Author Topic: North and South Korea  (Read 165125 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Putin's assist for Norks
« Reply #250 on: July 06, 2017, 08:51:43 PM »
second post

Putin’s Assist for North Korea
Russia sends a message to Trump by nixing a U.N. resolution.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4. Photo: /Associated Press
July 6, 2017 7:01 p.m. ET
25 COMMENTS

President Trump meets with Vladimir Putin on Friday, and the Russian strongman sent his early regards on Thursday by nixing a U.S. resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning North Korea’s latest missile launch. The resolution didn’t stipulate any action, but our friends the Russians still objected.

The Kremlin excuse is that the draft U.S. statement referred to the rocket as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Never mind that North Korea claims the missile was the equivalent of an ICBM, and the U.S. and other analysis of the trajectory and altitude suggest the same.

“The rationale [for Russia’s rejection] is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to other Security Council members. “Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue.”

The likelier explanation is that Mr. Putin wanted to send a message that he can make trouble if Mr. Trump resists a “reset” in U.S.-Russia ties. Russia has also joined with China in trying to coax the U.S. and South Korea to cease military exercises in Northeast Asia in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear program. But that would merely ratify Pyongyang’s current stockpile and missile progress, assuming it even honored such a freeze, which it would not.

Russia and China are authoritarian powers seeking to dominate their regions, but the problem with tolerating such “spheres of influence” is that regional powers often collaborate to stir trouble beyond those spheres. As they are now abetting North Korea.

Appeared in the July 7, 2017, print edition.

G M

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Re: Putin's assist for Norks
« Reply #251 on: July 06, 2017, 10:29:42 PM »
Strange, I was told Putin and Trump were BFFs! Or, that Trump was Putin's sockpuppet.


second post

Putin’s Assist for North Korea
Russia sends a message to Trump by nixing a U.N. resolution.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4. Photo: /Associated Press
July 6, 2017 7:01 p.m. ET
25 COMMENTS

President Trump meets with Vladimir Putin on Friday, and the Russian strongman sent his early regards on Thursday by nixing a U.S. resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning North Korea’s latest missile launch. The resolution didn’t stipulate any action, but our friends the Russians still objected.

The Kremlin excuse is that the draft U.S. statement referred to the rocket as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Never mind that North Korea claims the missile was the equivalent of an ICBM, and the U.S. and other analysis of the trajectory and altitude suggest the same.

“The rationale [for Russia’s rejection] is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to other Security Council members. “Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue.”

The likelier explanation is that Mr. Putin wanted to send a message that he can make trouble if Mr. Trump resists a “reset” in U.S.-Russia ties. Russia has also joined with China in trying to coax the U.S. and South Korea to cease military exercises in Northeast Asia in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear program. But that would merely ratify Pyongyang’s current stockpile and missile progress, assuming it even honored such a freeze, which it would not.

Russia and China are authoritarian powers seeking to dominate their regions, but the problem with tolerating such “spheres of influence” is that regional powers often collaborate to stir trouble beyond those spheres. As they are now abetting North Korea.

Appeared in the July 7, 2017, print edition.


Crafty_Dog

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #252 on: July 09, 2017, 09:07:24 AM »
I have commented on the probabilities of Nork cross-breeding with the Iranians, but in the last couple of days I have seen a number of reports that the Nork mobile missile launcher and other missile related equipment (including parts of missiles in question) were CHINESE.

Would love to have some citations for this.

This does make considerable sense-- my initial read being that the Chinese are being this as a way of forcing us to acquiesce in its conquest of the SCS , , , AND break our alliance with South Korea.

G M

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Is China Using North Korea For Nuclear Blackmail Against The US?
« Reply #253 on: July 09, 2017, 09:23:24 AM »
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/11/23/is-china-using-north-korea-for-nuclear-blackmail-against-the-us/#e37c24f2f8d1

Is China Using North Korea For Nuclear Blackmail Against The US?





Anders Corr ,   CONTRIBUTOR
I cover international politics, security and political risk. 

“Some White House officials believe that if Mr. Trump follows through on campaign vows to label China a currency manipulator and slaps Chinese imports with hefty tariffs, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make it a point to be uncooperative on North Korea.”
China’s linkage of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. trade issues would be close to using the nuclear weapons of a proxy country to blackmail the United States.

A Wall Street Journal article recently stated that “Some White House officials believe that if Mr. Trump follows through on campaign vows to label China a currency manipulator and slaps Chinese imports with hefty tariffs, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make it a point to be uncooperative on North Korea.” The main issue on which the U.S. needs Chinese cooperation on North Korea is to stop its development of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. If the White House officials are correct, China’s linkage of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. trade issues would be close to using the nuclear weapons of a proxy country to blackmail the United States.


A South Korean man watches a TV newscast reporting the visit to China by North Korea's Kim Jong-un, at a railway station in Seoul on May 20, 2011. Kim Jong-Un began a visit to China, according to Seoul media reports, signified Beijing's approval of the North's succession process. JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images

China has arguably done this before, including through nuclear assistance to proliferating authoritarian countries. China is a major ally of Pakistan, whose China-assisted nuclear weapons threaten India. China is an ally of Russia, whose nuclear weapons threaten the U.S. and Europe. China is an ally of Iran, whose China-assisted nuclear weapons development threatens Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which are U.S. allies. In other words, China assists all the major nuclear-armed countries that oppose the United States and its democratic allies. Why is that? Could it be that China is purposefully supporting nuclear proxies against the United States? If one of these proxies launches just a few weapons against the U.S., and destroys our economy, tax base, and therefore our defense industry, China could sit the conflict out, high and dry, and announce itself afterwards as the next global hegemon.

Giving into authoritarians with nuclear weapons, as one writer in the Atlantic recently proposed to do with North Korea, is not the answer. The U.S., our European allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are all democracies, and have bigger, better, and more innovative economies than the autocrats. If democracies could unify against the threat of authoritarian regimes, we could use strong economic sanctions and a robust military defense to dissuade them from their current path of authoritarian militarization. We should start with China, whose economy has the most to lose from trade sanctions, and which supports lesser autocrats worldwide. If we wait and do nothing about nuclear proliferation among autocrats, which is essentially what we have done for the last few decades, we abandon millions of people in our cities to the whims of nuclear-armed tin pot dictators like Kim Jong-un.

Crafty_Dog

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G M

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Re: Serious Read: Nork's new ICBM and nuclear strategy
« Reply #255 on: July 09, 2017, 10:11:05 PM »
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/

"My reconstruction of the missile's trajectory, assuming the North Korean claims are correct, give it a maximum range of perhaps 8,000 kilometers," John Schilling, a consultant to the 38 North website, told Yonhap News Agency.

So, if I am not mistaken, if a NorK ICBM were based in another country, like Iran, then all of europe would be in range, correct? All our Asian allies as well, right?


Crafty_Dog

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #256 on: July 10, 2017, 10:45:08 AM »
Too bad Obama-Hillary undid President Bush's foresight with the ABM deals with Poland and Czech Republic , , , Good thing President Trump is looking to rectify that.

DougMacG

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #257 on: July 13, 2017, 11:45:20 AM »
A VDH piece this week on NK seemed to have no solution or idea in it:
https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/07/13/west-can-neither-live-with-nor-take-out-north-korean-nukes-n2353920

There are reports that we had a clear chance of taking out Kim Jung UN on July 4 at the missile launch site (and didn't take it):
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-didn-t-kill-kim-jong-un-icbm-test-july-4-2017-7

Regime change was not the goal?  Huh??

After dithering and floundering on Osama bin Laden (1998), Iran, NK, healthcare, economics and so many other issues, it would be nice once in a while if the US had a plan instead of just talk and running up military, spending and debt.

This will be easier, safer, later??

I wouldn't want to be accused over at the UN of taking out a guy who is seriously threatening to destroy half the world.

G M

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #258 on: July 13, 2017, 12:16:14 PM »
A VDH piece this week on NK seemed to have no solution or idea in it:
https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/07/13/west-can-neither-live-with-nor-take-out-north-korean-nukes-n2353920

There are reports that we had a clear chance of taking out Kim Jung UN on July 4 at the missile launch site (and didn't take it):
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-didn-t-kill-kim-jong-un-icbm-test-july-4-2017-7

Regime change was not the goal?  Huh??

After dithering and floundering on Osama bin Laden (1998), Iran, NK, healthcare, economics and so many other issues, it would be nice once in a while if the US had a plan instead of just talk and running up military, spending and debt.

This will be easier, safer, later??

I wouldn't want to be accused over at the UN of taking out a guy who is seriously threatening to destroy half the world.


Killing Lil' Kim would almost guarantee kicking off a major war, if not WWIII. It may be a bullet we have to bite, but we really need to exhaust every other option first.

DougMacG

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #259 on: July 13, 2017, 04:41:23 PM »
"Killing Lil' Kim would almost guarantee kicking off a major war, if not WWIII. It may be a bullet we have to bite, but we really need to exhaust every other option first."

You are right - that is the thinking of the military experts who know more than me and  advise Pres. Trump that keeps it from happening.  

