Author Topic: The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR  (Read 382883 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR
« Reply #1250 on: October 14, 2019, 08:13:35 PM »
Far out, thank you.



Crafty_Dog

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Putin goes cruisin'
« Reply #1253 on: October 15, 2019, 11:22:24 AM »

Putin visits Saudi Arabia in sign of growing ties

Putin signs oil agreements and discusses regional security in his first visit to the kingdom since 2007.
21 hours ago

Russian President Vladimir Putin with Saudi Arabia's King Salman in Riyadh [Reuters]
Russian President Vladimir Putin with Saudi Arabia's King Salman in Riyadh [Reuters]
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Russian President Vladimir Putin has visited Saudi Arabia in his first trip to the kingdom in over a decade, signing oil agreements and discussing regional security, in particular, Saudi Arabia's ongoing rivalry with Iran.

A mounted guard escorted Putin's limousine to King Salman's Al-Yamamah palace in Riyadh after his arrival on Monday, his first visit since 2007.

At the palace, Putin listened to a Saudi military band play Russia's national anthem. He then greeted officials before sitting with King Salman for a conversation captured by state television.

The meeting signified strengthening relations between the two countries, who have worked together in recent years to keep oil supplies low, and thus keep prices high, but have been on opposite sides of regional conflicts.

Moscow has supported President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, while Riyadh backed groups which fought for his overthrow.

Russia has also strengthened ties in recent years with Iran, which is locked in a decades-old contest with Saudi Arabia for influence in the wider Middle East.

In recent months, tensions between the two sides have soared and veered towards open conflict. Putin has previously said he could play a positive role in easing tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, given Russia's strong ties with both sides.

In a statement broadcast during the visit, Putin praised King Salman's efforts at maintaining relations.

"Russia sees the expansion of friendly and mutually beneficial ties with Saudi Arabia as particularly important," Putin said.

In brief remarks, the 83-year-old King Salman said, "We look forward to working with Russia to achieve security and stability and fight terrorism."

Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the country's assistant oil minister, then lead a signing ceremony for 20 agreements between the two nations, most memoranda of understanding in the fields of energy, petrochemicals, transport and artificial intelligence.

Earlier in the day, a broadly grinning Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the country's de facto leader, had greeted Putin. The crown prince later met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Energy and Security

The Saudi Press Agency (SPA) said the two leaders discussed developments in Syria, where Turkey recently launched a cross-border offensive, and the ongoing civil war in Yemen, where a Saudi-led coalition has been fighting Houthi rebels since 2015.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Putin also discussed oil prices with King Salman and the crown prince.

WATCH
25:30

Saudi scholar Alaoudh: 'MBS is not Saudi Arabia'

"A substantial exchange of opinions took place, on regional problems, on situation at the energy markets, or on oil prices, to keep it simple," he told reporters in Riyadh.

Putin previously offered to provide Russian defence systems to Saudi Arabia after the September 14 attacks on its state-owned oil facilities.

While Yemen-based Houthi rebels claimed the attacks, Riyadh and several Western powers, have said Iran is to blame. Tehran has denied the allegation. The attack halved Riyadh's output of crude oil.
Threat to US-Saudi ties?

Any movement in a defence system deal would likely cause disquiet in Washington, which is sending 3,000 troops and additional air defence systems to Saudi Arabia following the attacks.

Asked about concerns Riyadh was cosying up to Moscow at the expense of relations with the United States, senior foreign ministry official Adel al-Jubeir said he saw no contradiction.

"We don't believe that having close ties with Russia has any negative impact on our relationship with the United States," he told reporters on Sunday. "We believe that we can have strategic and strong ties with the United States while we develop our ties with Russia."

SOURCE: Al Jazeera and news agencies

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR
« Reply #1254 on: October 15, 2019, 08:33:17 PM »
I heard that Erdogan posted an important piece today somewhere.  Would someone find it please?

Also I heard that Turkish troops were advancing so aggressively towards a position of ours that a Blackhawk hovered mere feet off the ground in front of them in menacing manner. 

WTF?!?

The President is looking like a blustering blowhard.
============================================


Trump Speaks Loudly, Carries a Toothpick
Betraying the Kurds harms U.S. allies and interests. It’s already made Israel nervous.
By William A. Galston
Oct. 15, 2019 6:53 pm ET
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Politics & Ideas: Three days after Trump announced the U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke about Israeli security concerns during a speech at a Yom Kippur War memorial ceremony. Image: Abir Sultan/Shutterstock

Game, set and match to Vladimir Putin in Syria. President Trump’s hasty and ill-advised withdrawal of American tripwire forces from Syria has forced the Kurds into a deal with dictator Bashar Assad, whose forces are re-entering the country’s Northeast region. With a modest investment, the Russian president not only staved off defeat for Mr. Assad but has moved close to his goal of reunifying Syria under his client’s control.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is also taking a victory lap. With the collapse of America’s position in Syria, his long-sought arc of Iranian influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean is within reach. Iranian-backed militias, key supporters of Mr. Assad during the civil war, are certain to be a long-term presence in his country. Forces commanded by Iran and Hezbollah along the Golan Heights border now represent a heightened threat to Israel.
The Mess in Syria, and Questions for the Democratic Debate
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America’s closest ally in the Middle East is worried, and rightly so. Reports from Jerusalem indicate that Israeli officials received no warning of the withdrawal. In a commentary echoed throughout the Israeli press, the daily newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth declared, “Trump abandons allies without blinking and Israel is liable to be next,” adding that “the entire balance of power in the Middle East is built on a very delicate web of supports, pressures, understandings and agreements—and Trump is unraveling that web.” Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli military intelligence, said: “It goes to the role of America as a superpower in the Middle East. If Americans leave, it’s easier for Iran, it’s easier for Bashar al-Assad, it’s easier for Hezbollah. All of these are our enemies.”

It’s news when a veteran Israeli official compares Mr. Trump unfavorably with Barack Obama. This is what a former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., Michael Oren, did in a recent interview. During Mr. Obama’s last meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the U.S. president said that “if Israel ever got into a serious war, of course the U.S. would intervene,” Mr. Oren recalled, then added: “I don’t think Israel can bank on that today” and “I don’t know now.”

Although blunders by previous presidents had eroded America’s standing before Mr. Trump took office, his actions have accelerated the decline. His last-second decision to cancel a retaliatory strike against Iran in response to Tehran’s downing of an American drone raised questions about U.S. resolve, which only deepened when the U.S. failed to respond in the wake of Iran’s attack on the heart of Saudi Arabia’s oil industry. Mr. Trump has turned Theodore Roosevelt’s famous dictum on its head: He speaks loudly and carries a toothpick.

There’s no doubt that many Americans are tired of “endless wars,” a phrase Mr. Trump now shares with the left wing of the Democratic Party. But equating 18 years of costly and bloody conflict in Afghanistan with America’s involvement in Syria obscures reality. The U.S. was protecting the Kurds, deterring the Turks and preventing Assad from consolidating his power—all of this with a small deployment of troops and remarkably few casualties over the past five years.

As the final report of the congressionally mandated, bipartisan Syria Study Group makes clear, there were viable policy options that could have safeguarded U.S. and allied interests. Instead, hardened Islamic State fighters are escaping from the prisons their Kurdish guards were forced to abandon, contradicting the central aim of U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq during the past five years.

The costs of Mr. Trump’s chaotic retreat extend beyond the geopolitical. There is a moral dimension to statecraft, whether Mr. Trump acknowledges it or not. Keeping promises matters, as do decency and loyalty and trust. Reputational damage weakens a nation’s balance sheet.

Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of President Trump’s closest confidants, declared that abandoning the Kurds would be a “stain on America’s honor,” and he’s dead right. Here’s what the Syrian Kurdish forces’ commander in chief, Mazloum Abdi, had to say about recent events: “At Washington’s request, we agreed to withdraw our heavy weapons from the border area with Turkey, destroy our defensive fortifications, and pull back our most seasoned fighters. Turkey would never attack us so long as the U.S. government was true to its word with us. We are now standing with our chests bare to face the Turkish knives.”

This is a textbook description of betrayal. American troops who have worked side by side for years with the Kurds are ashamed of their country. As a citizen and Marine Corps veteran, I am too. Mr. Trump is not, because he is incapable of feeling shame for anything he does, whatever its consequences for others, so long as it serves his immediate needs and gratifies his insatiable ego.

The Lord says to the prophet Isaiah, “there is no peace for the wicked.” But now, thanks to Mr. Trump, there may be peace for Mr. Putin, Iran and Islamic State.
« Last Edit: October 15, 2019, 08:44:50 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Apparently the Kurds noticed too.
« Reply #1255 on: October 15, 2019, 09:11:57 PM »
Our Doug said:

""As far as notice goes, he has been telling them this is coming from the start, 10 months ago and again a couple of months ago.  Didn't he lose Mattis and Bolton over this?  It was in all the papers. , , ,

"In spite of the way the evening news words it, this offensive didn't start because of America's withdrawal.  This offensive was delayed because of America's presence in the area.  The 10 month delay from the first notice gave them some time to take cover or make peace."

Apparently the Kurds noticed too

https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/fearing-us-abandonment-kurds-kept-back-channels-with-syria-russia-wide-open-1.603174?fbclid=IwAR3x0Vgmpl6QBaVnwi_qBy56WRz1TveyEugftVRvdhRV6pz-YI4t0JQwjjk

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WSJ: Iran is not as happy as you think
« Reply #1264 on: October 21, 2019, 09:26:00 AM »
third post

As America Leaves Syria, Iran Isn’t as Happy as You Think
Tehran finds itself at cross-purposes with Damascus and Ankara as Baghdad slips away.
By Ray Takeyh
Oct. 20, 2019 3:21 pm ET
Syrian soldiers in Kobani, Syria, Oct. 18. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

It is the conceit of the commentariat that Iran is a winner of the latest mayhem in the Middle East—the departure of U.S. troops from Syria and the subsequent Turkish incursion. Yet the clerical oligarchs seem anxious about all that is happening around them.

A continuing Syrian civil war was working for Tehran. It had managed to navigate skillfully the politics at play, developing good relations with both Bashar Assad and the Kurdish militias opposing him. The latter’s U.S. support created a sort of balance between the sides. Despite his precarious situation, Mr. Assad dreams of unifying Syria. His Iranian patrons have long advised him to limit his ambitions and consolidate power in the territory he commands. With the U.S. backing the Kurds, Mr. Assad had to follow Iran’s advice or risk a wider war he could ill afford.

Now that the U.S. is gone and the militias have been forced to ally with Mr. Assad, little stops him from trying to seize the 40% of the country he doesn’t control. After nearly a decade of war, Syria is exhausted. Any attempt to control more land is bound to jeopardize Mr. Assad’s existing gains. If Mr. Assad is mired in a longer and costlier war, Tehran would have to commit even greater resources to this conflict at a time when its economy is suffering due to sanctions and mismanagement.

Turkey looms large in the clerical imagination. In a region littered with weak and failing states, Turkey is a formidable power with its own ambitions for the Middle East. Iran is already at loggerheads with Saudi Arabia and caught in a costly sectarian conflict across the region. Ankara’s intervention in Syria is bound to complicate Iran’s designs in the Levant. Iran had forged decent ties with Kurdish forces and it viewed its buffer zone in northern Syria as a useful check on Turkey. With the U.S. gone, the Kurds have been swept back before the Turkish advance.

Iranian leaders including President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif urged Turkey not to move in to Syria. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the hard-line Friday prayer leader, captured the essence of Iran’s concerns, warning Turkey “not to stumble into America’s trap” and thus find itself in a quagmire similar to the Saudi predicament in Yemen. In a nonverbal warning, Iran conducted military maneuvers along its border with Turkey shortly before Ankara invaded Syria, according to Reuters.

With the U.S. gone, Iran’s attempts at persuasion will do little to restrain Turkey. In Syria, Ankara is bound to be more powerful, Mr. Assad more reckless, the Kurds substantially weakened, and Islamic State reconstituted. None of this is good news for Iran, which hoped to make incremental gains in the Levant by keeping the Syrian conflict simmering at a low burn.

