What the Escalating Wagner Feud Means for Russia's War in Ukraine -- And Beyond
May 16, 2023 | 20:57 GMT
While the Wagner Group's public feud with Russia's military leaders could complicate Russia's war efforts in Ukraine, the military contractor will likely remain involved in the war, though its role will diminish over time. Evgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Russian military contractor Wagner Group, has in recent days escalated his months-long feud with Russia's military leadership. On May 5, he accused Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, two close associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin, of causing the deaths of Wagner soldiers by failing to provide Wagner Group sufficient artillery ammunition. Then on May 10, Prigozhin suggested that an unnamed ''grandpa'' — a possible reference to Putin — was an imbecile whose withholding of resources was a catastrophic mistake. On May 11, reports in Russian media citing Kremlin officials suggested that the comments nearly crossed a red line of attacking Putin, but that Prigozhin's ability to plausibly claim that he was referring to other officials, including his usual targets Gerasimov and Shoigu, meant the words didn't constitute a direct attack on the president and therefore the Kremlin was unlikely to act against him. On May 15, additional leaks also began circulating that Prigozhin offered Ukraine intel on Russian forces in exchange for ceding territory around Bakhmut, which is likely related to Wagner's feud with the MoD as well.
The Wagner Group is a global paramilitary force that some European countries are now moving to designate a terrorist group, and that the United States has labeled a transnational crime organization.
Wagner soldiers have been a key force in Russia's war efforts in Ukraine since last fall. Wagner's feud with Russia's Ministry of Defense (MoD), embodied by Kremlin insiders Shoigu and Gerasimov, began festering in February over Wagner soldiers' inability to take Bakhmut in Russia's winter offensive, and has since worsened due to the MoD's ammunition saving for the upcoming Ukrainian offensive. Meanwhile, the Wagner group has taken massive losses on the battlefield that have shattered its remaining forces. In Prigozhin's eyes, his organization has sacrificed resources for the MoD. To that end, on May 9 Prigozhin griped that ''our enemy isn't the Ukrainian military'' but Russian ''military bureaucrats.''
Citing leaked U.S. intelligence documents, The Washington Post reported on May 5 that tensions between the MoD and Wagner were reaching new highs. Gerasimov and Shoigu were reportedly implicated in actions to sabotage Wagner and provide justification to reduce the group's role in Ukraine. Specifically, on Feb. 12, Gerasimov allegedly ordered to stop munitions supplies to Wagner, halting planned military transport flights that were set to transport ammunition to the organization's headquarters in southern Russia. Intercepted communications from Russia's Federal Security Service confirmed that Wagner was receiving less ammunition than it had been promised, suggesting Gerasimov's intervention caused the shortage.
According to the leaks published by The Washington Post, Russia's military leadership was so frustrated by Prigozhin's public attacks that some officials debated how to quash his criticism, considering a public campaign to discredit Prigozhin before concluding that banning him from speaking out was not feasible.
The feud could complicate Russia's efforts in Ukraine by deepening fissures within the Russian military, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources and weakening political support for the invasion. On one side of the ongoing feud is Shoigu, Gerasimov and the rest of Russia's defense establishment. And on the other is the Wagner Group and Russian military officials skeptical of the Ukraine war's trajectory — including the former head commander of the invasion, Gen. Sergey Surovikin, who Progozhin claimed on May 8 had been appointed as the Wagner Group's effective liaison with the MoD. The deepening rift between these two sides risks fueling factionalism in Russia's leadership and resentment among the rank and file that could complicate military efforts. Because of the feud, Russian military officers may not know the extent to which their actions should entirely align with Shoigu and Gerasimov, or with Prigozhin and aligned general Surovikin. This could make some Russian soldiers hesitant to see through orders that may be pushed in factional interests rather than objective military realities, leading to less optimal allocation of increasingly limited resources. Similar hesitance may grow among the rank and file, where reports indicate an interservice rivalry between Wagner and the MoD is breeding distrust and animus on the ground, reducing the interoperability of Wagner and Russian army troops and their combat effectiveness. Prigozhin's rhetoric also foments broader skepticism and disdain toward Russia's military and political leaders among not just soldiers, but the general public and elites. A sense of disunity has grown in recent months among influential military bloggers, some state propagandists, and even political officials. On May 10, lawmakers from the ruling United Russia party offered to invite Prigozhin to parliament to explain his grievances, demonstrating the increasing political visibility of the Wagner leader's skepticism of Kremlin-appointed military leaders.
Prigozhin has often followed his provocative statements and addresses with promotional videos seeking volunteers to join the Wagner group. The conduct suggests that Prigozhin is effectively using anger toward the regular army and accusations of MoD incompetence as a recruiting tool, underscoring Wagner's direct competition for manpower against the MoD's own volunteer campaign.
On April 30, Russia's deputy defense minister in charge of logistics, Mikhail Mizintsev, was removed from his position without explanation. But on May 4, Wagner announced Mizintsev had become a deputy commander of Wagner forces in Ukraine, making him one of the most senior Russian military officials ever to join the organization. The move is a potential sign of factionalism in the military.
On Oct. 8, Moscow General Sergei Surovikin was named as the first overall commander of the Ukraine invasion, replacing a previous command structure whereby multiple front commanders answered to Putin through Shoigu and Gerasimov. After only three months on the job, Surovikin was then replaced in January and demoted to serving as one of Gerasimov's deputies.
Surovikin's time as overall commander saw at least two major controversial decisions, including the retreat from the Western bank of the Dnieper River in November and the airstrike campaign against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure that failed to undermine Ukraine's resistance. This fueled speculation that Russia's top military leaders had set up Surovikin and his advocates, including Prigozhin, to serve as scapegoats.
