Author Topic: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia  (Read 164927 times)

ya

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G M

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #601 on: October 17, 2022, 10:34:35 PM »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #602 on: October 27, 2022, 04:44:03 AM »
The Indian defense minister has been commenting on taking back POK several times, most recently yesterday. The world ignores him :-), they are too busy with China, Russia, Ukr. Indian elections in 2024. I think he is waiting for China to make its move on Taiwan.
"Our aim is to implement resolution unanimously passed in Indian Parliament in 1994 to reclaim PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan:
@rajnathsingh in #Srinagar "
#Kashmir
#InfantryDay

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Indian economy poised to weather the economic storm
« Reply #603 on: October 28, 2022, 09:21:04 AM »
India Is Poised to Weather the Coming Global Economic Storm
9 MIN READOct 28, 2022 | 15:52 GMT



The Indian economy retains solid momentum and multiple advantages compared with many other lower-middle-income countries, which should enable India to emerge relatively unscathed from the impending global economic downturn and intensifying financial volatility. Following the COVID-induced recession in 2020, India's economy rebounded very strongly in 2021 and has maintained solid growth ever since. India has also overtaken China as the fastest-expanding economy among larger emerging economies. While inflation remains high in India due to global energy and food price shocks, it is not overwhelming. And while the value of India's currency has dipped, the rupee has depreciated far less than currencies in other countries due to a combination of central bank monetary tightening and foreign-exchange market intervention.

Indian real GDP growth averaged 5.5% over the past decade, fueled by solid investment and favorable demographics. According to the IMF, the economy will grow 6-7% in real terms this year and over 6% in 2023, supported by an investment ratio of over 30% of GDP. By comparison, China will only grow 3.2% due to both cyclical factors (such as extensive COVID-19 restrictions), as well as structural factors (such as Beijing's shift away from investment-intensive real estate and infrastructure-driven growth).
India's inflation will average 7% in 2022, largely due to the energy, commodity and food price shocks resulting from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This is high but not excessively so by India's recent standards, with the country's consumer price inflation averaging 5.8% in 2012-2021.
The rupee is down only 10% against the U.S. dollar in 2022, much less than the currencies of advanced economies (the U.K. pound, for example, is down 16% against the dollar). This comes as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has increased its policy rate to 5.9% from 4% earlier in the year to contain inflation.
India is among the fastest-growing economies in the world's fastest-growing region. In the broader Asia-Pacific, only Vietnam and Bangladesh are currently registering higher economic growth rates, but their economies are only a fraction of the size of India's economy.

In contrast to many other emerging economies, India has relatively solid economic fundamentals. Many low-income and lower-middle-income countries are experiencing severe financial challenges as the outlook for the global economy darkens, with the IMF predicting that one-third of countries will enter a recession next year. Several teeter on the verge of financial collapse and, even if they don't collapse, many will still be forced into painful, growth-reducing macroeconomic adjustments, major debt restructurings, or both. India's financial position, however, is comparatively solid. India has an investment grade rating from all three major international credit rating agencies, implying a very low probability of sovereign default and distress. To be sure, India's government debt is high by emerging markets standards and its fiscal deficit is large. But thanks to solid nominal economic growth, the country's debt ratio is projected to stabilize, ensuring medium-term debt sustainability. India's external debt is also very low, further reducing its financial vulnerabilities. In addition, a combination of sizeable foreign exchange reserves and a flexible exchange rate affords policymakers sufficient room to adjust without causing broader economic or financial problems in case of intensifying balance-of-payments pressures. Compared with many other emerging economies, India is also much less dependent on exports and is therefore far less affected by global economic shocks.

India's government debt exceeds 80% of GDP and its fiscal deficit is nearly 10% of GDP, which is high even by emerging markets standards. But strong underlying nominal economic growth will help stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at current levels, meaning these higher debt and deficit figures should not weigh on India's economic outlook.
The bulk of India's government debt is denominated in local currency and held by domestic investors, which substantially reduces financial risks. Non-resident holdings of general government debt total just 5%, whereas a more typical number in other emerging markets is 30%.
The external debt-to-GDP ratio is a mere 20%, which is quite low compared to an average ratio for emerging markets of 40-50% of GDP. Further, the RBI's foreign currency reserves are roughly equivalent to India's outstanding external debt, which sharply limits external debt-related risks.
In terms of external liquidity, the current account deficit is set to increase to 3-4% of GDP this year, mainly due to higher commodity prices. However, this is more than fully financed by stable foreign direct investment flows.
Portfolio outflows driven by higher U.S. interest rates are putting some pressure on India's balance of payments, but New Delhi has more than enough financial firepower to mitigate this pressure. The RBI has been intervening in the foreign exchange market to smooth out volatility, spending roughly $100 billion year-to-date and leaving foreign-exchange reserves at a sizeable $530 billion.
India's export-to-GDP ratio is only 19%, which is significantly below the unweighted global average of 29%. It's also much lower than countries like Vietnam, where exports exceed 100% of GDP.
Adequate food stocks in the country and continued government intervention to manage high prices also reduce the threat of food insecurity and related political risks in the coming months. India's current stock of key staples like rice and sugar is adequate and the government has restricted wheat and rice exports to prevent domestic price increases and possible shortages. New Delhi has also continued to foot the fertilizer subsidy bill in the face of rising international prices to shield farmers from higher input costs. In addition, the government has maintained a free grain distribution scheme for about 500 million poor people to restrict the impact of rising prices on lower-income households. These continued subsidies will see the Indian government breach its fiscal deficit target of 6.4% of GDP by a significant margin, but the larger deficit will remain manageable as food prices have begun to fall from their peak earlier this year and India's finances remain generally strong. India's expected food security will help maintain political stability in the country, as the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) already enjoys popular support and will not be challenged by large-scale social unrest due to food inflation.

Russia's February invasion of Ukraine caused significant disruptions to global food supplies by undermining the former's ability to export its main commodity: wheat. The fallout increased global demand for Indian wheat, prompting domestic producers to ship more of their products abroad. This led to price increases in India and fueled fears of potential wheat shortages. In May, the government intervened by imposing wheat export restrictions to mitigate prices and shore up domestic supplies of the staple grain.
Beginning Sept. 9, India banned the export of broken rice (widely used for animal feed and in some places human consumption). As a preventative measure against the risk of a low yield this season due to uneven rainfall distribution, the government also raised duties on exports of other rice varieties, except for basmati rice (a key commodity that generates significant revenue),
As of Oct. 1, the Indian government had a combined stock of 51.14 million tonnes of wheat and rice, which is 65% more than the required buffer stock during this time of year, according to the Food Corporation of India. This has prompted the government to extend the free food scheme, which is aimed at enabling poor households to offset inflationary prices during the upcoming festival season, until December. On Oct. 18, the government also raised the minimum support price (the rate at which the government buys grains from the farmers) for both wheat and mustard (another key food item) by 5% and 8%, respectively. These moves are aimed at boosting production in the upcoming winter crop cycle that lasts from October to March.
Food and fertilizer subsidies represent about 10% of India's total budget expenditure, or approximately $40 billion. Revised government subsidies increase the fertilizer and food subsidy bill by approximately 50%, or about $60 billion.
Compared with some of its neighbors, India also has a lower risk of energy insecurity thanks to its diverse sourcing options, as well as its sufficient fiscal space to support imports. New Delhi's neutral stance on Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine has enabled India to import cheaper Russian crude oil since March. India will continue to source Russian oil as long as it remains an affordable way to secure domestic energy supplies, which will likely remain the case for at least several more months. However, the risk of future Western sanctions will persist amid the G-7's push to institute a price cap on Russian oil, along with the EU ban on insuring tankers that ship Russian oil (which is slated to take effect in December). To mitigate the impact of the new EU sanctions and a potential G-7 price cap, the Indian government could opt to cover the logistics costs of oil imports with Russia by paying the added shipping and insurance costs itself. Meanwhile, major state-owned oil refiners in India are also exploring long-term deals with countries like Brazil, Columbia and the United States to cope with potential supply-side disruptions in the coming months. Additionally, the government has controlled domestic fuel price rises through excise duty cuts to petroleum products and direct financial assistance to energy retailers. Comfortable levels of coal stocks will also ward off a repeat of India's 2021 energy crisis, which led to power outages in most states (with Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh being the hardest hit). With enough fiscal room to cover exigencies, along with relatively secure (and diverse) sources of imports, India's energy outlook thus remains stable at a time when many other countries are struggling to keep the lights on without going broke.