And the current flare-up comes at a bad time for Tehran. In one of the many paradoxes of the Middle East, Iran gained much from the U.S. toppling Saddam Hussein. Iraq’s Sunni strongmen have haunted Persian monarchs and mullahs for decades, even launching an invasion in 1980 that traumatized a generation of Iranians. Since the 2003 invasion, Iran-backed Shiite militias have operated as an auxiliary force, coming to dominate Iraq—one of the Islamic Republic’s most consequential successes. Iran uses Iraq to transport its oil to the global markets in defiance of American sanctions.

But Iran’s domination doesn’t go over well. Tehran is the key actor in selecting Iraq’s prime ministers and Parliaments. This means it gets the blame for the Iraqi government’s corruption and inefficiency. Iraqi resentment of Iran exploded into protests this month that shook the foundations of the Baghdad government.

Tehran has tried to smooth things over. Iranians repeat the conspiracy theory that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia instigated Iraqi protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned that “Iran and Iraq are two nations whose hearts and souls are tied together. . . . Enemies seek to sow discord, but they’ve failed, and their conspiracy won’t be effective.” Mr. Khamenei’s putative successor, Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, reinforced his narrative, stressing that sedition is taking hold of Iraq. Beneath the stale rhetoric, the mullahs likely realize that the Iraqi government’s hold on power is tenuous. If it collapses, there could follow another messy civil war whose outcome Tehran may not be able to condition.

On top of all of that, now Syria is in flames. There are many sound arguments about why the U.S. should not have withdrawn its modest presence. But the notion that the pullout empowers Tehran is belied by its leaders’ expressions of anxiety. The Middle East rarely offers a respite to ambitious nations, even Iran.

Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Published in the Jordan Times
« Reply #1266 on: October 22, 2019, 09:45:55 AM »



Time to bite the bullet in Syria

Oct 21,2019 - Last updated at Oct 21,2019

CANBERRA — Recent events in Syria have naturally raised two questions: Who lost the country? And where might the international community go from here?

The first question is easier to answer. Looking back, Syria has probably been lost since the popular uprising in 2011. When President Bashar Al Assad’s regime stubbornly refused any effort to resolve the matter peacefully, no outside power proved willing to intervene. Instead, everyone hoped that a mix of sanctions, UN-led diplomacy and halfhearted attempts to support a “moderate” opposition would eventually bring down the regime.

It did not work. Fundamentalist forces gained political ground and territory, and others, including Iranian-backed militias and the Russian military after the fall of 2015, rushed to Assad’s defence. Although the regime had long deprived the Kurds in northern Syria of most of their rights, it started making concessions to them when it came under pressure. As a result, Kurdish militias abstained from challenging Assad, which led much of the broader Syrian opposition to shun them.

After Daesh established its “caliphate” in Mosul and Raqqa in 2014, enabling it to strike even Baghdad, there was an understandable rush to confront the terrorist threat. In Iraq, that task fell largely to Iranian-aligned Shia militias. But in Syria, the situation was more complicated. The United States had no intention of sending in its own combat forces, but it also knew that the Syrian opposition groups that it, and Turkey, had been arming were not up to the challenge. In any case, those groups were focused on toppling Assad, which had ceased to be a high priority for Western policymakers.

Given these constraints, the US threw its support behind the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). The US has long recognised the YPG as an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it, along with the European Union and Turkey, classify as a terrorist organisation. But even if the decision did not fit with any long-term strategy, it did satisfy short-term tactical needs, and supporting the YPG ultimately proved successful in depriving Daesh of its territory, though the group will remain a long-term threat.

The uprooting of Daesh would have been a good time to launch a political process to resolve the broader conflict. In fact, there were at least two options on the table. The first was to establish a Kurdish/YPG-governed entity in northern and northeastern Syria. But, of course, that would have raised the ire of Turkey, which was not ready to tolerate any PKK presence on its border. In addition to requiring an open-ended US military presence, this scenario would have resulted in Kurds ruling over substantial swaths of non-Kurdish territory.

The other option was to pursue a broader political settlement, with the goal of creating an inclusive governance structure acceptable to the regime in Damascus. Over time, this process could have led to an arrangement similar to that in northern Iraq, where the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) now cooperates closely with Turkey.

But this did not happen. As the US position evolved, the Trump administration rejected the first option and then actively discouraged the second, making a crisis inevitable. The trigger for the crisis was a telephone call in which US President Donald Trump gave Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a green light to send forces into Syria. Trump ordered the US military to abandon the area immediately, and added insult to injury by announcing it all on Twitter, shocking both the Kurds and many of his own advisers.

Since then, everything has come crashing down. With their credibility in tatters, US officials have desperately sought to create some kind of policy out of the ruins created by the presidential tweets. The president has threatened to destroy Turkey’s economy if it does what he enabled it to do. With Kurds, most of them civilians, fleeing Turkish bombs, the UN Security Council has remained typically silent, while the Europeans have condemned everything and everyone involved.

As foreign-policy disasters go, this is one for the record books. But the seeds for this larger conflagration were sown long before the now-infamous Trump-Erdogan call. Absent any coherent policy, the conditions were ripe for a crisis. The question now is whether there is any constructive way to proceed.

For now, the US has agreed with Turkey on establishing the wide security zone in northern Syria it sought. Russia, meanwhile, has evidently brokered some sort of arrangement between the YPG and the Assad regime. With Russian and Syrian government forces now entering some of the areas vacated by the US, the Trump administration is left trying to manage its relations with Turkey. As for the EU, there is little to be done. Having already cut off all high-level political contacts with Turkey, it is impotent in the face of this latest crisis.

Logic dictates that all of the relevant parties in the region should now sit down and try to come to some kind of agreement. In addition to the KRG, Iraq and other Arab countries, there also needs to be a place at the table for Turkey, Iran and the Syrian government. Yes, the Assad regime is associated with a wide range of horrors and atrocities; but there is simply no other way forward.

Regional talks certainly will not come easy. Many parties will have to swallow hard and face difficult realities. Unfortunately, the prospect of a democratic Syria was lost years ago. The top priority now must be to restore stability and prevent further catastrophes. There are no longer any good options, if, in fact, there ever were.

Carl Bildt was Sweden’s foreign minister from 2006 to 2014 and Prime Minister from 1991 to 1994, when he negotiated Sweden’s EU accession. A renowned international diplomat, he served as EU Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Special Envoy to the Balkans, and Co-Chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference. He is Co-Chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations. ©Project Syndicate, 2016.
www.project-syndicate.org

Crafty_Dog

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D1
« Reply #1267 on: October 22, 2019, 10:09:09 AM »
second post

Post reports. Then Trump added, “I go out to Dover and meet parents and it’s the most unpleasant thing I do.” More on developments linked to Syria below...
Problems viewing? View as a web page

 

October 22, 2019       



 
 

Turkey's military is set to renew its offensive against Kurds in northern Syria beginning at 3 p.m. EDT today. Turkish state-run television even had a running clock to let viewers know exactly when the operational pause will end — until it was flagged on social media Monday and apparently taken down.

Turkish President Erdogan is meeting with his Russian counterpart today in Sochi as the Wall Street Journal writes "both Ankara and Moscow [are] seeking to capitalize on a rebalancing of power in the region."

One significant detail still to be worked out: "Ankara wants control over territories in northeastern Syria to relocate half of the nearly four million Syrian refugees living in Turkey," the Journal reports. "But the agreement with Washington covers only about a quarter of Mr. Erdogan's proposed 300-mile-long safe zone." And that's why "Moscow's commitment to securing the remaining three quarters will be essential because the Russian-backed army of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad last week struck an agreement to work with the Kurdish militia."

Where the parties stand, via the Associated Press: "Turkey has suggested it wants Russia to persuade the Syrian government to cede it control over a major chunk of territory in the northeast. The Kurds are hoping Russia can keep Turkey out and help preserve some of the autonomy they carved out for themselves during Syria's civil war." Meantime, "Syrian President Bashar Assad has vowed to reunite all the territory under Damascus' rule."

To that end, Assad today called Erdogan "a thief," and said he was ready to support any "popular resistance" against Turkey's invasion, AP reports.  Said the Syrian strongman to his troops in northwestern Idlib province: "We are in the middle of a battle and the right thing to do is to rally efforts to lessen the damages from the invasion and to expel the invader sooner or later."
Assad also said he's offered clemency to Kurds who want to fight against Turkey, even as regime troops moved into "new areas in Hassakeh province at the far eastern end of the border, under the arrangement with the Kurds," AP reports from across the border in Turkey.

ICYMI: The U.S. military may keep a small number of forces in northeastern Syria, despite President Trump's apparent order to remove all of them from that region, Defense Secretary Mark Esper told reporters in Afghanistan (AP) on Monday. "There has been a discussion about possibly doing it," Esper said. "There has been no decision with regard to numbers or anything like that."

Reminder why this is a concern: "The United States, through the Syrian Democratic Forces, were sitting on one-third of Syrian territory, which happens to be the most resource-rich part of Syria," Dana Stroul of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy told us in our latest Defense One Radio podcast episode. "And via leverage of that land we could influence the political outcome for the broader underlying causes of the Syrian conflict."

But that would all seem to be all but lost now with the Trump-directed reduction in U.S. troops in NE Syria.

Said Trump during his cabinet meeting about pulling the U.S. out of wars: "It would be much easier for me to let our soldiers be there, let them continue to die," the Washington Post reports. Then Trump added, "I go out to Dover and meet parents and it's the most unpleasant thing I do."




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GPF: Russia's motives
« Reply #1270 on: October 23, 2019, 01:51:51 PM »

The Role of the Caucasus in Russia’s Middle East Strategy

Moscow is trying to play all sides.
By
Ekaterina Zolotova -
October 21, 2019
Open as PDF

Amid mounting tensions in the Persian Gulf and the Turkish incursion in northern Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying his best not to burn any bridges in the Middle East. Last week, Putin visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and this week, he will meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi. So far, the Kremlin has managed to maintain good relations with all parties involved in the turmoil, but in order to continue to do so, it will need to enlist the help of some of Putin’s closest allies in the North Caucasus.

A Precarious Position

Needless to say, this puts Russia in a precarious position. It’s trying to play all sides, claiming to be partners with multiple countries that have conflicting interests. Russia’s own interests in the Middle East are many, but chief among them is to maintain stability in the region, in large part so that the volatility doesn’t spread to Central Asia and the Caucasus – a critical area of concern for Russian security.

North and South Caucasus
(click to enlarge)

The North Caucasus is one of the most unstable regions in Russia. It has a diverse, multiethnic population and is highly dependent on financial support from Moscow. Without that support, the Kremlin would have a much harder time controlling this part of the country. The relative proximity of the Caucasus to the Middle East increases the risk that violent extremism will spread to Russian territory. Many of the Islamic State’s foreign fighters originate from the North Caucasus and Central Asian countries, which share a border with Russia. With the Islamic State effectively defeated, some of these foreign fighters have already returned home. The recent Turkish airstrikes have also allowed several hundred IS supporters to escape from Kurdish-guarded camps in northern Syria, creating the risk that some could find their way into the Caucasus. Russia sees this as a serious national security threat. Speaking at the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Ashgabat on Oct. 11, Putin said he had doubts about the Turkish military’s ability to control prisons housing IS militants.

Russia, therefore, wants to have a say in how the situation in northern Syria and the Persian Gulf unfolds. It doesn’t want to be dragged into another military conflict, which would be expensive and unpopular and could jeopardize its relations with some of its partners in the region. Instead, it prefers to play the role of mediator – which requires a careful balancing act. In the Persian Gulf, Russia has cultivated ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, though the two countries are longstanding enemies and the Saudis have blamed the Iranians for last month’s attacks on Saudi oil facilities. In the Syrian war, Russian support for Bashar Assad and Assad-backed forces has pitted it against Turkey, which has supported the government opposition. Though Russia and Turkey are historical rivals, Moscow doesn’t want to antagonize Ankara, and both have worked together to find a resolution to the conflict in Syria. Moscow therefore has to be careful not to rock the boat with either Damascus or Ankara. The Syrian Kurds have also asked Russia for help; Russian troops are currently patrolling parts of northern Syria to prevent clashes between the Turkish army and Kurdish forces.

