Fire Hydrant of Freedom

Today's Featured Analysis

Iraqi Governing Council: A Window of Opportunity for the U.S.?

Summary

The United States has always clearly opposed the possibility of a
theocratic state in postwar Iraq. Now the U.S. administration has
crafted a new 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, which includes
seven Islamists. It appears Washington is trying to craft an
Islamic democracy that could be used as a future model for the
Arab Middle East and possibly for the larger Muslim world.

Analysis

The United States has brought together Iraq's various political
forces -- with the exception of the Baath Party -- under the
banner of the new 25-member Iraqi Governing Council. The U.S.
interim administration crafted the body, which involves 25
individuals who are representative of most of the country's
various religious and ethnic groups.

The council's composition suggests that the United States is
trying to strike a balance between imposing a Western-style
democracy and thwarting the emergence of an Iranian-style
theocratic state in Iraq. If the U.S. administrators pull it off,
it could result in the emergence of an Islamic democracy that
could be used as a model for future governments in the region. It
will require careful calibration, however, to move from theory to
reality.

The ethnic, ideological and religious mix in the IGC highlights
the diversity that is the hallmark of Iraq, a nation-state
created by Britain 1921, following the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire.

The IGC has 25 members, but a few of them warrant individual
mention. Prominent among this group is Ahmed Chalabi, of the
Pentagon-supported Iraqi National Congress. There are familiar
faces also from Iraq's Kurdish groups: Massoud Barzani of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party; Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan; Salaheddine Bahaaeddin, leader of the Kurdistan
Islamic Union; and Mahmoud Othman, founder and leader of the
Kurdish Socialist Party. Hamid Majid Mousa represents the Iraqi
Communist Party; he has been its secretary since 1993.

Two members from the Shia Islamist Dawa Party also are among the
group: Dawa leader Ezzedine Salim and spokesman Ibrahim al-
Jaafari. Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi represents Iraqi
Hezbollah.

Mohammed Bahr al-Ulloum, widely regarded as a liberal Shia, is
the only cleric on the council. Mohsen Abdel Hamid, secretary-
general of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, represents Sunnis.
Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi represents Iraqi Hezbollah.

In a sense, the U.S. administration has retained a member of the
old regime: Aquila al-Hashimi, a woman, was a Foreign Ministry
official and diplomat under Saddam Hussein. There are two other
women on the council: Raja Habib al-Khuzaai, a southern tribal
Shia leader; and Sondul Chapouk, representing the Turkmen
minority.

Iran also appears to have a say in the council. Abdel-Aziz al-
Hakim is the brother of Iranian-backed SCIRI leader Ayatollah
Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim. In all, 13 of the 25 members are Shia
Arabs -- which likely is an acknowledgement of Iraq's Shia
majority. The council also has five Sunni Arabs, five Sunni
Kurds, one Christian Arab and one Turkman.

The presence of seven Islamists on the council is consistent with
U.S. President George W. Bush's stated desire for the
establishment of an "Islamic democracy" in Iraq. Likely toward
this end, Bush appointed New York University law professor Noah
Feldman to head the committee and oversee the drafting of Iraq's
new constitution. Feldman has a doctorate in Islamic thought from
Oxford and wrote After Jihad: America and the Struggle for an
Islamic Democracy, published in 2003.

Following mounting resistance from militant Islamic clerics and
Arab nationalists -- and the ever-present threat of Iranian
interference -- Bush said April 24 that he was determined to see
an "Islamic democracy" built in Iraq. In other words, this was
the compromise the United States was willing to make in order to
avoid being seen as disregarding the Islamic sensibilities of the
Iraqi people, some of whom openly have called for an Islamic
state. The Bush administration's goal is for the government in
Baghdad not to threaten U.S. interests, nor to facilitate any
non-state actors who would wish to do so. Washington apparently
views the establishment of an Islamic democracy in Iraq as a
potential way of ensuring these goals.

The problem is that neither the United States nor the Iraqi
people have a model of Islamic democracy to emulate. Turkey and
Iran perhaps could be categorized as Islamic democracies-in-the-
making, but they won't get there anytime soon. Both appear to be
slowly moving toward some form of Islamic democracy -- albeit
from opposite directions.

If the task at hand in Iraq is to be accomplished, it will
require careful calibration on Washington's part. For the U.S.
administration, it will be important to show support for the
project without inadvertently discrediting ICG members,
especially the moderate Islamists, in the eyes of their domestic
audience. If the masses view the council as being a group of U.S.
lackeys, it will quickly lose the respect of the Iraqis, not to
mention the entire Arab world.

However, if the United States is able to strike this delicate
balance, it could have far-reaching consequences in terms of
redeeming the U.S. image in the Muslim world. An Islamic
democracy in Iraq might even be able to help stem the tide of
radical and militant forms of Islam.

Stratfor has argued that the war against Iraq was only part of a
campaign in the larger war on terrorism. The United States has
tried to avoid associating the war on terrorism with Islam, but
these efforts have proved futile. Recent Gallup, Pew Trust and
other polls suggest that an overwhelming majority of Muslims do
not trust U.S. foreign policy when it comes to their part of the
world.

In the case of Iraq, there is a widespread impression that the
United States effected regime change in order to secure its
energy interests. The new Iraqi council provides a window of
opportunity for the United States to practice damage control by
trying to transfer power to an elected Iraqi government -- but
that requires security. Daily attacks on U.S. forces offset the
possibility of a quick transfer of power.

The IGC is bound to face a crisis of legitimacy, since it is a
U.S.-appointed, not elected, body. In a sense, there is a window
of opportunity here for Washington to make great strides in its
broader war. A successful Islamic democracy in Iraq not only
would stabilize that country, but eventually could break support
for militant Islam on a global scale, and perhaps pave the way
for democratization in the greater Islamic world. This, however,
will acquire a great deal of effort and statesmanship from the
Bush administration.

http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20030710.html

Tuhon Bill McGrath found this interesting piece.

7/25:  I've renamed this thread so that it may serve as the vehicle for related posts

Crafty Dog
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Raging Against Self Defense
 
Permission is granted to distribute this article in its entirety, so long as full copyright information and full contact information is given for JPFO.
Copyright ? 2000 Sarah Thompson, MD
Published by
Jews For The Preservation of Firearms Ownership, Inc.
P.O. Box 270143
Hartford, WI 53027
Phone (262) 673-9745
www.jpfo.org



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Raging Against Self Defense:
A Psychiatrist Examines The Anti-Gun Mentality
By Sarah Thompson, M.D.
righter@therighter.com


"You don't need to have a gun; the police will protect you."

"If people carry guns, there will be murders over parking spaces and neighborhood basketball games."

"I'm a pacifist. Enlightened, spiritually aware people shouldn't own guns."

"I'd rather be raped than have some redneck militia type try to rescue me."
How often have you heard these statements from misguided advocates of victim disarmament, or even woefully uninformed relatives and neighbors? Why do people cling so tightly to these beliefs, in the face of incontrovertible evidence that they are wrong? Why do they get so furiously angry when gun owners point out that their arguments are factually and logically incorrect?

How can you communicate with these people who seem to be out of touch with reality and rational thought?

One approach to help you deal with anti-gun people is to understand their psychological processes. Once you understand why these people behave so irrationally, you can communicate more effectively with them.


Defense Mechanisms
Projection

About a year ago I received an e-mail from a member of a local Jewish organization. The author, who chose to remain anonymous, insisted that people have no right to carry firearms because he didn't want to be murdered if one of his neighbors had a "bad day". (I don't know that this person is a "he", but I'm assuming so for the sake of simplicity.) I responded by asking him why he thought his neighbors wanted to murder him, and, of course, got no response. The truth is that he's statistically more likely to be murdered by a neighbor who doesn't legally carry a firearm1 and more likely to be shot accidentally by a law enforcement officer.1

How does my correspondent "know" that his neighbors would murder him if they had guns? He doesn't. What he was really saying was that if he had a gun, he might murder his neighbors if he had a bad day, or if they took his parking space, or played their stereos too loud. This is an example of what mental health professionals call projection ? unconsciously projecting one's own unacceptable feelings onto other people, so that one doesn't have to own them.3 In some cases, the intolerable feelings are projected not onto a person, but onto an inanimate object, such as a gun,4 so that the projector believes the gun itself will murder him.

Projection is a defense mechanism. Defense mechanisms are unconscious psychological mechanisms that protect us from feelings that we cannot consciously accept.5 They operate without our awareness, so that we don't have to deal consciously with "forbidden" feelings and impulses. Thus, if you asked my e-mail correspondent if he really wanted to murder his neighbors, he would vehemently deny it, and insist that other people want to kill him.

Projection is a particularly insidious defense mechanism, because it not only prevents a person from dealing with his own feelings, it also creates a world where he perceives everyone else as directing his own hostile feelings back at him.6

All people have violent, and even homicidal, impulses. For example, it's common to hear people say "I'd like to kill my boss", or "If you do that one more time I'm going to kill you." They don't actually mean that they're going to, or even would, kill anyone; they're simply acknowledging anger and frustration. All of us suffer from fear and feelings of helplessness and vulnerability. Most people can acknowledge feelings of rage, fear, frustration, jealousy, etc. without having to act on them in inappropriate and destructive ways.

Some people, however, are unable consciously to admit that they have such "unacceptable" emotions. They may have higher than average levels of rage, frustration, or fear. Perhaps they fear that if they acknowledge the hostile feelings, they will lose control and really will hurt someone. They may believe that "good people" never have such feelings, when in fact all people have them.

This is especially true now that education "experts" commonly prohibit children from expressing negative emotions or aggression. Instead of learning that such emotions are normal, but that destructive behavior needs to be controlled, children now learn that feelings of anger are evil, dangerous and subject to severe punishment.7To protect themselves from "being bad", they are forced to use defense mechanisms to avoid owning their own normal emotions. Unfortunately, using such defense mechanisms inappropriately can endanger their mental health; children need to learn how to deal appropriately with reality, not how to avoid it.8

(This discussion of psychological mechanisms applies to the average person who is uninformed, or misinformed, about firearms and self-defense. It does not apply to the anti- gun ideologue. Fanatics like Charles Schumer know the facts about firearms, and advocate victim disarmament consciously and willfully in order to gain political power. This psychological analysis does not apply to them.)

Denial

Another defense mechanism commonly utilized by supporters of gun control is denial. Denial is simply refusing to accept the reality of a given situation.9 For example, consider a woman whose husband starts coming home late, has strange perfume on his clothes, and starts charging flowers and jewelry on his credit card. She may get extremely angry at a well-meaning friend who suggests that her husband is having an affair. The reality is obvious, but the wronged wife is so threatened by her husband's infidelity that she is unable to accept it, and so denies its existence.

Anti-gun people do the same thing. It's obvious that we live in a dangerous society, where criminals attack innocent people. Just about everyone has been, or knows someone who has been, victimized. It's equally obvious that law enforcement can't protect everyone everywhere 24 hours a day. Extensive scholarly research demonstrates that the police have no legal duty to protect you10 and that firearm ownership is the most effective way to protect yourself and your family.11 There is irrefutable evidence that victim disarmament nearly always precedes genocide.12 Nonetheless, the anti-gun folks insist, despite all evidence to the contrary, that "the police will protect you", "this is a safe neighborhood" and "it can't happen here", where "it" is everything from mugging to mass murder.

Anti-gun people who refuse to accept the reality of the proven and very serious dangers of civilian disarmament are using denial to protect themselves from the anxiety of feeling helpless and vulnerable. Likewise, gun owners who insist that "the government will never confiscate my guns" are also using denial to protect themselves from the anxiety of contemplating being forcibly disarmed and rendered helpless and vulnerable.

Reaction Formation

Reaction formation is yet another defense mechanism common among the anti-gun folks. Reaction formation occurs when a person's mind turns an unacceptable feeling or desire into its complete opposite.13 For example, a child who is jealous of a sibling may exhibit excessive love and devotion for the hated brother or sister.

Likewise, a person who harbors murderous rage toward his fellow humans may claim to be a devoted pacifist and refuse to eat meat or even kill a cockroach.14 Often such people take refuge in various spiritual disciplines and believe that they are "superior" to "less civilized" folks who engage in "violent behavior" such as hunting, or even target shooting. They may devote themselves to "animal welfare" organizations that proclaim that the rights of animals take precedence over the rights of people.15 This not only allows the angry person to avoid dealing with his rage, it allows him actually to harm the people he hates without having to know he hates them.

This is not meant to disparage the many wonderful people who are pacifists, spiritually inclined, vegetarian, or who support animal welfare. The key issue is not the belief itself, but rather the way in which the person experiences and lives his beliefs. Sincere practitioners seek to improve themselves, or to be helpful in a gentle, respectful fashion. They work to persuade others peacefully by setting an example of what they believe to be correct behavior. Sincere pacifists generally exhibit good will towards others, even towards persons with whom they might disagree on various issues.

Contrast the sincere pacifist or animal lover with the strident, angry person who wants to ban meat and who believes murdering hunters is justified in order to "save the animals" ? or the person who wants to outlaw self- defense and believes innocent people have the obligation to be raped and murdered for the good of society. For example, noted feminist Betty Friedan said "that lethal violence even in self defense only engenders more violence."16 The truly spiritual, pacifist person refrains from forcing others to do what he believes, and is generally driven by positive emotions, while the angry person finds "socially acceptable" ways to harm, abuse, or even kill, his fellow man.

In the case of anti-gun people, reaction formation keeps any knowledge of their hatred for their fellow humans out of consciousness, while allowing them to feel superior to "violent gun owners". At the same time, it also allows them to cause serious harm, and even loss of life, to others by denying them the tools necessary to defend themselves. This makes reaction formation very attractive from a psychological point of view, and therefore very difficult to counteract.


Defense Mechanisms Are Not Mental Illnesses
Defense mechanisms are normal. All of us use them to some extent, and their use does not imply mental illness. Advocates of victim disarmament may be misguided or uninformed, they may be stupid, or they may be consciously intent on evil, but that doesn't necessarily mean they are "mentally ill".

Some defense mechanisms, however, are healthier than others. A safe general rule is that a defense is healthy if it helps you to function better in your personal and professional life, and unhealthy if it interferes with your life, your relationships, or the well-being of others. Young children utilize projection and denial much more commonly than do healthy adults. On the other hand, "if projection is used as a defense mechanism to a very great extent in adult life, the user's perception of external reality will be seriously distorted."17

Defense mechanisms are also frequently combined, so that an anti-gun person may use several defense mechanisms simultaneously. For example, my unfortunate correspondent uses projection to create a world in which all his neighbors want to murder him. As a result, he becomes more angry and fearful, and needs to employ even more defense mechanisms to cope. So he uses projection to attribute his own rage to others, he uses denial that there is any danger to protect himself from a world where he believes he is helpless and everyone wants to murder him, and he uses reaction formation to try to control everyone else's life because his own is so horribly out of control.

Also, it's important to remember that not all anti-gun beliefs are the result of defense mechanisms. Some people suffer from gun phobia18, an excessive and completely irrational fear of firearms, usually caused by the anti-gun conditioning they've been subjected to by the media, politicians, so-called "educators," and others. In some cases, gun phobia is caused by an authentic bad experience associated with a firearm. But with all due respect to Col. Jeff Cooper, who coined the term "hoplophobia" to describe anti-gun people, most anti-gun people do not have true phobias. Interestingly, a person with a true phobia of guns realizes his fear is excessive or unreasonable,19 something most anti-gun folks will never admit.

Defense mechanisms distort reality

Because defense mechanisms distort reality in order to avoid unpleasant emotions, the person who uses them has an impaired ability to recognize and accept reality. This explains why my e-mail correspondent and many other anti-gun people persist in believing that their neighbors and co- workers will become mass murderers if allowed to own firearms.

People who legally carry concealed firearms are actually less violent and less prone to criminal activity of all kinds than is the general population.20 A person who has a clean record, has passed an FBI background check, undergone firearms training, and spent several hundred dollars to get a permit and a firearm, is highly unlikely to choose to murder a neighbor. Doing so would result in his facing a police manhunt, a trial, prison, possibly capital punishment, and the destruction of his family, job, and reputation. Obviously it would make no sense for such a person to shoot a neighbor - except in self-defense. Equally obviously, the anti-gun person who believes that malicious shootings by ordinary gun owners are likely to occur is not in touch with reality.21


The Common Thread: Rage
In my experience, the common thread in anti-gun people is rage. Either anti-gun people harbor more rage than others, or they're less able to cope with it appropriately. Because they can't handle their own feelings of rage, they are forced to use defense mechanisms in an unhealthy manner. Because they wrongly perceive others as seeking to harm them, they advocate the disarmament of ordinary people who have no desire to harm anyone. So why do anti-gun people have so much rage and why are they unable to deal with it in appropriate ways? Consider for a moment that the largest and most hysterical anti-gun groups include disproportionately large numbers of women, African- Americans and Jews. And virtually all of the organizations that claim to speak for these "oppressed people" are stridently anti-gun. Not coincidentally, among Jews, Blacks and women there are many "professional victims" who have little sense of identity outside of their victimhood.

Identity as Victim

If I were to summarize this article in three sentences, they would be:


(1) People who identify themselves as "victims" harbor excessive amounts of rage at other people, whom they perceive as "not victims."
(2) In order psychologically to deal with this rage, these "victims" utilize defense mechanisms that enable them to harm others in socially acceptable ways, without accepting responsibility or suffering guilt, and without having to give up their status as "victims."

(3) Gun owners are frequently the targets of professional victims because gun owners are willing and able to prevent their own victimization.

Thus the concept of "identity as victim" is essential. How and why do members of some groups choose to identify themselves as victims and teach their children to do the same? While it's true that women, Jews, and African- Americans have historically been victimized, they now participate in American society on an equal basis. And other groups, most notably Asian-Americans, have been equally victimized, and yet have transcended the "eternal victim" mentality.

Why, for example, would a 6'10" NBA player who makes $10 million a year see himself as a "victim"? Why would a successful, respected, wealthy, Jewish physician regard himself as a "victim"? Conversely, why might a wheelchair bound woman who lives on government disability NOT regard herself as a victim?

I would argue it's because the basketball player and the physician believe that their identities are dependent on being victims ? not because they have actually been victimized, but because they're members of groups that claim victim status. Conversely, the disabled woman was probably raised to believe that she is responsible for her own success or failure.

In fact, many people who have been victims of actual violent crime, or who have survived war or civil strife, support the right of self-defense. The old saying is often correct: "a conservative is a liberal who has been mugged."

Special Treatment and Misleading Leaders

Two reasons for these groups to insist on "victim" status seem likely. First, by claiming victim status, members of these groups can demand (and get) special treatment through quotas, affirmative action, reparations, and other preferential treatment programs.

Second, these people have been indoctrinated to believe that there is no alternative to remaining a victim forever. Their leaders remind them constantly that they are mistreated in every imaginable way (most of them imaginary!), attribute every one of life's misfortunes to "racism" or "sexism" or "hate crimes", and dream up ever more complex schemes for special treatment and favors.22 These leaders are the ones who preach that the entire Black experience is slavery and racism, or that Jewish history before and after the Holocaust is irrelevant,23 or that happily married women are really victims of sexual slavery.24

Likewise, the NAACP is suing firearms manufacturers to put them out of business,25 and is especially opposed to the inexpensive pistols that enable the poor to defend themselves in gang-ridden inner cities. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) proposed evicting anyone who dares to keep a tool of self-defense in any of its crime-infested housing projects. Jewish leaders, especially those in the politically correct "Reform" branch, preach that gun control is "a solemn religious obligation",26 contrary to the teachings of their sacred scriptures and their own history.27 Law enforcement agencies falsely teach women that they are safest if they don't resist rapists and robbers,28 while women's organizations advocate gun control, thus rendering women and their children defenseless.

Victimhood is good business for organizations that foster victim status. As victims, the members depend upon the organization to protect them, and the organization in turn relies on members for funding and political power. In the interest of self-preservation, these organizations work hard at preserving hatred and bigotry and at keeping their members defenseless ? and therefore dependent.

Anti-gun groups love victims!

From my observations, pro-victimhood is a feature of all of the anti-gun special interest groups, not just the ones mentioned here. Every organization that supports gun control apparently wants its members to be helpless, terrified and totally dependent on someone else to control every aspect of their lives. It doesn't matter whether it's a religious, racial, ethnic, political, social, or charitable group. From Handgun Control, Inc. to the Anti- Defamation League to the Million Mom March, they all want you to live in fear. In this scheme, soccer moms are "victims" just as much as are inner-city minorities.

If these organizations truly cared about the people for whom they claim to speak, they would encourage safe and responsible firearms ownership. They would help people to learn how to defend themselves and their families so that they wouldn't have to live in fear. They would tell everyone that one of the wonderful things about being an American is that you have the right to keep and bear arms, the right to defend yourself, and how these rights preserve the right to be free.

The psychological price of being a victim

In our current society, victimhood has many perceived benefits, but there are some serious drawbacks. Victims tend to see the world as a scary and threatening place. They believe that others treat them differently, unfairly, and even maliciously ? and that they are helpless to do anything about it. This belief, that they are being mistreated and are helpless to resist, generates tremendous rage, and often, serious depression.

But for victims to show rage openly can be dangerous, if not outright suicidal. For example, a battered woman who screams at or hits her attacker may provoke worse beatings or even her own murder. And a person who successfully defends himself loses his status as "victim." For someone whose entire identity is dependent on being a victim, the loss of victim status is just as threatening as loss of life.

So, unable psychologically to cope with such rage, people who view themselves as victims: (1) use defense mechanisms to displace it into irrational beliefs about neighbors killing each other, and the infallibility of police protection, and (2) attempt to regain control by controlling gun owners, whom they wrongly perceive as "the enemy".

Say NO to being a victim!

But no one needs to be a victim! Quite simply, it's not very easy to victimize a person who owns and knows how to use a firearm. If most women owned and carried firearms, rapes and beating would decrease.29 Thugs who target the elderly and disabled would find honest work once they realized they were likely to be looking down the barrel of a pistol or shotgun. It's nearly impossible to enslave, or herd into concentration camps, large numbers of armed people.


Communicating with anti-gun people
How can you communicate more effectively with an anti-gun person who is using unhealthy defense mechanisms? There are no quick and easy answers. But there are a few things you should keep in mind.

