The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/14/iran-s-losing-major-operatives-in-syria.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Second post

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/10/14/cuban-military-forces-deployed-to-syria-to-operate-russian-tanks-say-sources/?intcmp=hpbt1

[ppulatie]

Haven't we heard this before in Angola?

[Crafty_Dog]

http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/13/iraq-uses-intelligence-center-operated-by-russia-i/

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-10-14/russia-sends-aircraft-carrier-syria-marking-ships-sixth-deployment-history

[Crafty_Dog]

American Killed in Raid to Rescue Kurdish Fighters in Iraq
Rare joint mission freed as many as 70 prisoners held by Islamic State
By Gordon Lubold in Washington and
Matt Bradley in Baghdad
Updated Oct. 22, 2015 11:04 a.m. ET
83 COMMENTS

American special-operations forces conducted a raid with Kurdish fighters inside Iraq and freed as many as 70 prisoners held by Islamic State in a rare, joint mission in which at least one American service member was killed, officials said.

The American, who has not been identified, is the first to be killed in action in Iraq since 2011, U.S. officials said.


A unit of as many as 30 U.S. special-operations forces conducted the joint raid to free Kurdish fighters, known as Peshmerga, at a prison facility held by Islamic State in the town of Hawija, U.S. officials said Thursday. More than 15 Islamic State fighters were killed, U.S. officials said.

The high-risk mission, apparently the first of its kind with Peshmerga forces, came after intelligence showed the 15 Peshmerga fighters being held by Islamic State were in imminent danger. It remains unclear if any of those fighters were among those rescued, U.S. officials said.

“There were indications they were all going to be killed, very soon,” said one U.S. official.

One U.S. official said that the mission was led by Peshmerga fighters and that the U.S. “enabled” them, by providing assistance including helicopters, intelligence, advice, and logistics. American troops are limited to training and advisory roles in Iraq.

The American commandos used two Chinook helicopters to raid the prison near the village of Al-Fedekha, said the mayor of Hawija, Sabhan al-Jabouri. The raid lasted from 3 a.m. to 5 a.m. local time, said Najmaldin Karim, the governor of Hawija’s surrounding Kirkuk Province.

The prison was located in the former home of an Iraqi judge that had been seized by the Islamic State. The building also served as an Islamic State headquarters. U.S. airstrikes were used before and after the operation to isolate the compound where the prisoners were being held.

As the operation unfolded, U.S. officials said a fire fight ensued between U.S. and Kurdish forces and the Islamic State fighters guarding the facility.

Two American officials said the initial raid was to rescue as many as 15 Peshmerga fighters. When the forces arrived at the site, they found and freed many more individuals who were being held captive.

The Thursday raid followed a bombing campaign that took out nearby bridges, checkpoints and roads to prevent reinforcements from attacking the commandos, said Mr. Karim.

“I think this was a good target,” said Mr. Karim. “They knew they could do it, so they went ahead and executed it.”

[G M]

http://www.investigativeproject.org/5013/isis-rapes-women-toward-allah#



Boy, are the vast majority of peaceful muslims gonna be pissed when they find out about this! Imagine how big the protests will be!

[Crafty_Dog]

 Unpromising Choices in Syria
Global Affairs
October 21, 2015 | 08:00 GMT Print
Stratfor

By Philip Bobbitt

I don't envy the officials in Washington who are tasked with forming a plan to resolve, or at least mitigate, the crisis in Syria. Like the punch line of the familiar old-timer from Maine's reply to the perplexed tourist from the city, "well, if I was going there I wouldn't start from here," it really doesn't advance things to say — as I have found myself saying — that the time for action was three years ago.

Syria, whose population is less than 23 million, has more than 7.5 million internally displaced persons. One in every four refugees in the world is a Syrian. The United Nations estimates that more than 200,000 persons have died in the conflict; the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claims that figure is over 320,000.

What is Global Affairs?

Currently, the United States has four main options. One is to try to contain the conflict and stand aside, which in light of Russian aid to the Syrian regime would crush the popular opposition and eventually end the civil war. A second option is to arm the opposition, especially the transborder Kurdish fighters, with more effective anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons backed by U.S. airstrikes, while acquiescing to Saudi Arabia's arming of the al-Nusra Front and its jihadist allies. A third possibility is to tacitly align with Iran and Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the destruction of the Islamic State. The final option would be to intervene with a coalition including Turkish and U.S. forces, as well as other militaries, striking directly at Damascus and terminating the regime.

The first of these options would be a historic embarrassment for the administration whose "red lines" the Syrian government has so studiedly crossed; nevertheless, embarrassment is seldom a justification for prolonging a deadly civil war. Indeed, some critics think this is one of the lessons of the United States' involvement in Vietnam.

The second option would prolong the civil war, perhaps even increasing the mass depopulation of Syria with all its consequences for human suffering. At least thus far, it seems unlikely that opponents of the regime aligned with the United States could effectively hope to hold enough territory to force a negotiated peace. Indeed, the longer the war continues, the more momentum accrues to the most retrograde and anti-Western insurgents. Arming the Kurds would also enrage Ankara and Baghdad.

The third option is at least consistent with what seems to be a long-term bet on Washington's part of an eventual rapprochement with Tehran. The relative youth of the Iranian population, its level of education compared to those in neighboring states, and a consistent trend in public opinion among the educated and the young that favors closer ties with the United States all seem to encourage this bet. Against such hopefulness, however, we must consider that strategic success by Iran's military forces and theocratic regime is unlikely to lessen their grip on power.

The last option would plunge the United States once again into an open-ended commitment in which it finds itself arrayed against forces that are currently warring with each other. It is not impossible to imagine the "exit strategy" demanded by commentators; in all likelihood, it would amount to a partitioning of the country and some sort of negotiated cease-fire, the policing of which need not require U.S. ground forces. But at least as likely would be an ignominious withdrawal forced by a disillusioned and frustrated American public, making this option the riskiest of all because of its potential domestic consequences. The possibility of armed clashes with Russia would only add to this risk.
Reframing the Issue

Facing such unpromising choices, the wisest course is often to reconfigure the problem. I remember the popular cartoon strip of my youth, Pogo, drawn by Walt Kelly. Few of my readers will remember those brilliant satires, but something of their narrative structure lived on in Charles Schulz's Peanuts and its ensemble of characters. In Pogo, as in Peanuts, the chief character was an earnest, rather gullible straight arrow whose basic decency was often thwarted by the complexities of a small but diverse world. At Pogo's side was his friend Albert. (I should add that Pogo was a sober, sensitive possum and Albert was a rather louche alligator, both always depicted standing upright with human accoutrements.) In the strip I wish to recall for you now, the two friends are playing checkers. Albert is wearing a velvet smoking jacket and chewing meditatively on a cigar. Suddenly, in a frenzied triumph, Pogo jumps all of Albert's checkers, wiping them from the board. The alligator is aghast; the cigar drops from his mouth. But then he recovers his poise. He reaches into his smoking jacket and pulls out a hand of cards. "I got a straight flush! What have you got?"

So I propose that we stop looking at this question as a problem of the Middle East; of course it is that, but it is not just that. More important than any of the United States' assets in the Middle East is the North Atlantic alliance. A refugee crisis of unprecedented proportions, at least in the decades since World War II, is shaking NATO countries to their constitutional foundations. A NATO ally, Turkey, has encountered its own troubles: the Islamic State has attacked it, Russian fighter planes have invaded its airspace, Syria has shelled its villages and its borders have witnessed the worst scenes of war-torn refugees seen since the Yugoslav Wars. In the past two weeks, surface-to-air missile have locked onto Turkish aircraft flying in domestic Turkish airspace. The situation cries out for the United States and its NATO allies to send aid of all kinds to protect a member of the alliance, to relieve the onward pressure of refugee migration to other allies, and to help alleviate the burden on Turkey.

The problem is that Turkey is no longer the repository of our hopes for a progressive democracy among Muslim states. Indeed, the quest for a democracy seems to have destroyed the secular basis of the state. As a result, Turkey's president has supported the very Islamic State that now attacks his country and appears to be responsible for the Oct. 10 massacre in Ankara. He has broken off negotiations with the Kurds, even though they are the most effective fighters in the region who, like the United States, oppose both the al Assad regime and the Islamic State.

In this situation, the creation of safe zones along the Turkey-Syria border offers a different kind of option. The United States has years of experience enforcing no-fly zones in the region with considerable success. The problem, as we saw at Srebrenica, is that safe zones must be enforced by regular ground troops or they will become killing fields. Air power alone, which can enforce a no-fly zone, cannot protect a safe haven. A NATO force including Turkish, American, British and French troops could effectively establish such a zone for refugees. It's only a beginning, and that is to say, something as troubling as it is promising.

[Crafty_Dog]

 America's Other Anti-Islamic State Efforts
Security Weekly
October 15, 2015 | 08:00 GMT Print
Stratfor

By Scott Stewart

U.S. C-17 cargo aircraft dropped 122 pallets of small arms and ammunition to rebel groups fighting the Islamic State in northeastern Syria on Oct. 12. The forces belong to the newly minted Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of anti-Islamic State Sunni Arab, Kurdish and Assyrian Christian militias.

Many have interpreted the recent U.S. supply drop to the Syrian Democratic Forces as an entirely new initiative – a desperate bid to salvage Washington's Syria strategy after ditching the Pentagon's train-and-equip program. These supplies, however, are just one small part of a longstanding U.S. effort in the area.

The now-defunct U.S. plan to train and equip rebel groups was only one of several programs initiated in Syria and was by no means the most important. Washington's efforts in the southern and northeastern parts of the country have proved far more successful, as has the not-so-covert CIA program to equip rebels battling the government of President Bashar al Assad in the northwest. The latter initiative supplied BGM-71 TOW missiles that greatly enhanced the rebel offensive in Idlib province. These advances against loyalist forces have heightened the threat to the Alawite heartland, which was one important factor prompting Russia to intervene in Syria.

What Success Looks Like

The U.S. programs in the northeast have been ongoing for some time and have in fact proven quite effective. The United States first airdropped weapons in October 2014 to the Free Syrian Army and to Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) during the defense of Kobani. Both are now involved in the Syrian Democratic Forces. Washington has since then continued to supply these forces with help from Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government. The only limit to the program's success and expansion has come from the Turkish government, which objects to assisting the YPG because the Kurdish militia has close ties with Turkey's militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

With the help of these weapons drops and a robust coalition air campaign, rebel forces managed to defeat the Islamic State at Kobani. The groups then continued their offensive in hopes of pushing the Islamic State completely out of the northeast. Many of these anti-Islamic State militias joined a coalition called Euphrates Volcano, the main coalition force north and east of the Euphrates River in Syria.

