The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran’s Ambitions Persist,

Checking the pulse of our annual predictions, every two weeks.

GPF Staff |November 16, 2018



From the Forecast: “Tehran must … move quickly to secure its objectives – to become the leading power in the Persian Gulf, and then to dominate the Arab world from the gulf to the Mediterranean. This will be Iran’s challenge in 2018.”

Update: If the demise of the Islamic State was the center of gravity in our 2017 forecast for the Middle East, the Iranian attempt to fill the power vacuum left in the group’s wake was the center of gravity in our 2018 forecast for the world’s most frenetic region. Iran has had a difficult year, capped off by the reimposition of U.S. sanctions targeting its oil sector. The U.S. has granted temporary waivers to many of Iran’s top energy importers to try to stave off a spike in oil prices. But as oil prices drop and it becomes clear that the market is oversupplied even with Iran on the sidelines, the incentive for U.S. leniency will soon pass as well.

Overall, it has been a mixed year in Iran and for this forecast. The Iranian economy seemed poised for meltdown at several points, and domestic politics seethed with such dissent that the government’s survival became a legitimate concern. We did not anticipate the level of discontent in Iran, nor did we fully appreciate that Iranian expansionism in the Middle East would exacerbate its domestic economic problems to the point that the Islamic republic’s foreign adventures in places like Syria would become as much a target for protesters as the U.S. and Israel historically have been.

Throughout the Middle East, too, Iran’s actions have had ripple effects. Iran-backed Shiite militias and their former leaders have gained substantial influence with the government in Baghdad, as Tehran tries to replicate in Iraq the success it has had in Lebanon with its proxy Hezbollah. Iran also has established bases throughout Syria and, together with Hezbollah, has stabilized the position of Bashar Assad, a stalwart ally. It has provoked Israel to launch multiple attacks in Syria and provided Hezbollah with technology and weapons to increase its potency should a war with Israel break out. All the while, Iran has continued to look for friends in the gulf, weakening Saudi Arabia in its own backyard.

Each of these dynamics, from Iran’s struggling economy to its expanding reach in the region, has been in play in recent weeks. For every report of a truckers’ strike or teachers’ protest against the mullahs, there are stories of Iran finding ways to evade sanctions by, for example, creating a new banking mechanism with China. Iraqi Shiite militias now receive the same salaries as Iraqi soldiers – which means Iran’s strategy to embed itself in Iraqi state structures is proceeding apace. Meanwhile, Iran remains defiant of the U.S. and, despite Israeli warnings, continues to press its positions in Syria and Lebanon. Iran faces many challenges, but it has not pulled back from its regional ambitions in any meaningful way, and that makes this particular forecast, while imperfect, a success.

[Crafty_Dog]

Is the Idlib deal dead? The agreement Russia and Turkey reached in September over the status of Idlib, the embattled province of northwest Syria, is on the verge of breaking down. The Syrian government claims Turkey has failed to hold up its end of the bargain because it has yet to remove the most extreme elements of armed opposition – namely, the 15,000 or so members of the al-Qaida affiliate known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. It also accused Turkey of resuming artillery bombardment of the demilitarized zone the agreement established and of deploying heavy military equipment to Idlib instead of the light equipment stipulated in the deal. Finally, Damascus said that the raising of Turkish flags over the Syrian cities Turkey now controls constitutes an act of aggression. Parties to the Astana talks – Russia, Turkey and Iran – agreed that under no circumstances would Idlib compromise Syria’s sovereign territory. Not for nothing, Russia said it was ready to start bombing HTS positions in Idlib again, going so far as to note that it would cooperate with both the Syrian government and the Syrian rebels that have honored the Idlib agreement to eliminate the jihadist threat there.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://clarionproject.org/syria-is-granting-citizenship-millions-iranians/

Big implications here!

[Crafty_Dog]

A Kurdish bus line. A new bus line from Iraqi Kurdistan to Kurdish cities in northeastern Syria has begun operating. Though it may seem like a minor development, it’s noteworthy because the Syrian Democratic Forces, the U.S. ally in Syria that is dominated by Kurds, will oversee it. This will surely frustrate Turkey. Ankara considers the Kurds in question terrorists, so it won’t be too happy to find them strengthening ties with Iraqi Kurds, with whom Turkey has comparatively better relations. Behind all this is Turkey’s fear that Kurds throughout the region will coalesce into an independent Kurdistan. So long as cross-border collaboration – tacitly OK’d by the U.S. – continues, Turkey will distrust Washington’s intentions. After all, the U.S. has already established new observation posts along the Syria-Turkey border, ostensibly to create a shield for Kurdish forces in northern Syria against future Turkish offensives.

[Crafty_Dog]

By GPF Staff


Daily Memo: Conflicts Brewing in the Middle East


All the news worth knowing today.


The U.S., Turkey and the Kurds. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey’s military will soon start operations east of the Euphrates River, a move that will directly target Syrian Kurdish forces allied with the United States. Rumors have begun to surface that he made the announcement in response to Washington’s construction of observation posts along the Syrian border despite Turkey’s objections. Turkish news agencies, which have begun to set up shop near the border to be closer to the action, have reported that heavy military equipment is already being shipped to Sanliurfa province in southeastern Turkey. Washington’s response has been a little inconsistent: A Pentagon spokesman said unilateral action by Turkey against the Kurds in the area is unacceptable before noting that Washington still wants to coordinate and cooperate with Ankara.
The Kurdish issue is a major sticking point in U.S.-Turkey relations. The U.S. needs Kurdish fighters to help fight its battles in Syria, but Turkey considers the Kurds terrorists. The interests of other countries further complicate the issue. Russia has been stirring the pot, trying to capitalize on the tensions by temporarily allying itself with Turkey in Syria. Its foreign ministry has said the “excessive” U.S. military presence in Syria threatens the Idlib peace deal, which Moscow would continue to enforce with Turkey. The U.S. and Turkey keep kicking the can down the road, but the Kurdish issue is not something they can put off indefinitely.


Bellicose words from Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would not rule out any type of military action against Iran to ensure his state’s survival – including potential action against Iranian proxies. Netanyahu underscored that Iran has missiles capable of striking anywhere in Israel and that Israeli forces are already engaged in airstrikes against Iran-backed groups in Syria. At a meeting of the U.N. Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo backed Netanyahu’s stance, saying that Iran’s ballistic missile activity is “out of control” and calling for increased efforts to halt Iranian weapons exports.


Netanyahu has also appealed to Saudi Arabia, a potential ally, as the two work to improve relations. The prime minister said Israel is not an enemy of Arab countries but a partner, and he emphasized that Israel’s support for the current Saudi government, despite the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, is critical to stability in the Middle East – and in the rest of the world. Russia has chimed in too, repeating calls to end the fighting in the Golan Heights. The Israel Defense Forces are currently excavating and destroying tunnels along the border with Lebanon and in the Golan Heights to reduce Israel’s vulnerability to a surprise attack by Iranian proxies like Hezbollah.

[Crafty_Dog]

For my fellow geopolitical junkies:

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Geopolitical Futures
Dec. 20, 2018
By Xander Snyder

The US Leaves Syrian Kurds High and Dry

Washington’s plans to withdraw from Syria will pave the way for Ankara’s offensive on Kurdish-held territory east of the Euphrates River.

The U.S. is reportedly on its way out of Syria. On Wednesday morning, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration said it would withdraw all U.S. forces from the country within the next 100 days. An anonymous official further claimed that all State Department Officials in Syria would be evacuated within 24 hours. On Thursday, anonymous U.S. officials told Reuters that the U.S. air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria would also stop. The announcements came days after the Syrian Democratic Forces, a largely Kurdish, U.S.-backed rebel group, declared victory over the last major Islamic State stronghold in eastern Syria. Now that the group’s defeat is near, the U.S. has accomplished its goals in Syria.