Anger and attacks do not work

Most gun owners, when confronted by an anti-gun person, become angry and hostile. This is understandable, because gun owners increasingly face ridicule, persecution and discrimination. (If you don't believe this, ask yourself if anyone would seriously introduce legislation to ban African- Americans, women, or Jews from post offices, schools, and churches. Even convicted felons aren't banned from such places ? but peaceful armed citizens are!) But an angry response is counterproductive.

It's not helpful to attack the person you're trying to persuade. Anything that makes him feel more fearful or angry will only intensify his defenses. Your goal is to help the person feel safe, and then to provide experiences and information that will help him to make informed decisions.

Be Gentle

You should never try to break down a defense mechanism by force. Remember that defense mechanisms protect people from feelings they cannot handle, and if you take that protection away, you can cause serious psychological harm. And because defense mechanisms operate unconsciously, it won't do any good to show an anti-gun person this article or to point out that he's using defense mechanisms. Your goal is gently and gradually to help the person to have a more realistic and rational view of the world. This cannot be done in one hour or one day.

As you reach out to people in this way, you need to deal with both the illogical thought processes involved and the emotional reactions that anti-gun people have to firearms. When dealing with illogical thought processes, you are attempting to use reason and logic to convince the anti-gun person that his perception of other people and his perception of firearms are seriously inaccurate. The goal is to help him to understand that armed citizens and firearms are not threats, and may even save his life.


Reversing Irrational thoughts
The Mirror Technique

One approach that can be helpful is simply to feed back what the anti-gun person is telling you, in a neutral, inquisitive way. So, when replying to my anonymous e-mail correspondent (above), I might respond, "So you fear if your neighbors had guns, they would use them to murder you. What makes you think that?" When you simply repeat what the person has said, and ask questions, you are not directly challenging his defenses. You are holding up a mirror to let him see his own views. If he has very strong defenses, he can continue to insist that his neighbors want to murder him. However, if his defenses are less rigid, he may start to question his position.

Another example might be, "Why do you think that your children's schoolteachers would shoot them?" You might follow this up with something like, "Why do you entrust your precious children to someone you believe would murder them?" Again, you are merely asking questions, and not directly attacking the person or his defenses.

Of course the anti-gun person might continue to insist that the teachers really would harm children, but prohibiting them from owning guns would prevent it. So you might ask how using a gun to murder innocent children is different from stabbing children with scissors, assaulting them with baseball bats, or poisoning the milk and cookies.

It's important to ask "open-ended" questions that require a response other than "yes" or "no". Such questions require the anti-gun person actually to think about what he is saying. This will help him to re-examine his beliefs. It may also encourage him to ask you questions about firearms use and ownership.

The "What Would You Do?" Technique

Once you have a dialogue going with an anti-gun person, you might want to insert him into a hypothetical scenario, although doing so is a greater threat to his defenses, and is therefore more risky. You might ask how he would deal with a difficult or annoying co-worker. He will likely respond that he would never resort to violence, but "other people" would, especially if they had guns. (Projection again.) You can then ask him who these "other people" are, why they would shoot a co-worker, and what the shooter would gain by doing so.

Don't try to "win" the argument. Don't try to embarrass the person you're trying to educate. Remember that no one likes to admit that his deeply held beliefs are wrong. No one likes to hear "I told you so!" Be patient and gentle. If you are arrogant, condescending, hurtful or rude to the anti-gun person, you will only convince him that gun owners are arrogant, hurtful people ? who should not be trusted with guns!


Defusing Emotional reactions
The "You Are There" Technique

Rational arguments alone are not likely to be successful, especially since many people "feel" rather than "think". You also need to deal with the emotional responses of the anti-gun person. Remember that most people have been conditioned to associate firearms with dead toddlers. So you need to change the person's emotional responses along with his thoughts.

One way to do this is to put the anti-gun person (or his family) at a hypothetical crime scene and ask what he would like to have happen. For example, "Imagine your wife is in the parking lot at the supermarket and two men grab her. One holds a knife to her throat while the other tears her clothes off. If I see this happening and have a gun, what should I do? What would happen next? What if after five minutes, the police still haven't arrived?"

Just let him answer the questions and mentally walk through the scenario. Don't argue with his answers. You are planting seeds in his mind than can help change his emotional responses.

The Power of Empathy

Another emotion-based approach that is often more successful is to respond sympathetically to the plight of the anti-gun person.

Imagine for a moment how you would feel if you believed your neighbors and co-workers wanted to kill you and your family, and you could do nothing at all about it except to wait for the inevitable to occur.

Not very pleasant, is it?

This is the world in which opponents of armed self-defense live. All of us have had times in our lives when we felt "different" and had to contend with hostile schoolmates, co- workers, etc. So we need to invoke our own compassion for these terrified people. Say something like, "It must be awful to live in fear of being assaulted by your own neighbors. I remember what it was like when I was the only (Jew, Mormon, African-American, Republican) in my (class, football team, workplace) ? and even then I didn't think anyone was going to kill me." It's essential that you sincerely feel some compassion and empathy; if you're glib or sarcastic, this won't work.

Using empathy works in several ways. First, it defuses a potentially hostile interaction. Anti-gun people are used to being attacked, not understood, by advocates of gun rights. Instead of an "evil, gun-toting, extremist", you are now a sympathetic, fellow human being. This may also open the door for a friendly conversation, in which you can each discover that your "opponent" is a person with whom you have some things in common. You may even create an opportunity to dispel some of the misinformation about firearms and self-defense that is so prevalent.

This empathy technique is also useful for redirecting, or ending, a heated argument that has become hostile and unproductive. It allows you to escape from the dead end of "guns save lives" vs. "the only reason to have a gun is to murder children." With empathy you can reframe the argument entirely. Instead of arguing about whether more lives are saved or lost as a result of gun ownership, you can comment on how terrifying it must be to live in a country where 80 million people own guns "solely for the purpose of murdering children".

You should not expect any of these approaches to work immediately; they won't. With rare exceptions, the anti-gun person is simply not going to "see the light," thank you profusely, and beg you to take him shooting. What you are doing is putting tiny chinks into the armor of the person's defenses, or planting seeds that may someday develop into a more open mind or a more rational analysis. This process can take months or years. But it does work!


Corrective Experiences
Perhaps the most effective way to dissolve defense mechanisms, however, is by providing corrective experiences30. Corrective experiences are experiences that allow a person to learn that his ideas about gun owners and guns are incorrect in a safe and non-threatening way. To provide a corrective experience, you first allow the person to attempt to project his incorrect ideas onto you. Then, you demonstrate that he is wrong by your behavior, not by arguing.

For example, the anti-gun person will unconsciously attempt to provoke you by claiming that gun owners are uneducated "rednecks," or by treating you as if you are an uneducated "redneck." If you get angry and respond by calling him a "stupid, liberal, socialist", you will prove his point. However, if you casually talk about your M.B.A., your trip to the Shakespeare festival, your vegetable garden, or your daughter's ballet recital, you will provide him with the opportunity to correct his misconceptions.

If you have used the above techniques, then you have already provided one corrective experience. You have demonstrated to the frightened, anti-gun person that gun owners are not abusive, scary, dangerous and sub-human monsters, but normal, everyday people who care about their families, friends and even strangers.

As many gun owners have already discovered, the most important corrective experiences involve actually exposing the fearful person to a firearm. It is almost never advisable to tell someone that you carry a concealed firearm, but there are ways to use your own experience favorably.

For example, if you're dealing with an anti-gun person with whom you interact regularly and have a generally good relationship ? a coworker, neighbor, church member, etc. ? you might indirectly refer to concealed carry. You should never say anything like "I'm carrying a gun right now and you can't even tell," especially because in some states that would be considered illegal, "threatening" behavior. But you might consider saying something like, "I sometimes carry a firearm, and you've never seemed to be uncomfortable around me." Whether to disclose this information is an individual decision, and you should consider carefully other consequences before using this approach.

First-hand experience

Ultimately, your goal is to take the anti-gun person shooting. Some people will accept an invitation to accompany you to the range, but others are too frightened to do so, and will need some preliminary experience.

First, you want to encourage the anti-gun person to have some contact with a firearm in whatever way feels most comfortable to him. Many people seem to believe that firearms have minds of their own and shoot people of their own volition. So you might want to start by inviting him simply to look at and then handle an unloaded firearm. This also provides you the opportunity to show the inexperienced person how to tell whether a firearm is loaded and to teach him the basic rules of firearms safety.

Encourage the newcomer to ask questions and remember that your role is to present accurate information in a friendly, responsible and non-threatening way. This is a good time to offer some reading material on the benefits of firearms ownership. But be careful not to provide so much information that it's overwhelming. And remember this is not the time to launch into anti-government rants, the New World Order, conspiracy theories, or any kind of political talk!

Next, you can invite your friend to accompany you to the shooting range. (And if you're going to trust each other with loaded guns, you should consider yourselves friends!) Assure him that no one will force him to shoot a gun and he's free just to watch. Let him know in advance what he will experience and what will be expected of him. This includes such things as the need for eye and ear protection, a cap, appropriate clothing, etc. Make sure you have a firearm appropriate for your guest should s/he decide to try shooting. This means a lower caliber firearm that doesn't have too much recoil. If your guest is a woman, make sure the firearm will fit her appropriately. Many rifles have stocks that are too long for small women, and double-stack semi-autos are usually too large for a woman's hand.

Remember that just visiting the range can be a corrective experience. Your guest will learn that gun owners are disciplined, responsible, safety-conscious, courteous, considerate, and follow the rules. He will see people of all ages, from children to the elderly, male and female, enjoying an activity together. He will not see a single "beer-swilling redneck" waving a firearm in people's faces.

In my experience, most people who visit a range will decide they do want to try shooting. Remember to make sure your guest understands all the safety rules and range rules before allowing him to handle a firearm. If you don't feel competent to teach a newcomer to shoot, ask an instructor or range master to assist. Remember to provide lots of positive feedback and encouragement. If you're lucky, you'll recruit a new firearms enthusiast.

But even if your guest decides that shooting is "not for him", he will have learned many valuable lessons. He will know basic rules of firearms safety, and how to clear a firearm should he need to do so. This may well save his life someday. He will know that guns do not fire unless a person pulls the trigger. He will know that gun owners are friendly, responsible people, not very different from him. Even if he chooses not to fire a gun ever again, he will be less likely to fear and persecute gun owners. And who knows ? a few months or years later he may decide to become a gun owner.

Why these techniques do not always work

You should remember that you will not be successful with all anti-gun people. Some people are so terrified and have such strong defenses, that it's not possible for someone without professional training to get through. Some people have their minds made up and refuse to consider opening them. Others may concede that what you say "makes sense," but are unwilling to challenge the forces of political correctness. A few may have had traumatic experiences with firearms from which they have not recovered.

You will also not be successful with the anti-gun ideologues, people like Charles Schumer and Dianne Feinstein. These people have made a conscious choice to oppose firearms ownership and self-defense. They almost always gain power, prestige, and money from their anti-gun politics. They are not interested in the facts or in saving lives. They know the facts and understand the consequences of their actions, and will happily sacrifice innocent people if it furthers their selfish agenda. Do not use these techniques on such people. They only respond to fears of losing the power, prestige and money that they covet.31

Conclusion

By better understanding advocates of civilian disarmament, and by learning and practicing some simple techniques to deal with their psychological defenses, you will be much more effective in your efforts to communicate with anti-gun people. This will enable you to be more successful at educating them about the realities of firearms and self- defense, and their importance to our liberty and safety.

Educating others about firearms is hard work. It's not glamorous, and it generally needs to be done one person at a time. But it's a very necessary and important task. The average American supports freedom of speech and freedom of religion, whether or not he chooses to exercise them. He supports fair trials, whether or not he's ever been in a courtroom. He likewise needs to understand that self- defense is an essential right, whether or not he chooses to own or carry a gun.


? 2000, Sarah Thompson.

Dr. Thompson is Executive Director of Utah Gun Owners Alliance, www.utgoa.org and also writes The Righter, www.therighter.com, a monthly column on individual rights.

Notes

1 Lott, John R., Jr. 1998. More Guns, Less Crime. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 11-12; Proposition B: More Security Or Greater Danger?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch. March 21, 1999.

2 Lott 1998, Pp. 1-2.

3 Kaplan, Harold M. and Sadock, Benjamin J. 1990. Pocket Handbook of Clinical Psychiatry. Williams & Wilkins. P. 20.

4Brenner, Charles. 1973. An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis (rev. ed.). Anchor Books. Pp. 91-93; Lefton, Lester A. 1994. Psychology (5th edition). Allyn & Bacon. Pp. 432-433.

5 Brenner 1973. P. 91.

6 Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 20; Lefton 1994, p. 432.

7 Talbott, John A., Robert E. Hales and Stuart C. Yudofsky, eds. 1988. Textbook of Psychiatry. American Psychiatric Press. P.137.

8 "Kids Suspended for Playground Game." Associated Press. April 6, 2000.

9 Lightfoot, Liz. "Gun Return to the Nursery School Toy Chest." The London Telegraph. May 22, 2000. Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 20; Lefton 1994, p. 433.

10 Stevens, Richard W. 1999. Dial 911 and Die. Mazel Freedom Press. [Analyzes the law in 54 U.S. jurisdictions]; see, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) [no federal constitutional right to police protection.]

11 Kleck, Gary and Gertz, Marc. 1995. Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self- Defense with a Gun. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology. Vol. 86 (Fall), pp. 150-187.

12 Simkin, Jay, Zelman, Aaron, and Rice, Alan M. 1994. Lethal Laws. Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership.

13 Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 20; Lefton 1994, p. 433.

14 Brenner 1973, p. 85.

15 Veith, Gene Edward, Jr. 1993. Modern Fascism: Liquidating the Judeo-Christian Worldview. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing. Pp. 39-40 [fascism exalts nature, animals and environment].

16 Japenga, A. 1994. Would I Be Safer with a Gun? Health. March/April, p. 54.

17 Brenner 1973, p. 92.

18 Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 219.

19 American Psychiatric Association. 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. P. 410.

20 Lott 1998, pp. 11-12.

21 Most American gun owners are not violent criminals and will not be potential killers. "The vast majority of persons involved in life-threatening violence have a long criminal record and many prior contacts with the justice system." Elliott, Delbert S. 1998. Life Threatening Violence is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on Prevention. University of Colorado Law Review. Vol. 69 (Fall), pp. 1081-1098, at 1093.

22 Sowell, Thomas. 2000. Blacks and bootstraps. Jewish World Review (Aug.14). http://www.jewishworldreview.com

23x Wein, Rabbi Berel. 2000. The return of a Torah scroll and confronting painful memories. Jewish World Review (July 12).

24 Dworkin, Andrea. "Terror, Torture and Resistance". http://www.igc.org/Womensnet/dworkin/TerrorTortureandResistance.html

25 Mfume, Kweisi, speech at the 90th annual NAACP meeting, July 12, 1999. http://www.naacp.org/president/speeches/90th%20Annual%20Meeting.htm

26 Yoffie, Rabbi Eric H. Speech supporting the Million Mom March, May 14, 2000. http://uahc.org/yoffie/mmm.html

27 "If someone comes to kill you, arise quickly and kill him." The Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin. 1994. The Schottenstein Edition. New York: Mesorah Publications. Vol. 2, 72a.

28 Rape and Sexual Assault, Dean of Students Office for Women's Resources and Services McKinley Health Education Dept., University Police, University of Illinois; Hazelwood, R. R. & Harpold, J. 1986. Rape: The Dangers of Providing Confrontational Advice, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Vol. 55, pp. 1-5.

29 Lott 1998, pp. 78, 134-37.

30 Frank, Jerome D. 1961. Persuasion and Healing. The Johns Hopkins Press. Pp. 216-217.

31 Richardson, H. L. 1998. Confrontational Politics. Gun Owners Foundation. 1

MIT Students To 'Track' Politicians

Turn tables on feds with website to
monitor government officials


Posted: July 7, 2003
5:00 p.m. Eastern

By Jon Dougherty
? 2003 WorldNetDaily.com


Modeled after a Defense Department concept that
ostensibly could keep tabs on every American, a
pair of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
students have created a website in which users
can "track" politicians and government officials.

The project, called Government Information
Awareness, or GIA, was developed by Chris
Csikszentmihalyi, assistant professor at the MIT
Media Lab, and graduate student Ryan McKinley.

The goal was to design a site that would act as
"sort of a citizen's intelligence agency,"
Csikszentmihalyi told the Boston Globe.

The GIA model was inspired by a Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency creation
known as Total Information Awareness, or TIA,
which later was renamed the Terrorism
Information Awareness system after it was
learned TIA could be used to monitor the activities
of millions of Americans in the government's
search for possible terrorists.

TIA is capable of analyzing financial, medical,
consumer, educational and travel data, among
other pieces of information, to formulate a pattern
of behavior that would match pre-determined
terrorist profiles.

"The goal of the Terrorism Information Awareness
program is to revolutionize the ability of the
United States to detect, classify and identify
foreign terrorists ? and decipher their plans ? and
thereby enable the U.S. to take timely action to
successfully preempt and defeat terrorist acts,"
says a DARPA description of the program.

Congress limited the scope of the program after
complaints from a number of civil liberties
organizations.

Many of those concerns were addressed in a letter
to the U.S. Senate by the Association for
Computing Machinery, which stated that
"because of serious security, privacy, economic,
and personal risks associated with the
development of a vast database surveillance
system, we recommend a rigorous, independent
review of these aspects of TIA."

"There are important steps that the government
can take now to increase our security without
creating a massive surveillance program that has
the potential of doing more harm than good," said
the letter. "Federal, state and local governments
already have information systems in place that
could play major roles with highly focused
'terrorist spotting.'"

Nevertheless, the architects of GIA say their goal is
similar, only in reverse; they want average citizens
to be able to keep track of information relating to
government employees and politicians.

GIA's mission is "to empower citizens by providing
a single, comprehensive, easy-to-use repository of
information on individuals, organizations, and
corporations related to the government of the
United States of America," according to a
description posted on the GIA website.

Also, GIA's mission is "to allow citizens to submit
intelligence about government-related issues,
while maintaining their anonymity" and "to allow
members of the government a chance to
participate in the process."

"In the United States, there is a widening gap
between a citizen's ability to monitor his or her
government and the government's ability to
monitor a citizen," says the website. "Average
citizens have limited access to important
government records, while available information is
often illegible. Meanwhile, the government's
eagerness and means to oversee a citizen's
personal activity is rapidly increasing."

McKinley told the Boston Globe "total
information" should be a two-way street between
government and civilians.

"If total information exists, really the same effort
should be spent to make the same information at
the leadership level at least as transparent ? in my
opinion, more transparent," he said.

Part of the technology involved in the site is
similar to data mining software used by such
search engines as Google. That includes, said the
Globe, "independent political sites like
opensecrets.org, as well as sites run by
government agencies."

Also, Csikszentmihalyi and McKinley took
advantage of round-the-clock political coverage by
cable channels such as C-SPAN. The MIT students
use video cameras to capture images of people on
screen, which are generally accompanied by their
names.

The Globe says a computer program then "reads"
each name and matches it to existing information
about that person already stored on site.



Jon E. Dougherty is a staff reporter and columnist for
WorldNetDaily.

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=33455


Government Information Awareness......a 'citizens' intelligence agency'.....

I like it.

http://opengov.media.mit.edu/GIA/TIA/

Item Number:14
Date: 07/08/2003
PHILIPPINES - GOVERNMENT SEIZES REBEL CAMP (JUL 08/PHILSTAR)

PHILIPPINE STAR -- New People's Army (NPA) rebels and Philippine
security forces fought in Aeta village in Zambales province, reports
the Philippine Star.  Some 20 rebels were killed and five police officers were killed in the clash. Government troops were trying to seize a makeshift NPA training camp when rebel snipers fired on them.  After a bloody firefight, the army captured the camp.

NIGERIA
Kidnapped OFWs in Nigeria Freed
from Agence France Presse on Monday, July 07, 2003
LAGOS--Two Filipino oil workers who were kidnapped by pirates in Nigeria's western Niger Delta region and held for two weeks have been freed, their embassies said Monday.

"They are OK," Philippine Ambassador to Nigeria Masaranga Umpa told Agence France-Presse. "They have been released, through the intervention of the governor of Delta State (James Ibori)."

Another captive, a German national, was also freed.

The German embassy's spokesman confirmed that the men were free but could give no further details. Both embassies said the hostages were now in the company of embassy staff.

An armed gang stormed a US-owned oil industry tugboat as it made its way through the swamps of the western delta last month and captured its German captain and two Filipino crewmen.

The trio were held in a village in the home area of the restless Ijaw ethnic group, which in March launched a rebellion against its perceived political marginalization.

But the motive for the kidnap appears to have been purely criminal. The men's captors demanded 25 million naira (equivalent to 197,000 dollars or 168,000 euros) in ransom and 400,000 naira for food.

Neither embassy could say if a ransom had been paid.

The men worked for the Florida-based oil services company Seabulk, which works as a sub-contractor supplying crews and vessels to the Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell in the delta.

In March, unrest among the Ijaws forced Shell and major US oil firm ChevronTexaco to shut down their operations in the western Delta, cutting more than 40 percent from Nigeria's oil output.

Production is now returning to normal, but the situation remains tense. Even before the March uprising the kidnapping of oil workers was fairly common.

Copyright 2003 www.inq7.net

www.stratfor.com

Geopolitical Diary: Thursday, July 3, 2003

The change of command at CENTCOM is scheduled for July 7, the U.S.
Department of Defense announced today. That answers the question we posed on June 26, when we wrote, "Since our view is that Iraq is now in crisis and that the crisis is intensifying, it follows that an accelerated change of command is in order. If [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld grasps the magnitude of the challenge -- and by now he would have to be in a coma not to -- he will dramatically speed up the transition at CENTCOM." Clearly, Rumsfeld is not in a coma. We can speculate as to why he has chosen to speak about Iraq as he has, but that is no longer all that interesting. The fact is the change of command at CENTCOM will take place at the earliest possible moment, which means Rumsfeld fully understands the severity of the situation, regardless of what he says.