The Indian cabinet has agreed to give $2 billion in aid to oil marketing companies that have been footing the bill of high energy prices without passing them on to consumers in order to control inflation.
Indian refiners like Indian Oil Corporation have inked deals with Brazil and Colombia for long-term crude contracts to prevent major disruptions in energy supply in the coming months.
India has sufficient coal stocks, which is crucial to its energy security given that coal generates about 70% of India's electric grid.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #604 on: October 29, 2022, 07:20:52 AM »


DougMacG

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Strategic Chinese Incursions into India
« Reply #606 on: November 14, 2022, 08:35:24 AM »
https://phys.org/news/2022-11-chinese-incursions-india-strategically.html
NOVEMBER 10, 2022

Chinese incursions into India are increasing and are strategically planned, study finds
by Northwestern University

Although it is impossible to pinpoint the precise locations of the incursions, it is clear that the incursions are clustered around hot spots. These are the so-called red-zones: parts of the Line of Actual Control between China and India, where the border is not clearly defined. Credit: PLOS ONE (2022). DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0274999
Chinese incursions across India's west and central borders are not independent, random incidents that happen by mistake. Instead, these incursions are part of a strategically planned, coordinated effort in order to gain permanent control of disputed border areas, a new study has found.

Led by Northwestern University, Technical University of Delft in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Defense Academy, the authors assembled a new dataset, compiling information about Chinese incursions into India from 2006 to 2020. Then they used game theory and statistical methods to analyze the data.

The researchers found that conflicts can be separated into two distinct sectors: west/middle (the Aksai Chin region) and east (the Arunachal Pradesh region). While the researchers learned that the number of incursions are generally increasing over time, they concluded that conflicts in the east and middle sectors are part of a coordinated expansionist strategy.

By pinpointing the exact locations lying at the root of the conflict, the researchers believe deterrents could be established in these specific areas to defuse tensions along the entire border.

The study, "Rising tension in the Himalayas: A geospatial analysis of Chinese border incursions into India," will be published on Nov. 10 in the journal PLOS ONE.

"By studying the number of incursions that occurred in the west and middle sectors over time, it became obvious, statistically, that these incursions are not random," said Northwestern's V.S. Subrahmanian, the study's senior author. "The probability of randomness is very low, which suggests to us that it's a coordinated effort. When we looked at the eastern sector, however, there is much weaker evidence for coordination. Settling border disputes in specific areas could be an important first step in a step-by-step resolution of the entire conflict."

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #607 on: December 12, 2022, 06:34:21 PM »
China intruded in Indian territory (Tawang region) on Dec 9, with a force of around 300 soldiers, fist fight ensued, injuries to both sides. Withdrew later. Looks like COVID zero policy needs a distraction ?.

Addendum: First skirmish after the Galwan incident. Chinese got thrashed..is the word on the street. Hard to get official confirmation.
« Last Edit: December 13, 2022, 04:46:32 AM by ya »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #608 on: December 13, 2022, 05:59:25 PM »
Here's a previous video from Tawang, when the Chinese jumped over the wall.  Enjoy.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1602705543852101632

DougMacG

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #609 on: December 14, 2022, 05:08:01 AM »
Thanks.  )

"Looks like COVID zero policy needs a distraction ?"

The Chinese totalitarians and their American counterparts have similar hypocrisies.  A policy has no exceptions, except for when it doesn't suit them.

More coverage here:
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-soldiers-tawang-clash-explained-rajnath-singh-8321880/

Crafty_Dog

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RANE: India's neutrality
« Reply #610 on: December 14, 2022, 04:08:44 PM »
In an Increasingly Multipolar World, India Maintains Its Strategic Neutrality
6 MIN READDec 13, 2022 | 20:19 GMT






A digital illustration of the Russian and Indian flags.

(Shutterstock)

Strategic calculations are driving India to preserve its close economic and security ties with Russia while also avoiding a major escalation of tensions with the West. On Dec. 2, an official from the Indian oil ministry recently announced that India would continue buying Russian oil, even after the Group of 7 (G-7) price cap on Russian crude shipments went into effect (which it did on Dec. 5). India — which has emerged as a major buyer of Russian oil over the past year — has opted not to support the price cap mechanism, despite U.S. and European efforts to convince the South Asian giant to join them in imposing more pressure on Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.

India has become the second-largest importer of Russian crude oil after China due to discounted prices offered by Moscow. Russian oil only made up 0.2% of India's total oil imports before March, but reached more than 20% in November. About one-third of this discounted Russian oil has been imported by private players in India. However, state-run Indian agencies have also taken advantage of the lower prices. India's access to cheap Russian oil has been critical in preventing fuel price hikes in India, which has helped mitigate inflation in the country.

India has resisted calls from the United States to join the G-7 oil price cap, arguing it will maintain its neutral stance on Russia-West tensions in order to preserve India's strategic autonomy.

India's neutral position on the war in Ukraine reflects New Delhi's foreign policy of strategic autonomy, which seeks to keep balanced political, economic and security partnerships in a multipolar world. India's long strategic, defense and growing energy partnership with Russia, as well as its shift from traditional non-aligned foreign policy to self-serving strategic autonomy, explain New Delhi's stance in the conflict between the West and Russia. Since the outset of the war in Ukraine, India has maintained a neutral position and refused to directly denounce Russia's actions, both in public and through votes in the United Nations. At the same time, India has also been careful not to breach any Western sanctions on Russia, which has prevented a conflict with the West. India took the opportunity to source discounted oil from Russia as such oil exports are not yet sanctioned. New Delhi is also exploring measures like trading in rupees and rubles with Russia to bypass the international system of financial payments (SWIFT) that many Russian entities are currently banned from using.

Russia and India have enjoyed close strategic, military and economic relations since the Cold War period. Although India maintained a non-aligned position through the Cold War, a close relationship between the United States and Pakistan (India's rival) brought the former Soviet Union and India closer together. The Soviet Union was the biggest arms exporter to India, and supported the development of India's public sector-led economy before liberalization reforms in the 1990s. When the West imposed sanctions on India after its nuclear tests in 1974, the Soviet Union assisted India's civil nuclear program. The Soviet Union also supported India's war to liberate Bangladesh in the 1970s and India tacitly supported Russia's occupation of Afghanistan. More recently, India has tried to prevent a close relationship between Russia and China to balance its interests in the continent, though this objective remains mostly out of India's control.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, India has called for the cessation of hostilities and diplomatic talks on multiple occasions. India has also abstained from many U.N. resolutions against Russia.

