Author Topic: Ukraine  (Read 219539 times)

ccp

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Ukraine must win
« Reply #1550 on: April 25, 2024, 03:07:21 PM »
Ukraine must win hold the line.

Funny how the goal has morphed.



Crafty_Dog

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A proposed solution for Ukraine
« Reply #1552 on: May 28, 2024, 12:28:05 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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Martha McCallum destroys Kirby
« Reply #1555 on: June 06, 2024, 03:38:17 PM »
I have had a high regard for Martha McCallum for quite some time, and make a point to catch her show at 15:00.

She is prepared, has quality guests, and is a superb interviewer. 

She also has real feeling for our vets from previous wars, so no surprise she was at Normandy today.  In addition to some deeply moving interviews with some of the remaining vets from Normandy, she also interviewed Pentagon mouthpiece ____ Kirby.

I was in fg awe in her mastery of the facts and the way she continuously penetrated through Kirby's skillful obfuscations.  Done with great class, and a true masterclass.   Trey Gowdy came on next and was full of efusive praised.

Would love for someone to find the clip of it.


Body-by-Guinness

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List of US Made Parts in Russian Weapons
« Reply #1556 on: June 09, 2024, 04:49:33 PM »
Some Ukrainians with a lot of time on their hands have been taking apart Russian weapons and noting what US sourced parts can be found in them:

https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/components


Crafty_Dog

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WRM: Uke plan to become indespensable
« Reply #1558 on: June 10, 2024, 04:24:00 PM »


Ukraine’s Plan to Make Itself Indispensable
As Putin tries to grind out a win, Kyiv is taking a page from Churchill’s playbook.
Walter Russell Mead
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Walter Russell Mead
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June 10, 2024 5:18 pm ET




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Ukrainian soldiers with the 57th Motorized Brigade near Vovchansk, Ukraine, June 9. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES/GETTY IMAGES
On a long road trip from the Moldovan frontier through Odesa to Kyiv, Kharkiv and back, I heard overwhelmingly that Ukrainians are determined to fight on. That isn’t always because they love President Volodymyr Zelensky, trust their generals, or see a path to victory. The bottom line in Ukraine is that they must keep fighting because Vladimir Putin gives them no choice.

Mr. Putin isn’t looking for compromise, they say. It isn’t about moving the border posts a few miles to the west. He believes he needs all or almost all of Ukraine, and he won’t stop until he gets it.

Worse, they say, Mr. Putin doesn’t only want to raise the Russian flag over the country and redistribute its wealth to his favored oligarchs. He wants to crush Ukrainian nationality, marginalize the language and culture, impose totalitarian rule over the country, and enlist Ukraine in his project of rebuilding the Russian Empire.

“When he’s conquered us,” says a young Ukrainian employee of a nongovernmental organization, “he’ll draft us into his slave army to keep driving west.”

My young friend is basically right. Mr. Putin doesn’t want Ukraine as a trophy. He wants it as a base—demographic, economic, geographic—for further expansion.

But if Ukraine can’t afford to stop fighting the war, what’s the plan to win? Last year Ukrainians and their supporters believed that superior Western weapons were going to give Ukraine dominance on the battlefield, while Western economic sanctions would drive Russia’s economy toward collapse.

The plan failed. The counteroffensive led to heavy casualties on the Ukrainian side without compensating setbacks for Moscow, and Russia’s economy so far has survived Western sanctions. Ukraine is trapped in a war of attrition with a larger, richer country, and Mr. Putin thinks he can grind out a win.

So, what is Ukraine’s Plan B? You won’t hear a lot of speeches about it in Ukraine, but if you look at the country’s actions, a new war-fighting plan appears to be taking shape. It isn’t unlike Winston Churchill’s Plan B after Germany’s smashing blitzkrieg victories in 1940. Britain, Churchill told the world, would fight on with everything it had, until “in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old.”

READ MORE GLOBAL VIEW
AI and the Art of War in UkraineJune 3, 2024
England’s Spring of DiscontentMay 27, 2024
Churchill didn’t expect an American rescue out of pity or principle. He had things to offer, and he had threats to make. Churchill wasn’t above gently reminding Franklin D. Roosevelt that some future British prime minister—Churchill himself would never consider it—might turn the British navy over to Hitler to gain better terms for a defeated and starving island. Churchill knew that Roosevelt couldn’t let that happen, and he believed, with reason, that the increased arrogance and aggression of the Axis powers would ultimately force America into full participation in the war.

Mr. Zelensky seems to be developing a similar plan. Ukraine seeks to make itself indispensable to the West and the U.S., not merely as a geographical barrier to Russian expansion but with capabilities that make the country valuable for its own sake. I visited the workshops where Ukraine is developing cutting-edge battle technologies. Ukrainian special forces are engaged in missions against Russian and Russian-backed forces in Syria and Africa. Ukraine’s cyber capabilities are significant and growing. Few countries match Ukraine’s ability to understand Russia and to cultivate an intelligence network inside it.

Ukraine’s bet is that as these capabilities grow, and as the confrontation between the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis of revisionists and the West deepens, two things will happen: Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia will grow, and Ukraine’s allies will do what they must to keep this valuable asset from falling into Mr. Putin’s hands.

Churchill and Roosevelt also used smart financing to get aid flowing to Britain fast enough to make a difference. Ukraine can do something similar. It could, for example, issue bonds backed by the value of future oil and gas resources from the Black Sea. Countries (including perhaps the U.S. under a President Trump) would be more forthcoming with funding if they saw some value attached. In addition, since those bonds would be worthless unless Ukraine wins the war and can exploit the Black Sea resources, there would be a stronger political constituency in some countries for a Ukrainian victory.

I once asked one of my interns if he’d figured out what his job was. “Yes,” he said, “it’s to become indispensable. If you have to have me, you’ll find the money to keep me around.”

That was a smart kid, and he’s gone on to great things. Mr. Zelensky seems to be learning the same lesson. Let’s all hope he succeeds.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Putin's terms
« Reply #1559 on: June 14, 2024, 08:42:48 AM »
By: Geopolitical Futures
Putin's view. Russian President Vladimir Putin set out his conditions for a cease-fire in Ukraine during a meeting with top Foreign Ministry officials on Friday. He said Kyiv would have to withdraw from the four regions in the east of the country annexed by Moscow, renounce plans to join NATO and maintain a neutral, nonaligned and nonnuclear status. He also said the Euro-Atlantic security system was nonfunctional and that Russia was working to formulate a new security structure in Eurasia. He made the remarks ahead of a peace summit on Ukraine in Switzerland this weekend, which Moscow is not attending.


Crafty_Dog

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Zeihan: Ukes hit Russian satellite
« Reply #1561 on: June 25, 2024, 06:46:55 PM »


Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1563 on: June 28, 2024, 06:45:19 PM »
Seems lucid to me!

Crafty_Dog

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A FB friend posts
« Reply #1564 on: June 29, 2024, 06:30:19 AM »
Former National Security Council official Alexander Vindman claims that Donald Trump is “full of sh**” because he did nothing “during his four years to end the Russia-Ukraine war.”

IN FACT, Trump approved the transfer of lethal weapons to Ukraine, which Obama forbad. Trump then blocked Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline with sanctions, which Biden waived despite warnings this “could facilitate a possible Russian invasion” of Ukraine.

Four months after the pipeline was completed, Russia launched a full-blown invasion of Ukraine. One month later, Biden prohibited the transfer of fighter jets from Poland to Ukraine, thus hindering their ability to stop the Russian onslaught.

SOURCES:
Vindman’s Claim
https://x.com/AVindman/status/1806501186427638222

When Russian invaded Ukraine in 2014, Obama refused to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons and only offered them non-lethal weapons. This led Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to remark, “Blankets and night vision goggles are important, but one cannot win a war with a blanket.”

https://apnews.com/article/3625313d1b54411ea0753387ccbd36b2

In 2017, Trump overturned Obama’s policy and approved the transfer of lethal weapons to Ukraine. This angered Russia and led Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov to accuse the U.S. of being “an accomplice in fueling the war.”

https://www.militarytimes.com/.../us-agrees-to-send.../

In 2019, Trump approved sanctions to block Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50875935

In May 2021, Biden ended Trump’s sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, angering Ukraine and others who had warned that that this action “could facilitate a possible Russian invasion” of Ukraine because “Moscow will no longer have to worry about Ukraine’s gas infrastructure to supply its main European customers.”

https://www.state.gov/nord-stream-2-and-european-energy.../
https://www.politico.com/.../us-ukraine-russia-pipeline...
https://www.euronews.com/.../nord-stream-2-construction...