The United States’ departure will leave its Kurdish partners in Syria high and dry. The U.S. has partnered with the SDF over the years to fight against the Islamic State. Since Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, it has also shielded the Kurdish People’s Protection Units – or YPG, the SDF coalition’s largest member – from an assault by Turkey, which considers the group a terrorist organization. Without a U.S. presence on the ground, Turkey will have free rein to move into the Kurdish-held portions of northern and northeastern Syria.

(click to enlarge)

And Turkey does indeed appear to be preparing to go after the Kurds. For the last week, it has been broadcasting its intention to start a new offensive east of the Euphrates River. It won’t be a small one, either: A spokesperson for Syria’s pro-Turkey rebels claimed Dec. 14 that 15,000 fighters are mobilized for the operation, and a few days later, Turkish newspaper Yeni Safak said that 24,000 troops, including Turkish soldiers, are ready for the fight. If these accounts are accurate, Turkey is planning to commit more of its own soldiers to this new operation than it did to its offensive in Afrin earlier this year. Reports have also surfaced that Turkey is moving tanks and artillery to its border with Syria, albeit west of the Euphrates. According to Washington’s announcement, the Kurds in northeast Syria will have to face this threat on their own.

Complementary Interests

Although the White House’s announcement reportedly took some U.S. officials by surprise, the timing makes sense. Proclaiming the Islamic State’s defeat will enable Washington to withdraw troops from Syria with something like a victory to show for it. Transnational jihadism has long been the main issue for the United States in Syria. The SDF’s capture of the last major IS stronghold east of the Euphrates demonstrates the success of its efforts against transnational jihadist forces there (apart from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which Turkey has yet to disband).
That’s not all the U.S. has to gain from the move. Earlier in the Syrian civil war, Washington wanted Turkey to take on a more active role in the conflict. Its hope, of course, was that Ankara would engage in the fight against jihadist organizations like IS. But the Turkish government was reluctant to invade Syria for the purpose of repelling a Sunni group that was weakening the administration of Syrian President Bashar Assad, whom it considered a regional adversary. The YPG, by contrast, is a much more appealing target for Turkey. Once Turkish forces have wrested control of northern and northeastern Syria from the Kurds – and it almost certainly will, given its military superiority – they will establish permanent administrative structures there, as they have in Afrin, to try to create a lasting buffer. Turkey will then take the YPG’s place as the target of IS attacks in the region – another of which reportedly occurred in Raqqa on Wednesday – forcing the country to confront the jihadist group.

(click to enlarge)

The U.S., then, will get what it wanted from Turkey all along – not because Ankara has changed its tune but because its interests once again align with those of Washington. The U.S. withdrawal from the region will pave the way for the offensive Turkey wants to launch against the YPG. Turkey’s offensive, in turn, will pave the way for the more permanent professional military force the United States wants in the region to keep IS at bay.

Stopping Iran

On top of that, Turkey’s offensive will further constrain Iranian power in Syria. It is in the interest of the United States to minimize the amount of territory the Assad administration reclaims in Syria. Even if Assad recovers 75 percent of his country, that’s still 25 percent that Tehran won’t have influence over. Were the war to continue as it has been going, Assad would consolidate all the territory held by non-Kurdish rebels, leaving Idlib as the only outlier, before turning his attention to the north and northeast. (Assad had a tacit pact with the Kurds to leave them alone while he dealt with the rest of Syria, but he and his foreign backers knew that at some point he would need to bring the territory they held back under the central government’s control.) By moving into the Kurdish-occupied territory now, Ankara will stop Assad before he has even had a chance to deal with Idlib, where Turkey also has a presence. Iran will still have access to some of its supply routes through southern Syria, though they have been under such strain recently that Tehran has found other ways to get arms and equipment to Hezbollah, including developing weapons in Lebanon.

As it prepares for its offensive east of the Euphrates, Turkey is also busy hashing out a peace plan for Syria with Iran and Russia. The three have agreed on the structure of a constitutional committee that could bring the war to a political end. It would consist of 150 delegates, including 50 representatives from the Assad government and 50 representatives from Syria’s rebel groups. The disposition of the remaining 50 delegates, reserved for “independent” members – in other words, representatives from Turkey, Russia and Iran – is still up in the air. Turkey is trying to gather as many bargaining chips as it can to strengthen its position in the talks, as states often do when negotiating a political compromise in a war. So long as Ankara doesn’t use its eventual presence in northern Syria to undermine Assad’s rule, Moscow probably will be willing to settle for an arrangement in which some territory remains outside the Syrian government’s control.

Ankara’s Ambitions

These other parties’ gain will be the Syrian Kurds’ loss. The U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish groups was always a tactical alliance, meant to minimize the number of American troops fighting IS on the ground. As that fight winds down, Washington has much less of a strategic rationale for maintaining that support, especially since doing so would jeopardize its relations with Turkey, which now appear to be on the mend after a tumultuous year. The U.S. special representative for Syria engagement seemed to back up the idea that Washington is ending its support for the Kurds, saying in a speech Monday at the Atlantic Council that the U.S. does “not have permanent relations with sub-state entities.” There’s every reason to believe Turkey’s pending offensive will succeed in defeating Kurdish forces after the U.S. withdraws its support. After all, it did so in northwestern Syria with Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, and again in Afrin with Operation Olive Branch this year.

(click to enlarge)

Depending on how quickly U.S. troops pull out of Syria, Turkey may have to delay its invasion. It may also face operational hurdles, as it did during Euphrates Shield, that slow its progress. Then, too, there’s always the possibility, however remote, that Washington and Ankara have reached a private understanding whereby Turkish forces will stop their advance at a certain point, or else the U.S. will resume its support for the YPG. Regardless, the developments in Syria reflect Turkey’s growing role in the Middle East, and the attending expansion of its geographic interests. No longer is Turkey focused on defending its own borders; it is turning its gaze much farther east.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Fallout from the Syria withdrawal. Nothing that happens in Syria happens in isolation. Washington’s decision to remove its troops will be felt throughout the region, perhaps nowhere more so than in Israel. Washington’s help in the fight against Iran is an important component of U.S.-Israel relations, one that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would rather not lose. To that end, he spoke to President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who he said confirmed that the U.S. will continue to influence the outcome in Syria and aid Israel through other means. It’s unclear exactly how the U.S. will do so, but it is clear that Israel is already trying to figure out how much risk the U.S. may have put it in – Israeli fighter jets have already been spotted in Lebanese airspace near the Syrian border.

Others are anticipating changes as well. The Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by the U.S. but dominated by the Kurds, warned that the withdrawal will lead to a jihadist revival. A leading Kurdish politician hinted that they may need to reconsider their alliances. The French government said the fight against terrorism was, in fact, not over and that its troops would remain in Syria accordingly. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said that the U.S. has the potential to usher in a political settlement in Syria but remained skeptical until seeing more action.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Cost of Betraying Syria’s Kurds
A U.S. pullout would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences and cause harm to U.S. interests.
4 Comments
By Tommy Meyerson
Dec. 20, 2018 7:00 p.m. ET
Kurdish fighters hold a position in northern Iraq, March 29.
Kurdish fighters hold a position in northern Iraq, March 29. Photo: safin hamed/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

I returned this year from military service in northeastern Syria, where the U.S. has supported local Kurdish, Arab and Syriac Christian militias in a grim campaign to dislodge Islamic State. Now refugees are returning to their homes, and locals are starting to rebuild after five years of fighting and nightmarish ISIS rule. In most places I was greeted by civilians thankful for the U.S. presence. I’ll never forget the little girl who ran up in a recently liberated market town and hugged my leg, refusing to let go.