While Prigozhin will likely continue making divisive comments, his reliance on Putin and the defense ministry mean that he is unlikely to continue escalating the feud to the point of crossing the Kremlin's red lines. Prigozhin will continue to publicize his grievances and garner attention, including by making critical comments toward the MoD, which will pose an informational challenge to the Kremlin. But the Kremlin is unlikely to muzzle Prigozhin because he does not pose a threat to Putin's power and Russia's greater political system. The Kremlin also does not believe Prigozhin will cross its clear red lines by, for example by directly attacking Putin, forming an anti-Kremlin political movement or engaging in treasonous activity.The Wagner Group remains entirely reliant on Russia's defense ministry for key weapons and transport, and Prigozhin's other business endeavors are dependent on government contracts that could be quickly curtailed should he overstep his bounds. Therefore, it is extremely doubtful that he would bite the hand that feeds him by significantly escalating his rhetoric. Prigozhin's activities are an attempt to increase his influence, but are not an attempt to fundamentally alter his ultimately minimal role in Russia's governance system. Prigozhin is still not viewed in the Kremlin or the general public as a viable politician, and remains unlikely to vie for such status at the risk of his life and fortune.
The ongoing feud will, however, likely further compel Moscow to gradually reduce the Wagner Group's role in Ukraine. Wagner forces remained Russia's primary offensive forces after Russia's military establishment endorsed General Surovikin's plan to move to the defensive while using missiles to strike Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Gerasimov's replacement of Surovikin in mid-January resulted in that strategy being partially abandoned, with Russia instead launching a larger winter offensive aimed at regaining the initiative. The offensive saw the Russian regular army play a larger role around Vuhledar and Kreminna, but yielded extremely limited gains. Only Wagner's preceding efforts in Bakhmut continued to gain ground, though it's come at an enormous cost. Wagner forces are now likely exhausted and demoralized. But most importantly, they're short of manpower, down to around 15,000 soldiers from approximately 50,000 early last fall. As Russia's regular army contingent in Ukraine has grown to approximately 500,000 soldiers due to mobilization, the relative importance of Wagner troops to Russia's overall force structure has fallen significantly. Furthermore, as the entire Russian army deals with ammunition shortages and prepares to defend against Ukraine's impending counteroffensive, for which Wagner is not structured, the lack of prestige-gaining offensive opportunities leaves little reason for Wagner to maintain a large presence on the front line.
Wagner will likely retain some involvement in the war, even if on a smaller scale, as Wagner forces have benefits compared with Russian regular troops that Moscow will want to continue leveraging. There are several reasons the Kremlin would want to keep some level of Wagner soldiers in Ukraine, despite the recent feud with Prigozhin. For one, Wagner soldiers have been fighting in conflict zones around the world for years, including in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The military contractor's surviving forces are thus more experienced than the vast majority of Russia's regular troops — especially the newly mobilized ones now deployed to Ukraine. For Russia, this makes Wagner a considerably useful resource for not only future combat, but for training and advising other Russian units in the meantime. Unlike Russian regular troops, Wagner fighters are also all volunteers and prisoners, which means their loss on the battlefield has a smaller impact on Russian society and Moscow's overall war efforts compared with the loss of regular soldiers or mobilized personnel. Furthermore, prisoners and previous mercenaries are not individuals taken out of the economy, and Wagner casualties are not reflected in Russia's official army statistics and thus lack political ramifications, which enables Moscow to use Wagner soldiers for riskier attacks. Furthermore, from a financial standpoint, Wagner forces' upkeep is less of a drain on the Russian government's budget (due to private funding sources picking up a larger portion of the group's operating costs). Another private military contractor could, in theory, eventually offer similar economic, political and strategic benefits to Moscow. But the other contractors currently operating in Russia — while plentiful — are still much smaller and lack the manpower, equipment, structure, administration, or media status to replace Wagner quickly.
On April 18, videos emerged in Russian media purporting to show that Wagner personnel were participating in the training of mobilized regular soldiers — a formerly exclusive undertaking of the regular army. Such training would constitute an expansion rather than a reduction of the military contractor's role, which would make it harder for Gerasimov and Shoigu to phase out the use of Wagner soldiers in Ukraine.
Despite his public criticisms, Prigozhin will also seek to stay engaged in Ukraine to ensure that he and his organization remain important to the Kremlin, though this will limit Wagner's ability to expand its operations in key geographies like Africa. Wagner's ''regime security'' services remain key to the Kremlin's global geopolitical strategy, including in countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic and Libya, providing services for which competition largely comes from other Russian private military contractors with weaker ties to the Kremlin. For Wagner, those global services are likely more lucrative from a business standpoint compared with fighting in the Ukraine war. But despite his recent criticisms of Russian leaders' strategy in Ukraine, Prigozhin will still seek to ensure that his organization remains involved in the Ukraine war. This is because Wagner's presence in Ukraine remains an important source of prestige, as well as a valuable insurance policy that will protect Prigozhin himself from the worst consequences of any red lines he may cross in the future. Pulling out Wagner's remaining forces to focus on activities in Africa could put him in increased danger as the Kremlin may seek to replace him with someone more committed to the Ukraine agenda. Therefore, Prigozhin's feud with the Russian military, Wagner's losses in Ukraine and continued presence there mean the group will likely be constrained in its ability to significantly expand its presence in Africa or elsewhere. These factors could cause potential clients to turn to one of the many other smaller (but growing) private military contractors in Russia or from another country by fueling concerns about Wagner's ability to fulfill contracts.
