might mean for the large number of U.S. firms active in China. The country’s huge size has made it a market of interest for companies ranging from auto makers like General Motors Corp. , technology companies like Cisco Systems Inc. or other manufacturers like Caterpillar Inc. —all of which have local ventures in China.

It isn’t clear how broadly the new law would be enforced. For now, the most vocal corporate opponents are a handful of U.S. companies that have determined the new law might crimp business prospects by requiring companies to get the blessing of CFIUS for some joint ventures that involve shared U.S. technology.
Related

    North Korea Cuts War Exercises
    Pyongyang Cancels Joint Performance
    Xi Looks to Ally to Fix U.S. Ties
    U.S. Works on Foreign Deal Curbs
    Chinese Solar Firm to Build U.S. Plant
    Tencent Makes Push Into China Shopping Malls
    U.S. Firms Say China’s Business Climate Is Warming, Survey Finds

IBM Corp. , for instance, last year agreed with China’s Wanda Internet Technology to share the cloud computing technology used in its Watson artificial intelligence system. Behind the strategy is the belief that embedding IBM’s technology in China’s business infrastructure would steer Chinese customers toward IBM as they seek future growth.

Other large U.S. corporations, from  General Electric Co.  to  Microsoft Corp. , see China as a crucial market for similar reasons.

IBM, among others, has said the bill—known as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act—would hurt U.S. companies’ ability to compete globally. “Foreign competitors that do not face similar regulatory restrictions will seize global market opportunities while American companies are left watching from the sidelines,” IBM’s vice president of government and regulatory affairs, Christopher Padilla, testified at a recent Senate hearing.

Supporters of the bill, who think it could be signed into law later this year, aren’t convinced. “I am concerned that some of the recent witnesses before the House and Senate have major financial conflicts of interest that prohibit an objective evaluation of the security threats we face,” Rep. Robert Pittenger (R., N.C.)—one of the drafters of the bill—said in an email.

“The business models for IBM, Microsoft, and GE, for example, have led to the transfer of military applicable technologies to China that have likely aided the modernization of the Chinese military and intelligence agencies,” said Mr. Pittenger. The bill’s supporters say it complements and strengthens export regulations rather than duplicating them.
Under ReviewThe number of transaction notices that CFIUShas reviewed in recent years.Source: Treasury DepartmentNote: 2017 figure is an estimate of nearly 240.
2010’12’14’16050100150200250

IBM and other opponents, while acknowledging national-security concerns, have suggested existing export controls to counter China rather than expanding the reach of CFIUS. IBM didn’t respond to requests for comment.

In an email, GE said while it supports the idea of changes to CFIUS, “it’s also important that any reform support America’s historical leadership in attracting foreign investment, not duplicate existing and well-established export control regimes, and preserve the ability of American companies to compete globally.” The company declined an interview. Microsoft declined to comment.

Several security experts say China has been sidestepping controls by taking minority stakes in U.S. technology companies or entering joint licensing ventures.

“There’s a very sophisticated and well-organized plan [by China] to acquire the technology and the reality is there are people here who want to sell it,” said William Reinsch, who was the Commerce Department’s undersecretary for export administration under President Bill Clinton.

And for many who have watched China easily avail itself of gaps in the CFIUS review process, the bill is the minimum that can be done in a fight that is likely to get much bigger. CFIUS blocked 10 deals between 2014 and 2016 over national-security concerns; China in recent years has accounted for the largest number of reviewed transactions.

“There’s a big trade war shootout coming up with China that I think, frankly, is overdue,” said Adm. Dennis Blair, co-chair of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property and a former U.S. director of national intelligence. He said among the key technologies right now are those involving artificial intelligence, data mining and pattern recognition.
How Bill Would Broaden CFIUS’s Reach

    Expands CFIUS’s jurisdiction to partnerships where a foreign firm doesn’t have a controlling interest, such as joint ventures, minority investments and licensing deals.
    Adds ability to review real-estate purchases or leases near military bases or other sensitive U.S. government properties.
    Updates CFIUS’s definition of “critical technologies” to include emerging technologies that could be essential for maintaining U.S. technological advantage over countries that pose threats to national security.
    Makes a filing mandatory if the partnership involves a state-owned enterprise.
    Expands CFIUS’s ability to revisit earlier transactions.
    Specifies national-security factors for CFIUS to consider in its analyses.

Source: Proposed Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2017

Supporters point to recent deals that they say deserve greater scrutiny because they give China access to critical technology, such as Advanced Micro Devices Inc.’s 2016 joint venture with China’s Tianjin Haiguang Advanced Technology Investment Co., which gave the company access to technology similar to that used by  Intel Corp. in its chips. Tianjin Haiguang didn’t respond to requests for comment.

AMD spokesman Drew Prairie said in an email that “some commentators have mischaracterized” the venture and that AMD received a “U.S. government classification confirming that the technology was not restricted for export”—a reference to Commerce Department export controls. As for the CFIUS overhaul bill, Mr. Prairie said AMD supports strengthened security but wants to make sure it doesn’t have “unintended consequences.” Dawning Information Industry Co. , the largest shareholder of Tianjin Haiguang, didn’t respond to an email.

Many businesses are also supportive of the bill, including software maker Oracle Corp. , telecommunications firm Ericsson Inc., steelmaker Nucor Corp. and railroad-car-equipment maker  Greenbrier Co s. Many say an expanded CFIUS would set needed ground rules for working with Chinese firms.

Even openly supporting the bill, some companies worry, could expose them to problems—not in the U.S. but in China. They don’t want to be blocked from entering deals in China, or prevented from selling products in its booming economy.

“We’re quiet about our support because of fear of retaliation,” said an executive at a large U.S. technology company.

—Kersten Zhang and Ted Greenwald contributed to this article.

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
« Last Edit: February 24, 2018, 10:22:16 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Stratfor: US-Taiwan
« Reply #607 on: February 24, 2018, 11:05:32 AM »
China may be dead set on pressuring Taiwan, but the United States is making subtle adjustments to challenge the cross-strait status quo. And the latest U.S. move has Taiwan set to host a U.S.-Taiwan defense industry conference for the first time in May. Though the annual gathering has been held in the United States the past 16 years, both sides have agreed to take turns holding the event going forward. And in 2018, the event will be held in two parts, with the main conference expected to take place in the United States in October. The split nature of the event may soften the blow for China slightly, but holding any part of it on Taiwanese soil will still sting.

Moreover, the event could eventually provide an opportunity for the United States to needle China further by sending high-ranking officials to Taiwan. The Taiwan Travel Act has not yet been signed into law, but its enactment would allow the United States and Taiwan to exchange visits from senior officials. The annual defense conference is typically attended primarily by defense contractors and military officials, but altering that would be an effective means for the United States to further challenge the "One China" narrative.

China views Taiwan as a wayward province, and vocally rejects any attempts to recognize it as a sovereign entity. But the United States has been laying the foundation for strategies to contain and challenge China, which it now labels its top strategic competitor. In late 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law. The law calls for increased defense cooperation with Taiwan, including arms sales and a feasibility study of port of call exchanges. Beijing has voiced bitter opposition to the law, which it says places unnecessary strain on the relationship between China and the United States. But, in addition to the Taiwan Travel Act, Congress has already introduced multiple bills that would legitimize Taiwan's status in the international community in ways that Beijing opposes.

Each of these steps from the United States, once mature, will widen the chasm between Washington and Beijing. Though China has watched warily to see how far the United States will push, it has wasted no time ratcheting up pressure against Taiwan by poaching its diplomatic allies and increasing its military presence around the island. China may respond to the United States by pursuing less collaboration in military exchanges or dialogues, but such an avenue may be less effective than it has been in the past. And as Taiwan gets pushed further toward the center of competition between the United States and China, Beijing's hopes for a peaceful reunification with the island will slip further away.

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
intellectual property theft
« Reply #608 on: March 02, 2018, 07:32:52 AM »
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-violated-obama-xi-agreement-halt-cyber-theft/

While Dems fart around with phony Russia got Trump elected scam
China is waging a state sponsored criminal enterprise on us for decades.   

Chinese scientists, professors are here in droves. 
How could one sort out the spies from those just trying to live a better life?


Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #609 on: March 02, 2018, 11:05:14 AM »
YES, let's stay on this issue!

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #610 on: March 02, 2018, 05:38:23 PM »
"YES, let's stay on this issue!"

This is the China US thread
so what is the issue do you mean

You don't think many
Chinese who work in our industries are not sending intellectual property back to China?

I doubt it is all overseas internet theft.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #611 on: March 02, 2018, 09:03:49 PM »
What I mean is Chinese intellectual property theft, industrial espionage, etc.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: George Friedman: Korea after the Olympics
« Reply #612 on: March 03, 2018, 06:23:01 PM »
By George Friedman

Before the Pyeongchang Olympics began, there were fears that North Korea would do something provocative during the games. Instead, the opposite happened. North Korea still stole the show, but it did so by using the Olympics to signal its openness to reconciliation with South Korea. With the closing ceremony behind us, this will be the lasting significance of the 2018 games.

After the ceremony concluded, China’s special envoy to South Korea met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The usual diplomatic niceties were exchanged after the meeting, but given that the meeting took place at a critical moment for the region, we need to consider the major issue that was under discussion, which was obviously relations between North and South Korea.

The Olympics may simply have been an interregnum in the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. Or it may represent a profound shift not only in relations between the two Koreas but also in the strategic realities of the region. The United States wants no such shift. Washington was unhappy with the Olympics diplomacy. The U.S. has no appetite for war with North Korea, but neither does it want reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula – unless it’s on Washington’s terms. It’s Seoul, though, that would be literally staring down the barrel should war break out. And so, Seoul opened its own dialogue with Pyongyang, separate from any U.S.-North Korean discussion that may have been underway.

Meanwhile, China does want a strategic shift on the peninsula. One of China’s major problems is that it does not control the waters off its east coast. The U.S. Navy’s presence is more than a challenge to the Chinese navy – it’s a challenge to China’s survival. As important, the formal and informal alliance system the U.S. has created – from Singapore to Indonesia to Taiwan to South Korea and Japan – represents a line of containment that China needs to break. If the events of the Olympics lead to a breach in U.S.-South Korean relations, they are of great importance to the Chinese.


(click to enlarge)

When the North Korea crisis began, there was a broadly held, erroneous assumption that China was as alarmed by North Korea’s behavior as the United States was, and therefore that it would serve as both a negotiator and a source of pressure. In fact, the Chinese were quite pleased to see North Korea back the U.S. into a corner. If the U.S. attacked, it would be seen as an aggressor and would be blamed for all collateral damage. If the U.S. refused to attack, it could be portrayed as weak and unable to stand up to North Korea. Either result would benefit China, at little or no cost.

The North Koreans were aware that the Chinese regarded North Korea as expendable. Their relationship with China has always been shaped by the Korean War, in which China did not get involved until its own borders were threatened, quite willing to accept the destruction of the North Korean state. Even had China wished to be an honest broker, history makes China suspect in North Korea’s eyes.

By creating a situation in which any hostile U.S. action included the potential devastation of Seoul, the North Koreans drove a wedge between the two allies. They forced South Korea to take steps that took away the initiative from the U.S. and, frankly, they forced it to prepare for a nuclear North Korea. The North then used the Olympics as its chance to step into the space it had created between the U.S. and South Korea. What happens next is the question. South Korea would obviously like to maintain its relationship with the U.S. while building a relationship with North Korea. North Korea, however, has no reason to go along with that.

From North Korea’s standpoint, its greatest strategic weakness is its economy. If it released the controls, the economy might surge, but then the regime might also be at risk. South Korea, on the other hand, is a vast economic success. Its primary interest is retaining that economic success, which means avoiding war. Before North Korea’s recent evolution, the U.S. guaranteed the South’s security and economic success. Now, the U.S. threatens it.

Given the situation, some sort of entente, or even confederation, is conceivable. Each side would retain its own regime, but the economic benefits of South Korea would help buttress the North Korean regime rather than threaten it. From the South’s point of view, this wouldn’t be the worst outcome. The South’s economy would be secure, and war would be avoided. From the North’s point of view, it might complicate regime preservation, or it might guarantee it, but either way Pyongyang would have control over relations with Seoul.

The complexities of such an arrangement would be enormous, yet the basic concept is simple. And it’s a concept that worries the United States and delights China. It would likely mean the end of the U.S.-South Korean defense relationship. That would be a risk South Korea would have to take, but at the moment, it’s the relationship itself that makes the situation perilous. The South may consider it. In that case, the U.S. position in the northern waters near China would weaken, and a crack would open in the containment structure. Japan would have to deal with this strange compound Korea, which would divert its attention away from China as well.

If this is what China is hoping for, then the Chinese special envoy’s visit to South Korea is the logical step. There is little to discuss with North Korea. But China would certainly like to see defense relations between the U.S. and South Korea broken, as much as North Korea would. For this, China might be willing to sweeten the deal for South Korea by making special rules for the access of South Korean goods to China possible, or offering other economic incentives that would induce South Korea in some way. With the Olympics over and the Koreas at a bit of a loss for what to do next, this is where China will want to be particularly helpful. And it’s where the U.S. has to consider the possible consequences of staying on its present course.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Stratfor: China--Philippines
« Reply #613 on: March 04, 2018, 02:39:56 PM »


China and the Philippines are slowly moving forward on a bilateral arrangement regarding the South China Sea, though they continue to face obstacles. On March 2, a presidential spokesman for the Philippines said the country has identified two sites for potential joint oil and natural gas exploration with China. This development comes in the aftermath of the countries' second bilateral maritime consultation in mid-February. At that meeting, both sides expressed their desire to move forward with joint mechanisms in the areas of fisheries, energy and marine scientific research, and they established a technical working group to tackle the energy issue.

The potential exploration sites include one area, SC-57, outside of disputed waters near the Philippines province of Palawan, as well as the SC-72 field, located in Reed Bank, which is claimed by both the Philippines and China. The SC-57 field is within the uncontested Philippines exclusive economic zone, while the SC-72 field was ruled to be a part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone in a Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that China does not recognize. The latter field, believed to be rich in natural gas potential, has been the subject of years of possible joint exploration discussions between Philippines' PXP Energy Corporation and China's state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). All these early attempts failed, however, in large part because China insisted that deals over the disputed territories come with acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. Negotiations were suspended in 2014 by former Philippine President Benigno Aquino III's administration amid intensified maritime tensions.

But developing potential maritime resources has become increasingly crucial for the Philippines, which produces some natural gas but imports virtually all of its crude oil. With domestic gas production nearing its peak, the country needs new energy sources to satisfy its economy — hence its focus on the commercially viable, proven resources around the Reed Bank. But the Philippines' lack of adequate technology, combined with China's opposition to unilateral development attempts in areas it deems disputed, have proved too much for Manila in the past.

When Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte came to power in 2016, however, he attempted to rebalance his country's strategic agenda and pursue a detente with China. In response, Beijing has extended certain concessions toward Manila. Both have worked to establish a joint fishing and patrolling mechanism in the Scarborough Shoal, a set of reefs and rocks that China seized in 2012 before granting the Philippines access in 2016. They've also laid the groundwork for possible energy cooperation, with the Philippines announcing in 2017 that it will resume drilling in the disputed sea and reportedly re-engaging in talks with CNOOC.