Despite its close ties with Russia, India also seeks to have cordial relations with the West in general and the United States in particular as a part of its balanced foreign policy. The strategic convergence to deter China's rise and influence (especially in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct) has resulted in strong alignment in recent years.For example, India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the ''Quad''), which also includes the United States, Japan and Australia. This group has met increasingly in recent years, with India's participation. More recently, India has also increased cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States on food and energy security. U.S-India bilateral ties have grown through a close defense partnership that includes military exercises, growing arms trade, information sharing and operational cooperation, as well as growing cooperation in trade and technology.

India's balanced foreign policy is also meant to somewhat shield its economy at a time of a generalized slowdown of global economic activity. New Delhi's neutrality on the conflict in Ukraine opens opportunities for Indian businesses to expand trade ties with Russia and reduce the country's high trade deficit, as well as incentivize the use of the rupee for international trade. Not being a party to Western sanctions also ensures a regular supply of critical inputs like fertilizers and coal, which is necessary to ensure domestic food and energy security. If India eventually cannot import Russian oil due to difficulties in getting ships or insurance because of the G-7 price cap, India's strong macroeconomic fundamentals (including high foreign exchange reserves) should enable it to purchase oil at international prices. In addition to oil, India imports fertilizers and coal from Russia as well. If India manages to avoid meaningful disruptions in those imports in the coming months, its food or energy supplies will remain secure.

Between February and November 2022, Russian exports to India totaled about $29 billion, whereas Indian exports totaled only $1.9 billion. According to media reports, in November Moscow sent New Delhi a list of 500 items that Russia would want to import from India, which included various raw materials (like paper and metals). India and Russia have been working to finalize a rupee-ruble trade mechanism for a few months. Russia's Sberbank and VTB Bank have opened special ''vostro'' accounts in India (foreign bank accounts in domestic banks in domestic currency) in India. The rupee-ruble trade mechanism is not yet operational, but it will reportedly target non-oil trade between the two states.

Indian energy companies — including ONGC-Videsh Ltd, Indian Oil and Oil India are — reportedly interested in participating in Russian upstream oil projects. The exodus of Western companies in Russian energy projects is creating opportunities for India to increase its presence in hydrocarbon exploration in Russia.

In the medium-to-long term, India will seek to preserve its role as a major middle power that keeps cordial ties with the United States while also retaining a strong relationship with Russia. India's push to preserve its strategic autonomy, however, may get tricky. An overt Russian escalation in Ukraine, for example, could make New Delhi reconsider its response to Moscow's aggression against Kyiv — especially if such an escalation involves the use of nuclear weapons. India's reliance on U.S. dollar-denominated systems for financial transactions could also complicate its ability to balance between the United States and Russia, while U.S. sanctions could restrict India's access to sophisticated military technology from Russia. But absent these scenarios, New Delhi's broader relationship with Moscow will likely endure, given India's dependence on Russia for weapons and protection against national security threats (like those posed by neighboring Pakistan and China).


ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #612 on: December 16, 2022, 04:04:29 AM »
Yesterday India tested its China centric Agni 5 missile with a range of over 5000 km at full load, enough to reach all parts of China.


Crafty_Dog

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ET: India-China clash on roof of the world
« Reply #613 on: December 19, 2022, 06:41:31 AM »
India and China Clash on the Roof of the World
Austin BayAustin Bay December 16, 2022 Updated: December 18, 2022biggersmaller Print
Commentary

Chinese dictator Xi Jinping lost face when his communist regime, confronting mass and violent protests in major cities, backed off on its totalitarian “zero-tolerance” COVID-19 lockdown policies. Heavens, export dollars from an Apple iPhone factory were at risk!

Chinese protesters from Xinjiang Province to Shanghai are heroes in the global fight for freedom. At the bottom Chinese political line, Xi brutalized and incited his most powerful enemy, the Chinese people, to the point he had to terminate his hard-core domestic control policy that imprisoned millions in their homes.

Hundreds of millions of mainland Chinese noticed Supreme Leader Xi backed down. Word gets around. You can’t keep a hundred million angry people from complaining to their 200 million friends and relatives. Moreover, The Great Cyber Firewall of China is porous. Credit angry Chinese coders committed to hacking it.

Subsequently Xi did something typical of threatened dictators: he launched military forays. Striking a foreign enemy ploy to steel wobbly domestic support is an old ploy. For example, Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri employed it in 1982 when he invaded the Falkland Islands. Thanks to Margaret Thatcher and the British military his foray failed.

Foray No. 1: Xi sent a score or two of jet bombers into Taiwanese airspace, or to be totally accurate, Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

To be totally accurate, communist air and sea forces routinely test Taiwan and the island doesn’t exactly rate as a Chinese foreign enemy. A geostrategic contortion affects my “foreign enemy” analogy. See, the Chinese Communist Party calls Taiwan a lost Chinese territory, a province Xi has sworn to recover.

However, the Taiwanese reject the CCP’s totalitarian claim. They wish to protect their free and wealthy society from the communist dictatorship’s inherent inhumanity and destructive corruption.

To defend themselves, the Taiwanese rely on themselves and the support of allies—the United States, Japan, and Australia foremost. So, Xi has his foreign enemies behind his Taiwan foray.

However, a fourth foreign power with an interest in defending Taiwan, India, is slowly but steadily aligning with America, Japan, and Australia. India presents Xi and his clique with a 3,800-kilometer-long strategic problem.

Foray No. 2 occurred Dec. 9 when Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed on an icy slope in the Tawang sector of the mountainous border between Chinese-occupied Tibet and India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state. India is building a major highway in the area, in order to improve New Delhi’s ability to defend the region.

If the geography is obscure, the stakes aren’t. The scuffle on the slope generated headlines across Asia.

Note I wrote Chinese-occupied Tibet. Communist China invaded Tibet in 1950. That was the predicate to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, which China launched and won. That war on the roof of the world is not officially over, so the hazy mountain border is called the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

In June 2020, the two Asian nuclear giants shot it out in eastern Ladakh (northeastern Himalayas). Twenty Indian soldiers died, and several Chinese soldiers were killed.

On Dec. 9? A hand-to-hand scuffle, with minor injuries.

Accidental encounter instead of Beijing muscle flexing? Maybe the LAC lacks specificity, so to speak.

I doubt it was an accident. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh made the critical strategic point. China is once again using military power to try “to unilaterally change the status quo” on the border.

China plays that game in the South China Sea when it encroaches on Vietnamese, Filipino, and Malaysian territory. Beijing prefers one-on-one (bilateral) economic and military bullying.

India, however, is much more powerful. And India has friends. In 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, at the behest of Japan, held its first informal meeting. The Quad consists of Japan, Australia, United States, and India. In 2007, Japan pointed out all four nations regard China as a disruptive actor in the Indo-Pacific.