But this fragile rose blooming in the desert will likely be crushed if the U.S. departs.

With peace finally in sight, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last week threatened to invade northern Syria and “cleanse” the region of our Kurdish partners. After a phone call with Mr. Erdogan, President Trump tweeted that the U.S. may soon pull all 2,000 troops from Syria. The best way for the U.S. to avoid dishonor and calamity is to walk back this policy shift and publicly commit to safeguarding its Kurdish partners until a durable peace agreement can be reached.

The U.S. and the West have quietly relied on the Syrian Kurds to sacrifice their young men and women by the thousands to defeat the Islamic State. Thanks largely to their efforts, ISIS in Syria has gone from a fearsome juggernaut to a ragged band of die-hards trapped in a shrinking patch of wasteland.

The partnership dates to 2014, when the Kurds mounted an inspiring last-ditch defense of Kobani against ISIS’ advance. The Kurds could have halted and focused on consolidating their own territory, but at America’s urging they expanded their effort against ISIS. In a coalition with Arabs and Syriacs of the Euphrates River Valley, they’ve swept south to dislodge ISIS from one-third of Syria.

I met many young Syrian fighters of all ethnicities, who under Kurdish leadership were determined to liberate their lands from Islamist despotism. In Raqqa and along the Euphrates I witnessed firsthand as steady trains of field ambulances carried Kurdish casualties in battle after battle. The Kurdish-led civil administration does the heavy lifting of guarding hundreds of ISIS’ most dangerous foreign fighters while their home countries drag their feet on extradition.

The West owes them a debt for the price they’ve paid. Instead, a U.S. departure would threaten them with disaster. Already Mr. Erdogan has directed two invasions of Syrian border regions—in 2016 north of Aleppo and this January in the northwestern Afrin region. Mr. Erdogan labels America’s Syrian Kurdish partners “terrorists,” links them with separatist rebels in Turkey, and suggests resettling their land with Arab refugees from elsewhere in Syria.

The Kurds have earned a reputation for fighting bravely, but without U.S. air power their prospects against a modern army with a robust air force would be grim. An invasion would force Kurdish forces to pull back from the front lines against the remnant of ISIS, allowing the jihadists to regroup and proliferate. It would likely spawn a fresh humanitarian catastrophe, including areas that have been mostly spared the worst of Syria’s civil war.

I heard frequently from Kurds about their fears of ethnic cleansing should Turkey invade. Invasion would also leave the door wide open for the Assad regime to launch an assault with help from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. I witnessed just such an incursion attempt by regime elements this February, while the Kurds were distracted with Ankara’s invasion of Afrin—an incursion repelled only by U.S. firepower.

A pullout would harm U.S. interests as well. It would shred America’s credibility as a counterterrorism partner world-wide, while abandoning a strategic area and making it harder to check jihadist, Iranian and Russian ambitions. Mr. Trump should make clear the U.S. stands with the Syrian Kurds and won’t permit a Turkish invasion. No one wants American troops to stay in Syria forever, but U.S. interests and honor demand that they stay for now.

Mr. Meyerson, a former U.S. Marine, is a student at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business.

[Crafty_Dog]

fourth post

Note that if Turkey actually buys the Russian Missile System it will likely enable the Russkis to reverse engineer US Airforce technology or something like that-- this is a serious issue!


Key U.S. Partner in Syria Thrown Into Disarray
Kurds consider abandoning the fight against Islamic State and seek new partners, including possibly the Assad regime, as U.S. forces leave Syria
By Sune Engel Rasmussen in Beirut and
David Gauthier-Villars in Istanbul
Dec. 20, 2018 4:10 p.m. ET

A key U.S. partner in Syria said President Trump’s abrupt order to withdraw American troops from the country could prompt it to leave the fight against Islamic State and seek new partners, including possibly Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces have been at the forefront of an international coalition battling the extremist group since 2015. The U.S. has supported the fighters with training and airstrikes, allowing the SDF to capture around one-third of Syria’s territory and most of its oil reserves.

But without American troops to back them, the Syrian Kurds are vulnerable to attacks from both Islamic State and Turkey, which views them as terrorists and a threat to its security. Mr. Assad, backed by Russia and Iran, has repeatedly vowed to retake control of the entire country despite diplomatic and military efforts by the U.S. and its allies to thwart a leader it considers responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths.

The Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal From Syria

President Trump ordered the withdraw of U.S. troops from Syria, and declared that America had "defeated ISIS." WSJ's Gerald F. Seib discusses the significance of the decision and its consequences. Photo: AP

Left in a lurch, the Kurds—the U.S.’s most reliable partner in Syria—could seek a settlement with Mr. Assad who, as opposed to Turkey and Islamic State, can offer them some protection. Kurdish leaders met with intelligence and security officials from the Syrian government this summer, but initial talks didn’t yield an accord.

“We are going to leave all of our options open,” SDF spokesman Mustafa Bali said. “We will look for the best decision that will fill the gap left by U.S. forces so that we can fight Islamic State. This does not preclude building new relationships with parties internationally and domestically."

A war monitor, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reported that SDF was considering releasing about 1,100 Islamic State fighters and some 2,000 relatives from captivity following Mr. Trump’s announcement.

Mr. Bali declined to comment on the Observatory reports. But he suggested the SDF’s commitment to fight Islamic State could falter without U.S. backing.

“We will have to shift our troops according to the developments and to defend,” he said. “We might have to leave the fronts with Islamic State entirely.”

A State Department official said Thursday “the Syrian Democratic Forces are an integral part of the fight to defeat ISIS,” and the department continues to back the United Nations-led peace process.

“Coordination and consultation between the U.S. and Turkey is the only approach to address issues of security concern in this area,” the official said, citing a recent high-level meeting between the U.S. and Turkey.

Based on their past priorities, Kurdish political representatives are likely to push in any talks with Syria for some degree of administrative autonomy and permission to teach the Kurdish language in schools, while Mr. Assad will want control of national borders and a majority of natural resources in the area.

On Thursday, the Kurds railed at Mr. Trump’s sudden decision to withdraw troops from Syria, saying such a move will hamper the fight against terrorism and further destabilize the region.

“This decision to withdraw will strike at joint efforts to eradicate terrorism,” the SDF said in a statement. “It will create a political and military void in the region and leave people at the mercy of opposing forces.”

SDF members were in a “state of shock,” said one U.S. peaceworker based in Beirut. “SDF officials have painted this as a betrayal locally.”

Threats to the Kurds are already growing. Turkey has moved military forces to its border with Syria in recent weeks. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said they stood ready to start an offensive on Kurdish militants “at any moment.”

Earlier in the year, Turkish troops captured Afrin in the northwest and in November began joint patrols with U.S. soldiers in Manbij, east of Afrin, after continuously threatening to capture the town by force.
Kurdish demonstrators gathered near the border wall separating Turkey from Syria in the western Syrian countryside of Ras al-Ain to protest Turkish threats of an offensive against them. President Trump’s order to pull out U.S. troops leaves Syrian Kurds vulnerable.
Kurdish demonstrators gathered near the border wall separating Turkey from Syria in the western Syrian countryside of Ras al-Ain to protest Turkish threats of an offensive against them. President Trump’s order to pull out U.S. troops leaves Syrian Kurds vulnerable. Photo: delil souleiman/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

A U.S. withdrawal would diminish the risk of American soldiers in the vicinity of Kurds being hit accidentally by Turkish fire. It would also accommodate Mr. Erdogan’s demand that Washington stop supporting the Kurdish groups, smoothing relations between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, analysts said.