This pragmatic arrangement could allow the Philippines to acquire the resources it needs, helping manage tensions. But as their relationship moves forward, both Manila and Beijing will likely confront the same obstacles that have damaged previous attempts at bilateral cooperation. In the Philippines, Duterte's engagement with China has prompted domestic criticism and nationalist sentiment. Manila has tried to allay concerns by emphasizing that any deals would be made at the company level and not with the Chinese government itself. But it will also need to iron out thorny constitutional issues. The Philippine Constitution dictates that Philippine entities must retain 60 percent capital and ownership when it comes to joint exploration with foreign companies — and Beijing is unlikely to accept that deal. Finally, even if both sides agree to caveats, China's powerful military presence in the South China Sea will put Manila at an increased security disadvantage.


ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
Levin' research into China cyber war on the US
« Reply #615 on: April 09, 2018, 09:17:57 AM »
https://www.conservativereview.com/articles/no-joke-mark-levin-explains-us-must-confront-china-now/

Even we here have noticed for years that the Chinese keep coming out with military designs that look exactly like ours.

I have not heard this in CNN or MSLSD.

The Chinese are at war with us, period.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
WSJ: China installed military jamming equipment on Spratly Islands
« Reply #616 on: April 09, 2018, 09:31:29 AM »
China Installed Military Jamming Equipment on Spratly Islands, U.S. Says
Disclosure comes as Chinese military conducts what U.S. officials describe as its largest military exercise to date in South China Sea

April 9, 2018 5:32 a.m. ET


China has installed equipment on two of its fortified outposts in the Spratly Islands capable of jamming communications and radar systems, a significant step in its creeping militarization of the South China Sea, U.S. officials say.

The move strengthens China’s ability to assert its extensive territorial claims and hinder U.S. military operations in a contested region that includes some of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

The disclosure comes as the Chinese military is conducting what U.S. officials describe as its largest military exercise to date in the South China Sea, maneuvers that include China’s first aircraft carrier as well as air force and ground units.

A U.S. Defense Department official, describing the finding, said: “China has deployed military jamming equipment to its Spratly Island outposts.”

The U.S. assessment is supported by a photo taken last month by the commercial satellite company DigitalGlobe and provided to The Wall Street Journal. It shows a suspected jammer system with its antenna extended on Mischief Reef, one of seven Spratly outcrops where China has built fortified artificial islands since 2014, moving sand onto rocks and reefs and paving them over with concrete.

China’s Defense Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.



Notes: Different countries refer to the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands by different names. China defines its claim as all waters within a ‘nine-dash’ line, based on a map issued by the Kuomintang government in 1947, but has never published coordinates for its precise location.

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (claim boundaries)

Beijing claims “indisputable” sovereignty over all South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters and demarcates its claims with a U-shaped line stretching from the Chinese coast almost as far south as Malaysia.

China says its island-building is for defensive purposes only, but the activity has stirred fears that it could use the outposts to enforce territorial claims that overlap with those of Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam, as well as the Philippines, which is a U.S. treaty ally. In the last year or so, China has tried to smooth relations with other claimants while continuing work on the islands.

Three of its outposts in the Spratlys—Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef—now feature 10,000-foot runways, hangars for fighter planes, ammunition bunkers, barracks and deep-water piers for ships.

While Chinese military personnel are at the Spratly outposts and Chinese ships dock there, China has yet to station ground units or fighter planes on the artificial islands, U.S. officials say. Nor have surface-to-air missiles or antiship cruise missiles been deployed in the Spratlys, though spots to install such weapons have been prepared, U.S. officials said.

But China’s ability to quickly shift military assets to the outposts is a serious concern for the Pentagon since it could enable China to control vital trade routes, exclude other claimants from disputed areas and interfere with the U.S. military’s plans to defend Taiwan.

“China has built a massive infrastructure specifically—and solely—to support advanced military capabilities that can deploy to the bases on short notice,” Adm. Harry Harris, the head of the U.S. Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last month.

According to U.S. intelligence, the new jamming equipment was deployed within the past 90 days on Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef.

“While China has maintained that the construction of the islands is to ensure safety at sea, navigation assistance, search and rescue, fisheries protection and other nonmilitary functions, electronic-jamming equipment is only for military use,” the U.S. Defense Department official said.

The U.S. regards most of the South China Sea as international waters and has sent ships through the Spratly archipelago to assert its right to freedom of navigation in the area.

China has been steadily escalating its military activities in the area. Beijing has deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and J-11B jet fighters in the disputed Paracel Islands since 2016. Those islands are about 500 miles north of the Spratlys in the South China Sea.

Beijing also has established a new Southern Theater Command to oversee Chinese forces responsible for the South China Sea.
A satellite image shows more than 40 Chinese naval ships, including the country's first aircraft carrier, sailing in formation in the South China Sea, just south of Hainan, on April 1.

A satellite image shows more than 40 Chinese naval ships, including the country's first aircraft carrier, sailing in formation in the South China Sea, just south of Hainan, on April 1. Photo: Planet Labs Inc.

Recent satellite images from Planet Labs Inc. showed about 40 Chinese naval vessels, including submarines and the aircraft carrier Liaoning, sailing in formation in the South China Sea near Hainan in an unusually large show of force.

The drills took place from March 24 to April 5 off the coast of southern Guangdong province, then moved off the east coast of Hainan, where they will continue until April 11, according to notices from China’s maritime safety administration.

“The goal is to inspect and increase the troops’ training level, and enhance their capacity to win a victory,” Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang said this month. “It’s not aimed at any particular country or target.”

Enhancing the Chinese military’s capacity for U.S.-style joint combat operations—involving all the armed services—is one of the main goals of a four-year military-restructuring plan begun by Xi Jinping, China’s president and military chief, in 2016.

Analysts said the exercises appear to be designed to practice joint operations involving China’s South Sea Fleet, based in Guangdong, and the Liaoning carrier group, based in China’s northeast, as well as air, missile and other forces.


Air Force spokesman Shen Jinke acknowledged last month that Su-35s and H-6s recently conducted joint combat patrols over the South China Sea, without specifying the exact timing or location. China revealed in February that it had sent Su-35s, bought from Russia and delivered in late 2016, to the South China Sea for the first time.

U.S. officials said drills involving Chinese marines on the mainland were part of the broader exercise as well.

Timothy R. Heath, a senior analyst at the Rand Corporation, said that while the main purpose of the exercise was to improve the readiness of China’s forces, it was also sending a political message.

“To Chinese domestic audiences, Beijing is signaling strength and readiness to defend the country’s interests, which may bolster nationalist support for the government,” Mr. Heath said. “To the region and the United States, Beijing is signaling that it has been acting with restraint, but that it is willing to meet confrontational policies with its own confrontational policies.”

Maj. Gen. Jin Yinan of China’s National Defense University said the South China Sea drills weren’t connected to the recent U.S. deployment of three aircraft carriers to the region. The USS Theodore Roosevelt arrived in Singapore last Monday. The USS Carl Vinson visited Vietnam last month and did joint exercises with Japan in the South China Sea. The USS Ronald Reagan is currently based in Japan.

“Even if all three carriers came to the South China Sea, what about it?” Gen. Jin told state-run China National Radio. U.S. carrier operations in the area gave China a chance to study their operations and their radar and other electronic signals, he said.

“What else can you do apart from a show of strength? Can you attack me? Do you dare to open fire?” he said.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com


G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
Spengler on China and the US-Serious read
« Reply #618 on: April 10, 2018, 11:17:58 AM »
https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/how-to-meet-the-strategic-challenge-posed-by-china/

How to Meet the Strategic Challenge Posed by China
March 2018 • Volume 47, Number 3 • David P. Goldman
David P. Goldman
Columnist, Asia Times

David P. Goldman is a columnist for Asia Times. He also writes regularly for PJ Media and the Claremont Review of Books and is the classical music critic for Tablet magazine. He has directed research at investment banks and served as a consultant for the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. A senior fellow of the London Institute for Policy Studies, he is the author of How Civilizations Die (And Why Islam Is Dying Too). In 2017, he was a Pulliam Distinguished Visiting Fellow in Journalism at Hillsdale College.


The following is adapted from a speech delivered on February 21, 2018, in Bonita Springs, Florida, at a Hillsdale College National Leadership Seminar.

China poses a formidable strategic challenge to America, but we should keep in mind that it is in large part motivated by insecurity and fear. America has inherent strengths that China does not. And the greatest danger to America is not a lack of strength, but complacency.

China is a phenomenon unlike anything in economic history. The average Chinese consumes 17 times more today than in 1987. This is like the difference between driving a car and riding a bicycle or between indoor plumbing and an outhouse. In an incredibly short period of time, this formerly backward country has lifted itself into the very first rank of world economies.

Over the same period, China has moved approximately 600 million people from the countryside to the cities—the equivalent of moving the entire population of Europe from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean. To accommodate those people, it built the equivalent of a new London, plus a new Berlin, Rome, Glasgow, Helsinki, Naples, and Lyons. And of course, moving people whose ancestors spent millennia in the monotony of traditional village life and bringing them into the industrial world led to an explosion of productivity.

Where does America stand in respect to China? By a measure economists call purchasing power parity, you can buy a lot more with $100 in China than you can in the United States. Adjusted for that measure, the Chinese economy is already bigger than ours. In terms of dollars, our economy is still bigger. But the Chinese are gaining on us, and in the next eight to ten years their economy—unlike the economies of our previous competitors—will catch up.

China, on the other hand, is an empire based on the coercion of unwilling people. Whereas the United States became a great nation populated by people who chose to be part of it, China conquered peoples of different ethnicities and with different languages and has kept them together by force. Whereas our principle is E Pluribus Unum, the Chinese reality is E Pluribus Pluribus with a dictator at the top.

China once covered a relatively small geographic area. It took about 1,500 years for it to reach its current borders in the ninth century. These borders are natural frontiers. China can’t expand over the Himalayas to India, while to its extreme west is desert and to its east is the ocean. So China is not an inherently expansionist power.

Nor is China unified. It has a written system of several thousand characters that takes seven years of elementary education to learn, working four hours a day with an ink brush, ink pot, and paper. Learning these characters well enough to read a school textbook or a newspaper is how the Chinese are socialized. The current generation is the first where the majority of Chinese understand the common language, due to the centralization of the state and the mass media. But the Chinese still speak very different languages. Cantonese and Mandarin are as different as Finnish and French. In Hong Kong, you’ll see two Chinese screaming at each other in broken English because one speaks Mandarin and the other speaks Cantonese and they don’t have a word in common.

China is inherently unstable because all that holds it together is an imperial culture and the tax collector in Beijing. It is like a collection of very powerful, oppositely charged magnets held together by super glue—it looks stable, but it isn’t.

Within the living memory of older Chinese, China underwent an era of national division, warlordism, civil war, starvation, and degradation. The Century of Humiliation, as the Chinese call it—which began with the opium wars in 1848 and ended with the success of the Communist Revolution in 1949—was a century in which civil war claimed untold millions of lives, and the terror of a return to those conditions is a specter that haunts the Chinese leadership.

China, like Russia, responds to its past humiliation by challenging American power. It would be naïve to expect the Chinese or the Russians to be our friends; the best we can hope for is peaceful competition and occasional cooperation in matters of mutual concern. But it is also important to recognize that American policy errors exacerbate their suspicion and distrust. For example, our decision to impose majority rule in Iraq created a Shi’ite sectarian state now allied to Iran, and it left Iraq’s Sunni minority without a state to protect them. This drove the Sunnis into the hands of non-state actors and unintentionally helped al-Qaeda and ISIS. Sunni jihad is a serious security threat to Russia and China, and Russia’s intervention in Syria is, in part, a response to our mistakes.

The Chinese live a double life. If you walk down the street in Beijing, you see people who dress very drably, who show little emotion and do their best not to draw attention to themselves. But if you go to a Chinese wedding or a restaurant where families gather, the same people are loud and bumptious. Their real existence is a family existence. During the Lunar New Year, the Chinese have the largest migration in history—three billion long-distance journeys are undertaken—because all Chinese will travel long distances to be with their family.

Here in the West, we have a concept of rights and privileges that traces back to the Roman Republic—we serve in the army, we pay taxes, and the state has certain obligations in return. There is no such concept in China. Beijing rules by whim. The Chinese do whatever the emperor—or today, the Communist Party—asks, hoping they will be rewarded. But there is no sense of anything deserved. The idea of the state held together by a common interest as in Cicero, or by a common love as in St. Augustine, is unknown in China. The imperial power is looked on as a necessary evil. The Chinese had an emperor for 3,000 years, and when they didn’t have an emperor they killed one another. It’s all very well to lecture the Chinese about the benefits of Western democracy, but most Chinese believe they need the equivalent of an emperor to prevent a reprise of the Century of Humiliation.

From the standpoint of most Chinese, the Communist Party dynasty that took charge in 1949 has brought about a golden age. It’s the first time in Chinese history when no one is afraid of starving to death or of a warlord coming through and raping the women and burning the crops. So for the time being, the regime has a great deal of support, even though it is more comprehensively totalitarian than Hitler or Stalin could have imagined. As deplorable as the regime looks to us, the prospects for transforming China’s way of governance are for now negligible.

China’s Communist Party government is a merciless meritocracy, which is one reason the Chinese have difficulty understanding American politics. If you’re in the Chinese leadership, you made it there by scoring high on a long series of exams, starting at age twelve—which means you haven’t met a stupid person since you were in junior high school. The fact that democracies can frequently advance stupid people—we are entitled to do that if we wish—doesn’t make sense to the Chinese. The one thing President Xi Jinping cannot do is get his child into Peking University unless that child scores high on his exams. Here in America, you can buy your way into Harvard. You can’t do that in China. So while the Chinese Communist Party is not a particularly efficient organization, and is certainly not a moral one, it has a lot of incredibly smart people in it.

Along with ensuring internal stability at all costs, China’s leaders are determined to make China impregnable from the outside. We hardly hear the term South China Sea these days, because that sea has become a Chinese lake. It has become a Chinese lake because the Chinese have made it clear they will go to war over it. There’s a Chinese proverb: “Kill the chicken for the instruction of the monkey.” China has an even greater concern over Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party is terrified that a rebel province like Taiwan can set in motion centrifugal forces that the Party will be unable to control. So the adhesion of Taiwan to the Chinese state—the imperial center—is for the Chinese government an existential matter. They will go to war over it. By demonstrating their willingness to fight over the South China Sea, they are demonstrating that they will fight all the more viciously over Taiwan.

China Graphs

Turning back to our two economies, consider the three graphs above. China does something that Japan, Korea, and other Asian nations do—it massively subsidizes capital investment in heavy industry. From the Chinese standpoint, a steel mill or a semiconductor fabrication plant are public goods—the Chinese look at these things the way we look at highways and airports. And as a result of Chinese subsidies for heavy industry, America has been pushed out of any major capital-intensive manufacturing. Thirty years ago the Japanese were doing this, which is why the Reagan administration took steps to force the Japanese to build car plants in the U.S. But Japan’s economy was very small compared to ours. Because China’s economy is roughly the same size as ours, the impact of Chinese subsidies is huge.

The first graph shows the capital intensity of the companies in the major Chinese stock index (MSCI) versus their return on equity. The more capital-intensive, the higher the return. In the United States, on the other hand, if you look at the S&P 500 on the second graph, the slope is in the other direction. More capital-intensive industries are less profitable. This distortion of global investment by Chinese subsidies for heavy industry has led to a stripping out of capital from American heavy industry. It’s not that Americans prefer financial assets to real assets—it’s that the Chinese have pushed us out. That’s why we’ve lost so much ground in terms of industry.

