Saudi Arabia & the Arabian Peninsula

[G M]

https://clarionproject.org/saudi-cleric-abayas/

Nice to see progress.

[Crafty_Dog]

Indeed; as previously noted here, it comes in the aftermath of Bin Salman responding to President Trump's call to cast out the whackos.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken key steps toward building a more entrepreneur-friendly economy. On Feb. 18, Riyadh's Cabinet approved the country's first-ever bankruptcy law, and the government later declared that it would soon allow women entrepreneurs to start businesses without male guardianships. Both actions help to unshackle Saudi talent as the government banks its economic future on cultivating a vibrant private sector.

The proposals, whose full details and pace of implementation remain unclear, underscore two key aspects of Saudi reform strategy. First, these reforms are among several delayed necessities for the country's financial health. The country has suffered from a lack of formal bankruptcy regulations for years, as businesspeople in disputes with creditors often skipped the country to avoid possible jail sentences. And Saudi women have been taking on jobs and managing businesses under the radar, especially in rural areas, for decades. Second, the proposals indicate that the government is more willing than ever to shake off old restrictions that enormously benefited traditional social influencers, particularly creditors and men.

The newly unveiled bankruptcy law aims to make investment less risky in the kingdom, allowing businesses to rely less on personal connections and more on transparent laws. Investors were at the mercy of their creditors. Business relationships resembled a patronage system where the creditor's personality served as an extra element of risk. Thus, investors have typically been either quite conservative or, alternatively, more willing to flee the country and abandon their debts. Both outcomes compromised the Saudi economy, limiting the pursuit of risky but potentially innovative ideas. This new bankruptcy law will shift the mentality away from such risk aversion, while allowing creditors who are still owed money to recover some of their losses.

Meanwhile, the announcement about female Saudi entrepreneurs marks another step toward encouraging economic independence for women. Though women informally run businesses throughout the kingdom, they always run the risk of being punished by religious authorities, male guardians or rival businesses. Implementing the new change will help Saudi society shift away from the patron-dependent model that has long slowed women's advancement. Details of the new proposal remain scarce, but the imperative of employing more women is clear: Female unemployment in the country is nearly double that of men. Of course, Saudi conservatives who have up to now kept quiet about the pace of social change may consider a female boss to be a bridge too far. By refusing to take certain jobs or escalating their complaints to the national stage, these conservatives may compel the Saudi government to reflect on the challenges it is creating for itself.

With all its new reforms, Riyadh is surely keeping in mind the rapid social changes of the 1970s — which contributed to the assassination of King Faisal in 1975 and the Grand Mosque siege in 1979. But Saudi Arabia will endure the risk as Vision 2030 unfolds, embracing potential pain in the hope of making powerful gains.

[Crafty_Dog]

Saudi Arabia on the Sidelines
Mar 1, 2018
By Jacob L. Shapiro

No region has been as active thus far in 2018 as the Middle East. The action has been driven by Iran, which is seeking to fill the vacuum left by the Islamic State’s defeat in Syria and Iraq. Amid the fighting and diplomatic horse-trading, one actor has been conspicuously silent for the past two months, the last major Sunni Arab power still standing in Iran’s way: Saudi Arabia. That silence ended this week. On Feb. 26, Saudi Arabia reshuffled its top military commanders, and on Feb. 28, it hosted Lebanon’s prime minister in Riyadh for a friendly visit. Neither event bodes well for Saudi Arabia’s future, which is looking more uncertain every day.

Saudi Arabia’s occultation was particularly notable because of its suddenness. In November 2017, it seemed like events in Saudi Arabia might be the most important in the region after the Islamic State’s defeat. That was the month when Saudi Arabia removed the economy minister and the head of the National Guard, set up a new anti-corruption agency, held numerous Saudi princes in a Ritz-Carlton hotel for ransom and threatened to declare war on Lebanon. The November political reshuffles suggested that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was quelling a potential threat to his newly confirmed succession to the throne. The Lebanon affair became an embarrassment because it showed that Riyadh was out of touch with the limits of its own power.

Relegated to the Sidelines

Since these developments, Saudi Arabia has been relegated to the sidelines. At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Saudi Arabia was a major sponsor of anti-Assad rebel groups. Now, Saudi Arabia is a spectator watching Iran, Turkey, Israel, Russia and the U.S. compete to reshape the region. Saudi Arabia’s benching is not for lack of interest; it’s for lack of ability. The kingdom is mired in a protracted conflict in Yemen and, up until November, was burning through its foreign reserves. (An increase in the price of oil has helped matters in recent months, but it’s a temporary state of affairs, and Saudi Arabia continues to run a budget deficit.)

Suffice to say, there is not much Saudi Arabia can do now in Syria. Instead, Saudi Arabia has been focusing on internal affairs. The most important of these has been extorting money from princes and other officials picked up in the anti-corruption drive to replenish state coffers. But there have been other notable, albeit small, developments. In January, the kingdom ended a 35-year ban on the public screening of movies when “The Emoji Movie” was shown on a projector in a tent. Last week, Saudi Arabia’s General Entertainment Authority chief announced that $64 billion would be spent in the next 10 years on entertainment projects such as movie theaters and an opera house.

Those may seem like frivolous developments, but they aren’t. They speak to the depths of Saudi Arabia’s challenges: $64 billion is about 10 percent of Saudi Arabia’s 2017 gross domestic product – a luxurious sum for a government in dire financial straits. But of course, the issue here isn’t just entertainment. It’s keeping the Saudi population pliant as the new crown prince reshapes the kingdom’s economic and political structure away from government handouts to an ever-expanding circle of royalty and oil payoffs to keep tribes invested in the system. Bread and circuses helped maintain the Roman Empire for centuries after its prime. The crown prince believes he just has to get to 2030, by which point his “Vision 2030” will have fixed all of Saudi Arabia’s problems.

That is all nice in theory, but it is much harder in practice. Even were we to grant that his plans could fix what ails Saudi Arabia (hint: we think it’s a pipe dream), every move he makes creates new enemies among the more conservative and religious parts of Saudi society, or simply among the princes who have been on the losing end of the anti-corruption drive. If the prince is to survive his reform drive, he will need the Saudi military on his side, which is exactly what the most recent reshuffling is designed to ensure. On Feb. 26, the Saudi Press Agency issued a short release that announced the termination and retirement of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the Air Defense Forces, and the commander of the land forces. Nearly all were replaced by relatively unknown officers whose main qualification is likely loyalty to the new crown prince.

Dangerous Foreign Threats

Serious though Saudi Arabia’s internal issues are, its foreign threats are even more dangerous. 2017 was a disastrous year for the kingdom’s foreign policy. Saudi Arabia tried to prevent Qatar from deepening its relationship with Iran – it failed. Saudi Arabia tried to get its allies in Lebanon to declare war on Hezbollah, and instead revealed how little the Saudis’ desires matter on the ground in Beirut. Saudi Arabia made little headway in the Yemeni civil war, and watched Iranian-backed Shiite militias, legitimized in Iraq in 2016, win important victories on the ground in Syria. Even the Islamic State’s defeat, which Saudi Arabia greatly wanted, did not come without its own attendant threats: Saudi Arabia is an enticing target for future IS operations.

It is not a surprise, then, that Saudi Arabia has decided to rethink its strategy. It replaced threats to the Lebanese prime minister with an invitation to come to Riyadh, and no doubt promised to deliver large sums of what Saudi Arabia has always purchased its allies with: money. When Iraq recently asked for money to help finance its reconstruction after the war against IS, Saudi Arabia pledged $1.5 billion, and would likely pledge much more if it meant Iranian influence in Iraq could be reduced. Money is ultimately all Saudi Arabia has to offer, and this explains why Saudi Arabia is collecting funds from its own princes even while it still retains more than about $500 billion in foreign reserves. Saudi Arabia sees the domestic and foreign challenges it faces and knows that even a sum as large as $500 billion isn’t going to be enough to solve them.
The irony about Saudi Arabia is that besides Israel, it has the region’s best-equipped military, but few forces. Having the equipment, however, isn’t enough – someone has to use it. Until Saudi Arabia can solve that problem, it is not going to be a major player because, while Saudi Arabia is looking for proxies to take its money, Turkey and Iran are providing their proxies with armor and artillery support. That’s why it doesn’t matter if Saudi Arabia develops a military-industrial complex (which it is trying to do) or that Saudi Arabia increased its defense budget by 9 percent in 2017 and will increase it by a projected 12 percent in 2018. At this point, the best-case scenario for Saudi Arabia is to break out the popcorn, root for Turkey and hope Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reforms work. The worst-case scenario is a Saudi civil war. Hope is never a good policy. Replacing military commanders is a better one, but it doesn’t fix the underlying problem. It only buys the crown prince time – and the clock is ticking.

The post Saudi Arabia on the Sidelines appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.

[Crafty_Dog]

Saudi Arabia:

Saudi Arabia has broken its relative silence. King Salman fired his military chief and several other top commanders, with no public explanation. Is this another move to prevent a coup? Will we see any changes in Saudi behavior after this military reshuffle? In other news, Lebanon’s prime minister said he was invited to visit Saudi Arabia.


•   Findings: There are three theories about the recent military shakeup. One is general dissatisfaction with the war in Yemen. A second is removing potential challenges to the king’s power. Media site Al Monitor suggests that the new deployment of Pakistani guards to Saudi Arabia is meant to protect the royal family. A third explanation is to reduce dissent among potential challengers to the regime – some of the appointments included descendants of King Salman’s brothers, who presumably might feel aggrieved by being sidelined in the accession line. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit, meanwhile, is something to monitor. A Saudi envoy on a four-day trip to Lebanon delivered the invitation to Hariri, who accepted quickly. It does seem like Hariri was coerced into resigning. The New York Times spoke with unnamed Saudi officials who seemed to corroborate this story. Hariri claimed when he rescinded his resignation on Dec. 4 that all issues had been resolved after Hezbollah promised to stay out of the affairs of other Arab states. It seems there are two possible explanations: One, Hariri feels comfortable in his position now because Riyadh couldn’t force him to resign a second time. Two, the military reshuffles somehow put new pressure on Lebanon and Hezbollah that didn’t exist before.