“It will remove the main problem between the U.S. and Turkey,” said Can Acun, an analyst at SETA, an Ankara-based think tank close to the Turkish government. “All other matters are secondary.”

The U.S. withdrawal also risks boosting an embattled Islamic State, whose fighters have fought the Syrian Kurds in a guerrilla-style insurgency for months, using suicide bombers, sleeper cells and kidnappings. The militants have killed more than 500 SDF fighters since September, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Mr. Trump’s sudden reversal of U.S. policy in Syria is also creating divisions within the SDF, which is led by Kurds, but includes Arabs, and has both a political and a military wing. In addition, some Kurds may leave their current positions and move into territory controlled by Syria’s government to be safe from Turkish attacks, said the U.S. peace worker. This could splinter the SDF would further weaken the fight against Islamic State.

U.S. allies outside Syria also questioned Mr. Trump’s decision. The British and French governments both said that Islamic State still poses a threat. Mr. Bali said the British and French foreign ministries have reassured SDF that their troops would remain in Syria.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, praised Mr. Trump and said leaving Syria was “the right decision.”

Russia, one of the main arbiters of the Syrian war, has in the past said Kurdish rights in Syria must be defended. But Moscow is unlikely to throw its support behind Kurdish fighters in eastern Syria to counter a Turkish intervention there, analysts said.

“Moscow is interested in preserving the remnants of a quasi-alliance with Turkey, so backing the Kurds is still out of the question,” said Pavel Baev, a professor at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo and a former analyst at the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

But analysts said the fate of the Turkish-Russian alliance hinged on Turkey meeting its side of recent bilateral agreements. Last year, Turkey agreed to buy S-400 missile defense systems from Russia. In September, Turkey also pledged to remove radical militants from the Syrian province of Idlib, one of the last pockets of resistance to the Assad regime and home to millions of refugees, after Russia accepted to hold off on attacking the area.

Should Turkey turn its back to Russia by seeking to cancel the S-400 contract, which has angered Washington, Moscow could retaliate by going back on the Idlib pact and launching an offensive on the Syrian province together with the Assad regime, the analysts said.

“Moscow is actively looking for ways and means to break the agreement,” Mr. Baev said, noting any move from Ankara “makes the offensive imminent rather than probable.”

—Nazih Osseiran in Beirut contributed to this article.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/How-Russia-defeated-America-in-Syria-574930

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/us-likely-end-air-war-against-daesh-syria

[Crafty_Dog]

Fourth post

More on the Syria fallout. U.S. officials on Thursday said President Donald Trump’s order for a quick withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria will also include an end to the U.S. air campaign against the Islamic State. Details remain vague at this point; U.S. Central Command said merely that the air campaign would continue so long as U.S. troops are on the ground. But defense leaders from nearly every partner in the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State – including Israel, France, the U.K., the Netherlands and Germany (most of which vowed to remain in Syria), as well as U.S. lawmakers and senior defense officials – voiced concern about the speed of the move. The main critique: The job isn’t quite done yet. Kurdish officials, meanwhile, warned that the loss of U.S. air cover would force them to effectively abandon the fight against the Islamic State, so they could shift resources north to counter the impending Turkish offensive, potentially allowing IS forces to reconstitute. According to one Kurdish official, this would force the Syrian Democratic Forces to release more than a thousand IS detainees. Given all the opposition to the move from inside the U.S. and out, it’s not hard to see the U.S. withdrawal timeline getting pushed back quite a bit. But it’s clear that the U.S. campaign will not be open-ended.

On U.S. allies and credibility. Concern about the U.S. move to leave Syria was compounded Thursday by the announcement that U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis will resign in February. One man won’t fundamentally alter the U.S. strategic course. We’ve been saying for years that the U.S. is overexposed and would seek to shift more of the security burden to allies and partners and manipulate global affairs from afar. Geopolitical structures are only as sustainable as the alignment of interests underpinning them. But Mattis’ resignation letter, in which he lambasted Trump’s apparent disregard for the value of long-standing U.S. alliances and diplomatic prowess, will only deepen the sense that the U.S. is a capricious and distracted power. Whatever the merits of the U.S. moves to recalibrate its global strategy, they are already creating vacuums of power that friends and foes alike are scrambling to fill. Along these lines, it’s worth noting that Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana announced that Manila would re-evaluate the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty due to Washington’s continued refusal to confirm that it covers Philippine-claimed parts of the South China Sea. Meanwhile, North Korea’s explicit demand yesterday that U.S. troops withdraw from South Korea, if not the entire region, was partially an attempt to gauge just how far and fast the Trump administration is willing to accelerate the U.S. recalibration.

[Crafty_Dog]

fifth post


https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/trump-syria-withdrawal-intervention-questionable/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=181221_G-File&utm_term=GFile-Smart

[Crafty_Dog]

sixth post

A lot to update in Turkey. Turkey, Russia and Iran said they will support the creation of a committee to bring a political settlement to the Syrian civil war. But they haven’t agreed on who exactly will sit on it. The committee will comprise 150 delegates – 50 from the Syrian government, 50 from Syria’s various rebel groups and 50 from so-called “independent” members (i.e., Iran, Turkey and Russia). It’s nothing less than a competition for who will have the most influence in Damascus once the Syrian conflict is over.

Meanwhile, there are signs that U.S.-Turkey ties are improving. The United States has approved a $3.5 billion sale of Patriot air defense systems to Turkey, presumably as an alternative to the Russian S-400 system, which can’t be integrated into NATO air defense systems. (The U.S. has long opposed its acquisition.) Russia is indifferent to the Patriot deal, claiming it won’t affect the S-400 sale. That’s true. S-400s and Patriots are similar but not identical; S-400s have a longer range, better intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missile potential, and greater versatility, while the Patriot is better for point defense. Turkey can claim it needs both.

Moreover, the U.S. said Tuesday that it is considering extraditing Fetullah Gulen, the Muslim cleric Turkey believes orchestrated the failed 2016 coup. The announcement contradicts a statement Washington made just one day earlier. It’s a subtle but important development – a public confirmation means Washington is probably looking for ways to reconcile with Ankara. To that end, the Trump administration said Wednesday that it would withdraw completely from Syria, something it said it wanted to do earlier this year (in March) but quickly backtracked on (in April). Along with a recent statement from Washington’s envoy to Syria – that the U.S. has “no permanent relationships with sub-state entities” – this is a foreboding prospect for the Kurds.

Behind the tree. Lebanon’s army was put on high alert after Lebanese and Israeli forces had a minor verbal altercation about the placement of a security fence. A video shows soldiers from Israel and from Lebanon only a few yards apart, arguing about where the fence should be erected relative to the Blue Line, the internationally recognized border established after the 2006 war. (Soldiers kept shouting the phrase “behind the [olive] tree.”) Israeli activity toward Hezbollah has raised the possibility of another war, making tiffs like this a little more troubling than before.

[Crafty_Dog]

seventh post

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-21/trump-call-that-went-rogue-hands-erdogan-surprise-win-on-syria?fbclid=IwAR278xcIXX-suwod-NoTMGMtxSfBGRfgezrKaKnYbHI574-0RSYnKIM31Mk

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jns.org/israel-jordan-saudi-arabia-join-forces-against-iran-in-syria/?fbclid=IwAR3mWiRzvlc_qyXddcCG_MuY6mDWKvqaLHpDf3jpVIgBwJuFBmNKmYpUX0k

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

http://carolineglick.com/pros-and-cons-of-the-us-pullout-from-syria/

[ccp]

Good analysis
and concise summary of "pros and cons"

Like you noted,
 CD we screw over the Kurds again .  Why would anyone trust us?