The Euphrates Volcano campaign to beat back the Islamic State in Raqqa province has been quite effective, and the rebel coalition has regained a great deal of territory. They have even managed to take all the Islamic State's border crossings east of the Euphrates River and lifted the Islamic State siege of al-Hasaka.

The past year of cooperation has allowed the Euphrates Volcano forces and the U.S.-led coalition to develop an ad hoc but highly effective system to call in air support. The aerial assistance that brought victory at Kobani quickly became a critical component of the coalition's offensive operations.

Now these former Euphrates Volcano forces are operating under the rubric of the Syrian Democratic Forces alongside new anti-Islamic State partners, including Assyrian Christian militias from the al-Hasaka area. Free Syrian Army elements in the bloc such as Jaish al-Thuwar have also incorporated fighters from groups that include the Hazzm Movement and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front.

These new fighters had been pushed out of northwestern Syria by al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Both the Hazzm Movement and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front worked closely with the United States in northwestern Syria. They also received U.S. training and weapons, including BGM-71 TOW missiles. These ties likely still endure, which means components of the Syrian Democratic Forces could maintain close relations with the CIA — a vital source for training and advanced weapons.

The Syrian Democratic Forces' inclusion of Arabs and Assyrian Christians is also important because it will allow the new bloc to present itself as more than just a Kurdish proxy. This will help the Syrian Democratic Forces as they conduct offensives outside Syria's Kurdish enclaves, especially if they aim to capture the Islamic State capital, Raqqa. Indeed, the YPG's Arab allies were vital to previous offensives against the Islamic State in non-Kurdish areas of Raqqa province. Emphasizing the Arab elements within the Syrian Democratic Forces may help minimize animosity toward the movement on the part of local Arab tribes and is also intended to help mute concern that Kurdish offensives are part of an ethnically-motivated campaign to seize power.

Retrenchment, not Retreat

The U.S. decision to cut the Pentagon's train-and-equip program must be seen in the context of successful U.S. collaboration with rebel forces elsewhere. The recent abandonment was simply a choice to cut a failing program in order to focus on the much more effective Syrian Democratic Forces initiative.

And in spite of negative press over the U.S. effort in Syria and a focus on the Russian intervention in the northeast, the United States has had real success cooperating with rebel groups on the ground. The Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by coalition air power, pose a serious threat to the Islamic State in Raqqa and have managed to a position themselves just south of Ain Issa — within 48 kilometers (30 miles) of the Islamic State's capital.

Should the Syrian Democratic Forces capture Raqqa from Islamic State, the victory would be highly symbolic. The city was the capital of the Abbasid caliphate from A.D. 769 to A.D. 809, when it moved to Baghdad. As Will McCants notes in his book, "The ISIS Apocalypse," the Islamic State has intentionally sought to emulate the Abbasid caliphate in many ways. The group aims to conquer Baghdad, for example. Driving the Islamic State out of its capital would go a long way toward shattering the group's image as the inexorable heirs of the Abbasids empowered by Allah to conquer the earth.

Taking Raqqa would have clear strategic value for the anti-Islamic State effort as well. The area around the city is an important hub for transporting people and supplies: Raqaa sits on the Euphrates River and controls critical highways.  For the Islamic State, rivers are essential – waterways and their flanking roads are the geographic core of the Islamic State's web of control.

Conquering the area around Raqqa will also serve to effectively cut the Islamic State pocket northeast of Aleppo off from the rest of its territory and make it hard to move supplies and troops. This would be particularly devastating if Turkey establishes the safe zone it has discussed implementing in northern Syria between Jarabulus and Azaz. Reaching the Euphrates River would also open up routes to use in an eventual campaign toward Deir el-Zour. This offensive would likely be combined with an operation to push down the Khabur River from al-Hasaka.

Deir el-Zour is another critical logistics hub, and the Raqqa to Deir el-Zour corridor serves as the heart of the Islamic State's Syrian territory. If they lose that area it will be difficult for the various regional arms of their organization to function as a cohesive whole. It would also deprive them of the current advantage they have of being able to operate along internal lines of communication and quickly shift resources from front to front.

While the eyes of the world are currently fixed on Syria's northwest region, tracking the operations of Syrian loyalists and their Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah allies, it will be important to also pay careful attention to the very significant operations happening east of the Euphrates River.
 

[Crafty_Dog]

Jimmy Carter: A Five-Nation Plan to End the Syrian Crisis

By JIMMY CARTER
OCT. 23, 2015


I HAVE known Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, since he was a college student in London, and have spent many hours negotiating with him since he has been in office. This has often been at the request of the United States government during those many times when our ambassadors have been withdrawn from Damascus because of diplomatic disputes.
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Bashar and his father, Hafez, had a policy of not speaking to anyone at the American Embassy during those periods of estrangement, but they would talk to me. I noticed that Bashar never referred to a subordinate for advice or information. His most persistent characteristic was stubbornness; it was almost psychologically impossible for him to change his mind — and certainly not when under pressure.

Before the revolution began in March 2011, Syria set a good example of harmonious relations among its many different ethnic and religious groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians and Assyrians who were Christians, Jews, Sunnis, Alawites and Shiites. The Assad family had ruled the country since 1970, and was very proud of this relative harmony among these diverse groups.

When protesters in Syria demanded long overdue reforms in the political system, President Assad saw this as an illegal revolutionary effort to overthrow his “legitimate” regime and erroneously decided to stamp it out by using unnecessary force. Because of many complex reasons, he was supported by his military forces, most Christians, Jews, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and others who feared a takeover by radical Sunni Muslims. The prospect for his overthrow was remote.

The Carter Center had been deeply involved in Syria since the early 1980s, and we shared our insights with top officials in Washington, seeking to preserve an opportunity for a political solution to the rapidly growing conflict. Despite our persistent but confidential protests, the early American position was that the first step in resolving the dispute had to be the removal of Mr. Assad from office. Those who knew him saw this as a fruitless demand, but it has been maintained for more than four years. In effect, our prerequisite for peace efforts has been an impossibility.

Kofi Annan, the former United Nations secretary general, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister, tried to end the conflict as special representatives of the United Nations, but abandoned the effort as fruitless because of incompatibilities among America, Russia and other nations regarding the status of Mr. Assad during a peace process.

In May 2015, a group of global leaders known as the Elders visited Moscow, where we had detailed discussions with the American ambassador, former President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, former Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov and representatives of international think tanks, including the Moscow branch of the Carnegie Center.

They pointed out the longstanding partnership between Russia and the Assad regime and the great threat of the Islamic State to Russia, where an estimated 14 percent of its population are Sunni Muslims. Later, I questioned President Putin about his support for Mr. Assad, and about his two sessions that year with representatives of factions from Syria. He replied that little progress had been made, and he thought that the only real chance of ending the conflict was for the United States and Russia to be joined by Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in preparing a comprehensive peace proposal. He believed that all factions in Syria, except the Islamic State, would accept almost any plan endorsed strongly by these five, with Iran and Russia supporting Mr. Assad and the other three backing the opposition. With his approval, I relayed this suggestion to Washington.

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For the past three years, the Carter Center has been working with Syrians across political divides, armed opposition group leaders and diplomats from the United Nations and Europe to find a political path for ending the conflict. This effort has been based on data-driven research about the Syrian catastrophe that the center has conducted, which reveals the location of different factions and clearly shows that neither side in Syria can prevail militarily.

The recent decision by Russia to support the Assad regime with airstrikes and other military forces has intensified the fighting, raised the level of armaments and may increase the flow of refugees to neighboring countries and Europe. At the same time, it has helped to clarify the choice between a political process in which the Assad regime assumes a role and more war in which the Islamic State becomes an even greater threat to world peace. With these clear alternatives, the five nations mentioned above could formulate a unanimous proposal. Unfortunately, differences among them persist.
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Recent Comments
Michael 10 hours ago

Carter's diplomatic solutions for ending the Syrian conflict are the best I have heard so far. The US should work with all sides & act...
behaima 10 hours ago

Mr. Carter, under whose watch the Iranian revolution was born, is no less naive now than then. Though well intentioned, the idea that...
nyalman1 10 hours ago

Thank you Mr. Carter for what amounts to a complete repudiation of President Obama and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Mideast...

    See All Comments

Iran outlined a general four-point sequence several months ago, consisting of a cease-fire, formation of a unity government, constitutional reforms and elections. Working through the United Nations Security Council and utilizing a five-nation proposal, some mechanism could be found to implement these goals.

The involvement of Russia and Iran is essential. Mr. Assad’s only concession in four years of war was giving up chemical weapons, and he did so only under pressure from Russia and Iran. Similarly, he will not end the war by accepting concessions imposed by the West, but is likely to do so if urged by his allies.

Mr. Assad’s governing authority could then be ended in an orderly process, an acceptable government established in Syria, and a concerted effort could then be made to stamp out the threat of the Islamic State.

The needed concessions are not from the combatants in Syria, but from the proud nations that claim to want peace but refuse to cooperate with one another.

Jimmy Carter, the 39th president, is the founder of the Carter Center and the recipient of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize.

 

[Crafty_Dog]

Analysis

Editor's Note: Russia began airstrikes in Syria on Oct. 1, in part to reinforce its weakening ally, the government of President Bashar al Assad. Moscow's intent is to influence the Syrian conflict in a way that protects Russia's enduring interests in the region. Since Russia established a secure port location and military air base through which to transport personnel and materiel, mainstream media have responded to Moscow's entrance into the conflict with a flurry of reports and speculation. Stratfor has long been monitoring Russia's political and military involvement in the country.

A month before Russia's first airstrikes in Syria, using state-of-the-art satellite imagery, we were able to pinpoint Russian movements in the country, concluding that the presence of air assets would likely mean Russia's physical entry into the conflict. More important, Stratfor noted how Russia's direct presence would send geopolitical ripples not only through the Middle East but throughout the world as it forced major powers to react to the dramatic change in the region's status quo. In this chronology we lay out some core analyses that highlight recent developments in the Syrian civil war, a conflict that has been dramatically altered by a more assertive Russia.
Stratfor's Fourth-Quarter Forecast

    Oct. 13, 2015: At the start of 2015, Stratfor forecast that Russia, unnerved by the developing U.S.-Iran rapprochement and locked in a standoff with the United States, would promote itself as a mediator of the Syrian conflict as leverage in its broader negotiation with Washington. Wherever the United States floundered in the Middle East, Russia would position itself as the problem-solver in a bid to rebuild its credibility in the region and make itself indispensable to the United States. That forecast was updated in the third quarter to say that the Russian-led project to cobble together a transitional peace plan for Syria would gain momentum but would ultimately perish on the battlefield as rebel factions and their sponsors lacked both the incentive and the trust to negotiate and uphold a sustainable power-sharing arrangement. These forecasts effectively set the scene for the fourth quarter as multiple interests converge and compete on the future of Syria.

