The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/us/politics/trump-syria-attack.html?emc=edit_th_180413&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=496411930413

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed that he authorized precision airstrikes April 13 (the early hours of Saturday, April 14, local time), targeting facilities in Syria linked to the government's chemical weapons program. Trump said that the strikes had been authorized in a combined effort with the United Kingdom and France, and that the operation against the Syrian government's chemical weapons capabilities would be sustained, integrating "all instruments of national power." British Prime Minister Theresa May issued a statement aligned with the White House statement, clarifying that the strikes were intended to be "limited and targeted" and are not about intervening in Syria's civil conflict. Pentagon officials confirmed that normal deconfliction channels with Russia were used, but that the Russians were not notified of target sites in advance and they did not attempt to intervene in the strikes, as had been expected.
A map of Syria showing locations of chemical weapons facilities attacked by U.S., French and British forces.

The scope of the operation is beyond a punitive strike, extending into a concerted effort to severely degrade the Syrian government's ability to manufacture and use chemical weapons.

Concurrent with Trump's speech, reports emerged from Syria of airstrikes targeting scientific research facilities in Damascus and Homs provinces. In addition, attacks were reported against the Mezzeh airfield — a major Syrian Republican Guard helicopter and air base and one of the installations linked to the government's operations targeting rebels in Eastern Ghouta. There were also reported strikes on the Jabal Qassioun mountain range overlooking Damascus, an area replete with army headquarters and artillery positions that supported the Eastern Ghouta campaign. State television also reported that the Syrian government launched anti-aircraft missiles over Damascus. The reported targeting aligns with a priority on striking facilities linked to chemical weapons. The target set was significantly expanded from the 2017 strike on the Shayrat airbase, which hit more than half a dozen targets, including air bases and chemical weapons sites. This indicates that the scope of the current operation is beyond a punitive strike, extending into a concerted effort to severely degrade the Syrian government's ability to manufacture and use chemical weapons.

Beyond the immediate tactical objective of degrading the Syrian government's ability to deliver chemical weapons — and a promise to sustain the military campaign as needed — Trump's speech touched on a broader strategic intent to challenge Iran's presence in Syria. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were named as allies in the effort to not only degrade the Syrian government's chemical weapons capability, but also to work against Iranian interests in the region. Qatar reportedly provided a staging ground for U.S. B1 bombers involved in the airstrikes.

[DougMacG]

Thanks for posting this.  It looks like Trump and the allies got this just about right in a difficult situation.  They did real damage; st back the program.  Showed they could penetrate and hit anywhere, anytime they want.  Got involvement from France and Britain and support from Merkel in Germany.  Add to that what Strat reports, the Gulf states are part of the alliance.

It was a 'measured' response.  Facilities destroyed and no civilian casualties?  More than that would have required authorization from Congress.  We aren't entering the Syrian war any more now than we were before these attacks.  We just aren't sitting by and letting rogue regimes develop and use deadly chemical WMD without consequence.

One early report turned out to be fake news.   Russia claimed it shot down 71 of the missiles when they didn't hit any of them or even try.  In that sense, perhaps Russia also cooperated in letting us execute a limited strike right that was bound and determined to happen - inside of what they consider their jurisdiction.  A message was sent to Putin as well as to Assad. 

A message was sent to Un as well.  Those after the attack pictures could be his facilities with not much more than the push of a button.  It would cost us not much more than 0.0% of our GDP to set back his weapons and palace building programs a decade or two.

Face the Nation host Margaret Brennan confronted Nikki Haley this morning with a graphic showing how the US went from allowing thousands per year of Syrian refugees to just 11 last year or this year and asking why the US isn't doing more.  Outside of Washington that is seen as evidence this President acting to protect us.

[Crafty_Dog]

Check out the CNN Pravda woman's face!!!

https://www.facebook.com/derekmke/videos/599007993778650/?hc_ref=ARSqp5lz9pDNj6pWhzgLO-Z6ISIbzh-Wi6DqM-qT-lr3m3nqQCklQIwCLQwxHS0yggY

[ccp]

yeah the Democr   :wink:at propaganda news anchor tried to spin the praise for Trump into a negative and instead of getting him to go along with  he threw it right back in her God darn face .  FU CNN!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/full-text-french-declassified-intelligence-report-on-syria-gas-attack-1.5995544

[Crafty_Dog]

Haven't had a chance to give this a proper read yet, but it looks interesting:

https://arcdigital.media/america-bombed-syria-but-what-does-the-u-s-want-1bffedaa6cf5

[Crafty_Dog]

By Jacob L. Shapiro
The West Rebukes Russia in Syria
Western powers made clear that they would hold Russia partly responsible for Assad’s actions.


Late last week, the U.S., U.K. and France launched coordinated missile strikes on select regime targets in Syria. It was the second time the Trump administration had ordered strikes on the Assad regime, and only two things distinguish last week’s strikes from the ones that were carried out a year ago: Twice as many missiles were fired in the most recent attack, and the U.K. and France participated. But the strikes will not change the Syrian war. They were driven mainly by domestic politics in the three countries involved, which have emphasized both that regime change is not their goal and that Russia is partly responsible for Bashar Assad’s actions.

Four Powers

There are now four global powers intervening in Syria: Russia, the U.S., the U.K. and France. Russia ventured south to distract from problems at home. The U.S., which intervened initially to try to destroy the Islamic State, has struck Assad twice, mainly because President Donald Trump does not want to be compared to former President Barack Obama, who didn’t enforce his own red line on Assad’s use of chemical weapons. The U.K. has latched on to Russia as Europe’s boogeyman and is using both diplomatic expulsions and now airstrikes against a Russian client state to distract from contentious Brexit negotiations, which as recently as a few months ago threatened to bring down Prime Minister Theresa May’s government. France, which is dealing with crippling labor unrest and a president, Emmanuel Macron, with rapidly declining popularity ratings, wants to hide what everyone already knows: France has become Germany’s junior partner in the EU.

All four are equally unprepared for a war over Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons. The U.S. is desperately searching for a way to leave Syria. The U.K. and France are hardly willing to deploy the type of military force that would be necessary to bring down the Assad regime, much less militarily confront Russia. Russia’s Syria deployment has always been limited, concentrated mostly on air assets to help the Assad regime defeat rebels who can’t challenge Russia in the skies. This is not Desert Storm, nor is it a prelude to World War III. It is foreign powers doing what they’ve always done in the Middle East: pushing pawns around on a chessboard to make a point to each other and even to themselves.

Meanwhile, the real players in this war were remarkably quiet over the weekend. Israel, which has bombed Assad regime targets and Iranian targets in Syria multiple times, reportedly supplied some intelligence on Syrian chemical weapons facilities but otherwise did not participate in the expedition. (A blast at a Hezbollah base south of Aleppo over the weekend appears to have been a weapons depot explosion and not an Israeli air attack, as many news outlets reported.) Turkey was busy mediating between Russia and the United States right up until the missiles started falling. Iran called the attacks a crime but has confined its vengeance to rhetorical flourishes thus far.

The Syrian civil war may yet morph into a much larger conflagration – but if that happens, it will be because of a clash of Turkish-Iranian interests, not because of limited Western airstrikes on Assad’s chemical weapons facilities. While Russia and the U.S. exchange condemnations at the U.N., the Assad regime will continue to mop up the opposition; Turkey will continue its incursion into northern Syria; Iran will continue building bases and strengthening proxies throughout the country; Israel will apply its deterrence strategy to a much larger target; and the Syrian Kurds will inch closer to the inevitable moment that they are hung out to dry by their patron – the U.S. – which no longer has a use for them. The sooner the threat of Western airstrikes abates, the sooner the belligerents can get back to the real fighting.

An Anti-Russia Coalition

But Western powers insist that they will continue to intervene so long as the Assad regime continues to use chemical weapons. Something here has never quite added up. There is little publicly available proof that chemical weapons were used in Douma. The U.S. has said it believes they were, but its track record when it comes to evaluating the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East leaves something to be desired. Furthermore, coalition airstrikes started shortly before investigators from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons arrived in Damascus. The timing of the Western strikes – which were delayed to give Russia an opportunity to remove its forces from harm’s way – is thus confusing, considering that launching the strikes before the investigation could be carried out gives Russia a useful talking point.
Moreover, there is little reason for the Assad regime to use such weapons. It’s too easy to explain this away by insisting that Assad is just a monster – he might be a monster, but he’s been an exceedingly pragmatic one up to this point, and there’s little reason to think that has changed. Assad and his patrons have no motive for using chemical weapons in this case. The regime is on the cusp of securing Damascus – why engage in a chemical attack on a mostly defeated opposition? Using chemical weapons offers little in the way of a military advantage and gives Assad’s enemies a useful pretext to launch attacks. Russia is trying to leave Syria and has been trying to move toward a negotiated settlement for months. Iran’s position in Syria is menacing but weak – it needs time to establish a robust presence and secure its long supply lines – and becoming a Western target is detrimental to its agenda.

Amid this confusion, the one thing that can be said for certain is that an anti-Russia coalition has been defined. The Western strikes did not change the balance of power in the Syrian war, and indeed, they have relatively little to do with the conflict that is grinding Syria into dust and ruin. It seems more likely at this point that the strikes were a political statement against Russia. (Germany was reportedly offered an opportunity to join the strike, but it has a more complicated relationship with Russia than the others do and didn’t want to engage in direct military action against a Russian ally.) The U.S., the U.K. and France may have bombed chemical weapons facilities in Syria, but they also went out of their way to demonize Russia as a menace to the liberal international order.

Our forecast for this year didn’t anticipate that the West and Russia would be clashing to this extent. Russia wants a balance of power in the Middle East, one that keeps Turkey and Iran fighting each other indefinitely, preventing both from becoming powerful enough to challenge Russian interests in its desired spheres of influence. The Western powers also want a balance of power. But old habits die hard. Cold War comparisons, however wrongly applied to the current situation, are understandably compelling in a morally ambiguous conflict. Domestic imperatives also sometimes outweigh international ones. Trump wants to look strong, May needs Europe focused on foreign threats instead of the border with Northern Ireland, and Macron is desperate for a political win – and all can be had at the low cost of bombing insignificant targets in a Middle Eastern pariah. As for Russian President Vladimir Putin, it’s now Moscow versus the West – and a great deal of economic dysfunction can be forgiven if it is suffered in defense of Mother Russia.

There are two wars being fought here: a military war for Syria, and a public relations war between Russia and the West. The airstrikes in Syria were salvos in the latter. The former has no end in sight.

[Crafty_Dog]

The White House is reportedly seeking to build an Arab force to replace the U.S. military presence in northeast Syria and help stabilize the area after the Islamic State is defeated, The Wall Street Journal reported April 17. U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has requested billions of dollars from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to restore northern Syria. In March, Trump said he wants to withdraw the approximately 2,000 U.S. troops deployed in Syria, which would likely damage U.S. credibility, impact the fight against the Islamic State and weaken Washington's ability to counter Iran in the region.

[DougMacG]

The White House is reportedly seeking to build an Arab force to replace the U.S. military presence in northeast Syria and help stabilize the area after the Islamic State is defeated, The Wall Street Journal reported April 17. U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has requested billions of dollars from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to restore northern Syria. In March, Trump said he wants to withdraw the approximately 2,000 U.S. troops deployed in Syria, which would likely damage U.S. credibility, impact the fight against the Islamic State and weaken Washington's ability to counter Iran in the region.