[Crafty_Dog]

Wasn't there something a few months ago where Trump/Mattis promised the Turks we would take back certain arms from the Kurds after ISIS was beaten or something like that?  I'm looking for it but can't find it.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

https://amgreatness.com/2018/12/21/out-of-syria/?fbclid=IwAR3QV20bbS5gJyPVrd1GXKbwUapEV05AJDYDwdVyG-6uu-Wolbab7rcPWb0

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13470/turkey-turns-on-america

[Crafty_Dog]

Fourth post

More on the U.S., Turkey and Syria. U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke on Sunday. Erdogan described the call as “productive,” and Trump said afterward that the U.S. withdrawal from Syria would be both “slow” and “highly coordinated” with Ankara. This seems to contrast with initial claims that the withdrawal would take 60 to 100 days. Trump signed the executive order for the withdrawal on Sunday. Ankara has signaled that it is willing to delay its offensive on Manbij and areas east of the Euphrates River. But reports indicate Turkey has sent a 100-vehicle convoy of reinforcements, including tanks and other weapons, to positions north and northwest of Manbij. Additionally, Yeni Safek reported that 8,000 Free Syrian Army fighters were deployed to the Manbij area. (It’s unclear if this deployment is part of or in addition to the 15,000 FSA fighters that were already mobilized.)

Meanwhile, Kurdish forces are doing what they can to cope with the fallout from the U.S. withdrawal. Over the weekend, officials from the Syrian Democratic Forces traveled to Moscow, seeking some sort of settlement with Russia that would prevent or at least limit the anticipated Turkish offensive. Russia reportedly offered to deploy border guards east of the Euphrates, but the SDF insisted that they be Syrian army units rather than the Iran-backed Popular Defense Forces that were sent to Afrin in February. With the U.S. withdrawing, Kurds in northern Syria are essentially faced with two options: quickly reach an agreement with Assad – presumably brokered by Russia – or face a Turkish offensive and long-term occupation. Russia will need to walk a fine line to broker such a deal, as it would like to see President Bashar Assad retake as much territory as possible and use the Syrian Kurds as leverage against Ankara, all the while avoiding a direct confrontation with Turkey.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/12/19/heres-what-may-be-driving-a-us-troop-withdrawal-from-syria/?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=Socialflow+ARM&fbclid=IwAR0ZeCKZ1UNo2xLWC2gWVwe_2EL1zvzc-U7qt2CBnvgxb9FlsjHJ2SvgY-0

Notice the words by Mattis

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/How-a-breakdown-in-relations-with-Turkey-could-lead-to-an-MBS-Bibi-bromance-575433

[Crafty_Dog]

By GPF Staff


Daily Memo: Strange Bedfellows in Syria, Anti-Marxism in China, Competition in the Indo-Pacific


All the news worth knowing today.


Alliances shift in Syria. For about as long as the U.S. has been engaged in operations against the Islamic State in Syria, the People’s Protection Units, a Syrian Kurdish militia funded by the U.S. and better known as the YPG, has done the bulk of Washington’s dirty work. So when U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly announced a quick end to U.S. involvement in Syria — a move that opened the door for Turkey to uproot Kurdish positions along the Turkey-Syria border — the YPG reached out to an unlikely partner for protection against a Turkish invasion: the Syrian government. On Friday, the rebels asked officials in Damascus to deploy troops to the city of Manbij and other Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria. The government is said to have complied. (Notably, accounts differ. Russia and Iran say Syria now controls Manbij, while the U.S., Turkey and local rebel groups say it doesn’t.) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Ankara has “no interest” in Manbij so long as the YPG leaves the city. But nothing is settled, and the fallout from the U.S. withdrawal is just beginning. Turkey may be happy to see the Kurds go, but if Syrian forces – and, by extension, Iran itself – gain a foothold on Turkey’s doorstep, it’s a bit of a Pyrrhic victory. Unsurprisingly, on Friday, Turkey’s primary rebel proxy group in Syria said its convoys were moving with some Turkish forces toward Manbij to “liberate” the town. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Erdogan are expected to meet soon to decide everyone’s fate.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pentagon-defends-syria-withdrawal-deliberate-thought-mutually-supportive/story?id=60056404

[Crafty_Dog]

https://nypost.com/2019/01/10/turkey-to-launch-attack-against-kurds-in-syria/

Let's see how the Progressive Neocons respond to this!

Wonder if they will call for President Trump telling Erdogan to put up or shut up.

[Crafty_Dog]

Will Turkey Invade Northeast Syria?
by Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
January 11, 2019
https://www.meforum.org/57580/will-turkey-invade-northeast-syria
             

 
The announcement by US President Donald Trump on December 19 of his intention to rapidly withdraw US forces from eastern Syria led to expectations of a rapid move by Turkish forces into all or part of the area currently controlled by the US-aligned, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces.

The precipitating factor that led to Trump's announcement, after all, was a phone call between the president and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For Turkey, control by what Ankara regards as the Syrian franchise of the PKK of a large swath of the 900-km. Syrian-Turkish border has long been seen as entirely unacceptable.

The Kurdish dominated SDF has capable and proven fighters. But without US help, and facing Turkish air power and artillery, they would be able to resist only for a while. This had already been proven in Turkey's Operation Olive Branch in January 2018, when Ankara invaded and destroyed the Kurdish canton of Afrin in northwest Syria.
For Israel, the prospect of a Turkish invasion was and remains a matter of concern. Pro-Iranian Iraqi Shia militias are deployed close to the border adjoining the Kurdish-controlled area. In the event of a Turkish incursion from the north, SDF fighters would likely leave the southern part of their area of control to try to stop the Turkish forces further north. This could leave the way open for a push by the Shia militias into the oil rich Deir al-Zor province. Alternatively, Syrian regime forces along with Iran-associated militias could push into the same area from west of the Euphrates River. In either case, the result would be a dramatic widening of the Iranian "land corridor," the area of freedom of activity for Iran and its allies. Israel was hence strongly opposed to the abandonment by the US of its Kurdish allies and their area of control.

Similarly, the US and allied base at Tanf is located in the area adjoining the Baghdad-Damascus highway. Its abandonment would thus leave the way open from the Albu Kamal border crossing between Iraq and Syria to Quneitra province, adjoining the Golan Heights.

For A number of reasons, however, the prospect of an early large-scale entry of Turkish forces into northeast Syria now seems less likely than it did a couple of weeks ago.
Firstly and most importantly, the US withdrawal, which alone would make possible a major Turkish incursion, currently looks less immediately imminent. On this matter, a certain confusion appears to reign, with different US officials saying different things.

The tendency to chaos of the current US administration is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can produce sudden apparent bonanzas, of the kind that the president's announcement of imminent US departure must have seemed to Turkey.

On the other hand, the chaotic approach to policy-making means that presidential statements of this kind can't necessarily be safely "banked," in a way that would be assumed to be possible with other administrations.

National Security Adviser John Bolton found himself cold-shouldered by Erdogan in Turkey this week, after he appeared, in a statement made in Israel, to be conditioning the withdrawal on Turkish agreement not to target Kurdish forces who had fought with the Americans.

Trump nevertheless tweeted on Monday that "we will be leaving at a proper pace while at the same time continuing to fight ISIS and doing all else that is prudent and necessary!"