I think any American President also fears the international relations aftermath and our own domestic reaction to it.  Easier to just keep kicking the can down the road, as was done by others at different times with OBL, Saddam, Iran and NK.  Let the next administration deal with it.  Is that in the best interest of the country?

Exhausting all other options, it's been 60 years, and 30 years since the phony Clinton- Albright deal where they promised to not do what is now done.

A strike should be done only if/when we are as ready as is possible with all possible allies to put down whatever happens in response.

My view is that if we conduct a surgical strike, in this case he is standing there and then he just falls over dead from a strike he can't see and nothing else... I'll bet there would be confusion, contention, struggle and decisions to be made from the inside to figure out who is in charge and what to do next.  If their next move is to set off major offensive attacks, it is a suicide mission and the end of the regime, just as he would face now..  If the successors reaction is to continue the same games of the last decades, now they know we might strike them at any time for their threats.  Think of the Reagan strike on Khadafy.
 We missed him but his life and his decision making changed.  Iran and whoever else threatens us would also feel the effect.  The message to those who do is, don't.
« Last Edit: July 13, 2017, 05:34:37 PM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: On a warpath paved with rational decisions
« Reply #260 on: July 18, 2017, 07:51:24 AM »
    Regions & Countries

    Topics

    Themes

    Series

Editor's Note:

North Korea demonstrated at least a rudimentary capability to launch a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with its latest test of the Hwasong-14. At the extreme estimates of its range, the missile has the ability to strike parts of the western United States. More tests and developments will be necessary to increase the Hwasong-14's range, payload and re-entry system, and questions remain about North Korea's ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and make it rugged enough to mount on the missile. Even so, Pyongyang is clearly well on its way to realizing its goal of a long-range nuclear weapons capability. This is the first installment in a three-part series examining the implications of this development for the United States' relationship with North Korea.

War is rarely the first option for countries trying to preserve or enhance their strategic positions. The United States and North Korea alike would rather avoid a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which would be complicated and costly for all parties involved. Neither wants war; each side strongly prefers an alternative path to resolve the core issues underlying the crisis. Yet their differing strategic imperatives and desired end states leave little room for compromise.

As North Korea draws closer to achieving long-range missile capabilities, something it sees as a security guarantee, the United States faces mounting pressure to act. But as Washington tries to coerce North Korea to end its quest for more sophisticated arms, Pyongyang feels compelled to accelerate its nuclear weapons and missile development. Each country is merely acting to preserve its interests. But their interests are driving them closer to a physical confrontation.

The Rational Assumption

Geopolitics teaches us to assume rationality on the part of actors on the international stage. The assumption doesn't suppose that individual leaders are somehow beyond the influence of emotion, misinformation or miscalculation. Rather it acknowledges the deeper forces at work, from the interactions of place and people that shape national characteristics and strategic culture to the systems and structures that develop in countries over time. No leader operates free of these constraints and compulsions. Though they still have leeway to shape their policies and actions, leaders, as individuals and as a collective group, do so within limits defined in large part by the environments in which they emerged. The rationality we assume from leaders is not universal; it is the product of their place and time under the influence of factors such as history, geography and economics.

The key, then, is to understand what guides the rationality of a country's leadership, on an individual level and in the government as a whole. After all, no one individual rules a country, since no single person could extend power over an entire population without the help of intermediaries. And each layer of leadership adds another set of constraints to the exercise of power. Disagreements arise in governments and in the populations they preside over. But the forces that influence the options available to leaders are far larger than the concerns of the individual. It is an analyst's job to understand and explain these factors, and a policymaker's job to take them into account when considering how to achieve a desired outcome.

Even so, it is sometimes simpler in international relations to assume one's adversaries are crazy. They don't follow the desired path or react in the anticipated way, so they must be acting irrationally. If one makes the wrong assumptions of an adversary (or even of an ally), however, the response to a given action may be far from what was intended.

Of course, understanding the other side doesn't guarantee the desired outcome, either. Irreconcilable differences in interests and perceptions of risk can get in the way of compromise. The most viable solution often is to constantly adjust one's actions to manage these contradictions, even if they prove insurmountable. At times, though, the differences can be so intractable as to drive nations into conflict if each side's pursuit of contrary interests leads to fear and insecurity for the other. Moves by one nation to constrain the threatening behavior it perceives from another then perpetuate the cycle of action and reaction. In the case of North Korea and the United States, the contradiction in their interests is growing ever starker as Pyongyang accelerates its nuclear weapons program and nears its goal of developing a missile capable of striking the continental United States.

As Pyongyang draws closer to the deliverable long-range nuclear weapon it has long pursued, Washington will be forced to decide whether to accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and live with that reality or to take the necessary steps to disarm it.

A Mutual Misunderstanding

Misunderstandings, misapplied assumptions and mismatched goals have characterized relations between the United States and North Korea for decades. Washington expected — or at least hoped — that North Korea would collapse on its own under the force of economic and social pressures. The evaluation misjudged the country as the Asian equivalent of an Eastern Bloc state waiting for the Soviet Union's demise to break free from the shackles of a foreign-imposed power structure. North Korea hasn't collapsed. In fact, in times of trouble, its neighbors (and even the United States) have helped stabilize the government in Pyongyang for fear that the consequences of the country's failure would be more dangerous than the risks entailed in its survival. North Korea, meanwhile, considered itself a fixture on the United States' target list, a remnant of the Cold War that Washington was trying to toss on the ash heap of history.

The two have had many opportunities for some form of reconciliation over the years. Time and again, though, progress has run afoul of perceived threats, diverging commitments, changing priorities, domestic politics and even extraregional events. As Pyongyang draws closer to the deliverable long-range nuclear weapon it has long pursued, Washington will be forced to decide whether to accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and live with that reality or to take the necessary steps to disarm it. The cost of action is high, but so is the perceived threat of inaction.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: On a warpath paved with rational decisions part two
« Reply #261 on: July 18, 2017, 07:56:18 AM »
The United States and North Korea appear to be on a collision course. Their differing interests are reaching a point of irreconcilability, and each side sees in the other a significant threat to its national interests. To understand the rapidly shrinking timeline for a potential conflict between the two, we must first state a few assumptions about each country's view of the other.

These assumptions are based on more than merely statements by individual leaders, which often are more about subjective desire than about objective reality. Instead, they are founded on a geopolitical analysis and intelligence study of the United States and North Korea drawing from assessments of history and strategic culture as well as studies of politics, economics and past behavior. Assumptions, of course, can be wrong and must be constantly tested; they also evolve over time, as circumstances and evidence change. But for now, these are our baseline assumptions about the key actors in the Korean crisis.

The View from Pyongyang

North Korea has long considered the United States, and not South Korea, its primary adversary. Pyongyang sees the long-term presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea as a direct, intentional hindrance to unification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. And when North Korea denounces joint exercises between U.S. and South Korean armed forces as practice for military action against it, it sincerely believes in the threat that it's decrying. North Korea has deterred the United States from military action for decades through a combination of political tactics and a robust military capacity that would create mass casualties for U.S. forces on the ground and for civilians in Seoul. Pyongyang, meanwhile, ensured that it never became enough of a threat that the cost of nonintervention would exceed that of intervention from Washington's point of view. 

Since the final years of Kim Jong Il's rule, however, North Korea's core leadership has reassessed its position. The government has begun to doubt that its frontline conventional weapons, even when supplemented with biological or chemical weapons, would deter U.S. military action or stop Washington from taking steps to overthrow it. A peace accord and nonaggression pact are no longer sufficient to guarantee the North Korean system's survival, a perception that has been reinforced again and again, most notably when the United States invaded Iraq despite the risks entailed. (Various so-called "color" revolutions, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the ouster and death of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi even after his country gave up its weapons of mass destruction program likewise put Pyongyang on edge.)

North Korea's Artillery Concentration

Under current leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea has drastically accelerated its nuclear and missile programs to try to develop a demonstrable capacity to strike at the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. The capability, from Pyongyang's perspective, would provide the only viable assurance that the United States would not work to overthrow the Kim administration through political, economic or military action. Pyongyang fully recognizes that the closer it gets to demonstrating the ability to strike the United States, the more pressure Washington will feel to stop the program, whatever the means. But the high cost of military action, which could rapidly expand beyond the Korean Peninsula, still keeps the United States from following through, as do political differences with its two regional allies, South Korea and Japan. China's objections have also deterred Washington from action.

North Korea, then, is caught in a conundrum: It feels it needs a nuclear capability to deter interference in its government, yet it understands that developing its deterrent will increase the chances of intervention. As a result, Pyongyang relies on the complexities of the region and the costs of military action to keep the United States at bay long enough that it can realize its nuclear ambitions. It's a dangerous gamble, but one that North Korea's leaders feel is worth the risk, since capitulation is the only alternative.

Washington's Perspective

For the United States, North Korea has long been a secondary problem. Though the country is a perpetual source of potential regional instability, its neighbors, and its own economic limitations, always manage to keep it in check. North Korea's nuclear program presented Washington with one of its first major post-Cold War crises. But the United States avoided military action in 1994 through diplomacy, and in the years since, its general policy toward Pyongyang has been to manage the issue and put off conflict. Confronted with the price of military intervention, the United States preferred declaring moratoriums on Pyongyang's missile testing, isolating it financially and making the occasional diplomatic deal. Washington, after all, has always expected North Korea to collapse at any moment, so waiting a while longer has been the more logical policy.