[Crafty_Dog]

Stratfor Worldview

 

Mar 14, 2018 | 19:40 GMT
Saudi Arabia: Cabinet Approves New Nuclear Policy


The Big Picture

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been spearheading efforts to reduce Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil and to diversify and liberalize the economy. These efforts include developing nuclear energy, and Stratfor’s 2018 Annual Forecast highlights the obstacles that bin Salman will confront as he pursues his agenda.

 
See 2018 Annual Forecast
See The Saudi Survival Strategy

On March 13, the Saudi Cabinet approved a new national nuclear policy in advance of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's visit to Washington on March 19-22, during which he is expected to push for a nuclear deal with the United States. Though Saudi Arabia’s policy clearly states that any nuclear activities will be purely peaceful and that the kingdom will follow all international laws in this regard, it also commits the country to best practices for handling nuclear waste and for developing a national capability in the nuclear industry. These guidelines suggest that Saudi Arabia could be planning activities that could lead to nuclear proliferation.

Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the foundational global treaty for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But its references to handling nuclear waste and developing a national capability indicate it plans to take a different path than did the other internationally approved nuclear program in the Middle East: that of the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates adheres to the most stringent standards on nuclear energy, eschewing in-country enrichment and reprocessing, two key aspects of the fuel cycle that can potentially lead to proliferation activities. The Emirati government even went so far so as to enshrine these commitments into domestic law. It appears that Saudi Arabia aims to own these parts of the fuel cycle, which it has acknowledged before. But its exact intentions will be made known over the next few months. 

There is uncertainty on the U.S. side of the equation as well. It has been rumored that U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry will be switching roles, which could slow down negotiations with Saudi Arabia. If Perry is replaced by someone with more of a scientific background, it could limit the number of concessions the United States is willing to make in nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia. The United States also faces pressure from several key allies, most notably Israel, to avoid striking a permissive nuclear deal with the kingdom.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://thehill.com/policy/international/379224-senate-trump-clash-over-saudi-arabia?userid=188403

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-crown-prince-jared-kushner-relationship-2018-3

More than one aspect to this story-- among them the image of the apparent actual leader of Saudi Arabia and an Orthodox Jew working together.

That said, my sense of Kushner is of a princeling of , , , unknown moral character in way over his head , , , 

If accurate, this unsourced article sheds light on Kushner losing his Top Secret clearance.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/258347/teaching-hebrew-in-saudi-arabia

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Fascinating piece

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-saudi-princes-quest-to-remake-the-middle-east?mbid=nl_Daily%20040218&CNDID=50142053&spMailingID=13239773&spUserID=MjAxODUyNTc2OTUwS0&spJobID=1380145740&spReportId=MTM4MDE0NTc0MAS2

[Crafty_Dog]

http://carolineglick.com/our-good-fair-weathered-saudi-friend/

[Crafty_Dog]

By Xander Snyder

Saudi Arabia is in a race against time to implement massive reforms that it hopes will minimize its economy’s dependence on oil and, in doing so, insulate it from social unrest once oil prices inevitably fall. And the government must do this without surrendering its control of the country. It’s a tall order for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the heir apparent to the kingdom who, by all accounts, appears to have consolidated enough power to at least try to pull it off.

There’s plenty of reasons to doubt that he will actually succeed, but that’s a problem for a later day. Right now, Brent crude is at about $75 per barrel, slightly above what the International Monetary Fund lists as Saudi Arabia’s breakeven point, giving the government some more revenue and thus a little more breathing room to change its ways.

Time and Money

It’s hard to say how long that will last, though. Prices have been rising, thanks to a combination of OPEC cuts, production agreements between Saudi Arabia and Russia, decreased U.S. inventories, and fears that a U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal will take Iranian supply offline. And they have gone up despite increased U.S. shale production – which counterintuitively makes sense, considering shale producers will up production as soon as oil prices exceed their own breakeven points, which tend to range between $35 and $70 per barrel.

Increasing production, however, takes time and money. The cost to finish uncompleted wells must be accounted for, as must the cost of transportation to market. Pipelines are a good option in this regard, but some pipelines are nearly at maximum capacity. (The delays have prompted producers to offer discounts of as much as $9 per barrel, according to some reports.) Another option is to transport by truck, something that requires more time and money. Other cyclical factors, including the demand for components such as the sand used to fracture a well, likewise drive costs up and forestall oil coming to market.

The delays mean that oil prices will stay high until shale producers can overcome their short-term barriers to production. As it happens, they are beginning to do just that. The number of active rigs in the U.S. has been increasing steadily since the middle of 2016. (As of April 2018 that number is 1,013.) Production has predictably surged. In May, the Energy Information Administration estimates that U.S. oil production will increase to 7 million barrels per day, a 15 percent increase compared to last May.

So while $75 per barrel of oil may allay some of Saudi Arabia’s immediate financial concerns, the long-term trend remains: More U.S. production will drive prices down. Saudi Arabia knows this and so must move quickly to take advantage of the current high prices. How quickly it acts depends on how much money it actually needs to fund its ambitious reforms.

Believable Rumors

And how much money it will earn remains to be seen. The International Monetary Fund puts Saudi Arabia’s breakeven price at $73 per barrel, in theory netting Riyadh a nice budget surplus at current prices. There are, however, some issues with the IMF’s breakeven figure. For starters, the formula it uses to calculate this figure is publicly available. Second, according to a paper published by the Council on Foreign Relations, IMF estimates vary by as much as 20 percent, even in the same year. Either way, as shale production responds to the market, oil prices are likely to decline, putting greater strain on the Saudi budget.

It’s no wonder, then, that the Saudi government is desperately trying to diversify its sources of non-oil revenue. And it has been somewhat successful, so long as you don’t look too closely. Non-oil revenues as a percent of the government’s total budget have increased from 8 percent in 2012 to almost 37 percent in 2017, an annualized growth rate of about 20 percent.

Still, in this same period, oil revenue has decreased so much that the total budget has declined by almost 45 percent, from about $330 billion to $185 billion (using the current riyal/USD exchange rate). In other words, the non-oil share of revenue appears to have increased so much primarily because its total budget has shrunk nearly by half. If Saudi Arabia was earning as much in non-oil revenues in 2012 as it is today, then non-oil would account for a much smaller share of the budget, about 18 percent.

(click to enlarge)

The Saudi government expects spending to outpace revenue in 2018, estimating a deficit of more than $50 billion, or roughly 7 percent of gross domestic product. Aside from raising taxes – something it has steadily done despite the political risks – there are only three ways it can account for this shortfall: dip into its reserves, seek foreign investment or confiscate assets from the elite. As of February 2018, Saudi Arabia had approximately $487 billion in reserves, a 5 percent decline from last February and a 33 percent decline from its peak in 2014. If the kingdom were to maintain deficit spending at the same rate as is anticipated in 2018, it would have about 10 years of runway. Of course, if oil revenue declines without a commensurate decrease in its reform expenditures, the deficit will grow, and its cushion will shrink.

Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia prefers to raise foreign investment. The most publicized measure in that regard is the initial public offering of Saudi Aramco. This offering, however, continues to be delayed, and while the Saudi energy minister may be citing “litigation and liability” complexities, the real reason is most likely the inability of Saudi Arabia’s bankers to reach the $2 trillion valuation that Mohammed bin Salman has sought. At that valuation, the anticipated sale of 5 percent of the company would raise $100 billion for Saudi Arabia, while somewhat more conservative market valuation estimates, ranging from about $500 billion to $1 trillion, would raise only between $25 billion and $50 billion.

Riyadh has also turned to the debt markets, issuing $17.5 billion in its first dollar-denominated debt offering in 2016, and another $11 billion this month. Though Moody’s A1 rating may give some assurance to investors, the reality is that Saudi Arabia remains bogged down in a proxy war in Yemen and preoccupied by Iran, its regional rival that is well positioned to gain more power. Any new developments in the broader Middle Eastern conflict that threatens to lure Saudi Arabia in either financially or otherwise – say, a war between Iran and Israel – is sure to make foreign investors wary and limit Saudi Arabia’s access to external capital.

Saudi Arabia has also confiscated assets from its elite. The arrest of 400 oligarchs last year netted $106 billion in confiscated wealth, according to the Saudi attorney general. This no doubt helps to plug the gap for now, but there are limits to how much the government can seize without facing a more concerted resistance.

All told, Saudi Arabia isn’t on the brink of collapse, but nor are the rumors of a palace coup from last weekend all that surprising. They attest to the difficulty of the government’s position. It needs to radically transform its political-economy in a relatively short time, all while it contends with regional security threats. The need to move quickly, then, is paramount, since a divided, weak homefront will preoccupy the regime’s focus and prevent it from confronting its external threats effectively.

A lot must go right for Saudi Arabia to achieve its far-reaching reform goals, and in the annals of history, countries are rarely so lucky.

[Crafty_Dog]

Two years ago Mohammed bin Salman, then Saudi Arabia's deputy crown prince, became the highest-profile Arabic-speaking millennial since Gazan singer Mohammed Assaf won the Arab Idol competition in 2013.  Announcing his "pride in the historical and cultural legacy of our Saudi, Arab, and Islamic heritage," the young royal articulated a new economic plan for his nation, Vision 2030. The plan aims to achieve three of Saudi Arabia's overarching goals — a vibrant society, a thriving economy and an ambitious nation — and it is turning heads in and beyond the kingdom. At home and abroad, the prospect of profit under Vision 2030 is tantalizing capital investors. The promise of a more open society also has captured the imagination of many Saudi citizens, who long for less censorship, more respect for indigenous arts and culture, protection for the peninsula's varied flora and fauna, and a few movie theaters.