Thus, the US timetable and the precise nature of US intentions remain something of a mystery for friend and foe alike. But for Erdogan, as long as US special forces and air power remain in and over eastern Syria, a Turkish entry would be possible only in coordination with them. And if it proves that the US is indeed not prepared to accept the wholesale crushing of its Kurdish partners in the war against ISIS (as the Turkish leader clearly envisages), this places a question mark over the Turkish planned action.

A second area of concern for the Turkish leader is the Russian stance. Russia has emerged as the key power broker between all countries and elements seeking to act within the Syrian space (with the exception of the US). Moscow chose to allow the Turkish incursion into Afrin in January 2018, probably as part of an attempt to draw Turkey away from its traditional Western alignment.

But statements by Russian officials this week appear to indicate that Russia prefers lands currently administered by the Syrian Kurds to return to the control of the Assad regime. Foreign Ministry representative Maria Zakharova, for example, unambiguously expressed this stance. Moscow evidently wants to be able to present the Syrian war as effectively over as soon as possible. A new standoff between a large Turkish-controlled area of north and east Syria and the Assad regime would not facilitate this. Erdogan said on Wednesday that he will visit Moscow in the near future, presumably with the intention of clarifying this matter.

Sipan Hemo, the senior military figure in the Kurdish YPG, has been leading a delegation taking part in Russian-brokered talks with Assad regime representatives in recent days. Kurdish sources close to the SDF confirmed that if forced to choose, the Syrian Kurds will prefer to allow the Assad regime to resume control of their areas of control, rather than face an onslaught from the Turks.

But, of course, as long as the US position remains ambiguous, and American withdrawal does not look immediately imminent, the Kurds are unlikely to accept the conditions of the regime. As seen in an earlier round of contacts over the summer, the regime will settle for nothing less than the resumption of its full sovereignty east of the Euphrates. That is, the termination of the Kurdish de facto autonomy that has held sway over the last half decade. The Kurds are likely to agree to these terms of surrender if the Americans are about to leave and the Turks are about to enter. But this is not yet quite the situation.

Lastly, it is not clear how effectively Turkey, with its Sunni Arab rebel allies, would be able to police the territories it would conquer from the SDF in the event of a major military operation. Kurdish attacks on Turkish forces in Afrin are a common occurrence. The area that would be taken in the event of a major operation into northeast Syria would constitute a far larger and more complex space.

Thus, in spite of the Turkish saber rattling on the border, and Erdogan's pledge in his New York Times op-ed this week that Turkey can "get the job done," significant obstacles remain before a large-scale Turkish incursion into northeast Syria.

Jonathan Spyer is a Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum, a research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies, and a columnist at the Jerusalem Post. He is the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (2010).

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/57632/israel-strikes-syria-era?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=74412fb0f8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_01_22_09_06_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-74412fb0f8-33691909&mc_cid=74412fb0f8&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[Crafty_Dog]

Iraqi Kurds attack a Turkish military camp. Kurdish outlet NRT News’ reports yesterday of Iraqi Kurdish protesters attacking a Turkish military camp in northern Iraq appear to be true. NRT said the attack on the camp in Shiladze, roughly 43 miles (70 kilometers) north of Mosul, was meant to protest a recent Turkish airstrike that killed four people in northern Iraq. Turkey’s Defense Ministry has condemned the attack, blaming it on a Kurdistan Workers’ Party provocation, and said it damaged at least two tanks. Local Kurdish news sources report as many as three dead and 10 wounded in the incident, which appears to have ended, as well as increased Turkish air activity in the region. Turkey’s presence in northern Iraq is nothing new, but this attack illustrates greater Iraqi Kurdish hostility to it.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

https://www.meforum.org/57640/hasnt-syria-used-s-300?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=41b4f816b0-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_01_23_06_15_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-41b4f816b0-33691909&mc_cid=41b4f816b0&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[DougMacG]

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-hits-ypg-targets-in-northern-syria-140810

January 27 2019 17:42:00

Turkish army yesterday hit YPG targets in northern Syria, “neutralizing” many militants, state-run Anadolu Agency said in a report based on local sources. Turkish howitzer hit YPG positions in Azaz and Mare districts, the agency said.

The Turkish military also struck YPG target in Syria’s Tal Rifat over the past three days.

Tal Rifaat is some 20 kilometers west of Afrin, which has been under the control of Turkey and its Free Syrian Army allies since an operation last year aimed at driving out the YPG.

Ankara considers the YPG as a terrorist organization due to its links with the PKK, which is listed a terror group by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/57709/tehran-plans-control-syria?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=5ecb49793f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_02_04_08_53_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-5ecb49793f-33691909&mc_cid=5ecb49793f&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[Crafty_Dog]

By Xander Snyder
Russia’s Balancing Act in Syria


The war is coming to an end, and so too might be some of Moscow’s alliances.


After eight years of war, Syria is mostly under Bashar Assad’s control once again. Russia, which joined the war in 2015 as one of Assad’s major supporters, must now consider its future involvement in Syria and its relationship with Assad’s other main backer, Iran. Moscow and Tehran have cooperated thus far, but Russia’s vision for a post-war Syria likely doesn’t include a strong Iranian presence. So what does the future hold for relations between the two countries as their need to work together fades? And how will Russia handle the other major players in Syria now that the war is largely over?

How We Got Here

Before considering what lies ahead, we have to examine how we got here. Russia and Iran cooperated in Syria to achieve a common objective: keeping Assad in power. But in supporting the Syrian regime, they had very different motivations. Russia wanted to distract from its underwhelming performance in Ukraine and its challenging economic situation at home. It also wanted to prove to Russians and the world that it’s still a major global player. Iran had more ambitious goals in mind. For Tehran, Syria was part of a broader plan to expand its influence and control throughout the Middle East. So while Russia was content to see Assad survive the war and pull its forces out once the conflict was over (save for a small contingent in Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval base), Iran wanted to maintain a presence in Syria long after the war’s conclusion. These different ambitions also resulted in different military approaches: Russia supported the Syrian military primarily through air power while Iran committed its own forces and backed proxy groups engaged in on-the-ground combat.


 

(click to enlarge)


They also had different views on other external actors involved in Syria – primarily Israel, which sees Iran’s presence in southern Syria as a direct threat to Israeli territory. Israel has, therefore, repeatedly struck Iranian and Hezbollah targets in southern Syria, even publicly announcing these attacks (most recently a week ago) to make clear that it will not tolerate an Iranian presence along its border. These are troubling signs for Russia, which would rather attend to more pressing security concerns than the fighting in Syria. Renewed hostilities could lead to the revival of jihadist groups that Assad would need Russia’s help to eliminate.

Russia, however, hasn’t exactly been going out of its way to limit Israeli airstrikes. It has condemned Israel’s attacks against non-jihadist groups in Syria, but it has stopped short of preventing or retaliating against Israeli attacks on Iranian targets because it doesn’t want to risk direct confrontation with Israel for two reasons. First, facing off against Israel’s well-equipped air force would be far costlier than launching airstrikes against militant groups, as it has been doing in Syria for years now. Second, Israel is a close ally of the United States, and a Russian attack on Israeli forces may provoke a U.S. response, which Russia wants to avoid.

Moreover, Russia may actually benefit from limiting Iran’s presence in Syria. It doesn’t want another conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, and the probability of such a conflict will increase as long as Iran’s presence in Syria grows. In addition, with Iran out of the picture, Russia could solidify its place as Assad’s primary patron, especially with much of the fighting now over.