As the third graph shows, China’s share of high tech exports has risen from about five percent in 1999 to about 25 percent at present, while America’s has plummeted from about 20 percent to about seven percent. That’s not a sustainable situation. What it means in practical terms is that America can’t build a military aircraft without Chinese chips. That’s a national security issue.

China’s “One Belt, One Road” policy, announced by President Xi in 2013, is a plan to dominate industry throughout Eurasia—both by land (belt) and by sea (road).

As a rule, so-called developing economies don’t develop, because 40 percent of the people are outside of the formal economy—they’re in the “underground” economy, mostly in small villages, and they live relatively unproductive lives. What the Chinese have done is to rip out the social structure of village life.

China’s economy is nothing like Japan’s, because Japan wanted to maintain its social structure. The Japanese protected agriculture, small retail, and small business. So in Japan we see a few great companies with global capacity sitting on top of a protected, inefficient economy. In China, which moved the mass of people from the villages to the cities, their equivalent of Amazon—Alibaba—will manage labor back in the villages. The Chinese have broadband everywhere, so as entrepreneurs figure out what villages can make, the villages will work for them.

The Chinese intentionally dismantled their social structure to avoid Japan’s constraints. And what they propose to do with “One Belt, One Road” is repeat that experiment throughout all of Asia—to Sinofy every country from Turkey to Southeast Asia.

A couple years ago, I visited the headquarters of Huawei, China’s telecommunications company—the biggest in the world—which hardly existed a dozen years ago. It has a campus that makes Stanford look like a swamp. Today it has 70 percent of the world market in telecommunications. How did Huawei do that? It cut prices and got massive subsidies from the government. After a three-hour tour, the Chinese sat the Latin Americans I was with down in a little amphitheater and said, “If you turn your economy over to us, we will make you like China. We’ll put in telecommunications. We’ll put in broadband. We’ll bring in e-commerce. We’ll bring in e-finance. You’ll be advanced like we are.” The Latin Americans didn’t take the deal, but the Turks have taken it.

Turkey plans to be a cash-free society in five years. Chinese telecommunications companies are rebuilding the Turkish broadband network. Turkey has given up on the West and is becoming the western economic province of China.

The impact of what China is doing is felt all over the world. Former allies of the U.S., including former NATO members, are orienting towards China. Russia—which has become totally dependent on China—has quadrupled its energy exports to China, providing China with land-based energy imports in case the U.S. tries interfering with seaborne energy traffic.

China has an extensive high-speed rail network, with trains going 200 miles an hour. This has had huge productivity effects, and the Chinese are proposing to build these trains all over Southeast Asia. Thailand, an agricultural country, sees that with high-speed trains built by China, it can become the source of fresh fruits and vegetables for China. So Thailand—which used to be an American ally—is being absorbed into the Chinese economy. And so on.

One of the most dangerous misconceptions Americans have about the Chinese is that they can’t innovate. Who do you think invented gunpowder, the magnetic compass, the clock, and movable type? Yes, China’s culture is much more conformist than ours. And on average, Chinese are less likely than Americans to be innovators. But there are 1.38 billion Chinese, and their research and development (R&D) spending is quickly catching up with ours. They’re producing four times as many science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) bachelor’s degrees and twice as many STEM Ph.D.s as the United States. Granted, some of them are of low quality—but many are excellent.

The single most troublesome deficiency we have in the United States is not the industrial base, which is relatively easy to deal with. It is the lack of scientific and engineering education. Six or seven percent of U.S. college students major in engineering. In China that number is 30-40 percent. That’s our biggest problem. Second to that is the fact, already mentioned, that there is a massive distortion of the global economic system caused by Chinese industrial policy.

The Chinese play very dirty. One of the issues raised in the Trump administration’s recent National Security Strategy is forced technology transfer. That is, if Intel wants to get access to the Chinese market—the biggest chip market in the world—China requires Intel to divulge everything it knows. From the standpoint of Intel stock price over the next five to ten years, that’s a pretty good deal. But it is bad from the standpoint of America’s national interest. If the U.S. government prohibits the transfer of technology to China, the Intels and the Texas Instruments of the world will scream, because it will hurt their stock prices. I’m a free trader, but national security sometimes supersedes the free market. This would be such a case.

Virtually all of American investment in R&D today goes to software. This means that we’ve conceded to Asia, and especially China, the actual manufacturing, to the point that—this bears repeating—we can’t put a warplane in the air without Chinese chips.

So what do we do about China? The answer is not to adopt an industrial policy. As Americans, we believe in individual liberty. We are not good at being collectivists. China and Germany have industrial policies. Culturally they can deal with it. We cannot. If we’re going to compete with China, we’ve got to do it the American way. And what we are best at is innovation.

In the 1970s, all the smart people thought Russia was going to win the Cold War. Economists at the CIA and in the universities believed that Russia had a great economy. But by 1989, we realized that the Russian economy was a piece of junk. It actually had a negative worth, because the cost of environmental cleanup exceeded the value of whatever Russia was producing.

What happened in the interim was the greatest wave of industrial innovation in American history. We invented fast, light, small, inexpensive microchips. We invented sensors that didn’t exist before. We invented the semiconductor laser. And we did virtually all of this through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and NASA, in cooperation with the great corporate laboratories.

The U.S. turned the Russian economy into junk by creating an economy that hadn’t existed before. That was the Reagan economy. During this creation, the Fortune 500 lost employment. The monopolies were all ruined. New companies no one ever heard of sprang up to commercialize the new technologies, and corruption declined because we had challengers taking market share away from the entrenched interests.

In 1983, I wrote a memo for the National Security Council arguing that the Strategic Defense Initiative would pay for itself—that the impact of the new technologies we were researching, once they were commercialized, would generate more tax revenue than we’d spent on R&D. When you do R&D, you don’t know the outcome. Manufacturing using CMOS chip technology came about because the Pentagon thought it would be great for fighter pilots to have a weather forecasting module in the cockpit. The semiconductor laser came about because the Pentagon wanted to light up the battlefield during nighttime warfare. These technologies produced unforeseen consequences that rippled in unimaginable ways through our economy.

We have failed to continue this innovation in recent decades. Starting with the Clinton administration, we came to believe we were so powerful that we didn’t have to invest in national defense and new technologies. Investment went into the Internet bubble of the 1990s, as if downloading movies was going to be the economy of the future.

I’m a free marketer. But the one thing markets cannot do is divorce themselves from culture. It is when we have a national security requirement, forcing us to the frontier of physics to develop weapons that are better than those of our rivals, that we get the best kind of innovation. So the government has a role—a critical role—in meeting the Chinese challenge.

If the Chinese are spending tens of billions of dollars to build chip fabrication plants and we come up with a better way of doing it, suddenly they’ll have a hundred billion dollars’ worth of worthless chip manufacturing plants on their hands. But you can’t predict the outcome in advance. You have to make the commitment and take a leap of faith in American ingenuity and science. We can meet the strategic challenge of China, but we have to meet it as Americans in the American way.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #619 on: April 10, 2018, 06:58:45 PM »
Spengler is always worth serious thought , , ,

G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #620 on: April 10, 2018, 07:02:17 PM »
Spengler is always worth serious thought , , ,

Yes. I put him up there with VDH and Richard Fernandez.

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
Chinese Spies in US, massive tech theft
« Reply #621 on: April 12, 2018, 08:26:01 AM »
I pointed out on this board that the universities are flooded with Chinese professors students etc.  OF COURSE many are taking everything they know for a fee and sending off to the China.

FINALLY here is the first article I have seen on this.  It ain't just a bunch of people sitting in China in some windowless concreter building hacking into our computers.
OTOH maybe a lot of American borns non Chinese are also being bribed :

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-spies-engaged-massive-theft-u-s-technology/

So what do we do about this?  
Ask a Dem and the answer is bring in more immigrants .  They have so much to contribute ..  blah blah blah.
« Last Edit: April 12, 2018, 09:42:10 AM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
Re: Chinese Spies in US, massive tech theft
« Reply #622 on: April 12, 2018, 09:21:57 PM »
I pointed out on this board that the universities are flooded with Chinese professors students etc.  OF COURSE many are taking everything they know for a fee and sending off to the China.

FINALLY here is the first article I have seen on this.  It ain't just a bunch of people sitting in China in some windowless concreter building hacking into our computers.
OTOH maybe a lot of American borns non Chinese are also being bribed :

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-spies-engaged-massive-theft-u-s-technology/

So what do we do about this?  
Ask a Dem and the answer is bring in more immigrants .  They have so much to contribute ..  blah blah blah.

Lots of Chinese would love to stay rather than return to China. Unfortunately, they usually aren't allowed to stay.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
US Commerce Dept tightens tech pressure on China
« Reply #623 on: April 18, 2018, 05:02:26 AM »
In the ever-evolving spat between the world's two largest economies, the United States is reaching for yet another tool to pressure China. On April 16, the U.S. Commerce Department announced that it is reinstating an order barring U.S. companies — including tech giants such as Google, Qualcomm and Intel — from selling parts, software and equipment to the Shenzhen-based telecommunications giant ZTE Corp. The move will undeniably be felt in ZTE's operations throughout the world.

The United States originally slapped its export ban on ZTE in 2016, after an investigation determined that the Chinese tech giant had run afoul of U.S. sanctions by buying U.S.-produced technology and exporting it directly — or embedded in ZTE's products — to Iran and North Korea. ZTE earned a few waivers as it tried to comply with the U.S. sanctions, and it eventually reached a full settlement in early 2017. Now, however, the United States is arguing that ZTE has violated the pact: Though the company fired four employees involved with the sales to the sanctioned countries, it did not follow through with its promise to reduce the bonuses paid to others involved. The White House is exploiting an opportunity that ZTE Corp. itself created — perhaps at the behest of Beijing, as ZTE Corp. is partially owned by a state-owned enterprise.

The development is a huge blow for ZTE, as an estimated 25 to 30 percent of its supplies and components come from U.S. companies. ZTE likely cannot, for example, use U.S.-produced semiconductors or include Google's Android-based operating system in its smartphones. ZTE has emerged as one of the five largest suppliers of telecommunications equipment in the world, but that status may be in jeopardy now, especially as it faces these challenges during the critical 5G testing, development and rollout period.

ZTE is one of the most important companies in China's ongoing tech innovation strategy, and the United States is engaged in an overall push against those efforts. As it did in 2016, the company will likely try any and all options to forestall or freeze the ban — though with the U.S.-China economic spat in full gear, it may find that the United States is less than accommodating.

If ZTE's pleas for leniency fail, other Chinese companies are likely to emerge from the background. China has adopted a strategy of supporting several tech giants with overlapping products that compete with one another. ZTE, one of the world's largest smartphone makers, has seen rivals Huawei, Oppo, Xiaomi and Vivo jump ahead as the leading Chinese companies in the space, for example. And while ZTE is a telecommunications leader right now, Huawei is a far bigger company and could be in a position to overtake its rival in the industry.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: Japanese Imperialism with Chinese Characteristics
« Reply #624 on: April 18, 2018, 12:31:44 PM »
Not at all wild about the title to the piece, but the news about REEs (a subject which I brought to the attention of this board a few years back) is BIG.

==============================================

Japanese Imperialism With Chinese Characteristics
Apr 18, 2018

By Jacob L. Shapiro

It is exceedingly rare for a scientific study about deep-sea mud in the Pacific to have geopolitical import. But then, we live in crazy times.

Nature – one of the world’s most prestigious scientific journals – published a paper on April 10 analyzing a deep-sea mud patch near Minamitorishima Island, a small island in the Pacific off the coast of Japan, and concluded that the 965-square-mile (2,500-square-kilometer) mud bed contained such a high concentration of certain rare-earth elements that it could meet the world’s REE demand for almost a millennium. This is uncharted territory for Japan, a country driven to horrible extremes in the first half of the 20th century by its dearth of natural resources and still defined by its reliance on imports to this day.


(click to enlarge)

A discovery of rare-earth elements cannot eliminate Japan’s extreme reliance on imports. This is a country that imported almost 90 percent of its energy needs and 60 percent of its caloric intake last year, and REEs cannot power automobiles or be served for dinner. And even though the Japanese scientists who conducted the study believe the mud can be mined in the “near future,” academics tend to have a different sense of what the near future means than the rest of the world. REEs are not actually all that rare – they are just costly and environmentally destructive to mine. It will take Japan years to take advantage of this breakthrough.

Even so, the discovery is a major boon for Japan. REEs have become increasingly important for the production of everything from flat-screen TVs to advanced military weapons systems, and until now, Japan has depended on a risky source for its supply: China. China accounted for 80 percent of global REE production last year and has not hesitated in the past to use this as leverage over Japan, mostly recently in a 2010 dispute over a Chinese trawler that collided with a Japanese coast guard patrol ship in disputed waters near the Senkaku Islands. For Japan, this discovery kills two birds with one stone: It offers Japan a chance to curtail its reliance on foreign imports for a key natural resource while also potentially weakening China’s grip over the REE market worldwide.

Strength Through Self-Sufficiency

It is an ironic shift in roles between East Asia’s two major powers. One of the defining differences between China and Japan has always been China’s abundance of natural resources. This imbalance played a critical part in Japan’s invasion of China in 1931 and Japan’s development of a formidable maritime force in the 19th century because securing sea lanes and access to natural resources was (and remains) synonymous with Japan’s survival. China has an ideological bent toward self-sufficiency because historically it has been capable of self-sufficiency. That, however, is beginning to change, and as it does, the relationship between Japan and China will transform as well.

China has risen to global prominence on the back of its export-driven economy. But imports are becoming more important than ever for the Middle Kingdom. Mao Zedong wanted China to be strong, and for him, that meant self-sufficiency. This fixation on self-sufficiency did not change even after Deng Xiaoping opened China’s economy up to the world. In 1996, China’s State Council issued a directive to achieve 95 percent self-sufficiency in grain production, and this goal was affirmed in China’s Mid- to Long-Term Grain Security Plan released in 2008. But in late 2013, Beijing conceded that Chinese appetites had grown too large, and “moderate imports” became an official part of China’s national food strategy. Now China is the world’s largest importer of soy and, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, will become the top importer of corn by 2020.

Oil is another key area where China’s reliance on foreign suppliers is becoming more pronounced. Last year, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest crude oil importer, a reflection both of increased U.S. domestic production and increased Chinese demand. In 2004, China imported just over 2 million barrels per day; last year, that figure rose to 8.4 million bpd. About 56 percent of Chinese oil imports came from OPEC countries in 2017 and 14 percent came from Russia, which means China has to consider both how to secure its maritime trade lanes to the Middle East and how to avoid becoming the Europe of the East, unable to challenge Russian ambitions because of its dependence on Russian energy. This will also make China particularly vulnerable to any power capable of blocking its access to these imports – the ultimate trump card in any U.S.-China trade negotiation.

Increasing Competition

These are problems with which Japan is intimately familiar. Japan, however, has a much smaller population than China and a more equitable distribution of wealth. China, and the myriad imperial dynasties that preceded it, has always had its hands full just with maintaining order at home. Building the type of maritime capability needed to secure far-flung resources is incredibly costly, and China is being forced to pour money and resources not into making sure hundreds of millions of Chinese living on less than $5.50 a day reach long-promised prosperity but into building and training a navy capable of protecting Chinese interests abroad, as well as building infrastructure in some of the most insecure regions of the world.