In October 2021, the pipeline was completed.
https://www.euronews.com/.../nord-stream-2-construction...

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-blown invasion of Ukraine.

https://www.britannica.com/.../2022-Russian-invasion-of...

In March 2022, Biden blocked the transfer of fighter jets from Poland to Ukraine.

https://nypost.com/.../psaki-pressed-on-bidens-refusal.../






Crafty_Dog

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Pro-Russian Blog Simplicius
« Reply #1570 on: July 31, 2024, 06:01:20 AM »
Lots of visuals at the link:
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-73124-die-welt-reveals-dire?publication_id=1351274&post_id=147154388&isFreemail=false&r=379fkp&triedRedirect=true


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SITREP 7/31/24: Die Welt Reveals Dire NATO Camp Outlook for Ukraine
SIMPLICIUS
JUL 31

 




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This week brings us another new batch of damning articles from the pro-Ukrainian Western media. The most telling of these comes from German Die Welt, which exposes how nearly all NATO ‘insiders’ secretly whisper among themselves that Ukraine stands no chance, but they dare not say so in public:


https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus252746254/Russlands-Krieg-Die-duestere-Ukraine-Realitaet-ueber-die-Nato-Insider-nur-anonym-sprechen-wollen.html
In Brussels, no one expected that Ukraine will win their lost territories back. Only no one wants to talk about it – at least officially. Die Welt has spoken with a number of insiders that give reasons for their gloomy outlook with one of Europe's self-inflicted fact.

Excuse the slightly wonky autotranslation, but here are some relevant snippets.

One of the most revealing facts is their admission that Kharkov was nothing more than a distraction by the Russian forces, something I made reference to in the last mailbag.

At the same time, Moscow has managed to induce Ukraine to send troops there by creating a new battle front in the Kharkiv area. “The Ukrainians have taken the bait,” says Colonel Markus Reisner from the Austrian Ministry of Defense. In addition, the supply of electricity is becoming increasingly precarious. Millions of Ukrainian households often have no water or electricity for hours on end.

Interestingly, Ukraine’s own 47th Brigade just recently confessed this as well, from another source:

The battalion commander of the 47th AFU brigade whines from near Ocheretino that the invasion of the Russian army in the north of the Kharkiv region has diverted a lot of AFU forces from the central areas, which are now critically insufficient near Pokrovsk. In addition, the change in tactics of the Russian commanders near Avdiivka demonstrates the success of the chosen strategy - a gradual offensive along several sections of the direction at once.

As you can see, there is a clear divergence between what the pro-Ukraine faction states publicly and what is privately acknowledged. Publicly, the narrative is that Kharkov is a “big victory” for the AFU because it stopped some kind of mythical Russian invasion force dead in its tracks. I roundly refuted this in the last mailbag, emphasizing that it was obvious to any half-decent analyst the Kharkov incursion was nothing more than a fixing action to strip away units from the main assault in Donbass.

Interestingly, the above statement from the 47th commander points to another ongoing narrative, which I’ll share as a brief digression from the Die Welt article. This is the sudden underscoring from several pro-UA sources that Russia is winning because of some new “tactic”, which turns out to be nothing more than the ‘death by a thousand cuts’ multi-vectored pressure we’ve been writing about here for almost a year and a half.


https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2024-07-27/russia-tactics-donetsk-ukrainian-land-14618903.html
The above WaPo piece starts off pessimistically:

POKROVSK, Ukraine — Russian forces have mounted an arc of attack in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, pushing through intense summer heat in a bid to extend Moscow’s steady territorial gains and capture the city of Pokrovsk, a key transit junction.

The offensive is underway as Ukraine continues to suffer from a shortage of soldiers and as election turmoil in the United States has set off new speculation that Kyiv may soon be forced to negotiate a surrender of lands.

However, observe the laughable cope they utilize in line with precisely what I mentioned above about the Kharkov offensive:


You can see how they rewrite reality to suit their agenda for glamorizing the AFU as a valiantly heroic army, when in reality they’re falling for each of Russia’s strategic ruses to great loss.

Oddly, after first programming their readers with the ‘valor’ excuse, they contradict themselves by shifting to the reality a few paragraphs later:

The reinvasion of the Kharkiv region, while yielding limited gains, nonetheless diverted Ukrainian resources. Oleksandr, 30, a battalion commander of the 47th brigade, fighting near Ocheretyne, said that Ukrainian forces are struggling and that Putin’s prize increasingly seems within Russia’s reach.

“This strategy is clever: You try to concentrate the strength of your enemy in one direction and then distract them at another,” said Oleksandr, whose call sign is “Genius” and who is being identified only by first name in keeping with Ukrainian military protocol.

But you see their qualifying of it with the word “nonetheless” as if to imply that this was merely an unintentional secondary byproduct of Russia’s Kharkov incursion, rather than the entire goal. Sneaky little tactics to brainwash their readers. It’s also fitting that callsign “Genius” was the only one amongst them who figured it out.

They go on to grudgingly cotton on to the truth:


They uncharacteristically underscore this by quoting ISW’s new release in stating that Russian commanders have drastically improved:


The piece de resistance of the whole shebang is this:

Ukrainian commanders and soldiers interviewed by The Post cited exhaustion and dwindling resources, including a severe lack of troops. A new mobilization law adopted by Ukraine’s parliament has yet to provide desperately needed reinforcements, as new conscripts are still undergoing training, and some draft-eligible men have fled the country or are hiding at home to avoid conscription.

One sergeant, 56, who goes by the call sign “Bart,” described the situation as “critical” and said there was “serious chaos” on the front lines. He blamed failures in leadership decisions, including cases of Ukrainian and Russian forces mixing up their positions.

They even go on to admit how Russian EW capabilities have likewise vastly improved, further underlining our recent refutations here of pro-Ukrainian claims that the AFU has a large FPV advantage:

Several Ukrainian commanders cited an acceleration in drone warfare as one of the principal challenges on the battlefield, with Russia having significantly increased its electronic jamming capabilities to erase Ukraine’s previous advantage using first-person view, or FPV, drones.

“What has changed tremendously is their drone tactics and their use of electronic warfare. We used to have the upper hand and were more efficient, but now this is not the case,” Mikhail said.

Now, getting back to the Die Welt article in a roundabout way. All the high level representatives the newspaper spoke to stated flatly that Ukraine will not win, nor reconquer any of the taken territories:

The majority of interlocutors say that “Ukraine will not win”, as one military representative put it simply. In concrete terms, this means that not only Crimea would be lost, but also other previously conquered territories - particularly in the east. They make up almost a fifth of the country's total area.

They state that a minority of anonymous military sources believe that Russia will run out of steam by Spring of 2025, at which point Ukraine could perhaps do “something”. But the majority believe more likely a ceasefire is approaching in the next “six to nine months”:

It seems much more likely to most interlocutors that a ceasefire is slowly approaching, possibly in the next six to nine months - regardless of who will be the next US president from January. “In view of the circumstances, I see no other option than an early ceasefire. This state of affairs could then last for years, with local violations of the ceasefire likely to occur again and again,” said a top diplomat.

Oddly, they convey that European leaders like Scholz fear pushing Russia too much as, according to them, it could lead to an overthrow of Putin and disintegration of Russia which would leave Russia’s 6,000+ nuclear weapons “in the hands of bloodthirsty dictators like Ramzan Kadyrov.”

They reiterate that Syrsky believes Russia could have nearly 700,000 troops in Ukraine by the end of this year, a figure that clashes loudly against claims Russia was suffering hundreds of thousands of losses per year:

This suggests that the West will continue to handle its arms deliveries “with a sense of proportion”, they say. On the other hand, Brussels also sees that Russia, unlike Ukraine, is in a position to keep mobilizing new reservists - according to Kiev, there are currently 520,000 Russian soldiers in the country and, according to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyj, there could even be 690,000 by the end of the year.

In line with this, more than ever Ukraine’s critical manpower shortage continues to be the main topic of discussion. An Estonian reserve soldier and war analyst with a large following wrote a detailed thread about the ongoing crisis. He gives an interesting rehash of Syrsky’s figures:

the Kremlin plans to increase the army to 620 thousand. Now it numbers 520 thousand, which is 5 times more than at the beginning of the invasion. The number of the Armed Forces in 2024 is approximately 350,000.