Doug: If he succeeds in building the coalition and stopping the enemy, our credibility won't be lost.
---------------

Walter Russell Mead, American Interest / WSJ 4/16:

Both Russia and Iran are overstretched. They suffer from weak economies and parasitical state structures. Their populations are not in love with their Syrian adventures. Despite recent increases, oil prices remain well below the level they require to fund their ambitious foreign policies while meeting domestic needs. Expanded sanctions against both Russia and Iran are gaining support in Europe. Simultaneously, Arab-Israeli cooperation against Iran continues to gel. A coalition of front-line states, promoted and supported by the United States, may ultimately address the Iran problem in ways no outside power ever could.

The Trump agenda has a real chance of success in the Middle East—but only if the Trump administration can master the dark arts of alliance management. That may seem unlikely, but if there is one thing we have learned about this president, it is that he can be tactically flexible in pursuit of his goals.

[Crafty_Dog]

Please print entire WR Mead article!

[DougMacG]

Please print entire WR Mead article!

"Rather than seek to impose an order of its own design on the turbulent region, Washington would simply ensure that no other power or group of powers succeeds in dominating the Middle East."

"A coalition of front-line states, promoted and supported by the United States, may ultimately address the Iran problem in ways no outside power ever could."
-----------------------
Along with VDH, WRM is my favorite Democrat.
Trump’s Realist Syria Strategy
By Walter Russell Mead,  American Interest, WSJ
April 16, 2018
As the echoes from President Trump’s second Syrian missile strike died away, many observers criticized the administration for lacking a coherent strategy. There is more than a little truth to the charge. The drama and disarray of this often-dysfunctional White House does not suggest a Richelieu at work. The presidential Twitter feed has not always been consistent or levelheaded on the topic of the Syrian war, and it is hard to reconcile Mr. Trump’s denunciations of Bashar al-Assad and his warnings about Iranian aggression with his apparent determination to remove U.S. troops from Syria as quickly as possible.

The tangled politics of last week’s missile strikes illustrate the contradictions in Mr. Trump’s approach. The president is a realist who believes that international relations are both highly competitive and zero-sum. If Iran and Russia threaten the balance of power in the Middle East, it is necessary to work with any country in the region that will counter them, irrespective of its human-rights record. The question is not whether there are political prisoners in Egypt; the question is whether Egypt shares U.S. interests when it comes to opposing Iran.

Yet the rationale for the missile strikes was not realist but humanitarian and legalistic: Syria’s illegal use of chemical weapons against its own people demanded or at least justified the Western attacks. For any kind of activist Middle East policy, Mr. Trump needs allies—including neoconservatives and liberal internationalists at home and foreign allies like Britain and France abroad—and the realpolitik approach he wishes to pursue would alienate them.

Nevertheless, as is often the case with this unconventional administration, a pattern if not quite a strategy is beginning to emerge—one defined as much by what the president rejects as by what he seeks to accomplish. The administration’s approach looks and often is erratic, but beneath the rants and the posturing Mr. Trump seems to be working toward an approach to the Middle East that reflects the interplay of American politics and interests in a strangely coherent way.

Mr. Trump sounds inconsistent at least in part because his choices are so unappealing. Iran’s Russia-assisted march toward regional dominance leaves the U.S. caught between two courses. Letting Iran have its way in Syria opens the door to a much more dangerous confrontation between Israel and its Arab partners on one side and Tehran on the other. But denying Iran a victory in Syria almost certainly would mean major American military commitments, as well as another extended exercise in nation-building as the U.S. tries to cobble together some kind of viable, nonradical government in Damascus.

Mr. Trump recoils from both choices on both political and policy grounds. Standing back while Russia and Iran run the table in the Middle East would be bad policy and bad politics—but so, too, would rushing into another Iraq-style military and political effort to stabilize Syria. The goal is to avoid bailing out without getting sucked in.

Mr. Trump may be unintentionally arriving at a form of offshore balancing. Rather than seek to impose an order of its own design on the turbulent region, Washington would simply ensure that no other power or group of powers succeeds in dominating the Middle East. When the balance of power appeared secure, the U.S. would have a low profile in the region; but when, as now, the balance appeared to be threatened, the U.S. would be more forward-leaning, working with partners who share its concerns to contain the ambitions of revisionist powers. Mr. Trump also seeks compensation from the countries whose independence America supports; rich allies like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should help pay for their defense.

For Mr. Trump, this is a common-sense approach to a thorny problem, and while the pressures of events—and the united efforts of his advisers—may sometimes cause him to deviate, his inner compass always returns to this course.

Mr. Trump’s approach carries its share of risks, but its failure is by no means assured. Both Russia and Iran are overstretched. They suffer from weak economies and parasitical state structures. Their populations are not in love with their Syrian adventures. Despite recent increases, oil prices remain well below the level they require to fund their ambitious foreign policies while meeting domestic needs. Expanded sanctions against both Russia and Iran are gaining support in Europe. Simultaneously, Arab-Israeli cooperation against Iran continues to gel. A coalition of front-line states, promoted and supported by the United States, may ultimately address the Iran problem in ways no outside power ever could.

The Trump agenda has a real chance of success in the Middle East—but only if the Trump administration can master the dark arts of alliance management. That may seem unlikely, but if there is one thing we have learned about this president, it is that he can be tactically flexible in pursuit of his goals.

[Crafty_Dog]

Superb piece!  Please post in Foreign Policy thread as well.  TY

[DougMacG]

Mohammed Haydar Zammar has been accused of recruiting some of the September 11 hijackers.
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/244655

Kurds keep reminding us who are friends are in the region.

[DougMacG]

Nice synopsis here of the situation, issues and implications.
https://www.hoover.org/research/syria-quagmire

Basically they agree with us.

Non-proliferation is over if Iran goes nuclear, and especially dangerous if they get the land bridge to the Mediterranean.

Old alliances fading, new ones needed.

Chemical weapons treaty dead if not enforced.

Genocide has been legalized.
"Over half a million people have been killed with several million displaced or in refugee flight through the region and beyond, amounting to the most extensive human disaster since the Second World War."

Kurds deserve a state but that invites war on all fronts.

Send a message to the wrongdoers. Tomahawk cruise missiles and carrier-based airstrikes - which we did.

And then back to my NHL referee strategy.  Let the parties fight until the system collapses into exhaustion before stepping in to break it up.  But even that does not stop the refugee crisis that is killing the west.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://israelunwired.com/iranians-killed-in-strike-on-syrian-base/

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran, Russia: After Russia issued a statement calling for the removal of all foreign bases from Syria, Iran said that it rejects Russia’s position and that its bases in Syria are there at the Syrian government’s request. It’s not clear what Russia was hoping to accomplish with its statement. Has it made a deal with Israel or Turkey?

[Crafty_Dog]

 Iran, Russia: What’s at Stake in the Syrian Civil War
May 23, 2018

By Xander Snyder
The era of foreign intervention in Syria is coming to an end – at least that’s what Russian President Vladimir Putin said when Bashar Assad, Syria’s president, visited Sochi last week. Granted, Putin’s statement was ambiguous – “in connection with the significant victories … of the Syrian army … foreign armed forces will be withdrawn from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic” – but Russia’s Syria envoy clarified the next day that Putin was, in fact, calling on all militaries to vacate the country.

Needless to say, this didn’t sit well with Iran, which has been cooperating with Russia in support of the Assad government. Iran rejected Russia’s announcement, insisting that it deployed its military at the behest of the Syrian government. Iran has its own reasons for being in Syria, of course, regardless of what the government in Damascus wants. It means to establish greater command of the Middle East and acquire land access to Lebanon and sea access to the Mediterranean. Even if this territory isn’t under its direct authority, Iran wants to keep Israel and Turkey from encroaching on its borders. In the process, Iran, the de facto leader of Shiite Muslims, hopes to quell Sunni resistance, which, as the Islamic State showed, can be a potent threat.

Russia shares none of these goals with Iran. The two may tactically work toward the same goal – keeping Assad in power – but cooperation between Russia and Iran has always been a marriage of convenience, not a true alliance. Russia needs to prevent any one power from controlling too much of the Middle East. A state that eliminates competition in the Middle East would be able to look north, to the South Caucasus, a critical buffer region for Russia. Any power that can gain a foothold in the South Caucasus threatens the North Caucasus, which, in turn, threatens the Russian heartland. Russia must keep Middle Eastern powers competing against one another if it is to prevent any single actor from cementing a position of strength in the South Caucasus.

Russia and Iran’s interests also diverge on oil. The government in Moscow relies heavily on oil and natural gas revenue, so any increase in the price of oil benefits Russia. Iran has a relatively low fiscal breakeven point for producing oil – it can turn a profit when oil is roughly $55-65 per barrel – so it could afford to produce more to keep prices low. Now that the Iran nuclear deal is all but dead, uncertainty around Iranian production has driven up oil prices, giving Russia a little more breathing room. In other words, sanctions on one U.S. enemy, Iran, benefit another, Russia.

Then there’s Israel, with which Russia has friendly relations. Iran’s expansion has begun to invite attacks from Israel, which objects to having an Iranian presence so close to its northeastern border. While Russia is content to bomb rebels in Syria who have no real way to defend against air attacks, it is far more apprehensive about getting caught up in a war against a country with a powerful military and strong motivations to intervene. Israel’s fight isn’t with Russia, and Russia’s isn’t with Israel. But Russia and Iran’s joint support of Assad nevertheless risks pitting Russia against a country it has no interest in fighting.

(click to enlarge)
This explains why Russian declined to retaliate after Israel attacked Russian anti-aircraft installations controlled by the Syrian military. In fact, Moscow didn’t even mention the incident. Sure, the installations in question were outdated, but the fact that Russia decided against selling Syria a more modern air-defense system, the S-300, a day after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow illustrates Russia’s desire to avoid providing Syria with the capability to damage Israel’s air force.

But for all the geostrategic reasons behind Russia’s intervention in Syria, Moscow also had a far simpler reason for propping up Assad: It needed to show the Russian people that, despite ongoing hardships, Russia had re-emerged as a global power. After 25 years of losing ground to NATO and the West, it needed to prove that it could counter the United States. It needed to test the preparedness of its military, which has undergone a number of reforms since its 2008 war with Georgia. (For Russia, the war was a success, but it exposed some weaknesses in its air force and in its missile capabilities.)

In Syria, a successful show of Russian force requires a victory and an exit strategy. Claiming that the Syrian military is strong enough to fend for itself, thanks largely to Russian assistance, fits with this narrative. It enables Russia to save face despite the fact it has been in Syria months after it declared its mission accomplished.
It’s unclear when, exactly, Moscow intends to withdraw its forces. When it does, Iran will be left with only a few options. It can continue to support Assad by spending more on the Syrian war, and begin to commit its air force, which, compared with Russia’s, is dated and dilapidated. Spending more is a difficult proposition for a country in the throes of protests over economic issues.

Otherwise, Iran could maintain its current level of support of Assad, but if Russia were to withdraw, Iran would be faced with Israel in its south and Turkey, which also has a modern air force, to its north. Without Russia’s backing, rebels, especially those who benefit from Turkish air support, would stand a better chance of retaking territory that they had lost to Assad.

Last, Iran could reduce its presence in Syria and instead focus on gaining greater control of Iraq, which is much closer to home anyway. That, however, presents its own set of challenges, and in any case risks opening up Syrian territory currently serving as buffer space to be taken by Turkey.