As with any great plan, the requirements and repercussions of enacting Vision 2030 are beginning to emerge. While many observers are anticipating the momentous challenges of transitioning the Saudi economy as outlined in Saudi Vision 2030 — including the unprecedented step of privatizing part of the state oil company — a look at one small endeavor hints at some of the obstacles that lie ahead.

The Secret Garden

Some 45 kilometers (28 miles) outside Abha, the capital of Saudi Arabia's southwestern Asir province, past the nearby King Khalid Air Base and off a shabby asphalt road piled on either side with plastic bottles, there awaits a surprising sight (and smell): hectares on end of blooming pink roses. The industrial garden, called Ward At Taif, manufactures rose waters and oils for sought-after aromatic products such as perfumes and incense. The small business takes its name from Taif, a city in Mecca province already famous for its roses. And not coincidentally, Ward At Taif sits at exactly the same elevation as Taif, just over 2,000 meters above sea level. Asir province is on a high plateau that regularly receives more rainfall than the rest of the country. It boasts blissfully sunny temperatures ranging from 15 to 32 degrees Celsius (60 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit) — prime conditions for cultivating roses. 

Sunday through Thursday workers come and pick. They pull flower head after flower head from thorny bushes and toss them into 5-kilogram (11-pound) plastic baskets. They are paid daily for harvesting 25 kilograms of rose petals and receive bonus pay for each additional kilogram. The workers are foreign, mostly Egyptian. The line manager, Ashraf Barakat, is a professional engineer from Egypt.

Once the baskets are full, workers transport them to a processing plant onsite. There, 25 kilograms of rose petals at a time boil for 10 to 12 hours in copper vats imported from Syria and Egypt. The scented steam is distilled through cooling pipes and eventually condenses into liquid, dripping into clear, sanitized bottles that collect 10 liters (about 2.6 gallons) of rose water each.

Rising to the top of each bottle like cream is rose oil — just a few milliliters. "It's as expensive as gold," Barakat says. "The custodian of the holy mosques washes the inside of the Kaaba walls with [rose oil] once a year." Other rose products are similarly in-demand, if less rarefied. Herbalists claim tinctures made from the petals may be effective for treating depression, anxiety and insomnia, and rosehip — the round part of the flower just below the petals — is rich in vitamin C.

Roses aren't the alternative to oil exports Saudi Arabia is looking for to diversify its economy under Vision 2030. But they highlight an important part of the solution: For the plan to succeed, Saudi citizens must learn and practice professions that international workers currently perform in the kingdom. Those jobs include skilled professions as well as unskilled manual labor, such as rose harvesting. Vision 2030 describes Saudi Arabia's employment predicament over the past decade, and an ambitious proposal to address it:

    "The retail sector achieved an annual growth rate in excess of 10 percent. It currently employs 1.5 million workers, of which only 0.3 million are Saudis.

    We aim to provide job opportunities for an additional million Saudis by 2020 in a growing retail sector that attracts modern, local, regional, and international brands across all regions of the country."

As for other workers around the world, promotion may come from the entry level, with merit-based rewards. A rose petal picker may go on to manage a factory like Ward At Taif, and somewhere along that road he or she may have a chance to take a school loan for a degree in mechanical engineering.
Every Rose Has Its Thorn

Of course, putting Vision 2030 in action won't be quite as simple as that. What is the road for Saudi nationals to take jobs such as harvesting rose petals or to become qualified operations managers at such a plant? And what will become of the international laborers currently working these jobs? These are people who send much-needed money home to their families in more than 100 other countries. Today 11 million foreigners work in the kingdom, according to Arab News. That's almost one-third of the country's total population. Some of these migrants harvest roses. Some build skyscrapers. Some are chauffeurs, employed full-time by families to drive women where they need to go. What will become of them once women start to drive legally on June 24?

The leaves of dozens of rose bushes at Ward At Taif vibrate as an F-15 from the nearby air base flies over, perhaps on a mission to Yemen. The economic ripples of Vision 2030 will take longer to be felt around the world. Still, it's not too soon for predictions, analysis and preparation for the effects of this bold vision.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saudi-Arabia-stops-new-business-with-Germany-over-its-pro-Iran-policy-558431

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.memri.org/reports/shift-saudi-medias-attitude-israel-%E2%80%93-part-ii-saudi-writer-who-visited-israel-we-want-israeli

[Crafty_Dog]

By Jacob L. Shapiro

After months of relative silence from Saudi Arabia, this was a noisy weekend. For the second time since he was named heir to the throne last June, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced a major Cabinet reshuffle, this time focusing on ministries related to culture, Islamic life and social development. Just one day earlier, French newspaper Le Monde reported that the crown prince had sent a letter to French President Emmanuel Macron threatening to attack Qatar, the target of last year’s Saudi-led blockade, if Doha acquired Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. Last but not least, Israeli news site News1 published an article about Saudi Arabia’s plans to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, potentially with help from Pakistan or Israel.

These stories point to the intense internal and external pressures Saudi Arabia is facing, even with the recent spike in oil prices. The Cabinet reshuffle is further evidence of Mohammed’s attempt to win the loyalty of the Saudi bureaucracy. The first salvos in this campaign were aimed at the military and wealthy Saudi citizens – two groups that could have been hotbeds of dissent against the young crown prince. Now Mohammed is turning to some of the ministries that will be responsible for implementing the reforms upon which he is staking both his life and his country’s future.

Saudi Plans Backfire

Mohammed has managed to install individuals loyal to him at many levels of Saudi Arabia’s political, military and religious structure, and the most surprising thing is that he has done so without creating significant backlash against his rule. Perhaps his opponents are biding their time, or perhaps there is a consensus within the ruling elite over the direction the country must take. Mohammed is by no means out of the woods – his position remains extremely precarious – but each step he takes allows him to cement his authority even further. He will need all the support he can get as he tries to transform Saudi Arabia from a tribal petrostate to a mature, 21st-century nation.

Le Monde’s report on the Saudi threat to attack Qatar is not nearly as heartening. This time last year, Saudi Arabia initiated a coordinated diplomatic assault against Doha to get Qatar, which was getting cozy with Riyadh’s main rivals Iran and Turkey, to fall back in line. Riyadh had no intention of allowing Qatar to become a fifth column in the Gulf, which Saudi Arabia views as its sphere of influence. So Saudi Arabia got its allies, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen, to sign on to a plan to isolate Qatar economically and financially.

But the plan backfired. Qatar didn’t bend, Al-Jazeera didn’t shut down, and the U.S. didn’t stop using Qatar as its forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command. In fact, Qatar’s economy grew stronger after the initial shock wore off, and its relationship with Turkey has deepened, with Qatar even agreeing in March to allow Turkey to establish a naval base in the country. Qatar also hasn’t stopped dealing with Iran on a pragmatic basis, restoring full diplomatic relations with Tehran two months after Saudi Arabia’s aborted attempt to bring Doha to its knees. Indeed, the Saudi strategy actually demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s fundamental weakness, not its strength.

If the report from Le Monde is true, Saudi Arabia is now pressing the issue once more. If Qatar were to acquire the S-400 system, it would help negate Saudi Arabia’s only real military advantage over its neighbors – its formidable air power, built through years of acquisitions of U.S. military hardware. Saudi Arabia has already seen what Russian involvement in the Middle East can mean for Saudi interests; Moscow’s intervention in Syria is the primary reason Bashar Assad’s regime survived, spoiling both Saudi and Turkish hopes to replace Assad with a Sunni leader. Saudi Arabia does not want Russia to prop up yet another Middle Eastern regime hostile to Saudi interests, especially not one with which Saudi Arabia shares a border.

But Saudi Arabia is playing a dangerous game here, one that it may not be able to win. On the one hand, Riyadh can’t look much weaker than it already does when it comes to Qatar, so there is little lost in making the threat and not following through. But following through on the threat would be dangerous because Riyadh could find itself not just stoking tensions further with Iran but even forcing Turkey – which already has a military base in Qatar in addition to the naval base that was agreed to – to directly oppose Saudi moves.

Nuclear Arms Race

The Israeli media report that Saudi Arabia may pursue nuclear weapons if it becomes clear that Iran has done the same is based mostly on conjecture and inference. There is no evidence that Pakistan is stockpiling nuclear bombs to transfer to Saudi Arabia should an arms race begin in earnest, only unconfirmed reports. Furthermore, the headline attracting most of the attention – that Israel might be transferring nuclear information to Saudi Arabia – is based not on evidence but on what the author describes as a “reasonable assumption” based on Israel’s interest to cultivate closer ties to Saudi Arabia.

It’s still notable, however, that a potential Saudi move to acquire nuclear weapons is being talked about at all. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister told CNN in May that the country would absolutely pursue a nuclear weapons program should Iran restart its own program following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. And since most indications suggest Iran never intended to fully give up its nuclear weapons program in the long term, even if it was willing to suspend uranium enrichment in the short term, a nuclear arms race between the Middle East’s major powers is a matter of when, not if.

Indeed, there is perhaps no country outside of Israel for which nuclear weapons would be more valuable than Saudi Arabia, especially if the United States pulled back from the region in the future. Of the major Middle Eastern powers vying for regional supremacy, Saudi Arabia is by far the weakest, and nuclear weapons are a tremendous equalizer. In other words, though we cannot confirm the veracity of the Israeli report, we also cannot find much fault in the underlying logic of its prediction.

Though Saudi Arabia has taken its licks in recent years, it remains a rich petrostate with formidable if limited conventional military capabilities and a history of relying on proxies to do its bidding. Riyadh no doubt still favors this strategy, as evidenced most recently by reports in Turkish media suggesting that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are working to create a new Arab militia in northeastern Syria that might be sympathetic to Saudi interests. The problem for Saudi Arabia is that this strategy has consistently failed to bring about an improvement in its overall strategic position, and in all directions, Saudi Arabia faces enemies stronger than itself. The crown prince can shuffle his Cabinet all he wants, but even if he can transform Saudi Arabia – a herculean task in its own right – his country is not even powerful enough to get Qatar to toe the line.