A few more fights on the roof of the world and the Quad will become an alliance.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

DougMacG

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India-China
« Reply #614 on: December 21, 2022, 02:02:12 PM »
India has moved an “unprecedented” number of troops to the disputed border with China after a clash between soldiers of the two nuclear-armed rivals. Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar revealed that Delhi was mobilizing thousands of troops along the mountainous 2,100-mile border, following an “encroachment” by Chinese forces that triggered a skirmish with Indian troops 12 days ago. The powers have been locked in a standoff along the border for more than two years, since China crossed the border to seize strategic positions in the disputed region of Ladakh in 2020, sparking a pitched battle that left 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese soldiers dead. “Today we have a deployment of the Indian army on the China border that we have never had. It is done in order to counter Chinese deployment, which has which has been scaled up massively since 2020,” Jaishankar said in Delhi on Monday. (Source: thetimes.co.uk)



ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #617 on: January 07, 2023, 02:37:54 PM »
Pak is effectively bankrupt, they can no longer pay their debts. Only 5.6 Billion $ in reserves, I hear debt due in 2023 is 8 billion!

https://www.dawn.com/news/1730193

And this article says reserves are $ 4.5 B
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2394554/pm-in-last-gasp-bid-to-revive-imf-talks

It is literally imploding at this moment.
« Last Edit: January 07, 2023, 02:41:00 PM by ya »

DougMacG

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #618 on: January 07, 2023, 03:02:24 PM »
Pak is effectively bankrupt, they can no longer pay their debts. Only 5.6 Billion $ in reserves, I hear debt due in 2023 is 8 billion!

https://www.dawn.com/news/1730193

And this article says reserves are $ 4.5 B
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2394554/pm-in-last-gasp-bid-to-revive-imf-talks

It is literally imploding at this moment.

Is this the China Belt and Road debt where China ends up owning all the assets in the country upon default, on a path to all the assets in the world?

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/col-nagial/understanding-pakistans-china-debt-trap/
https://asiatimes.com/2021/12/pakistan-struggling-to-pay-its-debts-to-china/
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/pakistans-china-debt-at-6-6-billion-in-past-10-months-funds-mostly-used-on-two-nuclear-plants/articleshow/69606049.cms

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #619 on: January 07, 2023, 07:13:51 PM »
Pak has the China CPEC debt, loot by the army, general corruption at every level. They are effectively broke, but the west keeps giving them a lifeline, to keep India in check. Now Pak soldiers are being killed almost daily in Balochistan as well as by the TTP based in Afghanistan/North West Frontier Province. Much of their real estate, airports, roads etc have been effectively mortgaged to the Chinese or others.

ya

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India-afpakia
« Reply #620 on: January 15, 2023, 07:29:30 PM »
Gilgit/Baltistan (POK) residents demand to join India.

https://youtu.be/8NUaenPADh4

If we look at how Bangladesh  was created (from E.Pakistan), the same playbook is playing out (it rhymes). Resident's are oppressed by Pak, no food, water, electricity, jobs nothing. Will demand to join India and India will oblige. India might even accept refugees from POK, as their number increases, India will move in. This year, India heads the G20 Presidency, so it will likely be 2025. May 2024 is elections and Modi will get a new 5 yr term. The writing is on the wall.

- Amazing amount of weapons are being purchased, missiles being fired, new subs, fighter air planes, heavy guns etc being purchased or manufactured. This cannot be all China centric. Something larger is afoot.
- Agniveer civil/military soldier recruitment scheme. 50,000 recruits per year! for a 4 year military training course, of which 1/4th get permanent military cadre and 3/4 are militarily trained civilians who can join the paramilitary forces. These will be needed if India intends to hold POK.
- Unrest rising in Pak, who knows if India is funding them ?
- Massive border infrastructure development against China, incase China makes a grab for Tawang monastery in a two front war.
- Gilgit area has a lot of Buddhist roots, Baltistan is mostly Shia. Even though Pak has tried to change demograhics (Sunnis), the base population is expected to be friendly.
« Last Edit: January 16, 2023, 06:14:47 AM by Crafty_Dog »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #621 on: January 30, 2023, 06:49:27 PM »
India has the fastest growth in the world...per IMF


DougMacG

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India has the fastest growth in the world...per IMF
« Reply #622 on: January 30, 2023, 09:49:14 PM »
Makes sense to me.

Look how pathetic those US projections are.  Who voted for that kind of mediocrity / failure?

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Indian Charm Offensive
« Reply #623 on: March 15, 2023, 02:03:19 PM »
Indian charm offensive. At India’s invitation, Afghan government officials will attend courses from the India Technical and Economic Cooperation Program, a bilateral assistance initiative focused on India's economy, regulations and history, among other things. This is despite the fact that New Delhi does not recognize the Taliban-led government in Kabul. Separately, India invited Pakistan’s defense minister and foreign minister to attend next month’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Delhi. If Pakistan accepts, it would be the first time in 12 years that a Pakistani delegation has visited India.

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« Last Edit: April 22, 2023, 09:57:11 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #625 on: April 22, 2023, 09:24:33 AM »
The Indian defense minister has been commenting on taking back POK several times, most recently yesterday. The world ignores him :-), they are too busy with China, Russia, Ukr. Indian elections in 2024. I think he is waiting for China to make its move on Taiwan.
"Our aim is to implement resolution unanimously passed in Indian Parliament in 1994 to reclaim PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan:
@rajnathsingh in #Srinagar "
#Kashmir
#InfantryDay

It wouldn't hurt my feelings at all.

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GPF: Washington's opportunity with India
« Reply #628 on: June 19, 2023, 08:55:53 AM »
June 19, 2023
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Washington’s Opportunity in India
It’s an open question whether the South Asian nation can truly be a counter to China.
By: Kamran Bokhari

India is drawing closer to the United States. After decades of being heavily dependent on Moscow for its military hardware, New Delhi is no longer sure it can count on Russia as its strategic position weakens. This shift comes as Beijing continues to intermittently clash with India along their border in the Himalayas. India has thus been forced to adjust its historic position as a nonaligned nation, but it’s an open question whether Washington can capitalize on the opportunity and promote its partnership with India to anything other than a defense alignment against China.

India and the U.S. understand the potential of the opportunity. Ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington this week, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity from the Biden administration. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke at the annual India Ideas Summit of the U.S.-India Business Council, while National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan traveled to New Delhi for a two-day visit. Separately, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was in New Delhi earlier this month to finalize a roadmap for U.S.-India defense cooperation.

The latter agreement is designed to fast-track technology cooperation and joint manufacturing in air combat, land mobility systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, munitions and undersea operations. A separate deal – the one with General Electric to manufacture engines to power India’s Tejas Mk 2 fighters and potentially for fifth-generation advanced medium combat aircraft – is a notable step forward in enhancing the defense partnership. That Washington is sharing cutting-edge defense technology with the world’s largest weapons importer makes it an important step in growing U.S.-India relations writ large.

More important are the geopolitical shifts driving this realignment. Throughout the Cold War, India was the leader of the nonaligned movement – a loose grouping of states that officially took neither side in the global struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But for all practical purposes, India was a Soviet ally, thanks largely to its own post-colonial left-wing predilections. That relationship is why, even today, as much as 60 percent of Indian military hardware imports come from Russia. Over the past three decades, though, India has moved away from a command-style economy and has thus diversified its weapons procurement with purchases from the United States and Europe.

But it’s easier said than done for countries operating on Russian platforms to fully untether themselves given the political, bureaucratic and technological challenges of doing so. And for a long time, India wasn’t especially interested in trying. Its threat assessment was largely shaped by its historic rivalry with Pakistan (a U.S. military patron) – which it managed with its Russian-made arsenal. That both countries became declared nuclear powers in 1998 compelled India to explore American options, but it was generally content with the gradual pace of diversification. Meanwhile, the competition with China was also in a stalemate for decades, with a few exceptions.