But in recent years, the U.S. view has started to change. Isolation, sanctions and stern statements from the United Nations have hardly slowed North Korea's drive toward a viable nuclear deterrent. Pyongyang no longer treats its nuclear and missile programs as bargaining chips to trade away in negotiations. And as its nuclear weapons development continues, nearing a point where the threat reaches the continental United States, moratoriums on testing are not enough. The sense is growing in the United States that Pyongyang's quest for nuclear capability is a crisis that can't be punted down the road any longer.

A North Korea armed with missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons to the United States is a danger Washington cannot accept. Even if the U.S. government assumes that Pyongyang wouldn't start a war (an idea not everyone agrees with), questions remain over how it would use its new capability. North Korea could, for example, use it to constrain Washington's responses to regional moves or perhaps share its weapons technology with other "rogue" states, thereby significantly altering the global nuclear landscape. Given the pace of Pyongyang's missile tests, Washington sees that the window for taking one last shot at non-military action is rapidly closing.

The United States wants to avoid war, but to do so, it feels it must make clear that it will use military action if necessary. Washington's airstrike against the Syrian government for allegedly using chemical weapons, recent ballistic missile tests and higher-profile military exercises on the Korean Peninsula were all meant in part to demonstrate that the United States is willing to resort to military action in the absence of a better option. The U.S. government is using the threat perhaps more to try to sway China and Russia than it is to change North Korea's behavior. From Washington's point of view, Beijing alone has the leeway to propose a nonmilitary solution to the North Korean crisis. Not only is China Pyongyang's primary economic backer, but it is also keenly interested in keeping the North Korean system in place as a buffer at its border.

From the Other Sides

But the risk of intervention outweighs the risk of inaction for Beijing. China still considers instability in North Korea, or the political and military repercussions of trying to overturn the leadership there, a greater danger than Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. It continues to believe, moreover, that for all Washington's bluster, the United States wouldn't follow through on military action to stop North Korea's missile development because doing so would risk starting an East Asian war. For China, which already lives with a nuclear-armed North Korea at its border, not to mention a nuclear India, Pakistan and Russia, Pyongyang's growing capabilities are a problem, but not an unmanageable one. The United States poses a bigger risk to its strategic interests. At the same time, China's options to respond have dwindled as Pyongyang has steadily restricted Beijing's communications and influence with it.

South Korea, too, has been coping with the North Korean military threat for decades. North Korea's nuclear program threatens South Korea, aimed as it is at the U.S. alliance structure. Nevertheless, Seoul understands that its national interests and those of Washington may diverge in the future, or at least not fully coincide. South Korea also foresees little danger of North Korea trying to reunify through force; U.S. support notwithstanding, Seoul's military capabilities have grown since 1950, and the international system is no longer conducive to military action on Pyongyang's part. In the event of another war between the two Koreas, China would be just as likely to intervene on the side of the South as on that of the North, if only to prevent the United States from getting involved.

Seoul and Beijing are each interested in managing the situation and forestalling conflict rather than in resolving the issue immediately. The advancement in North Korea's ballistic missile range, though a paradigm shift for the United States, represented only a small change for the region's overall security. Consequently, South Korea and China are trying to convey through their remaining channels with North Korea that they are willing to delay a crisis to shield Pyongyang from potential military action. Their assurances may embolden North Korea, but for Seoul and Beijing alike, delaying a confrontation is the preferable path, especially since neither see much chance of a true compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. China, meanwhile, maintains a sliver of hope that Washington may eventually accept the reality in North Korea and adjust its behavior toward the government in Pyongyang accordingly, backing off from military threats in favor of dialogue and management.

Russia and Japan each play a slightly smaller role and differ in their views of the situation. Moscow, which wants to avoid a war but lacks much clout with Pyongyang, is using the crisis to emphasize the threat Washington poses to international peace and stability. And Japan feels the change in North Korea's nuclear development perhaps more acutely than does South Korea. The missiles Pyongyang has been testing serve a more valuable military purpose aimed at Japan and the U.S. bases there than they do trained on South Korea, a country that has long been within the demonstrated reach of North Koreas' missiles. Tokyo sees the standoff with North Korea as an opportunity to fortify its position as the key U.S. ally in the region and to counter China's growing influence. In addition, the threat of Pyongyang gives the Japanese government further justification for its decision to lift the constitutional restrictions on the use of its armed forces.

Population Density

If these assumptions stand, a time is fast approaching when the United States won't be able to sit back and delay action anymore. Washington still has several options short of military action, but history has so far shown that the tactics are only temporary. Every deferral enables North Korea to move closer to its goal of developing a long-range nuclear missile while reinforcing Pyongyang's notion that U.S. security guarantees are nonbinding and rarely outlast a single president. Whether each side's perceptions of the other are accurate matters less than whether North Korea and the United States believe them and make their decisions accordingly.

ccp

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #262 on: July 18, 2017, 08:14:58 AM »
we don't have near as much to lose as the S Koreans.

Unless NK attacks us outright I don't see us being able to do anything.

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Poll-War/2017/07/18/id/802285/
I guess most Americans think it is better for K to have nucs on ICBMs that can reach us.

I would totally for military action now if it were not the blowback to S Korea.

Crafty_Dog

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Some US options
« Reply #263 on: July 18, 2017, 08:32:23 AM »
True sanctions with those who trade with Norks (CHINA!) trade War with China, sailing the SCS, nukes to Japan (and Sorks?), rebuild/strengthen regional alliances (Australia, and others --Philippines may or may not be possible) build alliance with India.

These are all options.

« Last Edit: July 18, 2017, 02:47:19 PM by Crafty_Dog »

ccp

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #264 on: July 18, 2017, 08:43:16 AM »
" trade War with China "

well we got that Democrat GS guy Cohen in WH talking Trump out of any such thing.

I also like the idea on the internet few days ago about kicking the Chinese students all 345 K of them out of our universities

But the Universities would go crazy with that.  Think of all the cash they get and the rest.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: This is how wars begin
« Reply #265 on: July 19, 2017, 03:43:39 AM »
This is how wars begin: not through the rash actions of erratic warmongers, but through the slow confrontation of irreconcilable differences. When the threat of inaction appears to exceed the threat of action, and compromise is off the table, conflict looks unavoidable.

North Korea and the United States appear to be well past the point of compromise. Pyongyang feels that its security hinges on a deterrent that would make Washington think twice about trying to overthrow North Korea's leadership or launching military action against the country. Washington, meanwhile, can't tolerate Pyongyang's efforts to develop a reliable nuclear weapon and delivery system that could strike the continental United States. Having nearly attained its security goal, North Korea can't delay further missile tests without giving the United States time to build national and international political support for military intervention. The United States similarly can't stop at a moratorium on North Korea's missile tests since only a few steps separate Pyongyang from long-range weapons capability. And past measures have done little to roll back North Korea's progress.

In the absence of a suitable middle ground with Pyongyang, Washington is counting on China and Russia to finally pressure North Korea into cooperating. Under the best-case scenario, further sanctions and isolation would cause factions of North Korea's elite to revolt, overthrow the Kim government and divert the country from its current course. But that outcome is not likely. The risk of destabilizing the country, on the other hand, would be high — too high for Beijing and Moscow to accept, especially when they have doubts that the United States will make good on its threat of military action. North Korea sees hesitation on the part of China, Russia and even South Korea and figures their reluctance to act will restrain a U.S. strike against it.

North Korea's Arms Push

Neither side wants war. The threat of physical conflict must be credible, however, if Washington wants to change Pyongyang's behavior or to convince Beijing that the risk of inaction outweighs the risk of direct action. The more credible the threat of war, the more pressure Pyongyang would feel to complete its program, and quickly. The more the looming prospect of conflict pushes China and Russia to try to prevent war, calling for talks and claiming the real danger lies in U.S. military action, the more confident Pyongyang would become that it can finish testing before Washington intervenes. And the closer North Korea gets to realizing its weapons ambitions without China's interference, the closer Washington gets to military action. That's not to say that war is inevitable, though. Changes in intelligence assessments, in leadership, in interpretations and in perceptions can always intervene unexpectedly. Or it may be that our core assumptions are simply wrong.

The U.S. military has for several years operated under the assumption that Pyongyang already possesses a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it at least regionally. But North Korea is unlikely to use a limited number of nuclear weapons to start a war with the United States, with its vastly superior military and nuclear arsenal. Consequently, traditional forms of nuclear deterrence could still keep Pyongyang in check. Political will may be lacking in the United States to undertake military action against North Korea that would disrupt economic and trade activity and leave behind a massive reconstruction project in Northeast Asia, if not lead to a regional conflict.