Obviously, it will be left to Gen. John Abiziad to craft the counterinsurgency strategy. However, the Philadelphia Enquirer reported that Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, is asking for a 33 percent increase in the number of troops in Iraq. Reuters quoted a "senior Pentagon official" -- also known as Rumsfeld (we never have figured out why Washington officials play these games, but they all do) -- as saying, "There has been no such request. There are still remnants that are going to try to do harm to our forces. And there are still going to be casualties. The other side is if you put more troops in, you put more targets in there." But you also increase the risk to the guerrillas. Either way, it is clear that a bottoms-up review of U.S. strategy will take place under Abiziad's control, and that review is under way now. Abiziad is in-theater now but will return next week for the change-of-command ceremony. We expect that he also will present his recommendations to Rumsfeld and U.S. President George W. Bush.

It should be noted that there appears to be a decrease in Iraqi guerrilla
operations in the past 24 hours, since Operation Sidewinder got into high
gear. Therefore, an argument can be made -- and we suspect it will be
made -- that more troops mean more Sidewinders, not that 24 hours means a whole lot.

As if Iraq and al Qaeda weren't enough, it looks fairly certain that the
United States will send nearly 1,000 Marines to Liberia. There has been an
ongoing civil war there, and the country is essentially in a state of chaos.
U.N. General-Secretary Kofi Annan asked the United States to send troops to Liberia. U.S. officials did not want to get involved there, but Annan was insistent and Washington was trapped. Having made the case for intervention in Iraq against Annan's wishes, U.S. officials were hard-pressed to reject Annan's call for intervention in Liberia. The logic is not crisp, but the public relations are. We suspect Annan enjoyed maneuvering the United States into an intervention. As of this hour, the intervention is not a done deal. Washington is hoping for any miracle that would keep it from sending troops into a situation that is both hopeless and not directly related to what the administration sees as core U.S. interests. But the probability is that the Marines will go in -- although the mission and exit strategy are not clear to us at all, and imaginative explanations is what we do for a living.

Japan buckled under U.S. pressure today. The Japanese were moving toward a deal worth $2 billion to develop the Azadegan oil field in Iran. The United States is putting intense pressure on Iran to curtail its nuclear
development program and one of the levers is to try to isolate Iran
economically. Japan's decision to reconsider its investment is a measure of the intensity of Washington's campaign. Japan imports all of the oil it
uses. It constantly is looking for long-term sources of oil as a matter of
core national policy. It also has a core national policy to maintain its
security relationship with the United States. The two cores collided, and
the United States won. The Japanese certainly are not happy to have been put in this position.

Making Japan unhappy is fairly gratuitous these days. What U.S. officials
really want to do is to make the Iranians unhappy. We suspect that they are quite unhappy with both the pressure and its effectiveness. What we continue to anticipate is the Iranian response. The student uprising in Iran has collapsed, but the Iranians continue to regard the rising as an American plot. It is very dangerous to make an enemy feel it is being crushed without actually crushing them. The heavier the pressure on the Iranians, without breaking them, the greater the pressure is for Iran to try to do something decisive -- like stir up the Iraqi Shiites. The United States is on a tightrope with Iran, which is why the faster Abiziad can get control of the situation in Iraq -- assuming he can get control -- the happier Washington is going to be.

Your Papers, Please
"...How did [Americans] manage to reverse [their] thinking? When did appeals to the lessons of history become treasonous? How did philosophic principles collapse into patriotic slogans? The answers to such questions underlie explanations for the much broader phenomenon of the collapse of Western civilization itself. Our very survival -- both as individuals and as a civilization -- depends upon a radical transformation of our thinking, one that compels us to confront those silent voices within us that can so easily erupt into bloodbaths..."

Butler Shaffer

Georgetown, Texas. Like a lynch mob fueled by a fear of the unknown and a willingness to see strangers as threats to be quickly dispatched, the herd impulse has, since 9/11, become mobilized on behalf of a war against shadows. Even beyond the violent and repressive reactions of the American government, the most unsettling consequence of the WTC attacks has been the nearly total collapse of the minds of most Americans.

For the duration of the war -- which government officials tell us will go on forever! -- men and women have rationed their intelligence and allowed what they would have heretofore regarded as their "fundamental principles" to be conscripted into the service of the state.

Americans who, five years ago, were so incensed at Bill Clinton's perjured testimony that impeachment proceedings were brought, now exhibit a willingness to be lied to about matters of far greater concern than oval office shenanigans. As the Bush administration continues to pile lie upon lie, it is evident that most Americans are completely indifferent to the purposes for the attack upon Iraq. I suspect that, if Bush and his fellow war conspirators were to publicly announce that the Iraqi invasion was deigned for no other purpose than to put money into their pockets, most Americans -- led by their electronic cheerleaders on talk-radio and cable television -- would praise them for showing "ambition" and "leadership!"

America is becoming the Nazi Germany we feared in my childhood. For those who were not around during those years, you can get a flavor for the anti-tyrannical sentiments of the time by watching any number of movies depicting the Nazi police-state. The constant presence of police; the insistence upon showing "your papers" to whichever government underling demanded them; the awareness that neither your person nor home was immune from state searches or seizures; the disappearance of people into unknown prison camps; neighbors spying upon neighbors, and children betraying their parents to the state; and the domination of society by a military and bureaucratic arrogance, arbitrariness, and absolutism, were constantly chilling examples of the dangers of state power.

How did we manage to reverse our thinking? When did appeals to the lessons of history become treasonous? How did philosophic principles collapse into patriotic slogans? The answers to such questions underlie explanations for the much broader phenomenon of the collapse of Western civilization itself. This is a topic around which my articles revolve, and has been addressed by numerous historians, as well as Carl Jung, whose psychological explanations add a depth to the inquiry unmatched by others.

A preoccupation with war has long been symptomatic of the decline of societies that practice it. Wars are essentially conducted by governments against their own people -- with "others" being held up as fear-objects around which to enlist the obedience and submission of their own citizenry. Any nation in wartime is telling us what George Bush, John Ashcroft, Tom Ridge, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, et al., are now telling us -- if we will suspend our indifference to truth long enough to observe -- namely, that society can only be held together by armed force, threats, imprisonment, and death. When coercion supplants cooperation; when the inviolability of the individual is sacrificed to some alleged collective security; and when violence is equated with "patriotism" and peace with "un-Americanism," the days of such a society are numbered.

<?<?For those who desire to understand the attraction that this violent, destructive system has for most of us, a new book, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, by Chris Hedges, offers one of the most powerful critiques of the war system since Randolph Bourne. Not content to moralize against war or to call it names, Hedges analyzes the topic from an historical, psychological, and institutional perspective, drawing upon literary and mythological works to illustrate his observations. At the same time, his book is quite critical of war, not the kind of read that flag-waving, "United We Stand" jingoists will find comforting.

Hedges has been a foreign correspondent for some fifteen years for such news organizations as the Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times. You may be more familiar with him as the recent commencement speaker at Rockford College, where he was hooted, heckled, and air-horned by war-lovers in the audience. Intellectual bankruptcy is another symptom of a dying culture, wherein discomforting ideas and criticisms can only be met with the kind of unfocused, thoughtless rage that is becoming increasingly evident in radio and television programming. For the herd-oriented, a new idea can only be countered not by clear thinking, but by blasts from an air-horn!

Hedges observes that "tates at war silence their own authentic and humane culture" and, in so doing, "erode the moral fabric" of a society. He adds: "[w]ar breaks down long-established prohibitions against violence, destruction, and murder," and leads to a situation in which "the domination and brutality of the battlefield is carried into personal life." "War," he goes on, "fills our spiritual void," and helps to erase "unsettling undercurrents of alienation and dislocation" in our lives. In words that reflect the disquieting climate in which we live, Hedges observes "a growing fusion between those in the state who wage war...and those who believe they understand and can act as agents for God."

I cannot exaggerate the importance of these observations. They force us, as do the writings of Jung, Krishnamurti, and others, to confront the "dark side" forces that reside within each of us no less than they did within tyrants and their supporters in other times and places. They also compel us to reconsider our thinking. The idea of creating systems designed to threaten, coerce, and kill, and to imbue such agencies with principled legitimacy, and not expect them to lead to wars, genocides, and other tyrannical practices, expresses an innocence we can no longer afford to indulge.

Hedges reminds us of the culture of war, which "is peddled by mythmakers" throughout society, including the modern media. You can observe such mythmaking as the media struggles to find evidence of "heroism" in a "war" that is more realistically described as a campaign of brutish bullying. A truckload of soldiers take a wrong turn on a road, are captured by Iraqi forces and later released, then brought back to America as "POW heroes"; the irresponsibility of single mothers leaving their infant children at home to go fight in a war; and the Hollywood-like staging of the "rescue" of Private Lynch, who is then brought back to America as a "heroine", are among the more apparent examples of the war system playing with smoke and mirrors in an effort to convince boobus Americanus of the nobility of the cause.

While the institutionalized butchery of the war system makes it difficult for me to equate it with heroism, one does, on occasion, find individual acts of a heroic quality even in battle. My favorite candidate for this role is Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot in the Vietnam War who came upon the scene of what we now know as the "My Lai Massacre." After becoming aware that what he was observing was not the ordinary combat of warfare, but a calculated slaughter of Vietnamese civilians by troops led by Lt. Calley, Thompson set his helicopter down between the civilians and the American troops. He then ordered his own crew to turn their machine guns on the American soldiers and, if they persisted in the slaughter, to fire on them. Thompson then took the civilians to safety and reported the incident, which led to the prosecution of Calley.

I doubt that there will be any statues of Hugh Thompson erected anywhere soon, or that he will be leading any Memorial Day parades. His actions were too heroic, for he stood up to the very excesses of butchery that Hedges informs us destroys our sense of humanity and, with it, our civilization. I would much rather have Hugh Thompson as my neighbor than I would any of the myriad of retired generals who became television network fixtures in the mythmaking to which we have become accustomed these past many months.

Our very survival -- both as individuals and as a civilization -- depends upon a radical transformation of our thinking, one that compels us to confront those silent voices within us that can so easily erupt into bloodbaths. While most of us continue to focus on the "Nazi holocaust" as the epitome of statist butchery, we must recall that the 20th century was the "holocaust century." Some 200,000,000 of our fellow human beings were slaughtered in various wars and genocides, and tens of millions more were wounded, both physically and spiritually, in ways that never heal.

Because we fear the responsibility for our actions, we have allowed ourselves to develop the mentality of slaves. Contrary to the stirring sentiments of the Declaration of Independence, we now pledge "our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor" not to one another for our mutual protection, but to the state, whose actions continue to exploit, despoil, and destroy us. The poet, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, declared: "I am waiting for the war to be fought which will make the world safe for anarchy." While I share his sentiment, it is nonetheless evident that wars only bring up from the depths of our dark side the kinds of moral flotsam and jetsam that have surfaced in Washington, D.C. In the process, they destroy those qualities of peace, liberty, spiritual centeredness, mutual respect, and sense of individual responsibility which, alone, make for the greatness of any civilization.

Butler Shaffer teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law.

BY DIANE RAVITCH
Tuesday, July 1, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT

Students across the state of New York recently took their Regents' examinations, the tests that they must pass in order to get a high school diploma. A year ago, the state education department was embarrassed when Jeanne Heifetz, a vigilant parent in Brooklyn, announced her discovery that state officials had expurgated literary selections on the English examination. Words and sentences that might offend anyone had been quietly deleted from passages by writers such as Elie Wiesel, Isaac Bashevis Singer, and Franz Kafka.

New York's penchant for bowdlerizing literature, it turns out, was not unique to the Empire State. The educational publishing industry follows very specific guidelines to ensure that school children are not exposed to words or topics that might be controversial, especially those that are related to gender, race, religion, or sex. I compiled a list of over 500 words that are banned by one or more publishers. Some are relatively obsolete, like "authoress" or "geezer," but others are everyday words that one is likely to encounter in the newspaper, like "landlord," "senior citizen," "dogma," "yacht" or "actress" (what would the late Katherine Hepburn have made of that?).


 

Since my book appeared, I have received a large number of letters from people in the educational publishing industry, offering fresh material about the sanitizing that occurs on a regular basis. In Michigan, the state does not allow mention of flying saucers or extraterrestrials on its test, because those subjects might imply the forbidden topic of evolution. A text illustrator wrote to say that she was not permitted to portray a birthday party because Jehovah's Witnesses do not believe in celebrating birthdays. Another illustrator told me that he was directed to airbrush the udder from his drawing of a cow because that body part was "too sexual."
A review of my book in the Scotsman, an Edinburgh newspaper, said that a well-known local writer for children sold a story to an American textbook company, along with illustrations. The U.S. publisher, however, informed her that she could not show a little girl sitting on her grandfather's lap, as the drawing implied incest. So, the author changed the adult's face, so that the little girl was sitting on her grandmother's lap instead. A contributor to a major textbook series prepared a story comparing the great floods in 1889 in Johnstown, Pa., with those in 1993 in the Midwest, but was unable to find an acceptable photograph. The publisher insisted that everyone in the rowboats must be wearing a lifevest to demonstrate safety procedures.

A freelance writer sent me the "bias guidelines" for a major publisher of texts and tests. The "bias guidelines" consist of advice to writers and editors about words and topics that must be avoided, as well as specifications for illustrations. Like other publishers, this one requires adherence to gender and ethnic balance. All lessons, test questions, and illustrations must reflect the following ratios: 50-50 male-female; 45% Caucasian; 25% African American; 22% Hispanic American; 5% Asian American; 5% American Indian and others; and 3% "persons with disabilities." These figures do not total 100%, nor do they represent actual U.S. Census numbers, but the principle of representation is well understood by writers and editors. American society, as represented in the textbooks, is perfectly integrated by race, ethnicity, gender, age, and disability.

When it comes to illustrations in textbooks, certain images--women cooking, men acting assertive, scenes of poverty, and old people walking with the aid of a cane or a walker--are likewise considered unacceptable. The specifications for photographs, I have learned, are exquisitely detailed. Men and boys must not be larger than women and girls. Asians must not appear as shorter than non-Asians. Women must wear bras, and men must not have noticeable bulges below the waist. People must wear shoes and socks, never showing bare feet or the soles of shoes, and their shoelaces must be solid black, brown, or white. People must never gesture with their fingers, nor should anyone be depicted eating with the left hand. Things to avoid: holiday decorations and scenes in which a church or a bar appears in the background.

There are so many rules, one wonders how they manage to keep track of them. Even after its national humiliation a year ago, the New York State Education Department still manages to make mistakes. On the last administration of the Regents' English examination in January, the state asked high school seniors to write about a poem by Matthew Arnold. However, the examination did not mention the name of this famous poem ("Dover Beach"); it inexplicably offered only one stanza of the four-stanza poem; and it changed or misquoted an important line. Instead of Arnold's exclamation, "Ah, love, let us be true to one another!" it stated, "Ah, friend, let us be true to one another!"


 

As the example shows, bowdlerization is not only dishonest, it leads to dumbing down of language and ideas. And of one thing I am convinced: The widespread censorship of language and ideas in education caused by the demands of advocacy groups will not end unless it is regularly exposed to public review and ridicule. The next time someone in a publishing office or a state education agency suggests deleting a literary passage from a test or textbook because it contains the word "anchorman" or shows a witch flying around on a broomstick, perhaps someone in the room will say, "Wait, if we do that, people will laugh at us."

Ms. Ravitch is author of "The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What Students Learn" (Knopf, 2003).

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THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
26 June 2003
 
by Dr. George Friedman
 
Summer Offensive

Summary

When we step back, the broader picture of the U.S.-al Qaeda war
becomes clearer. It appears to us that both sides are gearing up
for a summer offensive. Each, for its own reasons, is going to
try to engage in operations in a series of theaters, including in
the United States. This does not mean the offensives will be
successful. It does mean we can expect complex action from both
sides on a broad geographic scale. These need not be individual
large-scale operations, but collectively they will constitute
significant attempts to get an advantage in the war.

Analysis

The conquest of Iraq has created an interesting dynamic in the
war. Both sides are now under pressure to launch summer
offensives. Al Qaeda must demonstrate its continued viability.
The United States must exploit the victory in Iraq and disrupt al
Qaeda operations globally. This indicates to us that both sides
will carry out intense operations over the next few months.

If we look at the world through al Qaeda's eyes, the period since
the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has consisted of a series of
significant reversals. First, a U.S. offensive dislodged the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Second, the hoped-for insurrection
among the Islamic masses did not materialize. The primary goal of
the Sept. 11 assault -- to prompt a rising in the Muslim world
designed to create an Islamic regime in at least one country, to
serve as al Qaeda's anchor -- did not take place. Finally, Iraq
was occupied. The Baathist regime was no friend of al Qaeda,
except in the sense that the two shared an enemy. Nevertheless,
it appears in the Islamic world that al Qaeda has cost Iraq its
freedom.

In short, al Qaeda has little to show for Sept. 11 except
significant losses and failure. If this trend continues, as we
argued in our second-quarter forecast, al Qaeda will begin an
irreversible disintegration process, with support personnel
concluding that the organization has ceased to be operational and
therefore beginning to fall away. It is insufficient for al
Qaeda's network to assert operational capability; it must
demonstrate this capability. Thus, during the past quarter al
Qaeda has conducted operations in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and
possibly in Chechnya. Al Qaeda networks also have been disrupted
in Southeast Asia and Africa. The last few months were not
decisive; while they demonstrated that al Qaeda still was
functional, they did not demonstrate that the organization
remained fully effective.

Al Qaeda's challenge in the next few months will be intensified
over time -- we are moving toward the second anniversary of Sept.
11. Al Qaeda has developed an operational model in which it
launches major attacks about once every two years. The
organization's supporters could rationalize that the dearth of
major attacks over the past two years dealt more with operational
tempo than disruptions in the network. That excuse is going away
soon: Al Qaeda must demonstrate its ability to launch a single
major operation or, alternatively, a substantial cluster of
secondary operations.

While al Qaeda is under pressure to attack, the United States is
under the same pressure, deriving from a very different cause.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq was not an end in itself: It was
designed to set the stage for follow-on operations that would
shatter al Qaeda's infrastructure -- both by direct assaults on
al Qaeda and, indirectly, by pressuring regimes that have not
sufficiently controlled al Qaeda supporters. With that stage now
set, the primary value of the Iraq campaign will be Washington's
ability to rapidly exploit the advantage it has gained.

It follows from this, of course, that al Qaeda and its allies
must undermine the U.S. victory in Iraq. The current guerrilla
war has its origins in the Baathist desire to engage, attrite and
defeat the United States, but Islamists outside Iraq who have an
interest in limiting Washington's ability to exploit its victory
are supporting it directly. The guerrilla war serves a number of
functions, one of the most important of which is to tie down U.S.
forces and limit the bandwidth of U.S. command so it cannot
effectively exploit the Iraq victory.

As happens in war, therefore, events have combined to create a
sort of swirling engagement -- this time on a global scale. The
United States is attacking al Qaeda along multiple axes, and the
group is counterattacking. Each side has critical advantages, and
the outcome is unclear. Therefore, to gain conceptual control
over the operation, the United States -- with far greater
resources and therefore far greater opportunities for conceptual
confusion -- must build a system of theaters for organizing and
managing the war. This already has been done; now is the time
that the organization is being implemented operationally.

U.S. operational theaters can be divided this way:

1. Homeland: U.S. intelligence services appear to be moving from
surveillance to disruption mode. Both modes are necessary. In the
surveillance mode, the primary goal is to trace relationships to
map the full extent of the network. In the disruption mode,
security services attack the network -- either because they are
confident they have mapped its full extent, or because they feel
the risk of passive surveillance is too high. There are two risks
to be balanced: If the network is assaulted too early, large
segments might be left untouched; but if the surveillance
continues for too long, the network might be able to attack in
spite of surveillance. There is no science to this, and the art
generates many gray hairs since an error either way could be
disastrous. The exogenous factor driving decisions is the
perception of the imminence of attacks -- the greater the
perception of imminence, the greater the pressure to move from
the intelligence mode to the police mode and make arrests. Recent
actions, including the public arrest of an Ohio truck driver,
indicate that an offensive against known networks in the United
States is under way. Washington is shutting down known and
suspected networks to disrupt an al Qaeda offensive.

2. Afghan-Pakistan Theater: U.S. and allied forces continue to
come under attack in Afghanistan, despite the fact that they have
been playing a relatively passive role. There does not seem to be
a plan to launch a major counteroffensive against groups within
Afghanistan, but an offensive clearly is under way along the
country's border with Pakistan, in the north. The goal apparently
is to repeat the events of the winter 2001-2002 offensive in
Afghanistan: attack, disperse and disrupt al Qaeda command and
control facilities that appear to have redeployed to the remote
regions along the border. The offensive has been under way for a
while, but it clearly will intensify, which was one of the themes
of the Musharraf-Bush summit earlier this week. For Washington,
the capture or death of Osama bin Laden is a desirable end, but
not the principle end. The principle end is to destroy al Qaeda's
strategic command while undermining tactical and operational
capabilities in the United States.

3. Africa: Last week, a B-52 bomber on a training mission dropped
munitions that accidentally killed a U.S. Marine and wounded
several others near Djibouti. It struck us as interesting that
forces in Djibouti, which normally would be training for fairly
low-intensity conflict, would have been conducting exercises with
B-52s -- an expensive endeavor that is unlikely to be undertaken
without reason. The task force at Djibouti is responsible for the
Horn of Africa region as well as operations deeper in Africa. The
United States clearly has intense concerns over Kenya, where it
issued a major alert and closed its embassy for several days last
week. There also are indications of concern about al Qaeda in
Sudan. One example: A ship laden with explosives was captured
recently by Greek special forces. The ship was traced to Northern
Ireland, and Sudan claimed ownership of the explosives on board.
There have been concerns about al Qaeda using Sudan as a base of
operations in the past, rendering the ownership of the munitions
particularly interesting. A group of al Qaeda operatives were
captured in Malawi earlier this week and have been transferred to
U.S. control. Meanwhile, U.S. President George W. Bush will
travel to Africa in early July, with visits planned to Senegal,
South Africa, Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria. The visit to Uganda
is particularly interesting, since it is strategically placed in
relation to al Qaeda's area of operations. In our view, a
campaign against al Qaeda is intensifying in Africa and will
become more visible over the summer.