The more China becomes dependent on imports, the more Chinese geopolitics should begin to mirror Japanese geopolitics. And that necessarily means that China and Japan, which until now have established a pragmatic if uneasy working relationship, will increasingly compete over the same resources and trade routes. The REE issue is a perfect example. It is no coincidence that a week after the article in Nature was published, Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Chinese ships were carrying out illegal REE surveys in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Japan’s new REE treasure trove is located near a coral atoll roughly 1,150 miles from the main Japanese island chain – an advantage for the Japanese considering that they can exploit resources there with little environmental impact for the country’s main islands. But it’s also a disadvantage because it makes the resources vulnerable to Chinese exploration.

Chinese-Japanese competition over resources won’t erupt overnight, or even in the next year. For every Chinese violation of Japanese waters or Japanese development of new military capabilities, there is another diplomatic meeting meant to show that the countries are still friends – consider the ministerial-level meeting held between China and Japan in Tokyo this week, after an eight-year hiatus in economic talks. Direct conflict is not in the interest of either side yet and may not be for years to come. But make no mistake: As China grows more dependent on imports, its behavior will come to resemble Japan’s. The REE discovery is exceptional news for Japan, good news for the world, and bad news for China. But the more important story here is the slow development of what we might call “Japanese imperialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #625 on: April 18, 2018, 01:10:16 PM »
second post

China: China has reportedly deployed its Dongfeng-26 ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,000-2,500 miles (3,000-4,000 kilometers) and can reach the U.S. territory of Guam. How many of these missiles does China have in its arsenal? What locations are the most likely to be used for storing and firing this missile? What is its success rate?

G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
Important read- How the west got China wrong
« Reply #626 on: April 22, 2018, 02:50:02 PM »
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21737517-it-bet-china-would-head-towards-democracy-and-market-economy-gamble-has-failed-how

How the West got China wrong
It bet that China would head towards democracy and the market economy. The gamble has failed


 Print edition | Leaders
Mar 1st 2018
LAST weekend China stepped from autocracy into dictatorship. That was when Xi Jinping, already the world’s most powerful man, let it be known that he will change China’s constitution so that he can rule as president for as long as he chooses—and conceivably for life. Not since Mao Zedong has a Chinese leader wielded so much power so openly. This is not just a big change for China (see article), but also strong evidence that the West’s 25-year bet on China has failed.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West welcomed the next big communist country into the global economic order. Western leaders believed that giving China a stake in institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would bind it into the rules-based system set up after the second world war (see Briefing). They hoped that economic integration would encourage China to evolve into a market economy and that, as they grew wealthier, its people would come to yearn for democratic freedoms, rights and the rule of law.


It was a worthy vision, which this newspaper shared, and better than shutting China out. China has grown rich beyond anybody’s imagining. Under the leadership of Hu Jintao, you could still picture the bet paying off. When Mr Xi took power five years ago China was rife with speculation that he would move towards constitutional rule. Today the illusion has been shattered. In reality, Mr Xi has steered politics and economics towards repression, state control and confrontation.

All hail, Xi Dada

Start with politics. Mr Xi has used his power to reassert the dominance of the Communist Party and of his own position within it. As part of a campaign against corruption, he has purged potential rivals. He has executed a sweeping reorganisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), partly to ensure its loyalty to the party, and to him personally. He has imprisoned free-thinking lawyers and stamped out criticism of the party and the government in the media and online. Though people’s personal lives remain relatively free, he is creating a surveillance state to monitor discontent and deviance.

China used to profess no interest in how other countries run themselves, so long as it was left alone. Increasingly, however, it holds its authoritarian system up as a rival to liberal democracy. At the party’s 19th congress last autumn, Mr Xi offered “a new option for other countries” that would involve “Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” Mr Xi later said that China would not export its model, but you sense that America now has not just an economic rival, but an ideological one, too.

The bet to embed markets has been more successful. China has been integrated into the global economy. It is the world’s biggest exporter, with over 13% of the total. It is enterprising and resourceful, and home to 12 of the world’s 100 most valuable listed companies. It has created extraordinary prosperity, for itself and those who have done business with it.

Yet China is not a market economy and, on its present course, never will be. Instead, it increasingly controls business as an arm of state power. It sees a vast range of industries as strategic. Its “Made in China 2025” plan, for instance, sets out to use subsidies and protection to create world leaders in ten industries, including aviation, tech and energy, which together cover nearly 40% of its manufacturing. Although China has become less blatant about industrial espionage, Western companies still complain of state-sponsored raids on their intellectual property. Meanwhile, foreign businesses are profitable but miserable, because commerce always seems to be on China’s terms. American credit-card firms, for example, were let in only after payments had shifted to mobile phones.

China embraces some Western rules, but also seems to be drafting a parallel system of its own. Take the Belt and Road Initiative, which promises to invest over $1tn in markets abroad, ultimately dwarfing the Marshall plan. This is partly a scheme to develop China’s troubled west, but it also creates a Chinese-funded web of influence that includes pretty much any country willing to sign up. The initiative asks countries to accept Chinese-based dispute-resolution. Should today’s Western norms frustrate Chinese ambition, this mechanism could become an alternative.

And China uses business to confront its enemies. It seeks to punish firms directly, as when Mercedes-Benz, a German carmaker, was recently obliged to issue a grovelling apology after unthinkingly quoting the Dalai Lama online. It also punishes them for the behaviour of their governments. When the Philippines contested China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, China suddenly stopped buying its bananas, supposedly for health reasons. As China’s economic clout grows, so could this sort of pressure.

This “sharp power” in commerce is a complement to the hard power of armed force. Here, China behaves as a regional superpower bent on driving America out of East Asia. As with Scarborough Shoal, China has seized and built on a number of reefs and islets. The pace of Chinese military modernisation and investment is raising doubts about America’s long-run commitment to retain its dominance in the region. The PLA still could not defeat America in a fight, but power is about resolve as well as strength. Even as China’s challenge has become overt, America has been unwilling or unable to stop it.

Take a deep breath

What to do? The West has lost its bet on China, just when its own democracies are suffering a crisis of confidence. President Donald Trump saw the Chinese threat early but he conceives of it chiefly in terms of the bilateral trade deficit, which is not in itself a threat. A trade war would undermine the very norms he should be protecting and harm America’s allies just when they need unity in the face of Chinese bullying. And, however much Mr Trump protests, his promise to “Make America Great Again” smacks of a retreat into unilateralism that can only strengthen China’s hand.

Instead Mr Trump needs to recast the range of China policy. China and the West will have to learn to live with their differences. Putting up with misbehaviour today in the hope that engagement will make China better tomorrow does not make sense. The longer the West grudgingly accommodates China’s abuses, the more dangerous it will be to challenge them later. In every sphere, therefore, policy needs to be harder edged, even as the West cleaves to the values it claims are universal.

To counter China’s sharp power, Western societies should seek to shed light on links between independent foundations, even student groups, and the Chinese state. To counter China’s misuse of economic power, the West should scrutinise investments by state-owned companies and, with sensitive technologies, by Chinese companies of any kind. It should bolster institutions that defend the order it is trying to preserve. For months America has blocked the appointment of officials at the WTO. Mr Trump should demonstrate his commitment to America’s allies by reconsidering membership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as he has hinted. To counter China’s hard power, America needs to invest in new weapons systems and, most of all, ensure that it draws closer to its allies—who, witnessing China’s resolve, will naturally look to America.

Rivalry between the reigning and rising superpowers need not lead to war. But Mr Xi’s thirst for power has raised the chance of devastating instability. He may one day try to claim glory by retaking Taiwan. And recall that China first limited the term of its leaders so that it would never again have to live through the chaos and crimes of Mao’s one-man rule. A powerful, yet fragile, dictatorship is not where the West’s China bet was supposed to lead. But that is where it has ended up.

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
And in follow to CD's previous post how we got  China wrong;  what do we do about it how.

https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/how-to-meet-the-strategic-challenge-posed-by-china/

If the progressives, liberals, have their way I don't see how we could meet the challenge.
« Last Edit: April 23, 2018, 04:12:47 AM by ccp »

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: Short of War in the South China Sea
« Reply #628 on: May 05, 2018, 09:36:07 AM »
By Phillip Orchard

It’s been an awfully eventful year in the South China Sea – and it’s not even halfway over. In just the few first months of 2018, U.S., Japanese, Australian and Singaporean warships paraded their power around the waters by making several high-profile port visits to the Philippines and Vietnam. Meanwhile, in an uncustomarily overt show of military force, China launched a series of live-fire naval and air force exercises, including one involving at least 40 warships. In late March, the U.S. conducted a freedom of navigation operation, sailing a warship near a Chinese-controlled artificial island in disputed waters to discredit Beijing’s legal basis for its territorial claims. The same week, Chinese warplanes chased off Philippine surveillance aircraft monitoring developments in the disputed Spratly archipelago, even as the governments in Beijing and Manila were agreeing to jointly pursue and extract oil and natural gas in waters just off Philippine shores. Two days later, Vietnam canceled its second foreign-backed drilling project in disputed waters in less than a year. Both the Philippines and Vietnam were capitulating to repeated Chinese threats to disrupt any drilling project undertaken with another outside power.

But the list of events doesn’t end there. In early April, the Pentagon released satellite imagery showing that China had installed radar-jamming equipment on Fiery Cross Reef – one of several artificial islands China has gradually been militarizing in the Spratly archipelago, which are located, as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte put it, just a jet ski ride from Philippine shores – and landed military transport planes on neighboring Mischief Reef. The same day, 20 U.S. warplanes took off from and returned to the nearby USS Roosevelt aircraft carrier in just 20 minutes, an impressive display of operational tempo intended to demonstrate to the region just how far China has to go to achieve parity with the Americans. Shortly thereafter, China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier started sea trials, underscoring the remarkable pace of China’s own naval modernization.

More recently, on April 17, shortly after Duterte returned from a trip to China, the U.S. finally broke ground on base facilities in the Philippines, agreed to under a 2014 pact that Duterte had once threatened to cancel. (He also threatened to cancel the annual U.S.-Philippine Balikatan naval exercises, which will formally open next week with expanded Australian and Japanese participation.)

Two days later, Chinese warships had an unexplained “encounter” with three Australian warships sailing from Manila to Vietnam. Then, a week ago, Chinese researchers proposed replacing the infamous “nine-dash line,” which traces Beijing’s sweeping but nebulous claims in the South China Sea, with a fixed boundary more clearly outlining the area in which China would have exclusive rights to fish, drill for oil, station military assets and so forth. (Beijing often uses “researchers” to submit contentious proposals and gauge international reaction before deciding whether to adopt them formally.) Finally, at last weekend’s annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit, while U.S. bombers were cruising over the South China Sea, Chinese pressure once again prevented Southeast Asian leaders from demonstrating even a shred of unity in opposition to Chinese assertiveness. Member states succeeded only in issuing yet another watered down communique that addressed the South China Sea disputes in oblique terms.

(click to enlarge)

At issue, as always, is whether any of this will amount to more than shadowboxing. It’s difficult to say for sure, considering how performative so much of the behavior in the South China Sea can be. Perhaps the clearest signal came last week from Adm. Philip Davidson, the incoming chief of U.S. Pacific Command, who told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Equally notable were Davidson’s milquetoast recommendations to counter China’s expansion: more freedom of navigation operations, more development of advanced weaponry, and a steadier U.S. presence in the region. His recommendations echoed the case made by the commander of the USS Carl Vinson on a visit to Manila in February: that a consistent U.S. presence is what underpins regional security. Neither called for the U.S. to actually do anything to roll back the Chinese advance.

Davidson’s comments make sense. China is the only country that seems to know exactly what it wants in the South China Sea and that has settled on a strategy for getting it. Beijing is betting that it can draw Southeast Asian states firmly into its orbit, eventually securing access to the Greater Pacific Ocean merely by never giving an inch and creating a sense that Chinese domination is inevitable. The U.S. wants to counter this impression with occasional shows of force intended to demonstrate how much better its Navy is, while nudging littoral states to unite against the Chinese. But a demonstration of force isn’t the same thing as a demonstration of willingness to use force on another state’s behalf, and the U.S. has too much to do elsewhere to supply the resources needed for an anti-Chinese coalition among Southeast Asian states to have any teeth. Southeast Asian states are trying to play all sides to their benefit, but they are too wary of Chinese coercion, too uncertain about U.S. interest in intervening on their behalf, too weak militarily and too internally divided to act decisively in either direction.

So to what degree does the U.S. actually care about Chinese control of the South China Sea, as Davidson put it, in all scenarios short of war? The problem for Southeast Asia is this: Chinese dominion over what littoral states do in the South China Sea’s waters isn’t actually that much of a threat to U.S. interests in the big picture, at least for the time being. The main U.S. interest in the South China Sea dispute is preventing a conflict or an erosion of maritime law that threatens to disrupt seaborne trade. Some 30 percent of global maritime trade and about half of global oil tanker shipments pass through the waters each year. But so long as the U.S. can block Chinese traffic through the first island chain – the series of islands off China’s coast that stretch from Japan to Indonesia – and through the Strait of Malacca, China can’t risk stopping traffic in the contested waters. The U.S. also cares about things like rules-based order and the narrow material interests of littoral states, but it has little interest in what would inevitably be a costly war to defend them. And it cares about maintaining a balance between East Asia’s larger powers, but it would like this burden to fall on regional partners like Japan, Australia and India as much as possible – countries that have no more apparent interest in going to war over the drilling rights of Vietnam and the Philippines.

The risk of this approach is that, over the long term, it could dramatically raise the cost of a U.S. intervention to address issues it does care about, such as sea lane control. China’s military modernization will narrow the gap with the U.S. somewhat, particularly in an area where the Chinese would have home-field advantage, where it could amass forces and supplies quickly beneath the umbrella of its mainland-based missiles and air power. And if Southeast Asian states feel that U.S. indifference has given them no choice but to accept Chinese regional domination, it would undermine the United States’ regional position altogether since it would prevent Washington from using the first island chain to block the Chinese. Notably, Davidson also warned that China’s domination of the South China Sea will allow it to “extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania” and “use these bases to challenge U.S. presence in the region.” And if the U.S. concludes that a clash with China is inevitable, it’d have an interest in pushing back before China makes it even more costly to do so.

These are long-term threats, ones that the combination of China’s own internal woes and, say, Japan’s re-emergence may very well derail. But what we’re seeing in the South China Sea today are preparations grounded in the assumption that the fragile status quo won’t necessarily hold forever.

DougMacG

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19442
    • View Profile
Japan Should Increase Military Ties With Taiwan, Says Former Japanese Navy Chief [and Doug 

[The article is all about responding to Chinese activity in the South China Sea but I would add response the Kim Jung Un fiasco to the mix.  China wants to accomplish something, dominance, in the South China Sea. The Korea ordeal just adds to the need for Japan to re-militarize and for the other countries to join together to stand up to the bully in the neighborhood.  Why does China want Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, the United States and others to be forming and strengthening military alliances in their region?  Xi must be telling Un to wrap this this up.  - Doug]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/japan-should-increase-military-ties-with-taiwan-says-former-japanese-navy-chief_2512991.html

Japan Should Increase Military Ties With Taiwan, Says Former Japanese Navy Chief
By Paul Huang
May 3, 2018 11:34 am Last Updated: May 7, 2018 2:04 pm

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Ashigara (DDG 178), foreground, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) and the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG 57) transit the Philippine Sea on April 28, 2017. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Z.A. Landers)
ShareTweetShareEmail   
WASHINGTON—As the Chinese regime continues to flex its military muscle, the former chief of Japan’s naval forces said it is high time for Japan to increase its military exchanges and cooperation with its close neighbor Taiwan, which is also being threatened by Beijing’s aggressive activities in the region.