    With Russia providing critical reinforcement to loyalist forces in Syria, the regime's primary focus will be on filling out a statelet contoured against the stronghold of the ruling Alawite clan, a region that extends across the Hezbollah-dominated Bekaa Valley through Damascus and up the Homs-Hama corridor before anchoring on the Alawite coast. Under the claimed mandate of combatting terrorism, Russia and Iran will work together to help loyalist forces flush out rebel pockets along this corridor and repel encroaching rebels from Idlib in northeast Syria and Daraa, along the southwestern border with Jordan.

Russia Confronts the Gulf States on Syria

    Oct. 12. 2015: Press statements aside, this is obviously a tense time for Russia-Gulf relations. After all, Moscow is doubling down on its support for Iran's main allies in the Levant at a time when the Gulf Cooperation Council states are increasingly unimpressed with U.S. support for a rebel campaign designed — at least, from the Gulf Arab perspective — to push back against Iranian influence in the region. Russia understands perfectly that its actions in Syria will naturally compel the Gulf states to ramp up their own support for the rebels to even out the playing field. A discussion on parameters was thus in order.

Why Turkey Can't Sell a Syrian Safe Zone

    Oct. 7, 2015: But Russia is botching Turkey's plans. Russia, Turkey and NATO are still arguing over whether two alleged Russian violations of Turkish airspace near the Syrian border were intentional (as Turkey and NATO claim) or accidental (as Russia insists they were). Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said Tuesday that Russia was ready to form a working group and that it would be pleased to host Turkish Defense Ministry officials in Moscow to avoid further misunderstandings in Syria. Ankara has no choice but to interpret Russia's actions as a signal that Moscow is willing to interfere in a Turkish-led safe zone if Ankara tries to push ahead with its plans.

Europe Steps Into the Syria Crisis

    Oct. 2, 2015: Tensions have risen in the Middle East over the past two weeks as the United States and Russia have emerged with different ideas on solving the problems in Syria. But there is another heavyweight in this fight — a player with separate entanglements with both Russia and the United States and that could become influential in the region, though its primary concerns currently rest closer to home. That player is Europe.

In Syria, the U.S. Gives Up on Its Rebel Force

    Oct. 2, 2015: For now, the United States will be forced to react to unfolding events as it forms a new overarching strategy for Syria. Russia will drive events with its support of al Assad, and Washington will scramble to adjust to Russian moves even as it works with Moscow to deconflict its air campaign. Longer term, the United States sees a negotiated settlement to the conflict as its best option. But because of the myriad competing interests, an understanding between regional and global powers on Syria is still far off — and that assumes Syrian rebel groups would even accept such an agreement.

The Reasoning Behind Russia's Airstrikes in Syria

    Oct. 1, 2015: Global news media are buzzing with reports about Russia's first official airstrikes in Syria and the U.S. response to them. To understand the impact of these actions, however, we need to explore Russia's objectives in Syria rather than the airstrikes themselves. Russia's decision to go after rebels other than the Islamic State in its first foray was a bold message, but it was just one phrase in a much broader geopolitical communication between Russia and the rest of the world.

Explaining Russia's True Presence in Syria

    Sept. 25, 2015: Stratfor has been closely tracking the Russian buildup of military power at Bassel al Assad air base in Syria, charting the uptick of forces throughout September. Aside from the air assets and defensive ground capacity identified at the air base, reports indicate potential Russian activity at several other locations across the Syrian coastal region.

    Widely circulated satellite photography dated Sept. 13 revealed construction at the Istamo weapons storage facility and the appearance of tents at the al-Sanobar military facility south of Latakia. Though this led to conclusions of a possible Russian military presence at those facilities, more recent and detailed imagery provided by our partners at AllSource Analysis seems to contradict this assertion.

Russia Uses Syria to Influence Other Powers

    Sept. 21, 2015: Moscow continues to demonstrate a credible investment in the Syrian conflict by reinforcing its position in the country. Over the weekend, satellite imagery revealed new Russian aerial components arriving at Bassel al Assad air base near the Syrian city of Latakia. Footage from the Syrian front lines also revealed a significant number of Russian troops being directly embedded in units loyal to Damascus. This broadening Russian presence suggests that Moscow could be readying itself to provide close air support for Syrian units locked in open conflict against numerous rebel groups as well as the Islamic State.

Confirming Russia's Expanded Presence in Syria

    Sept. 10, 2015: The reinforcement of the airport shows that Moscow is preparing to deploy aerial assets to Syria, if it has not already done so. To sustain an overseas presence, Moscow must establish a sustained logistical connection and have forces in place to defend it. In this case, Russia is looking to establish an air bridge, with everything that entails. Stationing Russian aerial assets — such as fighter jets and attack helicopters — inside Syria is a clear escalation of Moscow's involvement in the country. Russia's previous involvement was limited to the transfer of equipment, spare parts and weaponry to the Syrian government and the provision of intelligence support.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/putin-wooing-americas-closest-syrian-allies-213317

[ppulatie]

US Intel analyst saying that the Russian aircraft was brought down by a bomb.

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/04/africa/russian-plane-crash-egypt-sinai/index.html

I have a question...........has anyone looked on You Tube to see if there is an offensive video posted that could be the blame for ISIS bringing it down?

[Crafty_Dog]

 

[ppulatie]

Here you go.............the reason...............

A pig tried to enter a Muslim Kosher Market.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnaOGDovr7k&feature=youtu.be

[ppulatie]

Okay, time to talk about the ISIS problem some more.

It is becoming more and more evident that ISIS or some other group brought down the Russian plane, likely by a bomb in the luggage area. If so, this suggests that ISIS is becoming more aggressive and could increase attacks in a variety of different scenarios, abroad especially, but here also. So let's add an assumption:

          ISIS has implanted its people in the illegal immigrants moving into Europe and they will be lying in wait to begin attacks on the populace.

Russia is going to increase their attacks on ISIS in Syria, but they will not go out of the area in all likelihood. They just don't have the forces to go further, and if they do, the US will probably try to restrict operations like we are doing in Turkey/Syria.

So what do we do?

I have been against getting involved due to the nature of any involvement. Our policies are so fractured and confused that any actions would probably do more harm than good. Additionally, our politicians and candidates only consider using air power which never wins a war, or else sending in limited numbers of troops which can have no real influence on the outcome.

To make matters worse, our military has been so beaten down by the last 15 years of warfare,  that the troops are worn out. The equipment is aged and outdated besides needing additional units put into service. And, Obama has worked to further downsize the military which makes it even more difficult to fight.  (This is in the manner of every war we have ever fought. Downsize the military and wait for the next crisis, then fight the last war over again, until we learn and do things right.) So it will take years to rebuild.

(Don't forget the Navy and Air Force in this either. We are down to about 325 ships. Air Force has seen all too many air wings deactivated. The A-10 is essentially retired. The F-35 appears to be a joke. Rather than spend hundreds of millions per plane, we could have updated and increased the A-10 and added Raptor units and been more effective.)

The Perfumed Princes in the Pentagon have been de-balled. They care only about advancement and nothing about what is right. They will not raise objections to stupid strategies, instead going along with the whims of the politicians.

Add to all of this is the unwillingness to use military force in the most effective manner. We want to fight "moral wars" without risk. Send a few drones over, maybe put into play special forces with limited rules of engagement, and primarily to train local forces to fight in place of our own forces. (We saw what that got us in Iraq. One shot fired and they all run, leaving their US equipment behind.)

The only way to win the upcoming war is Jacksonian Warfare. We have to pull out the stops and fight to win. This means breaking things and killing people. Not playing footsie and being nice.

So what is the solution?

[ppulatie]

Also, just breaking..........the guy stabbing the students at UC Merced.........his last name is Mohammed.

Go figure...........the religion of peace strikes again...............

[Crafty_Dog]

Pat articulates what is always the core question and his summary of the variables is quite close to mine. 

[ppulatie]

CD,

You have now confirmed that you are as delusional as I am........

[Crafty_Dog]

 Syria: The Limits of Foreign Military Support
Analysis
November 6, 2015 | 18:53 GMT Print
Text Size
(Stratfor)
Analysis

Editor's Note: Stratfor closely monitors conflict zones from a geopolitical perspective. What is perhaps the most volatile conflict today can be found in the territories of Iraq and Syria that are controlled by the Islamic State. Though these areas are cartographically distinct, they are functionally linked: Sunni tribal structures, rebel operations, Kurdish interests, external influences and the suzerainty of the Islamic State bind them together as a single, coherent theater.

The Islamic State capitalized on the chaos of the Syrian civil war and the inadequacy of Iraqi security forces to take over a large swath of the Middle East. After making some impressive gains, including the taking of the Iraqi city of Mosul, the Islamic State has lost some momentum, and an array of opponents have aligned against it. Nonetheless, the group is uniquely resilient and remains extremely dangerous and unpredictable.

In addition to examining the combatants inside the Syria-Iraq battlespace, Stratfor also tracks the political machinations, negotiations and goals of those outside the battlespace, including Iran, Russia, the Gulf monarchies and the United States. For the first time, in one place, Stratfor is providing routine updates covering the gains, losses and extent of the Islamic State's so-called caliphate.
Nov. 6
Syria

Rebels from the Free Syrian Army and from various Islamist groups recently defeated an offensive conducted by loyalist forces backed by Iran and Russia in Hama province. Rebels have since launched a counteroffensive, during which they seized important territory in the northern part of the province, including the town of Morek. In light of their losses, loyalists are now marshaling their forces in the city of Hama to repel further rebel advances.

The events in Hama province are revelatory, for they show the limits to Russian and Iranian support. Critical though that support may be, it is not robust enough to comprehensively turn the tide in the loyalists' favor. Russia is mostly providing air support and materiel, but it is not providing what the regime needs most: dependable manpower. Iran has helped to establish the National Defense Forces as an auxiliary force and has dispatched several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units and third-country militia forces, but even these cannot replace the tens of thousands of troops the regime has already lost.

It is little surprise, then, that the success of the loyalists has been uneven at best. They have pushed rebels back in places in southern Aleppo province, but they have been less successful in pushing them back in the provinces of Latakia and Homs. Clearly, the swift victory pro-government forces had hoped would accompany increased foreign backing is not in the offing.