4. Iraq region: U.S. and British forces are under attack
throughout Iraq. If disorganized mobs are doing the attacking,
then so much the worse, since it is more difficult to shut down a
disorganized operation. However, our view is that there is a
substantial degree of control over many of the operations against
U.S. forces, and Washington is under pressure to deal with the
situation. Reconstruction and development are more difficult in
an insecure environment, and persistent attacks on pipelines will
undermine the U.S. ability to underwrite costs through the sale
of oil. Perhaps more important, the perception that the United
States is incapable of bringing operations in the region under
control will undermine Washington's ability to exert pressure on
Iran and Syria, and to maintain the current relationship with
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, U.S. officials are under substantial
pressure to manage the insurrection more effectively -- and that
will mean a summer offensive.

There are other areas, such as Southeast Asia and Latin America,
that are highly relevant, but where the United States might not
launch intense offensives -- either because the threat hasn't
matured, the networks are already disrupted or due to resource
constraints. What is clear is that the summer will bring overt
and covert operations for the United States in multiple theaters
of operation worldwide.

It also means that if the United States makes headway, al Qaeda
will have to come to life. First, if the United States is
effective, it will have to protect itself. Second, if the United
States is effective, al Qaeda will face a use-it-or-lose-it
situation. If its assets are being rolled up, there is little
incentive for the network to continue to patiently preserve those
assets. It is paradoxical, but in the short run, the more
effective the U.S. operation is, the greater the danger from al
Qaeda becomes. Finally, al Qaeda itself is under pressure due to
its own circumstances to demonstrate that it remains capable. A
recent videotape and communique from al Qaeda's head of training
both assert that an offensive is in the offing. On the whole, we
think that is true.

The bottom line is that both sides in the war -- al Qaeda and the
United States -- are looking at this summer and fall as critical
periods. The United States must make some decisive inroads
against both al Qaeda and the regimes that do not control its
members. Al Qaeda must demonstrate that, in spite of U.S.
pressure, it remains a viable organization. This demonstration
could involve a series of smaller-scale operations -- as in Saudi
Arabia -- or a major Sept. 11-level operation in the United
States. But it seems to us that both sides need to make a move
soon, and we are therefore looking for a summer offensive that
stretches into fall. It will be an intense, complex and dangerous
period.
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We suppose it does not constitute news to say the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan is in trouble, but it represents the primary event of the day. The reason is simple: If Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorate to the levels of violence seen in the not-too-distant past, the implications will go
beyond Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The goal of U.S. President George W. Bush's administration, from the beginning, was to isolate this issue and quell tensions by reducing U.S. intrusion. Sept. 11, 2001, reduced that possibility dramatically, and the invasion of Iraq
eliminated the possibility. An element of diplomacy leading up to the war,
particularly in the Islamic world, was the guarantee of best efforts on the
part of the United States in creating a solution to the problem.

When the United States maneuvered to box Saudi Arabia into a measure of support for the war effort, a U.S.-supported peace plan for Israel and the PNA was part of the deal. Despite serious and justified misgivings on the part of the United States, having the example of the Camp David disaster in front of it, the United States made the guarantee. The peace plan's failure would have two results. First, Islamic governments that were relatively pro-Washington would face increased pressures from internal forces arguing that the United States betrayed its commitment to find a peaceful solution. Second, it could create a situation in which two insurrections are going on simultaneously -- one in Israel and one in Iraq -- which would be portrayed by many as a single conflict separated only by Jordan. Thus, keeping the lid on it has become, in spite of initial intentions, a fundamental interest for the United States, with failure carrying substantially potential penalties.

At the same time, the United States is seriously limited in the pressure it
can put on Israel. This is not because of the Jewish lobby's power in
Washington, which certainly is not trivial but also is not nearly as
decisive at this point as some would claim. Moreover, Jewish opinion is
hardly monochromatic anymore. Rather, the problem is symmetry. The United States is engaged in a war against Islamists believed to support terrorism. Israel is involved in a war against Islamists for the same reason. Washington is trying extremely hard to convince others to participate in the war, using the logic that radical Islamic forces equally threatened everyone. If the United States presses Israel to compromise with Hamas while at the same time pressuring everyone else -- such as Pakistan -- to take an uncompromising role on Islamic fundamentalism, inconsistency would be the least of its problems. It would have created a framework for compromise with Islamic fundamentalism that other countries would seize.

This is the basis of today's strange events, which included a statement by
senior Hamas leader Abu Shanab, who said, "What is the point in speaking in rhetoric? Let's be frank, we cannot destroy Israel. The practical solution is for us to have a state alongside Israel." Alongside this was a statement from Bush -- who might have been expected to latch onto Shanab's statement -- that "I urge the leaders in Europe and around the world to take swift, decisive action against terror groups such as Hamas, to cut off their funding and support, as the United States has done."

Shanab, considered a moderate, does not speak for Hamas, and some Hamas sources denied that he ever said that. This is the problem. A split appears to have developed within Hamas between a faction that essentially is prepared to shift to the stance taken by the PNA of accepting the existence of Israel, and a larger group that is unprepared to take that step. That split has kept Hamas from giving a definitive answer to the question of a cease-fire. Vastly conflicting signals have been given, leading to the expectation -- for days now -- that a cease-fire was near.

The problem has been that the only cease-fire Hamas can offer with any unity is one that doesn't commit Hamas to any time period, that doesn't guarantee long-term cessation of hostilities and certainly doesn't agree overtly to the existence of Israel. From Israel's point of view, this is the best of all outcomes. First, it shifts the burden of failure to Hamas, pushing the United States into confrontation with it. Second, it frees Israel from the burden of a cease-fire, which it regards simply as an opportunity for Palestinians to regroup under its protection. Israeli officials have no interest in a short-term cease-fire, don't think they can get a long-term cease-fire and want the blame for failure to rest on Hamas.

From Hamas' point of view, an explicit recognition of Israel would give away a critical bargaining chip and would, in addition, alienate its political
base, which might move toward another organization like Islamic Jihad or
simply split Hamas into two factions, with the pro-recognition faction
simply drifting into the PNA coalition. Nothing on the ground would change.

U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will be in the region this
weekend. Undoubtedly, any chance for a solution to this problem will have to wait for her arrival, since all factions on both sides now are posturing for the benefit of the United States. Bush has lashed out at Hamas in an apparent last-ditch attempt to frighten it into a compromise. After all, this entire process began when Hamas said the power of the United States had reached a level that made remaining outside the peace process untenable. Possibly the threat of a direct confrontation with the United States will sway Hamas' leaders to move toward Shanab's position. More likely, it will persuade Shanab to shift his position back to the main Hamas line.

There is not much left to this process, barring a major surprise from Hamas. Therefore, it is time to consider not whether there will be a cease-fire, but the level to which the next round of violence will rise. We expect this to depend on the rise in Iraq. If the violence can be sustained and the
United States perceived as unable to suppress it, the attraction of a double Intifada might be too much for Islamic forces to resist. If the United States can suppress the guerrilla movement, the perception of American power and relentlessness might cause Hamas to recalculate its position once again. Crises are blending together in the region. We suspect the Bush administration is acutely aware of this.

Stop Blaming, Wise Up to Postwar Realities

A clever foe may have an 'occupation fatigue' strategy for victory
             
by Caleb Carr, Caleb Carr, a military historian and a novelist, is the author of "The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians" (Random House, updated 2003) and "The Alienist" (Random House, 1994).


Americans have a long tradition of blaming their own civilian and uniformed commanders for wartime setbacks instead of recognizing the success of an enemy's efforts. There's a very good chance that this tradition is alive, well and hard at work in Iraq today.

The occupation goes badly. The press, the media and members of Congress demand to know: Who is to blame? As perhaps befits the most narcissistic (along with the most advanced and generous) society in world history, we Americans don't like to believe that our fate is ever out of our own hands or that anyone else in the world can beat our best efforts. When we fail, it must be the fault of our own incompetence.

Take Little Big Horn, for example. Gen. George Armstrong Custer was an arrogant fool, runs the standard wisdom, who rode blindly into an obvious trap. Actually, the Sioux chieftains Sitting Bull and, especially, Crazy Horse were two of the greatest ? and cleverest ? unconventional warriors in modern history.

And Pearl Harbor? Americans were asleep, runs the same strain of thinking, insensible to the dangers around them. Actually, the American armed forces knew that such an attack was possible and had even war-gamed it; but no war game could prepare them for the precise planning and the truly astounding daring of one of the premier offensive geniuses of World War II, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto.

And what of the only war the United States ever lost (an arguable epithet), Vietnam? Didn't we go down in defeat because our people and politicians stabbed our commanders in their collective back after making them fight the war with one hand tied behind it? Actually, no. American soldiers were overwhelmingly well supplied and fought bravely; but their commanders ? often men who had acquitted themselves well in prior conflicts ? were simply outwitted by Ho Chi Minh and his creative and determined military right arm, Vo Nguyen Giap, both past masters of a variety of war with which we had little or no experience.

To put those experiences in terms that our plain-talking President Bush might understand, we got whupped; and right now, we may ? may ? be on our way to getting whupped in Iraq.

We like to believe that when Saddam Hussein spoke of dragging the United States into Armageddon, he meant a war involving weapons of mass destruction, and that we were simply too quick and overpowering to allow such a scenario to develop.

But what if the Iraqi dictator actually realized that we would be so overpowering? And what if, acting on this realization, he abandoned a biochemical campaign before the war started, destroying or hiding his weapons of mass destruction deep underground, in terrain controlled by his most ardent supporters, while stockpiling enough cash to bankroll a different kind of Armageddon?

I'm speaking here of a carefully planned effort to sow anarchy and thus a desire among the Iraqi people for the return of a strong hand, as well as a complementary effort to destroy American domestic will when it comes to sustaining a gruesome and grueling occupation.

If "occupation fatigue" is indeed taking root in the American consciousness, it is not the fault of failed or cooked intelligence ? the subjects that are getting the most attention from critics of the Iraq undertaking. We should remember, after all, that American leaders from the founding fathers to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and beyond have flat-out lied about war aims, threats and intelligence in order to get the American people ? who generally have no taste for war ? to fight.

The American Revolution did not, ultimately, fulfill its promise of making all or even most men, to say nothing of women, equal (although few would argue this was reason to abort the separation from Britain); and FDR told legendary lies about such things as the Greer incident (in which the U.S. Navy provoked a German submarine attack on the destroyer, after which Washington tried to spin the event as German aggression) and the Lend-Lease program (which saw American supply and weapons shipments reach Britain before Congress had approved their dispatch).

Even if the Bush administration exaggerated the immediacy of the threat of Iraqi WMDs, it did not create the fact of Hussein's addiction to such weapons, any more than FDR fabricated the danger that totalitarian states posed to the world when he misrepresented what was going on in the North Atlantic before Pearl Harbor.

This is not to say that the American intelligence community did not make grievous mistakes before and during the Iraq war. But analysts trying to determine why we're in such a mess in Iraq right now by deciding which American leader or agency got us there are ignoring the possibility that Hussein may have had this mess in mind all along. And if that is the case, then we're in even deeper trouble than we thought: Hussein has been planning and organizing his unconventional resistance for a considerable period, while we have only begun to figure out a way to counteract it.

The continuing violence means that Iraq is not yet ready for the Middle Eastern Marshall Plan we were once so convinced that the Iraqis wanted. Let's remember that in order to implement the Marshall Plan, we destroyed Germany and dealt with the German populace ruthlessly. Had anyone in the former Nazi Reich mounted the kind of violent dissatisfaction with the pace of our charitable intentions that we're seeing in Iraq, they would have been arrested or wiped out, no questions asked.

Do we now want to shift gears toward a similarly draconian preparation for reconstruction in Iraq? Perhaps not, but the war is clearly not over, despite what Bush said during his patently silly amateur theatrics on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln.

The Pentagon must, however reluctantly, send in not only additional Special Forces units (the only troops we have that are capable of handling this situation without alienating the Iraqi people) to pick apart the resistance machine, but also police troops to meet the public safety emergency, as well as extra engineering units to restore services quickly.

We were all supposed to be happy friends in Iraq by now. But our antagonist may have proved, once again, to be a damnably clever opponent. Before we get entirely swept up with finding people on our own side to blame (there will be ample time for that later), we ought to be about the business of devising new schemes to neutralize our foe ? schemes even more imaginative than those admirable plans that brought us into Baghdad so quickly.

Upholding liberty in America
 
Edward Crane and William Niskanen
 
Published: June 24 2003 20:17
 

 

In the aftershock of September 11 2001, there is a greater awareness among most Americans of how precious their freedom is. They also realise the need for better government intelligence work to fight terrorism. But they should not let the government usurp basic liberties.

This is a danger as more and more anti-terrorist laws and rules strait-jacket the nation. There is a congruent danger: the rise of neo-conservatism on the right. The movement is using the threat of terrorism to expand government at home and abroad. America must safeguard its freedoms in the fight against terrorism, but protect itself from pernicious policies that erode freedom in the name of liberty.

Since September 11, Congress and the Justice Department have implemented laws and rules to protect America. But some of these new steps threaten civil liberties. One example is the Patriot Act. This 131-page law, which few legislators read, abandons procedural norms and expands the power of the executive branch, which is already too powerful.

Under no circumstances should an American be held captive in the US indefinitely, with no charges filed and no legal representation afforded. Yet this has happened under the Patriot Act. And now there is talk of a Patriot II. James Buchanan, the Nobel laureate, argues that governments will acquire more power when the opportunity arises. History shows this to be true, and the Patriot law reflects it. Today, with the war on terrorism, the opportunities for the state to expand are ubiquitous. Both liberals and conservatives are turning a blind eye to unnecessary usurpations of power, if not openly calling for them.

Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard law professor, has mooted the idea of "torture warrants", by which courts could authorise the use of torture to elicit information. The neo-conservative agenda is a particular threat to liberty - perhaps greater than the ideologically spent ideas of left-liberalism. Always a movement of bright intellectual leaders, neo-conservatism has mostly been a movement with a head but no body. One rarely runs into a neo-con on the street.

Underlying neo-conservatism is a desire to reshape America and the world through the efforts of a robust federal government. For years The Weekly Standard, the neo-conservative magazine, has pushed for initiatives to reinforce US international power. Merely living in a free society appears to be insufficient for neo-conservatives.

During George W. Bush's campaign for president, the neo-conservative influence was felt in domestic policy ideas such as faith-based initiatives that would involve the federal government in private local charities, often with a religious orientation. It was also seen in the call for a greater federal role in local education. These are both inconsistent with the concepts of limited government and federalism.

But neo-cons tend to be dismissive of the idea that the federal government should be limited to the protection of an individual's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. As William Kristol, editor of the Standard, has put it: "Are we willing to say that the country is worse off because of FDR or JFK or LBJ? I'm not willing to say that." So much for limited government.

During his campaign, Mr Bush said many sensible things about foreign policy, including the need for the US to have "humility" in its relations with other nations. But since September 11, neo-conservative influence on US foreign policy has reached new heights. We have grave concerns over the doctrine of preventive war and the seeming abdication of the responsibilities of Congress with respect to committing lives and treasure to armed conflict.

Some in the neo-conservative movement have openly called for an American empire around the globe. Max Boot, the writer, recently praised what he termed America's "imperialism" and said it should impose its views "at gunpoint". James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has called for a decades-long campaign to reorder the entire Middle East along neo-conservative lines. Such thinking is profoundly un-American.

All is not gloom. What is needed now is for limited government conservatives of the variety exemplified by President Ronald Reagan and Senator Barry Goldwater to join forces with libertarians and enlightened liberals who respect civil liberties. They should speak out in support of America's heritage of liberty.

Globalisation has been primarily an American undertaking and it has been good for the world's poor. The country's science, technology and entrepreneurship are healing the sick, cleaning the environment and making the world a better and more enjoyable place in which to live. The US is a great nation with little to apologise for. It has an enemy to defeat. The challenge is not to defeat itself.

Edward Crane is founder and president of the Cato Institute and William Niskanen is its chairman

Geopolitical Diary: Friday, June 20, 2003
Jun 20, 2003

The war in Iraq continued today with more attacks and casualties. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell downplayed the significance of his visit to the Middle East, saying it was just another day. The United States continued to warn Iran about developing nuclear weapons while Iran continued to resist. They are the same stories, different day.

The situation in Britain is a much more interesting tale. British Prime Minister Tony Blair is now in trouble. Whether he faces a mortal blow or not is not clear, but we tend to believe that his ability to govern is in rapid decline, with little to reverse it. The issue is Iraq. Two former ministers who resigned from Blair's cabinet have made the claim that Blair bypassed the normal operations of the British cabinet in making the decision to go to war with Iraq. More damaging is the claim that intelligence reports that should have gone to the cabinet were suppressed, while laundered versions tilted to support the decision to go to war were distributed instead. According to the ministers, the United States and Britain decided last summer to invade Iraq, with the date set for February. The justification for the war came later.

Stratfor has regarded this as the decision-making process since last fall, so obviously, we tend to believe the ministers. What is interesting, however, is the manner in which Blair is being weakened. This is particularly interesting when compared to the way his American counterpart, U.S. President George W. Bush, is not being weakened, certainly not equally.

The issue here is duplicity in the making of foreign policy, in particular, carrying out certain policies with differing public and private justifications. Duplicity in foreign policy is an essential characteristic, much as it is in a good marriage. If your wife asks you if she looks as good as she did 30 years ago, what are you going to say? When former U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was asked why he was aiding the Soviet Union, he had two potential answers. One was to say that he was aiding a blood thirsty dictator -- Joseph Stalin -- because he wanted the Red Army to bleed Nazi Germany dry, so that the United States could come in for the kill at the lowest possible cost. He certainly could have said it, but he took the second route. He avoided public justification for ignoring the nature of the Soviet regime, ignoring the cynical use of Soviet lives to ease the American way into Europe and simply emphasized the need to defeat Nazi leader Adolph Hitler. When asked about his true thoughts about Lend-Lease to Britain prior to the war, FDR simply tap danced around the question. His plans were crisp in his mind -- support Britain regardless of the Neutrality Act. His actions frequently went beyond the limits of the law. His speeches were designed to obscure reality.

When we look at the statecraft of a Roosevelt, we see that in a democratic society, politicians frequently lie about their true motives. Instead, they invent acceptable fabrications, so they don't have to state publicly what they think privately. This is not so much to fool the public, although FDR certainly intended to do that. Rather it is to avoid stating publicly to allies what your true intention is. Had FDR publicly stated that his strategy with the Soviets was to use them to bleed the Wehrmacht dry, it would have created an untenable situation for Stalin. Stalin was not exactly na?ve. He knew that the United States had him by the short hairs, and that the squeeze would be hard. He knew he had no choice. But it is one thing to understand that you are being hammered and another thing to admit it.

If the United States and Britain admitted publicly their real motives -- that they intended to squeeze the Saudis, Syrians and Iranians by occupying Iraq -- they would not have created a domestic political problem. However, without the domestic political problem, it would have been much more difficult for the Saudis, for example, to allow themselves to be squeezed. It is much easier to capitulate if you are permitted to keep your dignity than if you are going to be publicly humiliated.

And herein is the tale: As it becomes increasingly clear that the United States had complex geopolitical motives for invading Iraq and that WMD played only a small part in it, the U.S. public is relatively comfortable. The only ones getting excited are those who opposed the policy regardless of justification. There is no great shift in the polls over this issue. The American public appears to be more comfortable with both the underlying reason and the need to fabricate public justifications because, in the end, they simply supported the strategy.

Blair is in much bigger trouble, because the British public didn't support the general strategy and, more important, because Blair is from the Labor Party and his own party fragmented over the war. The WMD issue was more important to Blair because the Labor Party required a justification other than strategic requirements. This is because, in the end, Britain has somewhat different strategic requirements than does the United States. In particular, the Labor Party is uncomfortable with realpolitik and has been for a long time. The revelations have shown Blair to have been a cynical manipulator in the grand tradition, and that won't wash in the Labor Party. Nor are the Tories, who are more comfortable with this, likely to bail him out.

We suspect that in the end, Blair will execute a graceful exit. For Bush, the critical quesiton will not be whether he lied about WMD, but whether he can pacify Iraq and achieve his strategic goals in the region. For Blair, it is about what he did; for Bush, it is about what he will do. Since Blair can't change what he did, his enemies will bring him down. Bush is far from safe, but at least his fate is in his hands.

Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
18 June 2003
 
by Dr. George Friedman
 
Guerrilla War in Iraq

Summary

The United States is now clearly involved in a guerrilla war in
the Sunni regions of Iraq. As a result, U.S. forces are engaging
in counterinsurgency operations, which historically have proven
most difficult and trying -- for both American forces and
American politics. Suppressing a guerrilla operation without
alienating the indigenous population represents an extreme
challenge to the United States that at this point does not appear
avoidable -- and the seriousness of which does not appear to be
broadly understood.

Analysis

The United States currently is involved in an extended, low-
intensity conflict in Iraq. More precisely, it is involved in a
guerrilla war in the Sunni areas of the country, including much
of Baghdad proper as well an arc that runs from due west to the
north. The almost daily guerrilla attacks against U.S. forces
have resulted in nearly 50 deaths since U.S. President George W.
Bush declared the end of major military operations; they also
have tied down a substantial number of troops in
counterinsurgency operations, two of which (Operations Peninsula
Freedom and Desert Scorpion) have been launched already.

The war is not strategically insignificant, even though the level
of intensity is relatively low at this point. Guerrilla warfare
can have a disproportionate effect strategically, even when it
can be tactically and operationally managed.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that it violates the
principles of economy of force: The quantity of force required to
contain a guerrilla operation is inherently disproportionate
because the guerrilla force is dispersed over a large geographic
area, and its stealth and mobility requires a much larger force
to contain. Second, guerrilla war generates political realities
that affect the strategic level of war. Because of the nature of
counterinsurgency operations, guerrillas can generate a
simultaneous perception of weakness and brutality, regardless of
the intentions of the conventional forces. Since guerrillas
choose the time and place of their own attacks and use mobility
to evade counterattacks, the guerrilla appears to be outfighting
the regular forces. Even when they are merely holding their own
or even losing, their continued operation generates a sense of
power for the guerrillas and weakness for the counterguerrilla
force.

The nature of counterinsurgency requires that guerrillas be
distinguished from the general population. This is
extraordinarily difficult, particularly when the troops trying to
make the distinction are foreign, untrained in the local language
and therefore culturally incapable of making the subtle
distinctions needed for surgical identification. The result is
the processing of large numbers of noncombatants in the search
for a handful of guerrillas. Another result is the massive
intrusion of force into a civilian community that may start out
as neutral or even friendly, but which over time becomes hostile
-- not only because of the constant intrusions, but also because
of the inevitable mistakes committed by troops who are trying to
make sense of what appears to them an incoherent situation.