North Korea's government may be more risk averse than it seems. Pyongyang may not be willing to push its testing far enough to incite the United States to intervene. Alternatively, North Korea might not respond to a surgical strike against some of its nuclear and missile facilities, enabling Washington to interrupt its weapons development without triggering a full-blown war on the peninsula. Some Chinese commentaries have suggested that limited attacks on North Korea — even a single symbolic strike on a mobile missile ahead of a test — would shake the government enough to change its behavior. Pyongyang otherwise may feel sufficiently confident in its progress with the missile program that it shifts focus to political reconciliation with South Korea in an effort to ensure both its national security and its future economic prospects.

Geopolitics does not teach determinism. Despite the constraints and compulsions it creates, a country's geography can't eliminate every possible option. For all their differences, the United States and North Korea, perhaps ironically, share the same goal: avoiding a war. But each sees the other's path as untenable for its own national security. A war between the United States and North Korea is not inevitable, but it is growing increasingly likely — and not because their leaders are crazy.

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North Korea sanctions bill
« Reply #266 on: July 22, 2017, 07:32:19 PM »
Stratfor Worldview
worldviewer35811493132323


situation report

Jul 22, 2017 | 14:33 GMT
U.S.: House Sanctions Bill Amended To Include North Korea



The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives released details July 21 of a revised bill pertaining to sanctions against Iran, Russia and North Korea. The bill is similar to the Iran/Russia sanctions bill that was passed in the Senate in June, but also includes additional sanctions on North Korea. Controversy surrounded the extent of proposed changes in the Senate version, especially when it came to modifying existing sanctions against Russia. Similar to the sanctions bill in the Senate, this bill turns many Obama-era discretionary sanctions on Russia into mandatory ones. At the same time, it prevents any increase in scope on energy projects: The Senate bill now bars U.S. citizens from working globally on any deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale project that involves a Russian firm. Previous sanctions only restricted U.S. personnel from participating in projects inside of Russian territory or the country's exclusive economic zones. The House is expected to consider the bill on the floor next week, possibly on Tuesday.
 

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China-US Trade and the Norks
« Reply #267 on: July 24, 2017, 12:48:43 PM »
* * * * * *
The United States and China met to discuss trade issues. The meeting ended without agreement on anything. The obligatory joint press conference after the talks, where everyone pretends that everything was fine, was canceled. The only comment came from a U.S. official who said there were frank discussions, which means that the talks were tough and full of threats.

At the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency, GPF expected that these kinds of confrontations would take place. But both countries put aside their disagreements to deal with another overriding issue: North Korea’s nuclear program. The issue emerged shortly after Trump’s inauguration, when it became apparent that North Korea was moving aggressively to develop a nuclear delivery capability. After analyzing the military reality, the United States was reluctant to launch a strike against North Korea and instead pursued negotiations.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in April, discussions between Xi and Trump turned from trade and related policies to the question of North Korea. Over the years, the United States had relied on the Chinese to act as an intermediary and restrain North Korea. Trump asked Xi to play that role again, offering to reward China for its cooperation by softening the U.S. negotiating position on trade. We know that this happened because of various leaks, because of the lack of further confrontation over trade and because Trump tweeted that China’s help on North Korea would lead to a better deal for China.

But China has clearly failed to persuade North Korea to halt its nuclear program. There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that North Korea doesn’t trust China but does trust that having a nuclear weapon would block any American attempts to destabilize the North Korean regime. The second possible explanation is that China did not want to persuade North Korea this time. The reason is simple: Although China cares a great deal about trade, it cares much more right now about its geopolitical balance with the United States. North Korea has the United States on a hook. If the U.S. chooses not to attack North Korea, it would appear weak, and China would in turn look stronger. And if the U.S. chooses to attack, it could be portrayed as a lawless aggressor. In a full-scale attack, the U.S. would likely take out North Korea’s nuclear program, and China would be spared that problem. China would then claim that it had been busy mediating, and had nearly reached a deal, when the American cowboys struck.

This posturing matters a great deal to Beijing. China depends on maritime trade, and it requires easy passage through the South and East China seas to access the ocean. But the seas are riddled with small islands, and the U.S. Navy can easily block China’s access. With a navy that is in no position to challenge the U.S. at sea, China is left vulnerable to a potential blockade. Its best strategy is to convince one of the countries in the region, like the Philippines or Indonesia, to align with it to allow free passage. This strategy may be a long shot, but it matters greatly to China. The perception of U.S. weakness or recklessness on North Korea might cause some movement in these countries. And even if it doesn’t, either an attack or a failure to attack would create political problems for the U.S. in the region.

I believe that some variant of the second explanation was behind China’s failure to move North Korea. But the lack of results on this issue meant that trade, having been put on the back burner since the Trump-Xi summit, was now back at the forefront. The U.S. no longer had any reason to go easy on China, and China was not prepared to cave. This is both because the Chinese are good negotiators who play a weak position extremely well, and because the Chinese are trying to understand how Trump’s weak political position will intersect with trade talks.

The trade issue is a perfect example of how economic, military and political positions are inseparable in real life. Nations do not bargain on economic matters in a vacuum. In this case, the trade issue was bound up with possible war in North Korea as well as domestic U.S. politics. To fully understand the trade issue, you can’t examine trade on its own. And this is a great example of how these things intersect, but it’s far from a unique one. In international relations, all dimensions intersect and become part of a single fabric.

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WSJ: China getting ready
« Reply #268 on: July 26, 2017, 12:17:33 PM »
China Prepares for a Crisis Along North Korea Border
Beijing bolsters defenses along its 880-mile frontier and realigns forces in surrounding regions
By Jeremy Page
July 24, 2017 4:40 p.m. ET
290 COMMENTS

maps in original

BEIJING—China has been bolstering defenses along its 880-mile frontier with North Korea and realigning forces in surrounding regions to prepare for a potential crisis across their border, including the possibility of a U.S. military strike.

A review of official military and government websites and interviews with experts who have studied the preparations show that Beijing has implemented many of the changes in recent months after initiating them last year.

They coincide with repeated warnings by U.S. President Donald Trump that he is weighing military action to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while exerting pressure on China to do more to rein in Pyongyang.

Recent Chinese measures include establishing a new border defense brigade, 24-hour video surveillance of the mountainous frontier backed by aerial drones, and bunkers to protect against nuclear and chemical blasts, according to the websites.

China’s military has also merged, moved and modernized other units in border regions and released details of recent drills there with special forces, airborne troops and other units that experts say could be sent into North Korea in a crisis. They include a live-fire drill in June by helicopter gunships and one in July by an armored infantry unit recently transferred from eastern China and equipped with new weaponry.

China’s Defense Ministry didn’t respond directly when asked if the recent changes were connected to North Korea, saying only in a written statement that its forces “maintain a normal state of combat readiness and training” on the border. It has denied previous reports of thousands of extra Chinese troops moving into border areas.

Crisis Planning
China is realigning armed forces in its east and northeast to prepare for contingencies in North Korea.


NORTHERN THEATER

COMMAND



Sources: Jamestown Foundation (military units); James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies via the Nuclear Threat Initiative (nuclear facilities)

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman on Monday said: “Military means shouldn’t be an option to solve the Korean Peninsula issue.”

Chinese authorities have nonetheless been preparing for North Korean contingencies, including economic collapse, nuclear contamination, or military conflict, according to U.S. and Chinese experts who have studied Beijing’s planning.

China’s recent changes in force structure, equipment and training are connected to nationwide military reforms launched last year to overhaul Soviet-modeled command structures and prepare better for combat beyond China’s borders, those experts say.

In the northeast, however, those reforms are geared predominantly toward handling a North Korean crisis, the experts say.

China’s contingency preparations “go well beyond just seizing a buffer zone in the North and border security,” said Mark Cozad, a former senior U.S. defense intelligence official for East Asia, now at the Rand Corp.

“Once you start talking about efforts from outside powers, in particular the United States and South Korea, to stabilize the North, to seize nuclear weapons or WMD, in those cases then I think you’re starting to look at a much more robust Chinese response,” he said. “If you’re going to make me place bets on where I think the U.S. and China would first get into a conflict, it’s not Taiwan, the South China Sea or the East China Sea: I think it’s the Korean Peninsula.”

China, like many foreign governments, still considers a U.S. military strike unlikely, mainly because of the risk of Pyongyang retaliating against South Korea, an American ally whose capital of Seoul lies within easy reach of the North’s artillery.

The Pentagon declined to discuss U.S. planning efforts. American officials didn’t respond to questions about steps taken by China. But top American officials say they are focused on diplomatic and economic pressure, and view military action as a last resort.

Although technically allied to Pyongyang, Beijing wouldn’t necessarily defend its regime, but is determined to prevent a flood of North Koreans from entering northeastern China and to protect the population there, U.S. and Chinese experts say.

Beijing also appears to be enhancing its capability to seize North Korean nuclear sites and occupy a swath of the country’s northern territory if U.S. or South Korean forces start to advance toward the Chinese border, according to those people.

That, they say, would require a much larger Chinese operation than just sealing the border, with special forces and airborne troops likely entering first to secure nuclear sites, followed by armored ground forces with air cover, pushing deep into North Korea.

It could also bring Chinese and U.S. forces face to face on the peninsula for the first time since the war there ended in 1953 with an armistice—an added complication for the Trump administration as it weighs options for dealing with North Korea.