Room to Maneuver

The Kremlin has successfully managed relations with all these parties by using leaders from the North Caucasus, including most notably Chechen chief Ramzan Kadyrov, to build ties throughout the Middle East. Kadyrov, who accompanied Putin to Saudi Arabia and the UAE last week, is an important ally for the Russian president. He has maintained control of Chechnya and ensured that the republic remains stable. In exchange, Kadyrov has secured substantial subsidies for Chechnya from the Kremlin. (Chechnya is among the top five most subsidized Russian regions.)

In recent years, Chechnya has also attracted investment from Arab donors. The UAE has invested $350 million there, funds that have supported projects like a five-star hotel in Grozny called The Local, a large shopping center, and the Akhmat Tower high-rise complex. Saudi Arabia has also invested in projects, including a sheep breeding program in the Chechen mountains. In fact, Chechnya is the only region in the North Caucasus that has been successful in attracting foreign investment, mostly because of Kadyrov’s links to Middle Eastern investors. He has visited the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain many times over the course of his leadership and even met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during Putin’s visit last week. These personal ties are part of the Kremlin’s strategy to win over allies in the Middle East. So while Moscow continues to support Iran publicly, Kadyrov has worked to smooth things over with the Saudis – giving the Kremlin more room to maneuver throughout the region.

Russia could also lean on Chechen leaders to help maintain relations with opposing sides in the Syrian war. According to unconfirmed reports, Syrian Kurdish leaders have reached out to the Kremlin, asking Russia for help in their fight against Turkish forces in northern Syria. Moscow has reportedly agreed to transfer some special forces – more precisely, from the Chechen special forces – to the northeast. Though unconfirmed, this scenario would make sense considering that the Chechens have historical grievances against Turkey. In the past, Kadyrov has accused Turkey of financing terrorists and luring tens of thousands of Chechens to Turkey during the Second Chechen War (about 70,000 Chechens live in Turkey today).

Russia has managed to involve itself in various conflicts in the region without jeopardizing its relations with key partners. It has done so by relying on the cooperation of its republics in the North Caucasus. It has positioned itself as a mediator in the Syrian war and the Persian Gulf crisis and will continue to maneuver as much as possible between opposing sides in these conflicts.

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WSJ: Spyer: Putin is the New King of Syria
« Reply #1271 on: October 23, 2019, 11:43:56 PM »
I had not appreciated this until just now:

"If Israel wishes to continue its clandestine war against Iranian weapons transfers and infrastructure-building in Syria, it will be able to do so only with Russian permission, in an arena in which Moscow’s hand is now profoundly stronger. Expect a busy shuttle route to Moscow for whoever emerges as Israel’s prime minister."

===================================================


Putin Is the New King of Syria
The U.S. withdrawal makes Russia the new arbiter of everyone’s interests, including Israel’s.
By Jonathan Spyer
Oct. 16, 2019 6:17 pm ET
Hassan Rouhani, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin in Ankara, Turkey, Sept. 16. Photo: Pavel Golovkin/Associated Press

By giving Turkey a green light to invade northern Syria, the U.S. upended the balance of power in the Middle East with a single stroke. Russia is the biggest winner.

The Turkish attack, launched in conjunction with Sunni Arab Islamist groups in Syria’s north, had the predictable effect of causing Washington’s erstwhile Kurdish allies to request Bashar Assad’s assistance. Some 150,000 Kurdish civilians had already fled their homes to escape the advance of the Turkish military and its Islamist proxies.

Mr. Assad has already deployed his forces in Tal Tamr, Manbij, Tabqa and Kobani—towns formerly under the exclusive control of Kurdish forces. Details have begun to leak from the proposed deal cementing the surrender of the Syrian Kurds to Mr. Assad. The Turkish offensive continues but has made little progress. The U.S. is still extricating its forces and moving them to the safety of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Vladimir Putin is now the indispensable strategic arbiter in Syria. None of the remaining pieces on the broken chessboard can move without Mr. Putin’s hand. The Assad regime owes its survival to Moscow’s air intervention in September 2015. This reporter and others who have spent time in Damascus note the impunity with which Russian security and other personnel conduct themselves. They are effectively beyond the reach of the local authorities.

Moscow has co-opted important commanders within the Syrian security forces. The powerful and prominent Col. Soheil Hassan, commander of the Tiger Forces, is chief among them. Other than Mr. Assad himself, Col. Hassan was the only Syrian commander invited to meet with President Putin when he visited the Russian air base at Khmeimim in late 2017 to celebrate that year’s dramatic victories against Islamic State.

Russia also has its own forces embedded in the Syrian Arab Army, notably in the Fifth Assault Corps. Danny Makki, a British-Syrian analyst with contacts in the Syrian government, reported on Monday that the detail of the Assad-Kurdish agreement includes a provision for “the abolishment of the SDF”—the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces—“with all the current Kurdish forces and military groups joining the 5th Corps (Assault Legion) under Russian control.”

It is worth pausing for a moment to consider what this means. The SDF consists of some 100,000 seasoned fighters. Until this week it was the sole armed force able to operate east of the Euphrates. Since late 2015, when U.S. Special Forces helped to midwife the alliance, the SDF’s constituent parts—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as well as Assyrian Christian forces and Arab tribal militias—have fought under a single banner. In the victorious campaign to retake territory from Islamic State, the SDF has been the decisive actor and the U.S. ground partner of choice. Suddenly this powerful army appears to be coming under Russian control.

The Kurds still operate their civilian administration east of the Euphrates. Their forlorn hope is to salvage and maintain as much as they can of the autonomy they have painstakingly built since 2012. Baathist regimes—Mr. Assad’s as well as Saddam Hussein’s —are noted for unforgiving attitudes toward ethnic separatist projects, and especially those of the Kurds. But the ruling Kurdish party in eastern Syria maintains an office in Moscow. Such hopes as remain will depend on Russia. No one else is available.

Turkey will also depend on Russia to maintain its project in northern Syria. It isn’t clear if there was prior Russian knowledge of the Turkish operation. But by triggering America’s departure and then the rush of the Kurds to embrace Mr. Assad, Turkey’s action delivered two long-sought gifts to Moscow.

As the de facto arbiter, however, Russia now faces a tricky task. It must stand firm against a too-ambitious Turkish project that could trigger chaos and even an Assad-Turkish war east of the Euphrates. At the same time, Moscow aims to permit Turkey sufficient gains to speed its drift away from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and toward alignment with Russia.

To accomplish this, the Russians must first intimidate and then partly accommodate the Turks. Moscow has managed this delicate maneuver west of the Euphrates over the past two years. It will now try to do so on the east side as the Americans head for the exit.

Then there’s Israel—and Iran. With the Americans leaving (except for a residual presence in al-Tanf), de facto U.S. control of the skies of eastern Syria will also end. The SDF is asking for a Russian no-fly zone over eastern Syria to protect the Kurds from the Turkish air force.

If Israel wishes to continue its clandestine war against Iranian weapons transfers and infrastructure-building in Syria, it will be able to do so only with Russian permission, in an arena in which Moscow’s hand is now profoundly stronger. Expect a busy shuttle route to Moscow for whoever emerges as Israel’s prime minister.

Mr. Assad, the Kurds, Turkey and Israel all now depend on Moscow’s approval to advance their interests in Syria. This outcome has been sealed by this week’s sudden windfall, all without the firing of a single Russian bullet. All roads to Syria now run through Moscow. Mr. Putin could hardly ask for more.

Mr. Spyer is director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and a research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and at the Middle East Forum. He is author of “Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars.”



Crafty_Dog

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Kenneth Timmerman: Trump did not sell out the Syrian Kurds
« Reply #1274 on: October 24, 2019, 09:51:23 AM »
Kenneth R. Timmerman is the best-selling author of “ISIS Begins: A Novel of the Iraq War.” He lectured on Iran at the Pentagon’s Joint Counter-Intelligence Training Academy from 2010-2016.

https://nypost.com/2019/10/19/trump-didnt-sell-out-the-kurds-by-pulling-out-of-syria/?fbclid=IwAR3OBR3xg2ssO4dNnnkQIjRXwoMdzZitphvIoHa3O3GW9V8VCuc8BK-HVAc



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Stratfor: Turkey May Have Stepped into an Endless War in Syria
« Reply #1277 on: October 27, 2019, 07:07:53 AM »

Turkey May Have Stepped Into Its Own 'Endless War' in Syria
Charles Glass
Charles Glass
Board of Contributors
8 MINS READOct 25, 2019 | 10:00 GMT
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pictured here during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, on Oct. 22, 2019.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to deploy joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the so-called security zone Erdogan has ordered Syrian Kurds to evacuate.
(SEFA KARACAN/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Highlights

    Since its emergence as a republic after World War I, Turkey has largely considered it futile to intervene in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's involvement in Syria reverses that outlook.
    Erdogan's decision to expand Turkey's military occupation in Syria has prompted international outrage, but the action is widely popular in Turkey.
    Turkey has much to gain if its incursion into Syria succeeds, but it also has much to lose. Turkish history provides a warning: Offensives that start well can end badly.

"The Turks have always pursued an unhappy policy in regard to native populations," wrote German Gen. Erich Ludendorff of his World War I Ottoman allies. "They have gone on the principle of taking everything and giving nothing. Now they had to reckon with these people (Kurds, Armenians and Arab tribes) as their enemies." The Turkish army, driven out of Syria after four centuries in 1918 by the British and "native populations," is back. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's involvement in Syria reverses the policy of the republic's first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, that kept Turkey out of the Arab world. Ataturk looked westward and saw the futility of returning to lands that had rejected Turkish rule.

That arrangement worked for Turkey until 2011, when the uprising in Syria opened the way to foreign interference. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were backing assorted militias in their effort to depose Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Erdogan would not be left out. His border with Syria offered the most extensive terrain for infiltrating fighters and war materiel. Moreover, his Justice and Development Party had a long friendship with Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, whose attempt to depose al Assad's father, Hafez al Assad, in 1982 ended with the infamous massacre in Hama. Erdogan looked to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots to play a leading role in the resistance to the younger al Assad. In 2012, a Syrian former Cabinet minister told me that Erdogan had asked al Assad to put Muslim Brothers into his Cabinet. When al Assad refused, the former minister said, Erdogan made clear that he would back all efforts to remove the president and replace him with Islamists.

Step by Step Into Syria

One of the stated reasons for excluding the Muslim Brothers, in addition to their history of violent opposition to the regime, was that Syria had not legalized religiously based political parties. The divisive effects of sectarian parties had played out badly in Lebanon after 1975 and had done little to benefit Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003.

Al Assad countered Erdogan's support for his opponents by allowing Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to threaten Erdogan from Syria. The PKK was instrumental in the formation of the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) that fought with the United States against the Islamic State without joining the U.S.-backed opposition to al Assad.

Erdogan went step by step into Syria, opening the border to jihadists, facilitating weapons deliveries and, when needed, backing the rebels with firepower — as when Turkish artillery shelled the Armenian Syrian village of Kassab before the Islamists conquered it in March 2014. Barely one year later, Erdogan sent Turkish troops over the border on an innocuous mission, code-named Operation Shah Euphrates, to rescue the remains of Suleyman Shah, an ancestor of the first Ottoman sultan. Erdogan's next venture into Syria was an all-out invasion, Operation Euphrates Shield, ostensibly to combat Islamic State militants but effectively to force the YPG to retreat from the border zone in the northwest.

George Orwell would have appreciated Turkey's operational code names in Syria.