There is another level on which the guerrilla war intersects
strategy. The United States invaded Iraq in order to be perceived
as a decisive military power and to set the stage for military
operations elsewhere. Guerrilla warfare inevitably undermines the
regional perception of U.S. power -- justly or not -- while
creating the impression that the United States is limited in what
it can do in the region militarily.

Thus, the United States is in a tough spot. It cannot withdraw
from Iraq and therefore must fight. But it must fight in such a
way that avoids four things:

1. It cannot fight a war that alienates the general Iraqi
populace sufficiently to generate recruits for the guerrillas and
undermine the occupation.

2. It cannot lose control of the countryside; this could
destabilize the entire occupation.

3. It cannot allow the guerrilla operation to undermine its
ability to project forces elsewhere.

4. It cannot be allowed to extend the length of the conflict to
such an extent that the U.S. public determines that the cost is
not worth the prize. The longer the war, the clearer the
definition of the prize must be.

Therefore, the task for U.S. forces is:

1. Identify the enemy.

2. Isolate the enemy from his supplies and from the population.

3. Destroy him.

The dos and don'ts of guerrilla warfare are easy to write about,
but much more difficult to put into practice.

The centerpiece of guerrilla warfare, even more than other types
of war, is intelligence. Knowing who the enemy is, where he is
and what he plans to do is the key to stopping him. In Vietnam,
the North Vietnamese had much better intelligence about these
three things than the United States. Over time, despite material
weakness, they were able to turn this and a large pool of
manpower into victory by forcing the United States to do the four
things it should never have done.

Since intelligence is the key, we must consider the fact that
this war began in an intelligence failure. The core assumption of
U.S. intelligence was that once the Baath regime lost Baghdad, it
would simply disappear. Stratfor had speculated that Saddam
Hussein had a postwar plan for a national redoubt in the north
and northeast, but our analysis rejected the idea of a guerrilla
war on the basis that Iraq's terrain would not support one.

Nevertheless, it is the strategy the Baathists apparently have
chosen to follow. In retrospect, the strange capitulation of
Baghdad -- where large Iraqi formations simply melted away --
appears to have been calculated to some degree. In Afghanistan,
the Taliban forces were not defeated in the cities. They declined
combat, withdrawing and dispersing, then reorganizing and
returning to guerrilla warfare. Hussein appears to have taken a
page from that strategy. Certainly, most of his forces did not
carry out a strategic retreat to return as guerrilla fighters;
most went home. However, a cadre of troops -- first encountered
as Mujahideen fighters in Basra, An Nasiriyah and Karbala -- seem
to have withdrawn to fight as guerrillas.

What is important is that they have retained cohesion. That does
not necessarily mean that they are all being controlled from a
central location, although the tempo of operations -- daily
attacks in different locations -- seems to imply an element of
planning by someone. It does mean that the basic infrastructure
needed to support the operation was in place prior to the war:

1. Weapons and reserve weapons caches placed in locations known
to some level of the command.

2. A communications system, whether simply messengers or
communications gear, linking components together by some means.

3. Intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities designed to
identify targets and limit enemy intelligence from penetrating
their capabilities.

The central question is how they do this. First, how many and
what kind of weapons are stored, and where are they? Not only in
terms of conventional weapons, but also of weapons of mass
destruction. This is a critical question. We continue to suspect
that Hussein had chemical and possibly biological weapons before
the U.S.-led war. Where are the weapons now? Are they stored in
some way? Are they available for use, for example, against U.S.
base camps at some point?

Second, what is the command and control system? Are these
autonomous units operating without central control, are they
centrally controlled or is it a mixed system? Suddenly, the
question of Hussein's whereabouts ceases to be irrelevant. Are
Hussein and his lieutenants operating the war from a bunker
somewhere? How do they communicate with whatever command
authority might exist?

How can U.S. intelligence penetrate and disrupt the guerrilla
movement? The United States is best at electronic and image
intelligence. If the guerrillas stay away from electronic
communications except in extreme cases, electronic intelligence
will not work. As for image intelligence, it might be used to
find arms caches, but it is generally not particularly helpful in
a guerrilla war at this level.

Vo Nguyen Giap, who commanded communist forces against both
France and the United States in Vietnam, divided guerrilla war
into three stages:

1. Stage one: very small unit, hit-and-run actions without any
attempt to hold territory.

2. Stage two: continuation of stage one attacks combined with
larger units, regimental and below, engaging in more intense
attacks and taking and holding remote terrain as needed.

3. Stage three: conventional warfare against a weakened enemy who
is engaged and defeated.

Giap argued that the transition between stages is the key to
successful guerrilla operations: Too late or too early are the
issues. In Iraq, the guerrillas have a separate problem -- the
terrain makes the concentration of forces too risky. It is one
thing to mass several companies of light infantry in the
Vietnamese jungle. It is another thing to do the same in the
Iraqi desert. The Iraqi Achilles heel is that the transition from
the current level of operations is very difficult to achieve.

This is the same problem facing the U.S. forces. If a guerrilla
war is to be won, the second stage is the point at which it can
be won. During the first stage, the ratio between operational
costs and damage to the enemy is prohibitive. Carrying out
battalion-sized operations to capture or kill three guerrillas is
not only exhausting, it also undermines popular support for
counterinsurgency measures. In a stage two operation, the ratios
are more acceptable. But the Iraqis can't move to stage two
without playing into the hands of the Americans.

That seems to argue that the Iraqis intend to remain at this
level of operations for an extended period of time. How long
depends as much on their resources as on their intentions. How
many fighters they have, how secure their command system is,
where their weapons are located and how many they have will
determine the length of the fight.

From the U.S. point of view, fighting a retail guerrilla war is
the worst possible strategy. The key for the United States is the
destruction of the Iraqi guerrilla command and control system.
The North Vietnamese had a clearly defined command and control
system, but it was in the north and in Cambodia. There were
sanctuaries. At this moment, it would appear that the Iraqis have
no sanctuary. Therefore, the command centers are within political
reach of the United States. The question is where are they? Where
are Hussein, his sons and his other commanders? Gen. Abid Hamid
Mahmoud al-Tikriti, Hussein's No. 4 commander, was seized today,
which certainly represents a breakthrough for the United States.
What is not yet clear is whether this is the beginning of the
systematic collapse of the guerrilla command structure or whether
he was irrelevant to that.

Unless the United States is fortunate and this war comprises only
a handful of fighters who quickly will be used up, the only
strategy the United States has is to find and destroy the command
structure. Every army -- even a guerrilla army -- depends on
commanders, communications and supplies. Find and destroy the
commanders, and the army will not be able to resist a general
offensive. But first you have to find the commanders. Sweeping
after foot soldiers will only upset the population; going after
the generals is the key.

Therefore, the question of where Hussein, his sons and the rest
of the officials pictured on the deck of cards is not academic.
It has become the heart of the military equation.


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Geopolitical Diary: Monday, June 15, 2003

Tensions in Iran rose to significant levels over the weekend, as gunmen supportive of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei raided university dormitories in Tehran in actions clearly designed to intimidate pro-reform students. Motorists in the city responded by causing traffic jams and blowing their horns when pro-Khamenei paramilitaries were not in sight. The Iranians accused the United States of being behind the demonstrations and of exaggerating their significance. The Iranian Foreign Ministry said the United States was engaged in a "flagrant interference in Iran's internal
affairs." U.S. President George W. Bush said, "This is the beginning of people expressing themselves toward a free Iran, which I think is positive."

There is little doubt that the Iranian crisis has begun. The United States, directly or indirectly, is encouraging an insurrection not so much against the official Iranian government -- run by President Mohammed Khatami -- as
against the religious authority Khamenei controls. The internal pressure is being supplemented by the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are in a position to carry out covert operations in Iran in support of anti-Khamenei forces. There are unconfirmed reports that such operations already are under way. It is not clear that the students in Tehran have decisive support either in the city or in the country. However, it is clear that the United States views them as having sufficient weight to destabilize
the regime or, at the very least, generate massive tensions between the Khatami government and the Khamenei faction.

All of this is in a very early state. U.S. pressure on the Iranians may or may not have a decisive effect on the Iranians. The U.S. goal is to pressure the Iranians into changing their behavior both toward al Qaeda and on the
question of nuclear weapons development. The internal pressures on Iraq are complicated by the fact that the Iranians themselves have critical cards to play against the United States. At this point, the United States is dealing
with a guerrilla war within the Sunni areas of Iraq, where the scope and outcome are unclear at this moment. The Iranians have the ability to destabilize the U.S. occupation of Iraq if they were to use their influence to generate massive anti-American demonstrations south of Baghdad, where
Shiites dominate. The United States is risking this as it presses the Iranians. Therefore, it is critical for Washington to bring guerrilla operations north and west of Baghdad in the Sunni community under control before there are any actions in the south.

Given this, the United States launched operation Desert Scorpion, which appears to focus on the town of Al Fallujah, 45 miles to the west of Baghdad. It also appeared to be the largest U.S. combat operation since Washington announced the cessation of major hostilities in early May. Desert
Scorpion combined search-and-seize operations designed to identify Baathist guerrillas with the distribution of food and other supplies, which were designed to win over the population. Desert Scorpion appears to be targeting
the core dilemma facing the U.S. command in Iraq. Operations designed to engage and destroy guerrilla forces also are likely to increase hostility toward the United States among the populace, in effect strengthening the guerrillas. Desert Scorpion is intended as a test of a model that will not
generate the counteraction the United States fears. Still, Iraqi guerrilla forces attacked a U.S convoy about 20 miles south of the town of Balad. A truck was destroyed, and there were reports of several American casualties.

Israel remained surprisingly and interestingly quiet over the weekend. There were no further suicide bombings by Hamas, and there were reports of an Israeli withdrawal from parts of Gaza. The United States has brought massive pressure in an attempt to re-establish the proposed peace plan. Bush on June 15 condemned Hamas, saying, "The free world and those who love freedom and peace must deal harshly with Hamas and the killers." U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, "Clearly, if
force is required ultimately to root out terrorism, it is possible there would be American participation." We doubt that he said this without consultations with the White House.

It is not clear to us what an American force in Gaza or the West Bank could achieve that the Israel Defense Forces couldn't, but practicality is not the point of Lugar's statement. The White House is trying to tell Hamas that if
it continues to oppose the peace plan, the United States will stop all attempts at restraining Israel, freeing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to do whatever he wants to destroy Hamas. Hamas considered a cease-fire only because -- in the words of its leaders -- the U.S. victory in Iraq clearly
is caught between what it regards as the unequal concessions of the peace plan and fear of Israel unrestrained. It is obvious that some negotiations have taken place over the weekend between the Palestine National Authority
(PNA) and Hamas, and Israel and the PNA.

The United States undoubtedly does not want to cast Sharon loose. At the same time, it understands that the peace plan is dead unless Hamas can be sufficiently intimidated. So, the United States has carried out four operations over the weekend. First, Washington is moving to re-establish its
credibility by trying to quickly defeat Baath guerrillas. Second, it is trying to expand its credibility by destabilizing the Iranian regime. Third, it is trying to use its credibility to intimidate Hamas. And fourth, it is trying to exploit its credibility by forcing Hamas to the negotiating table.

All of this requires that the United States is not bogged down in a war it can't win in Iraq. It is not fair to expect the U.S. military to solve the problem posed by the Baath insurrection in a week. Nevertheless, that is what is needed. The United States went into Iraq to establish its credibility and indeed, its irresistible ferocity. Stalemate in Iraq is not, as they say, an option for the United States, as it affects the situation
from the Himalayas to the Mediterranean. The Baath challenge is strategic, not tactical. A rapid resolution is needed to influence the region. Therefore, the pressure on the U.S. military is not fair -- but it is real.

Get Tough on Rangoon
It's time to turn the tables on Burma's thugs.

BY COLIN L. POWELL
Thursday, June 12, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT

United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail has just visited Burma and was able to bring us news that Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and the leader of a peaceful democratic party known as the National League for Democracy, is well and unharmed. The thoughts and prayers of free people everywhere have been with her these past two weeks. Our fears for her current state of health are now somewhat lessened.

On May 30, her motorcade was attacked by thugs, and then the thugs who run the Burmese government placed her under "protective custody." We can take comfort in the fact that she is well. Unfortunately, the larger process that Ambassador Razali and Aung San Suu Kyi have been pursuing--to restore democracy in Burma--is failing despite their good will and sincere efforts. It is time to reassess our policy towards a military dictatorship that has repeatedly attacked democracy and jailed its heroes.

There is little doubt on the facts. Aung San Suu Kyi's party won an election in 1990 and since then has been denied its place in Burmese politics. Her party has continued to pursue a peaceful path, despite personal hardships and lengthy periods of house arrest or imprisonment for her and her followers. Hundreds of her supporters remain in prison, despite some initial releases and promises by the junta to release more. The party's offices have been closed and their supporters persecuted. Ambassador Razali has pursued every possible opening and worked earnestly to help Burma make a peaceful transition to democracy. Despite initial statements last year, the junta--which shamelessly calls itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)--has now refused his efforts and betrayed its own promises.
At the end of last month, this rejection manifested itself in violence. After the May 30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi's convoy, we sent U.S. Embassy officers to the scene to gather information. They reported back that the attack was planned in advance. A series of trucks followed her convoy to a remote location, blocked it and then unloaded thugs to swarm with fury over the cars of democracy supporters. The attackers were brutal and organized; the victims were peaceful and defenseless. The explanation by the Burmese military junta of what happened doesn't hold water. The SPDC has not made a credible report of how many people were killed and injured. It was clear to our embassy officers that the members of the junta were responsible for directing and producing this staged riot.

We have called for a full accounting of what happened that day. We have called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be released from confinement of any kind. We have called for the release of the other leaders of the National League for Democracy who were jailed by the SPDC before and after the attack. We have called for the offices of the National League for Democracy to be allowed to reopen. We are in touch with other governments who are concerned about the fate of democracy's leader and the fate of democracy in Burma to encourage them, too, to pressure the SPDC.

The Bush administration agrees with members of Congress, including Sen. Mitch McConnell, who has been a leading advocate of democracy in Burma, that the time has come to turn up the pressure on the SPDC.

Here's what we've done so far. The State Department has already extended our visa restrictions to include all officials of an organization related to the junta--the Union Solidarity and Development Association--and the managers of state-run enterprises so that they and their families can be banned as well.

The United States already uses our voice and our vote against loans to Burma from the World Bank and other international financial institutions. The State Department reports honestly and frankly on the crimes of the SPDC in our reports on Human Rights, Trafficking in Persons, Drugs, and International Religious Freedom. In all these areas, the junta gets a failing grade. We also speak out frequently and strongly in favor of the National League for Democracy, and against the SPDC. I will press the case in Cambodia next week when I meet with the leaders of Southeast Asia, despite their traditional reticence to confront a member and neighbor of their association, known as Asean.

Mr. McConnell has introduced the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act in the Senate; Reps. Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos have introduced a similar bill in the House. We support the goals and intent of the bills and are working with the sponsors on an appropriate set of new steps. Those who follow this issue will know that our support for legislation is in fact a change in the position of this administration and previous ones as well. Simply put, the attack on Ms. Suu Kyi's convoy and the utter failure of the junta to accept efforts at peaceful change cannot be the last word on the matter. The junta that oppresses democracy inside Burma must find that its actions will not be allowed to stand.

There are a number of measures that should now be taken, many of them in the proposed legislation. It's time to freeze the financial assets of the SPDC. It's time to ban remittances to Burma so that the SPDC cannot benefit from the foreign exchange. With legislation, we can, and should, place restrictions on travel-related transactions that benefit the SPDC and its supporters. We also should further limit commerce with Burma which enriches the junta's generals. Of course, we would need to ensure consistency with our World Trade Organization and other international obligations. Any legislation will need to be carefully crafted to take into account our WTO obligations and the president's need for waiver authority, but we should act now.

By attacking Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters, the Burmese junta has finally and definitively rejected the efforts of the outside world to bring Burma back into the international community. Indeed, their refusal of the work of Ambassador Razali and of the rights of Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters could not be clearer. Our response must be equally clear if the thugs who now rule Burma are to understand that their failure to restore democracy will only bring more and more pressure against them and their supporters.

Mr. Powell is the secretary of state.

Some of you may have heard that AC was fired by National Review.  Here's some background:

--------------------------

The background story here is as follows. Coulter wrote a column, quoted by many, wherein she called upon America to invade Muslim countries and convert them to Christianity. Then she wrote another column--whose original words seem in dispute--which meandered upon the same lines. National Review Online ran the first column, but did not publish the second. At which point NRO and Coulter parted ways. She loudly claimed censorship; they said editorial judgement. Here's the editor's letter explaining his side. Not badly, I think.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

October 3, 2001

Dear Readers,

As many of you may have heard, we've dropped Ann Coulter's column from NRO [National Reviw Online]. This has sparked varying amounts of protest, support, and, most of all, curiosity from our readers. We owe you an explanation.

Of course, we would explain our decision to Ann, but the reality is that she's called the shots from the get-go. It was Ann who decided to sever her ties with National Review -- not the other way around.

This is what happened.

In the wake of her invade-and-Christianize-them column, Coulter wrote a long, rambling rant of a response to her critics that was barely coherent. She's a smart and funny person, but this was Ann at her worst -- emoting rather than thinking, and badly needing editing and some self-censorship, or what is commonly referred to as "judgment."

Running this "piece" would have been an embarrassment to Ann, and to NRO. Rich Lowry pointed this out to her in an e-mail (I was returning from my honeymoon). She wrote back an angry response, defending herself from the charge that she hates Muslims and wants to convert them at gunpoint.

But this was not the point. It was NEVER the point. The problem with Ann's first column was its sloppiness of expression and thought. Ann didn't fail as a person -- as all her critics on the Left say -- she failed as WRITER, which for us is almost as bad.

Rich wrote her another e-mail, engaging her on this point, and asking her -- in more diplomatic terms -- to approach the whole controversy not as a PR-hungry, free-swinging pundit on Geraldo, but as a careful writer.

No response.

Instead, she apparently proceeded to run around town bad-mouthing NR and its employees. Then she showed up on TV and, in an attempt to ingratiate herself with fellow martyr Bill Maher, said we were "censoring" her.

By this point, it was clear she wasn't interested in continuing the relationship.

What publication on earth would continue a relationship with a writer who would refuse to discuss her work with her editors? What publication would continue to publish a writer who attacked it on TV? What publication would continue to publish a writer who lied about it -- on TV and to a Washington Post reporter?

And, finally, what CONSERVATIVE publication would continue to publish a writer who doesn't even know the meaning of the word "censorship"?

So let me be clear: We did not "fire" Ann for what she wrote, even though it was poorly written and sloppy. We ended the relationship because she behaved with a total lack of professionalism, friendship, and loyalty.

What's Ann's take on all this? Well, she told the Washington Post yesterday that she loves it, because she's gotten lots of great publicity. That pretty much sums Ann up.

On the Sean Hannity show yesterday, however, apparently embarrassed by her admission to the Post, she actually tried to deny that she has sought publicity in this whole matter. Well, then, Ann, why did you complain of being "censored" on national TV? Why did you brag to the Post about all the PR?

Listening to Ann legalistically dodge around trying to explain all this would have made Bill Clinton blush.

Ann also told the Post that we only paid her $5 a month for her work (would that it were so!). Either this is a deliberate lie, or Ann needs to call her accountant because someone's been skimming her checks.

Many readers have asked, why did we run the original column in which Ann declared we should "invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity" -- if we didn't like it.

Well, to be honest, it was a mistake. It stemmed from the fact this was a supposedly pre-edited syndicated column, coming in when NRO was operating with one phone line and in general chaos. Our bad.

Now as far as Ann's charges go, I must say it's hard to defend against them, because they either constitute publicity-minded name-calling, like calling us "girly-boys" -- or they're so much absurd bombast.

For example:

Ann -- a self-described "constitutional lawyer" -- volunteered on Politically Incorrect that our "censoring" of her column was tantamount to "repealing the First Amendment." Apparently, in Ann's mind, she constitutes the thin blonde line between freedom and tyranny, and so any editorial decision she dislikes must be a travesty.

She sniffed to the Washington Post's Howard Kurtz that "Every once in awhile they'll [National Review] throw one of their people to the wolves to get good press in left-wing publications." I take personal offense to this charge. She's accusing us of betraying a friend for publicity, when in fact it was the other way around.

And, lastly, this "Joan of Arc battling the forces of political correctness" act doesn't wash. In the same 20 days in which Ann says -- over and over and over again -- that NR has succumbed to "PC hysteria," we've run pieces celebrating every PC shibboleth and bogeyman.
Paul Johnson has criticized Islam as an imperial religion. William F. Buckley himself has called, essentially, for a holy war. Rich Lowry wants to bring back the Shah, and I've written that Western Civilization has every right to wave the giant foam "We're Number 1!" finger as high as it wants.

The only difference between what we've run and what Ann considers so bravely iconoclastic on her part, is that we've run articles that accord persuasion higher value than shock value. It's true: Ann is fearless, in person and in her writing. But fearlessness isn't an excuse for crappy writing or crappier behavior.

To be honest, even though there's a lot more that could be said, I have no desire to get any deeper into this because, like with a Fellini movie, the deeper you get, the less sense Ann makes.

We're delighted that FrontPageMagazine has, with remarkable bravery, picked up Ann's column, presumably for only $5 a month. They'll be getting more than what they're paying for, I'm sure.

-- Jonah Goldberg

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Today's Featured Analysis

Arroyo: Politics and Promises

Summary

Philippine Vice President Teofisto Guingona said June 8 that
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo should stick to her December
2002 pledge not to run in the 2004 presidential election.
Guingona's comments come amid weeks of intensified political
support for Arroyo to run in 2004, including reported backing
from U.S. President George W. Bush, South Korean President Roh
Moo Hyun and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. But as
Arroyo's supporters try to build a groundswell of public support
to justify the president reneging on her pledge, the alleged
support of other world leaders could prove more dangerous than
helpful.