Though Russia hasn’t yet left Syria, its departure will put even more pressure on Iran and open the Middle East up to Turkey. Russia just needs a public relations victory. Iran’s battle is existential, and there are no clear paths to exit in sight. Nevertheless, fissures in the Iran-Russia relationship, even if just rhetorical, reflect the weakness of Russia’s position in the Middle East.

The post Iran, Russia: What’s at Stake in the Syrian Civil War appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/06/iraqi-christians-say-trump-administration-not-serious-ally/

Those in Iraq who struggle to restore their ancient homes now that ISIS has been expelled express bitterness about an administration that promised them much.

Mosul, Iraq — It’s not the crushed buildings, open bomb craters, or even the bloodstained floors where the bodies of ISIS fighters have been rotting since the liberation of the Old City of Mosul that shock especially. It is the clumps of beard hair in the ruined churches. ISIS fighters used most of the 45 churches in the old city for shelter, target practice, and torture and, in the case of the Dominican church, as a place to hang their victims from inside the bell tower. As the battles intensified, many fighters shaved off their regulation long beards, which ISIS required of every man in Mosul (all of them were Muslims at that point), fighter or not. Rather like former Nazi troops shedding their uniforms before the approaching Allies, the soldiers of the caliphate thought they would evade capture if they got rid of their facial hair. The clumps were everywhere as we walked through the destroyed churches last week. The many dead bodies of ISIS fighters found in the desecrated churches are evidence that, for some, the barbershop escape plan came too late.

With my traveling companion, Catholic journalist Edward Pentin, I got to within a few miles of Mosul last year as the bombing intensified. We reached the abandoned Christian town of Karemlash. The damage was bad: ISIS had burned many of the houses and rigged them with IEDs, and, of course, desecrated both of the churches — in every church they captured in Iraq, every visible cross or image was defaced.

We made that visit to assess the damage and the possibilities, if any, for the displaced Christian population of the Nineveh Plain to return. People seemed optimistic, if security could be guaranteed and aid were granted, that they would go back and rebuild their houses and their lives.

This time, as we were driven around the Old City last month, getting out and walking gingerly through the rubble, which still concealed bodies and bombs, the Iraqi police general who was guaranteeing our safety kept turning to us and saying, “Mosul very good, yes?” Unfortunately not. The rather sinister fellow in the dark glasses and heavily dyed black hair was attempting to show us that life was back to normal in Mosul, but that is far from the case. The city still has no bishop or priest, and only ten Christian families have returned, from a population of more than 3,000 families in 2014. The Syriac Orthodox archbishop, who has not come back, has reportedly told his people to follow his example.

Across the Nineveh Plain, where Christians trace their roots back to the time of the Apostles, many Christians have returned nonetheless, some to the region’s formerly largest Christian town, Qaraqosh, but only because they are employees of the Iraqi government, which would not pay their salaries otherwise. The people we spoke to, in numerous villages and towns, so optimistic after the defeat of ISIS last year, are now living in a kind of no man’s land. Their houses are slowly being repaired, but there are no jobs, and the security is precarious. Like the many Germans who after World War II took pains to deny, downplay, or deflect any involvement of theirs with the Nazis, the Christians’ neighbors in Mosul today, who stole their houses and welcomed the ISIS fighters warmly, would now have us believe that they were only putting on a show of support, to protect themselves. Perhaps the barbershop strategy works.

“We are so weak,” one priest told me, “and no one in the West will protect us.” It’s not only the danger that ISIS sleepers and supporters could reemerge. Christians are also caught in the escalating tensions between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish desire for independence. The Shabak, a Shia group, is now surrounding the formerly Christian town of Bartella, buying houses and changing the demography of the area. The whole Nineveh Plain is now called “the disputed territories.”

“Disputed by who?” a parish priest experiencing the pressures of demographic change said to me. “We have always lived here. Show me the Kurdish cemeteries, if they claim this is their land.”

    One senior cleric in Iraq told me wearily that it might be better to stop holding conferences full of beautiful words and to start taking action to alleviate the crisis.

The despair becomes most palpable when the conversation turns to the question of U.S. assistance, or the dearth thereof,. During the 2016 presidential election, candidate Donald Trump made much of his support for persecuted Christians throughout the world. I was in Iraq before the election and again last March, not long after Trump took office. Every person we met, priest or layperson, supported Trump, loathed Obama, and believed good things were coming. Now, they say, it was all talk, empty words.

In May 2017, Vice President Pence declared that the defense of persecuted Christians would be a “foreign-policy priority” for the administration: “America will support these people in their hour of need.” Last October, to great acclaim from many Christian groups, he announced that the U.S. would bypass the United Nations and direct funds through faith-based groups and USAID (United States Agency for International Development). That aid has yet to appear. Obama holdovers, sources tell me, are directing funds to “dialogue programs” on the Nineveh Plain. It is unlikely that people who lost their homes, whose churches were used for torture, and whose dead were exhumed and decapitated are ready for teatime diplomacy.

–– ADVERTISEMENT ––
Comments   

Meanwhile, the number of Middle Eastern Christians admitted to the United States in 2017 dropped, because of the administration’s restrictions on immigration from various Muslim-majority countries. One senior cleric in Iraq told me wearily that it might be better to stop holding conferences full of beautiful words and to start taking action to alleviate the crisis.

Even amid the broken buildings and crushed bodies in Mosul, and in every town we visited, we brought a smile, and sometimes laughter, to the battered Christians there when we mentioned how ISIS fighters who returned to Europe were being received there. Rehabilitation, jobs, and apartments for the jihadis. For the persecuted Christians, not so much. Such grim amusement is about the only kind available to them these days.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/help-is-on-the-way-for-middle-eastern-christians-1528931329


By Mark Green
June 13, 2018 7:08 p.m. ET
32 COMMENTS

When Islamic State captured the Iraqi town of Telskuf four years ago this week, terrorists desecrated the local Chaldean Catholic church and beheaded congregants on the altar. The slaughter was only one episode from the genocide ISIS waged on Christians and other vulnerable religious groups across its so-called caliphate, nearly exterminating some of the region’s most ancient faith communities.

The U.S. stands with the persecuted religious and ethnic communities of the Middle East. And the federal government won’t rest until these oppressed people receive the help they need to thrive again. That’s the message I will deliver personally to Christian and Yazidi leaders when I visit Iraq this month. On behalf of President Trump, I will assure them that American assistance will soon turn from an inconsistent trickle into a steady stream.

President Trump already has directed U.S. armed forces to finish the fight against the ISIS barbarians, and today the group no longer holds territory in Iraq. But as Vice President Pence said at this year’s religious broadcasters convention, “Victory in combat is only half the battle.” The president directed his administration last October to end its support for United Nations programs that fail to provide aid for every group in need. Now, the U.S. Agency for International Development, which I lead, is charged with providing more effective and direct support to persecuted religious and ethnic minorities.

Four days after Vice President Pence announced the shift, I directed USAID to develop aid projects that address the challenges facing Christians, Yazidis and other minority groups in the region. To this end, USAID has redirected more than $60 million in humanitarian and stabilization assistance to provide infrastructure support and lifesaving aid in Northern Iraq. The money has helped rebuild schools, hospitals, power stations and wells, and eased the transition of those returning home.

In too many cases, however, assistance has taken too long to arrive. We have yet to reach many of the communities with the greatest need. Decisions made by the previous administration, such as an overreliance on the U.N. and an inadequate appreciation for the work accomplished by faith-based organizations, have proved hard to overcome. And the often rigid processes of federal bureaucracy have slowed implementation further.

At the direction of the president and vice president, USAID is now redoubling its effort to swiftly deliver and distribute the aid that Iraq’s persecuted religious communities desperately need. The delays must end, and they will.

Every day of delay brings persecuted communities that much closer to extinction. In Iraq alone, nearly 90% of Christians have fled in the past 15 years, emptying entire villages that had stood for more than a thousand years. The Yazidi population has been similarly decimated. Without immediate additional support, these groups may be forced to continue their unprecedented exodus, perhaps never to return to their ancient homes.

After my visit to Iraq, I will present President Trump with a comprehensive assessment of any roadblocks that prevented the speedy distribution of aid. I also will provide a detailed plan to expedite the delivery of crucial assistance to the most vulnerable communities.

Congress also has a crucial role to play. A more flexible budget and eased regulations would make USAID more effective in fulfilling its mission. And organizations across the federal government must continue working with Iraq to increase its order and stability, which are essential to the delivery of American aid.

The time to act is now. Christians, Yazidis and other persecuted religious communities in the Middle East have suffered unspeakable harm for too long. Their plight has touched the hearts of the American people and stirred this nation to step up with compassion and conviction. President Trump promised to provide them with the help they need to rebuild their communities and restore their hope, and we will work tirelessly to break down any barrier that stands in the way.

The ancient faith communities in Iraq and across the Middle East are counting on us. We will not let them down.

Mr. Green is USAID administrator.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.breitbart.com/jerusalem/2018/06/27/caroline-glick-trump-putin-syria/

[Crafty_Dog]

Note the last two lines here!

http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/air-raids-hit-more-syrian-towns-knock-out-hospitals-%E2%80%94-monitor

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/syrian-refugees-fear-conscription-prevents-return-home

https://israelunwired.com/syrian-refugees-running-to-israeli-border-fleeing-brutal-assad-attacks-on-daraa/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://israelunwired.com/israel-strikes-syrian-targets-as-iranian-general-warns-israel-of-islamic-army-in-syria-waiting-to-destroy-israel/

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia's Iraq War

Russia is showing signs of mission creep in Syria.


In September 2015, Russia began a military campaign to support the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria. Russia had a number of goals for the campaign: to crush the Islamic State, preserve a key ally in the Middle East and appear strong to the Russian public. But nearly three years later, the war continues, and Russia hasn’t found a way out of it. As jihadist groups in the country appear to be weakening, Russia’s motivations for staying in Syria are shifting. It wants to establish a regional balance of power and ensure that, when the civil war subsides, it still has ways to limit the reach of its historical adversaries – mainly Turkey but also Iran. Assad will play a role in this, but it is looking ever more likely that the Syrian Kurds will as well.

Iran and Russia’s Diverging Interests

Russia’s position in Syria is inevitably affected by another stalwart Assad ally, Iran. With substantial influence over the regimes in Iraq and Syria and its support for Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran has a formidable presence throughout the Middle East. This threatens to disrupt the balance of power that Russia wants to see in the region. But Iran is facing pressure at home, with the unraveling of the nuclear deal and protests since January over the struggling currency and deteriorating economic conditions. And even though they support the same side in Syria, Iran’s losses could be Russia’s gains. U.S. sanctions on Iran, set to take effect in early August, could give Moscow a larger share of the international oil market. Though sanctions could limit Iran’s capacity to support Assad due to declining finances, the Syrian regime’s military needs are likely to change anyway, from offensive to defensive capabilities, as it shifts its focus from retaking territory to holding territory. The need for Iranian support, therefore, may become less critical than it once was.


 

(click to enlarge)


The remaining pockets of anti-Assad resistance are in the southwestern province of Daraa and the northern province of Idlib. Even if Iranian support diminishes, Russia is prepared to offer Assad air support in these battles because it can’t risk letting the regime fall and having jihadists retake large swaths of Syria – and possibly encouraging jihadists in parts of Russia. A smaller Iranian presence could also make Assad more dependent on Russia and, therefore, more likely to act in Russia’s interests.

