June 27, 2022
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A New Phase in the Ukraine War
Russia has learned from early setbacks.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta and Allison Fedirka
Wars tend to unfold in phases, though it’s never clear how many phases there will be when the war breaks out, and less clear still where one phase ends and another begins until after the fact. It’s all part and parcel of the fog of war. What’s certain is that the first phase of war doesn’t always presage how the rest of the war will go.
If you apply that logic to Ukraine, you can conclude that the first phase is over, that both sides are prepared to continue, and that though Russia “lost” the first phase, it has learned enough lessons to emerge stronger as Ukraine faces a number of new constraints.
Ukraine
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Learning From Failure
Russia’s early setbacks owe largely to its failure to accommodate its own vulnerabilities. Moscow opened up the conflict on three fronts: in far eastern Ukraine, in the northeast along Ukraine’s border with Russia, and in the north along the border with Belarus. The two northern thrusts suffered from intelligence failures such as the number and enthusiasm of pro-Russia forces inside Ukraine that led to misinformed or just plain bad political decisions; from overextended supply lines and poor communication capabilities that left Russian forces uncoordinated and poorly protected; and from an ineffective and often times incompatible mishmash of old and new technologies and tactics. Put simply, it was a mess, and it led Moscow to withdraw its forces from its northern thrusts.
Russian Advances into Ukraine, March 7, 2022
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The second phase, then, takes place primarily in the south and east, and will occur in three distinct settings: cities, grain fields within the forest belt, and near river systems. Urban warfare will involve a lot of artillery followed by the forward movement of troops. Fighting in the grain fields will be akin to guerilla warfare, accompanied by the deliberate destruction of forests and fields, a practice that dates back to the Soviet era. Riverine warfare will be slower and stodgier, since natural barriers will obstruct offensives and counteroffensives.
Russia’s strategy for the second phase will prioritize military goals and will pursue them methodically. In practice, this means focusing its efforts on the stretch of Ukraine from Luhansk and Donetsk down to Kherson. Russia controls about 95 percent of Luhansk and about 60 percent of Donetsk. Within this conflict zone, Russian forces are creating a number of small battle pockets that allow for massive and concentrated fire on Ukrainian troops from two or three sides. The purpose of this approach is to grind down Ukrainian forces until they reach critically low levels. Unlike in the first phase of the war, in which Russia had a massive concentration of forces, this new tactic instills more flexibility and, in theory, more effectiveness against hard targets. Already, Kyiv has consistently sent reinforcements to these areas to replace the fallen.
Russian Territorial Control of Ukraine, June 23, 2022
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The new strategy – a shift from Russian troop advancement to Ukrainian troop attrition – is partly a response to Ukraine’s fortifications in the east. Moscow understands that Ukraine spent nearly a decade creating multilayered defenses in and around Donbas. The result was a sophisticated underground defense system across an estimated 40,000 square kilometers (15,500 square miles) that made any type of blitzkrieg operation impossible. A strategy centered on pockets of kill zones allows Russian forces to slowly but surely deplete Ukrainian forces without necessarily demanding huge Russian advancements. (Hence why Russia has been observably more active in destroying Ukrainian logistical targets.) In theory, the scene will play out like this: Russian advancements will be slow, and when they meet resistance they will stop, launch a series of rocket and artillery strikes against Ukraine’s defensive lines, and advance slowly again once enemy forces are weakened. Importantly, this entire strategy assumes that Western allies will continue to send only aid and military hardware, not soldiers. It’s a safe assumption, but if it’s wrong, Russia has a real problem on its hands.
Zone of Massive Ukrainian Fortifications, June 23, 2022
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Until then, Russia will continue to develop what appears to be future offensives from Popasnaya, which it took control of in May, in three directions: toward Lesichansk, the underbelly of Ukrainian defense; toward Zolotoye, which will sever Ukrainian communications; and toward Bakhmut, the fall of which would severely imperil surrounding areas by opening them up to Russian attack from the south. To execute these maneuvers, Russia will heavily rely on artillery complemented by aircraft, radio-electronic warfare, platoons and tanks. The logic of war makes it difficult for the Ukrainians to avoid Russian forces in the zone between Slavyask, Bakhmut and Lesichansk, which is becoming a center of gravity in the conflict. Both sides, therefore, understand the area’s importance.
Donets River Basin, Ukraine
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The biggest drawback of this strategy is that it excludes the use of drones, the absence of which reflects Russia’s tactical and material shortcomings. Small drones would enable more night attacks and significantly reduce manpower losses. Indeed, one of the biggest lessons Russia learned in phase one was that small drones can greatly assist artillery bombardment. Russia possesses sophisticated types of drones, but it doesn’t produce them on an industrial level – something a recent government decision will soon change.
Betrayal
Ukraine will have to adapt to changes on the battlefield and Russia’s new strategy accordingly. Kyiv understands that the outcome of the war may well come down to how long Ukrainian forces can keep fighting. In terms of hardware, Ukraine seems relatively well-positioned. It is well-equipped, with several air defense systems that mitigate the damage of Russian aviation assaults. Ukraine also has ample anti-tank weapons and sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles of various classes to provide strong artillery reconnaissance. Western allies have promised Ukraine even more weaponry to support its fighting efforts, but it is unclear how much of the promised goods are ready for immediate delivery and how long training will take.
Relatedly, manpower is a crucial issue. Ukraine got a ton of conscripts and volunteers at the outset of the war, and though they boosted Ukraine’s numbers, many of them lacked training and experience, and they deplete the number of reservists available later. Replacing soldiers always matters in war, but it matters even more as Russia starts to adopt a strategy of attrition.
This question ties into the more pressing constraint of managing both the political and military sides of the war. Public buy-in and nationalism play a huge role in galvanizing and unifying the Ukrainian people toward a single goal. On the military side, there will be instances in which military logic dictates that troops withdraw from one location, regroup and resist in a new location. (Such is the case in Donetsk, where 1,000 troops are stationed in what is effectively a kill zone.) But Kyiv will be under enormous political pressure to sell the war to its people and its allies, and the finer points of warfare aren’t always easy to articulate, let alone sell. The government, meanwhile, is also dealing with controversial legislation that divides political and military efforts. For example, measures to curb the use of the Russian language bolster anti-Russian sentiment but undermine the military’s propaganda warfare efforts, which are primarily in Russian. The government and military need to resolve tensions like these if they are to successfully adapt to this new phase of the war.
And so this summer is likely to witness both sides concentrating their efforts in three main directions: Kharkiv region, Donbas and Kherson. Ukraine will continue to prepare for a counteroffensive in Kherson, currently Russia’s weakest position. Russia is expected to finish its operation in Donbas and integrate the areas it occupies in Kharkiv and Kherson. Until Ukrainian forces are expelled from Donbas, Russia is unlikely to concentrate on other war theaters. That is, the war will not end with the taking of Donbas and Kharkiv. Ukraine will slowly retreat but with great resistance. Any sign of a peace agreement will be seen as a betrayal of national interests.