In that sense, these three reports from the weekend offer a window into the imminent challenges Saudi Arabia is facing – and it’s not a pleasant view.

[Crafty_Dog]

The beginning of this week brought good news for the Saudi economy. Government data, after all, showed surprising gross domestic product growth in non-oil sectors. Or so it seemed. Recently released unemployment figures tell a different story. Unemployment has edged to 12.9 percent, a record high and almost double the unemployment rate at the beginning of 2018. Rates such as these are never good, but they are especially problematic for a country with a young population in the middle of government efforts to transform not just the economy itself but the very culture of the state.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/08/31/joel-c-rosenberg-mohammed-bin-salman-is-33-here-are-21-impressive-reforms-already-underway.html

[G M]

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/08/31/joel-c-rosenberg-mohammed-bin-salman-is-33-here-are-21-impressive-reforms-already-underway.html

Pretty impressive!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://pjmedia.com/spengler/german-press-reveals-saudi-spook-saga-behind-khashoggi-disappearance/

[DougMacG]

https://pjmedia.com/spengler/german-press-reveals-saudi-spook-saga-behind-khashoggi-disappearance/

That he is a spy and ISIS contact makes sense but still probably doesn't excuse torture and dismemberment.  I will keep an open mind as the facts emerge.

The US MSM narrative is that this is Trump's fault because he criticizes journalists, but not the fault of the other side in the US who call for and applaud violence against political opponents. 

Maybe its not anyone in the US's fault.  Maybe we're just not being culturally sensitive to their ways.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.aei.org/publication/mohammed-bin-salman-and-the-khashoggi-disaster/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0dSaFpXTTNZV0psTW1VeCIsInQiOiJONXAzQWEzN1o4NVwvRVwvTVFRd3ZyYkppVFNmWVFyV1pQTmVKMEhkdXVvQmFhdFh4R0J3enNUMittWWZiZ3M5ZnlzZWhaVVZTOHhsK09VeFY3SXR6WTNWM3ZwcDNRUU5GNmFPWDhYVVVhdlwvY1paMmFhMmhQR1BlVVdZXC95eEtDNmsifQ%3D%3D

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Why Kill Jamal Khashoggi?
The most charitable interpretation is that this was an abduction that went horribly wrong.
158 Comments
By Karen Elliott House
Oct. 14, 2018 3:49 p.m. ET
Protesters outside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 9.
Protesters outside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 9. Photo: ozan kose/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The case of the vanished and apparently murdered Saudi activist and writer Jamal Khashoggi is a tale with a victim and villains, but no heroes.

Mr. Khashoggi, a longtime retainer of the Saudi royal family and more recently a critic of the regime, entered the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, Oct. 2, seeking documents relevant to a divorce. The Turkish government claims to have proof that a Saudi hit squad murdered him inside the consulate, chopped his body to bits, and dispatched the remains in a black van to a private plane headed for Saudi Arabia. Portions of this plot remain unverified but there seems little doubt Mr. Khashoggi is dead.

The primary villain apparently is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who runs every aspect of Saudi Arabia and without whose authorization nothing of consequence takes place. But this sordid episode isn’t best thought of as the clash between an autocratic ruler and a democratic hero. It is more of an internecine conflict.

Mr. Khashoggi, notwithstanding his credentials as a columnist for the Washington Post, spent most of his adult life working with and for the Al Saud family and its media properties. He also did stints for Saudi intelligence, headed for part of the time by Prince Turki al-Faisal, who later served as ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Khashoggi’s early claim to fame was interviewing Osama bin Laden in 1980s Afghanistan, where both were allied with the anti-Soviet mujahedeen. Mr. Khashoggi broke with bin Laden in the 1990s and after 9/11 became Riyadh’s favorite example of a reformed Islamic fundamentalist, often produced for visiting Westerners to outline his conversion. But under King Salman and the crown prince, Mr. Khashoggi became an outcast, accused of supporting the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. He moved to the U.S. in July 2017.

While Crown Prince Mohammed has made significant social and economic reforms, he has never claimed to be a democrat. Recently he acknowledged jailing 1,500 people, famously including the 300 relatives, ministers and business barons who were confined inside the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton. None of that, however, prepared those of us who knew him for the murder of a citizen in what is supposed to be the security of his nation’s consulate.

Kidnapping critics and returning them to Saudi Arabia isn’t new for this regime, though previously such incidents got little publicity because no one died. Perhaps the crown prince thought he could again escape any consequences. After all, Russia’s Vladimir Putin has poisoned dissidents in London; China’s Xi Jinping runs an archipelago of re-education camps; and Turkey’s increasingly despotic Recep Tayyip Erdogan—who is leveling the charges at the Saudis—has jailed thousands with little or no international consequence. Perhaps the world will soon forget a political murder.

But there surely will be a lasting reputational price for the crown prince. With so much power over a largely pacific populace, why would he order or sanction what amounts to a mafia murder? Mr. Khashoggi wasn’t leading a civil rebellion against the regime. Nor was he a widely popular focus of dissent in the kingdom. He seemed to pose no serious threat to Crown Prince Mohammad’s rule.

That Mohammed bin Salman believes Mr. Khashoggi was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Islamist organization, and on the payroll of Qatar, a Saudi nemesis, seems more an excuse than a reason. Those who watch the crown prince closely say he is determined to pre-empt any hint of possible disruption before it can materialize. So Mr. Khashoggi’s decision to register in the U.S. a new political organization, Democracy for the Arab World Now, perhaps funded by Saudi regional rivals, might have triggered this action.

It seems clear that Mohammed bin Salman, accustomed to issuing orders on every aspect of Saudi life without question or contradiction, wanted to silence Mr. Khashoggi. When efforts to woo him back as an adviser failed, he was captured in Istanbul, where he hoped to marry his Turkish fiancée. The most charitable interpretation is that this was an abduction that went horribly wrong.

Now what? While the crown prince can ignore Saudi domestic opinion, he must care about his international image, especially among foreign investors, whose money he needs to realize his Vision 2030 economic reforms. Businessmen who had embraced him—such as Richard Branson, Uber’s Dara Khosrowshahi and Viacom ’s Bob Bakish—are stepping back. Many others won’t dare show up at this month’s investor conference the crown prince is hosting in Riyadh. The mass incarcerations at the Ritz-Carlton a year ago had dimmed the crown prince’s image. This blackens it.

While the crown prince doesn’t care about media or even congressional criticism, he must care about any U.S. action that significantly alters the fundamental U.S.-Saudi relationship—which has never been based on shared moral values but rather on mutual security. In a dangerous neighborhood, Saudi Arabia depends on American security guarantees; likewise, any radical evolution in Saudi Arabia would threaten all U.S. interests in the region. Most important, President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed share a deep distrust of Iran, so that the U.S.-Saudi security relationship seems likely to hold for now.

But Congress may block weapons sales in support of the crown prince’s still-unsuccessful war in Yemen, where more than 6,000 civilians have died. Sen. Lindsey Graham has warned of a “bipartisan tsunami” in Congress if the Saudis are proved guilty of Mr. Khashoggi’s murder. Congress might even go beyond Yemen and block all weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, despite Mr. Trump’s opposition.

The more lasting effect likely will be a diminution of trust, leaving the U.S.-Saudi relationship resembling a loveless marriage in which neither side can afford to file for divorce.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/16/opinions/impact-of-khashoggi-could-last-generations-robertson-opinion-intl/index.html?fbclid=IwAR0rdLceeqWuCnhPNz3NndkfNQtO75Nf16gAEuWXijzSmQier9_AHtdxKDs

[DougMacG]

Don’t Ditch Riyadh in a Fit of Righteousness
By Walter Russell Mead, wsj today I believe
Paraphrasing, this is bad, very bad but don't hand the Middle East over to Iran because of this.

[Crafty_Dog]

Don’t Ditch Riyadh in a Fit of Righteousness
Khashoggi’s murder must be condemned. But Saudi Arabia still serves U.S. interests.
155 Comments
By Walter Russell Mead
Oct. 15, 2018 7:13 p.m. ET
A Turkish police officer at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 15.
A Turkish police officer at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 15. Photo: tolga bozoglu/epa-efe/rex/Shutterstock

The murder (if that’s what it was) of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, was a horror in itself, and a greater horror still in what it threatens to unleash. The Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ayatollahs of Iran are huddled over the corpse, hoping to turn a political profit from the death of an innocent man.

Mr. Khashoggi was a thorn in the flesh of the hyperactive crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Bin Salman, a man who faces a concatenation of problems the likes of which the House of Saud has rarely seen. Iran, hostile, arrogant and ambitious, has ruthlessly carved a “Shia crescent” from Baghdad through Damascus to Beirut. A gusher of American oil and natural gas has diminished OPEC. Turkey, sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and harboring dreams of restoring its old Ottoman glory, seeks to displace Saudi Arabia as the voice of the Sunni world. Russia has reasserted itself in the region. And inside Saudi Arabia, a growing population with high expectations demands more opportunity and better governance from a traditional monarchy largely unprepared for the 21st century.

It was out of this turmoil and fear that the MBS phenomenon emerged. At home and abroad, the Saudis attempted a series of frenzied initiatives, including a war in Yemen and the privatization of Aramco, to improve their position. Meanwhile, MBS stroked gullible American elites into the belief that he was a democrat.

It worked for a while; gullibility is America’s most plentiful natural resource. But after Mr. Khashoggi’s death, even the most naive observer can see that the crown prince is at best a modernizing autocrat, using dictatorial power to drag his country into the future: Peter the Great, not Thomas Jefferson. At worst, he could end like Phaethon, the Greek demigod who lost control of his horses while foolishly trying to drive the chariot of the sun.