The rebels' success in Hama will pressure Russia and Iran to commit even more forces to the conflict. Moscow and Tehran will probably give in to this pressure because even if outright victory is not possible, improving the lot of loyalist soldiers improves their bargaining positions if and when powers convene to negotiate a settlement. Indeed, Russia has already increased its presence in Syria from 2,000 personnel to 4,000. It has also established three forward operating bases beyond its airfield in Latakia, has sent additional surface-to-air missile systems, and has increasingly involved its own artillery units in support of the loyalists.

But therein lies the inherent danger of mission creep. Given how dim the prospects are for negotiating a settlement to the conflict, Russia and Iran could find themselves involved in a difficult war without a clear end in sight.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.funker530.com/direct-hit-mortar-round-lands-on-insurgent-during-interview/

[Crafty_Dog]

http://shoebat.com/2015/11/09/muslims-impose-new-law-on-christians-if-you-reject-islam-and-accept-christ-as-your-savior-we-will-force-your-children-to-worship-allah/

[Crafty_Dog]

Is It Iran's Middle East Now?
by Jonathan Spyer
Fathom
Autumn 2015
http://www.meforum.org/5622/iran-middle-east
 
 
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While Iran leads the best organised and most aggressive alliance in the Middle East, the built-in limitations of its methods and the sectarian nature of the conflicts in question will likely stymie Iranian domination of the region.

The Middle East is currently in the midst of widespread instability, civil strife and the collapse or contraction of state authority. Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Turkey, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Tunisia and Egypt have all experienced major instability over the last half decade. The first four of these areas have effectively ceased to exist as unitary states, and are now partitioned de facto between warring entities, organised according to ethnic, sectarian or tribal loyalty. The Palestinian territories too are divided into areas controlled by the Islamist Hamas movement in Gaza and the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank.

In this fractious landscape, powerful regional states are seeking to gain advantage, extend their own power, and diminish that of their rivals.

The collapse of states has in turn brought with it the decline of the national identities that supposedly underlay them, and the growth of sectarian identification as a political factor. The result is the emergence of Sunni-Shia conflict as a major overt presence in the Middle East. In Yemen, in Iraq, in Lebanon, and in a more complex way in Syria, Sunni-Shia rivalries form a central dynamic, which are also important in terms of the geo-strategic rivalries among major states competing in the Middle East.

State collapse has brought the decline of national identities and the growth of sectarianism.

Perhaps the single best organised and most aggressive alliance active currently in the Middle East is the bloc of states and movements gathered around the Islamic Republic of Iran. Motivated by clear strategic goals and by powerful ideological motivations, and with long experience of subversion particularly relevant to the current period of instability in the Middle East, Iran and its allies are powerful players in the regional contest.

Prior to the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear programme, signed on 14 July 2015, it had appeared that Iran might be approaching a point of overstretch. Tehran was committed to assist a large portfolio of clients engaged in conflict across the region, at a time when Tehran was itself subject to biting economic sanctions. The continued civil war in Syria and the opening of conflicts in Iraq and Yemen – in which the Iranians were heavily committed – seemed to introduce this possibility.

Sanctions relief bolsters Iran's capacity to assist armed clients across the region.

However, the conclusion of the nuclear agreement – and with it the prospect of release of impounded funds as part of sanctions relief – has immediate implications for the related subject of Iranian regional ambitions and outreach. The precise sum likely to become rapidly available to Iran following the signing of the agreement and sanctions relief remains unclear and disputed. Estimates range from $150 billion (the sum frequently quoted by opponents of the nuclear deal) to $56 billion (the likely sum according to US Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew).

But even if one assumes the lower estimate, and combines this with additional sums likely to become available to Iran because of renewed economic ties with the outside world as an element of sanctions relief, it may be concluded that the risk of overstretch, and a consequent inability on the part of Iran to sustain its regional commitments, has effectively disappeared as a result of the signing of the JCPOA.

As a result, Iran is well placed in the current period to continue its practice of supporting proxy political-military organisations in a variety of regional locations, in pursuit of Iranian strategic goals.

Iranian Ambitions in the Arab world

Iran is currently actively supporting proxies in major conflicts in the following areas: Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. In addition, there is evidence that Iranian agencies are active among Shia populations – as yet without major effect – in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Tehran also has a strategic relationship with (Sunni majority) Sudan.

Iranian aims

Iran's strategic goal is to emerge as the dominant power in the Middle East and, eventually, the entire Islamic world. It seeks to roll back US influence in the region and to work towards Israel's destruction.
 
Ali Younesi, a senior adviser to President Hassan Rouhani, sees Iran's role as "protecting the interests of all the people in the region – because they are all Iran's people."
At a conference on "Iran, Nationalism, History, and Culture" in Tehran in March 2015, Ali Younesi, a senior adviser on intelligence matters to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, outlined a clear vision for Iranian regional hegemony. Younesi described Iran's role as "protecting the interests of all the people in the region – because they are all Iran's people ... We must try to once again spread the banner of Islamic-Iranian unity and peace in the region. Iran must bear this responsibility, as it did in the past." He noted Iran's past as an empire, and spoke of a "greater Iran" which stretched from the borders of China to the Persian Gulf.

Younesi's statements are not, of course, a failsafe guide to policy. But the adviser's much noted speech is a fair summary up of the wide ambitions of Iran.

In practice, Iranian resources appear to be directed to realising this vision in two specific areas: firstly, the establishment of a contiguous line of pro-Iranian entities between the Iraq-Iran border and the Mediterranean Sea, and secondly, extending Iranian influence to the Arabic-speaking side of the Persian Gulf, and subverting the interests of Saudi Arabia in this area.
 
Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (right) with Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

The former goal has a number of motivating forces behind it. Firstly, there is an obvious strategic interest in reaching access to the Mediterranean, which has been a feature of Iranian and Persian state policy from antiquity.

Secondly, reaching Lebanon gives Tehran an entry point into the Israel-Arab conflict. The Iranians have invested heavily for over 30 years in their client Hezbollah in Lebanon. As non-Arabs and non-Sunni Muslims, the Iranians suffer from a 'legitimacy gap' in the mainly Sunni Muslim Arab Middle East. They seek to close this gap through commitment to the destruction of Israel, and in practical terms through the sponsorship of organisations engaged in war against the Jewish state. Access to Israel's borders is essential for this.

In addition, Iran has an interest in a weak or subordinated Iraq. The Iranian regime fought a bloody war against Iraq in the 1980s, which forms a core formative experience for the regime. To avoid any possible recurrence, Iran has an interest in ensuring a non-hostile Iraq through sponsorship of friendly political players in that country.
Iran's ballistic missiles and asymmetric conflict abilities offset its weak conventional ground and air forces.

With regard to the Gulf, Tehran sees Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council as rivals for power. Tehran lacks the conventional ground and air forces for projection of power beyond its borders. It seeks to overcome this disadvantage through the development of its ballistic missile programme, and through its efforts in asymmetric conflict.
While the Iranians may hope eventually to isolate Saudi Arabia and cause the Gulf states to abandon their links with the US and to instead come under Iranian protection, this moment is far away in terms of the current balance of power because of Iran's limited military capacities. At present, therefore, the Iranians aim to frustrate any Gulf or US ability to carry out operations in the Gulf or into Iranian territory through the building of a deterrent capacity.

The Iranian practice of harassing international shipping in the Straits of Hormuz and the investment in small boats, coastal defence and UAVs reflects this goal. Because of their limited conventional capabilities, the effective use of proxy warfare has high importance to the Iranians.

So to sum up, Iran's strategic goal is ultimately to build regional hegemony. In the short term its core goals include maintaining domination of the space between the Iran-Iraq border and the Mediterranean as well as deterring the US and intimidating the Gulf states.

These goals place Iran at loggerheads with those status quo states in the region, most importantly Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry, combined with the collapse of a number of regional states and the growing importance of sectarian identity as a marker of political loyalty, are producing a cross-border sectarian struggle, with Iranian clients lined up against clients of Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Qatar.

This sectarian element is important, because it represents a built-in limit to Iranian potential. As a Shia power, Iran finds it difficult to gain legitimacy among Sunni Arabs or to successfully develop proxies outside of Shia Arab populations, as becomes apparent when taking a closer look at Iran's main commitments in the region.

The pattern of Iranian success and failure

When assessing how things stand for Iran in the main countries in which it is engaged, an emergent pattern presents itself.

Syria

In Syria, Iran has been determined, since the outbreak of the uprising against the Assad dictatorship in March 2011, to preserve the dictator's rule. Iran and Syria have formal relations of military alliance dating back to 1982. Iranian financial assistance, mobilisation of regional proxies, help in military organisation and now direct provision of military personnel to Assad have been vital in preventing his downfall.
 
Members of the Iranian-backed Shia militia known as Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya in Damascus late last year.

Has the intervention into Syria been a success for Iran and its methods of outreach? Partially. Assad still controls Damascus. But he rules over only about 20 per cent of the entire territory of Syria. There are no prospects of the reconquest of the greater part of the areas lost any time soon. So Iran's efforts may have kept the dictator in his seat, but the result has not been a return to repressive stability, but rather the effective collapse and de facto partition of Syria, with Assad reduced to the status of a single warlord among others, rather than the ruler of a country.

It is noteworthy that despite Iranian assistance, the direction of the Syrian Civil War appeared to be turning decisively against Assad in the course of 2015. The intervention by Russia, beginning this past September derived to a degree from Russian perception that the current levels of support were not working and that if Assad was to be saved, a more direct involvement by Moscow was necessary. According to some reports, the Russian intervention was the direct result of a visit by Iranian Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani to Moscow in July 2015 in which he impressed on Russian officials the increasingly desperate predicament faced by Assad. If this was indeed the case, it is testimony to the limited efficacy of Iranian methods in the Syrian context.

Iraq

Iraq has a Shia Arab majority, and a traditionally pro-Iranian party (Dawa) is currently in power. Iranian assistance to the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in the form of the organising of the Shia militias in the Popular Mobilisation (Hashed al-Shaabi) played a vital role in stopping the Islamic State (IS) advance eastwards in the summer of 2014.
 
A poster of Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei at the entrance to an office of the Hashd al-Sha'abi (Popular Mobilization) in Baghdad. Photo by Jonathan Spyer.
The most powerful of the militias are political as well as military organisations. While these militias are officially administered by the Popular Mobilisation Committee, in reality the most powerful of them are directly linked to Iran. The Badr organisation, headed by Hadi al Ameri, and the Kataeb Hezbollah, led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, are the strongest of these groups. Both Ameri and al-Muhandis are veteran pro-Iranian Shia Islamist activists, with long and verifiable links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (the latter fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq war). Both are personally linked to the Quds Force and Qasem Soleimani.