At a Sasakawa Peace Foundation forum in Washington on May 2, Tomohisa Takei, the retired admiral and former chief of staff of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), said that Japan should remain vigilant in ensuring that China doesn’t get an opportunity to change the status quo in the region.

Takei also called for Japan to increase military communication and exchanges with its southern neighbor Taiwan, and said that currently there is “almost nothing” in terms of cooperation between the Taiwanese Navy and the JMSDF.

Taiwan has a strong navy. There must be more interaction between Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force ships and Taiwanese navy ships to avoid accident situations,” said Takei. “Japan and China already agreed to set up maritime and air communication mechanism. Japan should also establish such communication with Taiwan.”

Takei, who was the head of Japan’s naval forces from 2014 to 2016 and is now a fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, also said that Beijing’s military buildup and ever-increasing aggression in the region are primarily aimed at retaking Taiwan. Takei said Japan needs to increase engagement with “like-minded countries” in the Indian Ocean to resist the expansionist power.

The United States maintains a close military relationship with Japan, as the two countries have a mutual defense treaty in place. Due to political pressure from Beijing, however, Japan does not have any established military cooperation or exchange mechanism with Taiwan, which is Japan’s closest neighbor to the south.

“There is a lot of potential for Taiwan to cooperate more with Japan, especially in military aspects,” David An, a senior research fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute, told The Epoch Times. “Since much of [Taiwan’s and Japan’s] equipment are of U.S. origin and already have military communication systems in common, there is a lot of interoperability between Taiwan’s and Japan’s militaries.”

An, a former U.S. State Department political-military affairs officer, cautioned, however, that Taiwan’s military cooperation with countries outside of the United States is often done in a quiet and low-profile manner, so as to avoid interference by Beijing.

“If cooperation is quiet, then it is hard to tell the exact extent of cooperation—whether high, medium, or low,” An said, citing Taiwan’s military exchanges with Singapore, which does not formally recognize Taiwan’s statehood but regularly sends troops to Taiwan for training exercises, a low-profile program that has been in existence for decades that Beijing has consistently opposed.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #630 on: May 10, 2018, 07:41:43 AM »
This is a very interesting idea.  Let's keep an eye to see if anything comes of it.





ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
Gordon Chang : Levin Sunday show
« Reply #635 on: May 22, 2018, 03:25:53 PM »
Gordon is also on John Batchelor show a lot as well:

http://video.foxnews.com/v/5787496064001/?#sp=show-clips


Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: Serious Read: China pushes ahead with its aircraft carrier program
« Reply #636 on: May 24, 2018, 08:43:35 PM »
Making Waves: China Pushes Ahead With Its Aircraft Carrier Program
May 24, 2018
 

Summary

When China rolled out its first aircraft carrier six years ago, it was met mostly with shrugs, if not scorn. China had purchased the Soviet-era warship, dubbed the Liaoning, half-finished from Ukraine. It was immediately clear that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s shiny new toy – a floating blunderbuss in appearance and obsolescence – would never see serious combat duties. The launch of the Liaoning therefore raised some questions: Just what is the purpose of the Liaoning, and what do Chinese strategic planners have in mind?

Two weeks ago, China’s second aircraft carrier slipped out of port in the northeastern city of Dalian for its maiden sea trials. The Type 001A, which may enter service within two years, isn’t a dramatic improvement over the Liaoning. It’s based on the same outdated design, and thus faces most of the same inherent limitations. But there’s one major difference: China built this one from the ground up. The Chinese constructed it quickly, and they appear to be gearing up to build several more. This doesn’t mean that China is anywhere near ready to engage in exceedingly complicated carrier operations in unfriendly waters. And it certainly doesn’t mean China is set to become a pre-eminent maritime power, capable of squaring off against the U.S. Navy in the middle of the Pacific. Nonetheless, it’s no small feat – and one that hints at China’s expanding naval ambitions.

This Deep Dive examines the pace, limits and strategic rationale of China’s curious carrier program. Ultimately, it concludes that, at present, Chinese carriers are largely irrelevant to the growing competition over the Indo-Pacific, but also that Beijing has reason to believe this may not always be the case.

Reasons to Shrug

If the Chinese were to try to go toe to toe with the U.S. using their two aircraft carriers in open waters, it would be like taking a knife to, well, a carrier fight. Part of the problem has to do with the limitations of China’s carriers themselves. Both the Liaoning and the Type 001A have conventional oil-fueled steam turbine power plants, limiting their speed and service life compared to the far more efficient nuclear propulsion systems sported by U.S. and French carriers. Neither are particularly large, with the Type 001A expected to be capable of carrying 32-36 multirole fighter jets (plus a dozen or so helicopters), compared to as many as 90 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft on the new U.S. Ford-class supercarriers. Both have ski-jump assisted short take-off but arrested recovery, or STOBAR, launch systems – as opposed to catapult-assisted systems that are standard on more advanced carriers – putting extra stress on warplanes and limiting their sortie tempo, payloads and operating range. Mastering the more advanced carrier technologies will presumably take longer, and be far more expensive, than merely copying and modifying the Soviet-era designs of its current fleet.
 
(click to enlarge)

The other problem for China is that having a carrier capable of toting around a bunch of fighter jets is not the same thing as having a viable carrier battle group, consisting of an aircraft carrier and a full suite of escort submarines and surface ships – destroyers, frigates, cruisers and replenishment-at-sea ships – plus air wings with sophisticated anti-air, anti-submarine, early warning and electronic attack capabilities. Absent these components, carriers are sitting ducks.

China still has relatively limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which means that its carriers would be easy targets for enemy torpedoes. Its own nuclear submarines are believed to be roughly equivalent to what the U.S. was building in the 1980s. The STOBAR systems cannot handle heavy fixed-wing airborne early warning and control aircraft, limiting the carriers to early warning helicopters that cannot fly at the high altitudes needed for expansive detection ranges. Unlike the United States’ latest and greatest fighter jet, the F-35, China’s own premier warplane, the J-20, has no variant suitable for carriers. Moreover, Beijing does not have any experience integrating these complex parts into a unified strike group. In fact, training and experience will be a disadvantage for China in nearly all dimensions of bluewater operations. The U.S. has been doing carrier ops since before World War II. According to the Pentagon, China did not graduate its first cohort of domestically trained pilots to fly China’s carrier-borne J-15 fighter jets until 2015.

Finally, there’s the problem of logistics. China would be operating extremely far from its main base of operations on the mainland. With few nuclear-powered ships, China must be constantly worried about refueling. The U.S. has forward bases, supply depots and maintenance hubs around the globe. China is just beginning to scratch the surface on gaining long-term basing rights anywhere in the Indian Ocean, despite its investments in deep-water ports in various Indo-Pacific countries.

Trajectory Matters

As with all dimensions of China’s rise, trajectory is more important than the current balance of forces. And China’s shipbuilding program is demonstrating a capacity to pump out large, increasingly sophisticated vessels with remarkable speed.

China’s third carrier, for example, is expected to be significantly larger than the first two and include catapult launch systems. This means it will be able to carry a larger and more diverse air wing, including warplanes with heavier payloads and longer operating ranges. China is then expected to turn its focus to developing a nuclear-powered carrier in the not-too-distant future, allowing for much greater operating range and speed and addressing some of its refueling concerns. Furthermore, the Type 001A was built in around a third of the time it took the U.S. to build its latest carrier, the USS Gerald Ford. Granted, the Ford is a much larger and more sophisticated warship, and China has far more limited operational expectations than the U.S. in the near term, so the carriers can essentially be rushed into service and allowed to work out the kinks on the fly without fear of them pulling up lame in the middle of combat. So this tells us only so much.
 
(click to enlarge)

But China’s success in rolling out other new warships at a blistering pace and its success in playing rapid catch-up on the technology front tell us quite a bit more. The number of naval vessels rolled out by China over the past three years is greater than the total fleet of any country in Europe except France. Over that period, China has gone from no corvettes to 37. In 2016 alone, it commissioned 23 new surface ships (compared to just six by the U.S.), including a Type 052D guided-missile destroyer and three Type 054A guided-missile frigates – both considered world-class warships. According to the Pentagon, by 2020, China’s force will likely grow to between 69 and 78 submarines, compared to just 31 (most of them outdated or purchased from abroad) a decade ago. Altogether, the People’s Liberation Army Navy now boasts more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships and missile-armed patrol craft – by far the largest navy in Asia, according to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. (The U.S. Navy is expected to reach 326 ships in the next five years.)

What’s most notable here is how quickly China has been replacing obsolete components and weaning itself off foreign technology. In 2015, the Pentagon rated 70 percent of Chinese submarines (both nuclear- and diesel-powered), destroyers and frigates as being of “modern design,” compared to between 30-40 percent just a decade earlier. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, “The JIANGKAI-class (Type 054A) frigate series, LUYANG-class (Type 052B/C/D) destroyer series, and the upcoming new cruiser (Type 055) class are considered to be modern and capable designs that are comparable in many respects to the most modern Western warships.”
There are doubts about whether China can maintain the trajectory of its buildup if, as we expect, its economic growth slows considerably over the coming decades, creating new budgetary constraints. It’s also facing questions unrelated to its ability to build bigger and better ships. Perhaps most important is whether it can use its Belt and Road initiative to build out a logistics and base network needed to sustain a global presence. But it’s not unreasonable to assume that China has at least the technical chops to play catch-up in the carrier realm, and it certainly has the industrial capacity to do so. The real question is why it would want to – and what this may say about

China’s strategic intentions.

Carriers’ Diminishing Strategic Value

However strong its carrier groups might one day become, China’s decision to devote resources to them is curious for several reasons. Most important, carriers would do little to solve China’s most immediate strategic problems. In fact, China’s broader naval modernization push has been geared overwhelmingly toward making carriers altogether obsolete.

The issue comes down to two concepts core to naval doctrine: sea control versus sea denial. According to the godfather of U.S. naval strategy, Alfred Thayer Mahan, sea control is basically the unchallenged power to conduct maritime trade, military operations and so forth wherever and whenever a country likes, without putting itself at risk of attack by an adversary. Sea denial is simply the ability to conduct attacks on enemy ships, even without the ability to stop an attack on one’s own. Sea control, of course, is much more difficult to achieve, requiring carriers that provide a protective umbrella for all a country’s other ships. Sea denial can be achieved even without a substantial surface fleet, so long as a country has sufficient shore-based anti-ship missiles, aircraft and submarines. Achieving sea denial is sufficient for most countries’ strategic goals.

Since World War II, the U.S. has enjoyed sea control across most of the globe, including nearly all of the Western Pacific. This has allowed the U.S. to routinely move carriers into waters just offshore from conflict zones and establish air superiority. Indeed, just 22 years ago, the Clinton administration famously moved a carrier group and an amphibious assault ship into the Taiwan Strait in a demonstration of its ability to come to Taiwan’s defense in the face of a Chinese invasion. There was almost nothing China could do about it. That’s not the case today.

Across the globe, the proliferation of precision-guided anti-ship missiles and stealth diesel-electric submarines is gradually diminishing the U.S. ability to project power with impunity – and nowhere more so than in the South and East China seas, where China has historically been most vulnerable to foreign attack. Since embarrassing itself in the Taiwan standoff, the overwhelming focus of China’s naval modernization has been on building up sea denial capabilities as part of its broader anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. The goal, put simply, is to build a “fortress fleet” that, when combined with onshore missiles, air power, sea mines and swarms of deputized civilian vessels, would raise the costs of attacking China enough to give the U.S. and its allies serious pause before doing so.

Carriers, in particular, would be relatively easy pickings in China’s littoral waters. This has been a looming concern as far back as the early 1980s, when a top U.S. admiral told Congress that U.S. carriers would last just a day or two in a full-blown war with the Soviets. U.S. carriers have also routinely proved lacking during more recent war games and exercises, including those simulating an asymmetric attack on the U.S. fleet in a congested area like the Persian Gulf or South China Sea. In 2015, the French navy gracefully allowed the U.S. to save face by retracting a report that one of its subs had “sunk” the USS Theodore Roosevelt and most of its accompanying surface fleet during a war game. And their vulnerabilities will only increase as new space-based electronic warfare systems, longer-range and more precise missiles, unmanned systems and so forth come into play.

China’s carriers would be equally vulnerable, and its A2/AD strategy within its near seas doesn’t really require them. Over time, as the range, speed and sophistication of its sea denial capabilities increase, China intends to build strategic depth, gradually pushing its protective envelope outward until it can theoretically dominate the waters around maritime chokepoints along what’s known as the first island chain – a series of small islands running from Japan to Indonesia enveloping the South and East China seas. Presently, another naval power could use these islands to sever critical Chinese sea lines of communication, leaving the Chinese economy to wither on the vine. Carriers would do little to solve this problem. And, with China effectively encircled by hostile powers with growing sea denial capabilities and by U.S. positions in Japan, Guam, the Philippines and Singapore, plus U.S. carrier strike groups sitting farther afield, its carriers would be too exposed to enemy fire to play a central role in any such strategy, anyway. Nothing in China’s growing arsenal can do much to keep its carriers afloat in the face of a U.S. onslaught.
 
(click to enlarge)

For China, carriers may actually prove more of a vulnerability than an asset. Carrier groups are enormously expensive to develop and sustain. In the U.S., building a complete carrier strike group and air wing costs more than $35 billion, plus another $1 billion or so to keep everything humming each year. Labor and personnel costs in China will make building and upkeep less expensive for Beijing, but the carrier program will inevitably soak up resources that could be used for more important systems and dilute the talent pool by taking thousands of sailors to man the new warships. In a 2013 paper, for example, the U.S. Navy estimated China could produce more than 1,200 DF-21D “carrier killer” anti-ship missiles with what the U.S. pays for each one of its carriers. Moreover, the success or failure of China’s strategy is likely to hinge as much on China’s ability to strike an agreement with a country in the first island chain that ensures it access to the Pacific as on China’s military capabilities compared to those of the U.S. and its allies. Yet, building carriers deepens suspicion among regional states about Chinese intentions.

The Rationale Behind the Carriers

Beijing is certainly aware of these trade-offs and has prioritized development of the rest of the PLAN fleet over its aircraft carriers accordingly. Why, then, is China still building carriers? For one, China’s strategic imperatives aren’t confined to the South and East China seas. Its critical sea lines of communication extend much farther. For example, the vast majority of Chinese exports to Europe pass through the Indian Ocean, as do its critical energy imports from the Middle East. As a result, to bypass chokepoints in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, China is developing alternative import and export outlets in Indian Ocean littoral states. And this means developing maritime capabilities, base facilities and logistics networks needed to keep these outlets open should a conflict erupt to its east. Chinese naval doctrine now calls for a permanent carrier presence in the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, China sees a need to devote greater attention to growing Chinese interests farther afield. Indeed, Chinese strategic planners increasingly appear to be warming to the idea that the growing range of precision-guided missiles requires a capability to strike pre-emptively against an adversary in open waters east of the first island chain – a task in which carriers would have a more obvious role to play. China’s 2015 military strategy white paper, for example, calls for a shift in focus from littoral defenses to a “combination of near seas defense and distant sea protection,” citing the need to neutralize a distant enemy before it can launch land-attack aircraft and missiles against the Chinese mainland. In 2016, according to an internal Chinese navy paper obtained by The National Interest magazine, officers at China’s Naval Research Institute took this a step further, calling for the extension of area-denial capabilities to waters inside the so-called second island chain (Honshu, the Mariana Islands, Palau and eastern Indonesia), while developing “far seas counterattack” capabilities to conduct punitive strikes in response to an enemy attack in China’s littoral waters. In other words, China is beginning to embrace the notion that the best defense is a good offense.