The Saudi transformation is not going smoothly. Aramco’s privatization has been delayed and the ambitious Vision 2030 goals for economic renewal seem increasingly elusive. MBS’s foreign policy looks more chaotic than inspired, and the blunder in Istanbul was not the first false step. The arrest of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri last year and the failed diplomatic standoff with Qatar were not the strokes of a master. Nor is the kingdom’s ill-planned and poorly executed Syria strategy or its intervention in Yemen, which has created a humanitarian disaster without notably advancing Saudi interests.

The Khashoggi affair is more of the same. But more than other MBS-era blunders, this episode may be an existential threat to the international prestige he has been working assiduously to build—even as the Saudis appear to be cooking up an exculpatory cover story.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, flying to Riyadh at short notice to bring some order to the chaos, is well acquainted with the hard facts of the Middle East. He knows the crown prince’s Saudi Arabia is not an authoritarian caterpillar metamorphosing into a liberal butterfly. But neither are Turkey and Iran. And on crucial issues, U.S. and Saudi interests are aligned. The U.S. wants to ensure that no single power, inside or outside the Middle East, has control over the world’s oil spigot. That means Saudi Arabia must remain independent and secure.

There are two things the U.S. should not do. One is sweep Mr. Khashoggi’s murder under the rug. His disappearance has damaged Saudi Arabia’s standing, including in Congress. Mr. Pompeo needs to deliver a clear message that this behavior weakens and ultimately endangers the alliance. He should not be deterred by Saudi threats. Like the American Confederates who overestimated the power of King Cotton in the 1860s, the Saudis tend to overestimate King Oil’s power today.

But to do what the Iran-deal chorus and the Erdogan and Muslim Brotherhood apologists want—to dissolve the U.S.-Saudi alliance in a frenzy of righteousness—would be an absurd overreaction that plays into the hands of America’s enemies. It could also stampede the Saudis into even more recklessness. France was not expelled from the European Community or NATO in 1985 when its agents sank the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior, killing an innocent man in the process.

Without lionizing, ostracizing or enabling MBS, Mr. Pompeo needs to get to the heart of the matter: Saudi insecurity. To restore balance and sobriety to its foreign policy, Saudi Arabia needs to calm down, and only the U.S. can provide the assurances to make that possible. Among other things, this entails coordinating with the Saudis (and the Israelis) on a policy aimed at containing Iran and stabilizing the region. It also involves encouraging the economic transformation the Saudis seek at home. Even as he responds with appropriate gravity to a serious provocation, Mr. Pompeo must give Saudi authorities the confidence that sober and sensible policies will bring continuing American support for the kingdom’s independence and reform.

Appeared in the October 16, 2018, print edition.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/saudi-arabia-jamal-khashoggi-affair-us-government-in-dark/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-10-17&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives

[G M]

https://pjmedia.com/spengler/german-press-reveals-saudi-spook-saga-behind-khashoggi-disappearance/

That he is a spy and ISIS contact makes sense but still probably doesn't excuse torture and dismemberment.  I will keep an open mind as the facts emerge.

The US MSM narrative is that this is Trump's fault because he criticizes journalists, but not the fault of the other side in the US who call for and applaud violence against political opponents. 

Maybe its not anyone in the US's fault.  Maybe we're just not being culturally sensitive to their ways.

Exactly! Suddenly judging the muslim world by western standards isn't intolerant and xenophobic?

[ccp]

"That he is a spy and ISIS contact"  .. Muslim Brohood...

Now we know how he got a job with the Wcompost.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45906396?fbclid=IwAR2zjUpnjacHYMOpPTyxAfttaTUT5rGYSZDE0sO02M4qorHL8v4YDmS6pt0

[Crafty_Dog]

https://nypost.com/2018/10/18/why-the-saudis-despised-jamal-khashoggi/?fbclid=IwAR1IWOOcmGtskPjOblJ59eEJb6hUEEX8kqQIkAehQRYKjFeUocDlyhfTMQQ

[Crafty_Dog]

By GPF Staff


Saudi Arabia Reaches Its Moment of Reckoning, the Quad Keeps Things Informal

________________________________________
From the Forecast: “Saudi Arabia is mired in a political crisis. It started with the fall of oil prices but has reached a point that even a recovery wouldn’t put a stop to it. The dip has made it abundantly clear to Riyadh that its control over oil prices is not what it was during OPEC’s heyday and that it has no choice but to transform its economy. Change, though, is anathema to those who benefit from the status quo, and serious political instability will follow. Dealing with Iran amid ambitious reconstruction plans and a political crisis will be more than Saudi Arabia can handle. It will seek out allies, but its traditional partners – the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom – aren’t eager to team up with the Saudis on this issue.”

Update: In the Sept. 7 installment of the Forecast Tracker, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia played a leading role, not because of anything that had happened, but rather because of what hadn’t happened. At the beginning of the year, we expected the myriad challenges facing the country, including low oil prices and jihadist threats, to overwhelm the kingdom’s ability to set effective foreign policy for the region that would wind down the war in Yemen, push back against Iranian influence and increase the strength of a Saudi-led Arab regional coalition. We also expected that traditional Saudi allies like the United States wouldn’t be willing to go along with Riyadh’s more ambitious plans.

For much of this year, that forecast seemed to be trending off track. Enter one Jamal Khashoggi. It’s not polite to speak ill of the dead, and it is now all but certain that Khashoggi is no longer among the living. But sometimes the truth is more important than decorum. Before becoming a media darling of the West, Khashoggi was a Saudi journalist who had ties to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida and who, for a long stretch of time between journalism jobs, worked for Saudi intelligence. He also comes from an old and powerful Saudi family that traded in military weapons, and while the sins of an uncle shouldn’t be foisted off on a nephew, all men are, on some level, prisoners of their upbringing.

It says something about the fickleness of human beings that Saudi Arabia’s destructive war in Yemen and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s crackdown on his fellow princes and their wealth generated little more than apathy and punchlines in Western media but that Khashoggi’s disappearance has galvanized significant anti-Saudi feelings around the world. Most important among the kingdom’s newfound critics are the United States, where even conservative lawmakers are calling for Salman’s head, and Turkey, which is understandably upset that Riyadh would do its dirty work on Turkish soil. In that sense, our forecasting abilities were limited. Based on Saudi Arabia’s position in the Middle East and the tactics it was using to secure its interests, we expected significant blowback against it. We just didn’t realize it would take a case like Khashoggi’s to light the match.

But the match has indeed been lit. The pressing matter now will be the future of the kingdom, and specifically of its crown prince. Once a Western media darling himself for his desire to bring Saudi Arabia into the 21st century (and his purported aims to liberalize the country), Salman is now facing scrutiny on the world stage, and his image has been tarnished. Until now, no faction inside Saudi Arabia has meaningfully challenged his centralization of power. But there are many potential factions that could do so, chief among them the clerical establishment and the military. If the Saudi crown prince cannot rehabilitate his international reputation, these factions may at last have the opportunity they’ve been waiting for to strike back against the young Salman.

Then again, the Khashoggi storm may pass without much fanfare or action once Saudi Arabia produces an explanation for his death. Media cycles these days treat consumers like they have short attention spans. Even so, this story is about much more now than Khashoggi or MbS. This is about the future of Saudi Arabia. It’s a future that factions in the kingdom – some reformist, some traditionalist – are contesting, a future that depends on the continued steadfast support of an outside patron, a role that for many decades now has been played by the United States. That it is even being discussed openly in the U.S. that the alliance with Saudi Arabia may have outlived its usefulness is a sign of how dire the situation has become and reflects the kinds of issues we expected to dominate this year for Riyadh. The watershed has come later than we thought and in a form we didn’t expect, but it’s here now and Saudi Arabia has limited tools at its disposal to deal with it.


 
(click to enlarge)

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.patreon.com/posts/22203075

[DougMacG]

https://www.patreon.com/posts/22203075

Good points there.  What are Trudeau and Merkel going to do to westernize and civilize, maybe Christianize Wahhabi Saudi?  This has turned into a media opportunity to challenge and criticize Trump.  Trump didn't kill him.

Rand Paul on Fox News Sunday went on a two point rant, this was awful and we have no business in the Middle East.  He gets the captain obvious part right and the more difficult part dead wrong.

The question really is, what must Trump do to placate his critics in the media so they will move on to their next outrage..

How many time do we hear Khashoggi was a journalist and a Washington post reporter?  What else was he?

I've heard maybe a hundred times more about him already than I ever heard about beheaded WSJ reporter Daniel Pearl who really was a journalist.

Venezuelan dissident Fernando Alban is just as dead in last week's news.  Where is the equal outrage?
https://www.apnews.com/d1ef4f6c6a2c4aaf9d990b1002a8f5d8
Maybe he just fell off the 10th floor of police headquarters.
But it doesn't further the chosen narrative.

Trump needs Saudi to counter the Iranian threat.  That our allies aren't so perfect is not a new reality in the Middle East.  Yes, we should use our leverage to make things better there.  Can't do that if you leave the Middle East to Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and Russia.

The Leftist media need to save face for their support for the brutal Chavez-Maduro-Castro regime in dictatorial socialist Venezuela.  But they could at least report the news.  The "socialists" they supported all these years are slaughtering their critics.

[Crafty_Dog]

Why Turkey Isn't Burning Bridges With Saudi Arabia Over Khashoggi
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks about the slaying of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during a weekly parliamentary address on Oct. 23 in Ankara.
(Getty Images)


    The fallout from the Khashoggi affair underlines a larger battle between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for influence throughout the Sunni world that will continue in the religious, political and economic spheres.
    Turkey may be trying to use its muted response to coax Saudi Arabia into stopping its cooperation with Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, or possibly into to reducing Saudi economic pressure on Qatar, Turkey's major regional ally.
    Their slowly growing defense and economic ties will mitigate the chances of a complete rupture between Ankara and Riyadh.