The regional and global strategic situation has since changed, and so too has India’s threat assessments. U.S.-Pakistani relations have withered, and Islamabad’s chronic political-economic crisis has brought the country to the verge of default. As the threat from Pakistan fades, security along the northern border with China has become more concerning as Beijing continues to encroach on the Line of Actual Control. And Russia’s campaign in Ukraine has convinced New Delhi that it cannot rely on Moscow as much as it once did.

From America’s perspective, the confluence of a weakening Russia and an aggressive China is facilitating an outcome that Washington has long sought: a strategic relationship with New Delhi. Until recently, India was happy to forge closer ties with the U.S. but nonetheless wanted to balance them against its longtime partner in Russia – hence its continued business with Moscow in the face of international sanctions. New Delhi will continue to maintain ties with Russia for some time, but it knows it needs more reliable partners going forward.

Geopolitical constraints aren’t the only thing shaping India’s shifting attitude. There are also strategic factors that will drive its behavior. India already boasts the world’s fifth-largest economy, which can grow even more if it has a stronger economic relationship with the United States. Conflicts are not simply threats that need to be countered; they also create economic opportunities.

In the case of the U.S.-China competition, Washington can benefit from stronger cooperation with India in the military sphere. But as important is whether the United States can invest in India enough to make it a legit counter to China. After all, the Chinese economic miracle owes much to U.S. investment and technology. The question is: To what extent can a similar approach be applied to India, thus reducing China from its standing as the world’s largest industrial machine?

For Washington, a multifaceted approach like this would be a far more effective way to meet the challenge posed by China than simply relying on its military or relegating its relationship with India to only defense cooperation. New Delhi would certainly benefit as well. But that scenario depends on how India itself evolves – both in terms of political stability and greater economic reforms that can attract more foreign investment. Right-wing religious nationalism that is steering India toward the path of a majoritarian illiberal democracy could arrest its development.


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Bohdi's visit
« Reply #630 on: June 21, 2023, 05:12:59 AM »
American Islamists Propagate Myths of "Nazification of India" to Boycott Indian Prime Minister's Joint Address to Congress
by Abha Shankar
IPT News
June 20, 2023

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9330/american-islamists-propagate-myths


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RANE: Bohdi's visit
« Reply #631 on: June 21, 2023, 02:31:48 PM »
What to Watch For as India's Modi Visits the U.S.
Jun 21, 2023 | 19:39 GMT


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's official state visit to the United States will likely see the announcement of multiple agreements that will strengthen India's domestic defense industry and bolster U.S.-India defense ties. Modi is currently in the United States for his first official state visit to the country, following high-level but non-official state visits in prior years. The June 21-24 trip will only be the third official state visit ever by an Indian prime minister, and the first since former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's official state visit in November 2009. After attending a June 21 commemoration of International Yoga Day at the United Nations in New York, Modi landed in Washington this afternoon, where tomorrow he'll address a joint session of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate (making him the first Indian prime minister to have given two speeches to U.S. Congress) and attend an official state dinner. During his visit, Modi is also expected to attend a private meeting in Washington, D.C., with the CEOs of the United States' top 20 companies; a luncheon at the Department of State hosted by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken; and a June 23 dinner reception with members of the Indian diaspora community at the Ronald Reagan Building. Thousands of Indian Americans are reportedly expected to travel to Washington to welcome Modi and participate in various related events.

This will be the third official state visit under the Biden administration thus far, following South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's visit in April 2023 and French President Emmanuel Macron's visit in November-December 2022.

Modi's visit underlines what the White House has described as a ''deep and close partnership between the United States and India,'' and the important role the United States sees for India in countering China's growing influence.

In preparation for Modi's trip, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled to India June 4-5 and met with his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh to discuss upgrading bilateral defense ties and to settle on a five-year roadmap for jointly developing and producing defense and critical technologies.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited India June 13-14, where he met with Modi and other officials to settle the agenda for Modi's trip to the United States and to finalize the details of reported purchasing and joint defense production agreements.
The visit comes as India and the United States are strengthening their ties amid mutual concerns over China's increased assertiveness and growing regional and global influence. India has long relied on Russia for weapons and materiel. However, Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has threatened New Delhi's once-reliable supply of Russian arms, both by increasing risks of triggering U.S.
sanctions and prompting logistical issues that have hampered material shipments. Risks to India's arms supplies have notably also come amid worsening tensions with China, driven in part by recent clashes between the two countries' troops along their contested border, as well as China's expanded activity in the Indian Ocean (which has included frequent transits of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines). This has prompted India to accelerate years-long efforts to strengthen its domestic defense industry and diversify its foreign sources of weapons and materiel. And the United States has actively sought to support those efforts in the hopes of not only reducing India's reliance on Russia, but strengthening a partner it views as vital in countering China's growing regional and global influence (despite Washington and New Delhi's frequent misalignment on how to accomplish this). Against this backdrop, India and the United States have focused on strengthening bilateral defense cooperation and bolstering the former's domestic defense industry in recent years.

In March, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published a report that showed that Russia was still India's largest arms supplier, but that its share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64% in 2013-2017 to 45% in 2018-2022 due to a combination of ''strong competition from other supplier states, increased Indian arms production and, since 2022, [constraints] on Russia's arms exports related to its invasion of Ukraine.''

In June 2020, at least four Chinese soldiers and 20 Indian soldiers died in a particularly intense flare-up in Galwan Valley along the Himalayan border, in what was the first fatal clash between the two sides in decades. Since then, India and China have generally sought to avoid confrontations and quickly de-escalate along their border. But sporadic border clashes have nonetheless persisted, with the most recent reportedly taking place in early December 2022 in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that India and China had effectively blocked mutual media access by ejecting or denying visa renewals to each other's journalists. In May, India denied visa renewals for the last two Chinese state media journalists operating in India; the move followed China's failure to renew the visas of the last four remaining Indian journalists operating in China in prior weeks.

In May 2022, President Biden and Prime Minister Modi also announced the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which focuses on bolstering cooperation in developing and producing defense and critical technologies. The agreement has since helped underpin a number of discussions on U.S.-India defense cooperation.

While it will likely take years for India to fully absolve itself from its decades-long, outsized defense reliance on Russia, Modi's visit is poised to yield multiple agreements that will strengthen India's domestic defense industry and potentially spur a more significant shift in U.S.-India relations. Although Indian imports of Russian arms have steadily decreased in recent years, more than half of India's defense equipment is reportedly still Russian-made, which means India remains heavily reliant on Russia to upgrade its current equipment. This — along with the fact that Western military equipment is comparably more expensive, and that Russian and Western systems lack interoperability — will challenge India's push to diversify its defense equipment and supply chains. India's continuing ties with Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, in addition to the Modi administration's pursuit of domestic policies often criticized as undemocratic, will likely also leave some Western countries hesitant to share sensitive military technologies and limit the extent to which they're willing to deepen ties with India. And India will similarly remain wary of becoming too reliant on the United States and its Western allies, given New Delhi's pursuit of self-reliance and sensitivity to losing its strategic autonomy. But India's concern for the reliability of Russian arms supplies, combined with both Washington and New Delhi's mutual apprehension regarding China, may still be enough to overcome these long-standing constraints and realize a more distinct shift in the U.S.-India relationship. Modi's historic visit to the United States is thus still poised to see the announcement of agreements that strengthen India's domestic defense industry and pave the way for further bilateral cooperation. This could include agreements for rare technology transfers and collaboration on sensitive defense and critical technologies (like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors) under iCET.