The Shia militias, as both political and military organisations, are the key instrument for Iran in Iraq. Through them, the Iranians are able to directly impact the policymaking process in the country. Yet it is also the case that Iraq remains effectively divided into three component parts; the government controlled area in the south, the Islamic State territory in the centre, and the Kurdish north. Neither the Shia militias nor the Iraqi armed forces appear anywhere close to re-uniting the country, and it is difficult to see how they could do so, given their openly sectarian, Shia orientation.

So in the Iraqi context, Iranian influence is deep, but the result of it is the fragmentation of Iraq, and the Iranian domination of one part of it, rather than the emergence of a strong Iran-aligned unitary Iraqi state.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, the success of Iranian methods of outreach and subversion are most clearly showcased. Hezbollah is the prototype of an Iranian created and supported political-military group. Established by the Revolutionary Guards in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has, since 1990, been the only non-governmental organisation permitted to maintain an armed wing in Lebanon (with the exception of Palestinian groups permitted to carry arms within refugee camps). In 2006, Hezbollah launched a war on Israel without seeking the consent of the official government of the country. In 2008, it crushed an attempt to impose the authority of the central government over some of its activities.
 
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declared in a May 24 speech that his Lebanese Shia movement's fighters will deploy to "all the places in Syria that this battle requires."

Hezbollah has played a vital role in the Syrian civil war as an ally of Iran. Its personnel are taking an active part in the fighting. Iran and Hezbollah have also sought to take advantage of the chaos in Syria to establish an additional front for operations against Israel just east of the Quneitra Crossing (facing the Golan Heights). So far this has not been successful. Israeli pre-emptive action to prevent this has included the killing of a number of senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah personnel on 19 January 2015.

No challenge to Hezbollah's military power is on the horizon, though the entry of approximately one million Syrian Sunni refugees since 2011 has undermined the notion of an emergent Shia demographic majority that underlay and deepened the organisation's strength. There is evidence of efforts to organise among the Sunnis by both Jabat al-Nusra and IS.

There are no physical restrictions on Hezbollah's freedom of action. But at the same time, the notion of emergent open Hezbollah rule replacing the Lebanese state, and implementing the Iranian system of government in the country is far-fetched. Hezbollah has neither the need nor the possibility of imposing such rule. Iran has implanted a powerful military machine along the border with Israel, giving itself a direct entry to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the ability to intervene to help other allies in need (Hezbollah has also involved in supporting pro-Iranian groups in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories in recent years.) But even in Lebanon, the site of Iran's greatest success, if Iran was hoping to produce a similar Shia Islamic regime to its own, this appears neither imminent nor likely.

Yemen

In Yemen, the Iranian ally/client is the Ansar Allah organisation, more commonly known as the Houthis, after the name of the tribe that controls the organisation. The Houthis seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, in September 2014. The government of President Abd-al Rabbo Mansour Hadi was forced into exile in Saudi Arabia. The Houthis and their allies then began a march to the south, intending to seize the Gulf of Aden and unite the country under their control.

Saudi and Emirati assistance to Yemeni government forces seeking to prevent this outcome began on 26 March. Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain also joined the coalition against the Houthis. The Houthis, having failed to take Aden City, have now agreed to adhere to a seven point plan brokered by the UN at talks in Muscat, Oman. The plan includes a ceasefire and the return of the government to Sana'a. It is not yet clear if the planned ceasefire will be implemented. But again, we see the pattern of Iranian support resulting in division and renewed conflict, rather than outright victory for the Iranians.

Palestinians

Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad militants in training.

Iran maintains a strategic alliance of long standing with one Palestinian organisation – Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Islamic Jihad was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1981 by activists directly influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. PIJ has remained a supporter of Iran and beneficiary of Iranian aid and support ever since. Islamic Jihad, however, is a small organisation, with no serious ambitions for competing for the political leadership of the Palestinians. In the course of the 1990s, Iran sought to establish a strategic relationship with Hamas, largest and most powerful of Palestinian Islamist groups. This burgeoning relationship was disrupted, however, by the post-Arab Spring rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and then by the outbreak of civil war in Syria. Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood linked group, sought to distance itself from the Iran-aligned Syrian regime, which was engaged in crushing a largely Sunni Arab revolt. The movement transferred its headquarters from Damascus. At the same time, Hamas sought to draw closer to what looked then to be an emergent Muslim Brotherhood regional bloc, centred on Egypt and Qatar.

In the event, no such bloc emerged. But it led to estrangement between Hamas and Iran. As of today, a split pertains in Hamas regarding future relations with Iran, with some elements supporting a return to alignment with the Iranians and others favouring alignment with Qatar and an attempt to repair relations with Saudi Arabia.

During the period of the Second Intifada, the Iranians also maintained contacts with and support for armed elements within the rival Fatah movement. It is likely that these channels of communication and support still exist.

Conclusion

In all areas of Iranian regional "outreach," a common pattern exists. Iranian regional policy is characterised by the establishment and/or sponsorship of proxy political-military organisations. In every case noted, (with the partial exception of Lebanon) the result of the Iranian involvement is not Iranian strategic victory and the constitution of the state in question as an ally of Iran. Rather, Iranian outreach prevents the defeat and eclipse of the local Iranian ally, while ensuring division and continued conflict in the area in question.

This Iranian modus operandi – and its centrality in Iranian regional strategy – as well as the far reaching nature of Iranian goals as outlined above, mean the notion that a post JCPOA Iran can form a partner for stability in the region is deeply flawed, and will quickly be contradicted by the facts.

The export of chaos has the merit, perhaps, of keeping disorder far from Iran's own borders by ensuring that rivals to Tehran are kept busy engaged in proxy conflicts elsewhere. However, it is difficult to see how it can result in regional hegemony and leadership.

This Iranian penchant for fomenting chaos also places them on a different trajectory than the Russians. This is important, because the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war from September 2015 on has been characterised in some quarters as the birth of a new strategic alliance between Tehran and Moscow. Ibrahim Amin, editor of the pro-Hezbollah al-Akhbar newspaper, happily called this supposed new bloc the "4 + 1" alliance (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russia and Hezbollah).

Iran can be a spoiler, but not the founder, of a new Middle Eastern order.

But Russia has no interest in strategic support for Islamist proxies in the Middle East. Rather, it seeks powerful state allies, without particular concern as to their internal electoral arrangements or ideological proclivities. The Iranian model of creation and support of proxy Shia Islamist forces contrasts with Russia's desire for powerful, centralised forces with which it can do business. This means that Russia and Iran have different and even opposed regional orientations, even if there is currently an overlap with regard to the Assad regime in Syria.

As a result of the JCPOA, Iran is likely to increase its support for its portfolio of proxy organisations across the region. The net effect of this will be to increase regional disorder and foment continued conflict. However, because of the built in limitations of Iranian methods and because of the sectarian nature of the conflicts in question (which means Iran finds it very difficult or impossible to pursue really lasting alliances with non-Shia Arab clients), it is unlikely that this will result in the attainment by Iran of its strategic goal of regional leadership/hegemony. Iran is a spoiler par excellence. But despite its ambitions and pretensions, it does not look like the founder of a new Middle Eastern order.

Jonathan Spyer is director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

[Crafty_Dog]

Kurdish officials, with U.S. help, have launched an offensive against ISIS in Iraq, The A.P. said

Wednesday, November 11, 2015 11:55 PM EST

Backed by American air power, Kurdish officials early Thursday morning announced the start of a ground offensive to retake the western Iraqi town of Sinjar from Islamic State fighters and cut a major jihadist supply line between Syria and the Iraqi city of Mosul, The Associated Press reported.
The plan called for American airstrikes to open the campaign. Meanwhile, thousands of Kurdish pesh merga fighters, joined by Yazidi forces, prepared to sweep down from Mount Sinjar and attack fighters for the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, on multiple fronts.

[DougMacG]

Rubio went onto Fox and announced his plans for dealing with ISIS.

Bomb the training camps in Syria and also put in Spec Ops to assist. Doing this would make people reluctant to join ISIS.  (Isn't this exactly what Russia is doing right now in Syria?)

I would assume that at the highest levels of our government they have no idea what Russia is up to in Syria.

[G M]

Rubio went onto Fox and announced his plans for dealing with ISIS.

Bomb the training camps in Syria and also put in Spec Ops to assist. Doing this would make people reluctant to join ISIS.  (Isn't this exactly what Russia is doing right now in Syria?)

I would assume that at the highest levels of our government they have no idea what Russia is up to in Syria.

I'd venture that's a safe guess.

[DougMacG]

My plan to fight ISIS.
1: Order all borders and landmarks on emergency alert, US and all allies.
2. Commence the tracking and enforcing of all visa over-stays in US, and all allies who want our support.
3. Use NSA info and intelligence resources to track all social media celebrations worldwide of the Paris attacks. Surveil, deport, arrest, attack all identified terror sympathizers around the world - wherever justification exists.
4. Take out the nuclear facilities in North Korea all in one wave.  (In part, to send a signal to ISIS.)
5.  Within 2 days, strike all known nuclear facilities in Iran.  Also, in part, to send a signal.  The timing is important.  No delay.
6. Announce congressional declaration of war against ISIS worldwide while attacking ISIS holdings in Iraq, coming in from at least 3 fronts, with the ground support of at least 5 gulf states, France, Britain and hopefully 70 other countries.  Timing again is important, right as they are stilling watching coverage of the 2 previous attacks.  Make the Iraq operation as short and decisive as possible.
7. Launch the Syrian phase using intelligence acquired and the same coalition force.
8.  Reassign all UN employees and contractors and academics around the world currently working on global warming to working refugee shelters in the recaptured territories of Iraq and Syria.
9. Announce the expansion of Guantanamo and construction of additional detention facilities in the recaptured territories.  (Have Trump build them.)
10. Exit the region leaving sufficient residual force.  Defend the homeland.  Build ships, missiles, drones etc. - preparedness for the next round.  Pay for the operation with captured oil revenues and contributions billed to coalition partners.

