Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 330985 times)

Crafty_Dog

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ASEAN talks reveal deep divisions on SCS, Ukraine
« Reply #1550 on: November 14, 2022, 11:07:40 AM »
Here it is:

ASEAN talks lay bare deep divisions on South China Sea, Ukraine
U.S. allies' clash with Russia, China overshadows end of bloc's meetings in Cambodia


Leaders from across the Asia-Pacific region take part in the East Asia Summit on Nov. 13, part of three days of ASEAN-led meetings in Phnom Penh.   © Agence Kampuchea Press
CLIFF VENZON and TSUBASA SURUGA, Nikkei staff writers
November 13, 2022 14:10 JSTUpdated on November 13, 2022 19:00 JST

PHNOM PENH -- Southeast Asian leaders on Sunday concluded their annual summit, after three days of intense talks on everything from the crisis in Myanmar to the Ukraine war and tensions in the South China Sea.

The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations held the marathon meetings in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, where discussions with bigger powers including China, the U.S. and Russia highlighted deep divisions on critical security issues.

"We must maintain ASEAN unity regardless of circumstances for the best interests of the whole region," Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, this year's rotating ASEAN chair, said as he handed over the chairmanship to Indonesian President Joko Widodo.

Shortly before the proceedings wrapped up, U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida participated in the East Asia Summit, which brought together leaders from ASEAN as well as eight dialogue partners -- South Korea, Australia, India and Russia also among them.

The anticipated East Asia Summit statement was not immediately released, amid reports that the U.S. and Russia disagreed on the language. Still, an initial draft seen by Nikkei Asia and remarks by various leaders over the three days offered a window on participants' mindset -- and a preview of a closely watched bilateral meeting between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, set to take place in Bali on Monday.

The presidents of the world's top two economies will be coming face to face just ahead of the Group of 20 summit on the picturesque Indonesian island. Some hope their first in-person meeting since Biden took office last year might ease tensions between the superpowers. But in Cambodia, there was little sign that the U.S. and China can find much common ground.

Biden calls for a "free and open" Indo-Pacific, pushing back against China's effort to dominate much of the South China Sea. Beijing has reclaimed and militarized islands to assert its expansive claims over the strategic waterway, where ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines also lay claims.

A White House handout about Sunday's East Asia Summit said Biden underscored that freedom of navigation and overflight must be respected in both the East China and South China seas, and that all disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law. Biden also said the U.S. would "compete vigorously" and vowed to speak out on Chinese human rights abuses, while keeping lines of communication open to prevent conflict.

In the draft of the East Asia Summit statement, some leaders expressed "concern" over land reclamation and other activities that have "eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security, and stability in the region." They did not, however, name China.

Beijing, which prefers to deal with maritime disputes bilaterally with other claimants, has previously slammed what it describes as Washington's interference. During a summit with ASEAN counterparts on Friday, Li said, "We have full confidence, wisdom and capacity to take the key to the South China Sea issue firmly in our own hands."

On Sunday, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea should be followed in the South China Sea, which he called a vital global trade route.

"It's important to avoid conflict," Marcos stressed to reporters afterward.

Marcos also said that a long overdue "code of conduct" being negotiated by ASEAN and China is "urgently needed." He did not directly cite the arbitration ruling Manila won in 2016, which invalidated Beijing's expansive claims to the sea -- a decision China rejects.


Cambodia's Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville: The U.S. has expressed concern about the China-funded facility.   © Reuters
There were other friction points. In a meeting with Hun Sen on Saturday, Biden raised "concern" about Chinese military activities at the Beijing-funded Ream Naval Base, situated on Cambodia's coast on the Gulf of Thailand. The White House said the president stressed the importance of "full transparency."

Another pressing security matter on Sunday's agenda, meanwhile, was the threat posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. The draft East Asia Summit statement expressed "grave concerns" over the recent surge in Pyongyang's ballistic missile testing.

"This worrisome development reflects an increased tension on the Korean Peninsula and threatens peace and stability in the region and in the world," the document said.

Kishida sought stronger support from ASEAN leaders in dealing with North Korea. At one point during the weekend, he called Pyongyang's recent ballistic missile launches a "clear and serious challenge to the international community."

They "can never be overlooked," he insisted.

North Korea was a key topic for a three-way sideline meeting between Biden, Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on Sunday. Biden said the three nations are "more aligned than ever" on the threat from Pyongyang.

Separately, Kishida also stressed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing has not ruled out using force to "reunite" with Taiwan. Biden made the same call for peace at the East Asia Summit, according to the White House.

Looming over all of the discussions was the conflict half a world away in Ukraine.

During the East Asia Summit, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said leaders discussed Russia's ongoing invasion, which has unleashed economic and security shock waves in Asia.

"I pointed out that Russia's actions were causing an enormous human toll, that it was an illegal invasion," Albanese told reporters. He also called it "a breach of the international rule of law" that was "having economic consequences and rising costs of inflation through energy prices throughout the world."


Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, seated, talks with Singaporean Minister of Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan during the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh on Nov. 13.   © Reuters
The initial East Asia Summit draft statement called for respecting "sovereignty, political independence [and] territorial integrity" and underlined "the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities."

But Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was on hand to push Moscow's position.

Russia's state-run news agency Tass said Lavrov criticized NATO's expanding scope to the Indo-Pacific and said the U.S. and its allies were not taking into account "the interests of most of the countries that are here."