On his recent trip to New Delhi, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan implied that efforts were being made to overcome long-standing constraints to closer defense ties, saying Modi's visit to the United States would see ''a number of deliverables…fundamentally designed to remove those obstacles in defense trade, in high-tech trade, in investment in each of our countries, in taking away obstacles that have stood in the way of our scientists and researchers.''

Over the past year, U.S. and Indian officials have discussed a number of agreements for India to acquire or jointly produce materiel and critical military components. This includes a reported agreement for India to purchase a number of General Atomics MQ-9B SeaGuardian unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, both sides have reportedly worked to secure an agreement for General Electric to jointly produce its GE-F414 turbofan engine with India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited; the engine would power India's Tejas Mark-2 fighter jets and the rest of India's future fighter jets moving forward.

Despite deepening cooperation, the United States has been frustrated by India's continued engagement with Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, which has seen India increase its purchases of cheap Russian oil and participate in Russian-led multilateral military exercises over the past year. Critics have also pointed to reports of ongoing human rights issues in India, as well as the growth of Hindu nationalism, under the Modi administration.

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GPF: India and the SCO enlargement
« Reply #632 on: July 05, 2023, 10:37:53 AM »
SCO enlargement and division. India chaired a virtual summit of the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), where discussions focused on Afghanistan, Ukraine and expanding cooperation among member states. At the summit, it was announced that Iran was joining the bloc and that Belarus had signed a memorandum starting its own accession process. Participants agreed that the SCO is not directed against specific third countries or organizations and that it is open to broad cooperation with them. However, in a sign of division, India reportedly opted not to sign an economic development strategy through 2030 because of the document’s frequent references to Chinese policy initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative.

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #633 on: July 15, 2023, 05:23:31 PM »
1. As you may know, Modi was in Washington and met Elon Musk. Now Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) which is part of POK, about 28,000 sq miles  is being shown as part of India. Twitter users from GB are showing their location in India and the official acct of Pak govt dealing with GB has been shut down. This is all part of building a narrative that GB belongs to India, part of the G20 meetings are being held in Indian Kashmir so that everyone can see Kashmir for themselves.

2. There are multiple videos coming out where people from GB are demanding to be merged with Indian Kashmir. A key factor is the massive development in Indian Kashmir. GB has not got nything from Pak, no food, no electricity, no hospitals, jobs, roads nothing.

3. India continues its weapons purchases with an eye on China, from the US (GE engines for planes, Reaper drones) and from France (26 naval Rafales for the aircraft carrier and 3 scorpene subs), with Germany (acquiring new subs) etc.

4. For years the Indian airforce has had an airbase in Tajikistan at Farkhor. The purpose was to put pressure on Pak and also control the Wakhan corridor which is the GB border with Afghanistan.


5. India continues to have empty seats for legislators from POK in the Indian Parliament.

When India separated Bangladesh from Pak, the people of Bangladesh were fully supportive of India, once about 70% of people in GB support India, that will be the time to act. GB is mostly Shia, and Kashmiri Shia strongly support India.

In the meantime, India is building world opinion, building a pro-India narrative in GB.

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GPF: India's massive military restructuring
« Reply #634 on: July 27, 2023, 08:10:18 AM »
July 27, 2023
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India’s Massive Military Restructuring
New Delhi is positioning itself to meet the threat from China and be an effective security partner for the United States.
By: Kamran Bokhari

India’s strategic posture has been in a state of churn for several years now, compelling New Delhi to embark on the biggest military reorganization since the country’s founding in 1947. The South Asian giant is moving away from its historical focus on its western flank with nuclear rival Pakistan to focus on the much bigger challenges of dealing with the growing threat of conflict with China and building up its power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean basin. The need to address these emerging challenges is the principal driver behind the Indian military’s move to establish three new tri-service theater commands – i.e., centers that involve all three branches of the military (the army, air force and navy). The sheer magnitude of the military restructuring, along with the usual bureaucratic inertia, means it will be many years before the process is completed – though the country’s rapid economic growth will help propel its defense capabilities in the years to come.

India is set to launch the first of three integrated theater commands next month when the country celebrates the 76th anniversary of its independence. According to Indian media reports, the Jaipur-based Southwestern Command will focus on the western border with Pakistan. A second Lucknow-based Northern Command will focus on the increasing threats from China along the Himalayan border. The Maritime Command, meanwhile, will be headquartered in Karwar, in the southwestern state of Karnataka, and will focus on defense of the southern coast as well as power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean basin and beyond.

India's Integrated Theater Commands

(click to enlarge)

The first two commands will be headed on a rotational basis by four-star commanders from the army and air force, while the third will be headed by a naval officer who will report directly to the country’s top military officer, the Chief of Defense Staff, a post created just four years ago. Military operations will effectively be led by these senior officers, while each of the three service chiefs will be responsible for recruitment and maintenance of their respective branches of the military. Prior to this reorganization, the military had only two tri-service commands – the Andaman and Nicobar Command, responsible for the maritime area bordering Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia, and the Strategic Forces Command, in charge of the country’s nuclear arsenal. The new integrated platforms will be composed of 17 existing commands across the military, seven each from the army and air force and three from the navy. There are also plans for other joint commands led by three-star officers responsible for logistics, training, cyber, space, missiles and intelligence. They will report to the chief of Integrated Defense Staff under the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

These massive changes to the structure and functionality of the Indian armed forces reflect shifts in the regional and global security situation over the past 15 years or so. India’s main security challenge from Pakistan is not what it was decades ago when the two neighbors fought four wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. This is due largely to the emergence of social, political and economic crises that have weakened Islamabad to unprecedented levels. Its military leadership, which dominates many elements of Pakistani society and politics, has been recently trying to steer the country toward normalizing relations and trade with India. Pakistan is increasingly focused on its western flank, which in recent years has supplanted its eastern border with India as its main security threat due to the rising insurgencies led by Islamist rebels and Baloch separatists. Over the past quarter century, the threat to India from Pakistan has emanated largely from proxy Islamist non-state actors, which since the late 2000s have gone from being an asset to a major liability for Islamabad.

Still, New Delhi can’t lower its guard too much given the uncertainty surrounding the security situation in Pakistan in the long term. Meanwhile, India is also concerned about the threat from China, which has been increasingly hostile for the better part of the past decade. New Delhi faces security challenges from Beijing in three strategic sectors: the northwestern, central and northeastern regions straddling the 2,200-mile-long India-China border. This border will likely heat up as U.S.-China competition intensifies and as U.S.-India alignment grows, especially considering that India is the one area in the world where the Chinese have experience and capabilities to act militarily.

While it doesn’t face any immediate threats from the Indian Ocean, New Delhi still needs to dedicate resources to its southern flank. This will be crucial to India’s ability to become a major military ally of the United States in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Even its own imperative to move from being a regional power to a global power necessitates force projection capabilities on the maritime front. For India, maritime security has become a larger focus since Beijing launched its so-called String of Pearls strategy – a push to build military and commercial assets along the Indian Ocean. This strategy, however, has been largely unsuccessful, one reason that Beijing has been trying to keep India focused on its shared border in the Himalayas instead of its southern flank.