Indeed, there are some indications that Russia is allowing Israel’s strikes to continue. Last September, after Russia blamed Israel for an incident that led to Syrian forces shooting down a Russian military plane, Moscow delivered a number of S-300 air defense systems to Syria. These systems are more advanced than those already owned by the Syrians and would be a greater threat to Israel’s air operations in Syria. So far, though, Syria hasn’t used them against Israeli airstrikes, possibly because the S-300s aren’t operational yet or because Syrian forces still need to be trained to operate the Russian-made weapons. Syrian media have claimed that the S-300s came online in November, while Russian media have claimed that some of the launchers were installed this month and that the systems will be activated shortly.

In January, however, an Iranian lawmaker accused Russia of deactivating the S-300s during a Jan. 20 Israeli strike. Both the accusation and the airstrike came shortly after a Russian military delegation visited Israel to meet with Israel Defense Forces officials. Israel launched more airstrikes a week later and again on Feb. 12 – the S-300s weren’t used against either attack. This is all circumstantial evidence that Russia is delaying activation of the S-300s, but it supports the theory that Moscow doesn’t want Syria to shoot down an Israeli jet with Russian-supplied arms.

Russia may also be concerned about the efficacy of the S-300s. If they were to fail during an attack, it would be an international embarrassment for Moscow, which is trying to expand its arms export industry. Russia could blame Syrian operators for the failure, of course, but that would also be troubling for potential customers who may have concerns over usability. Moreover, Israel has performed drills against the S-300 and demonstrated the ability to penetrate areas covered by advanced air-defense systems in the past, so even if the system works as it should, it may not be able to stop an Israeli strike. In other words, Russia doesn’t have much to gain from activating the S-300s. Why did it deliver the systems if it didn’t want Syria to use them? It needed to responded to the downing of the Russian jet somehow, and this was likely the least consequential way to do it.

Looking Ahead

While Russia’s motivation to cooperate with Iran is fading, it’s finding more and more reason to work with another country that’s vying for influence in Syria: Turkey. Both countries want to eliminate jihadist groups in Syria’s northwestern Idlib province, though they remain at odds over Turkey’s desire for greater control over the Kurdish-dominated regions in northeastern Syria. A larger Turkish presence there could hamper efforts at a political settlement and endanger Assad’s hold over the country. Nonetheless, they have reached an accommodation over certain issues. Earlier this month, following peace talks in Sochi, a Kremlin spokesperson suggested that Turkey could invoke the 1998 Adana Agreement to justify an incursion in northern Syria. (The agreement allows Turkey to pursue fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – a Kurdish group based in Turkey – 3 miles, or 5 kilometers, into Syria.)

Last August, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement to prevent a Syrian offensive against rebel forces in Idlib and to establish a buffer between the province and Syrian forces. Under the deal, Turkey agreed to handle the jihadist militias in Idlib that were not under its control, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. But Turkey has largely failed to do so. HTS remains the most powerful force in the province and recently launched an offensive against Turkish-backed militias there. Russia, meanwhile, can’t pull out of Syria while groups like HTS pose a threat to Assad. Turkey may need to send in its own forces, rather than rely mainly on proxies, to eliminate or at least hold back HTS. In doing so, however, it would need to avoid direct confrontation with Syrian forces, which would risk pitting Russia against Turkey.

By not pushing back against strikes on Iran in the south and by accommodating the Turks in the north, Russia has been able to balance these two powers against each other. It’s a strategy that will keep Iran weak and Turkey compliant, at least so Moscow hopes, and it has the added benefit of ensuring that neither becomes powerful enough to challenge Russia in the Caucasus, a region over which the three countries have gone to war many times in the past. Whether the strategy works remains to be seen.

[bigdog]

https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/do-great-nations-fight-endless-wars-against-the-islamic-state-they-might/

[Crafty_Dog]

An analogy I read captures a certain notion in play here:  If you have a lawn, weeds will sprout up.  You either get rid of them or you let them proliferate.

I get President Trump's idea here, (which I suspect includes the notion of bandwidth-- we have a very full plate elsewhere in the world) but as I expressed to Sebastian Gorka in my call in to his radio show, I fear the vacuum left for Iran and the implications thereof.  (Gorka's response was "Good question, but not to worry; NS Advisor John Bolton is on the job and President Trump and he fully get it and things are happening behind the scenes that cannot be spoken of.")

[Crafty_Dog]

March 12, 2019
By George Friedman


Alliances Shift as the Syrian War Winds Down


The countries that aligned to help protect Assad may be reconsidering their allegiances.


Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel and Russia had agreed to cooperate on withdrawing foreign forces from Syria. If confirmed, it would mean that Russia has agreed to force the Iranians out of Syria, a significant development for both Israel and the Syrian war itself. It’s even more critical given that another round of talks between Turkey, Iran and Russia to find a settlement to the war is looming.

Russia has yet to confirm or deny Netanyahu’s comments, but it seems unlikely the Israelis would put Russia on the spot this way if they weren’t true. Israel wants Iran out of Syria, but it also wants accommodation with Russia. And the two countries have already shown some degree of cooperation in their Syrian operations. Israel has likely provided Russia with advance notice of its airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria, and so far, Russia has not blocked or, as far as we can tell, notified the Iranians about the strikes. In addition, Turkey, one of three countries negotiating an end to the conflict, appears relatively calm on the subject. Around the time Netanyahu made the announcement, Turkey’s pro-government Daily Sabah newspaper published an article dispassionately analyzing Russia’s relationship with both Israel and Iran in Syria. It seems clear Russia has indeed agreed to push foreign forces out of the country.

Before we can understand why Russia would do this, however, we need to understand why Russia went into Syria in the first place. The official explanation was that it wanted to protect Bashar Assad, a longtime Russian ally. But this explanation is hard to buy as Assad’s government is not strategically important to Moscow. Some have speculated that Russia was really trying to secure naval bases in Syria. The problem with that explanation is that supplies for a significant Russian naval squadron in the Mediterranean would have to flow through the Bosporus, which is controlled by Turkey. Turkey and Russia have an extraordinarily complex relationship, and the Russians simply could not rely on Turkish cooperation to supply the squadron in the event of war. Russian bases at Syrian ports would also be highly vulnerable to U.S. attack. So that reasoning never made much sense. Another possible explanation was that Russia wanted to gain control of energy pipelines, but given the price of energy and the cost of Russia’s military intervention, that explanation makes little economic sense.

It seems more likely that Russia intervened to demonstrate that it could undertake significant operations in the Middle East. It wanted to deliver this message to the Americans but more importantly to the Russian people. It was a low-risk operation that involved limited forces and an attainable goal. The Russians did save Assad, and that in itself had some strategic value.
Turkey, meanwhile, didn’t want Assad to survive the war, but in the wake of the 2016 coup attempt, Ankara wasn’t eager to involve itself in a foreign conflict. It needed to get its own house in order first. So although there was always some tension and distrust between them – in part because of Russia’s coveting of the Bosporus and in part because of Turkey’s desire to project influence in the Caucasus, a region located on Russia’s doorstep – Russia and Turkey found ways to manage their relationship. They were content to keep out of each other’s way.

Russia, however, was willing to provide only air support and a limited number of special forces to help Assad. It didn’t want to inject massive ground forces to protect the Syrian government, especially not against potential U.S. incursions or Turkish involvement, should Ankara change its mind. Inevitably, the amount of resources Moscow devoted to Syria climbed, but it was intent on avoiding the U.S. experience in the Middle East.

In particular, Russia had no desire and limited capability to extend its operations to southern Syria and areas along the Iraqi border – the territory in which the Islamic State was operating. It needed someone else to handle IS. Enter Iran. It was active in fighting IS in Iraq and was also a close ally of Assad. Assad was a member of the Alawites, a Shiite sect of Islam, and Shiite Iran wanted to ensure its ally remained in power. But the Iranians also had strategic reasons for protecting Assad.