Analysis

Philippine Vice President Teofisto Guingona said June 8 that
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo should "keep her word and not
run" in the 2004 presidential election, according to ABS-CBN
news. Guingona was referring to Arroyo's December 2002 pledge not
to seek election in 2004 so she could instead focus on her duties
as president without worrying about public opinion. Guingano
further urged Arroyo "not [to] allow herself to be influenced by
those around her urging her to run."

Guingano's comments come amid a near torrent of reports of
political backing for an Arroyo presidential bid, not only from
domestic supporters but also allegedly from international
supporters, including U.S. President George W. Bush, South Korean
President Roh Moo Hyun and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad. It is clear that Arroyo supporters, if not Arroyo
herself, are trying to build a groundswell of support for the
president, giving her little option but to renege on her pledge
and throw her hat in the ring for 2004. But the alleged support
from foreign leaders might turn out to be more dangerous than
beneficial in the final calculus.

As Stratfor noted when Arroyo initially announced her decision
not to run in 2004, the president simply was hedging her bets at
a time of declining popular support. If things kept getting
worse, Arroyo could keep her promise and bow out -- though that
would be admitting defeat. But more directly, she set herself up
as the selfless martyr, someone who cared more about the
Philippine condition than her own political ambitions. And she
could simultaneously throw the opposition into confusion and
rally her own party back toward some sense of unity. In addition,
like her father, when the time came she could reverse her
decision and accede to the will of the people and run again.

It would appear that the move is being made now -- whether simply
by her backers or with the express knowledge of Arroyo -- to
build the groundswell of public opinion necessary to justify her
reversal and bring her back into the pool of candidates for 2004.
Already there is a signature campaign in the Parliament among
members of the ruling Lakas-Christian and Muslim Democrats
(Lakas-CMD) coalition party to urge Arroyo to reconsider her
candidacy. She also has received the tentative backing of
Catholic leader Cardinal Jamie Sin and the reported foreign
support from Bush, Roh and Mahathir.

However, amid widespread rumors that Arroyo will announce her
candidacy closer to October or November, the presidential palace
is making it clear that the president has no intention of seeking
the 2004 nomination. In fact, one recent Philippine Star article
even cited one of the president's sons as saying that the Arroyo
family is cleaning up their residences to prepare for their
return to the private sector after the 2004 elections -- a sure
sign that Arroyo does not plan on running again. But if she is
considering an election bid, this is the image Arroyo wants to
portray -- adamant adherence to her promise not to seek the
election until the last possible moment when, in the interest of
the common good, she succumbs to domestic pressure and accepts
the nomination for the 2004 campaign.

But the alleged international support for an Arroyo election bid
raises interesting questions. On one hand, support from
Washington, Seoul and Kuala Lumpur can be seen as very diverse
and clear international backing for one of Southeast Asia's
newest leaders. Washington's support, however, can be a mixed
blessing, as there are still significant political and social
factions in the Philippines opposed to increased defense ties
with the United States -- factions that warn of the re-
colonization of the Philippines.

More intriguing, however, is the claim that Mahathir has offered
his explicit -- albeit secret - backing for another Arroyo term.
Mahathir has made non-interference a key part of his
international policies, and recommending a specific candidate for
president of another Southeast Asian nations easily can be seen
as interference in the internal political affairs of the
Philippines.

Mahathir's alleged support was predicated on continuity of the
Arroyo government facilitating the continuation and eventual
positive conclusion of peace talks between Manila and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front. And while Mahathir has shown a clear
interest in calming the Islamic insurgencies in Southeast Asia --
as there is often a spillover into Malaysia either directly or
through indirect economic consequences -- he also opposes
Arroyo's solution for domestic insurgencies: calling in U.S.
forces. Mahathir has vocally opposed the presence of U.S.
military bases in Southeast Asia, particularly as Washington
discusses reformatting its Asian presence. It would seem
counterproductive for Mahathir to back one of Asia's primary
Washington supporters.

This raises a dilemma for Arroyo's supporters at home.
Washington's support could be turned against Arroyo -- seen as
U.S. interference in its former colonial possession. And reports
of support from Mahathir, Roh or other foreign leaders who
secretly back Arroyo could prove detrimental to her potential
campaign if any one of them denies offering such backing -- and
thus exposes a political ploy to fabricate the appearance of
multinational and domestic support for an Arroyo presidency.
While an Arroyo bid is not yet in the bag, her supporters run a
risky campaign, unless they can reshape support for her candidacy
around purely domestic issues, leaving the international
community's support as an added bonus -- not a central issue.

FRONTLINE/World reporter Orlando de Guzman was born in the Philippines and grew up in a tribal community near the northern tip of the island of Luzon. He currently covers Southeast Asia for Public Radio International's The World.

FRONTLINE/World sent de Guzman to the southern Philippines to report on the growing insurgency there. His journey begins in the town of Jolo, part of a chain of small islands in the southern region of Mindanao. Jolo today is 98 percent Muslim, and, as elsewhere in Mindanao, has a long history of separatist movements fighting for autonomy from the central (and mostly Roman Catholic) government in Manila. In this diary, de Guzman writes about battles as spectacle, cell-phone text messages from guerrillas and life under fire.
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Early this year, amidst military preparations for a war in Iraq, the United States announced it was sending 3,000 soldiers to Mindanao, the southernmost region of the Philippines. FRONTLINE/World correspondent Orlando de Guzman, a Filipino reporter from the north, journeyed to Mindanao, where Muslim rebels are fighting a guerrilla war against the Philippine government -- a war in which the United States may soon be embroiled.

De Guzman's first stop is the port town of Jolo, where the United States has just announced the commencement of joint exercises with the Philippine army. As he enters town, de Guzman is greeted by a sign that reads, "We will not let history repeat itself. Yankees back off." At a local radio station, tribal singers protest the turn of events, singing, "Americans do not follow the divine law. They will steal our independence."

Once a Spanish colony, the Philippines is 90 percent Catholic, but the southern region of Mindanao has a sizeable Muslim minority and has long resisted the government in Manila. During the Spanish-American War in the Philippines, U.S. troops fought the Muslim, or Moro, population and committed massacres that are remembered to this day as a central part of the region's collective memory.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF, is by far the largest and best-armed Muslim rebel group in the Philippines. Tension between the MILF and the government has been escalating since February, and de Guzman is attempting to meet with the group directly. As he waits, he hears word of a battle being waged in a nearby village, so he heads there.

The area is thick with jungle vegetation reminiscent of images from the Vietnam War. In a strange scene, a crowd of villagers, mainly children, follows the Philippine army as a form of entertainment, cheering when they fire artillery shells. In the village itself, de Guzman finds that not the Philippine military but a civilian militia is in control. The captain tells him they're waiting for the national military to arrive, but does not seem confident. Even when the military does come to aid such villages, they seldom do more than keep the MILF at bay.

Not only are Muslim rebel groups keeping up the steady pressure of attacks on villages and even civilian farmers, but they're also making their presence known in the cities. De Guzman travels to the major port city of Davao, where the previous day a bomb exploded, killing 16 people. The government claims that the MILF is responsible, with help from Jemaah Islamiya, the same group responsible for the Bali nightclub bombing in October 2002. The MILF denies the claim.

Attacks such as the one in Davao, de Guzman notes, increase religious tension in an already volatile community and often result in counterattacks. Indeed, a few hours after the bombing, unidentified men in fatigues attacked three nearby mosques with hand grenades.

Fighting between the Philippine military and the MILF has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of Muslims. They seek refuge in evacuation centers set up by the government. The refugees now number 350,000, and some have been in an evacuation center for three years. De Guzman visits a center and finds life to be miserable and provisions scarce. Last month, he hears, more than a dozen children died from dysentery.

De Guzman receives word that the MILF is finally ready to meet him, so he and his producer Margarita Dragon travel into the jungle, into MILF-controlled territory. He ends up in Abubakar, a camp that spans 12,000 acres and was once home to 25,000 people. It formerly was a working model of the MILF's vision of an Islamic state, with a mosque, a school and a sharia court. But in 2000, in what was called "the all-out war," the Philippine government overran and destroyed Abubakar, which they said had been used as a terrorist training center. Though pushed underground, the MILF still controls most of their former territory by the use of a rotating volunteer force.

Most of the villagers have fled, but on his trek into the mountains, de Guzman meets a 70-year-old man who has refused to leave. When asked why he hasn't moved to the city like so many others, he says there's nothing for him to live on in the city -- no corn, no cows, no money, no living. So he stays, armed with the gun he recently bought and is prepared to use against the military. De Guzman asks him if the people here feel that they are fighting for their land. "No," the man says. "They are fighting for their lives."

After an uneasy night sleeping in hammocks to the sound of artillery fire, de Guzman and his escorts press through the rugged terrain to the former headquarters of the MILF. Only a broken-down cement structure remains, but the MILF show it off as a symbol that they have reoccupied the territory the government forced them to leave three years ago. De Guzman meets the local field commander, code-named "Congressman," who has been fighting with the MILF for 30 years. In an unusual moment, Congressman breaks down crying, as he says he would rather die fighting in the mountains than give up the dream of a separate Islamic state.

De Guzman is ordered to leave not long after he arrives. Back in the city, he waits two days, then receives word he will meet Al-Haj Murad, the MILF's chief military commander. This will be the first interview Murad has given in three years. De Guzman and Murad meet a short distance from a heavily guarded highway.

One of the founders of the MILF, Murad is the man in charge of its military operations. Like many MILF leaders, he is a former Mujahideen who fought the Soviets in the late 1980s in Afghanistan, where he met Osama bin Laden. The Philippine government has a $1 million bounty on Murad and other key MILF leaders. He is wanted for murder and for suspected involvement in bombings throughout Mindanao.

Surrounded by MILF soldiers, Murad talks to de Guzman over lunch. De Guzman asks him for his take on the joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises. Murad says he hopes the United States will realize that not all Muslims are terrorists, and he says the MILF is trying to avoid being labeled as such. "They cannot equate Islam to terrorism," he explains. "And the problem here in Mindanao cannot be a part of the fight against global terrorism."

De Guzman points to the links that security and intelligence analysts have made between the MILF and known terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiya. Murad concedes that while some MILF members fought in Afghanistan and may have developed personal relationships with terrorists, there is no organizational connection. He states plainly, "We are fighting on our own. Our objective is to achieve the aspiration of the Moro people. We are not concerned with the objective of the brothers in Indonesia, in Malaysia or in other regions in the Middle East." Murad labels the problem in Mindanao a domestic problem. U.S. intervention, he says, will only complicate the situation.

In the two months since de Guzman left Mindanao, joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises have commenced near Manila and will be starting in the southern Philippines soon. The MILF has responded with more attacks on Christian villages. On the eve of her recent visit to Washington, President Macapagal Arroyo ordered more attacks on MILF strongholds, inluding the same positions Orlando had visited. An additional 50 civilians have been killed and 30,000 more residents have been displaced. If history is any guide, de Guzman says, a U.S.-Philippine war against the MILF will be "long and dirty." He concludes, "For the people of Mindanao, a protracted war will certainly mean more suffering and deepening hatred between Christians and Muslims."


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1)

Jolo and its surrounding islands are home to some of the world's most enchanting beaches.  
Jolo's volcanic mountains rise sharply from the turquoise waters of the Sulu Sea. It is an island formed by fire: Everywhere you look there are clues to its violent geological past. The terrain is stunning, with dense jungle covering most of the island's near-perfect volcanic cones. It would be a perfect place to set up a beach resort -- if it weren't for the island's other, more lucrative business. Jolo has long been home to a number of Islamic insurgent groups -- the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and others. The most recent one, Abu Sayyaf, has degenerated into a notorious kidnapping group, which the government says is linked to al Qaeda. Dozens of foreign tourists and journalists have been held captive on the island -- some released only after paying thousands of dollars in ransoms.


Kids collect water at a popular beach resort near Jolo.  
"Jolo is nature friendly, but not very people friendly," my friend Alfadhar Pajiji, or "Fads," cheerfully reminds me as I gaze out of our ferry's portholes, admiring the view. I could never have made it to Jolo without the help of Fads, whom I met by chance in Manila as he was giving a talk. Fads -- a Jolo native, educated in Manila -- was offering up a passionate appeal to the public for aid to civilian casualties after a military offensive in Jolo, and arguing for an end to the military operations in his homeland. He invited me to come for myself and see what was happening. Most people on the island loathe the military. It's not uncommon for pitched gun battles between the military and equally armed civilians to erupt in the center of town.  

There are two ways to travel safely to Jolo: You can be escorted by a dozen or so heavily armed soldiers from the Philippine military, or you can keep a low profile and go with a trusted friend, as I did with Fads. Going with the military is a guarantee that no one will talk to you.

Years of military rule have placed power firmly in the hands of the men with the most guns -- the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Most people on the island loathe the military: even those who do not share the separatist views of the various insurgent movements often seem enraged by the Philippine military's occupation.

In the outskirts of Jolo's town center, the number of bullet holes that mark the gates to the army's main barracks give you a good idea of the public's sentiments toward the military. It's not uncommon for pitched gun battles between the military and equally armed civilians to erupt in the center of town. One such incident occurred last year during a demonstration by residents against the government The fighting began near the crowded market and continued all the way to the military camp, where both sides lobbed mortar shells over the high walls that ringed the barracks, the civilians from outside the barracks and the military from inside the barracks.



Jolo's dense neighborhoods are built on stilts to combat the swelling tides.  Decades of war between the central government and separatists have insured that the area remains one of the poorest in the Philippines. The main town on Jolo relies on expensive crude oil to run an ailing power generator. Every night, rolling blackouts plunge the island into darkness. The local hospital lacks basic sterilization equipment and suffers from chronic medical shortages. "There are only two ways the government in Manila makes its presence felt in Jolo," a local resident said to me. "They print the bank notes we use in the market; but besides that, the only other government presence here is the military."

Jolo is a heavily militarized island. There are about 5,000 Philippine troops here, most of them concentrated near the town center. The soldiers mill about in almost every street corner, their rifles lowered menacingly. Abu Sayyaf's estimated numbers range from 200 to a thousand men. Many on the island wonder out loud why the government hasn't been able to get rid of Abu Sayyaf, given that the rebels are vastly outnumbered. Now U.S. Special Forces are going to train the Filipino soldiers how to fight Abu Sayyaf.
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2)
U.S. soldiers are scheduled to conduct training exercises in Jolo. The U.S.-Philippine military exercises, called Balikatan ("shoulder to shoulder"), are meant to quell Abu Sayyaf, another Islamic militant group with alleged links to Al Qaeda that has degenerated into a kidnap for ransom gang.  
The day I arrived in Jolo, it was announced that joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises were going to be held on Jolo, among other places in Mindanao. The plan is controversial, given the Jolo residents' venomous relationship with the Philippine military. Streamers protesting the joint U.S. military exercises had been hastily strung in a number of prominent places. One reads, "No to War. We Do Not Want a Repeat of History."  

"We heard the Americans are coming. We are sharpening our swords to slaughter them when they come ... our ancestors are calling for revenge."  

This is not the first time American troops have come to Jolo. In 1902, U.S. soldiers imposed military rule on the island in an attempt to quell a brewing rebellion. In 1906, a tax revolt culminated in the massacre of hundreds of Muslim men, women and children who holed up in a mountainous area called Bud Dahu. It took the United States almost 15 years to "pacify" Muslim trouble spots in Jolo and elsewhere throughout Mindanao. It was a brutal campaign that became known as the Moro-American War.

Jolo's inhabitants deeply resent the heavy Philippine military presence and the U.S. occupation of 1902-1945. The second Balikatan incited new tensions.  

Jolo has largely been forgotten in U.S. history books, but the people here have never forgotten the Americans. Residents are reminded of the United States' past atrocities almost daily. The local radio station plays mesmerizing ballads known as "kissa": songs that recollect how Jolo's Tausug warriors fought the Americans in Bud Dahu at the turn of the previous century. The songs, which can go on for hours, weave current events with reflections from the past. "We heard the Americans are coming," the lyrics will go, the singer's voice rising with the melody of two violins, "and we are getting ready. We are sharpening our swords to slaughter them when they come ... our ancestors are calling for revenge." These songs waft through Jolo's dense neighborhoods -- clusters of ramshackle houses built on stilts above the swelling tides.

A traditional "kissa" singer performs a song of heroic resistance. American forces are almost always the enemy in these songs.  

This is one of the few places in the Philippines where Western pop music hasn't pushed out traditional songs. The people here are proud of their intact culture and their independent spirit. Spanish and American colonial troops portrayed the Tausugs as sword-wielding warriors who charged into certain death in battle. Today's perception hasn't changed -- the only difference is that now the Tausugs are armed with M-16 rifles. People here are proud of their martial tradition.

But they are also worn down and tired of war. "America first came to us in the name of war," says Julkipli Wadi, a history professor from Jolo. "Now they're coming again in the name of war. It is not fair. In the 21st century, they should come in the name of peace." To win the hearts of the people of Jolo, the United States has delivered medicines and hospital equipment and has promised to start a number of civic projects on the island. But the United States' alliance with the Philippine military will likely stir trouble. Filipino soldiers are seen as an occupying force here. Many on the island feel that the American presence will only complicate matters, that it will continue to militarize an island that has already seen enough war.

"You cannot continue to intimidate a people who've long been intimidated," says Wadi. "At best, what a military solution can do is neutralize for a moment the agitation of a people. But you cannot totally remove the sting that has been there for a very long time."
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3)





A "kissa" singer at a live radio performance.  
Any radio enthusiast would feel at home in the Philippines, an archipelago of some 7,100 islands. Turn the AM dial a notch, and you'll likely pick up half a dozen stations, each bumping against the other in the ever-crowded radio spectrum. And the news is never simply read over the airwaves -- it is shouted. You can't become a radio announcer here if you don't have the booming, macho voice of God or if you can't roll your r's for longer than three seconds. Reverb is used extravagantly to polish off each news item before you move to the next story. The rat-a-tat-tat machine-gun pace of newscasts never loses its cadence; news of a power outage is aired with the same urgency of a coup. Philippine radio makes NPR sound like a lullaby.
Philippine radio makes NPR sound like a lullaby. There is no place more fanatical about radios than Mindanao.  
As a radio reporter and a lover of the spoken word, I feel at home here. The first time I spent the night in a village in Mindanao, I was awakened before sunrise by six radios playing at full volume. The news -- a cacophony of voices and crackling live field reports -- barged into my room through the thin bamboo walls. There is no place more fanatical about radios than Mindanao. Radios are cheap, and they work even when power is cut and the whole island is plunged into darkness. But most importantly, radio stations are always the first to know the news. If the local radio station doesn't know something, someone will call in and tell them.



Radio broadcasts are unusually popular in Mindanao.  
While traveling on the most dangerous roads in Mindanao, our driver -- a former Muslim rebel -- would instinctively switch on the car radio, just in case there were any ambushes or major military operations along our route. As we were traveling early one morning in North Cotabato Province, we heard on the radio that the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front] had felled several high-voltage power lines with explosives. It must have just happened, as we had just enough time to swerve to avoid a tangle of cables and toppled posts.

The decades-old conflict in Mindanao is one of the most under-reported wars in the world. Mindanao is also one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist. Local reporters who live in Mindanao constantly face threats; journalists -- especially radio journalists -- are often gunned down for what they say, often in their broadcast booths as they're saying it.



A "kissa" violinist performs at a radio performance.  
Nonetheless, radio was our unseen guide throughout our entire journey. While we were there, the country's national press dropped Mindanao off its pages and airwaves to make room for the war in Iraq. There was no news from Mindanao, even as some of the biggest battles were raging on the country's own doorstep. Only the local radio stations continued to cover Mindanao's own war with loyalty.

--------
4)




Mortar and sometimes heavy artillery is used to ward off rebel attacks at Midsayap.  
News of the battle at Midsayap first came to us via -- what else -- the radio. Our film crew was loading our gear into our van when we heard about a pitched firefight raging in Midsayap, about 45 minutes from our hotel. Our driver, Bong (we affectionately called him Commander Bong), knew the area well, as did our guide, George Vigo -- a fearless local reporter and a friend whom I'd worked with on my first and subsequent assignments in Mindanao. The battle at Midsayap was close enough to get to and film as it was unfolding.


Military reinforcements arrive to help civilian militia against a sudden rebel attack.  
We arrived at the front line even before the military's reinforcements. There were sporadic bursts of gunfire, coming from armed pro-government civilians who were keeping the MILF from advancing. At some point I knew we'd have to film a gunfight, and I expected the worst. I had brought along two kinds of bullet-proof vests: a light one and a much heavier one for high-velocity rounds, the kind used by the U.S. military and made famous by all those television war correspondents in Iraq.


I hate war and I hate guns. I grew up in the northern Philippines during the communist insurgency's heyday in the 1980s. I lived in the midst of war, and I still get the same visceral reaction to guns as I did when I was younger. But more than anything, I was gripped with fear.

Farmers are armed and must patrol their fields at all times.  
One of the strangest things about the front line in Mindanao is that life carries on as usual. Sure, there are frightened people hastily packing their pots and pans and rounding up their cattle to flee. But then there are those who choose to stay and calmly carry on with their daily farm tasks. Rice is cooked, chickens are fed and wood is chopped as bullets fly overhead. These are the people who've seen enough conflict to know exactly when to stay and when to go. The thunder of mortar doesn't move them until it is close enough to shake the earth beneath their bare feet. It's a sadly confusing truth that you can actually grow accustomed to a war raging literally in your own backyard. I suppose this is what more than 30 years of conflict will do to you.



Children cover ears while watching Midsayap battle.  
What's even more disturbing about Mindanao's front line is how much of a spectacle it is. No battle is complete without its own army of children, teenagers and grannies watching the whole thing as if it were a movie. They gather by the hundreds, milling about and cheering every time Filipino soldiers fire deafening 105mm artillery rounds on enemy positions. They mockingly yell, "Allah Akbar" -- a sacrosanct Arabic phrase meaning "God is great" -- at MILF rebels pinned down by gunfire. The children scratch around in the dirt for black gunpowder pellets spilling out of crates of artillery rounds. Some of the kids light the pellets uncomfortably close to live shells. When gunfire rings across the rice paddies, those who are working in the paddies don't stop what they're doing -- they just watch while they work. It makes wearing a bullet-proof jacket seem pointless; it makes the wearer look like a buffoon.
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5)






Orlando de Guzman bides his time in Cotabato as he waits to hear from "Azwar," his MILF contact.  
"Meet me at 3 in front of the post office. I'll take my hat off a few times so you'll know it is me." This text message, in abbreviated Tagalog, appeared on my hand phone, and it came from our mysterious MILF guide. I'll call him Azwar. I'd never actually met him, but we'd traded a few messages the past couple of days.
The Philippines is one of the heaviest users of short messaging in the world. It sends more text messages than all of Europe. The MILF is just as hooked on "texting" as the rest of the country. One MILF cadre told me that cell phones are just as important as rifles.