Most interesting was a report from Condottiero channel, which has no source, but the channel has been relatively reliable in the past to my knowledge:

⚡️Big if true, from Condottiero channel:

At Zelensky’s headquarters yesterday in the Kharkov region, Syrsky voiced one very interesting thing - the Russian Armed Forces are increasing the number of troops in the Ukrainian theater of operations by 150-170 thousand people every 3 months.

I have seen something similar before in the Western military press and Ukrainian military analysts. Now this sounds very ominous for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Essentially, while the enemy is losing people and reserves in approximately the same numbers over a period of time, we are building up.

At the same time, stupid Ukrainian “analysts” are trying to calculate our expenses in parallel, estimating that Russia has already spent about 1.3 trillion dollars on SVO. Forgetting how much weapons, in principle, we now produce, in what dynamics and of what quality.

What does it mean? First of all, the next 5-6 months will be deadly for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a whole. And then we'll see. How many of them will survive until the new year and by what milestones.

And the usual suspects continue to sound the alarm about Russia’s spate of advances:





https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/07/24/a-ukrainian-brigade-collapsed-and-now-hundreds-of-soldiers-are-nearly-surrounded-near-prohres/
In fact, we’re seeing more and more women operators on the Ukrainian side, here’s a recent training session:

Hurrah - Photos from the training of the female mobile air defense battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kiev region. Also, the first female prisoners recently joined the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.


And a new Times article covers the travails of Dzvinka, a 28-year-old Bradley commander the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Mechanised Brigade:


https://www.thetimes.com/article/f4dd4904-ff47-4d14-8554-e681cab37d99?shareToken=1aab32d947031edbcfa9c53ee0082ece
Armchair Warlord reports on X that the latest NYT article reported a Ukrainian brigade in the collapsing Toretsk direction got 2000 reinforcements in the past two months, which presumably indicates their losses:


Just as a purely conjectural back-of-napkin math, this comes out to 1000 losses per month for one brigade. Most fronts like Toretsk have about 5 brigades, give or take, so 5000 per month per front = 166 casualties per day, per front. Now there are about 4-5 fronts with major hostilities, so multiply 166 x 4-5, and you get 664 - 880 casualties per day, which is miraculously quite in line with Russia’s usual listing of AFU daily casualties.



Russian armor also continues to pour in, with three separate videos in the past week alone showing train-loads of brand new T-72B3Ms, T-80BVMs, and T-90Ms:


The last one of the T-80s, you can even see they are marked with the new tactical symbol of the northern Kharkov group.


Ukrainian reserve officer and analyst Tataragami also had a new thread where he agrees that Russia’s Kharkov incursion was just a distraction:

Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.

His prognosis is not good:

However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.



Now again we see the discussion shift increasingly toward “negotiations” from the Ukrainian side:




Check Finnish President Alex Stubb’s flipflop in only a matter of months—I wonder what changed?


Klitschko stated that Zelensky will need a people’s referendum in order to sign an armistice with Russia:


Arestovich describes what will happen in November:


According to him, a truce will be established for the duration of the presidential elections. Recall that Arestovich does have a good record when it comes to predicting the war’s events, prior to the war, before he was forced to tote the Ukrainian propaganda line while working as presidential advisor.

However, in another solo video, he describes the catastrophic state of the Ukrainian power grid, and say that in merely 2-3 more Russian strikes, the entire grid will be relegated to 18th century levels, causing a total collapse of society next year:


"Arestovich recorded a video in which he announced the complete collapse of the Ukrainian energy system in 2-3 Russian missile strikes. Now Ukraine still has a nuclear power plant and an energy bridge with Europe. But Russia can destroy all this with two or three missile strikes, literally throwing the whole country back to the 17th century in a couple of days. Only the village will survive, the lighting will be from splinters. Winter will drive hundreds of thousands of people out of the cities and the whole country will be engaged in survival, not war. Russia, according to him, simply feels sorry for ordinary farmers."


The mayor of Dnipro also discussed the dire energy situation:


We see that the Ukrainian side puffs its chest and talks tough, but are increasingly speaking of negotiations. How likely is this, really? Well, the truth is, no one in Russia is talking like this, and in fact Lavrov, Peskov, Medvedev, and the rest of the Siloviki are signaling the total opposite. Russia is smashing through Ukrainian defenses like never before, the frontline is totally collapsing—for Russia to suddenly stop and negotiate is equivalent in logic to Assad “gassing his own people” when he was on the cusp of victory against the CIA’s FSA rebels. It makes no possible sense.

Yesterday, Putins’ presidential aide Patrushev said some interesting words in regard to this:


Listen closely—he specifically states what I just articulated above: Russia now has the massive advantage on the frontline and Ukraine and its Western sponsors want a rest so they can regroup and rearm. Does this sound like someone who’s ready to end the conflict and negotiate?

The fact remains that Ukraine is using the negotiations red herring merely to prop up the falsely constructed image of their own battlefield relevance. In reality, the AFU is slowly collapsing, but they are doing everything they can to present the image of strength by pretending a mere negotiated stalemate is the best Russia could eke out. These are desperate maneuvers to mask the total panic and insurgency on their side—they know it’s not a negotiations but a complete collapse and capitulation that’s closer to reality.

Just read the latest frontline updates, from New York Times:


https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/30/world/europe/russia-urozhaine-staromaiorske-ukraine.html
🇷🇺⚔️ 🇺🇦The New York Times spoke about the terrible massacre in which the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost many soldiers and Urozhayne at the junction of Zaporozhye and the DPR

▪️“For the soldiers of the 58th brigade and the forces of the National Guard, who held Urozhayne for 3 months, this loss was especially difficult. During this time, about 100 soldiers died or went missing. Commanders are preparing for possible reprimands from military leaders, who often require soldiers to hold their ground until the very end,” writes the NYT..

A Ukrainian officer is outraged that the whole country is not already mobilized:




Despite all that, Ukrainian yellow press continues to push the theory that Russian forces will be exhausted in a month or two:


https://kyivindependent.com/pivnenko-russia/
Russia will be unable to maintain the scale of its attacks in multiple sectors for a long time because its "capabilities are not unlimited," General Oleksandr Pivnenko, the commander of Ukraine's National Guard, said in an interview with Ukrinform published on July 25.

"In another month and a half, they will not be able to conduct active assaults in many directions at once and will switch to defense."

This is very difficult to understand, given that in the very same article they quote their own commander-in-chief, Syrsky, as saying Russia’s army will grow to nearly 700k by the end of 2024. So how is it possible Russia will run out of men and be ‘exhausted’ next month? Clearly someone is lying.


A few battlefield updates:

Krasnogorovka has almost entirely been taken:


The Niu York area has turned into a soon-to-be disaster for the AFU as Russia has almost entirely encircled their forces on very flimsy ground that sources indicate will make retreat difficult for the trapped contingent:


A wider shot:


There are about a literal dozen other advances including Rabotino, Konstantinovka, Toresk—where Russia has entered the outskirts—and even Chasov Yar, where paratroopers reportedly used the old trick of sneaking through sewer pipes and tunnels to finally breach the Siversky-Donets canal to finally establish themselves in the microdistrict on the other side after a long pause:


In the west of Progress, near Ochertino, Russian forces advanced as well. What’s clear is that a salient will eventually break off toward the main supply route in the north to cut off Konstantinovka like so:


As can be seen, the key stronghold of Konstantinovka is slowly being enveloped, and could be the big fight of next spring, just as Bakhmut and Avdeevka each were the main spectacles of late winter / early spring ‘22 and ‘23. The Chasov Yar paratroopers will eventually press into Konstantinovka from the east while the Toretsk contingent collapses the front from the south until the city is fully enveloped.


Some last sundry updates:

In the mailbag comments someone asked about the extent of North Korea’s supplies, and we now have evidence that North Korea has sent its formidable Bulsae-4 ATGM, which was reportedly spotted by Ukrainian drone:


https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/north-korean-bulsae-4-missile-system-reportedly-spotted-in-ukraine-for-first-time


Ukrainian sources report that a North Korean Bulsae-4 ATGM was spotted in the Kharkov region.

“Bulsae-4” is a land weapon, a further development of the concept of long-range ATGMs. Armored vehicles, even with good optics, have a viewing range of no more than 7-8 km, and most ATGMs have an even shorter range. But the North Korean “toy” has a range of more than 10 km, which makes it possible to attack armored vehicles from a known safe distance. To fly it, the rocket was equipped with a powerful engine and large stabilizers, so it partially resembles a loitering munition.