Beijing has rebuffed repeated American requests to discuss contingency planning, American officials say.

China has long worried that economic collapse in North Korea could cause a refugee crisis, bring U.S. forces to its borders, and create a united, democratic and pro-American Korea. But China’s fears of a U.S. military intervention have risen since January as Pyongyang has test-fired several missiles, including one capable of reaching Alaska.

“Time is running out,” said retired Maj. Gen. Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché to Moscow now attached to several Chinese think tanks. “We can’t let the flames of war burn into China.”

He wrote an unusually outspoken article for one of those think tanks in May arguing that China should “draw a red line” for the U.S.: If it attacked North Korea without Chinese approval, Beijing would have to intervene militarily.
A man in Dandong offered tourists the use of binoculars to view the North Korean side of the Yalu River in April.
A man in Dandong offered tourists the use of binoculars to view the North Korean side of the Yalu River in April. Photo: Damir Sagolj/REUTERS

China should demand that any U.S. military attack result in no nuclear contamination, no U.S. occupation of areas north of the current “demarcation line” between North and South, and no regime hostile to China established in the North, his article said.

“If war breaks out, China should without hesitation occupy northern parts of North Korea, take control of North Korean nuclear facilities, and demarcate safe areas to stop a wave of refugees and disbanded soldiers entering China’s northeast,” it said.

Maj. Gen. Wang said he didn’t speak for the government. But his article isn’t censored online—as it would likely be if Beijing disapproved—in China and other Chinese scholars and military figures recently voiced similar views.

In recent weeks, some details of China’s preparations have also emerged on the military and government websites.

The new border defense brigade patrolled the entire frontier in June to gather intelligence and has drawn up detailed plans for sealing it in a crisis, according to the military’s official newspaper.

Aerial drones would help identify targets, supplementing the new 24-hour video surveillance and addressing problems with “information access, rapid mobility and command and control,” another report in the newspaper said.

Many other units in the northeast have recently conducted new combat-focused training for the kind of joint military operations that experts say would be needed for an intervention within North Korea.

In one drill, a new “combined arms brigade” simulated battle against a “blue team” with artillery, tanks and helicopters, state television reported in June.

The new Northern Theater Command, which controls forces in the northeast, also now incorporates units in eastern China that experts say could be launched across the Yellow Sea toward North Korea.

Meanwhile, authorities in Jilin province, which borders North Korea, are reinforcing and expanding a network of underground shelters and command posts to withstand air, nuclear or chemical attack, local government notices show.
Chinese soldiers recently patrolled the streets of Dandong near the North Korean border.
Chinese soldiers recently patrolled the streets of Dandong near the North Korean border. Photo: Jiwei Han/ZUMA PRESS

Such facilities were needed “to respond to the complicated security situation surrounding the province,” Jilin’s civil air defense bureau said in a notice on its website, which also features photos and specifications of U.S. military aircraft.

In May, Jilin’s government unveiled what it called China’s first “combat-ready big data disaster preparedness center” in an underground facility designed to protect critical military and government data from nuclear or chemical attack.

Jilin authorities declined to comment, citing the sensitivity of the subject.

China’s military reforms aren’t complete and the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, remains ill-prepared for a North Korean operation, some experts say.

“I don’t see the PLA at this time being particularly enthusiastic about being tasked to undertake a potential near-term mission in North Korea,” said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. military attaché in Beijing.

But China, like the U.S., has been surprised by how fast North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has progressed, say foreign diplomats and experts. Beijing also worries that Pyongyang’s actions are now harming Chinese security interests, since the U.S. deployment in South Korea in April of a missile-defense system that China says can track its own nuclear missiles, diplomats and experts say.

Beijing’s interests “now clearly extend beyond the refugee issue” to encompass nuclear safety and the peninsula’s long-term future, said Oriana Skylar Mastro, an assistant professor at Georgetown University who has studied China’s planning for a North Korean crisis.

“China’s leaders need to make sure that whatever happens with (North Korea), the result supports China’s regional power aspirations and does not help the United States extend or prolong its influence,” Ms. Mastro said.

—Ben Kesling in Washington contributed to this article.

Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com

ccp

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us or them ?
« Reply #269 on: August 01, 2017, 07:50:37 AM »
One of the few times I agree with Lindsay Graham:

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/lindsey-graham-north-korea-ICBM/2017/08/01/id/805023/

I do not agree with Pat Buchanan that a nuclear armed Iran and N Korea is acceptable and no transgender troops are not going to protect us from that:

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/pat-buchanan-need-transgender-troops/2017/07/31/id/804940/

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Re: us or them ?
« Reply #270 on: August 01, 2017, 09:54:49 AM »
That's right ccp.  On national security issues, 'Reaganite' Buchanan is with the leftists and Lindsey Graham is with the hawks.  It seems like common sense to me to want to take out a lunatic that is actively and seriously threatening us. 

Peace through strength.  The more strength we have, the less we need to use it.  And vice versa, all hell broke loose during our periods of retreat and weakness.

Choosing our battles and the timing of them carefully is a form of wisdom.  Unwillingness to use our strength, ever, is weakness.

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High Power Microwave Solution?
« Reply #271 on: August 01, 2017, 10:22:53 AM »
A report last night on the One America Network (OAN, see my post referencing it on the Media thread) asserts that this technology is ready to go and is a solution to the Nork problem:

http://defense-update.com/20150516_champ.html


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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #272 on: August 01, 2017, 05:20:00 PM »
"   A report last night on the One America Network (OAN, see my post referencing it on the Media thread) asserts that this technology is ready to go and is a solution to the Nork problem:

http://defense-update.com/20150516_champ.html  "

Glad to see  military taking MY  advice:   :-D 8-) :lol:

from previous post of July 5 :
   
*** "start the attack
« Reply #231 on: July 05, 2017, 06:01:44 PM »
Reply with quote  Modify message  Remove message
with very high altitude nuclear explosions to create huge electro magnatic pulses.

 undecided

though wonder if even feasible and probably no one even knows if it would work or the side damage would be

? fallout"****

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #273 on: August 01, 2017, 09:28:05 PM »
Umm , , , if I understand correctly, not quite-- there is no nuclear explosion with the HPM.

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GeoFut: Norks testing sub launches
« Reply #274 on: August 02, 2017, 11:33:33 AM »
•   North Korea: North Korea conducted a submarine-launch ballistic missile ejection test July 30, according to an anonymous U.S. defense official who spoke to CNN. An ejection test assesses the systems responsible for pushing the missile out of the submarine far enough above the surface of the water for the missile’s rockets to ignite. While North Korea is believed to have one submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles, it’s unknown if Pyongyang has the technology required to ignite, stabilize and correct for an SLBM’s trajectory. This was the third ejection test North Korea conducted in July and the fourth this year.

•   South Korea: We continue to monitor military deployments in and around the Korean Peninsula. Seoul is currently reviewing U.S. strategic assets in the area. The nuclear-powered aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson and USS Ronald Reagan could be redeployed to the region. (Both were previously stationed in waters near the Korean Peninsula.)

The USS Vinson was not scheduled for deployment again until January 2018. Twelve F-16s and 200 airmen have also been deployed to South Korea for a four-month rotation. In addition, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has ordered the “temporary” deployment of the remaining four launchers that would complete the United States’ THAAD installation. Only two launchers were initially set up when the South Korean government blocked the remaining four.

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Bolton on Levin show
« Reply #275 on: August 07, 2017, 10:31:54 AM »


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susan rice advises Trump top bend over and take it
« Reply #281 on: August 10, 2017, 08:40:13 AM »
This *proves* the Obamamiester long ago decided to accept NK as a military nuclear power:

http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/08/10/susan-rice-urges-trump-tolerate-nuclear-weapons-north-korea/

despite as John Bolten pointed out the ridiculous mantra from multiple politicians including Brock the Great repeatedly stating the line "all options are on the table" (that everyone knew was BS)

So now Rice basically tells Kim you can have your nucs!

And that is what Bolten asked yesterday  do we accept NK as a nuclear power or do we use military  force?

Krauthammer FWIW accepts NK as a nuc power.  I don't.  

How would NK be if they have a 100 deliverable nuclear warheads?  let alone a few with questionable accuracy ?  would that be better?

Next up would also of course be Iran.  How would we like them having 50 or 100 nucs?
Brockster has obviously accepted them as a nuc power too.

He could have been honest but he never has been.
« Last Edit: August 10, 2017, 12:11:16 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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WSJ backs Trump's "fire and fury" remarks
« Reply #282 on: August 10, 2017, 04:34:40 PM »

By The Editorial Board
Aug. 9, 2017 7:12 p.m. ET
652 COMMENTS

When Donald Trump threatened North Korea with “fire and fury” Tuesday if it continues to menace the U.S. with nuclear weapons, he provoked almost as much backlash at home as in Pyongyang. The usual diplomatic suspects, including some American lawmakers, claimed his remarks hurt U.S. credibility and were irresponsible.