Pushing Back Against Turkey

Once Assad retakes Daraa and Idlib, which we expect he will do, he will then turn his attention to semi-autonomous, Kurdish-controlled parts of northeastern Syria. Russia’s role in this fight will be more complicated. Russia has a long history of supporting and working with Kurdish groups throughout the Middle East. It has at different times supported autonomy for Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria and even advocated for a Kurdish republic in Iran during the Cold War. (Of course, this was when Iran was still a U.S. ally.)

And Russia has another reason to support the Kurds in Syria: They could give Moscow a way to push back against Turkey and Iran in another key region, the Caucasus. Turkey designated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, a terrorist organization, and it sees the group as its most immediate security threat. Aligning with Kurdish groups would give Russia leverage over Turkey and Iran, both of which have the power to destabilize the South Caucasus along Russia’s southern border. Russia, Iran and Turkey have all fought for control over the Caucasus. Most recently, in the early 1990s, Turkey and Russia nearly confronted each other directly in the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

When Armenia threatened to invade Nakhchivan (an exclave of Azerbaijan surrounded by Armenia, Iran and Turkey), Turkey sent thousands of troops to the Armenian border to deter the invasion. Russia responded by sending thousands of its own troops to the other side of the Turkish-Armenian border. Then Russia went a step further, proposing the establishment of an exiled Kurdish parliament in Russia. Turkey responded by throwing its support behind Chechen insurgents in Russia. In 2005, the two countries agreed to stop supporting insurgent groups in each other’s territory, but it’s clear from this example that Turkey is a threat to Russia in the Caucasus.

Russia, then, could use the Syrian Kurds to keep Turkey in check. In theory, the same goal could also be accomplished through a unified, Assad-controlled Syria – which was Russia’s strategy in the Cold War. But this has some drawbacks. If Assad were to take full control of Syria, he’d have greater independence of action, and thus could refuse Russian requests to push back against the Turks. But if Kurdish groups in the north retained a semi-autonomous state with Russian support, these groups would be beholden to Moscow, and Assad would have to risk a confrontation with Russia to dislodge them, a maneuver he likely wouldn’t try.

The People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which is the main Kurdish group in Syria, has been supported primarily by the United States, but Russia has provided air cover to the YPG in certain anti-Islamic State operations and has been open to including the YPG in peace talks. What could lead the YPG to lean closer to Russia? The answer might be Manbij, the city that was held by the Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the YPG is the main constituent part, after the group defeated IS there. The U.S. repeatedly insisted that SDF fighters in Manbij were under American protection, and that it would not withdraw from the area. But it nonetheless agreed to leave the region in June, or at least reduce its presence there, after Turkey threatened to sever relations with the United States. The YPG subsequently said its advisers left the town. Currently, Turkey and the U.S. are conducting patrols around Manbij that the U.S. claims are “independently coordinated.”

The remaining SDF forces in northern and eastern Syria are now likely wondering what will happen when they, too, are no longer strategically useful to the United States. Washington still needs to maintain good relations with Ankara, in part to maintain access to Incirlik air base. As the U.S. continues to look for a way out of Syria, Russia will quietly step up cooperation with or support of the YPG so that it is well-positioned in the event of a complete American withdrawal.

Why, though, did the U.S. abandon the SDF in Manbij? America’s interests in Syria are narrower than Russia’s. The U.S. wants to eliminate the Islamic State, and while IS hasn’t disappeared altogether, it has lost almost all the territory it held in the Middle East. As the U.S. reassesses its global commitments, it will be increasingly inclined to limit its presence in Syria – and, therefore, its support of the SDF – if it appears that regional actors are capable of keeping IS in check. This is what the YPG fears, and what Russia is waiting for.

Naval Assets in Syria

We can’t talk about Russian interests in Syria without mentioning the naval base at Tartus. The base is in a strategic location on the coast of the Mediterranean. But it has some disadvantages. Based on a 2016 agreement with Syria, Russia is allowed to dock only 11 warships there, limiting the amount of force it can project from that location. Russia also faces supply problems. It can supply the base by sea either through the Black Sea via the Bosporus (which is controlled by Turkey); through the Atlantic Ocean via the Strait of Gibraltar (which is controlled by Britain); or through the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal (which is controlled by Egypt). Russia could also supply Tartus by air, but this would be costly and would limit the number of supplies it could send. In late 2017, Russia announced that it will be making the Russian Hmeimim air base in Latakia province a permanent installation. Hmeimim is only about 40 miles (65 kilometers) north of Tartus and directly accessible via the M1 highway, which runs parallel to Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

A naval base south of the Bosporus that’s allowed to dock a limited number of ships and faces supply challenges provides a small boost to Russia’s power projection capabilities but wouldn’t be a huge help if Turkey were to close the Bosporus and cut off Russian access to the Mediterranean. Still, having naval assets on both sides of the Bosporus is strategically valuable, especially considering that the Bosporus played a key role in the Russo-Turkish wars of the 18th and 19th centuries, as the Russian Empire grew more powerful and sought greater access to the rest of the world.

Like most things in the Middle East, Russian interests in Syria are complicated – which explains why Russia is showing signs of mission creep there. Its goal has gone from propping up the Assad regime to establishing a balance of power in the Middle East. This is where most foreign powers go wrong: Russia in Afghanistan, or the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia could easily get bogged down in a conflict it can’t control. The question now is whether Russia could handle the type of quagmire that the U.S. faced in Iraq. Time will tell.

[Crafty_Dog]

 




Is Southern Syria Heading For 'Lebanonization'?
by Jonathan Spyer
Jerusalem Post
July 12, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/is-southern-syria-heading-for-lebanonization
The raid on the T4 base at Tiyas in southern Syria this week was, according to global media reports, the third such action by Israeli air power against this facility in the course of 2018. It is the latest move in an apparently ongoing campaign to prevent the entrenchment and consolidation (these are the words favored by Israeli officials) of the Iranian military infrastructure in Syria.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime is moving into the final stages of its offensive against the rebellion in Deraa province. Evidence has emerged of the presence of Iran-supported Shia militias among the forces operating on behalf of the regime in Deraa. The two forces whose commanders were photographed in the area are Liwa al-Zulfiqar and the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade.
Haidar al-Jubouri, Zulfiqar’s commander, was photographed in the operations room of the Syrian Arab Army’s 4th Division in Deraa. Commanders of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, meanwhile, were seen in the area of Tafas. Notably, the latter individuals were pictured in Syrian Army uniform and in conversation with Russian officers.

A number of Israeli commentators this week downplayed the significance of these revelations.

They argued that the apparently minor and limited presence of the Shia militias in the Deraa offensive was testimony to the success of Israeli diplomatic efforts to impress upon the Russians the importance of limiting the Iranian presence in the offensives in southwestern Syria.

The Israeli concern is not primarily with Deraa.

Rather, Jerusalem is watching carefully to see which forces will be involved in the regime’s advance on Quneitra province, adjoining the Israeli-controlled part of the Golan.
If the Quneitra offensive involves a mix of forces similar to that in Deraa, this will enable officials to claim that Russian pressure is working, while presumably restating Israel’s determination to continue efforts to expel Iran from Syria in its entirety.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said this week that “the fact Iranian forces are present in Syria at all is unacceptable, and we will act against any Iranian consolidation in the area.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, met this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prior to the meeting, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement reiterating that “Israel will not tolerate a military presence by Iran or its proxies anywhere in Syria and that Syria must strictly abide by the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement.”

So Israel makes clear its determination that Iran should quit Syria in its entirety, acts against specific Iranian targets, and appears to ignore or downplay those elements of the Iranian presence against which air action would have more limited or problematic application (such as pro-Iranian units integrated into the Syrian Army).
The Iranians, meanwhile, appear at present to be absorbing the blows with little apparent attempt at response, while maintaining their overall presence in Syria.

Where may all this be headed? First of all, it is important to understand the nature and dimensions of the Iranian project in Syria.

Iran’s deep alliance with Assad’s Syria goes back to the first days of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to Hafez Assad’s support of Tehran in the Iran-Iraq War. Over the past seven years of civil war, however, the nature of the relationship has changed. Iranian provision of manpower and organization of paramilitary forces have been essential to the regime’s survival.

Tehran has invested upward of $30 billion in Syria. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has also recruited young Syrians into locally based IRGC-associated paramilitary groups (Quwaat al-Ridha, 313 battalion) and, of course, brought its paramilitary proxies onto Syrian soil, along with IRGC personnel.

This is a major, far-reaching process, resembling in its key particulars parallel projects in Lebanon and Iraq. The intention is to establish political-military structures that will serve to enable the projection of Iranian power over the long term. The Iranian expertise in this area is without parallel in the region. As a result of this approach, Tehran now dominates Lebanon and has the upper hand in Iraq. Assad’s Syria, which has an openly dictatorial system, is a different political context, of course, but the evidence suggests that the Iranians are digging in to stay.

Will the Russians act as the lever for the removal of this Iranian project? This appears to be the hope of Israeli policy-makers. But the facts would appear to indicate that Russia has neither the will, nor even the ability, to achieve this objective.

Regarding the former, on July 4, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described US and Israeli demands for a complete Iranian withdrawal as “completely unrealistic.”

The Iranian pro-regime media is full of fear and speculation at the prospect of Russian betrayal. The Russian agenda in Syria does not directly parallel that of the Iranians (Moscow seeks good relations with all interested parties, the better to make itself the essential arbiter). But Moscow also has no interest in seeing the Iranians humiliated or their project reversed, particularly because they remain essential to the viability of Assad’s regime.

In any case, the Russian intervention in Syria has been predicated on a modest ground presence.

It is thus not clear by which mechanism Russia could seek to induce such a withdrawal, even if it wished to.

So the Iranian project in Syria is likely to continue, and Iranian- associated forces in one guise or another are likely in the period ahead to be operating close to the border with Israel. Israel, meanwhile, is likely to maintain its intelligence domination across Syria, and to continue periodically to strike at Iranian and Iranian-associated targets, in order to build deterrence and prevent the consolidation of weapons systems and deployments.

Does this sound familiar? It ought to. It is in its essentials the situation that pertains in south Lebanon and (in a far less threatening way) the Gaza Strip.

What we see here is a contest between two systems with entirely different areas of expertise. The Iranians excel in establishing and utilizing political and paramilitary clients to build power within regional spaces. They are, however, sharply deficient in conventional military skills. Israel, meanwhile, is outstanding in the fields of air warfare and intelligence, and seeks to avoid being sucked into involvement in the complex and cutthroat world of proxy warfare within Arab societies (the now soon-to-beabandoned cooperation with the rebels of Quneitra represented only a partial exception to this rule).

The likely emergent picture in Syria, as in Lebanon, is therefore the ongoing consolidation of another IRGC project, in the framework of a weakened and truncated Arab state, along with an ongoing Israeli effort to deter the masters of this project from acts of aggression, or to confine such acts to the realm of rhetoric.

Such a state of affairs is, by its nature, precarious and potentially combustible. At the same time, the Israeli system has shown considerable skill in recent years precisely in the management of comparable situations.
Jonathan Spyer is a fellow at the Middle East Forum and a research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies.
Related Topics:  Iran, Syria  |  Jonathan Spyer

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

In Syria, the Harder Fight Is in the North


The south has been mostly retaken. But danger lurks in Idlib.


Even as the Syrian government hoists its flag over the newly reconquered southern city of Daraa, its offensive in the southwest continues. The remaining pockets of rebel resistance are growing smaller. With the continued support of Russia and Iran, Bashar Assad will almost certainly retake the last holdouts there as well.