(click to enlarge)

Iran, with its anti-IS operations in Iraq, had managed to project power beyond the Zagros Mountains on its western border. It already dominated Lebanon, whose major faction, Hezbollah, was an Iranian proxy. The Iranians were thus one country away from having an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean – which would make them the dominant country in the region, more powerful than the fragmented Sunni nations.

The one country missing in the Iranian project was Syria. While Russia wanted to limit its exposure there and supported Assad for reasons having little to do with Syria itself, Iran had an overriding interest in destroying IS and saving Assad. This formed the basis for a logical alliance.

But the Russians were wary of cooperating with Iran because, like Turkey, Iran has interests in the Caucasus. The Caucasus guard southern Russia and are, after the buffer states in Eastern Europe, the most important region for Russian national security. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia were part of the Soviet Union, but after its collapse, they became independent states. The North Caucasus remained part of Russia, but this included places like Chechnya and Dagestan that were occasionally difficult to manage and always capable of posing a challenge.

Azerbaijan, in particular, is a place that could present problems for Russia in the future. The Iranians have tried to project power in Azerbaijan through schools, propaganda and other sources of influence. A significant number of ethnic Azeris live in Iran today, mainly in the north, an area that was also occupied by the Soviets during World War II. Azerbaijan therefore is a complex place where Russia and Iran compete for power. If Russia dominated all of Azerbaijan, it would be an enormous threat to Iran. If Iran took control of Azerbaijan, it would be a dagger pointing at the North Caucasus.

Russia therefore doesn’t want Iran to build an empire stretching to the Mediterranean. In fact, it’s privately happy to see U.S. sanctions cripple Iran, though it won’t admit as much publicly. Russia needed Iran in Syria for a time, but as the saying goes, nations have no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests. So, having saved Assad, it’s now time for the Russians to move the Iranians out of Syria and deny them their empire.

Israel would be content if Russia were to manage to push Iran out of Syria. The Turks don’t want to see Assad stay in power in the long term but will tolerate him in the short term. The United States has mostly let the conflict play out, showing for one of the first times since 9/11 that it can restrain itself in a major Middle Eastern issue. And Russia got the boost in prestige it was seeking, though it has myriad other problems to contend with at home. Assad, meanwhile, has survived the war thanks to the help of his closest allies. All things considered, he was the biggest winner of all.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nordicmonitor.com/2019/01/turkish-court-authenticates-audio-that-revealed-intel-agency-mits-false-flag-in-syria/?fbclid=IwAR3Izbi8WoWKR5FkU_oYlmdYb3Fnrn9CqS07cbYLAzyRZijTFXqascuvRjU

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2019/03/day-after-syria-finally-came-what-comes-next/155919/?oref=defenseone_today_nl

[Crafty_Dog]

second post of day

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/d47030a4-122b-49ac-b9ad-2ba8510da2f1?utm_source=GPF+-+Paid+Newsletter&utm_campaign=80cfe1f6ec-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_29_03_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_72b76c0285-80cfe1f6ec-247660329

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEG6MuzfAl0&fbclid=IwAR3Tk1yFWDtK-bB2lXO1kyMI63C0ylVCJhX9mbYm00a9-0q5oXRJJaSx_Q8

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Now quite the neocon line that the New Yorker espoused during the Bush 43 and the Obama years, , , but what are the merits of the analysis here and now?

https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-trump-betrayed-the-general-who-defeated-isis?utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Daily_040419&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d3fa3f92a40469e2d85c&user_id=50142053&esrc=&utm_term=TNY_Daily

[Crafty_Dog]

Third post


https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/04/qatar-is-the-weakest-link-in-an-arab-nato/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202019-04-04&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.spartareport.com/2019/04/how-the-people-of-kurdistan-view-trump-and-america/?utm_medium=Referral&utm_source=onesignal

[Crafty_Dog]

https://off-guardian.org/2017/01/06/leaked-john-kerry-audio-white-house-wanted-isis-to-rise-in-syria/?fbclid=IwAR1ohZSpy7t8PhwGM-QA1FCRvyA4i7UsMJkWLXXg0rGSAcWiPc96lFmlNQo

 

Quite congruent with my theory about Hillary supervising gun running out of eastern Libya , , ,

[Crafty_Dog]

Turkey planning for the long run in Syria. ANSA, an Italian news agency, reported that Turkey was building a wall between Afrin, the Turkey-controlled province in northwestern Syria, and the neighboring area of Tell Rifaat, which is still controlled by the Syrian government. At the same time, even as Russia continues to bomb positions in Idlib province, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that there are no plans for a ground offensive in Idlib despite Turkey’s failure to contain violence against the Syrian regime stemming from the province. All this points to Turkey preparing for a long slog in Syria.

==============

Also see

http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2019/04/30/turkey-building-separation-wall-in-syrias-afrin_c6673ab8-7c1c-42ef-9f2f-3eead4577b15.html?utm_source=GPF+-+Paid+Newsletter&utm_campaign=a53757fc7b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_01_03_32&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_72b76c0285-a53757fc7b-247660329

[Crafty_Dog]

We have noted this here previously:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/02/persecution-driving-christians-out-of-middle-east-report?CMP=share_btn_fb&fbclid=IwAR0FMZx81eN3mMD4LN4Cg-EY75I7Pkzf-462D2aRLhc0ERQc_zBdhcAZ0yQ

IIRC even the Kerry State Dept. had to admit there was genocide of Christians in Syria.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14193/looming-crisis-mideast

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/284611/new-strategy-to-counter-iran?utm_source=tabletmagazinelist&utm_campaign=a1d3770bb9-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_14_06_48&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c308bf8edb-a1d3770bb9-207194629

[Crafty_Dog]

Iraqi Kurds and Iran. Iraqi Kurdistan’s Peshmerga Ministry has called on peshmerga and Iraqi forces to conduct a joint operation against Islamic State fighters. The ministry claims that the IS fighters are taking advantage of poor security between the peshmerga lines and those of Iraqi security forces to increase attacks. This news isn’t particularly surprising. Despite the Islamic State’s near-complete loss of territory, IS fighters still exist and were bound to take advantage of any security vacuum that may arise. What’s notable is that the call to arms comes alongside another announcement by an Iraqi Kurdish official claiming that the U.S. said it won’t abandon Iraq’s Kurds. Promises are cheap, especially when it comes to U.S. commitments in the Middle East. But with the ongoing standoff between the U.S. and Iran, the focus on Iran’s militias in Iraq, and some evidence that the U.S. is increasing its support of Iraq’s Kurdish insurgents to intensify pressure on Iran, these joint announcements may indicate where the U.S. would focus its military forces in Iraq, if a conflict with Iran emerges.

Iraq and U.S.-Iran tensions. Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi said Baghdad will attempt to mediate and reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran, and that Iraq has plans to send delegations to Washington and Tehran. Videos circulating on Iranian social media show the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps transporting S-300 air defense systems through the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the USS Abraham Lincoln and its carrier strike group conducted drills with a U.S. amphibious ready group in the Arabian Sea. The Navy said the exercises were aimed at threats coming from Iran and at increasing the “lethality and agility to respond to threats.” For its part, the Iranian regime’s desire for survival may ultimately help it avoid war: Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi floated the idea that “heroic flexibility,” a concept used in Iran to soften hardline stances in the past and to pave the way for nuclear talks in 2013, could be applied to the current situation.


•   Four warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet have left Sevastopol for joint exercises in the Black Sea, according to a fleet spokesperson. Russian media suggests the exercises could be in response to late April comments from the U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee, which called on the U.S. to increase military sales and security assistance to Ukraine.