The MILF is as hooked on "texting" as the rest of the country. One MILF cadre told me that cell phones are just as important as rifles.  
This text message from Azwar was significant. It was the first one to refer to an exact location and time. All the other messages I'd received had been deliberately vague and misleading. So at 2:45 p.m., our van was waiting at the meeting point. We kept the engine running so we could use the air conditioner, but it was no match for the scorching afternoon sun. I was baking by the time someone approached us. He wasn't wearing a hat. We walked over to a nearby coffee shop, where he explained the plan in clipped sentences. It boiled down to this: We were to be taken to the MILF's stronghold in a sprawling jungle, to an area known as Camp Abubakar.



As in the villages, life in Cotabato City continues despite the war.  
In 2000, Camp Abubakar fell to the military. Thousands of MILF fighters had once trained there and used the area as a base. And now the MILF's leaders had set up a shadow government there. It had a clinic, a school, mosques, a jailhouse and even a paved concrete road, courtesy of the Philippine government. The road was called "Friendship Highway," from back when the government and the MILF were still intent on forging some kind of peace agreement. Now the MILF does not operate so openly. In fact, its movements are highly secretive. The MILF's chairman, a Cairo-educated religious preacher called Hashim Salamat, no longer makes public appearances.



Producer Margarita Dragon films MILF fighters praying at Camp Abubakar.  
As we talked, I glanced around the coffee shop for possible spies. A man behind us appeared to be taking an interest in our conversation, but my companion carried on, stirring his coffee incessantly. First, we were to drive outside of Cotabato City to a small town, where we'd switch vehicles. We would then take a dirt road to an even smaller village, where we'd unload and immediately start walking toward the jungle. The big wildcard was that the route we were going to take has more than a dozen military checkpoints. We could avoid the checkpoints by avoiding the roads completely, but that meant adding a whole day's walking to the journey. Pressed for time, we opted for the quickest route. We'd just have to talk our way through the checkpoints if we were stopped. We were to set off at dawn the next day.

After leaving the coffee house, I got another text message from Azwar, saying that the man we'd just met was not actually him. It was his messenger. We would meet him the next day, he promised.
---------------
6)


De Guzman meets MILF contact.  
The next day we switched vehicles without too much trouble. We left our van behind and piled into a mustard-yellow passenger "Jeepney." Its engine sounded like it was running on half of its cylinders. Our new driver plied this route every day, and the familiar vehicle would raise few suspicions along the way.
Before we left, I was led through a crowded market to meet the real Azwar. I found him squatting on a low stool next to a tobacco vendor. He was wearing aviator shades that covered almost half his face. He explained that there were at least a dozen checkpoints along our route, but that an informant had traveled the road earlier this morning and found that the military was not searching any vehicles. We were clear to go.



Villagers flee as intense fighting begins between civilian militia and MILF rebels.
But as we were leaving town, two heavily armed soldiers flagged us down. My heart skipped a beat. It turned out they just wanted a ride. I overheard them asking my MILF guide if I was Arab. (In the past, Camp Abubakar had hosted a number of foreign guests from the Middle East. And there have been persistent reports of Malaysian and Indonesians, presumably belonging to the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya, helping train the MILF. The MILF hasn't denied it has hosted foreigners, but insists it has nothing to do with al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya.)


We passed more checkpoints, but seeing our two military hitchhikers hanging off the back of the Jeepney, the soldiers waved us through. I tried my best to hide my anxiety, and in my head, I was polishing my alibi in case we were questioned. "We've started a water project here, and we've come to film a short information video about the village up ahead, to convince our donors to release the funds soon." My MILF guide had a phony government I.D., and he was accustomed to bluffing his way through checkpoints. I lost count of the checkpoints after number 21. Our hitchhikers dropped off, and we continued alone.

Finally, the dirt road passed through a small village and ended next to a river. We were told to hurry up and walk. The trail took us through coconut groves and a few houses, where villagers dried fragrant strands of abaca fiber on wooden racks. Abaca fiber, or Manila hemp, was once the engine of the country's economy -- until DuPont invented nylon. There are few things as eerie to me as abandoned farmland. These hills have become too dangerous to till. The land lies weed-choked and fallow from war.

Along the way, we passed entire villages turned to ashes. We were told that these homes were burned by the military before they pulled out earlier this year. I met a 70-year-old man gathering wood along one of the mountain's ridges. He took me to his burned-out home. The roof was gone, so was the kitchen. A rain-soaked copy of the Koran rested on a shelf in what must have been the bedroom. I pulled it out to find it infested with thingyroaches. He must have left in a hurry when he saw the soldiers. I offered the Koran to him, and he told me to leave it where I'd found it. "I don't need it anymore," he said bitterly. "Everything is now in the hands of Allah." Before leaving, he told me that he would join the MILF if he only had a rifle and more years to live. "I have nothing else to lose," he said, pointing to his blackened house. As I left him, I couldn't help feeling that there must be something terribly wrong with a nation that makes a 70-year-old man want to pick up a gun and kill.
--------
7)

It is pointless to ask a guerilla how long it will take to get from point A to point B. They'll never tell you the truth, and if they give you an estimate, say three hours, multiply it by four. So 12 hours, give or take. We set off mid-morning, and the sun is already burning my skin. It is difficult to imagine how much hotter it will get. Soon, the evenly spaced coconut groves thin out, giving way to grassland and, finally, to thick jungle. A heavily armed unit of the MILF greets us further up the mountain. They wear ski masks and bandanas to cover their faces from our cameras. They carry homemade rocket-propelled grenades. But, most interesting, almost all of them have standard American-made M-16 rifles, each one engraved "Property of the U.S. Government."


The MILF says it buys its weapons and bullets from members of the Philippine military who run arms deals on the side. The Philippine military gets most of its weaponry from the United States. After September 11, 2001, the United States promised $100 million in military aid to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. "Whenever there's a gun battle between us," an MILF cadre would later tell me, "the soldiers see money, and we see new bullets.

"Here's how it works: A neutral emissary will show up to deliver the cash, and the [Philippine soldiers] will give him the bullets. Crates of bullets. If anyone asks the soldiers where the bullets have gone, they say it was a heated gun battle, and they used up everything. The bullets sell for 25 pesos [50 cents] apiece. Sell a hundred of those and you've got a sack of rice to feed your family."


These stories keep my mind off the grueling walk for a while, as do the giant ferns that grew as large as trees. By sundown we'd made it to our halfway point, where we'd planned to spend the night. But the camp site is in too much of a clearing and provided no cover. We were told that it wasn't safe. Helicopter gunships had attacked this very spot. So we carried on, walking -- stumbling -- through the jungle in this moonless evening. The military's nightly barrage of artillery fire echoed across mountain. I was told not to worry. The shells were landing a long way from us. By midnight we finally reached an empty concrete house. We crashed out in our hammocks, too tired to eat. At 2 in the morning, we were awakened for a meal of sardines and rice.

The morning light makes me realize that the house we'd slept in is actually a bunker. It is made of 1-foot-thick reinforced concrete, strong enough to withstand artillery fire. This structure, it turned out, was once the home of the MILF's chairman, Hashim Salamat. We were not allowed to meet Salamat. No one has since 2000, the year Camp Abubakar was overrun and Salamat made a hasty getaway from this very house. His location is known only by a handful of trusted MILF officers. But we were given unprecedented access to the MILF's field commanders and top political leaders.


-----------


In Camp Abubakar, later that day, I interviewed a longtime MILF field commander, known only by his radio codename, "Congressman." He was surrounded by nearly a hundred armed men, watching us silently as we set up the cameras. His broad face and firm voice conveyed experience. He joined the armed movement in 1972, six years before the MILF was officially organized. I asked him why he's devoted all his life to this -- what is he fighting for? He turned to me and thought about the question. Then he began to sob. He tried to regain his composure, but it was useless. The tears flowed down his face. He struggled to speak. "We want to achieve freedom and independence for Mindanao's Muslims," he said. "We'd rather die fighting for an independent homeland," he said tearfully, "than continue living under this oppressive system." The armed men around Congressman shifted uncomfortably. They may never have seen their commander break down like this.


MILF fighters raise their arms in solidarity after prayer.  
On our way down the mountain, I thought about why he had cried. I tried to imagine how it would feel to spend 30 years of your life in the jungle, hoping that change will come. I imagined how it would be to put up with years of living in hiding, in danger, with little food or shelter, fighting a military much more powerful than yours. I wondered how many would willingly choose the path he'd taken.


We were escorted down the mountain with a group of young MILF cadres. Some looked as if they were still in their teens. At some point they stopped to change into civilian clothes. Their 10-day-a-month stint in the jungle was over, and it was time to rest and blend back into society. A few miles down the track, we met a group of young men making their way up the mountain. It was their turn to be rebels. The commander, it seemed, would not be alone. And the war in Mindanao would continue.

------------


------------------
'Islands Under Siege'
Orlando Guzman
Reporter, FRONTLINE/World
Friday, June 06, 2003; 11:00 a.m. ET


As U.S. forces attempt to win the peace in Iraq, FRONTLINE/World travels to another corner of the world -- the Philippines -- where the United States is being drawn into a long-running civil war between Islamic separatists and U.S.-trained Philippine soldiers.

Airing Thursday, June 5, at 9 p.m. on PBS (check local listings), "Islands Under Siege" explores the island of Mindanao, to meet the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 12,000 strong rebel group fighting for an Islamic state.

Reporter Orlando Guzman was online Friday, June 6, at 11 a.m. ET, to talk about the film and what he learned on Mindanao.

The transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Falls Church, Va.: Enjoyed the show last night. It was good to see what the situation is really like in the southern Philippines. Why do you think the Phillipine military has been so ineffective in combating the MILF? It seems that even without U.S. help, the military (along with their Christian militia allies) would be far superior to the guerillas in terms of numbers of men, weapons, tactics, etc.

Orlando Guzman: The insurgency in the southern Philippines isn't somethign that can be won militarily. The MILF along with the New People's Army rebel group -- a communist movement -- both of these groups have been fighting guerrilla warfare and they enjoy, to some extent, popular support amongst the people in Mindinao. And I think to successfully deal with these insurgencies, the government has to look at other ways to improve the lives of people in Mindinao -- the other underlying causes of the conflict. I think that's one of the reasons why there's been these persistent insurgencies. No matter how much military force you put in there, it doesn't seem to be going away.

________________________________________________

Toledo, Ohio: Does it hinder or promote the MILF's causes to never claim responsibility for the bombings that the government always blames on them? This seems similar to Prime Minister Abbas and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. World leaders say they need to curtail their rogue factions in order to be "worthy" of negotiations. Do you think the MILF could stand to use the same strategy?

Orlando Guzman: I think we should be very cautious about saying who is doing these bombings. For one, it's extremely difficult getting any real first-hand info from Mindinao. One thing you learn quickly there is that not everything that is published or claimed is true.

The Philippine govt has been very quick to tag the MILF and the one that claimed the bombing in Bali as being responsible for another in the Philippines this year. So far, though, the govt can't find any evidence. THe man the govt claimed was the bomber was recently released. None of the intelligence officials explained why he was accompanied by several family members. That first bombing in February at the airport -- the crime scene was swept clean and hosed down before investigators could get there.

It could be the MILF behind the bombings, other Islamic militants or, as some Muslims believe, security forces trying to raise the rent on security on the island. My opinion is that there is certainly a big possibility that there are groups that may be disgruntled with the MILF's strategies and may be taking things into their own hands. Al Haj Murad, the vice chairman of MILF's military affairs, told me that there are plenty of people in Mindinao who are desperate and have no other way of fighting the government but by using terrorist activities. He said it is beyond MILF's capacity to control them.

________________________________________________

Brooklyn, N.Y.: Where you scared when you were with the rebels?

Orlando Guzman: Absolutely not. I think I did quite a bit of research before I went to rebel held areas, and so far the MILF has not kidnapped journalists unlike the Abu Sayaf -- it's denounced these activities. The MILF is very organized, has a political structure, a very clear chain of command -- especially the closer you move to its political leadership. And I did not really fear for my safety.

I was more concerned in my previous trips to an island called Jolo, where the Abu Sayaf is active. They've kidnapped journalists and tourists. Jolo is also an area where kidnapping is very common -- it doesn't have to be Abu Sayaf, but anybody with a gun who wants to auction you off to the highest bidder. So I do take extra precautions when I'm there

________________________________________________

Toledo, Ohio: I just finished reading Gracia Burnham's book about her experiences with the Abu Sayyaf. The government has been horribly embarrassed about the candor Gracia expressed with regard to the ineptitude (at times) of the Philippine army. Will the publishing of this book make the government even more resolute in bringing down what they see as terrorist factions in their country?

Orlando Guzman: The part of Gracia's book that has caught the most attention in the Philippines is a section where she alludes to collusion between local security forces, military and Abu Sayaf. In the book she mentions that a military general stationed in Bafilan was leaving peanut butter for her and her kidnappers. And there have been persistent reports of a particular general who was asking for a 50 percent stake of the ransom money for the Burnham's release.

This is not the first time that there've been allegations of collusion between the Abu Sayaf and military officers. A number of people Bafilan island could happily tell you stories about their time in captivity by Abu Sayaf rebels. And the suspicious things they saw going on between Abu Sayaf and the military.

I think that the central govt is resolute at trying to bring down groups like Abu Sayaf, but I don't know if the Philippine military on the ground -- local commanders -- have the discipline nor the honesty to effectively deal with Abu Sayaf. And I think that this is something that the U.S. should look into before it sends its own men to work side by side with these troops.

________________________________________________

New York, N.Y.: I was very impressed that you and your producer were able to gain access to Al haj Murad. While he claims that the MILF is fighting a for their homeland, the muslims represent a small minority, even in Mindanao. What will make the MILF understand that they need to negotiate something less than full control of Mindanao? And if they did decide to settle and negotiate, would the government really grant it at this stage, especially with the support coming from the U.S.?

Orlando Guzman: First of all, I think it's highly unlikely the govt will give in to MILF demands. It seems impossible at this point to imagine a separate Islamic state in Mindinao. I think that previous govt policy, starting with the transmigration programs of the 1960s and 70s effectively prevents this from ever happening. The ethnic and religious makeup of Mindinao has been reengineered to make any kind of Islamic state practical.

The first part to your question. The other option for the MILF would be to receive autonomy, but they saw what happened with the Moro National Liberation Front and what happened to them after they received autonomy. Autonomy has done little to benefit those on Mindanao and a lot of it has to do with the corruption of Muslim leaders and the lack of seriousness in the central goverment to make autonomy work.

________________________________________________

Detroit, Mich.: The article regarding Muslim insurgency in the Phillipines blatantly failed to cover the history of the region adequately. More often than not, Islam has spread as a result of conquest and mass murder. How did it spread so far east in the first place? Did they just pop up one day and say "Allah Akbah?" Inquiring minds want to know!

Orlando Guzman: Unlike in other parts of the world, Islam spread to Southeast Asia through the peaceful winds of commerce and Islam arrived in Southeast Asia long before Christianity did. and I think that this is a misconception that a lot of people have about Islam, that most Muslims are from the Middle East. The largest Muslim population in the world is in Indonesia. The form of Islam I've seen practiced in the Philippines is the most tolerant and peaceful I've ever seen.

________________________________________________

Alexandria, Va.: In the show, you mentioned that about half of the Philippines export revenue is generated by Mindanao. What industries are producing that and who's getting that money? It doesn't seem like the Moros are seeing any of that revenue coming their way.

Orlando Guzman: Land distribution is a massive problem and especially acute in Mindinao. On the eastern side of Mindinao in Bukidnon, an eastern province there, I've driven across countryside for four hours and was told that only one person owns that land -- a sugar cane plantation. I imagine that's true in other areas of Mindinao. These very large plantations are owned by people from Manila. You really get a sense of the feudal state of the country when you go to Mindinao.

There's two kinds of Christian settlers there. The very rich ones, as mentioned before, and then the very poor ones who are hired by the rich. In many places I've seen the very rich pit the poor Christians against the poor Muslims and they win in the end -- the rich.

________________________________________________

Honolulu, Hawaii: Thank you so much for your thoughtful documentation of the current situation in the southern Philippines. I was wondering how it was possible for you to gain access to high ranking guerrilla leaders and if their indenitities or security were compromised in any way by this story?

Orlando Guzman: Many of these guerrilla leaders already have a price on their head. Some as high as a million dollars. And I figure that they know how to look after their own security. It was a very cloak and dagger effort to meet these people. Some of it would seem straight out of Hollywood. There were car changes, we had to cover our tracks and in some cases we had to hide our faces.

But in the end, the Philippines is a fun place to report, because people are so willing to talk.

________________________________________________

New York, N.Y.: What does this rebellion mean for the stability of the Philippine government?

Orlando Guzman: I'm not sure how much Philippine officials realize the future of the entire country depends on what happens in Mindinao. The Philippines has been dragged backwards because of its inability to effectively deal with these insurgencies -- to deal with them in any kind of lasting and peaceful way. Mindinao has so much potential, but its riches have been squandered and plundered and I think that the lawlessness that the war has spread has benefited a very rich elite and the sad thing is, as long as this war remains profitable for certain people, we'll never see an end to the conflict.



________________________________________________

Orange, Calif.: How will U.S. involvement change the situation in Mindanao?

Orlando Guzman: It really depends on how the U.S. decides to get involved. From everything that we're seeing the U.S. believes that by training the Philippine military, improving their arms, by selling them more weapons would improve the lot of people in Mindinao. There is a real security problem in Mindinao, that I don't deny and that region has been conducive to breeding terrorist organizations.

But I can't see how the involvement of a major superpower can bring peace.

I think that there should be a genuine recognition of the unique identity and history of the Moros or Muslims in Mindinao. And I think until they feel respected and they feel that the government is serving their interests I think that peace will continue to be elusive. American involvement there may just mess things up.

________________________________________________

Honolulu, Hawaii: Were you able to find any evidence that the military presence in Mindanao is actually being sponsored by international corporate investors in an attempt at further land-grabbing in the region in order to dominate the rich natural resources still available in the islands?

Orlando Guzman: I didn't really see any evidence of that. There are multi-national corporations operating in Mindinao, but I can't say that they are doing the things that you claim.

________________________________________________

Toledo, Ohio: How different do you think this situation would be if Mindanao wasn't so rich in natural resources and exports? Would both sides put up as much of a fight if it didn't count for such a big percentage of the Philippines' economy?

Orlando Guzman: I can't speculate on that because I just like to stick to the reality of the situation.

________________________________________________

New York, N.Y.: What do people in areas of the Philippines think of this MILF and the muslims in the south in general? Or do they even care? If the MILF laid down arms and decided to integrate into society, would they even have the option? Is the dominance of the catholics preventing muslims from integrating at all?

Orlando Guzman: I think that in the Philippines there's really very little awareness about what's happening in Mindinao and I think the local media has to take some steps to change that. When you're in Mindinao it's really quite surprising that how much of what's happening there actually makes it to the pages of the newspapers in Manila. There's a feeling that Mindinao is really an old story and a lot people, especially Muslims in Mindinao are exasperated by the lack of understanding of the rest of Philippinos.

I think that its fair to say that there's a certain degree of bigotry toward Muslims amongst the majority Catholic population. And there's very little effort to try and understand where the Muslims are coming from. The Moro National Liberation Front, which is the other rebel group did lay down a lot of their arms in the early 1990s and a lot of them have been integrated into the army and police. But still there is a real lack of jobs, opportunities, for Muslims in general in Mindinao. There's also a real lack of education. Schools are overcrowded and there's very little incentive to go to school if there's no jobs at the end. So, I think that there's always going to be problems for people (rebels) trying to integrate back into normal society.

________________________________________________

Chicago, Ill.: Why don't modern Moro separatist groups widely use suicide attacks? Long ago Moros used to launch "juramentado" attacks withs blades against Spanish and American colonialists. Why haven't modern Moros revived the practices with explosives?

Orlando Guzman: I don't know the answer to that. Let's just hope that it doesn't turn that.

________________________________________________

Miami, Fla.: I read your walk-through experience on the Frontline Web site. I was left with the impression you sympathized with the Islamic groups, and painted the Americans as the perpetrators of "atrocities."

Am I correct in this impression or did you just inadvertently present more of the Islamic's side than the American?

Orlando Guzman: I don't think there's any saints in this conflict. I think that both sides -- the Philippine government and the MILF -- are guilty of atrocities. One thing that I do realize as well is that so few people have bothered to spend enough time in Muslim areas of Mindinao. So few people have bothered to ask these people why they're so angry. So few people have bothered to hear why Muslims support the MILF and why they see it as a legitimate revolutionary group.

And I find that it's my job as a reporter to go to areas where few have gone and listen to people, because maybe their greivances are valid.

________________________________________________

Boston, Mass.: Bottom line, regardless of how locally they operate, are the MILF terrorists?

Orlando Guzman: There've been a number of reports, the most prominent being in the NY Times, that suspected foreign terrorists have been training in areas controlled by the MILF. The claim that foreigners have claimed in MILF camps is not new. We've heard this for some time now. A lot of this information about these so-called training camps comes from PHilippine intelligence sources and it's difficult to say where they're getting their information from and whether its reliable or not.

We do know that there are individuals who've had plans to carry out bombings in Singapore and other other areas who have had personal links with MILF members. One of them is Fathur Rohman Al Ghozi, an Indonesian, with suspected links to Jamaah Islamiyah. He was arrested last January in Mindinao with a half a ton of explosives in his home. The MILF doesn't deny that Al Ghozi has visited MILF camps, but it says it didn't know Ghozi was a part of Jamaah Islamiyah.

That said, I've met a lot of MILF rank and file who've devoted all of their lives to what they see as a genuine revolutionary struggle. Like any organization, the MILF is a mixed bag, but I'll leave it to others to decide what to call it.