The main advantage of “Bulsae-4” is the availability of control via a video channel. The operator sees all the folds of the terrain, all objects, he can go around the obstacle and hit the target behind cover. The missile has a mode of approaching the target from above, while the operator selects its vulnerable spots. If in doubt, you can select a different target while in flight. As a result, “Bulsae-4”, with proper training of the operator, has the highest accuracy.

There was even a video claiming to show the Bulsae-4’s missiles destroying a British AS-90 SPG artillery howitzer at a claimed distance of over 10km, though I’m not sure if it’s been confirmed.

Keep in mind this is a very powerful capability that even Russia doesn’t have. It’s in effect an Israeli Spike NLOS which, unlike Kornet ATGMs, can go beyond line of sight—a sort of ground launched version of the Russian helicopter-fired LMUR missile. The fact that Russia still does not produce a single weapon system of this type is one of the single biggest detriments, and quite frankly, embarrassments, to the Russian army, given that they are one of the most useful possible weapons on the modern battlefield. Even Hezbollah has been using the Armas, a Spike clone, for the past few months to great effect.

Of course, one of the reasons Russia doesn’t bother developing it is because drones like Lancet and other anti-armor loitering munitions serve the same purpose, but it’s nevertheless a major weakness and critical missing piece in the Russian forces.



Another mailbag participant also asked about the partisan situation. Here’s another small update, the car fires have gotten so bad, now spreading from Odessa to Kiev and other cities, that a battalion commander of the Azov Brigade outright promised to start shooting on the spot any Russian-leaning citizens caught vandalizing their precious cars:




Rumor has it the situation on the front is so bad, Zelensky was forced to skip the Olympics ceremony:


I think he was spotted at the Olympics, anyway:




Today Belousov announced Russia’s FPV drone figures, reported by Kommersant:

Defense Minister Andrey Belousov said today that 4,000 FPV drones are produced in Russia every day.

With one analyst noting:

The Russian Army uses 100-150 drones a day at the brigade level in an intensive area of assault work.

The article also states:

In December, Forbes, citing a representative of one of the battalions of the Russian Army, reported on the production of FPV drones in the amount of 1 thousand units per day.

4000 per day is 120,000 a month. Last December, Strategic Industries Minister of the AFU, Kamyshin, reported that Ukraine produces 50,000 monthly:


https://kyivindependent.com/minister-ukraine-already-produced-50-000-fpv-drones-in-december/
Perhaps they too are around the 120k mark or more by now, no one knows for certain, but at least these are some official figures from both sides rather than wild speculations.



Head of the Ukrainian Border Service told a woman last year that Crimea would certainly be returned by July 28, 2024—you have my word, he says!


As a quick note, I’m still sequentially working through the last bit of mailbag questions in the comments section of the original thread. It turned out to be quite a larger task than I thought, as most questions simply are impossible to answer in a single sentence or two, requiring a little context, etc. So bear with me but the remainder will be answered in full by tomorrow.



I actually had wanted to cover much more information and other topics, but alas there is only so much room, so stay tuned for the next report.



Crafty_Dog

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Ukraine invades Russia? Sink Russki sub?
« Reply #1573 on: August 08, 2024, 08:12:09 AM »
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/kremlin-scrambles-as-ukrainian-forces-push-deep-into-russian-territory/ar-AA1oqPr8?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=c2632274dc514c049e08f0bc4579eaf1&ei=6

======================Ukraine Claims Sinking of Russian Submarine in Missile Strike
Kyiv is stepping up deep strikes against Russian targets as pressure mounts in the land war
By
Ian Lovett
Follow
Aug. 3, 2024 2:16 pm ET



KYIV, Ukraine—Ukraine said it had sunk a Russian submarine off the coast of occupied Crimea in a missile strike that would be a signature blow against Moscow’s embattled fleet there.

The apparent sinking of the Rostov-on-Don diesel-electric submarine in the port of Sevastopol on Friday night would be the first time one of four such vessels in the Black Sea Fleet had been sunk. Russian officials didn’t immediately comment.

Ukraine is using deep strikes with Western-provided missiles and domestically produced aerial drones to sap Russian strength as Moscow’s ground forces are inching forward in several spots along the bloody but largely stalemated 600-mile front line of the land war.

Ukrainian officials said that missile strikes Friday night also damaged four launchers of an S-400 air-defense system in Crimea, one of Russia’s most advanced. They also said a long-range drone strike on an air base in a Russian region neighboring Ukraine had destroyed an ammunition depot that stored glide bombs that are causing severe damage to Ukraine’s forces.

The strikes helped lift the mood in Ukraine, which has soured over recent months as Russia has continued to advance. The country also received its first F-16 jet fighters this week, which Kyiv and its Western allies hope will eventually challenge Russian air power. Six F-16s arrived in Ukraine in recent days with at least six trained pilots, according to a U.S. official.

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Ukraine first struck the Rostov-on-Don submarine last September with a cruise missile, causing severe damage. Russian state media said the vessel underwent repairs and would be brought back into service, but Ukraine’s General Staff said Saturday that they had struck and sunk it. The statement also reported the damage to four Russian missile launchers in Crimea, the latest attack to hit air-defense systems.

Kyiv is seeking to loosen Moscow’s grip on the peninsula, which Russia has occupied since 2014. Ukraine has used missiles and sea drones to sink or damage around two dozen Russian ships in the Black Sea, forcing the Russian Navy to withdraw most of its vessels from occupied Crimea. It has also twice struck and damaged a road-and-railway bridge connecting Russia to Crimea that had been a key military supply artery.

In addition, Ukrainian officials said Saturday that a drone attack had struck an ammunition depot at the Morozovsk airfield in Russia’s Rostov region. The depot housed the massive glide bombs that Moscow has been using to level entire Ukrainian blocks in front-line villages and cities, according to the officials. Videos posted online showed a series of massive explosions following the strike.

In a video address Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky hailed the strikes and said they showed the value of hitting Russian military assets on the ground.

“Russian combat aviation must be destroyed wherever it is, using any effective means,” Zelensky said.

The U.S. earlier this year permitted the limited use of weapons it provides against Russian territory in response to attacks from across the border. Ukrainian officials say restrictions still leave Ukraine handicapped in its efforts to combat Russian attacks.

In the video, Zelensky again called on the West to permit the use of all weapons it provides on Russian territory, particularly against airfields where planes that launch the glide bombs are based. He said Russia had launched 600 of the bombs in the last week.

“This is the only way to ensure protection for our people,” he said.

Lara Seligman contributed to this article.
« Last Edit: August 08, 2024, 10:13:52 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Body-by-Guinness

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Ukraine Controls Station Providing European Natural Gas
« Reply #1574 on: August 09, 2024, 11:26:17 AM »
The Enforcer
@ItsTheEnforcer
·
5h
🚨BREAKING/ALERT: Ukraine has taken control of the Sudzha gas control station in the Kursk region of Russia.
Ukraine now has the ability to shutoff Russian gas supplies to Europe, and use it as leverage. This is a MAJOR development.

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Ukraine’s Attack on Kursk
« Reply #1575 on: August 09, 2024, 03:35:29 PM »
History geeks remember Kursk was the site of the largest armor battle of WW II and indeed remains the largest armor action. Ukraine appears to be gambling that taking a position they can’t hold will provide them negotiating leverage:

The Kursk Gamble
A Ukrainian Gamble for peace negotiations?

STEPHEN BRYEN
AUG 09, 2024

The Russians got caught with their pants down in Kursk.  The Ukrainians pulled off a large-scale invasion using new tactics.  They advanced far into Russian territory, mostly unopposed, or countered only by some inexperienced territorial units.  They did it with drone power but not any other air power, mostly because they don't have any (notwithstanding the symbolic F-16s which are based in Romania).

Russia has declared a Federal Emergency in the Kursk region.

Thanks for reading Weapons and Strategy! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

This is written on the morning of Friday, August 9th.  The invasion started on the previous Tuesday, August 6th.  While the Russians are now pounding the Ukrainians, the Russians are only just bringing up sufficient troops and special operators to try and crush the Ukrainian advance.  This too was pre-planned by the Ukrainians (and their NATO backers).  Ukrainian forces are digging in wherever they can, as the objective is to hold territory for as long as possible.