The only thing that complicates the offensive is Israel. Israel has been adamant that it will not tolerate Iranian or Hezbollah positions too close to its border – in fact, it will attack Iranian supply lines far from its border, as it did last month when it struck Syria’s border with Iraq near Abu Kemal. More recently, on July 15, Israel launched another strike near the Nayrab airport, close to Aleppo. Though some reports identified the target as a Syrian government installation, others claimed it was a logistics site used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – a more plausible explanation, considering Israel has always said its fight is with Iran, not Assad.

Neither Iran, Syria nor Russia want to draw Israel into the fight in southern Syria – they all want Assad to reassert control there. And that’s why they will (largely) leave it to Assad’s army to reclaim it. It’s a difficult balance to strike, since Iran still has an imperative to expand its influence westward toward the Mediterranean. Hence the reports of pro-Iran militias, including Iraq-based Popular Mobilization Forces, roaming the areas disguised in Syrian army uniforms. Still, the threat from Israel will limit Iran’s involvement in the south.

Bigger difficulties lay to the north in Idlib, which, unlike the south, has a large Turkish presence. Turkish conventional armed forces are stationed there, and they support a network of proxy groups composed of rebel factions of the Free Syrian Army, which were instrumental in the taking of Afrin. (Estimates vary, but as many as 25,000 fighters were believed to have been rerouted from Idlib to participate in the Afrin offensive.)



 

(click to enlarge)


Now, Afrin is mostly subdued. The Peoples’ Protection Units, dominated by the Kurds and considered a terrorist group by Turkey, is withdrawing from Manbij. Turkey is busy learning how to administer a conquered region. So while some FSA fighters will remain in Afrin and Manbij, more will be free to return to Idlib, where those fleeing the south will likely regroup, their flight made all the more easy by the cease-fires Moscow has been brokering while the Syrian military retook the south. In other words, when Assad finally consolidates control over the south, he will then have to face as many as 40,000 fighters in Idlib. That’s not even counting the Turkish military, which doesn’t want Syrian forces roaming around on its turf.

And when Assad faces these much larger forces in Idlib, he will probably do so without Russian air support. Moscow has no interest in starting a war with Turkey, and if the Russian air force were to support an Assad offensive in Idlib, the opportunity for direct clashes between Russian forces and Turkish forces (or their respective proxies) would be high.

In theory, Turkey and Russia could arrange a deal whereby Russia attacked only rebel positions in Idlib that are not allied with Turkey. In practice, neither side would be willing to take the risk. Indeed, in recent days Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin, during which he warned that targeting civilians in Idlib could destroy the spirit of the Astana accord. An anonymous Turkish official echoed the statement, saying Idlib was a “red line” for Turkey. Russia will likely cite the de-escalation agreement from 2017 as a reason to recuse itself from the offensive. Assad may have to simply accept a more permanent Turkish presence in his country.

After all, Turkey hasn’t spent the past two years establishing itself in northwest Syria just to give it up. It has an imperative to acquire greater strategic depth in the region, to meet what it considers a Kurdish terrorist threat along its borders and to insulate itself from Iran. Turkey has even begun issuing identification cards for people in northern Syria and is working to establish new systems of governance over the areas it has conquered. Retaking Idlib would require Assad to do something he has not yet had to face throughout the course of the entire Syrian civil war: risk state-to-state war – with a more powerful country to boot.

What happens in Idlib will, to a large extent, depend on Russia. Propping up Assad currently serves Russia’s interest, but Moscow doesn’t need Assad to retake the entire country for its interests to be satisfied. In fact, Russia benefits when Syria is divided between Syrian and Kurdish forces in the north. If those divisions enable Russia to maintain a semi-autonomous Kurdish presence in the north – which it could use against Turkey when convenient – then there’s really no reason for Russia to risk war with Turkey now. There aren’t enough benefits, and the costs are too great.

[Crafty_Dog]

Russian officials have been exceedingly busy with the Middle East. A high-level Russian delegation traveled to Lebanon on July 26 to discuss developments in Syria. From there, the delegation went to Turkey on July 27 to hold talks on the same subject. Back in Moscow, Russia hosted Palestinian intelligence officials on July 27 and discussed “growing tensions” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – at least according to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. On Monday, Russia is hosting Iranian and Turkish officials in Sochi for so-called Astana-3 talks. If prior gatherings are any indication, they will agree to next steps with great fanfare and then ignore those agreements on the ground. In any event, Russia is highly active right now in the Middle East and may be accelerating a push for some kind of diplomatic solution to its Syria quagmire.

Turkish-U.S. relations, meanwhile, continue to founder. While U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis attempted to pour cold water on potential U.S. sanctions against Turkey by citing continued military cooperation between the two sides, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan turned the heat back up, accusing the U.S. of psychological warfare and insisting that if the U.S. did not change its tune, it would “lose a sincere and strong partner.” The two most pressing issues right now are a dispute over the imprisonment of an American pastor in Turkey (and Turkey’s long-running demand for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, whom Ankara accuses of plotting an attempted coup in 2016) and the threat of sanctions from the U.S. if Turkey continues buying natural gas from Iran – which Erdogan says Turkey has no intention of stopping. These are superficial issues, but they highlight a widening divergence between U.S. and Turkish strategic views of the Middle East – a far more important development than U.S. wishful thinking on the emergence of an Arab NATO to combat Iran.

[DougMacG]

GPF:  "widening divergence between U.S. and Turkish strategic views of the Middle East – a far more important development than U.S. wishful thinking on the emergence of an Arab NATO to combat Iran"


The importance of Turkey I recognize but don't fully appreciate.  There is value in that relationship but they have been an unreliable ally, if an ally any more at all. The coalition that includes Israel and Arab nations like Saudi to contain Iran I consider to be a very promising development, not wishful thinking.

[Crafty_Dog]

Turkey, Russia, Iran and Syria may be settling on a common enemy in Idlib. On Tuesday, following a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hinted at an agreement to cooperate against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an al-Qaida-linked group formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra. With the Islamic State largely defeated in Syria, Lavrov said, HTS is now the main target.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reiterated that jihadist rebels and more moderate opposition groups in Idlib need to be separated, and that province-wide bombing by Syrian forces would lead to catastrophe. Turkey’s support against any effort to isolate HTS would be key, given that HTS has served as something of a Turkish proxy in Syria in the past (though its ties with Ankara have always been strained) and that Russia is seeking to head off a confrontation with Turkey as Syrian President Bashar Assad prepares an offensive to retake Idlib province, the only remaining rebel-held province in Syria. Lavrov also said the U.S. is standing in the way of further progress against the group.

Meanwhile, activists say airstrikes and shelling of targets in Idlib by Assad’s forces has reached its most intense level since Russia, Turkey and Iran agreed to set up a de-escalation zone in the province last year. And Turkish media reported that the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, is now keen to work with Assad in Idlib, with thousands of fighters moving to Aleppo in recent weeks to take part in the impending offensive.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/head-of-syrian-intelligences-palestine-department-assassinated-report/amp/?__twitter_impression=true

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/the-future-of-eastern-syria-and-the-israeli-intere?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=7095080c15-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_08_17_08_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-7095080c15-33691909

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump Administration Implements MEF Plan to Sideline UNRWA
News from the Middle East Forum
August 31, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/trump-administration-implements-mef-plan-to-disman
PHILADELPHIA – August 31, 2018 – In announcing today an immediate end to all U.S. government funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the Trump administration has adopted one of the Middle East Forum’s signature policy prescriptions.

The U.S. taxpayer contributed $364 million in 2017, about one-third of the total UNRWA budget, almost triple the European Union contribution and by far the most from any single UNRWA donor.

At the State Department’s request, the Forum on Aug. 8 provided it with a detailed plan to dismantle UNRWA – a refugee agency that perversely sees its mandate as creating ever-more refugees.  Today’s announcement takes a first step toward that end.

The second step should be for the US government to divert funds to local partners on the ground via direct relationships with hospitals, clinics, schools, municipalities, micro-financing programs, vocational capacity building initiatives, infrastructure managers, social service providers, and others.

The third step will be to end U.S. recognition of the fake Palestine refugees. In 1950, UNRWA counted 625,000 Palestine refugees; today it counts 5.3 million of them. MEF estimates that actual Palestine refugees – those who fled in 1948-49, did not take on a nationality, and do not live in the West Bank or Gaza – number about 20,000. That means that over 99 percent of UNRWA-recognized Palestine refugees do not fit the definition of refugee according to the U.S. government. UNRWA’s unique definition nourishes Palestinian irredentism and terrorism, renders diplomacy futile, and creates regional instability. MEF advises treating the 99 percent as needy people deserving of assistance, not as refugees.

Key advantages of this three-step plan include: ending the creation of new Palestine refugees, limiting UNRWA’s anti-Israel propaganda, and encouraging the constructive development of a Palestinian polity, economy, culture, and society.

MEF efforts to change U.S. policy began in 2010, when it worked closely with then-Sen. Mark Kirk (Republican of Illinois) to require the State Department to issue a report detailing how many individuals currently considered Palestine refugees fit the U.S. government definition of a refugee, and how many are currently supported by U.S. aid. That led to passage of the “Kirk Amendment” in 2012.

MEF has also worked with Representatives Chris Stewart (Republican of Utah), Kay Granger (Republican of Texas), Chuck Fleishmann (Republican of Tennessee) and Ann Wagner (Republican of Missouri) toward ending Palestinian refugee proliferation; and is currently working with Congressman Doug Lamborn (Republican of Colorado) and Senator James Lankford (Republican of Oklahoma) on legislative initiatives addressing the topic in-depth.
_____
 
The Middle East Forum promotes American interests and works to protect Western civilization from the threat of Islamism.

For immediate release
For more information, contact:
Gregg Roman, Director
Roman@MEForum.org
+1-215-546-5406 ext. 104
Related Topics:  Arab-Israel conflict & diplomacy, Arab-Israeli debate in the U.S., Hamas, Palestinians, US policy 

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

After seven years of conflict, the future of the Syrian civil war may come down to the battle for Idlib. Syrian leader Bashar Assad has already taken back control of much of the country, and this northwestern province is the last remaining rebel stronghold.

But taking back Idlib won’t be easy. In fact, it’ll be harder and more complicated than many of the other recent campaigns in the south for two reasons. First, it is a much larger region than the areas in the south, such as Daraa, Eastern Ghouta and Quneitra, that the Syrian army seized in recent months. It is, therefore, also more heavily populated with rebels, in part because many of the cease-fires brokered by Russia in the south allowed rebels safe passage out of these areas and into Idlib. Second, Turkey has a military presence in Idlib. This complicates the situation for all parties involved because Turkey and the Syrian regime have conflicting interests in this region. Russia supports the regime but doesn’t want to go to war with Turkey, a country with which it needs to maintain good relations. For this reason, the Syrians are afraid the Russians may abandon them. Meanwhile, Turkey wants room to maneuver in relation to the U.S., and having hostile relations with Russia would limit its options.

A battle over Idlib would therefore pose a threat to all parties involved in the conflict. In the wider power struggle among countries in this war, Idlib may be little more than a distraction, but it’s a dangerous one. Winning a military battle here may cost far more than anyone is prepared to pay. This Deep Dive will consider another option: a deal among these countries to oust the rebel group that controls much of the province. All of these parties have an interest in eliminating this group – one of the most extreme in Idlib – and so it’s the one area where they can cooperate. They may not get everything they want out of such a deal, but they will all benefit in some way. And at this point, that may be the best they can hope for.