The President’s point was that the North’s escalating threats are intolerable; he didn’t set any red lines. True to form, Pyongyang responded by putting the U.S. island of Guam in its cross hairs. Mr. Trump may be guilty of hyperbole (quelle surprise), but that is far less damaging to U.S. credibility than Barack Obama’s failure to enforce his prohibition on the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in Syria. The foreign-policy elite who claim to be shocked also don’t have much credibility after their policy across three Administrations led to the current North Korean danger.

While the President’s words were unusually colorful, the Communist-style language may have been part of the message: Kim Jong Un isn’t the only one who can raise the geopolitical temperature. The U.S. has military options to neutralize the regime’s nuclear threat if it continues to develop long-range missiles, and the U.S. is considering those options.

National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said as much in an interview Saturday, explaining that Pyongyang’s nuclear threat is “intolerable from the President’s perspective. So of course, we have to provide all options to do that. And that includes a military option.” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reinforced that message Wednesday, warning North Korea to stop acting in ways that could “lead to the end of its regime.”

Last week Senator Lindsey Graham told a morning television program, “There is a military option to destroy North Korea’s program and North Korea itself.” The South Carolina Republican revealed that Mr. Trump told him there will be war if the North continues to develop long-range missiles: “He has told me that. I believe him. If I were China, I would believe him, too, and do something about it.”

The China reference is a tip-off that the main audience for this rhetorical theater is in Beijing. Kim Jong Un won’t stop now that he’s so close to his goal of a nuclear deterrent. But China might restrict the flow of oil to the North, for example, if it believes that stronger action on its part could forestall a U.S. pre-emptive strike.

The other audience for Mr. Trump’s remarks is the North Korean leadership around the young Kim. If they believe they are doomed by Kim’s nuclear course, their best chance of self-preservation is to remove him. Regime change and then reunification is the ultimate solution to the North Korean problem.

One statement isn’t going to change minds in Beijing or Pyongyang. The Trump Administration can also signal its seriousness by imposing secondary sanctions on more Chinese companies, financial institutions and individuals. The U.S. also needs to move more military assets into the region to make the use of force credible.

Striking North Korea remains a last resort because the regime can hit the South with nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Yet in 1994 then-President Bill Clinton used the threat of military action as he tried to force the North to give up its nuclear program. But former President Jimmy Carter exceeded his diplomatic mandate and maneuvered Mr. Clinton to accept a deal that propped up Pyongyang without adequate inspections.

Diplomacy works best when there is a credible stick to go with the carrots. The Trump Administration has the right idea, even if the President’s words lack the usual diplomatic politesse.

Appeared in the August 10, 2017, print edition.

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #284 on: August 10, 2017, 08:13:02 PM »
One more ballistic missile test by NK in the direction of Guam, will be crossing Trump's orange line. He is goading Kim to do just that, so that he can say he acted in self defense.

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #285 on: August 11, 2017, 08:30:27 AM »
Does anyone know at least with public knowledge anything about the accuracy of their guidance systems.  Can they actually hit Guam or Hawaii or Alaska (or hopefully Hollywood - just kidding - hope CD no near Hollywood)?

It is not too late.  Unless we want NK to become an even greater menace with multiple times the number and power of their nucs in the years to come.

It is like watching the tech stocks crash in 2000.  Wringing hands praying and hoping for the bleeding to stop until some ( me ) realize I lost most of it.
Time to take action.  Sure it will be terrible .  Sure it is easy for me to say sitting here on the East coast but I don't see any other way.  It will only get worse not better.

Unlike bidding our time like mutually assured destruction doctrine , in this case bidding time has only benighted our enemy.

Imagine NK with 5 times the nucs and better delivery systems .

And if we get rid of NK regime then maybe, then take aim at Iran nun program , then maybe just maybe Iran will get the message loud and clear.

Or we can talk stupid, with words like "we need more" and "better" and "serious diplomacy", or "all options are on the table".

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Susan Rice - you say we failed to stop NK
« Reply #286 on: August 11, 2017, 09:13:24 AM »
No kidding but to actually hear an Obama disciple say this is to my knowledge new:

http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/administrations-susan-rice-national-security-adviser-nuclear-weapons/2017/08/10/id/807027/

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Trump’s Full-Court Press Is Squeezing the Nukes Out of North Korea
« Reply #289 on: August 14, 2017, 08:58:39 AM »
http://observer.com/2017/08/donald-trump-north-korea-diplomatic-military-strategy/

Trump’s Full-Court Press Is Squeezing the Nukes Out of North Korea
The hermit kingdom is starting to blink now that China isn’t its shield
By Austin Bay • 08/14/17 8:00am
   

President Donald Trump with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, and National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster on August 11, 2017. JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
The Trump administration’s “pressure strategy” is disrupting the North Korean regime.

In March of this year, the Trump foreign policy team of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, and the Tweeter-in-Chief himself began a coordinated attack on Kim Jong-un’s regime, with the interim goals of disrupting its political and military plans, psychologically rattling its leaders, and exposing the regime’s grave weaknesses. The ultimate goal was to set conditions for achieving the long-range goal: denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.


The great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said that the best strategy is to attack the enemy’s plans. With a soldier-scholar like Jim Mattis in the Trump administration, a stroke or two of Sun Tzu should surprise no one.

As a result, the Trump team is taking diplomatic, economic and military actions—not drawing feckless rhetorical red lines. Its actions are seizing the initiative, limiting the enemy’s options, and exploiting the enemy’s weakness. These actions are designed to force the thugs in Pyongyang to ditch their nuclear weapons and quietly rot within the starving confines of their Communist gulag.

* * *

We aren’t engaged in a game. This is the latest phase of the Korean War. Though war is not a sport, some sports analogies are instructive. Basketball’s full-court press is a defensive attack on the offense’s “plan” to score—which would be a sportscaster’s description of the Trump administration’s North Korea policy. In basketball, teams employ a relentless full-court press to degrade an opponent’s ability to move the ball, deny easy shot attempts, and disrupt shots the opponent takes. “Pressing” teams try to force their opponents to make mistakes that lead to turnovers. A sustained press that forces mistakes dispirits an opponent.

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The U.S. can do more than run an aggressive defense. America, when it decides to use it, has the premier global offense. North Korea cannot “press” American power; it can only provoke it.

And it has provoked America to the point that Trump is promising fire and fury.

* * *


Employing diplomacy, economic power, military power and information power (the ability to gather and communicate intelligence) in concert is a geo-strategic full-court press.

The acronym for the four elements of geo-strategic power is DIME: “Diplomatic,” “Information,” “Military” and “Economic” power. Coordinating these elements creates a synergistic force whose sum is greater than its parts. I explained this to an eighth grade history class and the kids got it. Diplomacy was my index finger, Information the middle finger, Military the ring finger, and Economic power the little finger. Individually, the fingers poke, but together they form a fist.

I showed the kids my fist and threw a punch in the air. I told them that in other circumstances this wasn’t a weapon but a grip on a tool. They got that, too.

Unfortunately, coordinating the elements of power is very difficult. The U.S. government’s civilian agencies don’t play well together—protecting their budgets and their political turf in the Washington swamp is their first priority. So in the field the military does it all ad hoc. Company, field grade and general officers become diplomats in helmets. Combat engineers are developmental aid experts.

* * *

Yet the Trump administration is using all elements of power in a coordinated effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

Start with the D for Diplomacy. The U.S. has forged a solid alliance committed to Korean denuclearization. The U.S., Japan, South Korea and Australia are the principle front line nations, but western European nations and key members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) add economic and political weight. India is in the background. China is the man in middle, and it knows India is in the background.

All of the east and southeast Asian nations have a common security interest in denuclearization: They are already in range of North Korean missiles.

U.S. diplomats have also succeeded in getting the UN to impose harsh economic and political sanctions on North Korea.

I for Information began in earnest with Tillerson’s declaration that the era of strategic patience with the Kim regime is over. Trump’s threats of fury and fire mock Kim Jong-un. Yes, Trump outraged the pearl-clutchers in the American foreign policy establishment. American presidents aren’t supposed to talk like that!

Except they do. Take Harry Truman for example.

The theater of threat is a key element in North Korea’s intimidation and extortion routine. Trump’s fiery threat pushed Kim Jong-un off center stage. Now Trump has the rhetorical threat initiative, not the fat kid.

Trump also has a track record for following through on a threat. In April, he punished Syrian President Bashir al-Assad for using chemical weapons. Trump isn’t seeking a legacy like Bill Clinton; he isn’t bogged down in Iraq like George Bush; and he isn’t a faculty lounge poseur like Barack Obama touting red lines then failing to back words with deeds. Trump has demonstrated that he will act. That’s important information from the bad cop.

This information is a suavely packaged threat from the good cops: National Security Adviser Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster told ABC News “…We are not closer to war than a week ago, but we are closer to war than we were a decade ago.”

This information adds spine to the bad cop and good cops’ coercive diplomacy: Pyongyang’s insistent violation of previous deals and arrangements has left Washington, Tokyo and Seoul with nil interest in conceding anything to the dictatorship, but particularly on the issues of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

M for Military: The U.S. and its allies have massive and modern forces. They are full spectrum forces employing everything from the bayonet to ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missiles and cyber weapons. South Korea’s ground forces are highly-trained and well led. Japan has quietly developed offensive strike capabilities. The allies have deployed a missile defense “thin shield” that is capable of shooting down a volley of North Korean IRBMs. Trump would use the entire arsenal if he had to, and China knows this.