According to Rybar reporting on Telegram, Ukrainian forces consisting of the 82nd and 80th separate air assault brigades are leading the attacks, supported by the 22nd and 61st separate mechanized brigades of the AFU. In addition, the 150th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Air Assault Brigade, 151st Territorial Defense Battalion, and 24th Mountain Assault Brigade are participating (https://t.me/dva_majors/49105) in a limited capacity.


The Russian side still is rather disorganized.  Overall responsibility for Kursk and the northern area has changed hands a number of times in recent months, leaving confusion and lack of preparation in its wake.  The Russians are reportedly bringing up fresh forces (so far not named), including units known as "fire brigades."  These are assault spetsnaz-type units they are well trained and effective.

Everyone knows that sooner or later the Ukrainians, despite the addition of reserve troops, will be driven out of Russian territory.  But that will take time, and "sooner" and "later" have special meaning in the context of the goals of the incursion, a topic I will return to below.

There is a lot of criticism in Russia on the lack of preparedness on the Russian side.  There is no doubt that the Russian General Command had plenty of notice on Ukrainian preparations, but did nothing to counter it, or even to prepare to counter an invasion. Part of the reason probably is the heavy focus on major gains especially in Donbass by Russian forces, leading to a number of breakthroughs that either have happened or are about to take place.  That uber-command-focus and the realization that Ukraine needed all the forces it could muster just to try and stop Russian advances, the top Russian military commanders did not think the Kursk preparations were of much concern.


Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, is in a lot of hot water.  There have been two meetings of the Russian Security Council which Vladimir Putin presided over and where Gerasimov gave reports on the Kursk situation.  The reports, as released to the press, were extremely optimistic and suggested that the situation was well in hand.  It was not.  While we don't know what else Gerasimov had to say, or what Putin remarked in response, there are some video images of Putin frowning as Gerasmov spoke.  It was pretty clear he didn't believe a word of what Gerasimov was saying.


Tendra Spit (Google Maps)
The Kursk attack was planned to be coordinated by two other attacks far south in the Kherson area.  These attacks featured naval landings.  The first took place on August 6th on the Tendra Spit, then at night on the 8th of August on the Kinburn Peninsula.  The attacks featured the heavy use of drones and electronic warfare, including Baba Yaga drones that use six rotors and carry a large 33 pound warhead.  The Ukrainians lost four assault boats and two Baba Yaga drones.  One boat was able to land but the attacking forces were eliminated. Both attacks were successfully countered and the diversion failed to work. 


Kinburn Peninsula
For the record, the Russians are reporting on losses on the Ukrainian side.  RT (Russia Today government news site), based on Russian Defense Ministry information, reports that Ukraine has lost up to 945 soldiers as well as 102 armored vehicles, including 12 tanks and 17 armored personnel carriers. The figures include more than 280 troops and 27 armored vehicles destroyed over the past 24 hours in areas bordering Kursk Region.  There is no information on Russian losses.  Russia has been pounding the Ukrainians with air power, including glide bombs equipped with precision-strike capability.

Operational Objectives

Why would Ukraine be willing to sacrifice so many troops in an operation that will "sooner or later" get rolled up?  Here are the reasons:

Firstly, Ukraine's ability to defend its territory in Donbass is a dead end, as the Russians are carrying out relentless attacks slowly dislodging Ukraine's defenses, even in built-up towns with high rise concrete and steel buildings as strong positions for Ukraine's troops. On a daily basis Ukraine has been losing around 1,000 troops (killed and wounded) and morale in some brigades has gone to near zero.  The losses, even though Ukraine does its best to cover them up, pervades the society.  Much of the resistance to Ukraine's new draft laws is the sense that raw newly-recruited troops will be thrown into combat as "meat" brigades and slaughtered. Most front-line Ukrainian brigades are well below full strength, and in many cases experienced fighters have been lost.

Secondly, Ukraine's leadership is under considerable western pressure to negotiate with Russia, something that even Zelensky has acknowledged.  While Zelensky keeps promoting some sort of multi-nation peace conference, with Russia invited to the next one, the Russians have made it clear they are not interested.  The Russians also are pressuring Zelensky by saying he is no longer the elected leader of Ukraine and thus not a qualified interlocutor.

Zelensky also knows that if Trump wins in November he has a big problem. Mr. Trump is now saying that even before he actually takes office, that if he wins he is going to solve the Ukraine problem.

Ukraine counters that under current conditions they could be forced to give up a lot of territory and point out that as things now stand they have little leverage.  Ukraine cannot continue the war much longer, there is little hope (although a great desire) for NATO to intervene, and Ukraine fears it will be left out on its own.

Thus the Kursk offensive is a gamble for Ukraine to have leverage with Russia in a peace negotiation.

Kursk is an extremely sensitive area for Russia.  The WW2 battle for Kursk was a major turning point for the Soviet Union leading to the eventual defeat of the Wehrmacht. That battle was one of the costliest fights in WW2 and remains today the biggest tank battle in history.   Boris Sokolov places the Russian losses at 450,000 killed, 50,000 missing (POWs), and 1.2 million wounded throughout the course of the battle.

If Ukraine can hold Russian territory, perhaps for a few months, they can use it as a trading card with Russia.

But more is involved, and this should not be overlooked.

The strategy and tactics Ukraine is showing at Kursk was developed with NATO.  It is a test case for the defense of Europe in case of a Russian attack.  Why is this so?  NATO, in its present configuration, is in a bad place when it comes to defending territory.  If fighting were to break out in Poland, or Romania, or north in the Baltics, the Russians would have a significant advantage in ground forces.  One way to counter that would be exactly the kind of operation Ukraine is testing right now in the Kursk region.  One can easily imagine a similar vector in a broader European conflict, perhaps aimed at knocking out Kaliningrad or focused on St. Petersburg or even Moscow.


Photo: Gazprom gas station near Sudzha (Russian media)
There are other factors in Ukraine's operation that may play a role, such as the Sudzha Gas Metering station.  The station, located on the Russia-Ukraine border several kilometers from the Russian town of Sudzha, handles all gas flowing from Russia to Europe. The station is located about 5 miles inside Russia's border with Ukraine.  Ukraine claims to now control the station and there is speculation that Ukraine may decide to blow it up.  If that happens then Europe will have to depend on LNG exports from the United States. Like the overall Kursk operation, the Gas Metering Station is a bargaining card, if Ukraine can hang on to it.  If they blow it up, then it becomes an economic issue for Russia and Europe.


Kursk Nuclear Power Plant
Another possible target is the Kursk Nuclear Power plant.  It is far deeper inland than the Gas Metering Station.  Moreover any attack on the power plant could cause a Chernobyl type disaster that would not help Ukraine's political position in Europe.  Even so, the Ukrainian press is speculating about the fate of the power plant and reporting that the Russians have decided to put better protection around the facility.

How Clever?

The big question is whether Ukraine will be successful in the Kursk operation.  Much depends on the rapidity of the Russians response and the ability of the Ukrainian forces to dig in and hold ground. While the operation is military, the outcome hoped for is political.  There is no doubt it is a big gamble.  It upsets the Russian stodgy and systematic approach to territorial conquest.  But it risks a huge reaction and utter defeat if it fails prematurely.  It isn't clear how quickly the Ukrainians will jump at trying to force a negotiation with Russia, nor is it clear that the Russians will take the bait.

https://weapons.substack.com/p/the-kursk-gamble?r=1qo1e&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&triedRedirect=true

Crafty_Dog

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Simplicius
« Reply #1576 on: August 10, 2024, 05:00:35 AM »
« Last Edit: August 10, 2024, 06:41:18 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1577 on: August 12, 2024, 02:25:38 PM »
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-81124-desperate-for-escalation?publication_id=1351274&post_id=147536911&isFreemail=false&r=379fkp&triedRedirect=true




A BTDT friend assesses thusly:

"One of the biggest key takeaways is this: From this point forward, if Russia sees a spike in EW or counter-EW signatures anywhere along its border, it will absolutely have no choice but to respond whether the threat is real or not. Ukraine has established enough of a pain-reflex to allow for effective feints for some time to come. I suspect they will exploit it."

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FO: Ukraine
« Reply #1578 on: August 13, 2024, 03:07:32 PM »


Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) head claims that the U.S. is preparing to replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with the former Ukrainian Interior minister. The SVR says this is to support negotiations with Russia, appease Ukraine aid skeptics in the West, and cease “reckless steps that threaten to escalate tensions.”


Indian and Russian Central Bank senior personnel are meeting in Moscow this week to circumvent trade in dollars and the barriers imposed by U.S. sanctions on Russian goods. Part of this is setting an exchange rate for the Rupee and Ruble.