[G M]

My plan to fight ISIS.
1: Order all borders and landmarks on emergency alert, US and all allies.
2. Commence the tracking and enforcing of all visa over-stays in US, and all allies who want our support.
3. Use NSA info and intelligence resources to track all social media celebrations worldwide of the Paris attacks. Surveil, deport, arrest, attack all identified terror sympathizers around the world - wherever justification exists.
4. Take out the nuclear facilities in North Korea all in one wave.  (In part, to send a signal to ISIS.)
5.  Within 2 days, strike all known nuclear facilities in Iran.  Also, in part, to send a signal.  The timing is important.  No delay.
6. Announce congressional declaration of war against ISIS worldwide while attacking ISIS holdings in Iraq, coming in from at least 3 fronts, with the ground support of at least 5 gulf states, France, Britain and hopefully 70 other countries.  Timing again is important, right as they are stilling watching coverage of the 2 previous attacks.  Make the Iraq operation as short and decisive as possible.
7. Launch the Syrian phase using intelligence acquired and the same coalition force.
8.  Reassign all UN employees and contractors and academics around the world currently working on global warming to working refugee shelters in the recaptured territories of Iraq and Syria.
9. Announce the expansion of Guantanamo and construction of additional detention facilities in the recaptured territories.  (Have Trump build them.)
10. Exit the region leaving sufficient residual force.  Defend the homeland.  Build ships, missiles, drones etc. - preparedness for the next round.  Pay for the operation with captured oil revenues and contributions billed to coalition partners.

I like it.

[DougMacG]

This NY Times article has a pretty good map marking major events relating to ISIS around the world.

Looks like "we have them contained"    - to planet earth.

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Recall if you will the prophetic warning issued by George W. Bush in July 2007: "To begin withdrawing from Iraq ... will be dangerous for Iraq, for the region and for the United States. It will mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al-Qa'ida. It means that we would be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It will mean we would allow terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they had in Afghanistan. It will mean that American troops will have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous."

[DougMacG]

Obama under fire for saying that ISIS has been 'contained' just hours before Paris attack as he heads to Turkey for G-20 Summit
In an interview with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos on Thursday, Obama said he didn't believe ISIS was gaining strength
The interview aired just hours before ISIS claimed responsibility for the horrific attack in Paris that killed 128 people on Friday
Several social media users, including Donald Trump, have criticized Obama
ISIS has grown during the Obama administration from a group he once called al Qaeda's 'JV team' to the force it is today
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3318751/Obama-fire-saying-ISIS-contained-hours-Paris-attack-heads-Turkey-G-20-Summit.html#ixzz3rgu2qXMz

[ccp]

"Obama under fire for saying that ISIS has been 'contained' just hours before Paris attack as he heads to Turkey for G-20 Summit"

I haven't heard any of the MSM sources give him what he deserves on this.   Never mentioned.

Did I miss something?

 

[DougMacG]

"Obama under fire for saying that ISIS has been 'contained' just hours before Paris attack as he heads to Turkey for G-20 Summit"

I haven't heard any of the MSM sources give him what he deserves on this.   Never mentioned.

Did I miss something?

ISIS is contained and global warming is the biggest national security threat we face.  I know smart, successful people who can't believe he has said these things.  Not everyone reads the forum!

[DougMacG]

Isn't 'disproportionate response' what Israel is always accused of doing?  Count the UN resolutions condemning them. 

Meanwhile:  https://www.rt.com/news/322211-france-airstrike-isis-raqqa/
French jets drop 20 bombs in massive anti-ISIS raid in Syria
http://abcnews.go.com/International/french-jets-bomb-syria-police-launched-international-manhunt/story?id=35215091
French Jets Bomb ISIS Targets in Syria After Police Launch Manhunt for 'Dangerous' Suspect

To be clear, I favor disproportionate response as an attempt to deter these kinds of attacks.  Just wondering about double standards.

[DougMacG]

AFTER PARIS
How to Beat ISIS: The President Is Partly Right
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/16/how-to-beat-isis-the-president-is-partly-right/

To cut the flow of recruits and funds to ISIS, we must make ISIS look unattractive and weak—drab. This is what we have to teach our enemies and those tempted to join them: disenchantment.

In a contentious press conference, President Obama vowed to stay the course regarding his ISIS policy in the wake of the Paris attacks. The AP reports:

President Barack Obama on Monday conceded that the Paris terror attacks were a “terrible and sickening setback” in the fight against the Islamic State, but forcefully dismissed critics who have called for the U.S. to change or expand its military campaign against the extremists.

“The strategy that we are putting forward is the strategy that is ultimately is going to work,” Obama said during a news conference at the close of two days of talks with world leaders. “It’s going to take time.”

Both in the United States and abroad, the reaction to the President’s statement has been largely negative. There is a very widespread view that President Obama’s own dilatory leadership style and his refusal to engage seriously in Syria gave ISIS the room it needed to take root and grow. It’s likely that future historians will agree; this president is unlikely to be hailed as a strategic genius by anybody not on his payroll.

Nevertheless, it’s worth noting that President Obama isn’t just blowing smoke when he talks about successes against ISIS. In particular, the strategy of helping the Kurds push ISIS back has led to significant progress on the ground. Just last week, the Kurds cleared ISIS out of Sinjar, and as a result of its military setbacks, ISIS has less access to fresh supplies and recruits coming through Turkey.

This matters. Groups like ISIS depend on two power sources. One is the radical jihadi ideology that now circulates widely among discontented Muslims and rootless young people in the Middle East and elsewhere. The other is the sense of victory and drama. ISIS needs to create wins and excitement to lure new recruits and keep its current fighters loyal and inspired.

The self-styled caliphate isn’t a major military power and has only been able to acquire and hold territory because of state breakdown in Iraq and Syria. For the last few years, ISIS has been following a successful formula: Rapid military gains on the ground led to a huge international profile, which in turn attracted jihadis from all around the globe and established the organization as the new leader of radical Islam. ISIS advertises its success with the pornography of jihad: bloody executions posted on the web, widespread announcements that it is selling captured girls in slave markets, massacres of the “heathen.”

The goal of the terrorists has always been to escape the drab realities of ordinary history and events, to create a kind of magical space—a return to the 7th century, the age of the Prophet, of miracles and legends. Joining the group offered a real life version of a video game.

The problem the jihadis are now facing is that while it is easy to create this kind of illusion in the short term, it is very hard to make it work over the long run. History grinds that kind of illusion down and drags those who tried to sustain it back into the world of real forces, real obstacles, real (as Clausewitz would say) friction.
We’ve seen this before. After 9/11, the great and dramatic attack created a legend, but then al-Qaeda was dragged down, and dogged by its adversaries. The group managed to survive the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, but, despite that, this attrition little-by-little (and sometimes big step-by-big step) damaged the brand. ISIS represented a new approach, and its victorious march across Syria and Iraq electrified the jihadi universe. But now ISIS, too, is beginning to sag.

On the ground these days, ISIS is engaged in a war of inches that will likely test its capacity to the limits, like its (lack of) ability to manage and operate supply lines, for example. The poor training and quality of its fighters will also now matter more. And the absence of dramatic victories, indeed the reality of setbacks and retreats, will reduce the enthusiasm and undercut the morale of current fighters, to say nothing of the impact on potential recruits.
This may be one reason why ISIS has apparently shifted to prioritize attacks like the Paris horror. It likely needs the acts of drama and violence to replace the revolutionary theater that its military advances once gave it. Running wild through the streets, gunning down the crowds in a night club: This is fantasy violence, video games brought into the real world. ISIS is again the coolest of jihadi brands, the cutting edge of the war against the real. The intent is not so much to terrorize the West as to galvanize the faithful.

Understanding ISIS’ methods can help us counter its aims. One key for us: to step up the grim war of attrition against ISIS on the ground. Life for the average ISIS fighter has to become a miserable affair of holing up, getting shot, running out of food, and putting up with bad medical care and low supplies even as the higher-ups live it up in the ruins of Raqqa. That word needs to filter out across the jihadi grapevine. To cut the flow of recruits and funds to ISIS, we must make ISIS look unattractive and weak—drab. If at the same time we work aggressively to reduce its ability to repeat the Paris attacks, ISIS will continue to fade.

This is a way to weaken ISIS, but it won’t solve the problem of jihadi violence. The cultural fugue of the Islamic world will continue to generate new disorders, new radicalisms, new waves of hate and murder. And the stories of the glory days of the Caliphate and legends of ISIS will continue to resonate and inspire new waves of jihad, just as the legend of al-Qaeda did before it.

But defeat hurts—and the more we keep whacking moles, the more discouraged the other moles will be. So the defeat of “terrorism” is a long way off. But the defeat of individual terrorist groups and forms of jihadi ideology, while short of a complete solution to the problem, is good in and of itself, and it contributes to the long term solution: the definitive disillusionment of potential radicals.

This is what we have to teach our enemies and those tempted to join them: disenchantment. There is no magic road back to the 7th century triumphs of Islam. That door is closed. The Islamic world, like the rest of us, must live in the real world of the 21st century.

So President Obama is partly right. The American partnership with the Kurds has inflicted real damage on ISIS. But he’s wrong if he thinks what we have done is enough, or that a few incremental shipments of ammo and MREs will do the trick. The battle against ISIS is one campaign in a long and brutal war. The bloodiest battles and the greatest dangers may still lie ahead.

[Crafty_Dog]

 Searching for a Syrian Solution
Analysis
November 17, 2015 | 09:15 GMT Print
Text Size
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (L), U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura (C) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (R) address the media after the International Syria Support Group meeting in Vienna, Austria, on Nov. 14. (VLADIMIR SIMICEK/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary

In a notable breakthrough in negotiations over the weekend, the International Syria Support Group agreed during a meeting in Vienna to convene Syrian government and opposition representatives on Jan. 1, 2016, in formal negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. The support group, made up of virtually every direct and indirect foreign state participant in the Syrian civil war, has aspired to find a solution to the destabilizing Syrian civil war, and progress has increasingly appeared to be within reach. However, serious obstacles remain that could rapidly undermine any gains the group hopes to accomplish going forward.
Analysis

The current timeline for the peace plan agreed to by the International Syria Support Group is as follows: By Dec. 14, the group will reconvene to review progress so that the United Nations can seek to convene Syrian government and opposition groups in formal negotiations by Jan. 1, 2016. By May 14, 2016, a cease-fire between Syrian government and opposition groups will come into force, allowing the process for drafting a new constitution to begin. Finally, by May 14, 2017, U.N.-administered free elections will be held under the new constitution, ushering in a new government and, hopefully, bringing an end to fighting in the country.

The International Syria Support Group's aim is to get the foreign state participants in the Syrian conflict to reach an agreement on a solution to the country's civil war that would then be presented to the Syrians. The Washington Post reported that to facilitate the cease-fire, actors in the International Syria Support Group will stop all support and supplies to "various belligerents" on both sides once negotiations are underway.