Then came Operation Olive Branch from January to March 2018 in the largely Kurdish province around Afrin. In that onslaught into a hitherto peaceful corner of northwestern Syria, Turkey relied on about 25,000 Free Syrian Army and other rebel fighters to occupy towns and villages. "Instead of protecting vulnerable civilians' rights, these fighters are perpetuating a cycle of abuse," Human Rights Watch declared. The United States refrained from assisting its Kurdish allies, a precedent for its behavior when, following his now-famous telephone conversation with President Donald Trump, Erdogan ordered his army and its allied Islamist militia to advance into northeastern Syria on Oct. 9. Turkey's Operation Peace Spring followed the Operation Olive Branch game plan (George Orwell would have appreciated these operational names) that expels Kurds, civilians and fighters, from the northeast, executes Kurdish politicians and gives Turkey control of a 20-mile-wide belt from the Mediterranean to the Iraqi border.

Despite international outrage and sanctions, Erdogan's decision to expand his military occupation of northwest Syria to the northeast and destroy the YPG is popular among all factions in Turkey. The new mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, who won office on promises to resist Erdogan's Islamist and anti-Kurdish policies in Turkey's most cosmopolitan city, backs the military operation. On Twitter, he called the YPG a "treacherous terror group," betraying the Kurds who helped elect him. A leading opposition daily, Sozcu, headlined its front page, "Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Arabs — all united against Turkey. Bring it on." The pro-war fever infecting Turkey replicates the parades, flag-waving and oaths of allegiance that accompanied the country's entry into World War I in 1914. When the Ottoman fleet attacked Russia's forts along the Black Sea, Turkish political parties and media outdid each other to demonstrate support for an offensive that started well and ended badly. Turkey lost its empire, and the European Allies occupied Istanbul.

Much to Gain, Lots to Lose

Turkey has much to gain if its Syria gamble succeeds — control of a large area it abandoned in 1918, removal of thousands of Syrian refugees from Turkey to parts of Syria they do not know, containment of the YPG and PKK to areas south of its so-called safe zone and a voice in Syria's future. It also has much to lose — the lives of its soldiers, perpetual warfare along its border and the undying animosity of Kurds in both Syria and Turkey.

Erdogan's new collaboration with Russian President Vladimir Putin — with whom he agreed at Sochi, Russia, on Oct. 22 to deploy joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the 20-mile security zone that he has ordered the Kurds to evacuate — dilutes his control in northeastern Syria. It also permits al Assad's Syrian army to return to an area where Syria has a greater claim to sovereignty than has Turkey. The obstacle to ending the eight-year Syrian civil war remains Turkey's sole control of the northwestern Syrian provinces of Idlib and Aleppo and the estimated 60,000 rebels, most of them jihadists, it controls there and has used as its mercenaries against the Kurds. The politician most likely to decide the fate of that area is, as with the Kurdish northeast, neither Trump nor Erdogan, but Putin. Watch that space.

The politician most likely to decide the fate of northwestern Syria is, as with the Kurdish northeast, neither Trump nor Erdogan, but Putin.

Trump permitted the Turkish invasion, then decided it was not such a good idea and, while not sending the Turkish army back into Turkey, imposed selective economic sanctions, which he lifted Oct. 23. Many Americans support Trump's stated desire to end the "endless wars" in the belief that taxpayers' money is better spent on education, health and infrastructure at home than on military operations abroad. Trump, however, has not brought troops home. About 200 American soldiers are to remain at al-Tanf military base, part of a 55-square-kilometer (21-square-mile) area of oil-rich desert where the borders of Syria, Iraq and Jordan meet. He redeployed 1,000 special operations forces from Syria to western Iraq. He is sending 1,800 soldiers to Saudi Arabia. He is threatening Iran with war following his abrogation of the 2015 nuclear deal. He supplies weapons, intelligence and logistical support to Saudi Arabia's relentless war in Yemen.

Ending the endless wars is not unlike decolonization, which Europeans undertook following the bankruptcy of their economies during World War II. Most of the colonial withdrawals were as disastrous for the countries involved as the colonial conquests had been. Think of the massacres that followed the partition of India in 1947, the war in Palestine when the British withdrew in 1948, the French wars in Algeria and Vietnam, and Belgium's criminal actions in the Congo. Among the most irresponsible colonial retreats was Portugal's from lands it had occupied for four centuries: Angola, Mozambique and East Timor. The first two suffered protracted civil wars, while Indonesian troops invaded East Timor in December 1975 with American approval and massacred a third of its population by the time they were forced to leave in 1999. Now the United States, after arming and earning the trust of Syria's Kurds, is leaving them to face the Turkish onslaught.

When President Barack Obama considered the covert operation to train and equip Syrian rebels in 2013, code-named Operation Timber Sycamore, he said to his aides, "Tell me how this ends." As Turkey is discovering, it doesn't.


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« Last Edit: October 29, 2019, 08:55:03 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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GPF: Turks fire on Russians?
« Reply #1280 on: October 29, 2019, 08:55:43 AM »




Turkish operations in Syria. The Syrian Kurdish Hawar News Agency has reported that the Turkish army shelled a Russian military police patrol near the Syrian town of Al-Darbasiyah along the Turkish border. According to the agency, two Russian military personnel were injured along with two journalists and four civilians. The story has not been confirmed, but if accurate, its potential implications cannot be overstated. Turkey and Russia have cooperated in Syria because it has been convenient for both of them to do so, but as the war winds down, this cooperation will come into question as both countries reevaluate their roles and goals in the country. There are underlying geopolitical differences and competing interests that make further cooperation difficult. Incidents like the shelling of a Russian police patrol could have dangerous consequences down the road.

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State Dept fukking Syrian Kurds even more?
« Reply #1281 on: October 30, 2019, 06:43:49 AM »
State Department Official Demanded Kurds Capitulate to Islamists
by John Rossomando
IPT News
October 30, 2019
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8137/state-department-official-demanded-kurds
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State Department Special Envoy for Syrian Joel Rayburn talks last week with Syrian Democratic Council President Ilham Ahmed.

First, the United States agreed to withdraw special operations forces from a section of northeastern Syria, opening the door to a Turkish invasion aimed at U.S.-allied Kurdish, Arab and Syriac Christian forces there who played a key role in defeating ISIS.
Now, the State Department is demanding that those vulnerable Kurds work with Islamist forces who support the very Turkish onslaught that places them in harm's way.

A top State Department official made the demand last week during a meeting with Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) leaders, said an SDC source who was present. The Kurds were told to capitulate politically to the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (ETILAF).

That means the Kurds will not get any say in negotiations over Syria's future, but Islamists will.

ETILAF is based in Istanbul and closely follows the Turkish party line, including endorsing Turkey's invasion which aims to ethnically cleanse Kurds from a swath of northern Syria. It is dominated by members of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood who support a theocratic future for Syria, and have supported al-Qaida-aligned jihadists in Syria.

President Obama recognized ETILAF as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people in 2012 even though it controls no ground in Syria. In contrast, the SDC controlled a third of Syria's territory prior to Turkey's invasion two weeks ago.

In supporting the Turkish assault, ETILAF cited "the transnational terrorism organizations which make of [sic] these areas a haven for spreading chaos, violence and terrorism," in a press release about the invasion. "The Coalition also supports the [Syrian] National Army, the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of Staff in their efforts. Syria is a platform to threaten the security and stability of Syrians and neighboring countries."

An Oct. 15 meeting at the State Department between Joel Rayburn, the U.S. Syria envoy, and SDC officials quickly grew heated over the U.S. direction that the Kurds work with the same people supporting Turkey's assault on them. Rayburn angrily broke a pencil in the face of SDC President Ilham Ahmed's translator after the SDC representatives reminded him of a 2016 incident when U.S. Special Forces had tried joining the fight alongside the ETILAF-supported Free Syrian Army (FSA).
These FSA fighters had threatened to kill them and shouted "Death to America" at them.

The SDC members also told the State Department official they would not work with the Islamist-dominated group because they could not be trusted.

State Department officials declined to comment about the meeting.

Despite U.S. policies, the SDC's military arm, the Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF), continued to demonstrate its worth as an American ally when intelligence it provided helped make possible Saturday's special forces raid that killed self-appointed ISIS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. SDF spies worked with the CIA since May to track Baghdadi's movements, tracking him down to a house near the Turkish-controlled town of Jarablus, Syria, Polat Can, a top SDF adviser wrote on Twitter. They got so close that they were able to steal a pair of Baghdadi's underwear to verify his DNA.

"You don't sell out an ally like that, my God," said Anne Speckhard, director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE).

Speckhard spent considerable time in northeastern Syria getting to know Ahmed and members of the YPG/YPJ Kurdish militia, which Turkey considers part of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey's contention that the militia and the PKK are the same organization and that it poses a threat to the Turks is false.

"I've worked with those YPG people; they're amazing," Speckhard said. "Anyone who can manage to put together a government that acts and looks like a democracy in the Middle East on the ashes of ISIS should be congratulated and win the Nobel Prize."

Recent decisions have left that work in ruins.

The source from the State Department meeting named three people with Muslim Brotherhood ties with whom Rayburn demanded the SDC cooperate. They are former ETILAF President Anas al-Abdeh, former Syrian National Council President Mouaz al-Khatib and former Syrian National Council member Hassan Hachimi. All three have made public statements supportive of al-Qaida terrorists.

Al-Abdeh told London-based Al-Hayat in 2016 that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and al-Qaida-linked Jabhat al-Nusra were "all in the same trench."

"We cannot differentiate between fighters," al-Abdeh said.

He also opposed the Obama administration's decision in 2015 to partner with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to oust ISIS from its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa. SDF forces lost 11,000 lives fighting to defeat al-Qaida and ISIS.

Hachimi and al-Khatib each made statements in late 2012 that condemned the Obama administration for declaring Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization.

Speckard's primary work involved interviewing ISIS prisoners held by the SDF.

"Everybody knows when taking a look into it that Turkey was arming ISIS and helping ISIS to fight the Kurds," Speckhard said. "That went on for years, and Turkey also let 40,000 foreign fighters stream through; they let the wounded come to be treated. Now they are back at it."

ETILAF's "Prime Minister" Abdul Rahman Mustafa toured the border town of Tal Abayad on Thursday, a week after evidence showed the Turkish military using incendiary white phosphorus munitions against civilians. Mustafa also toured the headquarters of the "Syrian National Army" (SNA) Third Legion. Top SNA commander Maj. Gen. Selim Idris, who endorsed al-Qaida's Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in 2015, accompanied Mustafa on the visit. The SNA previously was known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

The Third Legion includes Jabhat al-Shamiya, a jihadist group considered a terrorist organization by the Dutch government. It seized homes from Christians in the town, according to an Arab news correspondent who took photos and posted them online. The legion also recently was responsible for the brutal murder and beheading of Hevrin Khalaf, a prominent Kurdish politician, early in the invasion.

Video showed another element of the Third Corps, Faylaq al-Majd, known in English as the Glory Corps, mutilating the body of a dead female Kurdish fighter.

ETILAF also showed its unreliability when weapons the Obama administration supplied to FSA-umbrella groups found their way into the hands of the al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS.

Due to last week's agreement between Turkey and Russia, an approximately 20-mile "safe zone" has been imposed along the border between Syria and Turkey. The SDF was required to withdraw from the zone.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged his desire to ethnically cleanse his 20-mile wide security zone along Turkey's border with Syria, replacing Kurds with Arabs.

"The most suitable for this area are Arabs. These areas are not suitable for the lifestyle of Kurds. Because these are virtually desert regions," Erdogan told the Turkish state TV channel TRT.

So far, a supposed cease-fire Turkey agreed to has not held, despite President Trump's decision to remove economic sanctions against Turkey.

Sources in Syria told Speckhard on Thursday that Turkish drones continue to attack Kurdish targets and bombs continue to fall. At least two dozen Kurds were killed since Sunday, Telegraph reporter Raf Sanchez wrote.

Related Topics: John Rossomando, Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Kurds, Syrian civil war, Syrian Democratic Council, National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, State Department, Joel Rayburn, Ilham Ahmed, Free Syrian Army, Anne Speckhard, SDF, Muslim Brotherhood



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Caroline Glick: Trump's Syrian Chessboard
« Reply #1283 on: November 01, 2019, 07:36:44 AM »
The ever thoughtful Israeli journalist Caroline Glick

http://carolineglick.com/al-baghdadi-and-trumps-syrian-chessboard/

Articles
Al-Baghdadi and Trump’s Syrian Chessboard
11/01/2019
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US President Donald Trump’s many critics insist he has no idea what he is doing in Syria. The assassination of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi over the weekend by US Special Forces showed this criticism is misplaced. Trump has a very good idea of what he is doing in Syria, not only regarding ISIS, but regarding the diverse competing actors on the ground.