Still, establishing sea control in either area – the Pacific east of the first island chain or the Indian Ocean Basin – would be a tall order, even with a major leap in carrier design, technology and experience. As noted earlier, Chinese carrier battle groups in either theater would be operating far from home, at the edge of their protective umbrellas from onshore missiles and well within range of sea denial assets of other regional powers. Their supply lines could easily be severed if the Chinese have not first established firm control over the myriad maritime chokepoints in the Indo-Pacific, and their Belt and Road bases could themselves be neutralized by enemy air power. Thus, the ability of the carrier groups to secure China’s far-flung interests in the event of conflict is still highly aspirational, at best.

Keeping Its Options Open

It’s also possible that China is under no illusions that it will ever achieve bluewater naval parity with the U.S. – and that it still sees carriers as worth the time and money even if it doesn’t plan on challenging U.S. supremacy on the high seas anytime soon. Indeed, according to the state-owned Global Times: “China doesn’t have to throw around its naval weight like the US does, we don’t need to wage a war in far-flung littoral waters on the other side of the world and thus we don’t need so many carriers as far as our ability goes, and we have no intention to police the world.”

After all, the U.S. is still heavily invested in carriers despite signs that their utility is declining. The U.S. hasn’t fought a major naval battle on the high seas since World War II. (In fact, no one has.) And the United States’ naval supremacy will not be challenged for at least another generation. Yet, the U.S. is planning to spend more than $43 billion on its next three carriers alone and launch a new one every five years.

The U.S. is doing so, in part, because worst-case scenarios are at the core of any power’s strategic planning, and in part because maintaining an overwhelming edge is a good way to dissuade any other powers from attempting to challenge it. Carriers are also valuable in reassuring allies, responding to humanitarian disasters, keeping sea lanes open and providing air cover for land-based wars against overmatched foes.

China will have more interest in these types of operations as its interests ripple outward – particularly in areas where it thinks the U.S. may have no appetite to try to stop it – and as it tries to prove to its skeptical neighbors that it can deliver the regional security benefits currently provided by the United States. At minimum, China’s carriers are a symbol of national prestige. It’s hard to say what tangible benefits this really provides, but Beijing has a political imperative to keep its people bought into the narrative that the Communist Party is making the country a great power.

Finally, Beijing may think that budgetary and political pressures could push the U.S. further into isolation and allow China to emerge as the dominant power in the Western Pacific without firing a shot. Of course, other regional powers – particularly Japan, India, South Korea and Australia – will also get a say in how easily China would fill the maritime vacuum left by the U.S. in such a scenario, while even weaker countries like Vietnam and Indonesia are also developing substantial sea denial capabilities. But waning U.S. interest in the region would certainly give China greater freedom to operate.

From this perspective, China doesn’t need to decide exactly what its carriers will be used for now. But if Beijing suspects carriers may end up helping it solidify its regional dominance – and, at minimum, deliver enough diplomatic, political and asymmetric benefits to justify the costs – then it has good reason to start laying the groundwork for a more robust naval footprint now. Building a viable fleet of carrier groups and mastering the training, technology, infrastructure and supply lines needed to make them meaningful takes decades, after all, and the U.S. and its allies will be improving their own systems in the meantime.

In other words, China’s interest in carriers is perhaps best described as an attempt to keep its options open. China cannot fully determine what kind of naval power it’s going to be; too many factors are outside of its control. But it wants to be ready to push outward if and when a door opens.

The post Making Waves: China Pushes Ahead With Its Aircraft Carrier Program appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19756
    • View Profile
Emperor Xi
« Reply #637 on: May 26, 2018, 11:14:24 AM »
Just the fact that we dupes in the West continue to debate whether China is partner, a competitor or out right enemy ( I favor the latter by a wide margin)

speaks to the success of a carefully crafted planned long game of *Red* Chinese:

https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/obama-administration-politicized-intelligence-law-enforcement-apparatus/

Can we meet the challenge?   :-o I need to reread this again:

https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/how-to-meet-the-strategic-challenge-posed-by-china/

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
China: Growing Old Before It Grows Rich


The Communist Party has become a victim of its own policy success.


The Chinese Communist Party may finally be getting out of the family planning business. Three years ago, the party scrapped its infamous one-child policy. Last week, Bloomberg reported that China’s State Council is mulling ending birth limits altogether. The damage to China’s demographic outlook done by tight population controls has been immense – and it may take several generations for the country to recover.

The Damage Done

When Deng Xiaoping’s government implemented the one-child policy in 1979, population control was all the rage across the globe. Amid booming population growth in the years following World War II, some demographers were warning that the human race was about to breed itself into extinction. Most famously, Stanford professor Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 best-seller “The Population Bomb” warned that hundreds of millions of people, mostly in the developing world, would starve in the 1970s alone. This, of course, turned out to be wildly off the mark. Among other failures, it did not anticipate extraordinary advancements in agricultural technology and mechanization. The famines that did occur were primarily caused by age-old scourges like war, political instability and gross policy mismanagement.

But for China, the threat was all too easy to visualize. A decade earlier, between 23 million and 55 million people starved to death during the famine that resulted from Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, and collectivization had left the country’s agricultural sector in tatters. Meanwhile, China’s population was exploding, nearly doubling in the years since the Communist Party had won the Chinese civil war. To stave off another disaster, the party turned to its most tried and true policy response: tightened control over even the most intimate affairs of its people.

Today, China has become a victim of its own success. In 1980, Chinese population growth, measured as the crude birthrate minus the crude death rate, had reached 15 per 1,000 people. By 2015, when the one-child rule was lifted countrywide, this had dropped below 5.5 per 1,000 people. Fertility rates today are estimated to be around 1.7 children per adult female, well short of the 2.1 replacement rate. In fact, fertility rates have been below replacement levels since the early 1990s, bottoming out at just 1.18 in 2010.

This means that the average Chinese citizen is getting older, fast, and this trend is expected to pick up speed beginning around 2030. According to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, China’s working-age population (those aged 16 to 59) will fall more than 23 percent to around 830 million by 2030 and 700 million by 2050. By then, a full third of the Chinese population will have reached retirement age, compared to around 15 percent today.

Making matters worse, fertility rates haven’t increased substantially since Beijing decided to allow families to have a second child three years ago. In 2016, according to official figures, 18.46 million Chinese babies were born, nearly 2 million more than the previous year and the highest number since 2000. Nearly half were born to families that already had a child. But things came back to earth in 2017, with births plummeting some 3.5 percent to 17.23 million, nearly 3 million short of official forecasts.
The problem for China is that government policy hasn’t been the only thing keeping birthrates low. The one-child policy has, in many ways, become self-sustaining. In Chinese culture, people are generally expected to take care of their parents when they reach their golden years. This means average Chinese households will be expected to take care of four parents – and have no siblings to share this burden with – leaving less time and money to raise kids of their own. This, combined with factors like career pressures, changing social pressures, the lower birthrates that generally coincide with urbanization and so forth, means Chinese couples have become less inclined to have more kids even if allowed to. According to the Population Research Institute of Peking University, “fertility desire” – the number of children the average Chinese adult female wants (or believes she will be able to afford) – is between 1.6 and 1.8.

Drags on China’s Growth

A shrinking, aging population poses problems for any country; China’s size and position on the development curve simply make them more acute.

For one, it means a lot more retired people to take care of – and fewer working-age people to shoulder the burden of rising pension payouts, health care costs and so forth. In China, the dependency ratio (the number of people too young or old to work divided by the working population) is expected to surge to nearly 70 percent by 2050, compared to just more than 36 percent in 2016. In other words, there is expected to be 1.3 workers for every retired person by the middle of this century, down from nearly three today. Even if the end of the two-child policy compels Chinese couples to start having substantially more children, an immediate bump would actually make the dependency ratio worse for another 15-20 years (in other words, until those newborns enter the workforce).


 

(click to enlarge)


Magnifying this problem are macroeconomic challenges. For example, a shrinking population means declining consumer demand and output. Tighter labor markets drive up wages, making export-oriented industries less competitive – a major concern for a manufacturing-dependent country like China, whose economic rise is fueled by abundant low-cost workers.

To a degree, health care advances that enable people to live and work longer, combined with technological advances that enable the Chinese economy to sustain productivity with fewer workers, will help soften the blow. This, in part, explains Beijing’s hearty support for emerging technologies – such as self-driving cars, robotization and artificial intelligence – that will inevitably displace workers in the short term. Nonetheless, the demographic outlook is expected to be yet another drag on China’s continued economic rise.

Projections at this time-scale are bound to be inexact, but the International Monetary Fund forecasts that demographic pressures will reduce Chinese gross domestic product growth by 0.5 percent to 0.75 percent over the next three decades. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, demographics is a major contributor to what it expects will be a sharp decline in economic growth beginning in the not-too-distant future. Between 2030 and 2060 (the same period when the Chinese government expects to see the sharpest drop in the working-age population), the OECD forecasts just 2.3 percent annual growth, down from an estimated 6.8 percent last year.

Why It’s Worse For China

China isn’t alone in this challenge. South Korea, Japan and a number of Western countries have comparably low fertility rates and shrinking, aging populations. (Every day in Japan, the world’s oldest country, nearly a thousand more people die than are born.) But China is different in four main ways.

First, this trend is happening faster in China than elsewhere. The slice of the Chinese population made up of retirees will jump from less than 10 percent to a full quarter in just 25 years. In Western countries, this shift has taken place far more gradually, generally over a century or more. China will have far less time to adjust.

Second, it’s happening earlier on China’s development curve than any other major economy. In other words, China is growing old before it grows rich. When Japan reached the percentage of retirees China has now, per capita incomes were double those of China today. When South Korea crossed this threshold, incomes were nearly three times as high. This meant more money to sink into eldercare in aggregate, plus fewer one-child households left holding the bag. And even these countries are still struggling to cope with the rising social costs and economic stagnation tied to demographic decline.

Third, at least compared to Western countries, China has never been particularly receptive to immigration. The United States’ ability to attract and absorb immigrants is an enduring source of national strength, occasional political spasms over the issue notwithstanding. China has no tradition of attracting foreign immigrants; just 1,576 foreigners were granted permanent residency in China in 2016. And it’s unclear how the country’s rigid systems of social control would adapt to a major influx of outsiders.

Finally, China’s political-economic balance is far more precarious than that of more developed economies. The benefits of its economic rise have not been shared equally between the coasts and the interior. For a variety of other structural reasons, economic growth is already expected to gradually slow over the coming decades; demographics will make the challenge only more difficult to manage. Making matters worse, the one-child policy led to an explosion of gender-selective abortions, creating a sizable imbalance between the sexes. By 2014, there were 41 million more men than women in China – and this gap is widening. In other words, there will be tens of millions of males with poor chances of marrying and looking for an outlet to vent their frustrations. In fact, after it lifted the one-child policy in 2015, the government saw a wave of protests by couples demanding compensation for being denied the right to build a bigger family.

In a democratic country, mass social and economic dissatisfaction may lead to the fall of a particular government, but in democracies, governments come and go all the time. To the Communist Party, the threat of social unrest is existential. The public tolerates the party’s tight social controls so long as it continues to deliver on its pledge to make the whole country a modern, vibrant state. In this climate, even a modest economic slowdown could reverberate in ways that threaten to make the whole project come undone.



Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Philippines gets feisty with China?!?
« Reply #639 on: June 02, 2018, 09:41:25 AM »
GPF:

Philippines, China: Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte said the Philippines would go to war with China if it crossed certain “red lines.” This is quite an about-face for Duterte, who has previously spoken about the futility of war between the Philippines and China. Over the weekend, satellite images appeared to show the Philippines rebuilding an air base on a contested island in the South China Sea. What are the red lines, and what changed that gave Duterte enough confidence to make his statement?

•   Finding: Foreign ministers from China and the Philippines recently had a bilateral meeting in which both sides explicitly laid out their red lines. The Philippines said China could not interfere with Manila’s work in the Spratlys around Second Thomas Shoal, which the Philippines has held ever since deliberately running aground a rusting naval vessel there in 1999. Manila also said no party could unilaterally extract natural resources in the South China Sea. China said its red line called for no new occupation of island areas under a 2002 agreement. Recently, there has been an increase in Chinese and U.S. military activity in the South China Sea, which may have played a role in this exchange.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
WSJ: Mattis and Congress fire warning shot across Chinese bow
« Reply #640 on: June 04, 2018, 03:34:14 AM »


By Nancy A. Youssef
Updated June 2, 2018 11:46 p.m. ET
289 COMMENTS

SINGAPORE—The U.S. and China appear to be headed for a more confrontational relationship in Southeast Asia as Washington warns of a more aggressive response to the militarization of disputed islands in the South China Sea.

Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a regional security conference, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis warned there could be “much larger consequences” in the future from China’s moves to install weapons systems on islands in the sea. He didn’t specify what the consequences would be.

The warning, in response to a question from an audience member, came after a speech by Mr. Mattis in which he said “despite China’s claims to the contrary, the placement of these weapons systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion.”

He also called his decision to not invite China to the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise, slated to begin later in June, “an initial response” to its increased militarization of the South China Sea.

His comments were the most assertive yet in response to what he has described as a ramp-up of Chinese military activity in the past month. This appeared to lay the groundwork for an increased U.S. military—or even economic—response.

China recently sent an H-6K heavy bomber to Woody Island, one of the areas under dispute. It also installed surface-to-air and antiship cruise missiles and communication-jamming equipment on some islands, U.S. officials have said. The U.S. responded last month by sending two Navy warships into the South China Sea to conduct a freedom of navigation operation.

Beijing’s activities are “in stark contrast to the openness of what our strategy promotes; it calls into question China’s broader goals,” Mr. Mattis told a packed house of international military officials, senior global lawmakers, experts and others on Saturday.

China says it has “indisputable” sovereignty over a number of South China Sea islands and the surrounding waters. It says its new facilities are for defensive and civilian purposes.

Lt. Gen. He Lei, of the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Sciences, delivered a frank defense of China’s armaments in the South China Sea. Beijing has deployed soldiers and weapons there for defensive purposes, he said, calling criticism of those developments irresponsible.

“If we deploy soldiers and weapons in the South China Sea, it is just a matter of China’s sovereignty,” he said at a panel discussion Saturday after Mr. Mattis spoke.

China was the hottest topic of conversation during talks at the three-day conference, even though President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are scheduled to meet here June 12. Mr. Mattis a passing reference to the eagerly awaited summit, saying diplomats were leading the way. On Friday, Mr. Trump said the summit was back on, just a week after canceling it in a letter to Mr. Kim.

“Our objective remains the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Mr. Mattis said, making no mention of maintaining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which included tough sanctions. Hours earlier, after a White House meeting with a top North Korean official, Gen. Kim Yong Chol, Mr. Trump said he would no longer use the term.

Speaking later before a trilateral meeting with his counterparts from Japan and South Korea on Sunday, Mr. Mattis said the U.S. wouldn’t give North Korea sanctions relief until it had confirmed it no longer had a nuclear weapons program. “North Korea will receive relief only when it demonstrates verifiable and irreversible steps to denuclearization,” he said.