E is for Economic, meaning sanctions and financial restrictions. However, the most pertinent policy tool can be summarized in a tweet. Recall that Trump indicated China would have a better trade deal if it helped curb North Korea.

How is the Trump team managing to pull it off? Here’s my guess: Trump and Tillerson aren’t from the D.C. swamp. Mattis was a combat soldier who also served as a diplomat with a helmet.

* *  *

America wants China to add additional pressure. It believes China has the power to squeeze the nukes out of North Korea.

But China has its own interests—some of which conflict with U.S. interests. For example, U.S. and Chinese interests conflict in the South China Sea. On August 7, the U.S., Australia and Japan urged ASEAN to create a “South China Sea code of conduct” defining rules for resolving disputes in the region that are “legally binding, meaningful, effective, and consistent with international law.” The three nations emphasized their “strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions,” which is a direct slap at Beijing. It appears the deal being offered does not demand that China withdraw from its man-made islets.

China knows it can ill-afford a trade war with the U.S., Japan and Europe. This code of conduct amounts to a “semi-win-win” if everyone in the region agrees to it and lives by it. It is an example of coordinated diplomacy to encourage China to help denuclearize North Korea—and help itself economically and politically.

* * *

Has the Trump pressure strategy produced positive results?

North Korea has blinked, but the sensationalist mainstream media, from The New York Times to CNN, have missed it.

But the sharp minds at 38north.org didn’t. They reported, “Anyone familiar with the North’s statements knows that over the past month there has been a major shift in Pyongyang’s formulation about negotiating.”

Yet CNN quoted North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho as saying “…We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table…”

38north provided the correction:

“Unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the D.P.R.K. are fundamentally eliminated, we, under no circumstances, will put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table and will not flinch even an inch away from our path of strengthening of the nuclear forces, which is chosen by ourselves.”

To interpret Pyongyang’s statement as the “we just might talk about getting rid of the nukes” signal it is requires that the interpreter possess certain skills.  The interpreter must know the relevant history, have common sense (a skill related to historical knowledge), pay close attention to current developments, and maintain an open mind free of ideological and emotional-political distortion. Unfortunately, the contemporary U.S. mainstream media fall short in all four skill sets.

Responding to Trump’s rhetorical fireworks, Kim threatened to fire missiles at Guam. Remember, Guam is U.S. soil.

It’s where America’s day begins.

Following that North Korean threat, Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull said his country would immediately come to the aid of the U.S. if North Korea attacks Guam.

Japan announced it may intercept the North Korean missiles with anti-ballistic missiles.

But here’s the big news: now China is warning North Korea that it’s on its own “if it launches missiles threatening U.S. soil and there is retaliation…” China, however, “would intervene if Washington strikes first. ”

China is clearly separating itself from the Kim regime and saying it will not defend North Korea if North Korea attacks U.S. territory. China is no longer North Korea’s shield.

Did Trump’s in-your-face provoke Kim into a rhetorical threat that went too far, one that led to the Chinese warning? Fair question to ask.

When you read or hear so-called experts argue it’s too late to stop North Korea from obtaining operational nuclear weapons—turn the channel or cancel your subscription. The suits are spewing tripe.

* * *

Blinking is a good sign, but it isn’t retreat.

In an article that appeared in The Observer on July 11, I sketched the administration’s six options for courses of action.

In the last month, we’ve seen Option 1 (another “do the right thing” bid to Beijing) pursued with a stroke or two from Option 2 (coercive diplomacy directed at China).

The interim results have reduced but not eliminated the need for Option 6 (delayed reprisal and the war to denuclearize).

However, the threat to Guam increases the probability the Trump administration will employ Option 4:

“Return of serve. This is an operation that could support several diplomatic options. The U.S., South Korea and Japan could use their ABMs to intercept every North Korean test launch. They might also employ cyber warfare to disrupt tests (perhaps they have already done so). The objective of ‘Return of Serve’ is to stymie the test program and embarrass Kim Jong-un.“

Get in his face and block his shots. Pressure basketball? No, pressure diplomacy to stop a nuclear war.

Austin Bay is a contributing editor at StrategyPage.com and adjunct professor at the University of Texas in Austin. His most recent book is a biography of Kemal Ataturk (Macmillan 2011). Bay is a retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel.

DougMacG

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Re: North Korea
« Reply #290 on: August 14, 2017, 12:45:30 PM »
Previously on these pages:  It would be great to wake one day to the news that our President had created a quiet coalition between the US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, for just this one purpose and they successfully disarmed and dethroned the dictator.  Easier now than later.

Since then...   Russia voted for sanctions.  China voted for sanctions.  China will stop the import from NK of coal, iron ore, fish and other items shorting them of a billion in badly needed hard currency.

Supporting us in a military operation against the nuclear threat of Kim Jung Un is one more step away.

They help in this not because they like us or want to help us but for their own purposes and because the world's largest economy and military still has levers if we are willing to use them.


DougMacG

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NORTH KOREA’S NEW MISSILES CAME FROM UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, REPORT CLAIMS
« Reply #291 on: August 15, 2017, 06:37:32 AM »
Missile technology "via black market"... (?)
 
http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-north-korea-missiles-north-korea-nuclear-north-korea-missiles-650504

The speed at which North Korea has ramped up its missile and nuclear defense programs within the last two years is reportedly due to purchases Kim Jong Un’s regime has made on a weapons black market linked to Ukraine and Russia, as the United States and the globe fret over a potential military conflict.

A new report released Monday by the International Institute for Strategic Studies explains the North has made “astounding strides” in missile development, and it could not have done so without a high-performance liquid-propellant engine, or LPE, provided by a “foreign source.”

Crafty_Dog

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #292 on: August 26, 2017, 05:24:41 AM »
My theory has been it was the Iranians, but this certainly sounds plausible.

At any rate, this does not rule out my notion that the Iranians are there as well, in effect outsourcing/sharing nuke efforts.  (Remember the Nork nuke plant in Syria that Israel took out some years ago?)

Crafty_Dog

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With EMP being a possibility, isn't this an act of war?
« Reply #293 on: August 28, 2017, 05:52:28 PM »
Stratfor Worldview
worldviewer35811493132323


Aug 29, 2017 | 00:07 GMT
North Korea: Latest Missile Test Overflies Hokkaido, Lands in Pacific
North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean.
(Stratfor)

Save As PDF
At around 5:58 a.m. local time, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean. Early indications are that the missile had a flight time of around 14 minutes, had an apogee of 550 kilometers (340 miles) and splashed down some 2,700 kilometers from its launch point. While these numbers point to a medium-range ballistic missile, the possibility remains that the North Koreans either tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with an early engine cutoff or were experimenting with a heavier warhead. Alternatively, the missile could have failed before reaching its full theoretical range. The latter possibility is reinforced by reports that the missile broke into three parts before landing.
 
The launch site of the latest missile test is believed to be near Sunan, where Pyongyang's international airport is located. Launching from this site continues the trend of North Korea testing its missiles from diverse locations across the country. This makes it harder to predict where and when the next North Korean weapons test will occur. It also adds to the difficulty of targeting North Korea's dispersed missile arsenal in a conflict scenario.
 
North Korea is heavily constrained by geography when it comes to testing long-range missiles. There is virtually no direction in which North Korea could launch an IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at a standard or minimum-energy trajectory without overflying another country's territory. Previously, Pyongyang sought to sidestep this constraint by testing its long-range missiles at a lofted trajectory, which minimizes the flight distance from the launch point by maximizing the apogee of the missile's flight. North Korea has done this with its latest ICBM and IRBM tests this year. This type of flight profile places more stress on its missiles, but Pyongyang wants to test its long-range missiles in a standard trajectory because it is the trajectory that it would rely on for missile attacks against Guam, Hawaii or the continental United States.
 
Because of its limitations, the missile flight path of today's launch is the least provocative one North Korea could have chosen for a standard trajectory test. The part of Japan that was overflown is lightly populated, and in the event of an accidental impact on Japanese territory it carries the least risk of damage or casualties.
 
In the past, Japan has emphasized its willingness to shoot down any North Korean missile deemed likely to land on Japanese soil. Tokyo, however, has maintained an ambiguous line on whether it would intercept North Korean ballistic missiles overflying its territory. It is risky to try to do so, since a miss could publicly undermine confidence in the country's ballistic missile defenses. Japan also doesn't want to encourage North Korea to test missiles that overfly Japanese territory, though until now Pyongyang has largely limited itself to high-trajectory tests that would splash down in the Sea of Japan or in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Having tested a ballistic missile over Japanese territory — and not one disguised as a satellite launch vehicle, as in previous cases — the North Koreans will feel more emboldened in continuing ballistic missile tests over Japan.
 

G M

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Re: With EMP being a possibility, isn't this an act of war?
« Reply #294 on: August 28, 2017, 05:54:54 PM »
I would certainly think so.

The fact the NorKs got away with it is very disconcerting.