For weeks, allegations of criminality and a cover-up have consumed the Turkish media after Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed at Riyadh's consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2. Three weeks later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told parliament that Saudi authorities had planned the dissident's slaying. Erdogan has a penchant for bombast, but the speech was understated, and the president even issued a cordial appeal to Saudi King Salman to cooperate in exposing the truth in the Khashoggi affair. Conspicuously, Erdogan elected not to mention the elephant in the room: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to have played a role in the killing.
The Big Picture

Among the major states of the Middle East, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are rivals competing for dominance in the Sunni Muslim world. The fallout over the violent death of a Saudi journalist in Turkey has given Ankara some leverage against Riyadh, which it will use carefully.
See Rebalancing Power in the Middle East

See The Saudi Survival StrategySee Turkey's Resurgence

The speech and the steady leak of information from Turkish authorities strengthen the view that Erdogan is trying to carefully pressure Saudi Arabia, whose worldview and regional policies are at odds with Turkey's. Erdogan isn't going so far as to risk destroying relations with Saudi Arabia — especially given the prospect that the crown prince could emerge from the scandal — but if international pressure against the crown prince rises, Erdogan is well-positioned to join in the campaign. For the moment, Turkey is seeking to alter the balances within the Saudi royal family by emphasizing that the king is a credible partner while explicitly questioning who instigated the killing, all without mentioning the crown prince by name.

The antagonism between the crown prince and the president is mutual. In comments earlier this year to the Egyptian press, the crown prince called Turkey, Iran and political Islam an "axis of evil." Basically, the two leaders are revisiting a familiar history of Saudi-Turkish rivalry, which goes back decades. Economic priorities might prevent each side from damaging an otherwise productive relationship, but that doesn't mean each won't try to capitalize on the other's moments of weakness and public relations stumbles — particularly in the way Turkey appears to building leverage against Saudi Arabia in the Khashoggi killing.

Who Leads the Sunni World?

At its core, the conflict is driven by their differing political visions for the Sunni world, as well as the struggle between the visions to get the upper hand. For Saudi Arabia, which is the custodian of Islam's two holiest cities, Turkey's challenge is seen as an attack on the legitimacy of the Saud family as rulers. For Turkey, whose sultans once held the same cities as the caliphs of the Sunni world, it is an opportunity to secure soft power in the Muslim world for decades to come.

At its core, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is driven by their differing political visions for the Sunni world.

The question of leadership in the Sunni world has been in flux since the nascent Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate in 1924. In the republican Turkish view, it is authentic expressions of Islamic thought, as espoused by morally upright Muslim citizens, that ought to guide and rule the Sunni world. The Saudis, in contrast, believe that traditional and clear hierarchies, with authority vested in Riyadh-appointed members of the ulama (Muslim clerics), should guide the Sunni world. In essence, Turkey posits that the legitimacy for leadership comes from the grassroots authenticity of everyday Muslims, while Saudi Arabia claims that it is based on the hierarchy of tradition.

This worldview explains Riyadh's abhorrence of movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which holds views similar to Turkey and which has received political protection from Ankara. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has operated out of Turkey since Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi seized power from Mohammed Morsi, a member of the group, in 2013. Turkey's worldview appeals to Muslims anywhere who believe that it is not tradition or social deference that must determine leadership, but commitment to the Islamic faith.

This is a direct political threat to the Saudi royal family's legitimacy; the more Saudis are exposed to such thinking, the more they may question the tribal-cum-wasta ("influence") social contract that underpins much of the monarchy's authority. While the Saudis also claim to be pursuing true and authentic representations of Islam, their insistence on royal privilege and prerogative opens them to criticism that their religious scruples are not as consistent as they say. This creates a soft power contest between the two, and Riyadh hopes to keep this Turkish-derived influence as far away from Saudi subjects as possible.

Rival Camps

Because Turkey and Saudi Arabia view themselves as the Muslim world's pre-eminent Sunni powers, they are broadly aligned on many foreign policy issues. For instance, both countries want to contain the spread of Iranian hegemony in the region, perceiving Persian power as a threat to their own ability to lead the Middle East and the Muslim world. This makes the two powers natural allies to the United States' growing efforts to contain Iran's influence. Washington's increasing reliance on the two to help contain Iran rests on existing U.S. dependence on the pair to bolster regional counterterrorism efforts. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have, after all, committed to fighting the Islamic State alongside the United States.

But despite their broad alignment on Iran, Ankara and Riyadh have very different relationships with Tehran. While Saudi Arabia avoids as much contact with Iran as possible, Turkey shares a border and an economic and strategic relationship with the country. This might expose Turkey to certain risks (for instance, the risk of suffering harsher U.S. sanctions on Iran in the coming months and years if Turkish companies continue to trade with Iranian entities), but it also provides Ankara a certain freedom to maneuver that Riyadh does not enjoy, such as in the Syria conflict. Moreover, Turkey and Iran's shared border and large Kurdish populations also give the pair common cause to contain Kurdish separatism.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia further have an interest in supporting the same political causes across the Sunni world, albeit from different angles. The two countries support Palestinian statehood but have pursued contrasting approaches to economic and political aid for the community. Turkey is closer to Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that rules Gaza, while Saudi Arabia primarily backs Fatah, the Palestinian faction that controls the West Bank and which is hostile toward Hamas. Turkey is also publicly healing its rift with Israel, which will broaden its ability to extend support to the Palestinians, at a time when Saudi Arabia has kept its ties with Israel as quiet as possible while expressing public support for the Palestinian cause.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also staunchly opposed Syrian President Bashar al Assad throughout most of the Syrian civil war, but they have supported different rebel groups in the conflict. In this, Saudi Arabia's recent support for the Syrian Kurds has particularly irked Turkey, which view such rebel groups as terrorists.

Competition and Conflict

The Iranian-Saudi rivalry has attracted much attention, but the Turkish-Saudi rivalry — nuanced though it is — is also producing real policy effects, drawing regional Sunni countries into either the Ankara or Riyadh camp. Because Turkey's political model threatens governments such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the two states have aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia's regional endeavors. But other Sunni governments, such as Qatar, have grown closer to Turkey because Doha supports Islamist politics as a means of forming deeper connections to global Muslim communities. A few, such as Jordan and Lebanon, try to benefit from both.

Further afield in Africa, the two powers have sought to build the political, religious, economic and security influence that could bolster political legitimacy on the continent. In the Horn of Africa and across North Africa, both countries are opportunistic, taking advantage of political openings, as in Somalia, where Turkey supports political forces opposed to rivals backed by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In Tunisia, Turkey has tried to support the Islamist Ennahda party to help it counter more secularist parties, prompting Saudi Arabia's (somewhat unsuccessful) efforts to back the latter. Saudi Arabia has also sought to weaken Turkey's ability to make Africa an export market by undercutting Turkish efforts with donations or investments. By strengthening African economies, Saudi Arabia can help give them the strength to push for a harder bargain with Turkey or to seek imports from elsewhere.

As rivals, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have found ways to needle each other at points of weakness. Because preventing the development of an autonomous Kurdish polity is Turkey's primary security objective, Ankara is increasingly nervous about Saudi and Gulf efforts to connect with Kurds in Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia also deeply opposes Turkey's support for Qatar, which helped provide a political and security lifeline at the beginning of the June 2017 blockade. Riyadh especially wants to prevent Ankara from bolstering its military presence in Qatar. What's more, the two have also supported different communities within the crowded and complex political spectrum in Lebanon, in some ways inflaming Beirut's political problems.

Neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia has a significant interest in stirring political waters that could upend valuable economic ties.

Economic Ties

Despite the rivalry, Saudi Arabia and Turkey's burgeoning economic ties might mitigate the possibility of a serious rift — particularly in the realm of defense. Turkish-Saudi defense collaboration began in September 2013, when the two countries ratified a cooperation agreement. Late in 2017, Aselsan Corp., one of Turkey's most important defense companies, formed a joint venture with Saudi Arabia's Taqnia called Saudi Defense Electronics Co. (SADEC), which focuses primarily on electronics, including jammers, radars, electronic warfare suites and infrared receivers. As part of the joint venture, Aselsan and Taqnia have commenced construction on a factory in Saudi Arabia.

Turkey has not yet made any major arms sales to Saudi Arabia, although Ankara has been negotiating the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to Saudi Arabia and has entertained hopes of selling its Altay tank, as well as other weapons and equipment. Because bilateral defense ties remain in their infancy, a serious rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia would not upend any current arms deals, but it would certainly hinder Ankara's ambitions of expanding into the lucrative Saudi market, meaning neither side would benefit from a profound rupture in relations.

In terms of trade, the relationship is not massive (the two conducted just $4.7 billion in largely balanced trade last year), yet both governments have pledged to increase trade and investment in sectors that matter to both. Accordingly, neither country has a significant interest in stirring political waters that could upend valuable economic ties. Turkish construction firms, which represent a strategic sector for Ankara, have won contracts to build Saudi Arabian housing projects — the number of which is set to grow substantially under Riyadh's Vision 2030. Saudi tourists, whose numbers have also been increasing yearly, have also buoyed the Turkish economy by spending big when visiting Turkey. Saudi citizens have also been at the forefront of a campaign to gobble up Turkish real estate, highlighting just how important the kingdom's customers are to the economic sector for Ankara. (Naturally, some of Riyadh's influence over Ankara through the real estate market is mitigated by the $1 billion in investments that Qatar, an even bigger foe of Saudi Arabia, has made in Turkey's housing market in the past three years.)

Keeping Calm, for Now

For now, Riyadh is playing it safe with Ankara as it tries to defuse the Khashoggi crisis. So what, ultimately, does Turkey want as it dangles the journalist's case over Saudi Arabia? Economically, Turkey could be quietly soliciting Saudi financial support in exchange for an end to the media pressure on the crown prince or it might even be soliciting some diplomatic relief for Doha, which remains under the Gulf Cooperation Council's blockade. Politically and security-wise, Turkey is also seeking a channel to contain Saudi support for the Kurds.

Ultimately, however, much of the Saudi-Turkish rivalry fits into the political and soft power spheres, in which personalities like Mohammed bin Salman and Erdogan compete for prestige and Ankara and Riyadh attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Sunni world. For now, Turkey appears to see the benefit in not rocking the boat with Saudi Arabia— but that's no guarantee that it won't change its mind.

