Australia’s Role in America’s War With China
By: Jacek Bartosiak
March 3rd, 2021
Australia’s Role in America’s War With ChinaJacek BartosiakMarch 3rd, 2021Analysis
In U.S. plans for a war with China, Australia serves as a base for peripheral operations in the Indian Ocean and in the Indonesian Straits.
Of course, there are voices in the Antipodes against America’s use of Australia in a war, but for now the Australian government stands firmly with Washington. It is therefore quite possible for Canberra to participate in a war with China, should it ever come to that.
Strengths and Weaknesses
A sea state whose navy is weaker than that of the enemy may try indirect methods – peripheral raids or military campaigns far from the conflict’s center of gravity and the enemy. The ability of a maritime state to “wait” in conflict and disperse the continental state’s power through the horizontal expansion of the theater of operations is a significant advantage for the U.S. and Australia over China – one that will fade as the Chinese achieve the status and capabilities of a maritime power.
Perhaps this should be the overall strategy of both countries in a potential war with China: an attack on distant communication lines. The Chinese economy is very sensitive to the smooth, free and timely flow of goods and merchandise by sea, the lion’s share of which flow from Africa and the Middle East across the Indian Ocean.
A division of tasks is also possible. The U.S. Navy would operate in the Western Pacific, and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), somewhat in the rear, would carry out diversions on the periphery of the Indian Ocean, taking advantage of the convenient geographic location of its west coast. The RAN would have to strike against China’s naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, operating from Gwadar in Pakistan, in order to eliminate the enemy’s naval forces at the beginning of the conflict. The Indian Ocean is, from the point of view of military geography, larger than the Western Pacific, and has no advanced counter-combat structures like the South China Sea or the Western Pacific. In the future, however, the northern part of the ocean will become more frequented by enemy forces and infiltrated by its reconnaissance, making RAN operations difficult.
At the same time, analysts in Australia realize that in the event of a war with China, Australia will not be able to count on quick and adequate military aid and supplies. The planning leaves no doubt: The conflict will last many months, if not years, and will involve a great effort by the U.S. to replenish its own weapons and ammunition, especially precision ammunition, so the allies’ needs will be served on stretched communication lines threatened by intersection from China.
The greatest challenge to any operation in the Indian Ocean is its sheer size. There are 1,864 nautical miles between the Australian ports of Perth and Darwin. Another 3,266 nautical miles lie between Perth and the U.S. base at Diego Garcia. The conventional Australian submarine fleet will find it difficult to maintain more than one or two ships in the war area on longer patrols in the Indonesian archipelago, much less far out in the Indian Ocean.
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Nuclear submarines are much more operational in the Indian Ocean. Australia does not have them, so in the Indian Ocean, it will have to rely on the air force, including long-range unmanned patrol systems. Fleet Base West (HMAS Stirling), in Perth, is conveniently located for the operation of U.S. Navy nuclear submarines and would be the third in the Indian Ocean theater of war alongside Guam and Diego Garcia. (It is also possible to build a small spare port for submarines in the Cocos Islands near Indonesia, after the lagoon is partially drained, which would also improve the logistics of the allies during the conflict.)
An Indispensable Ally
Essentially a continent-sized island, Australia lies on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific routes and is the southern anchor of the entire Indo-Pacific operational area, which is fundamental to the United States. In recent years, U.S. and global attention has shifted east toward Asia, and Australia – a distant continent during the defining conflicts of the 20th century – has found itself near the center of the strategic contest between the world’s two largest powers. For the U.S., Australia and their alliance became a priority. It could become America’s most closely allied relationship in the 21st century.
At the same time, for Australia itself, China is a major trading partner. China buys huge amounts of natural resources from Australia, in particular iron ore and natural gas, but also agricultural produce. As a result, the previously poorer Western Australia is growing rapidly. In 2013, China accounted for 35 percent of the country’s exports, double the share from just five years earlier. Australia is more economically dependent on China than it ever was on the United Kingdom, not to mention the United States.
For two decades, the Australian economy has grown every year, despite the 2008-09 financial crisis. It is the only developed country to achieve such a result. According to analysts, only South Korea is more dependent on fluctuations in Chinese markets. Mandarin is Australia’s second most important language, and Chinese tourists spent more money there than tourists from any other country before the pandemic.
From the point of view of military geography, Australia is located at the junction of the Pacific and Indian oceans and has an ideal location that allows control over the sea and air communication routes connecting both waters. Due to its location and its modern infrastructure and strategic depth, determined by the vastness of the territory, Australia is an indispensable ally for the United States.