Regarding ISIS, the obvious lesson of the Baghdadi raid is that Trump’s critics’ claim that his withdrawal of US forces from Syria’s border with Turkey meant that he was going to allow ISIS to regenerate was utterly baseless.

The raid did more than that. Baghdadi’s assassination, and Trump’s discussion of the mass murderer’s death showed that Trump has not merely maintained faith with the fight against ISIS and its allied jihadist groups. He has fundamentally changed the US’s counter-terror fighting doctrine, particularly as it relates to psychological warfare against jihadists.

Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration initiated a public diplomacy campaign in the Arab-Islamic world. Rather than attack and undermine the jihadist doctrine that insists that it is the religious duty of Muslims to fight with the aim of conquering the non-Muslim world and to establish a global Islamic empire or caliphate, the Bush strategy was to ignore the jihad in the hopes of appeasing its adherents. The basic line of the Bush administration’s public diplomacy campaign was to embrace the mantra that Islam is peace, and assert that the US loves Islam because the US seeks peace.

Along these lines, in 2005, then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice prohibited the State Department, FBI and US intelligence agencies from using “controversial” terms like “radical Islam,” “jihad” and “radical Islam” in official documents.

The Obama administration took the Bush administration’s obsequious approach to strategic communications several steps further. President Barack Obama and his advisors went out of their way to express sympathy for the “Islamic world.”

The Obama administration supported the jihadist Muslim Brotherhood against Egypt’s long-serving president and US ally Hosni Mubarak and backed Mubarak’s overthrow with the full knowledge that the only force powerful enough to replace him was the Muslim Brotherhood.

As for the Shiite jihadists, Obama’s refusal to support the pro-democracy protesters in Iran’s attempted Green Revolution in 2009 placed the US firmly on the side of the jihadist, imperialist regime of the ayatollahs and against the Iranian people.

In short, Obama took Bush’s rhetoric of appeasement and turned it into America’s actual policy.

The Bush-Obama sycophancy won the US no good will. Al Qaeda, which led the insurgency against US forces in Iraq with Iranian and Syrian support was not moved to diminish its aggression and hatred of the US due to the administration’s efforts.

It was during the Obama years that ISIS built its caliphate on a third of the Iraqi-Syrian landmass and opened slave markets and launched a mass campaign of filmed beheadings in the name of Islam.

In his announcement of Baghdadi’s death on Sunday, Trump unceremoniously abandoned his predecessors’ strategy of sucking up to jihadists. Unlike Obama, who went to great lengths to talk about the respect US forces who killed Osama bin Laden accorded the terrorist mass-murderer’s body, “in accordance with Islamic practice,” Trump mocked Baghdadi, the murdering, raping, slaving “caliph.”

Baghdadi, Trump said, died “like a dog, like a coward.”

Baghdadi died, Trump said, “whimpering and crying.”

Trump posted a picture on his Twitter page of the Delta Force combat dog who brought about Baghdadi’s death by chasing him into a tunnel under his compound and provoking him to set off the explosive belt he was wearing, and kill himself and the two children who were with him.

Trump later described the animal who killed Allah’s self-appointed representative on earth as “Our ‘K-9,’ as they call it. I call it a dog. A beautiful dog – a talented dog.”

Obama administration officials angrily condemned Trump’s remarks. For instance, former CIA deputy director Mike Morell said he was “bothered” by Trump’s “locker room talk,” which he said, “inspire other people” to conduct revenge attacks.

His colleague, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retired admiral James Winnefeld said that Trump’s “piling on” describing Baghdadi as a “dog” sent a signal to his followers “that could cause them to lash out possibly more harshly in the wake.”

These criticisms are ridiculous. ISIS terrorists have richly proven they require no provocation to commit mass murder. They only need the opportunity.

Moreover, Trump’s constant use of the term “dog” and employment of canine imagery is highly significant. Dogs are considered “unclean” in Islam. In Islamic societies, “dog” is the worst name you can call a person.

It is hard to imagine that Baghdadi’s death at the paws of a dog is likely to rally many Muslims to his side. To the contrary, it is likely instead to demoralize his followers. What’s the point of joining a group of losers who believe in a fake prophet who died like a coward while chased by a “a beautiful dog – a talented dog?”

Then there is Russia.

Trump’s critics insist that his decision to abandon the US position along the Syrian border with Turkey effectively surrendered total control over Syria to Russia. But that is far from the case. The American presence along the border didn’t harm Russia. It helped Russia. It freed Russian President Vladimir Putin from having to deal with Turkey. Now that the Americans have left the border zone, Turkish President Recep Erdogan is Putin’s problem.

And he is not the main problem that Trump has made for Putin in Syria.

Putin’s biggest problem in Syria is financial. The Russian economy is sunk in a deep recession due to the drop in global oil prices. Putin had planned to finance his Syrian operation with Syrian oil revenues. To this end, in January 2018, he signed an agreement with Syrian President Bashar Assad that effectively transferred the rights to the Syrian oil to Russia.

But Putin hadn’t taken Trump into consideration.

US forces did not withdraw from all of their positions in Syria last month. They maintained their control over al-Tanf airbase which controls the Syrian border with Jordan and Iraq.

More importantly, from Russia’s perspective, the US has not relinquished its military presence adjacent to Syria’s oil facilities in the Deir Azzour province on the eastern side of the Euphrates River. Indeed, according to media reports, the US is reinforcing its troop strength in Deir Azzour to ensure continued US-Kurdish control over Syria’s oil fields.

To understand how high a priority control over Syria’s oil installations is for Putin it is worth recalling what happened in February 2018.

On February 7, 2018, a month after Putin and Assad signed their oil agreement, a massive joint force comprised of Russian mercenaries, Syrian commandos and Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces crossed the Euphrates River with the aim of seizing the town of Khusham adjacent to the Conoco oil fields. Facing them were forty US Special Forces deployed with Kurdish and Arab SDF forces. The US forces directed a massive air assault against the attacking forces which killed some 500 soldiers and ended the assault. Accounts regarding the number of Russian mercenaries killed start at 80 and rise to several hundred.

The American counter-attack caused grievous harm to the Russian force in Syria. Putin has kept the number of Russian military forces in Syria low by outsourcing much of the fighting to Russian military contractors. The aim of the failed operation was to enable those mercenary forces to seize the means to finance their own operations, and get them off the Kremlin payroll.

Since then, Putin has tried to dislodge the US forces from Khusham at least one more time, only to be met with a massive demonstration of force.

The continued US-Kurdish control over Syria’s oil fields and installations requires Putin to continue directly funding his war in Syria. So long as this remains the case, given Russia’s financial constraints, Putin is likely to go to great lengths to restrain his Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah partners and their aggressive designs against Israel in order to prevent a costly war.

In other words, by preventing Russia from seizing Syria’s oil fields, Trump is forcing Russia to behave in a manner that protects American interests in Syria.

The focus of most of the criticism against Trump’s Syria policies has been his alleged abandonment of the Syrian Kurds to the mercies of their Turkish enemies. But over the past week we learned that this is not the case. As Trump explained, continued US-Kurdish control over Syria’s oil fields provides the Kurdish-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces with the financial and military wherewithal to support and defend its people and their operations.

Moreover, details of Baghdadi’s assassination point to continued close cooperation between US and Kurdish forces. According to accounts of the raid, the Kurds provided the Americans with key intelligence that enabled US forces to pinpoint Baghdadi’s location.

As to Turkey, both Baghdadi and ISIS spokesman Abu Hassan al-Mujahir, who was killed by US forces on Tuesday, were located in areas of eastern Syria controlled by Turkey. The Americans didn’t try to hide this fact.

The Turkish operation in eastern Syria is reportedly raising Erdogan’s popularity at home. But it far from clear that the benefit he receives from his actions will be long-lasting. Turkey’s Syrian operation is exposing the NATO member’s close ties to ISIS and its allied terror groups. This exposure in and of itself is making the case for downgrading US strategic ties with its erstwhile ally.

Even worse for Turkey, due to Trump’s public embrace of Erdogan, the Democrats are targeting the Turkish autocrat as Enemy Number 1. On Tuesday, with the support of Republican lawmakers who have long recognized Erdogan’s animosity to US interests and allies, the Democratic-led House overwhelmingly passed a comprehensive sanctions resolution against Turkey.

The al-Baghdadi assassination and related events demonstrate that Trump is not flying blind in Syria. He is implementing a multifaceted set of policies that are based on the strengths, weaknesses and priorities of the various actors on a ground in ways that advance US interests at the expense of its foes and to the benefit of its allies.

Originally published in Israel Hayom.


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Serious Read: GPF: Inching towards the end of conflict in Syria
« Reply #1284 on: November 04, 2019, 09:52:21 PM »
Maybe the President is smarter than we think?
======================================

   
    Inching Toward the End of the Conflict in Syria
By: Hilal Khashan

Starting a protracted conflict is much easier than ending it. That’s especially true when the regime in question is callous and fossilized and foreign countries are waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of a deteriorating situation. These two factors explain how the brutal armed conflict in Syria got underway. Before his death in 2000, Hafez Assad entrusted select members of his old guard with shoring up the safety of the future regime of his politically inexperienced son, Bashar Assad.

Instead of applying Hafez's Machiavellian approach in addressing a seemingly spontaneous and innocuous protest movement, the old guard recommended heavy-handed action. The regime's use of excessive coercive force militarized the uprising and invited foreign intervention – from Iran, to rescue the younger Assad, and Saudi Arabia, to bring Iran down and prevent the formation of the Shiite Crescent (that is, Iran’s overland route to the Mediterranean).
 
(click to enlarge)

Syrian army defectors established the Free Syrian Army, with the goal of bringing down their former commander in chief. But as uncoordinated material support from outside militaries flowed to rebel groups, jihadist militias arose in Syria’s overwhelmingly religious society.

Syria, a Geopolitical Chessboard

The United States did not seek to overthrow Assad's regime, despite what people may think. (This was borne out, in particular, when the Obama administration failed to punish the regime for crossing the notorious “red line” of using chemical weapons against the Syrian people.) Rather, the CIA’s 2013 program was aimed at supporting the FSA against radical Islamic movements, such as the Nusra Front. But when the program proved ineffective, Langley terminated it in 2017 and recognized Russia's leading role in defeating jihadism in Syria and restraining Iran’s burgeoning power.

Russia, in partnership with the Syrian air force, had already begun in 2015 a systematic air campaign to support Assad’s army, which, despite massive backing by Iran and its multinational Shiite militias, had been forced into retreat. Russia also intended to help rebuild the Syrian state.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan abandoned the core demands of Syrian rebels in favor of establishing a safe zone despite American, Russian and Iranian reservations. While moderating Turkish ambitions, clearly with tacit U.S. backing, Russia seems determined to rein in Iran’s influence in Syria. Foreign power players share a desire to prevent Iran from extending its territorial control in eastern Syria and filling the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from the area. Russia has been keen to recruit young Syrians away from Iran; it invested in the formation of the Fifth Assault Corps that reports directly to Russian officers, and whose 50,000 members come from pro-regime groups and elements of the defunct Free Syrian Army. Russia is also expanding its Hmeimim air base and naval facility in Tartus. Russia deployed FAC units last year in southwestern Syria and near the cease-fire line in the Golan Heights after reaching an understanding with the U.S. and Israel. Iran demonstrated its anger at Russian efforts to weaken its influence on the government in Damascus by ordering its Shiite militia allies to refrain from participating in the battle for Idlib in June, which rendered it an unnecessary war of attrition.
Contrary to media reports that Islamic militants sought to attack Russia’s Hmeimim air base near Latakia, the truth is that the Iranian-created 313th Battalion in Qardaha, the Assad family's hometown, sent drones to fly over the base only for harassment. The Russians ordered the Syrian regime to disband this battalion after implicating it in launching drones.