Stratfor Worldview
worldviewer35811493132323


Aug 29, 2017 | 00:07 GMT
North Korea: Latest Missile Test Overflies Hokkaido, Lands in Pacific
North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean.
(Stratfor)

Save As PDF
At around 5:58 a.m. local time, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean. Early indications are that the missile had a flight time of around 14 minutes, had an apogee of 550 kilometers (340 miles) and splashed down some 2,700 kilometers from its launch point. While these numbers point to a medium-range ballistic missile, the possibility remains that the North Koreans either tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with an early engine cutoff or were experimenting with a heavier warhead. Alternatively, the missile could have failed before reaching its full theoretical range. The latter possibility is reinforced by reports that the missile broke into three parts before landing.
 
The launch site of the latest missile test is believed to be near Sunan, where Pyongyang's international airport is located. Launching from this site continues the trend of North Korea testing its missiles from diverse locations across the country. This makes it harder to predict where and when the next North Korean weapons test will occur. It also adds to the difficulty of targeting North Korea's dispersed missile arsenal in a conflict scenario.
 
North Korea is heavily constrained by geography when it comes to testing long-range missiles. There is virtually no direction in which North Korea could launch an IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at a standard or minimum-energy trajectory without overflying another country's territory. Previously, Pyongyang sought to sidestep this constraint by testing its long-range missiles at a lofted trajectory, which minimizes the flight distance from the launch point by maximizing the apogee of the missile's flight. North Korea has done this with its latest ICBM and IRBM tests this year. This type of flight profile places more stress on its missiles, but Pyongyang wants to test its long-range missiles in a standard trajectory because it is the trajectory that it would rely on for missile attacks against Guam, Hawaii or the continental United States.
 
Because of its limitations, the missile flight path of today's launch is the least provocative one North Korea could have chosen for a standard trajectory test. The part of Japan that was overflown is lightly populated, and in the event of an accidental impact on Japanese territory it carries the least risk of damage or casualties.
 
In the past, Japan has emphasized its willingness to shoot down any North Korean missile deemed likely to land on Japanese soil. Tokyo, however, has maintained an ambiguous line on whether it would intercept North Korean ballistic missiles overflying its territory. It is risky to try to do so, since a miss could publicly undermine confidence in the country's ballistic missile defenses. Japan also doesn't want to encourage North Korea to test missiles that overfly Japanese territory, though until now Pyongyang has largely limited itself to high-trajectory tests that would splash down in the Sea of Japan or in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Having tested a ballistic missile over Japanese territory — and not one disguised as a satellite launch vehicle, as in previous cases — the North Koreans will feel more emboldened in continuing ballistic missile tests over Japan.
 

Crafty_Dog

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #295 on: August 28, 2017, 09:42:11 PM »
If I have this right, haven't the Japanese now allowed the precedent and by so doing given the Norks the option of putting them into the 18th century at will?

DougMacG

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #296 on: August 29, 2017, 06:09:56 AM »
If I have this right, haven't the Japanese now allowed the precedent and by so doing given the Norks the option of putting them into the 18th century at will?

Time will tell but I am thinking this was the game changer, allows Trump to tell China that Japan and many others are going nuclear now unless the NK threat is shut down.

As Clinton, Bush, Obama should have known, this doesn't get easier later.

It is hard for me to believe this will go by answered.
« Last Edit: August 29, 2017, 07:02:03 AM by DougMacG »

ccp

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #297 on: August 29, 2017, 06:14:17 AM »
 "   It is hard for me to believe this will go by answered.  "

We have already basically heard from Bannon and others that pro active military measures are off the table.

Just not going to do it. 

Already decided better NK go nuclear then use military to stop them.

Same for Iran

Isn't it obvious?

GAme over .  It is accepted as fact we are check mated

Crafty_Dog

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Re: North and South Korea
« Reply #298 on: August 29, 2017, 06:24:31 AM »
On Special Report last night one of the panelists commented that the Norks have overflown Japan three times previously, but apparently not for many years, thus this is the first time since the Norks have gone nuke.   He added that in the Norks mind it may be that they are badly pressed by the dramatic decrease in oil etc due to the new sanctions and as usual feel the need to do something in response to the US-Sork joint exercises.

I'm not seeing anyone yet making the connection that I am-- that an overflight enables an EMP attack.  Perhaps one of the sundry policy makers who read this forum  :-D will act upon this?

Back on August 11 President Trump spoke about there being immediate consequences if the Norks messed with us or our allies and there also was his comment that sure sounded like the threat of nuclear devastation.

In "The Odyssey" there was a chapter where Odysseus was sailing between between two monsters and the slightest miscalculation would have led to the doom of his crew and him.  (Names of the monsters?)  President Trump (and we with him) is now sailing between being revealed as a blusterer or a warmonger.  The man's lack of gravitas and the disloyal opposition's near treasonous mindset make him an exceedingly poor candidate for explaining to the country (which has lost its collective mind) what needs to be done.

CCP may be right, it may be game over.  If so, this also means China gets the South China Sea.

FWIW IMHO we do still have game to play.  Trade War with China (Coincidentally Trump is making big tariff noises right now) and enabling the Japanese to go nuke are both big cards to play.
« Last Edit: August 29, 2017, 06:26:43 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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George Friedman: What a Korean Agreement May Look Like
« Reply #299 on: August 29, 2017, 07:42:25 AM »
second post of day:
====================

What a Korean Agreement May Look Like
Aug 24, 2017

By George Friedman

It’s a toss-up whether the United States and North Korea will sue for peace or opt for war. Still, there appears to be interest on both sides in easing tensions. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has even intimated a possibility for direct talks. Informal talks have taken place for the past few months, of course, but these would have clearer imperatives: that Pyongyang not fire missiles at Guam and that the United States reduce the amount of military exercises it holds with South Korea. But is it even possible to reach a settlement on the terms they want?

The U.S. demand is easy to state but difficult to implement. It wants North Korea to reverse course on its nuclear weapons program. Merely halting the progress Pyongyang has already made would enable North Korea to resume development at a later date. In fact, earlier agreements fell apart because they neglected to include such a provision, and so the North Koreans were able to pick up exactly where they left off. Hence the current crisis.

Correcting that mistake would entail dismantling certain facilities and, since the U.S. would never expect North Korea to honor its commitment, Washington would demand permanent inspectors with unfettered access to every facet of the program to remain in the country. So while the U.S. demand may seem modest, it is in fact radical. Simply forfeiting a nuclear weapons program would give Pyongyang nothing. The government is unlikely to accept peace on these terms unless it can demand some substantial concessions from Washington.

This brings us to North Korea’s demands, which are much broader than Washington’s. Pursuing a nuclear weapons program, one meant to discourage any threat to the regime and thus ensure its survival, demanded a huge amount of resources. The North Koreans have not come this far simply to walk away with nothing to show for it. If they were to agree to abandon their program, they would do so only if another means of security were in place.
 North Korean soldiers look at South Korea across the DMZ in 2011 in Panmunjom, South Korea. CHUNG SUNG-JUN/Getty Images
This would likely require a new regional framework whereby the U.S. would enhance North Korea’s position at the expense of its allies. The framework would also have to weaken U.S. influence in the region, perhaps by relinquishing its relationship with South Korea and withdrawing its forces from the peninsula, or perhaps by keeping its Navy out of the Sea of Japan. Maybe U.S. aircraft would be prohibited from flying near Korean airspace, and maybe Washington would have to rework its treaties with Japan so that its troops there did not threaten North Korea. In short, if North Korea must abandon its military capabilities, so too must the United States, or so the thinking of Pyongyang would go. The U.S. will not alter the regional balance of power lightly. And even if it did, it would have to consider the financial burden of propping up the government in Pyongyang. The United States is unlikely to accept this.
War is the one option the U.S. has to prevent North Korea from completing its nuclear weapons program – if it has not done so already – without giving up anything (except blood) in return. But, as has been widely discussed, this option would be difficult and bloody, and if success is measured by the elimination of all nuclear facilities, there is no guarantee that it would be successful. North Korea is not particularly keen on the prospect of war, either – it knows war introduces the possibility of annihilation. But it has come to read the fear in South Korea, which would likely bear the brunt of the war, as a check on U.S. intent. This dramatically reduces the chance of war.
That means North Korea has options and therefore the upper hand in negotiations, at least for now. It can press on with its nuclear program, or it can, in theory, negotiate a redeployment of U.S. forces. If there are no negotiations, North Korea gets a nuclear weapons program. If there are negotiations, and the negotiations fail, North Korea gets a nuclear weapons program. If there are negotiations, and the negotiations succeed, North Korea will lose its nuclear weapons program but gain a tremendous amount of concessions from the United States. Either way, North Korea comes out ahead.
Of course, agreements have been made and broken before. If North Korea surrendered its program, the U.S. could renege on whatever promises it made, re-establish military ties with South Korea, and re-deploy its naval and air forces. The government in Pyongyang understands as much – even expects as much – so it is highly unlikely to reverse course on its program.
It is easier to hold talks than to reach a settlement. It is easier to reach a settlement than to honor it. And this is why wars happen. Wars create a finality that diplomacy can’t. Sometimes.