[Crafty_Dog]

Like
· Reply · 1d
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Why is everyone defending a Muslim Brotherhood agent? We know it's all selective condemnation by the media. I was in the UAE when the government deported 200 of them for plotting to undermine and overthrow the government. They were planning violent Jihad attacks (one was carried out, but not recognised as such by most), and placing agents all over in positions of influence.
Manage
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· Reply · 1d · Edited

=================

Charles Blanchard
Charles Blanchard I’m wondering why anyone would defend what might have been the stupidest op in the history of the world. The Muslim brotherhood is hardly monolithic anyway. Aren’t saudi’s Allies in Yemen an offshoot of the Muslim brotherhood?

Anyway if MBS was behind it and is now planning to execute the people that carried it out, he seems to me to be a poor leader to get behind. Not exactly the George Washington of the Middle East.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

====================

Chad McCoy
Chad McCoy Lloyd De Jongh he's been misreported as being a US citizen so it appears US member of the press was murdered. There's more to this, freedom of the press, assassination, humans rights, and the extending drama provided to the media by the Saudis.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

====================

Marc Denny
Marc Denny Chad McCoy Ummm , , , You sure about that? The reporting I've seen has him as having had legal residence, not US citizen.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

==============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan has been infiltrating the US successfully for a long time, working through dozens of front organisations. Hussein Obama was an enabler of theirs. They have an agenda right out of the 7th century, I'm surprised anyone would want to defend the…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

============================


Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan would love to see an even more Salafist government in Saudi, so they are making hay out of this. It's sheer coincidence that it's made the news to this extent and is used to attack the enemies of the Ikhwan and the Orange Man Bad. It's not a…See More
1
Manage
Haha
· Reply · 1d

===========================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I didn't feel some of my girlfriends would cheat on me either, but it turned out otherwise. US media is largely unreliable and dishonest, Obama was an enabler of numerous Islamic causes and groups. In Iraq I was there for his ISIS bombing campaign. Sur…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

===========================









Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The military doesn't run off and do their own thing. They follow orders. The above are your statements, not mine. Those are good questions, but why is your FBI so corrupt? Is it indicative of mismanagement from the Obama era? https://www1.cbn.com/ibrahim-21
Manage
www1.cbn.com
Obama’s Brother: Muslim Brotherhood Leader?
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


==========================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d

====================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d

===========================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh They follow orders. And when ordered to bomb empty fields they did exactly that. The US media dutifully reported that ISIS was being hammered. By dust thrown up by bombs dropped 2km away, after a leaflet drop gave them notice in advance.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited

===================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


==================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


===============================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you take on board the words of one of your senior military men?
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

=================


Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I haven't listened to this one yet: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zT8tF41KDI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Accuses Barack Obama Of Treason
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d

====================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Got their asses handed to them militarily, which was no surprise. However, the neutered FBI and other intelligence agencies had their anti-Jihad Islamic terror programs gutted by Obama. People who spoke out were fired. Europe is no better, I have some …See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

===================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Pro-Islam is anti-US. Obama was no friend to the US police, or race relations. The decline of race relations is Obama's fault, as is the rise of AntiFa, unchecked migration, the rise of ISIS, transgender madness and other events happened on his watch. Funding Iran, allowing the Ikhwan to infiltrate the US government, those are not pro-US moves.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

===========================


Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you need an ISIS membership card to prove that ISIS is embedding people into migrant caravans, or a Hezbollah ID to prove that they are training drug cartel members, infiltrating their people via these means and funding efforts to move weapons and d…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited

===============================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh ISIS has training camps in South Africa. Do you expect a logo on the wall and a flag above the house? Left wing propaganda consists in denying that there are enemies of the US and freedom at work. Am I a right wing propagandist?
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d


=======================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh https://orientxxi.info/.../barack-obama-lackey-of-egypt-s...
Manage
orientxxi.info
Barack Obama, “lackey” of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


=======================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh So are you claiming that Admiral Lyons is wrong? He's military, of long standing.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

==================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Lyons reveals Obama's pro-Islamic, pro-Iranian stance. Which by default, is anti-American. When all you have is the headline to criticise... Did Obama send pallets of cash to the Iranians? Did he give ISIS free reign? Did he allow the Ikhwan to propoga…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

[G M]

Awesome!

Like
· Reply · 1d
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Why is everyone defending a Muslim Brotherhood agent? We know it's all selective condemnation by the media. I was in the UAE when the government deported 200 of them for plotting to undermine and overthrow the government. They were planning violent Jihad attacks (one was carried out, but not recognised as such by most), and placing agents all over in positions of influence.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited

=================

Charles Blanchard
Charles Blanchard I’m wondering why anyone would defend what might have been the stupidest op in the history of the world. The Muslim brotherhood is hardly monolithic anyway. Aren’t saudi’s Allies in Yemen an offshoot of the Muslim brotherhood?

Anyway if MBS was behind it and is now planning to execute the people that carried it out, he seems to me to be a poor leader to get behind. Not exactly the George Washington of the Middle East.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

====================

Chad McCoy
Chad McCoy Lloyd De Jongh he's been misreported as being a US citizen so it appears US member of the press was murdered. There's more to this, freedom of the press, assassination, humans rights, and the extending drama provided to the media by the Saudis.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

====================

Marc Denny
Marc Denny Chad McCoy Ummm , , , You sure about that? The reporting I've seen has him as having had legal residence, not US citizen.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

==============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan has been infiltrating the US successfully for a long time, working through dozens of front organisations. Hussein Obama was an enabler of theirs. They have an agenda right out of the 7th century, I'm surprised anyone would want to defend the…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

============================


Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan would love to see an even more Salafist government in Saudi, so they are making hay out of this. It's sheer coincidence that it's made the news to this extent and is used to attack the enemies of the Ikhwan and the Orange Man Bad. It's not a…See More
1
Manage
Haha
· Reply · 1d

===========================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I didn't feel some of my girlfriends would cheat on me either, but it turned out otherwise. US media is largely unreliable and dishonest, Obama was an enabler of numerous Islamic causes and groups. In Iraq I was there for his ISIS bombing campaign. Sur…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

===========================









Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The military doesn't run off and do their own thing. They follow orders. The above are your statements, not mine. Those are good questions, but why is your FBI so corrupt? Is it indicative of mismanagement from the Obama era? https://www1.cbn.com/ibrahim-21
Manage
www1.cbn.com
Obama’s Brother: Muslim Brotherhood Leader?
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


==========================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d

====================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d

===========================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh They follow orders. And when ordered to bomb empty fields they did exactly that. The US media dutifully reported that ISIS was being hammered. By dust thrown up by bombs dropped 2km away, after a leaflet drop gave them notice in advance.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited

===================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


==================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


===============================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you take on board the words of one of your senior military men?
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

=================


Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I haven't listened to this one yet: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zT8tF41KDI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Accuses Barack Obama Of Treason
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d

====================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Got their asses handed to them militarily, which was no surprise. However, the neutered FBI and other intelligence agencies had their anti-Jihad Islamic terror programs gutted by Obama. People who spoke out were fired. Europe is no better, I have some …See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

===================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Pro-Islam is anti-US. Obama was no friend to the US police, or race relations. The decline of race relations is Obama's fault, as is the rise of AntiFa, unchecked migration, the rise of ISIS, transgender madness and other events happened on his watch. Funding Iran, allowing the Ikhwan to infiltrate the US government, those are not pro-US moves.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

===========================


Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you need an ISIS membership card to prove that ISIS is embedding people into migrant caravans, or a Hezbollah ID to prove that they are training drug cartel members, infiltrating their people via these means and funding efforts to move weapons and d…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited

===============================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh ISIS has training camps in South Africa. Do you expect a logo on the wall and a flag above the house? Left wing propaganda consists in denying that there are enemies of the US and freedom at work. Am I a right wing propagandist?
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d


=======================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh https://orientxxi.info/.../barack-obama-lackey-of-egypt-s...
Manage
orientxxi.info
Barack Obama, “lackey” of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d


=======================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh So are you claiming that Admiral Lyons is wrong? He's military, of long standing.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

==================

Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Lyons reveals Obama's pro-Islamic, pro-Iranian stance. Which by default, is anti-American. When all you have is the headline to criticise... Did Obama send pallets of cash to the Iranians? Did he give ISIS free reign? Did he allow the Ikhwan to propoga…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d

[Crafty_Dog]

Yes, Lloyd brings a lot to bear.  I keep working on getting him to post here regularly.

==================

On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines – and Future
By Karen Elliott House

The fragility of Saudi society is often attributed solely to its dependency on oil revenues. This is an oversimplification. Today, Saudi Arabia is facing problems that have been built into the very fabric of its society for hundreds of years. Indeed, long before oil was discovered, the Arabian Peninsula was held together by a combination of faith and the ruler’s largess. In exchange for accepting the rule of the monarch, Saudis mostly stayed out of popular politics.

Saudi Arabia’s social contract hinges on the mutual legitimization of religious and secular power. This duality is no coincidence. Muhammad bin Saud, who founded the first Saudi state in 1744, sought to unite a disparate group of tribes spread over the vast Arabian Peninsula into a single entity. This required casting off Ottoman rule, and to do so, he needed a unified force. To overcome the multiplicity of tribal interests that stood between Saud and a loyal, unified force, he looked to religion. At the time, some religious scholars believed that Islam had lost its way, but a reform movement led by Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to purify the religion by returning it to its roots. In exchange for spreading Wahhab’s reformist version of Islam, Saud’s new state was granted religious legitimacy.

While the first Saudi state would not last long into the 19th century, its two subsequent incarnations – the last of which is the current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – were also founded on the premise of the Saudis’ right to rule. Yet the need to unite through faith reveals a reality of Saudi society the rules would rather avoid: It is extremely divided. For example, Saudi Arabia is a majority Sunni country, but it has a large Shiite population. In addition, people in the country’s central Nejd region – long isolated from the outside world by deserts – often do not see eye to eye with those in Hejaz, which sits on the Red Sea and is thus highly influenced by trade and the ideas that so often accompany it.