Ultimately, the new command structure is designed to allow India to protect against any threats from Pakistan and China, especially in the event that the two countries collude against New Delhi. It’s also aimed at preparing India for a major partnership with the United States and other allies to ensure regional security. But despite India’s projected growth in the years ahead, this will be a herculean task for the world’s fourth-largest military.

ya

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Imran Khan imprisoned
« Reply #635 on: August 06, 2023, 05:00:06 AM »
Pak puts Imran Khan in prison for 3 years. The nation is on a death spiral.
« Last Edit: August 06, 2023, 08:46:39 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #636 on: August 11, 2023, 08:43:52 AM »
India is changing its penal code (British Colonial Hangover)...I think it would be important to have new laws put in to deal with any mischief Pak may do amongst Indian muslims. This is a necessary step before India makes a go for POK.

*Bill also lists new offences such as acts of secession, arm ..

Read more at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/102640505.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

« Last Edit: August 11, 2023, 10:10:59 AM by ya »

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #637 on: August 15, 2023, 03:52:32 AM »
Just posting a cultural snippet from India, where the army is respected very much. A young Sikh soldier comes back to his village after being inducted into the Indian Army.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1691352766764228608

Also, today is India's Independence day, enjoy...https://twitter.com/i/status/1691346294747328512
« Last Edit: August 15, 2023, 05:02:47 AM by ya »

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #638 on: August 15, 2023, 06:57:19 AM »
Very nice clip with the family.

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #639 on: August 21, 2023, 06:13:20 PM »
Not much discussion of BRICS in the news, starts tomorrow. Neither is there any discussion of India potentially landing a moon rover in 2 days at the South pole. South pole is where supposedly the water is, which India identified a few years ago. Russian Lunar 25 module crashed a few days ago, they wanted to be the first to reach the S.pole. Well am going back to watching the Kardashians.

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #640 on: August 22, 2023, 04:39:16 AM »
Not much discussion of BRICS in the news, starts tomorrow. Neither is there any discussion of India potentially landing a moon rover in 2 days at the South pole. South pole is where supposedly the water is, which India identified a few years ago. Russian Lunar 25 module crashed a few days ago, they wanted to be the first to reach the S.pole. Well am going back to watching the Kardashians.

Yes I was reading a little about both.  Very interesting.  My thought on BRICS.  If this is an organization of independent states, shouldn't they be independent of Russia and China especially, more so than of the US.

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #642 on: August 29, 2023, 06:41:50 PM »
Not much discussion of BRICS in the news, starts tomorrow. Neither is there any discussion of India potentially landing a moon rover in 2 days at the South pole. South pole is where supposedly the water is, which India identified a few years ago. Russian Lunar 25 module crashed a few days ago, they wanted to be the first to reach the S.pole. Well am going back to watching the Kardashians.

Yes I was reading a little about both.  Very interesting.  My thought on BRICS.  If this is an organization of independent states, shouldn't they be independent of Russia and China especially, more so than of the US.

At this time BRICS + is just a big poke in the eye to the US and EU. Russia is well respected in Africa, because they never colonized it. The Europeans have a long history of colonization and looting Africa, I think they are on their way out. China provides the financial clout and African dictators and leaders love that, they can also make some money on the side, just like the Paki Generals did. India is basically there as a champion of the global south. India has a long history with Africa (eg Gandhi was in S Africa), particularly on its east coast where many Indian businesses settled. With Egypt and Iran, India has ancient cultural ties.

So BRICS+ is not much at the moment, but its economy is greater than that of the G7. 40 nations want to join...
« Last Edit: August 29, 2023, 07:20:26 PM by ya »

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Gatestone
« Reply #643 on: August 30, 2023, 06:48:28 AM »
Slavery: The Ostentatious Hypocrisy of BRICS towards Black Africans
by Paul Trewhela  •  August 30, 2023 at 5:00 am

In a garish example of anti-democratic, anti-West, collective state hypocrisy, leaders from the BRICS bloc -- representing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -- meeting in South Africa over three days last week invited four Muslim states and two others to join the bloc, while keeping total silence over the racist and Islamist massacre by heavily armed Arab militias of black African civilians being carried out in West Darfur in Sudan over the preceding weeks.

"[A]trocities pile up in Darfur after 100 days of Sudan fighting", in which "Arab militias are accused of killing lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders". — Al Jazeera, July 24, 2023.

" [The city of Al-Geneina in West Darfur] has been ethnically cleansed." — Humanitarian worker, Sky News, broadcasting scenes of thousands of desperate Sudanese refugees displaced in neighbouring Chad, August 17, 2023.

The Africa Defense Forum disclosed on May 16 that Russia's Wagner group was supervising gold-mining in Darfur, and smuggling nearly $2 billion in gold out of the country.

Yet the "great and the good" -- China's President Xi Jinping, Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa, with Russian President Vladimir Putin addressing the congregation by video to endorse Russia's war in Ukraine -- made no mention of this genocidal massacre.

Instead, the BRICS leaders invited states with the world's longest history of enslaving black Africans to join them.

China's Xinhua news agency reported how Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi, who attended the BRICS conference, hailed it as a "commendable step that will facilitate worldwide development while upholding principles of justice."

Justice? Raisi was deputy prosecutor general in a four-member committee codenamed the "death commission" in Iran in 1988, which was responsible for the executions of thousands of political prisoners who were loyal to a banned opposition movement, "on orders issued by Raisi and his three colleagues."

Worse, although slavery continued legally in Iran until 1929, "It never went away". — iranwire.com, April 30, 2020.

The article showed a series of photos of black African slaves in Iran, such as this one from the 1880s. — Denise Hassanzade Ajiri, "The face of African slavery in Qajar Iran – in pictures," The Guardian, January 14, 2016.

The issue of the enslavement and oppression of black Africans -- continuing to this day in Darfur and elsewhere -- is an issue suppressed by BRICS.

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #644 on: September 01, 2023, 04:51:52 AM »
That is a valid point, but this is exactly where BRICS+ differs from the west. They are not the global policeman, as  the US tries to be. BRICS+ from what I understand is focused mostly on improving their economies, infrastructure etc, without falling into the IMF debt trap, or suffering from US dollar hegemony (SWIFT sanctions, strength of US $ which devastates developing countries). Trying to be the global policemen and control behaviour of individual countries is beyond the BRICS abilities or interest.

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GPF: India-China and the path to escalation
« Reply #645 on: September 01, 2023, 02:55:31 PM »
September 1, 2023
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China, India and the Path to Escalation
Beijing’s clashes with New Delhi are part of the Chinese strategy to extract concessions from Washington.
By: Kamran Bokhari

There is growing international concern about a potential conflict between China and India over their disputed border in the Himalayas. However, the possibility of a war between the two neighbors has to be understood in the context of the increasing pressure Beijing is coming under both domestically with a faltering economy and on the foreign policy front with U.S.-led containment efforts. These circumstances could lead Beijing to become more assertive with India in an effort to extract concessions from Washington, a key partner for New Delhi.

This week, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited China for talks requested by her Chinese counterpart as part of Beijing’s efforts to repair relations and slow its economic downturn. But China’s recent engagements with India have been less placating. According to a Reuters report, Chinese President Xi Jinping is planning to skip the G-20 summit set to take place in New Delhi on Sept. 9-10 and will send Premier Li Qiang in his place. Xi’s absence would come just weeks after he held talks with his Indian counterpart on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in South Africa in August. Meanwhile, on Wednesday, the Chinese government released an official map showing India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and northwestern Aksai Chin region as Chinese territory, drawing strong criticism from the Indian government.