The United States, wishing to dominate the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean militarily, will have to use Australian bases, ports and airports, provide logistics, train and rotate units, and maintain military stocks and equipment repair centers. Australia is an excellent base for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, by both sea and air. Its proximity to the Indonesian and South Asian “bottlenecks,” the main arteries of world trade, enables it to exercise operational control over the Sunda and Lombok straits. Australia is also a great base for all operations in the Indian Ocean and for the control of Asian countries’ sea routes from resource bases in Africa and the Persian Gulf.
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Until recently, U.S. domination in the waters surrounding Australia was stabilizing and comfortable. Australia could trade with whomever it wished in Asia, benefiting from the military and political protection of American power. When, after Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit in 2005, the head of the Australian Foreign Ministry described the alliance treaty with the U.S. as merely “symbolic,” it led to genuine panic in Washington. The Chinese believed that Australia could play a role similar to that of France in Europe (in the Western camp, but with a distance to the United States). Economic relations with China flourished in the following years, but the Australian government chose to strengthen its political ties with the U.S.
This decision met with criticism from many analytical centers and business circles in Australia, which were of the opinion that a position should not be taken directly on the American side in the impending conflict for domination in this area of the world.
Australia is familiar with the strategic dilemmas related to the rise of an Asian power, particularly when Australia depends for its security on a weakening and departing power. Beginning in 1921 and with the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese naval treaties, the Australians began to fear Japan and stopped believing that their geographic remoteness kept them safe. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Australia did not openly condemn the aggressors’ actions and avoided confrontation. Australian politicians feared a Japanese invasion and doubted British guarantees, including the ability of the British navy to come from a base in Singapore to aid Australia. They also did not believe that the United States would be able to provide significant assistance in the event of a war with Japan. Regardless of these sentiments, Australia benefited greatly from trade with Japan and recorded a positive trade balance with that country, very similar to the current Chinese case.
The Rivalry Moves Closer
Australia’s military role in a possible war with China is closely related to where a possible conflict would take place. If it erupted far away in Northeast Asia or around Taiwan, Australia would not be able to make a significant contribution, but it could provide key logistical and base facilities as well as reconnaissance and intelligence services for U.S. forces, especially in the event of the destruction of U.S. infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of the conflict.
In the event of a conflict in the South China Sea, Australia’s role would be huge, given the proximity to its ports and infrastructure, including military airports. Then, most likely, Australian forces would assist in launching strikes against Chinese forces in order to prevent the capture of strategic locations around the Indonesian islands and straits, and to try to gain control and access to key maritime crossings in the Indonesian archipelago to protect the traffic of ships and allied warships while destroying Chinese communications.
However, it is likely that in the coming years and decades, the strategic U.S.-China rivalry will gradually move to the Indian Ocean. There will be competition if China builds a real ocean fleet and finally gets access to the ports it is building in the Indian Ocean basin (in Gwadar, Djibouti, Ceylon, the Seychelles, Kenya and East Africa). Especially if China tries to control the lines of communication from the Persian Gulf, Africa and Europe, crucial to keeping the Asian economies alive, Chinese bases in the region will be a threat to Australia. In connection with the above, the basic roles for the Australian armed forces in a possible future war can be distinguished: providing strategic depth, operation of the submarine fleet, reconnaissance tasks and force projection into the Indonesian Straits.
An Important Advantage
Australia’s most important advantage is its strategic depth, far as it is from the Asian mainland. As U.S. bases in the Western Pacific become more vulnerable to destruction by Chinese attacks, including missile strikes, Australia will play a larger and more important role as a technically well-developed logistics center and sanctuary free from enemy combat.
China’s growing reliance on missiles would indeed make Australia, which is outside China’s effective combat range, very attractive for allied air operations. And while Chinese submarines may threaten Australia’s communication lines and targets, it is likely that most of the Chinese submarine fleet will be occupied with more important matters within the second island chain. However, Chinese subs could be expected to conduct mining operations and missile attacks on ports and coastal infrastructure, and Chinese special forces may be secretly deployed to sabotage operations at military bases in northern Australia. To defend against these threats, Australia needs to strengthen coastal surveillance and security procedures around bases, ammunition and fuel depots.
China's Perspective
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In that sense, Chinese forays in the north would resemble the Japanese sabotage operations in Sydney and Newcastle during World War II – operations that were psychologically effective but ultimately irrelevant to the outcome of the conflict.