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Ukraine blew up Nordstrom pipeline?
« Reply #1579 on: August 15, 2024, 05:17:43 AM »
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/nord-stream-pipeline-explosion-real-story-da24839c?mod=hp_lead_pos7

A Drunken Evening, A Rented Yacht: The Real Story of the Nord Stream Pipeline Sabotage
Wall Street Journal ^ | 8/14/2024 | Bojan Pancevski

 Ukraine has a long history of training top civilian and military divers. A naval base on the Crimean Peninsula in the past trained deep-sea divers for the purposes of sabotage and demining. ... Armed only with diving equipment, satellite navigation, a portable sonar and open-source maps of the seabed charting the position of the pipelines, the crew set out. The four divers worked in pairs, according to people familiar with the German investigation. Operating in pitch-dark, icy waters, they handled a powerful explosive known as HMX that was wired to timer-controlled detonators. A small amount of the light explosive would be sufficient to rip open the high-pressure pipes.

(Excerpt) Read more at wsj.com ...
WSJ paywall
« Last Edit: August 15, 2024, 05:34:19 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1580 on: August 15, 2024, 07:32:21 AM »
Far out!!!



Crafty_Dog

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George Friedman: Update on Ukraine
« Reply #1583 on: August 20, 2024, 09:50:21 AM »


August 20, 2024
View On Website
Open as PDF

Update on the War in Ukraine
By: George Friedman
Two and a half years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine, a former part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The reason for the invasion was geostrategic: Moscow justifiably feared that a hostile power could invade it from the west through Ukraine and up from the south. Such was the case for invasions by Napoleon and Hitler. Without strategic depth, Russia has no buffers.

For Russia, that no one was currently planning such an invasion meant little. Geopolitics demands preparing to defend against an enemy before the enemy plans to attack. Moscow was, after all, painfully aware that pro-West forces supported an uprising that unseated a pro-Russia president several years earlier. The West’s support was based on the fear that Russia would invade Ukraine and, in time, the rest of Europe. Neither side’s fears were irrational.

The assumption of many was that Russia would rapidly crush the Ukrainian army and that a quick assault would close the door on U.S. intervention and supplies. If the logic was correct, the execution was not. The first foray into Ukraine consisted of tanks on multiple fronts, a show of force meant to sow panic among the public. This, too, was a mistake. Early photos were filled with unmoving tanks in a 40-kilometer (25-mile) column on the road from the north heading toward Kyiv. Apparently, Russia had not prepared enough storage or delivery of supplies for the tanks. Ukraine’s method of attack, meanwhile, kept the column from moving as it destroyed tanks at each end, blocking the Russian ability to move its main thrust. In short, the tank columns moved in, got bogged down and were stopped not far inside Ukraine's borders. The sight of immobile armor defined the war. Here was a powerful but flawed army that Ukraine could exploit. It gave Ukraine and the U.S. confidence to face the Russians.

Added to this were several intelligence failures. Moscow did not expect Washington to intervene. But Washington was schooled in many wars. It would not send troops, but it would send the kind of equipment needed to block Russia sufficiently, if not definitively. Moscow also overestimated Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. It assumed incorrectly that Europe, especially Germany, would refuse to cooperate with NATO. Instead, Europe has tried – fairly successfully – to find other vendors and prioritized the transition to green energy. Finally, Moscow misread Ukraine's strategy. The Ukrainian army did not mass its troops to try to break the Russian formations; it divided its forces into small, nimble units empowered to strike where the opportunity arose, making concentrated attacks more difficult for Russia.

Critically, a decision was made near the start of the war to deploy the Wagner Group, a private Russian mercenary outfit. Not only was Wagner relied on more heavily than contractors usually are for conventional battle, but it was put on more or less equal footing with conventional Russian forces. This created tensions with the Russian military command over vital issues like ammunition distribution. President Vladimir Putin appeared to side with Wagner more than his official military command and wanted to use Wagner as a reliable force. However, that drama played out with an attempted insurrection by Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was pardoned but later died in a plane crash. Naturally, the episode weakened the military command’s confidence.

The point of this recap is to remind us that Russia made a series of mistakes throughout the war that pertain to the events of the past couple of weeks. From the jump, Moscow prioritized the capture of cities over the destruction of enemy forces. The former is much more difficult and resource-heavy than the latter. This goes some way to explain, however imperfectly, Ukraine's startling invasion of Russia. Having failed to take the whole of Ukraine, Russia must now change its strategy or risk even more failure. So far, the decisions made have rendered success impossible.

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Zeihan
« Reply #1584 on: August 23, 2024, 04:27:55 AM »


Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Belarus-Ukraine
« Reply #1586 on: August 26, 2024, 09:01:34 AM »


Ukraine warned Belarus not to succumb to Russian pressure to attack.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Tragic mistakes. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry warned that Belarus is massing troops and equipment, including former Wagner Group fighters, near Ukraine’s border under the pretext of military exercises. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Belarusian forces, particularly special operations units, have concentrated tanks, artillery, air defense systems, and other military assets in the Gomel region near northern Ukraine. These activities, near the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, pose both national and global security risks, Kyiv said. The ministry urged Belarusian officials not to bow to Moscow’s pressure and to withdraw their forces from the Ukrainian border beyond the range of their weapons. Ukraine said it has not and will not engage in hostilities against the Belarusian people.


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How Trump would settle war
« Reply #1588 on: September 04, 2024, 06:33:19 AM »

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Re: How Trump would settle Ukraine war
« Reply #1589 on: September 04, 2024, 06:58:50 AM »

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXjYCiUWjOU

Seems like bold hyperbole but I believe Trump will negotiate an end to this war.

Same way NHL refs end fights, wait until the parties are exhausted, then step in.

I won't like the settlement, Russia will be rewarded with land for committing war on its neighbor.

Trump has leverage on both sides.  He has leverage over Ukraine with control over military aid and leverage over Russia with control over military aid against them.

New lines will be drawn roughly where they way they are controlled on inauguration day.

Too bad Slow Joe didn't settle it this summer instead of taking his latest 40 day vacation. 

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Our Coming Nuclear War?
« Reply #1590 on: September 13, 2024, 10:48:54 AM »
Noted here, but not much developed, is the current administration’s prosecution of the Ukrainian proxy war has been abysmal though, unsurprisingly, not much discussed by the administration’s media handmaidens.

Meanwhile, those that have been trafficking in Russian electoral fables for well over a decade now likely feel as though they have to not only continue pushing the plow down that well worn furrow, but also need to use it to their political advantage, given that so many have bought into those fables, hook, line, and sinker. When doling out rotten lemons one might as well also vend rotten lemonade, eh what?

Those quaffing that lemonade, alas, likely aren’t aware of the stakes, described below, as MSM toadies realize describing its odious bouquet and flavor would be frowned upon by the factotums pulling the strings while hiding behind the ever fraying fiction of a constitutional republic. ”Leaks” may be less forthcoming should that sort of career suicide be embraced, so reporters come to heel and peck at the line of breadcrumbs laid out for them, as demonstrated so ably by the ABC “moderators” toting water during this week’s debate.

The losers in this scenario? Those American citizens as well as the citizens in other NATO countries that may find their climates subject to a 10,000 degree thermonuclear warming in a fraction of a second or two. If a couple of degrees over decades of the same is a catastrophe, imagine what that many orders of magnitude heating in a fraction of a second will bring? Probably have to invent some new words as current claims of catastrophic change has inured many to that unending drumbeat.

But hey, it’s all for a good cause. Americans rarely vote the party in power out of office in time of war, and indeed war is often the reason cited when the constitution is tossed on the trash heap, given recent covid folly or that favorite of statists FDR, who did the same during WW II with Japanese Americans, to name just one instance. And hey, he wanted to pack the Supreme Court, too! Besides, Trump is still evil incarnate so anything embraced to prevent his election is game, up to and including nuclear war:

The Big Change Ahead: NATO Starting a War With Russia?

The British Want to Blow Up Russia and "Win" the War

STEPHEN BRYEN

SEP 13, 2024

There is no other way to interpret it: Washington and its client NATO members are declaring war on Russia.  That is the direct meaning of the forthcoming visit of Zelensky to Washington where the parties will agree on targets inside Russia.
To say this is an insane, reckless move is understatement.  This is the most dangerous step possible for the US and NATO and it will lead to World War III
.
Don't believe any garbage "justifying" the use of long range missiles on Russia.