Competition between Russia and Iran in Syria goes beyond military influence on the ground to economic supremacy. Russia has a competitive advantage over Iran in winning big reconstruction projects. Russian President Vladimir Putin angered the Iranians when he negotiated to grant Russian businesses the lion’s share of postwar projects in return for propping up Assad’s regime. Assad is unhappy about Iranian attempts to control the centers of decision-making in Syria. He prefers to work with Russia because Moscow wants to be a junior partner, whereas Tehran wants to be the dominant partner.

Assad also understands that the United States, Russia and Israel have decided to disallow Iran's permanent presence in Syria. Russia has concerns that Iran will be an obstacle to its long-term economic interests in Syria. The Russians reason that Syria will emerge from the devastating civil war as a fragile state. Putin does not want to have rivals in determining Syria’s domestic and foreign policy, and he made this point clear to Assad before committing himself to rescuing Syrian regime. Russia understands Syrian sectarian and ethnic sensitivities, and, unlike Iran, which promotes a strictly religious agenda, it has no reservations about dealing with the country's diverse groups. When Moscow secured the withdrawal of Islamist rebels from Greater Damascus last year, it used Chechen military police officers to communicate with them. The Russians want to work with an able Syrian government and avoid getting stuck there, whereas the Iranians prefer to work with a lackey administration. The crippling sanctions against Iran curtail its ability to preserve its achievements in Syria. The eventual readmission of Syria to the Arab League, which Assad is eager to realize, threatens to distance its regime from Iran.

The cost of staying in Syria is high and useless. In addition to business opportunities in Syria, Putin is more interested in flexing military muscle to project the surge of Russian military might and win concessions in Europe. The Russian public sees no strategic reason to squander scarce resources on such a volatile country, while poverty-stricken Iranians are unable to comprehend their mullahs' ideological drive in Syria. In terms of articulating their Syrian policy, Russia is pragmatic, while Iran is dogmatic. Thanks to Russian mediation, there is increasing evidence that Turkey is willing to work with the Syrian government whose forces, even if token, are positioning themselves in specific border posts. The release of 18 Syrian soldiers recently arrested by the Turkish army, despite Assad's anti-Turkish rhetoric, points in that direction. Erdogan had to shelve his ambitions to overthrow Assad's regime and install a pro-Turkish government in Damascus. He's now resigned to the establishment of a safe zone along the Syrian border under strict American and Russian surveillance after halting Operation Peace Spring.

Iran’s heavy involvement in the Syrian conflict generated the false impression that its influence there has become paramount. This claim is far from reality. Iran faces a fundamental weakness in determining the future of Syria, mainly because of its overbearing political style and the small size of Syria’s Shiite community. Shiite proselytization is not as widespread as the Iranians think it should be, since Sunnis have an aversion to it and Alawites disfavor it. Despite Iran's best efforts, there are less than 300,000 Syrians who follow Twelver Shiite Islam – the branch of Shiite Islam favored by Iran. Even though Iran founded Syrian Shiite militias (such as Imam al-Rida Forces in Homs and al-Baqir Brigade in Aleppo), the main forces commanded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are Iraqi and Afghan Shiites.

Postwar Syria

No matter what shape postwar Syria takes, the country will look different than what it was before 2011. Nearly 600,000 Syrians have lost their lives, and more than half of the country’s population of 21 million on the eve of the uprising have been displaced, both internally and externally. Even though Assad escaped the fate of other presidents in the countries of the Arab Spring uprisings, he did not win the war; in fact, he is the biggest loser in the battle for Syria. Syria is economically devastated, and he is presiding over a shattered country, whose cost of reconstruction could reach a staggering $1 trillion. (For reference, Syria’s gross domestic product in 2010, just before the war, was about $60 billion.) It is doubtful whether reconstruction can occur in Syria's massively corrupt business and bureaucratic environment. Postwar reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Lebanon do not bode well for Syria. The regime lost critical oil and water resources and the fertile agricultural areas of northeastern Syria. Iran’s IRGC and Russian forces control the command structure of most Syrian military and security formations, and the Turks established their much-sought security belt to prevent the Kurds on both sides of the border from linking up. The perceived Kurdish threat remains a top priority for Turkey and a stable determinant of its foreign policy choices.

The ongoing understandings among the major actors in Syria, be they bilateral or multilateral, are setting the stage for military action in Idlib, the site of the last major battle in the Syrian armed conflict. Syria's march toward the final settlement of its conflict will commence only then. One must not assume that Iran's presence there is about to end. It will not, but its scale would not live up to the expectations of Iran's conservative ruling elite. Unlike Iran’s sway over Iraqi politics, Syria is reemerging as an arena of inconclusive regional competition.   





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Re: Serious Read: GPF: Inching towards the end of conflict in Syria
« Reply #1285 on: November 04, 2019, 09:54:05 PM »
Stable genius?


Maybe the President is smarter than we think?
======================================

   
    Inching Toward the End of the Conflict in Syria
By: Hilal Khashan

Starting a protracted conflict is much easier than ending it. That’s especially true when the regime in question is callous and fossilized and foreign countries are waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of a deteriorating situation. These two factors explain how the brutal armed conflict in Syria got underway. Before his death in 2000, Hafez Assad entrusted select members of his old guard with shoring up the safety of the future regime of his politically inexperienced son, Bashar Assad.

Instead of applying Hafez's Machiavellian approach in addressing a seemingly spontaneous and innocuous protest movement, the old guard recommended heavy-handed action. The regime's use of excessive coercive force militarized the uprising and invited foreign intervention – from Iran, to rescue the younger Assad, and Saudi Arabia, to bring Iran down and prevent the formation of the Shiite Crescent (that is, Iran’s overland route to the Mediterranean).
 
(click to enlarge)

Syrian army defectors established the Free Syrian Army, with the goal of bringing down their former commander in chief. But as uncoordinated material support from outside militaries flowed to rebel groups, jihadist militias arose in Syria’s overwhelmingly religious society.

Syria, a Geopolitical Chessboard

The United States did not seek to overthrow Assad's regime, despite what people may think. (This was borne out, in particular, when the Obama administration failed to punish the regime for crossing the notorious “red line” of using chemical weapons against the Syrian people.) Rather, the CIA’s 2013 program was aimed at supporting the FSA against radical Islamic movements, such as the Nusra Front. But when the program proved ineffective, Langley terminated it in 2017 and recognized Russia's leading role in defeating jihadism in Syria and restraining Iran’s burgeoning power.

Russia, in partnership with the Syrian air force, had already begun in 2015 a systematic air campaign to support Assad’s army, which, despite massive backing by Iran and its multinational Shiite militias, had been forced into retreat. Russia also intended to help rebuild the Syrian state.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan abandoned the core demands of Syrian rebels in favor of establishing a safe zone despite American, Russian and Iranian reservations. While moderating Turkish ambitions, clearly with tacit U.S. backing, Russia seems determined to rein in Iran’s influence in Syria. Foreign power players share a desire to prevent Iran from extending its territorial control in eastern Syria and filling the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from the area. Russia has been keen to recruit young Syrians away from Iran; it invested in the formation of the Fifth Assault Corps that reports directly to Russian officers, and whose 50,000 members come from pro-regime groups and elements of the defunct Free Syrian Army. Russia is also expanding its Hmeimim air base and naval facility in Tartus. Russia deployed FAC units last year in southwestern Syria and near the cease-fire line in the Golan Heights after reaching an understanding with the U.S. and Israel. Iran demonstrated its anger at Russian efforts to weaken its influence on the government in Damascus by ordering its Shiite militia allies to refrain from participating in the battle for Idlib in June, which rendered it an unnecessary war of attrition.
Contrary to media reports that Islamic militants sought to attack Russia’s Hmeimim air base near Latakia, the truth is that the Iranian-created 313th Battalion in Qardaha, the Assad family's hometown, sent drones to fly over the base only for harassment. The Russians ordered the Syrian regime to disband this battalion after implicating it in launching drones.

Competition between Russia and Iran in Syria goes beyond military influence on the ground to economic supremacy. Russia has a competitive advantage over Iran in winning big reconstruction projects. Russian President Vladimir Putin angered the Iranians when he negotiated to grant Russian businesses the lion’s share of postwar projects in return for propping up Assad’s regime. Assad is unhappy about Iranian attempts to control the centers of decision-making in Syria. He prefers to work with Russia because Moscow wants to be a junior partner, whereas Tehran wants to be the dominant partner.

Assad also understands that the United States, Russia and Israel have decided to disallow Iran's permanent presence in Syria. Russia has concerns that Iran will be an obstacle to its long-term economic interests in Syria. The Russians reason that Syria will emerge from the devastating civil war as a fragile state. Putin does not want to have rivals in determining Syria’s domestic and foreign policy, and he made this point clear to Assad before committing himself to rescuing Syrian regime. Russia understands Syrian sectarian and ethnic sensitivities, and, unlike Iran, which promotes a strictly religious agenda, it has no reservations about dealing with the country's diverse groups. When Moscow secured the withdrawal of Islamist rebels from Greater Damascus last year, it used Chechen military police officers to communicate with them. The Russians want to work with an able Syrian government and avoid getting stuck there, whereas the Iranians prefer to work with a lackey administration. The crippling sanctions against Iran curtail its ability to preserve its achievements in Syria. The eventual readmission of Syria to the Arab League, which Assad is eager to realize, threatens to distance its regime from Iran.

The cost of staying in Syria is high and useless. In addition to business opportunities in Syria, Putin is more interested in flexing military muscle to project the surge of Russian military might and win concessions in Europe. The Russian public sees no strategic reason to squander scarce resources on such a volatile country, while poverty-stricken Iranians are unable to comprehend their mullahs' ideological drive in Syria. In terms of articulating their Syrian policy, Russia is pragmatic, while Iran is dogmatic. Thanks to Russian mediation, there is increasing evidence that Turkey is willing to work with the Syrian government whose forces, even if token, are positioning themselves in specific border posts. The release of 18 Syrian soldiers recently arrested by the Turkish army, despite Assad's anti-Turkish rhetoric, points in that direction. Erdogan had to shelve his ambitions to overthrow Assad's regime and install a pro-Turkish government in Damascus. He's now resigned to the establishment of a safe zone along the Syrian border under strict American and Russian surveillance after halting Operation Peace Spring.

Iran’s heavy involvement in the Syrian conflict generated the false impression that its influence there has become paramount. This claim is far from reality. Iran faces a fundamental weakness in determining the future of Syria, mainly because of its overbearing political style and the small size of Syria’s Shiite community. Shiite proselytization is not as widespread as the Iranians think it should be, since Sunnis have an aversion to it and Alawites disfavor it. Despite Iran's best efforts, there are less than 300,000 Syrians who follow Twelver Shiite Islam – the branch of Shiite Islam favored by Iran. Even though Iran founded Syrian Shiite militias (such as Imam al-Rida Forces in Homs and al-Baqir Brigade in Aleppo), the main forces commanded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are Iraqi and Afghan Shiites.

Postwar Syria

No matter what shape postwar Syria takes, the country will look different than what it was before 2011. Nearly 600,000 Syrians have lost their lives, and more than half of the country’s population of 21 million on the eve of the uprising have been displaced, both internally and externally. Even though Assad escaped the fate of other presidents in the countries of the Arab Spring uprisings, he did not win the war; in fact, he is the biggest loser in the battle for Syria. Syria is economically devastated, and he is presiding over a shattered country, whose cost of reconstruction could reach a staggering $1 trillion. (For reference, Syria’s gross domestic product in 2010, just before the war, was about $60 billion.) It is doubtful whether reconstruction can occur in Syria's massively corrupt business and bureaucratic environment. Postwar reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Lebanon do not bode well for Syria. The regime lost critical oil and water resources and the fertile agricultural areas of northeastern Syria. Iran’s IRGC and Russian forces control the command structure of most Syrian military and security formations, and the Turks established their much-sought security belt to prevent the Kurds on both sides of the border from linking up. The perceived Kurdish threat remains a top priority for Turkey and a stable determinant of its foreign policy choices.