The defense chief also portended an unpredictable period in the days leading up to the talks.

“We can anticipate at best a bumpy road to the negotiations,” Mr. Matis told his counterparts. “As defense ministers, we must maintain a strong collaborative defensive stance so we enable our diplomats to negotiate from a position of strength at this critical time.”

In his main speech earlier in the conference Saturday, Mr. Mattis sought to reassure allies that the U.S. remained a reliable partner even after the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement and, earlier in the week, imposed aluminum and steel tariffs on the European Union, Canada and Mexico.

“America is true in both word and deed,” Mr. Mattis said. “America remains committed to maintaining the region’s security, stability and economic prosperity, a view that transcends America’s political transitions and will continue to enjoy Washington’s strong bipartisan support.”

At the conference, Asia-Pacific officials are discussing the need to work collectively to ensure that the region is secure. At the same time, the U.S. military has sought to intensify its defense cooperation with India. That includes encouraging New Delhi to buy more American military equipment and forging a closer four-way naval partnership that also includes Japan and Australia.

The U.S. military recently changed the name of its command covering Asia and the Pacific Ocean to the Indo-Pacific Command from the Pacific Command.

Military analysts say the American appeal to India reveals concerns about Beijing’s assertive stance in the region. And it has drawn criticism from China.

But during the conference’s keynote speech, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stressed the concept of a “regional comprehensive partnership.” He spoke about the need to work with multiple nations, including the U.S. and China.

“India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members,” Mr. Modi said.

Write to Nancy A. Youssef at Nancy.Youssef@wsj.com



=====================================
The Other China Challenge
Mattis and Congress push back against Beijing’s South China Sea escalation.
By The Editorial Board
June 3, 2018 3:32 p.m. ET
29 COMMENTS

While President Trump focuses on trade and North Korea, China is aggressively building military outposts beyond its borders in the South China Sea. Beijing wants to push Washington out of the Indo-Pacific, and the Trump Administration and Congress may finally be developing a serious strategy to respond.

Trillions of dollars of trade annually float through the Indo-Pacific, which stretches from East Africa through East Asia. In recent years China has built military bases on artificial islands hundreds of miles from its shores, ignoring international law and a 2016 ruling by a United Nations tribunal.

The buildup has accelerated in recent weeks, as China has deployed antiship missiles, surface-to-air missiles and electronic jammers on the Spratly islands and even nuclear-capable bombers on nearby Woody Island. This violates an explicit promise that Chinese President Xi Jinping made to Barack Obama in 2015 that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” on the Spratlys.

The next step could be deployed forces. At that point “China will be able to extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania,” Admiral Philip Davidson, who leads the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said in April.

In the face of China’s buildup, the U.S. has shown uneven commitment. Mr. Obama limited freedom-of-navigation patrols to avoid a confrontation and never committed the resources to make his “pivot to Asia” a reality. China saw Mr. Obama’s hesitation and kept advancing. The growing concern is that China will begin to dictate the terms of navigation to the world and coerce weaker neighboring countries to agree to its foreign policy and trading goals.
Potomac Watch Podcast
The Job Market Booms; Trump's Pardon Spree

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis lately has been putting this concern front and center. He recently rescinded an invitation to the Chinese navy to participate in the multinational Rimpac exercises off Hawaii this summer. And at the annual Shangri-La security dialogue in Singapore this weekend, Mr. Mattis said that “the placement of these weapons systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion.”

He pointed to the Rimpac cancellation as a “small consequence” of this behavior and said there could be “larger consequences,” albeit unspecified, in the future.

One such consequence could be more frequent and regular freedom-of-navigation operations inside the 12-mile territorial waters claimed by China. Joint operations with allies would have an even greater deterrent effect, and the U.S. should encourage others to join. Beijing will try to punish any country that sails with the U.S., but that will underscore the coercive nature of its plans.

Believe it or not, Congress is also trying to help with the bipartisan Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA). The Senate bill affirms core American alliances with Australia, Japan and South Korea, while calling for deeper military and economic ties with India and Taiwan. It notably encourages regular weapons sales to Taipei.

The bill authorizes $1.5 billion a year over five years to fund regular military exercises and improve defenses throughout the region. It also funds the fight against Southeast Asian terror groups, including Islamic State. This will help, but more will be needed. This year’s $61 billion military spending increase was more backfill than buildup, and China recently boosted its defense budget 8.1%.

ARIA also tries to address Mr. Trump’s major strategic blunder of withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, which didn’t include China. The Senate bill grants the President power to negotiate new bilateral and multilateral trade deals.

It also calls for the export of liquefied natural gas to the Indo-Pacific and authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate a deal with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). If the U.S. had a trade rep who believed in trade, this could strengthen the U.S. relationship with Vietnam and the Philippines—countries at odds with China over its territorial claims and militarism.

The bill is backed by Republicans Cory Gardner and Marco Rubio and Democrats Ben Cardin and Ed Markey, which is a wide ideological net. China’s rise, and Mr. Xi’s determination to make China the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, is a generational challenge that will require an enduring, bipartisan strategy and commitment. A firmer stand to deter Chinese military expansionism is an essential start.

DougMacG

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19442
    • View Profile
Re: US-Japan, Abe interested in Korea deal!
« Reply #641 on: June 06, 2018, 12:49:46 PM »
Abe would like to include missiles that can reach Japan dismantled with the de-nuclearize deal. I agree.  Also he wants release of prisoners.  Fair enough.

One more person thinks a deal is possible, (along with Xi meeting with Un at least twice).   All we should ask in return is that he pay Japan's fair share of defense since Sept 1945 and we will remove the threat of Un.

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/japans-abe-meet-trump-ahead-us-north-korea-55683437

DougMacG

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 19442
    • View Profile
« Last Edit: June 07, 2018, 04:21:13 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #643 on: June 07, 2018, 05:26:16 AM »
A lot of interesting tidbits in that.


Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
Stratfor: China-Taiwan
« Reply #645 on: June 12, 2018, 09:13:57 PM »
China Grows Anxious About Taiwan Reunification
In this photograph, Taiwanese sailors stand on a U.S.-made Guppy-class submarine in southern Taiwan on Jan. 18, 2017.
(SAM YEH/AFP/Getty Images)


    Tensions between China and Taiwan have reached a decade high, but Beijing is unlikely to take military action unless Taipei declares independence.
    The changing strategic picture in the region and increased tension between Washington and Beijing will only boost Taiwan's importance in the coming decade.
    A younger, more independence-minded Taiwanese generation could clash with China's goal of achieving national reunification.
    China has played a long game of carrot-and-stick with Taiwan, alternating between military threats and economic sweeteners, but the clock may be ticking down to a confrontation.

One of the biggest obstacles to China's campaign for "national rejuvenation," President Xi Jinping's plan to guide the country to world prominence, lies across 180 kilometers (112 miles) of water on the island of Taiwan. The mainland's drive to return China to a position of global strength — which it hopes to complete by 2049 — includes reunification with Taiwan. The remnants of the Nationalist Party that fled to the island during the civil war waged in China in the 1940s remain there, creating a situation that the conflict's Communist victors cannot accept. While successive governments in Beijing have tried without success to reclaim or to reintegrate the island, they did prevent it from pulling away. Their efforts to draw Taiwan closer have yielded mixed results, but over the past few decades, Taiwanese nationalism has continued to rise. Today, with the island's younger generations displaying an increasing desire for independence, the United States is showing signs of greater support for Taiwan. These factors have helped to push tensions across the Taiwan Strait to their highest point in a decade.

The Big Picture

As the United States weighs its options on turning up the pressure on China, it will continue to pave the way for closer ties with Taiwan, putting cross-strait tensions in the spotlight while ratcheting them up.

The Push and Pull Over Taiwan

Over the decades, Beijing has alternated between military intimidation and economic sweeteners to try to keep the government in Taipei in line. Recently, the mainland's elevated military posture along with increasing diplomatic coercion and heated rhetoric about reunification have strained relations with Taiwan. A growing willingness by both Taipei and Washington to break cross-strait protocols has aggravated tensions. As it applies increasing strategic pressure on China, the United States has moved to increase official communication and defense cooperation with Taiwan while boosting arms sales to the island. The current U.S. administration is not the first to challenge the "One China" principle — mainland China's view that it has sovereignty over Taiwan — but the changing balance of power between the mainland and island is heading into a pivotal period.

The growth in military and political might that has accompanied China's economic rise has transformed the geopolitical landscape in the Asia-Pacific while increasing Beijing's willingness to assert its will on its periphery. For China, Taiwan is a last holdout to its long-awaited national reunification and a critical missing piece in its strategic attempts to break through the first chain of islands off East Asia's coast. By securing Taiwan, China would gain a direct route into the wider Pacific unencumbered by geographic chokepoints, and it has shown a growing willingness to use its burgeoning power to achieve that objective.

The United States, in response, is increasingly pushing back against Beijing's assertiveness. It is challenging China's economic rise with threats of punitive economic measures, but countering Beijing's growing naval power may be more difficult. Taking on China's maritime expansion will require greater U.S. naval engagement in the Indo-Pacific as well as closer collaboration with regional allies. Taiwan is a key cog in such a strategy, given its location along the first island chain as well as its potential role as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" within striking range of the mainland.

This map shows Chinese maritime chokepoints and U.S. encroachment

Rejuvenation and Reunification

During its history, China has ruled Taiwan indirectly for long spans. But the island has also been home to European and Japanese colonies. Today, Beijing remains resolute in achieving reunification. While it has historically been willing to bide its time in regards to Taiwan, its urgency to end the separation is growing. Three trends are fueling this drive. First, China has a self-imposed deadline to "achieve national rejuvenation" by 2049 — the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China — and the country's leaders may want to make tangible progress toward reunification with Taiwan sooner than later. With term limits on the Chinese presidency removed, Xi could attempt to address reunification during his tenure.

Second, previous attempts at unity have not borne fruit. After several failed tries over the past few decades, including conducting intimidating offshore missile exercises in 1995 and 1996, Beijing primarily has sought to use economic interdependence as a tool. China's leaders had hoped that closer economic ties would convince the Taiwanese that their interests are interwoven with the mainland's, decreasing the popular appeal of independence. But Taiwan's generational change and a rapidly shifting strategic environment have upended that effort. Between the push for independence and the willingness of rivals to elevate the island's stature, China's ultimate concern is that Taiwan will only drift farther out away.

Finally, Beijing is increasingly concerned that the understanding of the "One China" policy — under which the United States recognizes Beijing as representing China — could be at risk. The United States could move closer to recognizing Taiwanese independence or could adopt a more assertive and visible military presence on the island. A direct U.S. military presence would not only greatly complicate China's options on unity but also ensure that China would find itself at war with the United States if it tried to use its military to force reunification.

Between Two Giants: Taiwan's Future

Taiwan's path ahead is uncertain and risky. It sits between two giants locked in a great power competition, and its limited international clout and increasingly outmatched military puts it at a disadvantage. Washington's attempts to elevate its ties with Taiwan and improve its military capabilities are certainly welcome in Taipei, especially because they allow the island to access military technology and equipment that previously had been denied. Still, U.S. guarantees for Taiwan remain ambiguous and untested.

Taiwan remains rightfully suspicious of the depth of U.S. commitment and aware that the United States could reverse course and bargain away their relationship as part of a grand settlement with China. Furthermore, Taipei is caught between the growing sentiment both within the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and among the younger generations for independence and the deepening resolve in Beijing to prevent it. Taiwan's freedom to maneuver is limited and at perpetual risk of spilling over into conflict. These conditions are forcing Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to tread carefully, lest her country become embroiled in the broader U.S.-China confrontation.

And despite China's increased urgency to act on reunification, the current level of its military capabilities still limits its options. Right now, any Chinese military operation against Taiwan, from a blockade to a direct amphibious assault, would be exceedingly difficult and risky, especially if the United States intervenes. Given the expectations that China's military capabilities, particularly in comparison to Taiwan's, will continue to increase, it would make more sense for China to wait for its armed forces to grow more powerful before even considering a military operation against Taiwan.

The tension between the wisdom of waiting and the urgency of acting is expected to weigh heavily on China in the years ahead. Still, absent a sudden and pivotal event such as a Taiwanese declaration of independence, it is unlikely that Beijing would resort to any military option before at least 2030, by which point Chinese military strength is forecast to have grown significantly. The only certainty is that reunification will remain a core objective for Beijing.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: Japan and South China Sea
« Reply #646 on: June 13, 2018, 11:27:58 AM »
Japan: Japan has expressed concern over the U.S. decision to suspend military exercises with South Korea. Japan has been worried that it may be left out of a possible U.S.-North Korea deal as the U.S. prioritizes its own interests and relations with South Korea and China. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with his Malaysian and Laotian counterparts, and during both meetings, the leaders discussed increasing bilateral cooperation on the North Korea issue. Is this a sign of Japan trying to step up as a regional alternative to China when it comes to dealing with North Korea? Is Japan acting in partnership with the U.S., or offering an alternative should the U.S. presence in the region wane? Check if Abe has met with any other Southeast Asian heads of state in recent days to talk about North Korea.


Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF
« Reply #648 on: June 25, 2018, 08:56:32 AM »
China is contending with several challenges to its foreign policy agenda. The first and most important is China’s relationship with the United States. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis is traveling to China to have a “conversation” – a polite way of saying the U.S. is sending a major official to relay an important message to Beijing. As Mattis was in transit, two Chinese government sources said that Beijing would not target U.S. companies operating in China in retaliation against U.S. tariffs – a surprising development, considering that is one of China’s strongest countermeasures against U.S. protectionism. China may be trying to ease tensions while saving face.

China has its hands full in other areas too. Chinese relations with the Philippines are at a two-year low over the Scarborough Shoal issue. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s move to align Manila with China is now causing trouble for his government at home, creating a push to shore up the Philippine navy. Protests erupted over the weekend in Vietnam against the establishment of special economic zones in which Chinese companies could get long-term leases with favorable conditions. Meanwhile, the Australian government is now seeking a formal security treaty with Vanuatu. This strategically located South Pacific island nation made waves earlier in the year when reports emerged that China was seeking to build a military base there. Those reports were never substantiated, but Australia’s recent rhetorical clashes with China, followed by this diplomatic outreach, suggest something was afoot and that Canberra is moving quickly in response.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 72256
    • View Profile
GPF: US weighs its options in the South China Sea
« Reply #649 on: June 29, 2018, 01:31:23 PM »


The US Weighs Its Options in the South China Sea
Jun 28, 2018

Summary

Over the past year, there’s been a growing chorus of warnings from the United States that it’s preparing to adopt a more confrontational stance in the South China Sea. With China’s installation of radar jamming equipment and long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles this spring on Fiery Cross Reef – one of China’s seven artificial islands in the disputed Spratly archipelago – the pretense that Chinese President Xi Jinping intended to uphold his vague pledge in 2015 to refrain from militarizing the islands has evaporated. Now, the quiet standoff appears primed to enter a new phase.

Last month, for example, a top U.S. general talked openly about the U.S. ability to destroy Chinese military installations in the South China Sea, and Defense Secretary James Mattis said the U.S. is planning a “steady drumbeat” of naval exercises near Chinese holdings in the disputed waters. In May, the U.S., Japan and Australia agreed to formulate an “action plan” on cooperation in the South China Sea. Even France and the United Kingdom are talking openly about becoming more active in the region. But it’s far from clear what the U.S. and its allies really have in mind. The U.S. has few options that would alter the facts on the ground, and those that would push the Chinese back carry substantial risks. Ultimately, the South China Sea just may not be important enough to the U.S. to take such risks.   