Putin has pointed out that while Ukraine will host the missiles, they will be fired by NATO personnel who will also insert the targeting data coming from overhead satellites covering Russian territory.  Those satellites are American.

The upcoming Zelensky-Biden meeting should also include Harris, so she takes full responsibility for starting a war.

No one can presume what the outcome will be.  Will Russia unleash nuclear weapons and bring a definitive end to the Ukraine war?  Will it shoot down American satellites?  Will Russia send rockets to hit supply depots in Europe, especially in Poland which is the jumping off point for military supplies to Ukraine?

There are many other possibilities open to Russia. Russia could transfer nuclear weapons to Iran, for example, or to Syria.
The truth is Washington wants to take up Zelensky's proposals for deep strikes on Russian territory because Ukraine is losing the war and could be defeated even before the Presidential elections in November.  The Biden-Harris “team” will have to explain why they kept backing a loser, causing tens of thousands of casualties, instead of seeking a diplomatic settlement that was easily within their grasp. Here again Washington stopped a deal in the making between Ukraine and Russia, and Biden and Harris are directly responsible for that.

Zelensky's strategy is easy to grasp.  He knows everything is falling apart and Ukraine won't be able to fight anymore by winter, as the infrastructure of the country, especially electrical power, but also fuel, dries up. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski says that Ukraine’s electrical power has been degraded by 70%, perhaps more.

So Zelensky's strategy is to bring NATO directly into the war.  And, stupidly and arrogantly, Washington is playing the same game.
No one, other than the UK, wants to see a war in Europe.  The UK is no longer an important European country and lacks a land army worth talking about. Instead its government built a couple of massively expensive aircraft carriers that function poorly, if at all, instead of strengthening its military and rebuilding its defenses. In any case, the UK dances to the US tune.  The British are anxious to attack Russia, but haven’t bothered to figure what will happen when Russia blows up the UK.

The big question is why Washington wants to fire missiles into Russia?  It means that Biden, Sullivan and Blinken know that their Ukraine policy is a disaster.  Instead of trying to open communications with the Russians, they are upping the ante and taking huge risks, with little idea how things will end up, unless they are really getting ready to send in NATO troops and use NATO airpower in the Ukraine war.
Russia may not match the US in many military categories, but it occupies a large landmass and has strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.  We have known for years that Russia's military does not really differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear systems; rather they see them all along a continuum to be used as necessary.  What this means is that Russia  can launch ICBMs and submarine IRBMs against US continental targets.  People in Washington should understand that the US has almost no continental air defenses capable of stopping a Russian nuclear attack.

For years strategists have worried about a so-called "first strike" capability.  I can't say Russia really has that, but no one should want to find out.

The only hope is to persuade our current leaders, soon to be replaced, that they will be held accountable for starting a war without any grounds for doing so.  One of the features of government is that people make decisions without taking responsibility. In the case of World War III, no matter what soap opera propaganda flows into US newspapers, our leaders will have a lot of blood on their hands if they go ahead with bombing Russia.

https://weapons.substack.com/p/the-big-change-ahead-nato-starting?r=1qo1e&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&triedRedirect=true


Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Will West Allow Ukes to Hit Deeper Into Russia
« Reply #1592 on: September 17, 2024, 07:22:00 AM »


September 16, 2024
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Will the West Let Ukraine Strike Farther Into Russia?
If Kyiv’s allies allow the use of long-range munitions inside Russia, the war will escalate.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

On Sept. 14, Ukraine again asked the West for permission to strike deeper into Russian territory. The request came a day after U.S. President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met in Washington, and so far no decision has been disclosed. In Moscow, meanwhile, authorities continue to endorse a statement Russian President Vladimir Putin made earlier in the week that if NATO missiles were used to attack Russia, it would bring the West “directly” into the war.

The discussion over Ukraine potentially using NATO-supplied long-range missiles in Russia started about two weeks ago, leading up to a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv on Sept. 12. London supposedly indicated privately it was amenable to giving Ukraine the green light but said Washington was holding things up. Other reports suggest the U.S. was, indeed, warming up to the possibility.

Many believed Blinken would authorize the use of NATO missiles during the Sept. 12 meeting, albeit with a list of restrictions such as a prohibition on attacking oil refineries and power plants. But the meeting came and went, and no agreement was reached. Instead, the parties announced a joint aid package of $2.3 billion, and Blinken and Lammy promised to take the matter home to discuss with their countries’ leaders. Kyiv is using the intermission to intensify its pressure on the West.

For Ukraine, the issue is all the more urgent now that it has invaded Russia proper. Troops stationed in the southern region of Kursk are immobile, and they are especially vulnerable to FAB glide bombs, which Russia introduced to deadly effect this summer. Moscow claims it has recaptured a number of villages in Kursk and inflicted some 7,000 casualties on Ukraine. These figures are unverified, of course, but the fact remains that without long-range NATO missiles, Ukraine says it has no way to strike the airfields from where the glide bombs originate.

Needless to say, the introduction of such missiles would escalate the conflict. High-level Russian leaders have said as much. It’s no secret that the West is already involved. The prevailing logic has been that the West is not attacking Russia but assisting its ally in self-defense – a narrative that Russia has accepted so far. It’s also no secret that Ukraine would have lost the war long ago without Western support. The Kremlin has ignored this because it has had the upper hand. Supplying munitions to Ukraine for use in Ukraine is one thing; using NATO arms to attack Russian installations on Russian territory is quite another, one that Moscow says is tantamount to declaring war. The U.S. understands as much and is therefore exercising restraint, much as it has throughout the conflict. (Recall that Washington had concerns over Javelin missiles at the outset of the invasion, restricting their use only against rebels in Donbas or against Russia in the event it invaded, which it did.)

And yet the U.S. and the U.K. accused Russia of escalating the war in Ukraine by procuring ballistic missiles from Iran. At the Sept. 12 meeting, Blinken said that Russia's use of Iranian missiles would "further empower their aggression in Ukraine," while Lammy remarked that the provision of Iranian missiles to Russia had "clearly changed the debate" over long-range weaponry. All of this points to the possibility of Kyiv being given permission to use long-range missiles.

Still, it’s unclear if the West will go through with it and if Moscow would in fact treat it as an act of war. Considering the conflict in Ukraine so far has crossed many of Putin's red lines with relative impunity, it’s tempting to call it another Russian bluff. After all, Russia’s interest is to avoid engaging in direct military conflict with NATO because it knows it would lose. More compelling is that China, Russia’s sometimes-ally, would do everything in its power to prevent Moscow from going to war with NATO. Russia’s probable defeat would only isolate China further and significantly weaken its position relative to the U.S.

However, Moscow has taken extreme and surprising positions since the beginning of the war – starting with the invasion itself, which many believed was a bad idea. Moreover, Moscow believes that NATO is a threat to Russia. Its latest strategy document states explicitly that Russia is in a broader conflict with the West over influence in Ukraine (and much of the rest of the world) and as such needs to make alliances to weak Western posture globally. And while the Russian public has had some misgivings about the war, the threat of missile strikes closer to home could change opinions fairly quickly.

In fact, Russia may have already signaled its intent to take action. On Sept. 13, authorities in Kyiv and Bucharest reported that a cargo ship operated by Turkey transporting Ukrainian grain to Egypt was hit by a suspected Russian missile in Romania's exclusive economic zone, some 50 miles (80 kilometers) off the Romanian coast. Russia declined to comment on the incident, which, in turn, triggered an increase in the price of wheat. With the risk of war growing in the Black Sea, prices for both food and shipping are likely to increase, which bodes ill for an already fragile global economy.

If permission is given for Ukraine to use long-range missiles on Russian targets, Russia will have to react. While a direct attack on NATO is likely out of the question, Russia may still find ways to respond – by targeting ships in the Black Sea, intensifying attacks on Ukraine, advancing on the southern front or targeting Kyiv directly. Depending on the severity of the response, China or another third country may choose to step in to push for peace. Things are just as likely to spin out of control. Wars are, after all, notoriously uncertain

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Media vs. Peace?
« Reply #1593 on: September 19, 2024, 06:44:17 AM »
The Media vs. Ukrainian Peace?
The anti-Trump agitprop around Putin’s war isn’t helping anybody.
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Sept. 17, 2024 5:11 pm ET



There’s a reason, after a previous assassination attempt, I wrote a column headlined “Rethinking Trump and the Ukraine War” and mentioned the trickle, which since has become a flood, of U.S. government pseudo-crackdowns on Russian propaganda. These crackdowns seem mainly designed to flog the idea to U.S. domestic voters that the Kremlin backs Donald Trump.