Despite the latest initiative's ambitious goals, it is still unlikely that the plan will result in an effective end to the conflict. The following issues will prevent further progress in finding a solution:
Syrian Participation

The fact that no Syrian group from either the loyalist or rebel side was included in the negotiations points to the stark divisions that will plague the peace process. This was deliberate: The United States and other negotiating partners wanted to minimize friction during the talks so that the international group of negotiating powers could present a unified message to the key players in Syria.

However, the fact remains that while it will be difficult for the foreign powers to reach a consensus, it will be even harder for the warring parties on the ground in Syria. There are simply too many armed forces of varying ideologies and motivations driving the conflict.

The Opposition Picture

One of the principle difficulties in reaching an agreement, even at this early stage, is agreeing on which rebel groups should lead — let alone be included as representatives of — the opposition in the talks, if and when the talks take place. Even powers that support the rebels have significantly differing opinions. The United States, for instance, has long sought to mainly include the Free Syrian Army. However, it was recently reported that the United States, under pressure from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, also conceded to accepting Ahrar al-Sham as a core opposition group.

The Kurdish question is another unresolved issue that does not appear to have been addressed in the latest meeting or subsequent agreement. Turkey will undoubtedly be wary of any significant role given to the Syrian Kurds in upcoming negotiations, while the Kurds are sure to push for greater autonomy, conflicting with both the wider rebel and loyalist positions.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle, however, is the sheer number of armed rebel organizations in the civil war. Hundreds of groups, from the very small to the very powerful, such as the Army of Islam, Ahrar al-Sham and the wider Free Syrian Army, are fighting in Syria. Reaching a consensus on a rebel negotiating position when the rebels themselves can only really agree on the need for President Bashar al Assad's downfall could critically undermine the negotiation process.

Terrorist List

Even with a negotiated agreement between rebel groups and Damascus, the Syrian civil war would not completely stop because two major terrorist groups — the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra — would remain. The Islamic State is an uncontroversial issue since virtually all armed forces in Syria are the Islamic State's enemies. The group's attacks in Paris have also made an end to the Syrian crisis even more desirable, though the issue always had some measure of urgency. But the inclusion of Jabhat al-Nusra and similar groups on the terrorist list would considerably complicate the situation and threatens to unravel any potential agreement.

Several rebel groups including Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham and the largely secular Free Syrian Army have operated and continue to operate closely with Jabhat al-Nusra. Convincing these rebel groups to disentangle themselves from their alliances with Jabhat al-Nusra, whether those alliances are ideological or out of convenience, will be difficult. It would be even more challenging to convince the same rebel groups to stop fighting the loyalist forces and turn their guns on Jabhat al-Nusra.

At the same time, continued strikes on Jabhat al-Nusra in such a narrow and clearly saturated battlefield could also rapidly undermine the negotiation process as other rebel groups are damaged. The Russians have previously struck Free Syrian Army allies of Jabhat al-Nusra, essentially arguing that they operate together and are therefore the same. The Russians will be keen to maximize the number of rebel groups on the terrorist list, likely forcing certain rebel factions into breaking from any negotiation process altogether.

Finally, Jabhat al-Nusra is hardly the only extremist group within the rebel landscape beyond the Islamic State. Jihadist groups such as Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jund al-Aqsa maintain similar or even more extreme ideological positions. These groups will be especially opposed to a cease-fire pushed from abroad and will likely continue operations even as loyalist and rebel factions seek peace. 
Ending Support

Any effort to force belligerents in the conflict to agree to a cease-fire by withdrawing supplies and support will be complicated by the fact that many of the International Syria Support Group members are themselves active participants in the conflict. Iran and Russia are present on the ground in a fighting capacity, while the United States is increasingly inserting itself into the conflict in support of its Syrian Democratic Forces allies. These nations, as well as others such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, could claim that support given to their respective proxies is meant to combat the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, rather than other loyalist or rebel forces. All sides will have an incentive to ensure their own preferred groups are better advantaged if and when they reach the negotiating table, making it extremely difficult to halt the flow of all supplies in practice.

Moreover, the International Syrian Support Group process deliberately omitted the question of the Syrian president's future in its most recent meeting. The group's members readily admit that al Assad's position is a polarizing issue, and many fear that raising the issue would undermine progress before it even begins. However, this only highlights the disputes that have yet to be settled in the process.

Ultimately, Russia and Iran are not entirely committed to ensuring al Assad's personal leadership of Syria as long as their interests are met, but stepping in to convince al Assad to leave power — let alone successfully doing so — is a step both Tehran and Moscow would only take when they are truly confortable with the talks' progress. But at this stage, the obstacles that still lie ahead make getting there as distant a prospect as ever.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/11/18/u-s-drones-have-been-striking-islamic-state-members-planning-attacks-in-america/

[Crafty_Dog]

Generally, most of us here have sneered at Lindsay Graham, but what say we now about his recommended strategy in light of the current situation and trajectory?
 

[DougMacG]

Generally, most of us here have sneered at Lindsay Graham, but what say we now about his recommended strategy in light of the current situation and trajectory?

Not sure to what you refer:

This?  Or please post details.   
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lindsey-graham-obama-isis_564cd871e4b00b7997f8c0df
Lindsey Graham Backs Obama's Call For War Powers Against ISIS
Senator proposes granting the White House sweeping authority to attack the terror group anywhere
-------------------------------

Yes, Republicans should pass enabling legislation - as if we did have a commander in chief.

Lindsey Graham is a hawk, very strong on foreign policy and homeland security.  If that were the only issue, he would be among the best.  (He is also very strong at prosecuting the case against Hillary Clinton and the email and Benghazi mess.)  He is a slow learner on some other issues...

[Crafty_Dog]

Fair enough!

Allow me to clarify:  For quite a while now he has been advocating a coalition, led by the US (approx 10% US troops) of US, Jordan, Egypt, and IIRC Turkey and Saudi Arabia too to go in and take out ISIS (Assad too, but that was pre-Russia)

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. Eyes Russia-Iran Split in Bid to End Syria Conflict
Washington’s Middle East allies aim to coax Putin to support limits on Tehran-backed Assad’s time in power
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on Oct. 20 arrived for a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow. Photo: Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin/Associated Press
By Jay Solomon
Updated Nov. 19, 2015 12:59 p.m. ET
WSJ

WASHINGTON—The Obama administration and European and Arab allies are seeking to peel Russia away from its alliance with Iran, a partnership that has bolstered Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, said senior diplomats involved in efforts to end Syria’s lengthy conflict.

The efforts, which have unfolded quietly through meetings involving Russian President Vladimir Putin and Middle Eastern leaders, are meant to coax support from Moscow for a limit on Mr. Assad’s time in power. Such a step would solidify an emerging international coalition and help clear the way for a more concerted military effort to counter Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Iran is seen as a brake on those efforts because of its more staunchly pro-Assad position, which it wants the Kremlin to support. If Russia holds fast to Iran and Mr. Assad, it would undermine hopes for an international consensus.

A senior U.S. official on Tuesday said Washington has seen “increased tensions between Russia and Iran over the question of the future of Syria.”

U.S. and European officials also said they believe Iran’s elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has withdrawn some troops from Syria in recent weeks, because of a strain on its resources. The IRGC has ramped up its military presence in Syria since September, in coordination with Russia’s airstrikes on rebel militias. A number of senior IRGC officers have been killed in Syria in recent months.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, met with Iran's President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September. ENLARGE
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, met with Iran's President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September. Photo: Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin/Reuters

Mr. Putin has held discussions in recent weeks with leaders from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, and has indicated Moscow would seek to limit Iran’s influence inside Syria as part of any negotiated settlement to the conflict, the senior diplomats said.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, has lobbied the Kremlin against supporting Mr. Assad in the long term and empowering Iran, his closest regional ally, said Arab officials.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, held talks with Mr. Putin in Moscow that focused on denying Iran and the Lebanese militia, Hezbollah, the ability to use Syrian territory to launch attacks on Israel.
Related

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French President François Hollande wants a new international coalition led by his country, the U.S. and Russia to combat Islamic State, which is suspected in last week’s attacks in Paris and the downing of a Russian airliner over Egypt in October.

However, Mr. Hollande, like U.S. President Barack Obama, has long held that Mr. Assad is a chief source of the Syrian crisis and must be removed from office before Syria’s woes can be addressed. Moscow and Tehran are longtime Assad supporters.

Russia offered a resolution before the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday designed to provide international support for efforts to counter Islamic State. France also is expected to offer a resolution, and diplomats said that Security Council members are seeking unity on Syria.
Residents were evacuated on Wednesday in Saint-Denis, near Paris, after a police raid on a terrorist hideout left two people dead. ENLARGE
Residents were evacuated on Wednesday in Saint-Denis, near Paris, after a police raid on a terrorist hideout left two people dead. Photo: Peter Dejong/Associated Press

The resolution from Russia defines terrorist groups in Syria in broad terms while still targeting the Islamic State extremist group. The French text will focus more tightly on Islamic State. François Delattre, France’s ambassador to the U.N., said that France and Russia would work on their respective resolutions but it remained unclear whether the resolutions eventually would be merged or remain separate. Tensions could surface among Council members if one resolution was rejected in favor of the other.

U.S., European and Arab officials said they remain cautious about Mr. Putin’s willingness to distance Russia from Iran and Mr. Assad. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Tuesday repeated his government’s official stance that no preconditions be set on the Syrian dictator’s departure as part of the negotiations aimed at ending the Syrian conflict.

Still, the growth of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and its suspected role in the recent terror attacks, has intensified calls in Washington and Europe for a unified position with Russia.

Iran offered no indication during recent talks in Vienna on Syria that it was willing to pressure Mr. Assad to leave office. But U.S. and European officials said they are more optimistic that the Kremlin will show flexibility on the Syrian leader’s tenure as the diplomacy continues.

New talks are scheduled for December, and the U.S. and Russia said they would push for a formal cease-fire between Mr. Assad’s forces and his political opponents—but not Islamic State.

“A lot will depend on where the Russians go according to their own interests,” said a European official involved in the Syria diplomacy.

Arab states have made clear to Mr. Putin that their support for the cease-fire was conditional on a time frame being set for Mr. Assad’s departure, the European official added. “They will not do that at all unless there is a clear sign of a political transition” in Damascus, said the official.

Mr. Putin held separate discussions with leaders of Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on Oct. 11 to discuss Syria, said officials briefed on the diplomacy. Included in the meetings were the crown prince of the U.A.E, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and the deputy crown prince and defense minister of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman.