The Battle for Idlib

In early 2015, Assad looked to be losing the Syrian war. Russia, one of Syria’s key allies, couldn’t let that happen, and later that year it decided to join the fray to keep Assad in power. Its intervention, especially its air support for Syrian troops on the ground, began to turn the tide in Assad’s favor. Now, after having retaken much of the south, Assad is setting his sights on Idlib.

He’ll likely try to enlist the help of Moscow, but for Russia, Idlib has little consequence. Sure, taking back the province would be a big victory for the Syrian regime, but even with Idlib under its rule, there will still be areas of rebel-held territory in the north controlled by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. But for Turkey, the province has substantial strategic significance. Ankara sees it as a place from which it can launch attacks against Syrian Kurdish groups, including the People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which it considers a terrorist organization. Turkey also sees Idlib as a buffer area, positioned as it is on the Turkey-Syria border, from where it can limit refugee flows, which have been a growing problem for Ankara. Turkey has therefore been fortifying its “observation posts” – military outposts sanctioned by the Astana accords in late 2017 – with anti-air defenses and concrete walls, and building hospitals and a helicopter field.

Russia knows that attacking Turkish positions in Idlib will be seen as an act of war against Ankara, which it wants to avoid. Turkey is a regional power and a NATO member, and an assault on Turkish forces may draw in other NATO members in Ankara’s defense. This would unite Turkey and the West just when cracks in the relationship between Ankara and Washington are growing. (Although, if NATO were to refuse to intervene on Turkey’s behalf, that would deepen the divide in the alliance.) Even an attack on Turkish proxies would likely push Turkey closer to the West. Russia, therefore, is looking for a way out of this quagmire.

Currently, much of Idlib is controlled by one group: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. HTS arrived on the scene in July 2017, roughly three months before Turkey’s military entered Idlib. At that time, Turkey had already been cooperating with militias there, including, most importantly, Ahrar al-Sham, which effectively controlled Idlib prior to July 2017. But a split in Ahrar al-Sham started to grow between two factions: pragmatists, who wanted to establish an Islamist party that could gain international legitimacy and even seek support from the West, and hard-liners, whose approach was more akin to al-Qaida’s and who wanted to establish an Islamic state. This division weakened Ahrar al-Sham and gave HTS (and its spinoff, Hurras al-Din) an opening.

HTS is the product of a merger between al-Qaida’s Syria affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and several other rebel groups. Jabhat al-Nusra wanted to establish an Islamic caliphate and was among the most ideologically rigid groups active in Syria at the time. HTS was thus able to attract hard-liners from other groups, including Ahrar al-Sham. The two groups became fierce enemies as HTS’ power in Idlib grew and Ahrar al-Sham’s faded. The leader of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, publicly declared the group’s independence from al-Qaida, and in May 2017, al-Qaida announced it had severed all ties with HTS.


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When Turkey was preparing to enter Idlib, it had two options: try to crush HTS by force, or cooperate with a staunch rival of its main proxy in the province. Turkey chose the latter. It was a partnership born of necessity – one that Turkey would rather not have made, all things being equal. But its focus at the time was on establishing a presence along the Turkey-Syria border that would enable it to exert pressure on the YPG and manage cross-border refugee flows.

But now, Turkey has a stronger hand to play. It invaded Afrin – a province in northwest Syria that was controlled by the YPG – in January 2018 and through this conquest now has command over a significant piece of Syrian territory in the north. It can thus turn its attention to HTS, a militia group that it never really trusted and couldn’t control.

Turkey has since established relations with other rebel groups in Idlib. In February, what remained of Ahrar al-Sham joined forces with another group called Nour al-Din al-Zenki to form the Syrian Liberation Front, which was meant to balance HTS’ presence in Idlib. HTS began launching attacks on the SLF, and for three months, the two fought for control of the province. Given Turkey’s ties with Ahrar al-Sham and its distrust of HTS, Turkey likely encouraged the formation of SLF to either counterbalance HTS, weaken it or, at least, figure out where HTS forces were most strongly positioned.

In July, Turkey helped form the National Liberation Front, a coalition of rebel groups in Idlib that included the SLF. Estimates suggest the NLF has some 85,000-100,000 militants. Turkey reportedly invited HTS to join the NLF, but it refused, proving that Ankara still couldn’t control the group. HTS continues to attack Syrian army positions around Idlib – which could provoke Assad into launching an assault on the province. Turkey would rather not face off against the Syrian regime there, but it can’t stop HTS from attacking regime forces in southern Idlib and northern Hama. Partnering with HTS may have helped Turkey in the short term, but if Assad were to invade Idlib, it could prove costly in the long term.

What a Deal Would Look Like

Idlib is one place where all the parties involved in the war have a common interest: They all want HTS gone. So what would a deal among these countries look like? One of the more likely scenarios is that they would agree – either formally or informally – to join forces to eliminate the group from the province. After HTS is forced out, Turkey would be allowed to remain in the province but would cede portions of southern Idlib – where HTS has a strong presence – to the Assad regime. Russia would support Assad in southern Idlib but would stop short of providing air support to any offensive that risks bringing it into direct confrontation with Turkey. Turkey would be allowed to stay, so long as it could control its proxies and keep them from attacking the Syrian regime. In effect, this would amount to a semi-permanent territorial acquisition by Turkey, even if no party would be willing to admit as much.

In such a scenario, Turkey would end up administering portions of Idlib and Afrin, and in exchange, it would protect these areas from the Syrian regime, which would have to put up a much more powerful offensive than it did in the south if it wanted to challenge Turkey and its proxies. Insurgent groups that disobeyed Turkey and continued to attack the regime would either be forced out of Idlib by Turkey’s proxies or, should they leave Idlib to continue the assault on the Syrian army, be dealt with by Assad.

This arrangement would lead to a greater balance of power between the principal players in the broader war and possibly even a respite in the fighting. It may not be a permanent solution, but it could usher in the next phase of the conflict. Why would each of these parties agree to cooperate to get rid of HTS?

Turkey
Turkey would prefer not to have to deal with HTS at all. The group is unpredictable and could threaten its position in Idlib. HTS’ forces are concentrated in southern Idlib, so a deal would likely require Turkey to withdraw from that part of the province, which would then be controlled by the Syrian army, with Russia’s support. In other parts of Idlib where Turkey has a presence, it would be up to Turkish proxies to eliminate the remaining HTS forces.

But it’s hard to imagine that Turkey would withdraw from Idlib entirely. Its primary concern remains the YPG in the north, and it wouldn’t want problems in Idlib to threaten its position in Afrin. Ceding Idlib to the Syrian regime would leave Turkey exposed and the Turkish province of Hatay vulnerable to massive refugee flows that would result from a regime offensive. It would also give the momentum in the conflict to the regime, which could then focus on taking back the Kurdish-held territories. This would be unacceptable to Turkey, since it would lose the ability to keep military pressure on the YPG in Syria. A full withdrawal from Idlib could lead to a full withdrawal from northern Syria, and at that point, Turkey would have to trust the Syrian regime to control the Kurdish population in the north in a way that’s consistent with Turkey’s interests. Turkey therefore is more likely to stand its ground in northern Idlib with the help of its proxies.


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Turkey’s Proxies
Turkey’s proxies are also eager to get rid of HTS. The group’s approach has resulted in conflict and division among other rebel groups that would rather focus on their battle against Assad. They’re concerned that the lack of unity against the regime could create a power vacuum, which could be filled by the Islamic State.

The groups that make up the NLF would cooperate with a deal that focuses first on dismantling HTS, but they wouldn’t want to be held back from continuing their fight against Assad. Some of these groups could choose to break off from the NLF, but they would do so at the risk of being targeted by Turkey, Turkey’s proxies and the Syrian government. The other pro-Turkey groups that choose to abide by the deal would accept Turkey’s control of the region in exchange for protection from regime forces. These forces could then bide their time, waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of a potential dissolution of the agreement.

Syrian Regime
Assad likely wouldn’t feel completely comfortable with a deal that leaves a fairly large area protected by Turkey. But he would nonetheless be inclined to accept it since it would eliminate arguably the least controllable and most extreme rebel group remaining in Idlib, and would probably help him retake more territory in southern Idlib. For Assad, it’s a step in the right direction.

Even absent a deal, Assad is unlikely to launch an assault on the province for three reasons. First, he couldn’t rely on Russian air support in the areas where Turkey is entrenched. Second, he would have to confront a far greater number of militants there than he did in battles in southern Syria, making the fight bloodier, costlier and far less predictable. This is partly because the deals brokered by Russia in the south allowed rebels to flee and guaranteed their safe passage to Idlib in exchange for handing over territory to Assad. In many of the areas Assad retook, he didn’t actually eliminate the militants fighting against him; they simply relocated to another part of the country. Third, and relatedly, even though Assad has recently reconsolidated his hold over large portions of the country, a substantial segment of his army isn’t capable of carrying out offensive operations, since it’s mainly used for garrison duties. This means that the heavy casualties the Syrian army is likely to incur will be among Assad’s most experienced and well-trained contingents – which may encourage rebels to challenge the regime in other territories, knowing its resources will be stretched to the limit. It is safer for Assad to accept the presence of Turkish forces and their proxies, for now, while he rebuilds his country and secures his prior conquests. Assad could benefit from a period of stability to refortify his military.

Russia
Russia would also support a deal on Idlib because it would bring Assad one step closer to securing rule over the entire country. But Russia doesn’t actually need Assad to control all of Syria. On the contrary, Russia is more than happy to play the role of broker for the various entities fighting each other in Syria – most notably, Turkey, Assad, the Syrian Kurds and Iran. Letting Turkey keep a chunk of Syria under its control would constrain Iran in Syria and limit its expansionist aims throughout the region. Russia has an interest in preventing a regional hegemon from emerging in the Middle East that could also set its sights on the Caucasus, which would threaten Russia more directly.

A deal that would at least temporarily end hostilities would also bring Russia closer to being able to claim some sort of victory in Syria. The last thing Russia wants right now is for Assad to drag it into a confrontation with Turkey that would end the gradual warming of relations between Moscow and Ankara, and push Turkey into cozying up to the West. A Russia-backed offensive in Idlib could do just that.

The U.S.
The United States’ involvement in Idlib has been limited, but it would welcome the defeat of an al-Qaida-linked group there. Signing on to a deal that would allow Turkey a more permanent presence in Idlib could also help smooth over relations between Washington and Ankara, which have been strained of late. It would also limit Assad’s reach and ensure that, for now at least, he doesn’t have complete control over all of Syria.

How the Deal Could Break Down

A deal to eliminate HTC would, therefore, be in the interest of all these parties. But it could break down in two ways.

The first would be through insurgent groups’ refusal to accept Turkish control. Even rebels that are part of the Turkey-backed NLF may grow tired of the status quo and want to break from the coalition to continue fighting Assad. Weakening Turkey’s hold over the coalition would require a substantial number of rebels to leave the NLF at once. But if it were to happen, Assad would have to respond regardless of whether he would have Russian air support. Moscow would prefer to stay out of it, but even if it did offer Assad some assistance, it would be limited and wouldn’t target Turkish positions directly.

Over time, this could result in a gradual withdrawal of Turkey from other areas of northern Idlib, as the weakening of its proxies would force it to either increase its own military involvement or retreat back to Afrin. Turkey would be insistent on standing its ground in Afrin and Manbij, but its ability to devote additional manpower and resources anywhere in Syria would be, like Iran’s, partially contingent on its economic situation back home, which is currently in flux.