Oil wealth alleviated much of Saudi Arabia’s poverty. Yet with greater wealth came higher expectations as a new generation became accustomed to ever greater levels of government subsidies. To meet these expectations, Saudi Arabia’s leaders must somehow diversify the country’s economy away from the oil industry. Yet the deeply ingrained religious elements in Saudi society create massive constraints and dislocations that will be difficult to overcome. Men often see themselves as above the jobs that are available yet are unqualified for the jobs they want. Women are allowed to work but face substantial religious restrictions limiting the types of jobs that can hold. The resultant gap is filled by immigrant laborers, paid wages that would be unacceptable to many Saudis. The workforce (excluding the military) thus has twice as many foreign workers as it has Saudis.

Saudi Arabia must transform its economy to solve these problems. Yet doing so requires reforms that would also fundamentally transform its society, which threatens the religious-political social contract that has since its inception been the linchpin of Saudi unity. To survive, Saudi Arabia must first risk peeling off the glue that has held it together for centuries.

“On Saudi Arabia” is an impressive effort to outline the dysfunction in Saudi society that poses a major threat to the ruling family. Through years of on-the-ground interviews, Karen Elliot House paints a picture of day-to-day life for different types of people in Saudi society. But she does not omit the high-level analysis that’s required to put these experiences into the context necessary to walk away with a fuller understanding of where the country sits at this particular moment in history, and why it faces the challenges it does today.

Xander Snyder, analyst

[Crafty_Dog]

Third post of the day

https://amgreatness.com/2018/11/19/big-medias-power-games-and-the-khashoggi-affair/

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump’s Pick for Saudi Ambassador is Expert on Hezbollah and Iran
by Seth J. Frantzman
The Jerusalem Post
November 15, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/trump’s-pick-for-saudi-ambassador-is-expert-on-hez

[Crafty_Dog]

https://globalnews.ca/news/4545784/jamal-khashoggi-osama-bin-laden/?fbclid=IwAR2Whti61AIY7H7bwfrG4nbQZRlASgLda9JhR1WG_SXzPtlEfQekGNb7Th8

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/saudi-arabia-alliance-requires-realpolitik/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-11-21&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.patreon.com/posts/22884900

Hat tip to Michael Yon for the find.

[G M]

https://www.patreon.com/posts/22884900

Hat tip to Michael Yon for the find.

Yup.

[ccp]

"https://www.patreon.com/posts/22884900"

These same high and holy LEFTist MSM phonies and their email network Democrat pols had little problem when AMERICANS were murdered by a violent mob in Benghazi did they?  When Obrock's soldiers went out and completely lied about who was responsible (right before an election ) to cover up the truth and Hillary , (the terrible) stated that it was too bad they died they knew their jobs were risky to start with  we heard nothing from MSM.  They mocked the Benghazi investigators  and the Repubs who were the only ones who would dare question Obama (the self proclaimed "great").

Now with an Arabian guy who may have done some side work for the Bezos' WP  who was obviously murdered by the Salman guy in a foreign country should prompt undercutting the interests of our entire country which would only help enemy Iran and its' proxies.

No fake news there!  sarcasm

No distortion of the facts by Leftist Media ! sarcasm.

Anything simply to make Trump look bad !  NO sarcasm - just truth.

the MSMedia absolutely the enemy of half the people of this country and factually of most in this county though some refuse to admit it.

[Crafty_Dog]

Its Breitbart but it is interesting:

https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2018/11/23/caroline-glick-trump-jamal-khashoggi/

[DougMacG]

From a link in Glick's colummn:

Kashoggi mourned Osama bin Laden's death.

"[Kashoggi] first drew international attention for interviewing a young Osama bin Laden"

"Mr. Khashoggi’s first claim to fame was his acquaintance with Osama bin Laden. Mr. Khashoggi had spent time in Jidda, Bin Laden’s hometown, and, like Bin Laden, he came from a prominent nonroyal family. "

"Mr. Khashoggi cheered for the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which was supported by the C.I.A. and Saudi Arabia. So when he got an invitation to see it for himself from another young Saudi, Bin Laden, Mr. Khashoggi jumped at the chance."

Years later, after American commandos killed Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, Mr. Khashoggi mourned his old acquaintance and what he had become.

“I collapsed crying a while ago, heartbroken for you Abu Abdullah,” Mr. Khashoggi wrote on Twitter, using Bin Laden’s nickname. “You were beautiful and brave in those beautiful days in Afghanistan, before you surrendered to hatred and passion.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/world/middleeast/jamal-khashoggi-saudi-arabia.html
---------------------------
For the record, I did not take to twitter to mourn Osama bin Laden's death nor did anyone I know.  This 'journalist' did not deserve brutal murder but his life and work deserve some scrutiny. 

A brief recap on what his friend/acquaintance Osama bin Laden did before Kashoggi mourned his death.  Killing Americans since at least 1993:

1991: Bin Laden expelled from Saudi Arabia.

Feb 1993: The first World Trade Center bombing.  The first al-Qaeda terrorist attack on America was carried out killing six and injuring hundreds. Six Muslim radicals, whom the US officials suspect have links to bin Laden, are eventually convicted for the bombing.
Americans killed.

1994: The Saudi government revokes bin Laden citizenship and freezes his assets after he issued fatwas, or Islamic religious pronouncements, denouncing both the royal family and the United States.

Nov 1995: A truck bomb exploded near the Saudi National Guard Communications Center in central Riyadh, killing five American soldiers and two Indian police. The attack is attributed to bin Laden's group, which did not claim responsibility but made clear its support for those responsible.
Americans killed.

June 1996: A truck loaded with explosives destroyed a building at the US military base of Khobar in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen American servicemen were killed and 386 were wounded.
Americans killed.

August 1996: Bin Laden formally declared a holy war against the US forces.
Declared war against America.

August 1998: Suicide bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania kill 224 people including 12 Americans. The United States indicted bin Laden for role in embassy bombings.
Americans killed.

2000: The destroyer U.S.S. Cole was attacked while refueling in Yemen. Seventeen sailors were killed.
Americans killed.

Sept 11, 2001: Two hijacked US airliners crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and a third hijacked plane crashed into the Pentagon outside Washington, killing more than 3,000 people.
Americans killed.

Sept 13, 2001: the US government named bin Laden as a principal suspect for coordinating the attacks in New York and Washington.

Dec. 26, 2001 - Bin Laden said in a video that the 9/11 suicide attacks were intended to stop the US support for Israel.

Nov. 2002 - Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for three suicide car bombs which blew up the Mombasa Paradise resort hotel full of Israelis, killing 15 other people and wounding 80.
Israelis killed.

2003-2007: Al-Qaeda continued to release time-sensitive and professionally-verified videos demonstrating Bin Laden's continued survival as recently as August 2007.

September 2007: Osama bin Laden appeared in his first videotape in nearly three years, to mark the sixth anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Jan. 24, 2010 - Bin Laden claimed responsibility for the failed Dec. 25 bombing of US airliner in an audio tape and threatened more strikes on US targets.
Tried to kill Americans.

Aug. 2010 – US gets initial lead on Osama’s hideout in Pakistan and President Barack Obama ordered an all-out mission to capture him alive or kill him.

May 1, 2011: President Barack Obama announced late night on Sunday that Osama bin Laden was killed in a firefight with U.S. forces in Pakistan and his body was recovered.
--------------------------
Who else in American 'mainstream' media mourned the death of Osama bin Laden.  The turn to "hatred and passion" was not a recent, minor or incidental event in his life.  It was his life's work.

[Crafty_Dog]

“I collapsed crying a while ago, heartbroken for you Abu Abdullah,” Mr. Khashoggi wrote on Twitter, using Bin Laden’s nickname. “You were beautiful and brave in those beautiful days in Afghanistan, before you surrendered to hatred and passion.”

What meaning do you give to the last seven words of that sentence?

[DougMacG]

“I collapsed crying a while ago, heartbroken for you Abu Abdullah,” Mr. Khashoggi wrote on Twitter, using Bin Laden’s nickname. “You were beautiful and brave in those beautiful days in Afghanistan, before you surrendered to hatred and passion.”

What meaning to you give to the last seven words of that sentence?

Good question. Getting at that is why I posted the whole quote where Glick only wrote that he mourned the loss.

Taken literally, he is only celebrating the life of a good man before he "surrendered to hatred and passion" like a friend of Hitler might still consider him bold and beautiful before all the Nazi stuff.  I find it outrageously offensive even with the qualification though a neutral party might say he is technically not supporting the acts for which Osama bin Laden is known.  Calling him by a private, endearing nickname (through US based Twitter) after nearly 20 years of devastating terror war against the US is something beneath poor taste though it was nuanced.

I posted that timeline of terror to add the context that terror, killing Americans and inspiring others to try to destroy America and Americans was not some minor or insignificant part of "brave and beautiful" "Abu Abdullah's" life.

[Crafty_Dog]

I was a tremendous admirer of WSJ editorialist in the late 70s early 80s and then author of "The Way the World Works" which the WSJ called "one of the 100 most important books of the 20th century" but during his final years he became an anti-semitic crank and apparently a stooge of Saddam Hussein in the run up to the Iraq War.  Does that change that I think TWTWW to be a brilliant book?

Even Konrad Lorenz, whom I admired to the point of naming my son after him, turned out to have had his Nobel prize revoked or something like that because the Nazis used some of genetic work to bolster their theories.  I've read deeper than most in his works, yet I saw nothing for myself of Nazism.

Here the quote shows only that Kashoggi remembered the man with whom he went to war-- is there a stronger bond?-- yet he still saw him as having surrendered to hatred and passion.

As best as I can tell Kashoggi was Muslim Brotherhood, with all the hatred and fascism that implies, but that impression does not rest on this quote.