The ongoing understandings among the major actors in Syria, be they bilateral or multilateral, are setting the stage for military action in Idlib, the site of the last major battle in the Syrian armed conflict. Syria's march toward the final settlement of its conflict will commence only then. One must not assume that Iran's presence there is about to end. It will not, but its scale would not live up to the expectations of Iran's conservative ruling elite. Unlike Iran’s sway over Iraqi politics, Syria is reemerging as an arena of inconclusive regional competition.

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Re: The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR
« Reply #1286 on: November 05, 2019, 07:07:38 AM »
It would not be the first time the man has surprised me to the upside , , ,

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Bernard-Heni Levy: France can lead Europe and save Syria's Kurds
« Reply #1287 on: November 13, 2019, 08:17:08 AM »
France Can Lead Europe and Save Syria’s Kurds
Following Chirac’s Bosnia example, Macron should assume the responsibility Trump’s U.S. abdicated.
By Bernard-Henri Lévy
Nov. 12, 2019 7:22 pm ET

Kurdish civilians flee Kobani, Syria, Oct. 16. PHOTO: BAKR ALKASEM/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Nothing remains to be said about the American abandonment of Syrian Kurdistan. But what about Europe?

Is not Europe also responsible for the fate of our most dependable allies in the war against Islamic State? Is it not at least as affected by the strategic and moral disaster of leaving the field open for Turkey, Iran, Russia and the thousands of jihadists the Kurds had been holding, who are now in the hands of Bashar Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdogan ?

And does Europe not possess the means, with its 500 million inhabitants and 28 national armies, to take up the gauntlet, to step in for the 2,000 Special Forces troops the U.S. is withdrawing, and, for the first time, to begin to assure a share of its own defense while standing up for its values?

That is the proposal I made in January after President Trump’s first withdrawal announcement. At the time, I floated the idea of a European military unit made up of as many of the 28 European Union members as were willing to recognize the geopolitical significance of the event unfolding on the Turkey-Syria border. With France already having some 200 Special Forces soldiers on the ground, it wouldn’t be hard, given the political will, to arrive at 2,000 with troops from elsewhere in Europe.

A precedent exists—one I witnessed up close.

It is June 1995. The war against Bosnian civilians has been raging for three years. The international community is doing nothing. The United Nations Protection Force is on the ground, but Unprofor is a prisoner of its own mandate, which leaves it a spectator as the Serbs shell Sarajevo and commit acts of genocide in Srebrenica. The U.S. under Bill Clinton, like Mr. Trump today in Syria, deems the Balkans a faraway quagmire that is to be avoided at all costs.

Such is the situation when newly elected French President Jacques Chirac arrives on the scene. With consternation, he sees the French members of Unprofor chained to the Vrbanja bridge and humiliated. He observes that when two blue helmets fall in the center of Sarajevo, struck dead by Serbian rockets fired from the surrounding hills, Unprofor is unable to respond.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization convenes in Paris to discuss once more the possibility of responding to what are euphemistically termed Belgrade’s provocations. When the meeting concludes with another resounding decision to do nothing, Chirac cannot help but notice. He presents the idea of forming—outside the NATO framework and free of the paralyzing procedures of the EU—a force composed of those of France’s partners who share his sense of urgency.

The French, the British, a small Dutch contingent and troop transports furnished by Germany are forged into a Rapid Reaction Force with flexible rules of engagement. It breaks free from the rut of cruelty and cowardice that Bosnia has been for the past three years.

The Rapid Reaction Force remains, in principle, under the command of U.N. Gens. Rupert Smith and Bernard Janvier. Its sole mission, in principle, is to protect a U.N. force that has become a hostage to itself and its absurd mandate.

But the soldiers who make it up are not wearing blue helmets. Their Warrior armored vehicles, Lynx antitank helicopters and AMX-10 tanks are not covered with the white paint that has become a synonym for impotence, dishonor and surrender. Instead, each wears the uniform of his own nation’s military—a detail that makes all the difference.

Soon they are protecting the rutted road through Mount Igman that is the sole remaining supply route for besieged and famished Sarajevo. With 120mm mortars, they pound the artillery position that launched the rockets that killed the two U.N. peacekeepers. One day, an arms depot is destroyed; the next, a Mirage 2000 drops laser-guided missiles on the Serbian snipers’ command center in Pale. So begins the virtuous cycle that will end with Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995, the routing of Serb forces whose strength was based on the West’s weakness, and, finally, the Dayton peace accords.

Syria in 2019 isn’t Bosnia in 1995. But couldn’t the same solid core of European countries that succeeded in deploying 4,500 troops in an entirely hostile theater of operations deploy 2,000 on the border of a nation that still pretends to be our NATO ally? Can’t the modicum of political will needed to lend aid to the brutalized Muslims of Bosnia now be summoned in defense of another group of beleaguered Muslims, the Kurds, who, moreover, fought for us and protected us from Islamic State?

Why wouldn’t France, Britain and other willing countries of Europe jump at the chance to provide not an armada, not a regiment, but a few hundred elite troops to replace those who, until recently, had been enough to keep northern Syria a sanctuary?

French President Emmanuel Macron, in a splendid interview in the Economist, pronounced NATO “brain dead.” He seems to know better than anyone that a page of Western history is turning and that Europe will have to reinvent its own security. He also knows that the germ of the collective European defense that he has pursued with such energy since his election may lie between Erbil and Raqqa.

Mr. Macron’s hour has arrived. That is the message addressed to him by the many Americans of goodwill—Republican, Democrat and independent—I have had the good fortune to meet during a weekslong tour of America I made to support the Kurds in cooperation with the New York–based nonprofit Justice For Kurds.

May Mr. Macron act—not against but alongside the best of the United States.

Mr. Lévy is author of “The Empire and the Five Kings: America’s Abdication and the Fate of the World” ( Henry Holt, 2019). This article was translated from French by Steven B. Kennedy.

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Pipes: Eight Trends in the Middle East
« Reply #1288 on: November 14, 2019, 08:44:53 AM »
The Middle East in Flux: Eight Trends
by Daniel Pipes
The Washington Times
November 11, 2019

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Originally published under the title "Middle Eastern Gyrations: Oil, Water, Islamism and anti-Zionism in Flux."



Eight trends, most of them negative.

As ever, the Middle East is monumentally in flux. As usual, most developments are negative. Here's a guide:

Water replaces petroleum as the key liquid: Oil and gas still provide nearly 60 percent of the world's energy, but this number is declining and even the wealthiest oil producers are feeling the pinch ("GCC states look to new taxes as oil revenues remain weak"). Contrarily, tensions over water are becoming a major source of international tensions (e.g., Turkey vs. Syria, Ethiopia vs. Egypt) and a driving force of domestic change (the Syrian revolt of 2011). It's also a potential cause of massive migration; a former Iranian minister of agriculture predicts that water shortages will force up to 70 percent of the country's population, or 57 million Iranians, to emigrate.

Anarchy replaces tyranny: Of course, some tyrannies remain, notably in Turkey and Iran, but anarchy has become the region's greater bane, including whole countries (Libya, Yemen, Syria) and parts of others (e.g., Sinai). Though generally less threatening to the outside world, anarchy is an even more miserable personal experience than tyranny, for it lacks guidelines. As a thirteenth century Koran scholar noted, "A year of the sultan's tyranny does less harm than a moment of the people's anarchy."

Efforts to overthrow the old order have had few beneficial consequences.

The failure of Arab youths' efforts to make improvements: Around 1970, many Arabic-speaking countries began an era of corrupt strongman rule. Starting in Tunisia in December 2010, efforts to overthrow the old order have shaken governments but had few beneficial consequences. In some cases (Libya, Yemen, Syria), they led to civil war; in another (Egypt), they merely brought on a younger strongman. Recent uprisings in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Lebanon have yet to conclude but odds are, they too will end badly.

The decline of Islamism: After peaking in about 2012, the radical attempt to apply Islamic law severely and in full has lost ground in the Middle East. Several factors account for this: a fear of wild-eyed fanatics like Boko Haram, Shabaab, ISIS, and the Taliban; the dismal experience of Muslim peoples who have lived under Islamist rule (e.g., Egypt in 2012-13); and the fracturing of Islamists (e.g., in Syria) into competing and hostile factions. What might come after Islamism is unclear, but after a century of failure with it and other extremist ideologies (including fascism and communism), an era of anti-ideology might lie ahead.

Governments that once treated Israel as the archenemy now work with it.

Iran is the most divisive country, not Israel: For decades, the issue of the Jewish state drove and divided Middle East politics; now, it's Iran. The Islamic Republic dominates four Arab capitals (Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa), aggresses elsewhere, and spreads its radical version of Islam. Governments that once treated Israel as the archenemy, notably Saudi Arabia, now work with it in a range of ways, overt and covert. As a side note, the global Left has inherited the Arab states' old toxic anti-Zionism; Israel now enjoys better relations with Saudi Arabia than with Spain or Sweden.

Iran and Turkey take up the Arab states' anti-Zionism: The era of Arab state warfare on Israel lasted only 25 years, 1948-73, and ended 46 years ago because politicians found this conflict too expensive and risky. Instead, they abandoned it to sub-state actors like the Palestinians. Eager to take up the slack, Iran's Khomeini and Turkey's Erdoğan made opposition to Israel central to their messages. If so far, they have mostly limited their aggression to words, that could dramatically change.

More Americans find war excessively costly and adventurous.

Americans react against over-involvement: George W. Bush began nearly simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that many Americans found excessively costly and adventurous, prompting a long-term backlash. Barack Obama and Donald Trump each responded in characteristic ways (one critical of the United States, the other boisterously nationalist) to reduce U.S. military commitments in the region. Obama's 2012 red-line retreat and Trump's 2019 pulling of soldiers, both involving Syria, symbolize this retreat.

Russia makes noise but China builds: Vladimir Putin seems to be everywhere – closing commercial deals, selling arms, sending troops, convening conferences – but these are the pyrotechnics of a power in decline. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping's China quietly builds its economic infrastructure, a network of political alliances, and military power in the region, to be called upon whenever Beijing decides to exert its will. Beijing, not Moscow, poses the great threat.

One piece of unabashed good news (Islamism's decline) stands out among these many and protracted problems.

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GPF: Turkey unhappy with Russia and US?
« Reply #1289 on: November 19, 2019, 11:18:02 AM »
Intriguing , , ,

=====================

Russia pushes back. Russia said it was “perplexed” by the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s announcement that Turkish forces could halt the cease-fire in northern Syria and relaunch their offensive there. The Turkish foreign minister said Russia and the U.S. had violated the agreement made with Ankara in October, warning that Turkey would “do what is necessary” if powers continued to disregard Turkish demands. Russia’s Defense Ministry warned that such actions would further escalate the situation and highlighted Russian efforts to help stabilize the area. Despite their collaboration on some key issues, Russian and Turkish strategic interests in northern Syria have been at odds: Russia has sought two additional air bases to counter Turkish forces and the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, and both powers have tried to lay claim to strategic locations like Deir el-Zour and Idlib.

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Too bad we aren't there to play policeman
« Reply #1290 on: November 22, 2019, 09:27:41 AM »
GPF

The military mess in Syria. Northern Syria is becoming increasingly crowded, and tensions are rising among Russian, Iranian, Turkish, Syrian and Kurdish affiliates. There are multiple reports that Turkish soldiers and Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army militias in Ain Issa, Kobani, Tal Tamir and Abu Rasayn have violated the October cease-fire agreement between Russia, Syria and Turkey. Turkish forces have continued to clash with Syrian Kurd-affiliated militia groups, while Iran has been accused of using Russia-made cluster munitions in camps controlled by the Turkey-backed National Army. Moscow has considered joint patrols in northern Syria as a mechanism to contain Turkish aggression and prevent any territorial push from Ankara into southern Syria, but collaboration has been limited; Russian military police have clashed with Turkey-backed paramilitaries and have been aggravated by anti-regime groups in Kobani and Rojava that have thrown Molotov cocktails and stones at joint patrol armored vehicles.