The second possible breakdown would involve Assad making moves to take back control of Idlib. This would, however, largely depend on how much support the regime could count on from its other stalwart ally, Iran. Given the recent instability in Iran, especially with the looming imposition of more sanctions in November and talks in the U.S. to sever Iran from the SWIFT banking network, it’s difficult to predict how involved it will be in Syria and where it will concentrate its efforts. It won’t pull out of the war completely – it couldn’t take the risk of Assad’s regime collapsing – but if massive protests, similar to those that erupted at the beginning of this year, flare up again, it may be forced to reduce its spending on adventures abroad and instead invest in keeping its own economy running.

In this case, it would have limited leverage in Idlib. It would be in favor of eliminating rebel groups that challenge Assad’s power, and so would support a deal to get rid of HTS, though Shiite-majority Iran wouldn’t welcome the ongoing presence of Sunni-majority Turkey in Syria. Nevertheless, Iran doesn’t want to push Turkey further into the Western orbit – in part for its own economic reasons. The chances that Turkey will continue to purchase natural gas from Iran even after November are stronger now that ties between Washington and Ankara have frayed. (Indeed, Turkey would be loath to have to depend more on Russia for natural gas than it currently does, so it has an interest in buying energy from other suppliers.)

If Iran reverses course and becomes stronger than it is now, however, it may after some time encourage Assad to take more aggressive action in Idlib regardless of Turkey’s presence there. Iran’s goal would be to eliminate the Sunni insurgent groups in Syria that can challenge its own position in the country. This scenario would also bring Turkey and Iran closer to confrontation, which we have predicted will happen at some point.

For now, though, the most likely next phase in Idlib and the Syrian civil war is a concerted effort to eliminate HTS (and its offshoots like Hurras al-Din), and an acceptance of a more permanent Turkish presence in northwest Syria. A solution to the struggle over this pocket of the country is less important than the relations among the big players in this war. It would therefore have to involve some sort of balance among them, perhaps with intermittent and indecisive small-scale combat but without a full-blooded attempt to win.
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[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jns.org/satellite-images-indicate-iran-is-building-another-missile-site-in-syria/?utm_source=IVN&utm_medium=email

https://israelunwired.com/iranian-casualties-in-apparent-israeli-airstrike-on-syrian-airforce-base/

[Crafty_Dog]

Erdoğan's Dilemma
by Jonathan Spyer
Jerusalem Post
August 30, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/beyond-the-lines-erdogan-s-dilemma
Syrian regime and Russian forces are preparing for an offensive into Idlib province in northwest Syria. The attack on Idlib is set to mark the final major action in the war between the Assad regime and the insurgency against it.

Moscow has moved 10 warships and two submarines into the waters off the western coast of Syria. This represents the largest concentration of Russian naval forces since the beginning of Moscow’s direct intervention in the civil war in Syria in September 2015.

The regime, meanwhile, is dispatching ground forces from further south, as its forces complete a recent offensive against Islamic State fighters in the Sweida area.

Idlib is set to form the final chapter in a Russian-led strategy that commenced nearly three years ago. According to this approach, rebel-controlled areas were first bombed and shelled into submission and then offered the chance to “reconcile” – that is, surrender to the regime. As part of this process, those fighters who did not wish to surrender were given the option of being transported with their weapons to rebel-held Idlib.

This approach was useful for the regime side. It allowed the avoidance of costly last-stand battles by the rebels. It also contained within it the expectation that a final battle against the most determined elements of the insurgency would need to take place, once there was nowhere for these fighters to be redirected. That time is now near.

There are around 70,000 rebel fighters inside Idlib. The dominant factions among them are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (the renamed Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda franchise in Syria) and the newly formed, Turkish-supported Jaish al-Watani (National Army), which brings together a number of smaller rebel groups.

The presence of the Turkish-supported Jaish al-Watani among the Idlib rebels reflects the complex, broader political/diplomatic situation surrounding the upcoming Idlib offensive. The offensive will not mark the end of conflict in Syria. Rather, once Idlib is returned to the regime, the dynamic in Syria will conclusively shift – from one at least partially led by autonomous political-military organizations, to one entirely directed from above by sundry state interests, which make use of various militia groups as proxies.

As this dynamic emerges, it represents a particular dilemma for Turkey. Ankara in the early stages of the war abandoned a burgeoning relationship with the Assad regime to throw its full weight behind the Sunni Arab rebellion. It saw the insurgency (correctly) as one of a number of conservative Sunni Arab movements then sweeping the Middle East. The AKP government envisaged itself as the natural patron and leader of these movements. Unfortunately for the Turks, the Sunni Islamist wave was brief and has left little permanent imprint on the region.

With the entry of the Russians onto the Syrian battlefield, and the decision by the US not to offer major support to the rebels, the insurgency lost any hope of defeating the Assad regime.

Turkey then transferred its focus in Syria to two areas: preventing the Kurdish area of control in the northeast from extending across the 900-km. Syrian-Turkish border in its entirety, and, slightly more nebulously, preventing the complete defeat and destruction of the rebels, which if allowed to happen would represent a humiliating failure for the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The first goal was achieved in two stages: in August 2016, in Operation Euphrates Shield, the Turks established an area of control in northern Syria from Jarabulus to Azaz, leaving the Kurdish Afrin canton isolated. In January 2018, in the creatively named Operation Olive Branch, they then destroyed and occupied Afrin, thus creating an area of exclusive Turkish control, stretching from Jarabulus to Jandaris in the Aleppo Governorate.

The second goal appeared for a while to be progressing in a satisfactory way. The Turks have invested in administration and education in their area of control in northwest Syria. Signs in Turkish, Turkish-trained police, Turkish administration in schools and hospitals are all features of the “Euphrates Shield Zone.” The authorities there have even issued new ID cards for residents of the area, marked with the opposition flag and translation in Arabic and Turkish. The formation of the Jaish al-Watani forms a key element of this effort.

But this project is placed into question by the prospect of the regime offensive in Idlib. There are 3.5 million civilians in the province. Turkey fears the possibility that this offensive could generate a new rush of refugees for Turkey’s borders or into the Euphrates Shield Zone. Also, given Assad’s determination to reconquer Syria in its entirety, a successful Idlib offensive will surely be followed by pressure on the Turks to quit this zone. It would at that point constitute the last remaining barrier to Assad’s full reincorporation of northwest Syria.

But for Turkey to quit this area would be to accept the final and total eclipse of the Sunni Arab cause, and the clear and humiliating total defeat of Turkey’s aims. To do so while the PKK-associated Kurds retain a large de facto area of control east of the Euphrates would represent a double defeat.

Turkey is currently engaged in diplomacy to forestall this possibility. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu last week warned against a military operation in Idlib, saying it would be a disaster. Cavusoglu, notably, was speaking to reporters in Moscow, after meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.

Russia is key here. A notional Moscow-brokered truce has been in place in Latakia, Idlib and Hama provinces for the last three weeks. But it is subject to daily violations by regime forces and seems likely to go the way of previous Russian-brokered agreements in other parts of Syria which preceded regime and Russian assaults.

Erdogan is due to travel to Iran on September 7, to meet with presidents Putin and Rouhani. The future of northwest Syria is set to dominate the discussions.

Why is the Russian position pivotal? Iran, of course, supports the reunification of Syria by the regime. Turkey clearly prefers the status quo. Russia, meanwhile, has broader interests. On the one hand, it is in alliance with the regime and Iran. On the other, Moscow has a clear interest in drawing the government in Ankara further away from its fraying connections with the US. Offering Turkey at least part of what it wants in northern Syria would be useful in this regard but would have a cost for Moscow’s relations with its allies. It is probable that Putin will seek some face-saving formula for Turkey. But the dilemma showcases the fragility of Russia’s current stance as the supreme arbiter in Syria, enjoying positive relations with all forces.

Erdogan will be seeking in Tehran to use the Russian desire to draw him away from NATO, and perhaps Iranian hopes that Ankara may act as an oil-sanctions buster for Iran after November, to salvage something of Ankara’s project in Syria.

As the Syrian revolution goes down to military defeat, the great game of the presidents and the diplomats over the ruins of the country is moving into high gear.
 
Jonathan Spyer is a Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies.
  
Related Topics:  Russia/Soviet Union, Syria, Turkey and Turks  |  Jonathan Spyer
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Also see:

https://www.westernjournal.com/ct/trump-nikki-haley-ratchet-pressure-syria-issue-warning-military-action/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=AE&utm_campaign=can&utm_content=2018-09-04

[Crafty_Dog]

https://clarionproject.org/us-tracks-elaborate-scheme-by-iran/

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump’s Syria Moment
The looming massacre in Idlib shows the lack of U.S. leverage.
49 Comments
By The Editorial Board
Sept. 4, 2018 7:29 p.m. ET


What happens in Syria rarely stays there, as Barack Obama learned the hard way and Donald Trump is now discovering. Bashar Assad’s forces and his Iranian and Russian allies are preparing an assault on Idlib province, the last major opposition redoubt, and the attack is putting Mr. Trump’s lack of a Syria strategy in sharp relief.

The White House issued a statement Tuesday warning against “a reckless escalation of an already tragic conflict.” The press secretary also warned against another use of chemical weapons, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, worried about a “humanitarian catastrophe” in Idlib. “We don’t see any way that significant military operations are going to be beneficial to the people of Syria,” Gen. Dunford said.

This is all well meaning, but it’s the kind of diplomatic pleading that John Kerry and Mr. Obama were famous for in Syria, and we know how that worked. Amid these U.S. entreaties, Russia began air strikes around Idlib on Tuesday and a Kremlin spokesman promised to finish the job “unconditionally.”

Mr. Trump has dined out politically on his two air strikes responding to Mr. Assad’s use of chemical weapons, but those pinprick attacks didn’t change the underlying reality in the conflict: Mr. Assad, Russia and Iran are on their way to controlling Syria in the post-civil war, post-Islamic State era. This axis of opportunism allowed the U.S. and Kurds to roll up ISIS in Syria’s northeast while the axis focused on wiping out opposition strongholds.

Mr. Trump’s impulse has been to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria once its stronghold in Raqqa was liberated, but he is slowly figuring out that this has damaging strategic consequences for U.S. interests.

One problem is that it lets Iran turn Syria into another forward operating base on Israel’s border. National Security Adviser John Bolton has been demanding that Iran leave Syria, and seeking Russia’s help in the effort. But Iran and Russia respond to power, not pleading, and they’ve heard Mr. Trump announce many times that he wants out of Syria.

Meanwhile, Turkey, Russia and Iran are meeting later this week in Tehran to decide on their next steps in Syria. The Turks want a buffer zone in the north from refugees, as well as some assurance that Kurdish separatists won’t be allowed to operate from Syria. Russia wants to be seen as having assured the victory of its client, Mr. Assad, while retaining air and naval bases. Iran wants to be Mr. Assad’s puppet-master.

Mr. Obama left Mr. Trump with a mess in Syria, but in 20 months the President has done little to alter the balance of forces. Mr. Trump seems content to issue tweets about Idlib, but Mr. Assad and his allies won’t stop there. Their next target will be the Kurds and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), America’s main ground partners, who are working with U.S. special forces in Syria east of the Euphrates River.

The danger is that the Kurds and SDF will begin to negotiate a cease-fire to save themselves from becoming the next Idlib. Then U.S. forces would be isolated in Syria and a withdrawal would be inevitable. Iran will own the place, despite Mr. Trump’s speeches about containing its regional aggression.