The meetings happened weeks after Russia and Iran launched joint military operations in Syria to aid Mr. Assad against an advancing insurgency that includes Islamic State and rebel militias supported by the U.S. and its allies. Saudi officials publicly warned Moscow after its intervention that Moscow could face rising opposition from Sunni Muslim states because of the Kremlin’s alliance with Shiite-dominated Iran and Mr. Assad.

Sunni Arab leaders have warned Russia that its military intervention in Syria has allied it with Shiite Iran, Mr. Assad’s Alawite sect and Christians against the region’s Sunni majority.

Mr. Putin, however, surprised his royal guests by stressing Russia would seek to diminish Iran’s role inside Syria as part of the campaign, said the officials briefed on the talks. The Russian leader specifically that said if the Arab states supported him he would help them in their efforts to contain Tehran.

Russian officials didn’t respond to requests for comment about the discussions.

Mr. Putin met Mr. Netanyahu weeks earlier in Moscow in a bid to make sure that the Russian and Israeli militaries wouldn’t mistakenly target each other inside Syria. But Mr. Putin conveyed a similar message to the Israeli leader—that Russia’s role in Syria could serve to constrict Iran’s and Hezbollah’s operations.

Last week, Mr. Netanyahu voiced confidence during a trip to Washington that Russia and Israel were now largely on the same page with respect to Israel’s interests in Syria. “If Iran wants to establish a second front along the Golan Heights as it’s established in southern Lebanon, we’ll take forceful action, as we have,” he said then.

Historically, Russia and Iran have been strategic rivals. Czarist Russia conquered territories controlled by the Persian Empire in the Caucuses and modern day Azerbaijan during wars fought during the early 1800s.

Moscow helped Iran build its Bushehr nuclear power plant after the 1979 Islamic revolution, but later cooperated with the U.S. to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. Former President Dmitry Medvedev backed United Nations sanctions on Iran that sought to force Tehran to stop producing nuclear fuel.

However, Mr. Putin, since reclaiming the presidency in 2012, deepened military and economic cooperation with Tehran. Moscow recently said it would complete the sale of a sophisticated antimissile system to Tehran. And the two countries have closely coordinated over the past year in defending Mr. Assad.

Still, U.S. and European officials said they believed Iran is concerned that Russia’s growing military presence in Syria could minimize Tehran’s influence in Damascus. And they said these divisions between Moscow and Tehran may become more pronounced as the negotiations continue.

“We think there are some tensions between the Russians and the Iranians,” U.K. Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond said last week.

—Farnaz Fassihi contributed to this article

[DougMacG]

Gallup: 64% Disapproved of Obama’s Handling of ISIS—Before Paris Attacks
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/gallup-64-disapproved-obamas-handling-isis-poll-taken-nov-4-8-paris

[Crafty_Dog]

Just noticed this thread has gone over 100,000 reads 

=================================

By Scott Stewart

Earlier this month I wrote an analysis asserting that time is working against the Islamic State. I argued that the factors responsible for the Islamic State's stunning rise in popularity last year — the group's territorial gains, its successes against authorities and its propaganda — are starting to wear out. Much of the group's appeal lies in its portrayal of itself as an agent of apocalyptic Islamic prophecy, and as time passes without the prophecies coming true, people will become increasingly disillusioned.

Since that analysis was published, it has come to light that the Islamic State's Wilayat Sinai was responsible for the Oct. 31 bombing of Metrojet Flight 9268. Meanwhile, the Islamic State also claimed responsibility for the Nov. 13 Paris attacks. In the wake of these incidents, many people are asking me, "How can the Islamic State be weakening when they are conducting spectacular terrorist attacks?" So I thought it would be a good time to discuss where terrorism fits within the spectrum of militancy and how a weakening militant organization can still effectively employ terrorism, even as its capabilities to wage conventional and guerrilla warfare diminish.

Tool of the Weak

For the most part, terrorism historically has been employed by weak militant organizations against militarily stronger opponents. (There are, of course, exceptions to this.) Many revolutionary theories hold that terrorism is the first step toward launching a wider insurgency and eventually toppling a government. Marxist, Maoist and focoist militant groups have often sought to use terrorism as the beginning phase of an armed struggle. In some ways, al Qaeda and its spinoff, the Islamic State, have also followed a type of focoist vanguard strategy. They attempt to use terrorism to shape public opinion and raise popular support for their cause, expecting to enhance their strength enough to wage an insurgency and later, conventional warfare, to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate.

Terrorism can also be used to supplement an insurgency or conventional warfare. In such cases, it is employed to keep the enemy off-balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. Such attacks are intended to force the enemy to divert security forces to guard these vulnerable targets. The Afghan Taliban employs terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State. But the goal of most militant organizations that employ terrorism is to progress beyond it and pursue larger, more complex forms of military action. Most revolutionaries do not believe they can overthrow a regime with terrorism alone.

Despite its limited use in overthrowing a government, terrorism is a very economical tool. It takes far less manpower and fewer weapons to conduct a terrorist attack than it does to wage guerilla or conventional warfare. In fact, the manpower and ammunition required for one large guerrilla warfare battle could be enough to support many terrorist attacks.

Organizations that are no longer capable of conventional warfare will often shift to fighting a less resource-intensive, hit-and-run insurgency as a means to continue fighting. Likewise, militant groups who have taken losses on the battlefield often shift from insurgency to terrorism in an effort to remain relevant and continue striking their opponents while conserving resources and attempting to rebuild, with the goal of someday returning to larger-scale military efforts.
Shifting to Terrorism

For many years now, Somalia's al Shabaab has served as a prime example of an organization moving up and down the militancy spectrum. It has switched back and forth between holding and governing areas, waging an insurgency and launching terrorist attacks. Of course, al Shabaab also often used terrorist attacks to supplement its insurgency campaign.

But as outside forces from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya invaded Somalia and removed al Shabaab from Mogadishu and then Kismayo, the group also shifted the focus of its terrorist attacks: Instead of purely internal offensives, it began to launch more externally focused attacks in places like Uganda and Kenya. Still, despite lashing out against Uganda and Kenya, al Shabaab continues to be hard-pressed inside Somalia, and it has not been able to maintain a high tempo of attacks outside the country.

The Islamic State's Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi (better known by its former name, Boko Haram) has also shifted from holding and governing territory to insurgency and terrorism. As noted in a previous analysis, the group's use of suicide attackers has increased dramatically this year as it has lost control of areas it had previously taken over in northeastern Nigeria. Unlike other jihadist groups, a very high percentage of Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi's suicide bombers are female; in 2015 alone, they employed more female suicide bombers than any group in history. In fact, Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi has employed more than twice as many female suicide bombers so far this year as its total number of bombers (26) in 2014.

Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi also lashed out with suicide bombings in Chad, Cameroon and Niger, countries that are supporting Nigeria's fight against the jihadist group. Yet despite this rapid escalation of suicide bombings (the group has conducted well over 100 this year), and their spread to neighboring countries, there is no doubt that the group is considerably weaker now than it was in 2013, when it didn't conduct any suicide bombings, or in 2014, when it conducted only 26 suicide bombings. In other words, the number of terrorist attacks a militant organization launches is not necessarily an accurate gauge of its strength.

The same holds true for the Islamic State's core organization. It is still unclear exactly what the connection was between the Paris attackers and the Islamic State core, but even if the core leadership planned, funded and directed the attack, the Islamic State's ability to hit soft targets in Paris does not mean that it is getting stronger. Indeed, the Paris attack is merely the latest of several Islamic State plots that have emerged in Europe over the past year. The difference is that officials did not detect and thwart the Nov. 13 plot, as they did the others that very well could have achieved similar results. Likewise, the fact that the Islamic State's Wilayat Sinai was able to destroy a Russian airliner has little bearing on the current strength of the Islamic State core or its Egyptian branch.

That said, even though the Islamic State is weakening as its fighters die, it loses financing and territory, and its apocalyptic message loses appeal, the group will continue to pose a terrorist threat. The same was true of its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, after it lost its territory and most of its fighters following the Anbar Awakening. Terrorist attacks ultimately require far fewer resources than holding and governing territory, which will enable the Islamic State to remain dangerous long after it loses control of Ramadi, Mosul, Raqqa and the other territories it governs.
 

[Crafty_Dog]

I have some big questions about some aspects of this, but the man's track record is serious and his ideas deserve serious consideration:

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/obama-isis-strategy-afghanistan-war-213380

[G M]

I have some big questions about some aspects of this, but the man's track record is serious and his ideas deserve serious consideration:

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/obama-isis-strategy-afghanistan-war-213380

Treat ISIL like the Taliban? Hammer it initially then pull out and give everything back?

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/syrian-rebels-blow-up-russian-helicopter-after-jet-downed/?omhide=true&utm_source=MadMimi&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Syrian+rebels+blow+up+Russian+helicopter+after+jet+downed&utm_campaign=20151124_m128403273_11%2F24+Breaking+Israel+Video%3A+Syrian+rebels+blow+up+Russian+helicopter+after+jet+downed&utm_term=Syrian+rebels+blow+up+Russian+helicopter+after+jet+downed

[Crafty_Dog]

Reliability completely unknown

https://www.facebook.com/jeanbaptiste.kim.3/videos/146392639052889/

[G M]

Reliability completely unknown

https://www.facebook.com/jeanbaptiste.kim.3/videos/146392639052889/

I'm calling BS.

[Body-by-Guinness]

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/11/what-is-going-on-in-syria-model-this.html

[DougMacG]

(Thread could be called, this is what happens when America fails to lead.)

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/427603/downed-russian-plane-warn-putin-not-to-escalate

Turkey is a member of NATO.  Russia is supposed to be attacking ISIS, in lieu of having a US-led coalitions, but really is propping up the Assad regime.  Erdogan, our ally, bombs the Kurds, our ally, and launched a Sunni Islamist revival in Turkey, has refused to let NATO use Turkish bases.

'The caliphate survives because its defeat is nobody’s priority. America’s aim is to limit its military commitment in the Middle East. For Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, the big threat is Iran. Iran’s main mission is to prop up the Syrian dictator, Bashar Assad. Mr Assad’s first concern is holding other rebels at bay. The rebels’ obsession is to get rid of Mr Assad.'
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660123-bombing-kurds-well-islamic-state-turkey-adding-chaos-middle  

We are inactively at war with Russia in the Ukraine, while he is our ally acting on 'our behalf' as boots in the air in Syria.

I may have already asked this, what could possibly go wrong?