Despite these signs of hostility, over the past few weeks senior commanders from China’s People’s Liberation Army held a series of talks with two- and three-star Indian generals to de-escalate tensions in the western Ladakh sector along the Line of Actual Control, which separates Chinese- and Indian-held territories. The flurry of meetings at the operational commander level suggested that the two sides were trying to hammer out a deal to return forces to the positions they held prior to Chinese incursions in 2020 that led to violent clashes. The timing of the talks, ahead of the Xi-Modi meeting in Johannesburg, suggested that a significant deal could have been in the works. But conflicting official accounts of what was discussed indicate that a resolution will likely not be in the offing for the foreseeable future.

The difficulty in agreeing to a resolution is a result of the fact that China and India have conflicting interests. China is increasingly at odds with the United States, while India is emerging as a close partner of Washington. In many ways, India is strategically sandwiched between the two counties. For Beijing, India is a pressure point that it can use to try to gain leverage in talks with Washington. It is, after all, the only place where China has some ability to use military power to further its strategic imperatives.

Many believe that China’s military is focused on Taiwan, a perception Beijing certainly feeds into by conducting military exercises in the waters around the self-ruled island. But the Chinese know well that their military has little combat experience, certainly none in the maritime space, meaning it would be no match for the force structure that the U.S. and its allies have put in place in the Western Pacific.

The PLA does have combat experience against India, with which it fought a war more than half a century ago. But 1962 was a very different time. India was a much weaker country than it is now and far more focused on its regional rival Pakistan, which it had fought in 1948 and would fight again. This was also the height of the Cold War, and Washington was focused on containing the Soviet Union and bogged down in Vietnam. Neither the Indians nor the Chinese were nuclear powers yet. The Chinese were thus able to seize control of a chunk of territory in the Kashmir region and in northeastern India.

In the decades that followed, Chinese and Indian forces engaged only in minor clashes (in 1975 and again in 1986-87) in Arunachal Pradesh around the time India was absorbing the disputed area. Apart from these incidents, the two neighbors remained largely conflict free. In the 1990s and 2000s, they concluded several agreements to manage their territorial disputes until a permanent settlement could be reached.



(click to enlarge)

It wasn’t until a decade ago that trouble erupted again when Chinese forces began making limited incursions at multiple points on the Indian side of their long border. Since then, there have been five noteworthy cases of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control – in 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020 and most recently last December. None of these incidents, however, involved the exchange of live fire. Even the 2020 incident, which resulted in several fatalities on both sides, involved hand-to-hand combat with clubs and rocks.

Considering the recent tensions and the firepower that both countries have deployed to their border over the past three years, an outbreak of armed hostilities is quite possible. However, the Chinese are unlikely to gain territory from such an exchange, given the difficult terrain in the Himalayas. They also know that the Indians will have close U.S. military and intelligence support in case of a conflict. Furthermore, India has far more combat experience than China because of the wars it fought with Pakistan.

Thus, the Chinese leadership understands that any conflict with India could have enormous costs, including for its economy, which is already struggling. The fallout from the war in Ukraine that Russian President Vladimir Putin is dealing with right now is not lost on Xi. The Chinese will therefore likely tread carefully to find a sweet spot between strategically poking India and avoiding a major eruption.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #646 on: September 02, 2023, 05:54:22 AM »
India's plans on acquiring POK are moving to the next stage, where people from Gilgit Baltistan (GB) are now openly demanding that they merge with India (no doubt with covert Indian support).
https://youtu.be/sSOYk5WYX9o
My current thinking is that the demand to merge with India will come from the people of POK and India will oblige. Much can be learnt, from the parallels of how India freed/created Bangladesh (E.Pak) and acquired the state of Sikkim. The plans will not be the same but will ryhme.

- The food crisis in POK will result in people of GB clamoring to get into India, India will oblige by opening the Kargil road (which the people are requesting), this will lead to a refugee crisis and then India takes back GB with massive public support. India will open the road for humanitarian reasons, at a time of its choosing.

- India is currently investing a lot in Indian Kashmir, and the narrative is being created and contrasted with POK where there is no development and even food, electricity, medical care, education is non-existent in POK. This year a lot of media attention was garnered with the visit of 3 Miss Worlds/Countries to Kashmir, with the possibility of a competition in Kashmir.

- Recent Indian moon mission and today's rocket to the Sun's periphery is all, garnering admiration in POK and Pak to merge with India.

- Indian general elections are in May 2024. Modi is expected to win a massive majority. If that happens, POK will be in the bulls eye for his next term.

- Economically, India is getting stronger, its expected to become the 3rd largest economy in the next 2 years.
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- To compare with the banana republic of Pak, their ex PM is in prison and being asked to give up politics and go into exile in Londonistan.
- The Pak rupee has been devalued extensively
- No food, water or electricity in Pak.
- India is talking about renegotiation of the Indus Water Treaty, which will further reduce Pak's water, India holds all the levers.
- The state of Pak economy is dire.
« Last Edit: September 02, 2023, 06:22:20 AM by ya »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #647 on: September 09, 2023, 06:56:14 AM »
India is holding the  G20 Summit in New Delhi. not much coverage in the media.
Some notable points.
-Xi did not attend, probably did not want to meet Biden, or snub India or both.
- India added the African Union, about 51 countries to the G20 Group as a permanent member, just as the EU is part of the group. This improves India's relations with Africa (commodities and challenges China). Next the G20 Presidency shifts to Brazil, you can be sure Latin America will be added next.

Here's the video of Indian FM Jaishankar bringing in the African Union Head and ultimate hug with Modi
https://twitter.com/i/status/1700395154086215847

- A new land and sea route has been set up to Europe, to counter China's belt and road initiative.
- MBS from Saudi Arab is on a State Visit to India, PM of Mauritius was also accorded a lot of importance, 2 countries where China is vying for influence and the US is losing influence.
- India has for long asked for a Permanent Seat at the UNSC and China always vetoes that. Slowly, other international organizations are being developed to counter China. It is obvious that industry will shift from China and India is being built up as the alternative.
- What is very obvious is how warmly Modi greets several of the leaders of these countries, relationships are good. In recent times, France, Egypt, Saudis have given Modi perhaps their highest civilian awards !. Neither China nor the US has these relationships.
« Last Edit: September 09, 2023, 07:14:37 AM by ya »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #648 on: September 09, 2023, 07:38:21 AM »
YA:

Love having you here helping us with matters pertaining to India and its place in the world.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #649 on: September 09, 2023, 12:10:33 PM »
In recent times, India's moon mission, sun mission, G20, current state of development in Kashmir, all of this is causing huge demands in POK to unite with India. Indian BJP leadership has started to say, that the people of POK will demand union with India and that is happening.

Religious flavored songs are being sung to unite with India (advanced stage of mutiny), these are in urdu, but they will give a flavor. https://youtu.be/I5EEhIoCMJU?t=942
There is no food, electricity, education etc. Huge protests in POK, that India should open the border at Kargil. This is a bit like the Berlin wall between East and West Germany. People in POK can see the development in Indian Kashmir. Looks like the Bangladesh model + softpower will be used to unite with POK. The army will then ensure law and order.

- At some point India will open the borders, refugees will flow to India, India will take over Bangladesh (Bangladesh model).
- If China makes a move on Taiwan, India may again use the situation to take over POK.
- Next general elections in May 2024, Modi is likely to comeback with super majorities. Apparently he has not taken a single day of vacation over the last several years !.