The U.S. needs to reassure the Kurds and SDF that it will protect them if they’re attacked while working out a longer-term strategy that raises the price for Iranian intervention. An Obama-style retreat from Syria will not end well for U.S. interests.

Appeared in the September 5, 2018, print edition.

[Crafty_Dog]

Turkey has allocated more money to Syria – despite its economic problems at home. The government in Ankara plans to provide funds for training programs for young Syrians in areas it currently controls. It also said it would compensate the families of rebels who have died fighting for Turkey in Afrin. These are bald attempts to generate goodwill among the people Turkey now finds itself governing. It’s not the behavior of a country that intends to leave anytime soon.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://mailchi.mp/0c4afe6887c0/what-the-battle-for-idlib-really-comes-down-to?e=8f1f2f26d2

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/clashes-between-kurds-and-syrian-army-troops-leave-18-dead

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/us-marines-conduct-large-drills-rebels-southern-syria

[Crafty_Dog]

By George Friedman

Creating an Arab NATO

It is hard to imagine an Arab alliance that can cohere as a military giant.


The United States has announced plans to hold a summit in January to launch what’s being called an Arab NATO, officially the Middle East Strategic Alliance. On the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting last week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held preliminary talks with the other main countries involved – namely, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council plus Egypt and Jordan – to discuss the summit. The idea has been batted around before, but for the first time, the U.S. president is planning to preside over a meeting intended to discuss its creation. The story didn’t receive much coverage last week, with other stories monopolizing the press, but in other times, it would have dominated the news.

In the past, the idea of an Arab NATO was motivated by a desire to unite Arab nations against jihadists. Political realities delayed its creation, but this time around, it’s being motivated by the expansion of Iranian influence, which poses an existential threat to Arab states. Iran already has a dominant position in Iraq, substantial influence in Syria and Lebanon, and is supporting Shiites fighting in Yemen. And though its economy is under extreme pressure, particularly with the addition of U.S. sanctions, Iran would become a more direct threat to Arab regimes, if only it could consolidate its position. Iran’s interest in the Arab world is to guarantee its own security and, as important, to gain control of Persian Gulf and Arab oil. It's a distant threat, but distant threats should be addressed early rather than later. Hence the meeting between the leaders of the future Arab NATO.


 
(click to enlarge)


In creating the invitation list, however, the summit hit its first snag. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are deeply hostile to Qatar. Qatar is close to Iran geographically and in policy. Given the direction the winds are blowing, cozying up to Iran was prudent. For the Saudis and the UAE, it was a betrayal. This and undoubtedly other less visible issues triggered a diplomatic crisis last year, when a Saudi-led group formed a blockade against Qatar. The U.S. position seems to be that including Qatar – which hosts U.S. bases – would protect Doha and shift it away from Iran.

This is one of the virtues of an Arab NATO. It would bring Arab nations together and lock them into place, just as NATO did in Europe. It would start as a defensive platform, providing military, economic and political support to limit Iranian influence. Later, it could take on an offensive role, reversing Iranian gains in the region.

There are several questions still unanswered. Would the alliance include a collective defense clause, similar to NATO’s Article 5, stating that if one member is attacked, all the others must take action? Would the United States make such a commitment? Would it have a command structure with forces from each country committed to war plans, as NATO does?

It also poses some strategic questions. If this alliance actually works, then the Arabs go from being a divided and mutually hostile people to a united and potentially powerful entity. There’s a very real chance this could threaten both Turkey and Israel. Since both countries have large militaries, this could wind up, in the worst case, as an Arab power surrounded by non-Arab powers (Israel, Turkey and Iran). That would make quite a battle.

I am likely looking too far in the future of an organization that doesn’t yet exist and is still struggling over what to do with Qatar. It is hard to imagine an Arab alliance that can cohere as a military giant. But in geopolitics, imagination is a more powerful tool than common sense, since history constantly confounds common sense. The likelihood of this alliance surviving and growing powerful is small, but it is not impossible. If it happens, it could change the region, threaten other powers, and generate conflict.

[Crafty_Dog]

Highlights

    The United States is expanding its goal in Syria to include the full withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria and the replacement of the current government in Damascus.
    A more assertive U.S. approach to the Syrian government and the Iranian presence in Syria is bound to lead to more friction between Moscow and Washington.
    Concerns about possible chemical weapons and refugees involved in an offensive in Idlib further limit the potential for the United States and Russia to reach an understanding.

The United States is expanding its goal in Syria to include the full withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria and the replacement of the current government in Damascus. A more assertive U.S. approach to the Syrian government and the Iranian presence in Syria is bound to lead to more friction between Moscow and Washington. Concerns about possible chemical weapons and refugees involved in an offensive in Idlib further limit the potential for the United States and Russia to reach an understanding.
The Big Picture

Syria is a major battleground that has drawn in countries near and far. It currently remains a center of competition between the United States and Russia, as both nations pursue their own interests. And in terms of progress – or lack thereof – on cooperation, Syria serves as an indicator of the overall direction of the U.S.-Russia relationship.
See 2018 Fourth-Quarter Forecast
See Middle East and North Africa section of the 2018 Fourth-Quarter Forecast

Specifically, the United States is now striving for the full withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria and a transition from the current government in Damascus to one more acceptable to Washington. This is not the first time the United States has significantly altered its goals in Syria. At various points during the Syrian Civil War, the country has vacillated between two policies: one of actively working against the Syrian regime and one of focusing strictly on the defeat of violent extremist groups. This latest shift, however, will firmly dash any prospect of significant cooperation with Russia in the country. Moscow has taken an expansive approach to preserving its gains in Syria by establishing an equilibrium in the country – and that effort requires working with the U.S. government in a way that lends legitimacy to the Syrian government. Thus, a more aggressive U.S. approach to the Syrian government and Iran's presence in the country is bound to lead to more friction.

Complicating the dynamic between the United States and Russia in the country is the imminent Syrian loyalist offensive in Idlib province. Ever since the United States ended its CIA program to arm rebel forces in Syria last year, the United States has had very little influence or presence in Idlib. Still, two factors could drive a bigger U.S. response to the offensive on the province. The first is the threat of yet another massive spillover of refugees into Turkey – and from there, into Europe. Approximately 3 million more refugees could attempt to flee significant loyalist operations around Idlib, and the threat of this massive influx has not only strengthened Turkey’s resolve to oppose such an offensive but also elicited warnings from the United States and its European allies.
A map showing the current areas of control in the Syrian Civil War

The second factor is the potential use of chemical weapons by Syrian government forces. On numerous occasions, Damascus has resorted to the use of chemical weapons, including nerve agents, in its efforts to regain territory. And in two instances, this has prompted U.S.-led punitive military strikes. According to U.S. officials who have cited intelligence reports, Syrian President Bashar al Assad has approved the use of chlorine gas in the upcoming military operations in Idlib, The Wall Street Journal reported Sept. 9. While U.S. officials have said nothing about nerve agents (which has been a clear American red line), even the use of chlorine on a large scale would likely draw another U.S. punitive strike. Such a response is especially likely due to the high visibility of the Idlib situation and Washington's multiple warnings about chemical weapons use. Beyond the risky prospect that the strikes could escalate the conflict (particularly given the Russian and Iranian presence in the country), they would also make it more difficult for the United States and Russia to cooperate on a shared plan in Syria.

Russia's recent threats over the Al-Tanf garrison, an area in eastern Syria where the United States maintains a small number of troops alongside rebel forces, are one indicator of the deteriorating relationship between the two major powers. According to U.S. officials, the Russians have twice threatened to conduct military operations in the area over the last 10 days, prompting the U.S. military to warn against any such move and deploy Marine reinforcements to the area.

Unless Russia or the United States makes a significant miscalculation or causes a severe accident, it is unlikely that either will escalate their dispute in Syria to the point of active hostilities. After all, neither power is willing to run the risk of sparking a wider war over Syria. Still, the significant differences that are coming to the fore as the United States takes a more assertive stance on Iran and al Assad ensure that Moscow’s hopes of an agreement with Washington on Syria will not bear fruit.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/israel-s-war-with-iran-is-inevitable?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=11b9fe85c8-INBAR_CAMPAIGN_2018_10_08_10_06&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-11b9fe85c8-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-11b9fe85c8-33691909

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran's Imploding Strategy
by Jonathan Spyer
Jerusalem Post
October 05, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/iran-s-imploding-strategy
Originally published under the headline "The logic behind Iranian moves in the Middle East."

The effort by the US and its allies to contain and ultimately roll back the gains made by Iran in the region over the last half decade is currently taking shape, and is set to form the central strategic process in the Middle East in the period now opening up.

[Crafty_Dog]

The world retains its ability to surprise , , ,

Remember all those predictions when President Trump moved our embassy to Jerusalem?

.
Israel and Oman. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Oman on Friday with a high-profile delegation that included his national security adviser, the Mossad chief and the director general of the Foreign Ministry. The trip appears to have been a success. On Saturday, Oman’s foreign minister said that it might be time for Israel “to be treated the same” as other states in the region and that the U.S. is helping broker a “deal of the century” to put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas paid a visit of his own to Oman just a few days earlier.) From its strategically invaluable location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, Oman has long been a (mostly) nonaligned country, a position that enables to it to play a quiet role as mediator in the region’s many disputes. Perhaps more notable was the reaction by other states in the region. At a summit attended by U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, the foreign ministers of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia said they supported the meeting and the broader peace process. The show of support subtly reveals the real target of all this diplomatic maneuvering – Iran, whose foreign minister criticized the meeting, and which Israel blamed for rocket attacks from Gaza on Friday night.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://clarionproject.org/khashoggo-affiar-derail-arab-nato/

[Crafty_Dog]

A quick update on Syria. It was a busy weekend for the beleaguered country. Syrian warplanes struck rebel territory in Idlib province for the first time since Russia and Turkey agreed to create a buffer zone in September, according to activists. In Aleppo, more than 100 people were injured in a suspected gas attack on Saturday. Syria and Russia blamed the rebels, and Moscow launched airstrikes on rebel positions following the attack. Meanwhile, the United States has started building five observation posts on the Syria-Turkey border, despite opposition from Ankara. Major clashes between Islamic State militants and U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in eastern Syria killed dozens of civilians and fighters. The defense ministers of Turkey and Russia held talks on Syria on Sunday. Clearly, they had a lot to talk about.

Honorable Mentions

    Saudi crude oil production hit an all-time high in November – 11.2 million barrels per day, according to Bloomberg.

[ccp]

Honorable Mentions

    Saudi crude oil production hit an all-time high in November – 11.2 million barrels per day, according to Bloomberg

maybe a deal made by Trump in return for ignoring the kashoggi murder

CNn could be honest and explain why it would have been better for 330 million people to pay more at the gas pump because of this one Bin Ladin lover .

Not defending his murder but which outweighs which.  If brock was still the Prez he would have lectured the Saudis for the cameras holding his chin high up in the air with a stern look then do nothing about say something about a red line - and the media would have fawned all over him !

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/is-the-trump-administration-pivoting-the-fight-in-syria-toward-a-war-with-iran?mbid=nl_Daily%20112618&CNDID=50142053&utm_source=nl&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20112618&utm_content=&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=Daily%20112618&hasha=52f016547a40edbdd6de69b8a7728bbf&hashb=e02b3c0e6e0f3888e0288d6e52a57eccde1bfd75&spMailingID=14683457&spUserID=MjAxODUyNTc2OTUwS0&spJobID=1522011946&spReportId=MTUyMjAxMTk0NgS2