I also drew a connection to the “witless polemic,” as I called it, of analysts who think it advances Ukraine’s cause to paint a likely U.S. president and his 75 million voters as Putin supporters.

The latest would-be assassin, Ryan Routh, may well have been a fan of such agitprop. He lacked Lee Harvey Oswald’s military training but not his wannabe aspirations, having traveled to Ukraine to pose, apparently in unwelcome fashion, as an organizer of foreign legionnaires.

Which brings us to today’s subject. Even without a second attempt on Mr. Trump, that subject would have been the Biden administration’s looming, unavoidable and consequential decision about how heavily to involve U.S. capabilities in Ukraine’s expanding campaign to strike targets inside Russia.

The decision involves risks. It needs to be made as part of a plan, not as another episode in the “no, no, no, yes” routine that has defined Joe Biden’s response to Ukrainian aid requests. Indeed, neither Kamala Harris nor Mr. Trump should be especially easy with Mr. Biden (or his aides) making so pregnant a call whose consequences they would inherit.

Vladimir Putin is again threatening escalation but he hasn’t, despite what you’re hearing, threatened nuclear use, which would be strategically grotesque even for him, as the boy who cried wolf so many times he made it impossible for his adversaries to know when he meant it.

The moment has also arrived when Ukraine remembers that its interests aren’t the same as U.S. interests. The most important aim behind its Kursk offensive may be the least spoken: As long as Kyiv holds Russian territory, nobody will impose, and Russia can hardly accept, a freezing of current positions, as suggested by Trump running mate JD Vance.

The signaling has been no less elaborate on the Western side, with noisy consultations and travels, culminating in Friday’s meeting with Mr. Biden and the new British prime minister, who reportedly advocates allowing Ukraine to use NATO-supplied weapons to bring the war more deeply into Russia. From a distance, the signs are the sort that even might precede negotiations.

To U.S. strategists, understand, the current fighting is already superfluous and has been since Mr. Biden’s military chief bruited a cease-fire two years ago.

The victory that most serves the U.S. would be a deal that turns a hot war into a cold war while letting Washington shift its attention elsewhere (not an unfamiliar experience for U.S. allies). Already U.S. geostrategists are looking forward to wooing Mr. Putin from his Chinese captivity.

Complicating matters, some cease-fire advocates in the West go wrong, and get themselves rightly suspected of being Putin allies, by insisting Ukraine should be extorted to seek peace by cutting off American aid, as if this wouldn’t be an incentive for Mr. Putin to keep fighting.

The obvious path: Extort Ukraine’s compliance with a peace deal by piling on the aid commitments, to assure its long-term self-defense.

This isn’t a job for a lame duck, much less a U.S. president of uncertain cognitive function, much less the author of the U.S. strategy so far, which has all but amounted to coaxing Mr. Putin to dig himself deeper into a failed war.

From a cynical perspective, this made sense during Mr. Biden’s first term. He could avoid stating a definition of victory that he could be criticized for or judged against. Had he achieved the second term he sought, he would have to lay his cards on the table. That’s when Ukraine was likely to discover that, for all the media talk that possibly excited the alleged assassin Mr. Routh, the Biden objective isn’t different from the Trump objective. The only difference is the political interest that allows Mr. Trump to put into words what Mr. Biden won’t.

In a televised presidential debate, forms should be observed: Mr. Trump should have said (as he has before) that he told Mr. Putin to stay out of Ukraine and in that sense favors a Ukrainian victory. But war isn’t a sporting event. The Biden administration wished to defer responsibility, but an endgame to meld U.S. and Ukrainian interests is becoming a necessity perhaps even before the next president takes office.

This involves risk—Mr. Putin has his own endgame in mind though I imagine he no longer can believe in some giant reversal by which Ukraine doesn’t end up a heavily armed if unofficial ally of a strengthened and enlarged NATO.

But in another sign of how badly off-kilter this election has become, we may not discover until after Election Day whether Ms. Harris has any thoughts at all on what should happen next.



Crafty_Dog

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Zeihan
« Reply #1596 on: September 30, 2024, 02:54:05 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Update on Ukraine
« Reply #1597 on: October 02, 2024, 05:25:30 AM »
October 2, 2024
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Update on Ukraine
The winter will impose difficult logistical issues.
By: Geopolitical Futures

At a U.N. meeting in New York on Sept. 22, the G7 countries announced that they would provide a $50 billion loan to Ukraine. The announcement followed reports of new developments in the conflict related to energy infrastructure, the country's economic conditions and another possible wave of refugees fleeing west into Europe. As the war enters its third winter, now seems a good time to update our readers on how the current ground conditions could affect the outcome of the conflict.

As in all wars, logistics is crucial. Key routes can be effectively targeted using terrain denial weapon systems such as artillery, airstrikes, drones and mines. But in the winter, these routes become fewer. As the initial invasion showed, unimproved roads become impassable in snow and mud, restricting major movements to better routes. Improved or paved roads with predictable traffic will be more vulnerable to attack. This will greatly affect forward locations that are farther from the main supply routes converging at essential transport hubs. Paved roads, meanwhile, will be vulnerable to attack.

Road conditions will also make resupplying frontline troops increasingly difficult. This will have a direct effect on Ukrainian positions in Russia's Kursk region, which cannot be supplied through air assets because of Russian air defense systems. Pontoon bridges will be less efficient and reliable as rivers freeze, leading to chokepoints on the limited routes available for crossing. Consequently, there will be a significant need for route security and control if Ukrainian forces choose to maintain positions farther from the main supply routes.

Equipment – or rather, the lack of equipment – is also affecting realities on the ground for the Ukrainian population. Insufficient resources needed for the winter may hurt morale – not just for the troops but also for the public writ large, which is contending with infrastructure problems that have made water and food more scarce. On Sept. 19, for example, the U.N. reported that Russian forces struck several energy facilities, noting that it could “take years to fully repair and restore” them. Indeed, attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure persist, with 20 of 24 regions indicating similar strikes. Reports paint a dire picture: Some 95 percent of thermal power plants have been destroyed, and all major hydroelectric power plants have failed. So far, it’s unclear whether the generators provided to Ukraine as part of its aid packages will keep the civilian population warm and meet the military’s energy needs. (The recently announced G7 loan is expected to address repairs and reconstruction, but both will take time.)

Ukraine Energy Infrastructure

(click to enlarge)

Access to clean water and food has reportedly become a challenge too. The war famously wrecked Ukraine’s agricultural production, and estimates suggest Russia has damaged roughly one-third of Ukraine’s water supplies. Even if the country can produce enough food to meet the people’s needs, energy shortages will drive prices up. The U.N. refugee agency reports that over 6.7 million Ukrainians have already left the country since the Russian invasion. Approximately 6.2 million are still in other parts of Europe, while an additional 3.6 million are internally displaced within Ukraine.

This raises the obvious question of whether the Ukrainian public still supports the war. The latest polls show that 53 percent of Ukrainians believe the war is worth it, but only 36 percent are willing to endure the war for “as long as it lasts." Nearly 30 percent are not willing to endure it any longer. If the general public’s living conditions and the country's military standing degrade further in the next few months, the percentage of those who don’t support the war could climb higher. That could affect political stability and, therefore, the way the war is waged.

This is especially relevant considering Ukraine’s already high reliance on drones, which are meant to compensate for its shortage in manpower and conventional weaponry. Ukraine is dependent on the conventional weapons the West delivers and uses drones and satellites for surveillance, seeking to make it difficult for Russian forces to consolidate and mass troops and equipment near the frontline for major advances without being targeted. Ukraine’s drone manufacturing factories are based in Kyiv, making them vulnerable to any political instability that would be caused by a decrease in popular support for the war.

Given all factors constraining Kyiv’s ability to fight a protected war, the government may consider finding a way to end it – if it can do so on favorable terms. Ending the war would benefit the West. But victory is hard to achieve, and there’s no evidence to suggest Russian forces are unable to use larger weapons in their arsenal, even in Kursk. Despite the costs, the most likely outcome is a winter stalemate with limited advances as both sides try to hold on to territory and equipment that can be resupplied in the spring.

Ridvan Bari Urcosta and Andrew Davidson contributed to this analysis. Mr. Urcosta is an analyst at GPF, and Mr. Davidson, a GPF intern, is completing a master’s degree in international relations


DougMacG

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