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Kurds, Russia, Assad, and Turkey
« Reply #1291 on: November 27, 2019, 11:34:02 PM »
China Is Europe’s Problem Too
Only the trans-Atlantic alliance can counter Beijing’s moves in the Pacific.
By Walter Russell Mead
Nov. 25, 2019 7:06 pm ET
Opinion: China's Rise Makes U.S.-European Alliances More Important
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Opinion: China's Rise Makes U.S.-European Alliances More Important
Opinion: China's Rise Makes U.S.-European Alliances More Important
Global View: As the United States focuses its foreign policy on the Pacific and the rise of China, U.S.-European alliances should be recognized as an important tool in countering the burgeoning Moscow-Beijing alliance. Image: Pang Xinglei/Zuma Press
What will the trans-Atlantic alliance look like in a world focused on the Indo-Pacific? That, more than President Trump’s unpredictable diplomacy, is the question that haunts Europe. During the Cold War, protecting Europe from Soviet aggression was Washington’s highest foreign-policy priority. That didn’t only mean that the U.S. put troops in Europe. Washington took European opinions seriously, engaged with Europeans, cut deals with them and was willing to make concessions to preserve alliance unity.

Clearly, some of that has changed. The next U.S. president may not share Mr. Trump’s undiplomatic instincts or his affinity for Brexiteers such as Nigel Farage and anti-Brussels figures like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. But will he or she engage in the ritualistic ceremonies of diplomatic consultation with the various chancellors, presidents, commissioners and high representatives that Europeans so love? When America’s most urgent foreign policy worries involve smoothing over Japanese-Korean spats or facing down China in the Taiwan Strait, just how relevant will Europe be? When Europe calls Washington, will anybody answer the phone?

The French like to say they are a Pacific nation, thanks to Tahiti and other outposts, but it takes more than a sprinkling of islands, however idyllic, to make you a serious factor in Pacific politics. From a military standpoint, the European powers—and NATO itself—won’t play a large role in the Indo-Pacific zone. Nor will European ideology or Europe as a model have much appeal there. The memories of colonialism are too strong, and many Asian countries see the slow-growth, high-regulation European social model as a trap to avoid, not a goal to be reached.

Yet as China looms larger, a new trans-Atlantic consensus is forming. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in one of her rare political missteps, decided last month to allow China’s Huawei to supply components for Germany’s 5G internet. Americans made the usual protests and threats, to be met by the usual refusals. But the matter didn’t end there. Delegates to her party’s conference last week revolted, adopting a resolution that could lead to a Bundestag vote to block Huawei from Germany’s 5G rollout. Prominent Social Democrats, the center-left party uneasily allied with Mrs. Merkel’s Christian Democrats, agree. Chinese companies cannot be trusted with German data.

The convergence between European and U.S. views on China is far from complete. France has refused to exclude Huawei from its 5G program, and other European governments as well as many European companies still see China through rose-tinted lenses. But opinions are changing. Like Americans, Europeans sympathize with Hong Kong’s democracy movement, and are horrified by Beijing’s treatment of the Tibetans and Uighurs. The Federation of German Industries has been voicing sharp criticism of Chinese business practices for the past year.

There is another force pushing Americans and Europeans closer together: Vladimir Putin, who appears to have resigned himself to a full-fledged alliance with China. Russia’s disruptive agenda in Europe, ranging from the annexation of Crimea to efforts to influence European elections through disinformation, has always suffered from a lack of money that is the curse of Russian power projection. A perception that Russian activity in Europe is more of a nuisance to the U.S. than a strategic threat has gained ground in some neo-isolationist circles. But as China makes major investments in Greece and across Southern and Eastern Europe, that perception could change. The closer Russia and China are aligned, the more important Europe’s Russia problems become for a China-focused U.S. foreign policy.

The Indo-Pacific isn’t Las Vegas—what happens there doesn’t stay there. As China’s economic, political and military reach expands in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, European as well as U.S. interests will be affected. Efforts by China to export its method of authoritarian governance backed by high-tech surveillance will pose a serious threat to a vision of the open society that Europeans and Americans mostly share.

One hates to say anything so obvious, but world politics is a global endeavor. During the Cold War, America’s main focus was on Europe, but Japan and South Korea were important allies without whose support and counsel the Cold War would have been much harder to win.

The real question isn’t whether the U.S. will take the problems of the Indo-Pacific too seriously and write off its old allies in Europe. It is whether Americans and Europeans will recognize the global nature of the challenge before us.

About this, I am an optimist. The Americans who best understand the potential threats emerging from China also know that without Europe’s help it will be difficult and perhaps impossible to prevail. The harder Americans think about China, the more they will care about Europe. If enough Europeans share U.S. concerns about Beijing, the Western alliance will remain a vital force even as the world’s political center of gravity shifts to the Indo-Pacific.



Crafty_Dog

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Gerecht: The Syrian Front-- serious read
« Reply #1294 on: December 23, 2019, 12:16:43 AM »


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Is Iran's influence about to wane?
« Reply #1296 on: December 23, 2019, 06:08:56 AM »
Third post

Is Iran's Influence in Syria About to Wane?
7 MINS READ
Dec 23, 2019 | 09:30 GMT
This Aug. 14, 2016, picture shows heavily damaged buildings in the al-Khalediah neighborhood of the central Syrian city of Homs.
This Aug. 14, 2016, picture shows heavily damaged buildings in the al-Khalediah neighborhood of the central Syrian city of Homs. Tehran helped Damascus win the civil war, but it might not be able to help it normalize.

(LOUAI BESHARA/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Syria's government has won the civil war in part because of Iran's help. To win the peace, however, it'll need aid from elsewhere. ...

Nearly nine years on, the Syrian government is winning the country's civil war, thanks in large part to strong Iranian and Russian support. But as the war winds down, questions are rapidly emerging about how it might secure the peace — and what that means for the influence of the allies that helped get it there. In particular, there is great uncertainty about Iran's deep influence in Syria, as Damascus strategizes ways to emerge from its economic isolation, restore its sovereignty over its internal affairs and reduce its exposure to Israel's repeated attacks. These imperatives, however, clash with some of Iran's strategy for Syria, creating a situation in which Damascus might have no choice but to cut Tehran's influence down to pre-war levels if it's ever going to find a way to rebuild.

The Big Picture
As Syria's civil war becomes more stable, the value of its allies is changing. While the conflict was hottest, Iran managed to turn Syria into a forward position against Israel, a strong supply route to Hezbollah and a proxy theater against its Gulf Arab rivals. But now that Damascus needs to overcome its economic isolation and reassert control of its internal affairs, it is facing pressure to push back against the aspects of Iranian strategy that isolate it from potential new friends and expose it to recurring Israeli attacks.

See The Syrian Civil War
Iran's Diminishing Value
For decades, Tehran and Damascus have maintained close relations, in part because of their shared mistrust of Israel and their uniqueness as non-Sunni islands (at least in terms of Syria's rulers, if not most of its population) in the Middle East. Over the course of the civil war, however, Iran has managed to gain more influence in Syria because its intervention was exactly what Damascus required in its hour of need. Tehran supplied arms and militias that bolstered Syria's flagging national army, which had been torn apart by defections and paralyzed by distrust. Indeed, Iranian and Iranian-linked forces supplied much of the resources that allowed Damascus to retake Syria's major cities and push rebel factions toward the northern border with Turkey.

But as major cities like Damascus, Latakia, Aleppo and others have come firmly under Syrian control, residents of these areas, especially government loyalists, are yearning for a return to normalcy and economic recovery. U.N. estimates, however, put the price of reconstruction as high as $400 billion, meaning that the rebuilding effort will require the aid of many nations, including ones hostile to the current government. Given this, as Iran struggles under the weight of sanctions it has less to offer than it would like. 

This graphic charts Syria's economic performance over the course of the civil war.
Today, the Syrian government controls most of the country's major cities, where up to 77 percent of its prewar population lived (displacement and poor record-keeping during the war mean there is no precise figure for the population today). Within the relative security of government-controlled areas, the population was, up until recently, experiencing an economic rebound: The Central Bank even reported a 1.9 percent growth in gross domestic product in 2017, the last year the institution published such data (the World Bank, however, still believes Syria's GDP regressed during the same time).

But now a series of problems are hampering economic progress, forcing the country to rethink its strategies to overcome economic isolation. U.S. sanctions against Syria's biggest economic ally, Iran, have hurt Tehran's ability to fund infrastructure projects and provide credit lines for essential goods. Before U.S. sanctions, Iran gave up to $8 billion a year to Syria, but it appears it is no longer able to fulfill prior obligations, as Tehran slashed wages for Iranian-aligned militias and delayed projects — or handed them to Russian companies.

And in terms of trade and energy flows, normal service hasn't resumed either. Syria's old trade routes remain largely disrupted, as the major Turkish frontier remains closed while routes through Iraq and Jordan have failed to supplant it. At the same time, Syria's small energy fields are still in the hands of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. Long-standing internal corruption, too, continues to drain resources. Compounding Syria's economic woes are the economic and political crises in Lebanon, Syria's last major local trade partner and one of its primary economic outlets to the world.

Time to Make New Friends
Though Damascus has defeated most of its most serious enemies, even loyalists are raising questions about Syria's future. Discontent emerged last summer in Damascus as ongoing energy shortages resulted in long lines to purchase fuel. And over the border in Lebanon, a shortage of dollars is now affecting business in Syria, fostering further resentment at the country's isolation.

Working to decrease Iranian influence to pre-civil war levels would not only bring Syria closer to the Gulf Arabs, it would also reduce Israel's incentive to continue its long campaign against Iranian forces in Syria.

Even Syria's government — which remained united in the face of the uprising — remains riven with its own internal factionalism, warlordism and politicking. The close family of President Bashar al Assad dominates the state, but sectarian clans, business leaders, militia commanders, military officers and parliamentarians are all jostling for a share of the spoils that loyalty to the state warrants. Finding a balance among these internal factions has been a longstanding priority for the al Assad family and will continue to be so in the year ahead.

Given its situation, Syria must find new economic resources to dole out to the factions. As Tehran is limited in what it can do, and Moscow and Beijing have so far been reluctant to open their checkbooks, Syria is looking farther afield — specifically, to some Gulf states, where it has made some diplomatic inroads with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The former, in particular, is wealthy enough to invest in some of Syria's reconstruction; Abu Dhabi is also a useful diplomatic partner that could convince Riyadh to join in some capacity as well. For the time being, impending U.S. secondary sanctions on Syria will ensure that only companies with a high tolerance for risk will loosen their purse strings, however.

Naturally, too, these Gulf Arabs have a price of their own: a reduction in Iran's influence in Syria. But with security relatively normalized in regime territories, it's a price that Syria might be able to stomach, as it no longer needs the same level of Iranian involvement as it did in years past — in fact, Iranian forces might now be doing Damascus more harm than good in some areas. That is especially the case with Israel, as Israeli forces continue to hit Iranian forces inside Syria, further damaging vital Syrian infrastructure like the capital's airport. Working to decrease Iranian influence to pre-civil war levels would not only bring Syria closer to the Gulf Arabs, but it would also reduce Israel's incentive to continue its long campaign against Iranian forces inside Syria.

As it is, al Assad's government itself is loath to allow foreign influence to become permanent in Syria's internal politics. But as Syria seeks to restore some independence of action and cut back on Iran's clout in the country, Tehran will naturally move to preserve its influence — but in doing so, it may end up antagonizing Syria, the Russians, or both, especially if it does so too assertively or quickly for Syria.

As Syria attempts to reintegrate into the international community and find someone to bankroll some of its reconstruction, the era of Tehran's ascendence in Damascus might be drawing to a close. If so, Iran might find itself back in the position it held in 2011, when it was a major Syrian ally — but not a major patron able to use Syria at will.

Crafty_Dog

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Russia and Lebanon
« Reply #1297 on: January 06, 2020, 02:38:28 PM »