This Deep Dive examines U.S. strategic interests in the South China Sea (or lack thereof) and gauges what may compel the U.S. to push back against Chinese assertiveness there. It then looks at the oft-misunderstood freedom of navigation operations, known as FONOPs – to date, Washington’s favorite tool for dealing with the territorial dispute – and explains why such ops will do little to deter Beijing. Finally, it assesses the United States’ options in the South China Sea should it want to go further in limiting China’s expansion in the hotly contested waters.

U.S. Interests in the South China Sea

The United States is relatively uninterested in who controls a few man-made molehills in the Spratly Islands. But the U.S. would be vitally concerned should any country attempt to use its position to restrict freedom of navigation either for U.S. naval ships or global trade. Some 30 percent of global maritime trade and about half of all global oil tanker shipments pass through the waters each year. Someday, the thinking goes, China could use the reefs that it has turned into remote military outposts, combined with its increasing sea denial, naval, coast guard and maritime militia capabilities, to restrict movement there – or at least threaten to do so – and coerce other countries that rely on the waters. Already, it has begun using them to deny other littoral states the ability to fish, drill for oil and so forth in the disputed waters.

But, at least at present, the U.S. doesn’t need to roll back China’s island-building to keep Beijing from restricting maritime traffic. So long as the U.S. can cut off Chinese commerce flowing through chokepoints along what’s known as the first island chain and through the Malacca and Sunda straits, China likely couldn’t disrupt maritime traffic in the South China Sea, even if it had a good reason to. The Chinese economy would be crippled, and the world would be united against it. Attempting to shut down sea lanes would be an act of desperation. It’s not the kind of thing China could threaten in order to gain leverage against the U.S. in scenarios short of war.

Moreover, for the foreseeable future, the military assets stationed on the artificial islands would likely prove only of marginal value in an all-out conflict between China and the United States. Located more than 700 miles (1,100 kilometers) south of Chinese bases on Hainan, the Spratly bases do effectively expand the range of China’s missiles and bombers. The supersonic YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles and HQ-9B anti-air missiles placed on Fiery Cross Reef in May give China missile coverage over a vast area of the South China Sea, including a base in Palawan expected to host U.S. forces. Three of the artificial islands have runways capable of handling bombers and fighter jets. If China struck first in a conflict, these capabilities would certainly come in handy. But the island bases likely wouldn’t last long. Their locations are fixed and cannot be camouflaged, making them easy pickings for U.S. missiles.
 
(click to enlarge)

Still, the U.S. has reasons to want to put an end to China’s militarization of the islands. And since dislodging the Chinese will get only harder as China’s maritime and anti-ship missile capabilities and ranges improve, the U.S. has an interest in acting sooner rather than later. Perhaps the most important reason is to maintain its credibility with its allies and potential partners in the region – those that are already suffering materially from China’s expanding presence. If the U.S. appears to be washing its hands of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it will heighten the sense among claimant states like the Philippines and Vietnam that the distant U.S. wouldn’t intervene on their behalf.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has a point when he says U.S. disinterest in a war over China-occupied reefs off the Philippine coast has given Manila – a U.S. treaty ally – little choice but to comply when Beijing dictates terms on fishing and resource extraction. To date, the U.S. has declined to confirm that its mutual defense treaty with Manila, which the U.S. has kept vague to avoid getting drawn into a war not of its choosing, even covers the South China Sea. (Further alienating Manila, the U.S. has confirmed that its treaty with Japan covers the disputed Senkaku Islands.) Vietnam’s recent cancellations of two much-needed drilling projects, reportedly under threat from Beijing, spoke louder than words. All this plays into China’s narrative that Southeast Asian states would be wise to accept its ascension as regional hegemon as a fait accompli.

This becomes a problem for U.S. strategy if it leads regional states – the Philippines, in particular – to abandon cooperation with the U.S. at Beijing’s behest and allow China to take up positions that give it access through critical chokepoints. In such a scenario, the U.S. would lose its trump card and its status as traditional guarantor of regional maritime trade. Already, the Duterte administration has been delaying implementation of a landmark pact giving the U.S. rotational access to Philippine bases, including one on Palawan, near the Spratlys.

Thus, the U.S. has been gradually bolstering its presence in the South China Sea to reassure other littoral states and signal to Beijing that the U.S. is not abandoning the region. But the question remains just how much Washington thinks China’s expansion in the disputed waters matters to U.S. interests – and just how far the U.S. is willing to go to protect those interests.

A Primer on Freedom of Navigation Ops

At minimum, the U.S. appears primed to accelerate the pace of freedom of navigation operations. The goals and mechanics of these operations, and how they fit into U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific and beyond, are often mischaracterized. Since we’re likely to be hearing a lot about them in the coming years, it’s worth understanding how they work and what they can and cannot achieve.

The basic goal of FONOPs is to reinforce norms (such as free navigation and maritime law), particularly those outlined under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in 1994. (The U.S. is not an UNCLOS signatory, providing much rhetorical and propaganda fodder to China, which is. Nonetheless, the U.S. treats UNCLOS as customary international law and is effectively its staunchest enforcer.) Since the late 1970s, the U.S. has quietly conducted scores of FONOPs around the world each year, only publicizing them, with minimal detail, in an annual report. China is not the only target; in 2017, the U.S. targeted excessive maritime claims of 22 countries, including allies and partners like the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, India and Indonesia.

China’s Claims

In the South China Sea, U.S. FONOPs have taken on a much higher profile, in part because China’s territorial claims are so vast and its violations of UNCLOS have been so flagrant. China has reclaimed more than 3,000 acres of land atop seven reefs that previously were at least partially submerged.

Under UNCLOS, if China’s holdings met the definition of an island – a feature always above water and capable of sustaining human life or economic activity – then they would grant China three things: a territorial sea within the surrounding 12 nautical miles, a contiguous zone between 12 and 24 nautical miles, and an exclusive economic zone extending out 200 nautical miles. A state can exercise sovereign control over a territorial sea, making and enforcing its own laws in the waters (as well as the airspace above) free from outside interference. In an exclusive economic zone, the state has exclusive resource rights. However, if the China-occupied feature were considered merely rock – always above water but incapable of sustaining human life or economic activity – then it would give Beijing a territorial sea and a contiguous zone but no exclusive economic zone. And if determined to be at a low-tide elevation – i.e., a maritime feature that is submerged at high tide – it would generate none of the three. (Transforming a rock or low-tide elevation into an artificial island does not alter its legal character.)
 
(click to enlarge)

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled that all seven of China’s artificial islands in disputed parts of the South China Sea are either rocks or low-tide elevations, not islands, meaning none grant China exclusive resource extraction rights. It also ruled that China’s historical rights to waters within its sweeping “nine-dash line” do not supersede UNCLOS. Importantly, the court did not rule on rightful ownership of any of the reclaimed islands – just that whoever controls them is not entitled to the benefits that would be granted by an island, and thus many of China’s claims and activities are not in accordance with international law. Officially, the U.S. has also stopped short of taking a position on which feature belongs to which country.

What FONOPs Actually Achieve – And What They Don’t

FONOPs are one way for the U.S. to uphold the 2016 international tribunal ruling. The operations can take many forms, depending on what legal point the U.S. is trying to make or the type of excessive maritime claim the U.S. is intending to challenge. Most are focused on reinforcing what’s known as “innocent passage.” Under UNCLOS, a warship from any country is allowed to transit through the territorial waters of another so long as it refrains from activities such as military exercises or surveillance operations, research and survey activities – and so long as it moves “continuously and expeditiously” through the waters. It’s also considered out of step with UNCLOS for a state to demand that ships passing through its territorial waters provide prior notice or obtain permission before doing so, though some countries disagree with this interpretation. Where a country like China is making such demands, the U.S. will often have a warship sail through territorial waters without notice or permission. Narrow point made.

Sometimes, the U.S. will use FONOPs to more pointedly discredit China’s sweeping claims. In May 2017, for example, the USS Dewey sailed near Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation built up by China in the Spratlys some 150 miles from Philippine shores. To assert that the man-made island does not grant China, say, the right to block Philippine fishermen from the area, the U.S. did two things prohibited under the principle of innocent passage: First, it sailed in a zigzag pattern, rather than passing through expeditiously. Second, while within 12 nautical miles of the reef, the crew conducted a man overboard exercise. Both activities implicitly made the point that the U.S. does not consider the waters around Mischief Reef to be Chinese territory. Beijing’s standard response to U.S. FONOPs – tailing the warships with their own and demanding that they promptly leave – is intended to make the opposite point and show the folks back home that they’re “standing up” to the imperialist Americans.
 
(click to enlarge)

If all this seems like little more than shadowboxing over legal minutiae, that’s not far from the truth. FONOPs make for good headlines, but they are not an actual deterrent and never were intended to be. Technically, they don’t even assert that the U.S. thinks that China shouldn’t be allowed to occupy the reefs. They don’t generate leverage for the U.S. or punish China for its aggressiveness. Since the U.S. quietly conducts dozens of them each year around the world, and since they work best when conducted at a regular clip, they don’t signal displeasure about an unrelated point of tension with Beijing or serve as warnings of, say, a growing willingness to confront China. They may help reassure allies about U.S. engagement in the region, but they achieve less in this regard than joint exercises would and nothing more than routine operations in international waters would. Mostly, they assert a uniform legal principle and underscore the U.S. role of protector of the high seas. If it could trust China to comply with UNCLOS, the U.S. would likely be satisfied. But recent history shows that making international law the focal point of U.S. strategy would be fruitless. The U.S. has conducted FONOPs around Chinese features at a steady clip since 2016, including at least seven since President Donald Trump took office. They have not altered Beijing’s strategy or behavior in any discernible way.

Going Beyond FONOPs

If the U.S. wants to stop China’s expansion in the South China Sea, it won’t have many clear-cut options for doing so. The problem for the U.S. is its superior firepower can’t be put to much use so long as it’s not willing to pick a fight over other countries’ islands, meaning the U.S. likely wouldn’t be playing to its strengths.

It can attach some costs to Chinese actions, however. For starters, it can ramp up security assistance to Southeast Asian littoral states and better equip them to defend themselves – supporting the U.S. goal of relieving itself of duties as the global policeman and allowing it to better manage regional affairs from afar. It’s already been doing this, to a degree, and growing Japanese security assistance to the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia has amplified U.S. efforts. (Notably, though, the current version of the legislation setting the Pentagon’s budget in 2019 would cut funding for security assistance to Southeast Asia by half.) The U.S. could make it clear that certain Chinese moves will be met with a commiserate increase in military aid to the region, creating at least some room for negotiation. The main limit of this approach is that most South China Sea states have no hope of ever achieving parity with the Chinese, making them unlikely to force the issue. Some, like Vietnam, have substantial sea denial capabilities that could be used to at least temporarily restrict Chinese freedom of action. But using them would risk drawing them into a larger conflict they’d have little hope of winning, while also leading to Chinese economic retaliation.

One step the U.S. has not yet even threatened is pressuring Beijing with targeted sanctions. Multinational Chinese construction firms doing the island-building, telecommunications firms installing equipment on the atolls, and commercial airliners ferrying civilians there would be obvious targets. It’s doubtful this would deter Beijing, which sees its South China Sea islands as an integral part of its anti-access/area denial strategy and will happily tolerate sanctions if it means avoiding the humiliation of backing down. It has ways to continue on without the help of commercial partners, anyway. But for the purposes of raising the cost of expansion and doing something tangible in support of allies like the Philippines, this, too, would go further than mere FONOPs. The U.S. certainly has not been meek about targeting Chinese firms and banks with secondary sanctions to further its goals on North Korea, Iran and trade.

Ultimately, however, to restore the status quo, the U.S. would need to bring power to bear directly. This could take one of two forms. The first is to do what China has done to the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia and blockade its access to the islands. There is a strong case that this would be legal under UNCLOS. The U.S. doesn’t have the sort of coast guard or paramilitary assets in the region that China uses to harass and block outside vessels. To avoid having to police the situation by itself with warships ill-suited for the task, the U.S. would want to lean on a multinational coalition involving coast guards and civilian vessels from littoral states, plus allies like Japan, Australia and European powers – though it’s uncertain to what degree these states would be willing to provoke China in this manner. This option would have the highest risk of accident or incident that leads to unwanted escalation, and the mechanics would be exceedingly tricky. Washington would have to decide ahead of time if it’s really willing to risk war with rules of engagement that allow U.S. forces to come to the defense of a partner vessel that comes under attack.

The second option, on the extreme end of the spectrum, would be a military operation to expel the Chinese from their man-made islands and restore the status quo – or at least threaten to if China launches a new island-building project on a contested reef. This, too, would risk sparking a broader conflagration with China, but a wider war would not be automatic. For one, U.S. operations would be targeting remote outposts that were uninhabited three years ago and wouldn’t put many Chinese citizens at risk, making it conceivable that Beijing could use its media controls to contain a nationalist backlash and avoid getting drawn into an all-out war it’s not ready for. For another, China wouldn’t be able to do much to fight back even if it wanted to. China’s installation of military assets like radars and anti-air and anti-ship missiles on the islands notwithstanding, the Chinese navy would still be poorly equipped to defend them – especially those several hundred miles from the naval and air bases and missile installations on the mainland.

Most important, since the U.S. would not have much need to take and hold the islands, it could attack from a distance using standoff cruise missiles and potentially avoid direct confrontations between U.S. and Chinese warships and warplanes in China’s backyard. This means Chinese counterattacks would largely be punitive, not tactical, even if the growing range and sophistication of China’s “carrier killer” anti-ship missiles and longer-range ballistic missiles are making it harder for the U.S. to act with impunity. The U.S. wouldn’t need to open broader operations to neutralize Chinese air power or disrupt Chinese logistics networks, and Chinese counterattacks would risk escalation against the world’s most powerful military for little tactical benefit. In other words, there would be no World War II-style fights to the death over critical islands, and the operations could stay relatively contained.

Doing this wouldn’t decisively eject the Chinese from the islands or deny them future access. Nor would it prevent China from harassing Philippine fishermen or Vietnamese oil drillers. But it would attach a major cost to Chinese aggression, while demonstrating U.S. willingness and ability to play the role of arbiter in the South China Sea. Even milder U.S. threats have compelled China to back off in the past. In 2014, for example, the Chinese coast guard stopped blocking resupply boats from reaching Philippine marines marooned on Second Thomas Shoal when a U.S. surveillance plane showed up overhead. And in 2016, the Obama administration reportedly drew a red line around Scarborough Shoal, a flashpoint reef seized from the Philippines in 2012, compelling Beijing to abandon reclamation plans there.

Still, war has a way of taking on a life of its own, and it’d be naive to dismiss the risk of escalation. Regional support cannot be guaranteed. It would also give cause for Beijing to retaliate indirectly on other issues important to the United States. At minimum, it would amount to a complete breakdown of U.S.-Chinese relations at a time when there are still many issues where the U.S. wants Chinese cooperation. The U.S. would effectively be prioritizing ally reassurance in the South China Sea over trade, North Korea and so forth. Geopolitical issues of this magnitude are not settled in a vacuum. Unlike Philippine anglers blocked from Scarborough Shoal, the U.S. could reasonably decide it has bigger fish to fry.

The post The US Weighs Its Options in the South China Sea appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.