Moreover, distance and maritime geography mean that Chinese conventional submarines would have a hard time in the shallow waters to the north and east of Australia. They would have to surface frequently, and their noisy nuclear subs would be easily tracked by the well-equipped Australian coastal listening stations. The United States could help with its long-range reconnaissance, nuclear submarines and strike aviation operating from Australia.
Currently, Washington’s bomber aviation and submarine fleet rely heavily on a small number of bases in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. In the Western Pacific, the main base is Guam, located 1,800 nautical miles off the coast of China. Guam may soon be within range of Chinese ballistic missiles and is already within range of submarine-fired maneuvering missiles and aircraft. U.S. aircraft are also stationed in the Indian Ocean, on the British island of Diego Garcia, 3,900 nautical miles away from China. A significant distance means an extension of the time of arrival to the place of conflict, which significantly limits combat capabilities by shortening the time of effective patrolling and reducing the weight of the combat load.
Australia, on the other hand, provides the U.S. with a relatively safe sanctuary for air operations beyond the reach of Chinese forces. The airbases in the sparsely populated Northern Territory, Cape York, Queensland and Western Australia lie approximately 2,700 miles from the Taiwan Strait and “only” 1,700 nautical miles from the South China Sea. In addition, Australia has islands in the Indian Ocean. The runway on the Cocos Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean is even closer – 700 miles to the narrow straits of Sunda and Lombok. From the military port of Stirling, the distance to the South China Sea is comparable to the distance from Guam. The use of the naval port in Stirling by U.S. nuclear submarines significantly diversifies the deployment of U.S. forces in theatre while enhancing operational accessibility both in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf. Unlike Guam, all of these locations are beyond the reach of conventional Chinese missile forces, including those in development.
Added Benefits
Notably, air bases in northeastern Australia increase the strategic mobility of the United States, especially in terms of reconnaissance and performance of tasks by long-range strike aviation and for tanker aircraft, which will be crucial given the vast expanses of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Of course, fuel storage facilities would be essential in this regard. Tanker planes will be needed to provide an air bridge for tactical aviation operating over the South China Sea and for bombers operating from Diego Garcia. Australia currently has only one squadron of airplanes stationed in Tindal, in the north of the country. The Darwin base is the only one in the north of the country that can accommodate American heavy tanker aircraft and bombers, and is therefore the center of allied air operations.
In the north of Australia, there are three more bases that are currently empty: Curtin, Learmonth and Scherger. All of them have lanes of little more than 10,000 feet (3,000 meters), which is not enough to accommodate U.S. Air Force tankers and heavy bombers. In addition, more planes mean more parking. Airports in the north have shelters for 10-20 multi-role fighters, but all except Tindal are close to the sea and require shelters to protect from the elements. Finally, investment in rapid refueling facilities for combat operations will be required to be able to operate more aircraft at one time and plan intensive combat operations.
Another island that could prove useful is Christmas Island, located in the Indian Ocean close to the Indonesian Straits. Its role as a detention center for migrants limits its martial effectiveness, and in any case the island’s runway is located at the top of a mountain and ends with a cliff that slopes steeply into the sea, making it impossible to extend it to the minimum required 11,000 feet for the stationing of American tankers and long-range bombers.
Developing the Cocos Islands would require even more infrastructure investments. There are no shelters and hardly any place to park aircraft. The fuel depots are far away and insufficient, and the runway is only 8,000 feet long. Moreover, flight control and guidance systems are outdated. However, if developed correctly, the airport on the Cocos Islands would be ideal for stationing long-range maritime patrol aircraft. Learmonth Airport is closer to the South China Sea than Darwin and has good logistical links to the rest of the country.
Notably, there are oil resources and refineries in southern and western Australia, but there are too few oil pipelines throughout the country. Raw materials such as oil are transported by ships, and ships and tankers would be the first targets of a Chinese attack. From ships, oil and other raw materials are transported by trucks and local pipelines. During rainy seasons, access by heavy trucks to some air bases is difficult in the north. (Officials are considering plans to transport by train in the future.) Therefore, the priority should be the improvement of railway infrastructure and its protection, as well as fuel storage facilities, refineries, storage facilities for weapons and ammunition, rockets and precision weapons. Australia will have to provide for its own protection to eliminate the possibility of attacks by special forces.
The airport network described above enables the U.S. and Australia to have a tactical aviation presence over the most important sea routes in the Western Pacific, the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. It strengthens U.S. strike capabilities in the event of a conflict with China, and it discourages the Chinese from carrying out a preemptive strike. This, in turn, could allow Washington to control the escalation of conflict.