U.S. To Expand Sanctions Against Myanmar
Jun 06, 2003

The U.S. State Department announced June 6 an expansion to sanctions against the military regime in Myanmar. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the list of Myanmar officials banned from entering the United States will be lengthened. The move follows increased criticism by Congress of Myanmar's military crackdown on the political opposition.

STRATFOR'S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
http://www.stratfor.com
5 June 2003

=================================================================


Today's Featured Analysis

Suu Kyi Detention Points to Deeper Troubles for Myanmar

Summary

The recent detention of pro-democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi
following clashes between government supporters and members of
her National League of Democracy has raised questions of the
efficacy of the snail's-pace talks between the government and
opposition in Myanmar. But the attack that led to Suu Kyi's
detention might reveal a deeper problem for the central
government than simply an active pro-democracy movement.

Analysis

U.N. Special Envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail has said he will go
ahead with a scheduled trip to Yangon on June 6, a week after the
military government placed pro-democracy advocate Aung San Suu
Kyi in "protective custody" after a clash between members of her
National League of Democracy (NLD) and pro-government members of
the Union Solidarity and Development Association.

The detention has raised questions about the government's
commitment to the ongoing dialogue with Suu Kyi, aimed at
ultimately ending the international isolations and sanctions on
cash-strapped Myanmar. But more fundamentally, the timing of the
clash, just before Razali's long-planned visit, suggests deeper
problems for the regime than simply dealing with the NLD. Rather,
it might signal dissent from local officials worried that
Yangon's talks with Suu Kyi will strip them of their power and
economic well-being.

Reports vary widely over what exactly happened May 30, but both
government and opposition sources agree that there was a violent
clash between NLD and union members in northern Myanmar after Suu
Kyi visited the area. The union was founded in 1993, and,
according to the government, was established "to strengthen the
Union of Myanmar, to promote love and understanding among
indigenous peoples, to strengthen state sovereignty, to safeguard
territorial integrity and to develop the country and to build a
peaceful and modern State."

Yangon claims a spontaneous melee broke out when union members
rallied against NLD supporters, leaving four dead and about 50
injured. The government then took Suu Kyi and 19 other NLD
leaders into protective custody to avoid further violent
outbreaks.

Opposition supporters claim the government sent police or
military troops, local thugs, prisoners and union members to
ambush Suu Kyi's caravan, attacking NLD members and assaulting
Suu Kyi herself, who by some accounts sustained head and shoulder
injuries from broken glass. These reports claim that about 70 or
80 people died, several hundred others were injured and numerous
NLD members were detained.

While the exact cause of the violence is disputed, the existence
of the clash is undeniable. NLD members had complained prior to
the May 30 clash that union and local officials were harassing
their meetings and travels, using the excuse that the NLD was
"disrupting" traffic when members came to town. This incident,
then, was not entirely out of the blue, but the timing is rather
unfortunate for the central government.

Despite some differences of opinion within the ruling State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC), there had been an agreement to
try to press ahead with talks with Suu Kyi and undertake a public
relations campaign to try to extricate Myanmar from its
international isolation -- largely triggered by the military
government's refusal to accept the results of the 1990 elections.
Thus Yangon freed Suu Kyi from house arrest, allowed her to
travel the country and agreed to talks. Government officials also
reassured the United Nations, through Razali, that it was
interested in reform.

But the arrest of Suu Kyi just before a scheduled visit by Razali
is a black mark against Yangon. And, given the timing, it
suggests that the clash in northern Myanmar might not have been
entirely sanctioned by the SPDC. Rather, it instead might reflect
an already existing split in the SPDC or, more troubling for
Yangon, it could be the result of a local official taking things
into his own hands.

The SPDC has been split on the idea of working with Suu Kyi, but
had come to a consensus to continue. But in February, the SPDC
promoted Maj. Gen. Soe Win to Secretary 2, the fourth-ranked
position on the council. Soe Win had been commander of the
Northwest Military Region until a sweeping change in Myanmar's
regional military commanders placed him in Yangon -- where the
top leadership could monitor him.

Several opposition sources inside and outside Myanmar have
accused Soe Win of masterminding the attack on Suu Kyi in an
attempt to undermine the reconciliation process and return to a
more hard-line approach toward the NLD. And while this might be
true, there is another, more likely underlying trigger for the
incident -- a growing distrust of the reconciliation process by
regional officials.

The central government understands the need to alter the
international opinion of Myanmar to break free from sanctions and
boost the country's economy. Thus, Yangon has assured neighboring
Thailand that Suu Kyi's detention is only temporary and that it
will re-open universities on June 16, less than three weeks after
their closure following the clash. But local military commanders
and government officials currently benefit from the existing
political order, one in which they effectively serve as local
warlords backed by Yangon. It is this reason that the SPDC called
back nearly all of the regional military commanders in 2001 -- to
reign in the growing power of these disparate officials who were
stripping power from Yangon in their own self-interest.

And for them, the idea of more democracy in Myanmar is a direct
challenge to their current power and authority. They oppose moves
to compromise with Suu Kyi -- even moves shy of reintroducing
full participatory democracy -- because it threatens their very
existence. Thus, it is not unlikely that the May 30 actions were
locally organized attempts to throw a wrench into the already
difficult mechanics of reconciliation.

And the government's decision to place Suu Kyi and other NLD
leaders in protective custody -- a common euphemism for detention
-- might actually be in part to prevent further outbreaks of
violence -- particularly given the apparently unrelated bombings
that have taken place in various areas of the country in the past
six months. Yangon now is in a difficult position. If it intends
to maintain some momentum toward international normalcy, it must
continue talks with Suu Kyi and refrain from overly obvious
actions designed to limit the NLD's movements and operations.

But if regional commanders -- or even some members of the central
leadership -- are opposed to the process, Yangon's top three
leaders must take action. And that very well might come in the
form of another military or regional government reshuffle.
...................................................................

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Putting the world back together again
Jun 5th 2003 | AQABA, CRACOW AND EVIAN-LES-BAINS
From The Economist print edition

American diplomacy is widely regarded as arrogant and selfish. The president's trip this week should refine that verdict


GEORGE BUSH began at Auschwitz. He laid wreaths at the wall of death, a place where prisoners were summarily shot, and at the unbearable ruins of Birkenau's gas ovens, a jumble of bricks that remain as they were found in 1945, half-destroyed by the retreating Nazis.

The sombre symbolism of the camps suited a week-long tour to the two most troublesome objects of American diplomacy. As the president said later that day, ?They remind us that evil is real and must be called by name and must be opposed.? That was aimed at critical Europeans. The camps also provide?though this remained unspoken?terrible reminders about Jewish insecurity. This was not irrelevant to the second half of the visit, to the Middle East.

Since September 11th 2001, the foreign policy of almost every other country has been driven by reaction to America's willingness to project its power unilaterally. Critics have argued that the Bush administration has too narrow a view of America's interests and uses its immense power disruptively. They have sought to restrain it, Gulliver-like, in a net of obligations. Supporters have tried to steer it, engaging in America's foreign-policy debates before decisions get made, and backing them afterwards. Arab states have hoped to attract its attention by persuading the president to commit himself to regional peacemaking.

This week they had their wish. Mr Bush made his first visit to the region, standing with the Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers and the king of Jordan at Aqaba, in Jordan, to announce that they would take the first steps on the road map, supported the day before by Arab leaders at their summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, in Egypt. In Aqaba, Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers, recognised each other's right to have a state. Mr Abbas reiterated Israel's right to peace and security and vowed to end both the armed intifada and incitements to violence against Israel. Mr Sharon confirmed Israel's acceptance of the ?two-state solution?, allowed that a Palestinian state would have to be formed on contiguous territory to be viable, offered to ease the plight of Palestinians under occupation and said his government would begin to remove ?unauthorised outposts?. These declarations all follow the road map.

Several developments made this possible. Victory in Iraq has prompted America and Arab regimes to push anew for peace, as happened after the first Gulf war. A reformed Palestinian Authority?itself partly a product of American pressure?is a more acceptable and viable partner. As important, terrorist strikes, especially those in Saudi Arabia last month, have given Arab governments a bigger stake in settling the dispute, since it fuels violence that threatens them, too.

?We will continue to fight the scourge of terrorism,? said Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's president, ?regardless of justifications and motive.? The lack of a qualification marks a shift. Arab regimes?though not Syria, which denounced the statement?now accept that terrorism by Palestinians is still terrorism. They promised to funnel their aid through the Palestinian Authority which, if done, might help dry up the outside money that fuels the militant groups.

At the summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, the five Arab participants unambiguously endorsed the road map and Mr Bush's role. The ?rejectionists? were marginalised?Syria was not invited?and the Arab regimes, in contrast to some previous peacemaking attempts, were properly involved. ?A good beginning,? said Mr Bush, as he flew off to visit American troops in Qatar.

Naturally, that guarantees nothing about the future. During the first phase of the road map, the Israeli army is also supposed to withdraw from areas it has occupied since September 2000. Mr Sharon made no mention of that. The hardest issues of all?Jewish settlements, Palestinians' ?right of return? and the status of Jerusalem?remain for the third phase. Meanwhile, the summit raised, but left unresolved, more immediate doubts.


 

Many Arabs still worry that the Americans will disengage when things go wrong


 
First, many Arabs still worry that the Americans will disengage when things go wrong, as things surely will. For the administration, this is a brief but passing period which is favourable to engagement, after the Iraq war and before the 2004 election campaign. But Mr Bush shows some signs of preparing to stick it out. The administration announced a new envoy to the region, John Wolf, a career diplomat who is associated with the neo-conservatives. He will head a team of Americans who will go to the region to monitor negotiations. Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, has been named as Mr Bush's ?personal representative? on the topic, a clear sign of engagement by the White House.

 
 
Great to see you, Prince Abdullah, President Mubarak, my good friend Tony...
 

Second, what are the roles of Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinians' new prime minister, and Yasser Arafat, their president? Mr Arafat was not invited, though Arab regimes have previously said peace will not be possible without him. Since last June, Mr Bush has said the opposite: peace will be impossible with him. The summits advanced America's aim of building up support for Mr Abbas as an alternative. Arab leaders gave his Palestinian government a ringing endorsement, and Mr Abbas himself seems to have increased his prestige with Mr Bush. By the end of their first meeting, said one observer, ?They were like pals from a long time ago.? But, as he also noted, Mr Abbas will need to show Palestinians proof that he can deliver benefits on the ground.

 

The hard road to trust

Politically, it is Mr Sharon who is in immediate trouble. According to Israeli defence sources, the government will start taking down some 15 ?unauthorised outposts? next week. There are dozens more outposts, built since March 2001, dotting the West Bank, which must be removed in this first phase of the road map. But if 15 go it will be a significant start, certainly in terms of domestic politics.

There have been intelligence warnings of violent or even armed resistance from settler extremists. The defence sources said that the army would act fast and firmly to dismantle the outposts, and to make sure that the evicted settlers did not return to them or set up new ones. Leaders of the mainstream settler movement, while dissociating themselves from threats of violence against the soldiers, intend to organise large-scale passive resistance against the dismantlement operation.

More than 40,000 people attended an anti-government rally organised by the settlers in Jerusalem, just hours after the summit ended. ?We won't allow a single inhabited spot to be removed,? declared one speaker. ?This road map goes straight to hell.?


?This road map goes straight to hell?
 
The looming clashes over the outposts could well grow into a terminal showdown between Mr Sharon and the two parties of the far right that sit in his cabinet. The National Union, with seven seats in the 120-seat Knesset, and the National Religious Party, with six, say they are staying in the government to keep the Labour Party out. But if Mr Sharon's words turn into deeds, they may have no choice but to leave. Labour promises Mr Sharon the support of its 19 Knesset members without necessarily joining the government?so long as he gets on with removing the outposts and freezing the rest of the settlements as required by the road map.

Mr Abbas faces a less immediate political embarrassment, but the challenge before him, if he is to translate his promise to end the armed intifada into reality, is enormous. He needs to achieve a ceasefire that includes the Islamic factions, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. He will be able to do so only if he can point to changes on the ground.

Sobered by the new American wind blowing right into their now closed offices in Damascus, the Islamists have been sounding conciliatory, vowing not to ?embarrass? Mr Abbas in his endeavours for peace. But their terms for a truce remain as hard as ever, demanding reciprocity from Israel. They want a ?guarantee? that Israel will withdraw from the Palestinian areas it has reoccupied, and end its policy of assassinating known Islamist fighters. They have ruled out disarmament. ?We will continue to defend ourselves,? said one Hamas man. Many in Mr Abbas's own Fatah movement hold the same view.

At Aqaba, the Palestinians' new security chief, Muhammad Dahlan, urged Israel to release more prisoners beyond the 100 or so freed as goodwill gestures in recent weeks. There are 6,000 Palestinians in Israeli jails, many of them Fatah activists, including the movement's West Bank leader, Marwan Barghouti. Mr Dahlan believes the release of these prisoners would give him the legitimacy and the personnel to build an effective police force that might one day take on Hamas.

This is his and Mr Abbas's cautious game plan: first a ceasefire, next policing and then, and only then, disarmament. Time, and reciprocal action by the Israelis, will be required for all three phases. The Palestinians believe that Mr Bush, eager to see the new leadership strengthened, is sympathetic to this approach.

Monitoring both Israeli and Palestinian compliance with the road map, monitored by a team of American supervisors under Mr Wolf, will begin next week. The team, said Mr Bush pointedly, would be ?stating clearly who is fulfilling their responsibilities?. The Israelis professed themselves pleased that only America, and not the other authors of the map?the UN, the EU and Russia?would be involved in this monitoring. The Palestinians were pleased that it would begin forthwith.

Israel was particularly gratified that Mr Bush had been persuaded at the last minute to add a reference in his Aqaba speech to Israel as ?the Jewish state?. Silvan Shalom, Israel's foreign minister, said that this was meant as a negation of the ?right of return? claimed by the Palestinian refugees. Israel initially had wanted Mr Abbas to make this point in his speech, but the Palestinians are not prepared to renounce the right of return at this early stage.

 

Europe's quicksands

In the glare of all this momentous activity, the earlier leg of Mr Bush's trip was almost forgotten by mid-week. But this, too, was a vital mission to repair damage and make peace. Europeans had long taken America's power and Europe's relative powerlessness for granted, until the build-up to the war in Iraq. At that point, France and Germany started talking about American power as something to be contained. Some Americans started dividing Europe into old and new, sceptics and allies. Mr Bush's trip attempted to reinstate the old close ties, but only on certain conditions.

?The United States is committed to a strong Atlantic alliance,? the president told a crowd in Cracow, in Poland. ?This is no time to stir up divisions in a great alliance.? He went out of his way to claim that, in the Middle East and in developing countries generally, ? we need the help, the advice and the wisdom of our European friends and allies.? This seemed good evidence?and the rash of joint policy agreements on trade and aid after the G8 summit at Evian-les-Bains produced more?that the administration is still committed to the transatlantic alliance as a whole, not just to a few select members of it.

In some areas, closer transatlantic co-operation is certainly on the cards. After the G8 summit, NATO's secretary-general, Lord Robertson, reiterated demands that the organisation do more to act as a peacekeeper outside its traditional area of operation. During the summit, America announced the extension of the so-called Global Partnership against nuclear proliferation. Set up at last year's summit, the project is concerned with such matters as destroying Russian chemical weapons. It has now been joined, for the first time, by a group of small European countries.

What is much less clear is whether the broader differences about the use of American power have been narrowed enough to improve ties across the board. Only strong assertions of mutual interest were likely to allay the deep distrust engendered by the Iraq war, and these were not forthcoming.

Mr Bush did not flinch from pointing out specific areas where the two sides disagree: on lending conditions for poor countries, for example, and on genetically modified food. Nor did he gloss over the ructions before the war. He told the Poles that ?you have not come all this way only to be told [by France] that you must now choose between Europe and America.?

Backstage, the talk was blunter. Miss Rice talked of her disappointment at the questioning of America's motives in Iraq and of her ?consternation? at French and German behaviour. ?There were times,? she said, ?that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein. I'll just put it very bluntly. We simply didn't understand it.? She added, at another point, ?That disappointment will, of course, not go easily.?

Jacques Chirac, France's president, was no less clear where he stood. ?I've no doubt whatsoever,? he said at Evian, ?that the multipolar vision of the world that I have defended for some time is certainly supported by a majority of countries throughout the world.? He turned the G8 meeting of rich industrial nations into virtually a global summit, inviting 13 leaders from developing countries. And he summarily rejected an American suggestion that the G8's resolution on Iran and North Korea implied that force could be used against countries that breach international rules against proliferation. ?This interpretation,? he said, ?seems to be extraordinarily daring.?

The contrast with Vladimir Putin was instructive. Russia, too, has worried about America's projection of unilateral power and has praised attempts to constrain it internationally. But Mr Putin gave Mr Bush almost everything he wanted. Before their meeting, at the 300th anniversary celebrations in Mr Putin's home city of St Petersburg, Russia's parliament ratified the treaty that pledges to reduce the two sides' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds over ten years (the treaty was signed last year, but the parliament had refused to ratify it during the Iraq war). Mr Putin said that Russian and American policies on Iran?one of the most contentious issues between them over the past few years?were closer than anyone thought, and that Russia did not want Iran to get hold of nuclear weapons. Their meeting ended in a bear-hug.

The difference lies partly in European and Russian attitudes. Russia has decided that it needs to work with America on strategic and nuclear matters, while Europe is divided about how close it wants transatlantic ties to be. It also lies partly in American attitudes. As Mr Bush's trip confirmed, his administration will not let allied reluctance slow down something that it perceives to be in its national interest. And when Europeans are split, America is quite prepared to cherry-pick among them. No better evidence for this can be seen than a new anti-nuclear proliferation measure announced at the G8 summit. Incensed by its inability legally to confiscate a weapons shipment from North Korea to Yemen that was intercepted at sea earlier this year, America decided to set up a new interdiction regime to crack down on such trade. The first countries it went to for support were Spain, Poland, Britain and Australia, the ones that sent troops to Iraq.

That may be understandable. When a country thinks its national security is threatened, it will hardly let even allies dictate its response. Yet the Bush administration also shows signs of cherry-picking here, seeing as its particular allies Britain, Spain, Italy and the new democracies of central Europe. To paraphrase Lord Acton, America may be seeking to create a New Europe in order to redress the balance of the Old.

 
FOTOS
Vladimir, let's hug again! After you, Jacques, you French bastard. This one's Polish, right?

 

This will not happen without a fight. The leaders of France and Germany frequently (though mistakenly) like to assert that nothing much happens in the EU unless they agree. Moreover, they do not seem seriously abashed by the outcome of the war in Iraq. True, both voted for the United Nations resolution to lift sanctions. But French officials do not think America has been vindicated by victory. On the contrary, they argue that military action has reaped a harvest of chaos in Iraq and more terrorism by al-Qaeda. If anything, they feel their opposition has been vindicated by the failure to find Mr Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

In short, American diplomacy, like Mr Bush's foreign travels, seems to come in two parts. In the Middle East, America showed that it is willing to use its power in ways that are neither arrogant nor selfish. But whether that will be enough to reassure European critics is another matter.

If the truth matters, then all should read the full text of President Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002. This speech began the overt and official US policy that culminated in the invasion of Iraq. For those who wish to read the complete speech, here is the text. I have posted the complete text here because excerpts have a way of reflecting the editor's bias.

As an example, consider the Wolfowicz quote in the Vanity Fair press release. That press release hyping the Vanity Fair article fails to include Wolfowicz's next sentence. That sentence reads, "But there have always been three fundamental concerns: One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism and the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people."

One thing is clear. The President's speech to the UN mentioned a lot more than just WMD's.

Rick
***********************************************************

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html

"Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, and ladies and gentlemen: We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world. Yesterday, we remembered the innocent lives taken that terrible morning. Today, we turn to the urgent duty of protecting other lives, without illusion and without fear.

We've accomplished much in the last year -- in Afghanistan and beyond. We have much yet to do -- in Afghanistan and beyond. Many nations represented here have joined in the fight against global terror, and the people of the United States are grateful.

The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war -- the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear. The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. After generations of deceitful dictators and broken treaties and squandered lives, we dedicated ourselves to standards of human dignity shared by all, and to a system of security defended by all.

Today, these standards, and this security, are challenged. Our commitment to human dignity is challenged by persistent poverty and raging disease. The suffering is great, and our responsibilities are clear. The United States is joining with the world to supply aid where it reaches people and lifts up lives, to extend trade and the prosperity it brings, and to bring medical care where it is desperately needed.

As a symbol of our commitment to human dignity, the United States will return to UNESCO. (Applause.) This organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights and tolerance and learning.

Our common security is challenged by regional conflicts -- ethnic and religious strife that is ancient, but not inevitable. In the Middle East, there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale.

In one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.

Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.

To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.

In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored.

Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke its promise. Last year the Secretary General's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini, and Omani nationals remain unaccounted for -- more than 600 people. One American pilot is among them.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit no terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq.

In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge.

From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.

United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.

Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region.

In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens.

In 1991, Iraq promised U.N. inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing U.N. inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely. Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, condemning Iraq's serious violations of its obligations. The Security Council again renewed that demand in 1994, and twice more in 1996, deploring Iraq's clear violations of its obligations. The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations; and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable. And in 1999, the demand was renewed yet again.

As we meet today, it's been almost four years since the last U.N. inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years for the Iraqi regime to plan, and to build, and to test behind the cloak of secrecy.

We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.

Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?

The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.

We can harbor no illusions -- and that's important today to remember. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. He's fired ballistic missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel. His regime once ordered the killing of every person between the ages of 15 and 70 in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. He has gassed many Iranians, and 40 Iraqi villages.

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.

Events can turn in one of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.

If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time.

Neither of these outcomes is certain. Both have been set before us. We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well.

Thank you very much."
Attachments:

Item Number:13
Date: 06/03/2003
PHILIPPINES - MILF LAYS DOWN ARMS FOR NOW (JUN 03/BBC)

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP. -- The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) rebel group began a unilateral cease-fire on Monday in the
Philippines, reports the BBC.  A MILF spokesman said the group will continue the cease-fire until June 12.

"The armed forces will not fire upon MILF groups that raise the
white flag, come out in the open and peaceably return to the fold,"
said President Gloria Arroyo.  However, said Arroyo, the military will continue to strike MILF elements that "remain underground."