Despite Ukraine's geographical distance, this year's ASEAN meetings became a key forum for both sides to argue their cases. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba met counterparts on the sidelines of the summit and urged them to condemn Moscow's invasion and support his country.


Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1552 on: November 20, 2022, 02:13:34 PM »
What excrement Bloomberg is!

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Walter Russell Mead: Japan to increase military spending bigly
« Reply #1553 on: November 29, 2022, 06:25:35 AM »
Global Tensions Spur a Sea Change in Japan
Public opinion polls show more than 60% support for higher military spending.
Walter Russell Mead hedcutBy Walter Russell MeadFollow
Nov. 28, 2022 6:24 pm ET
Tokyo

Riots in China, deepening war in Ukraine, continuing upheavals in Iran: It’s been a dramatic week in world affairs. But the quiet revolutions sometimes matter more. Japan is one of the stablest countries on earth, and there are no crowds in the streets as bureaucrats shuffle papers and write reports.

Nevertheless, what is in those reports will have a massive impact on world politics—and could well determine the outcome of the U.S.-China competition.

Germany’s Zeitenwende, or historical turning point—the abandonment of appeasement as the basis of Russia policy and a shift toward greater military spending—has received more attention. But as I learned on a recent visit to Tokyo, the shifts taking place in Japan go further and rest on a wider consensus than anything happening in Berlin.

The pandemic years saw a steady increase in political and military tension in Japan’s neighborhood. Fiery rhetoric from China’s “wolf warrior” diplomats was frequently aimed at Japan. North Korea stepped up its missile program. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shocked a public firmly committed to the post-World War II framework of international law based on the United Nations Charter. China’s support of Russia’s invasion stunned Japanese observers and drove home the danger that China could launch an attack on Taiwan.

A new national-security strategy is expected to be released before the end of the year, and Japanese and foreign observers alike expect it to be a scorcher. Japan is on course to double defense spending, embrace “counterstrike” weapons that would give Japan-based missiles the ability to strike targets on mainland Asia, develop a world-class arms industry based on cutting-edge technology, and upgrade its self-defense forces into one of the world’s most powerful militaries.


Japan turned a corner during the past three years. Public opinion, once resolutely pacifist, has shifted. Polls now show more than 60% support for higher military spending. Officials who previously sought to avoid characterizing China as a threat now speak candidly about the need to counter China and, if necessary, to defend Taiwan. Diplomats and military analysts agree that Chinese control of Taiwan and the surrounding waters would seriously damage Japan’s global position. Several people told me that China’s next step after occupying Taiwan would be to press claims to Okinawa. Others said that control over Taiwan and the surrounding waters would give China a strategic chokehold on trade routes vital to Japan.

Many expected Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who represents Hiroshima in the Diet, to embrace a less activist course than his predecessor, Shinzo Abe. But in part because of his previous reputation as a dove, Mr. Kishida has so far pushed the envelope further while encountering less resistance than Abe’s sometimes brash approaches. Even traditional pacifists like longtime Liberal Democratic Party coalition partner Komeito have softened their opposition to a stronger military.

What happens in Tokyo matters. Japan is America’s single most important ally, and the strategic bond between the two powers is the foundation of America’s position in the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s decision to double down on its American alliance while building up its own capabilities is a major setback for China’s effort to reshape East Asia. In the Philippines and Southeast Asia, Japanese investment and trade help counter China’s economic power. Japanese diplomacy, less hectoring and more culturally sensitive than America’s sometimes abrasive preaching on issues like human rights, is often more effective in Asian capitals. The steady development of closer Japanese relations with India and Australia has been a major factor behind the rapid evolution of the Quad.

Much remains to be done. Japanese-Korean relations, despite some improvements under South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, remain difficult. Japan itself, with a stagnant economy and the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, will be hard put to sustain the necessary military buildup.

But at this point it is the U.S. that must do more to secure the peace of East Asia. Given the long military supply lines across the Pacific and the likely difficulty of providing supplies if hostilities break out, the U.S. should position substantial quantities of weapons and supplies in the region. American as well as Taiwanese and Japanese officials told me that current stockpiles are woefully insufficient.

Beyond that, Washington still needs a regional economic strategy. Expanding economic integration between the U.S. and friendly Asian economies is an essential dimension of any long-term policy for the Indo-Pacific.

America’s unique ability to attract powerful allies around the world remains critical to our national security and the values we cherish. The Japanese strategic awakening is historic, and Americans should do everything we can to support it.

Crafty_Dog

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ET: Chinese provocations
« Reply #1554 on: December 09, 2022, 06:30:54 AM »
Communist China ‘Tempting a Crisis’ With Military Provocations: DOD Official
By Andrew Thornebrooke December 8, 2022

Communist China is baiting a catastrophic conflict in the Indo-Pacific by engaging in threatening and erratic military maneuvers designed to intimidate the United States and its allies.

The regime’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), frequently risks the lives of its pilots and those of the United States and its allies by conducting aggressive close maneuvers, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner.

“We have PLA aircraft coming within tens of feet of allied aircraft; we have them releasing flares and chaff, we have them doing dangerous maneuvers around aircraft and, to exactly this point, it is tempting a crisis that could have geopolitical and geoeconomic implications,” Ratner said during a talk with the American Enterprise Institute on Dec. 8.

“If Beijing’s intent is to somehow intimidate the United States out of operating according to international law, that hasn’t worked [and] it’s not going to work. But it is very reckless behavior.”

Ratner’s comments referred to increasingly common incidents in which PLA aircraft have attempted, and sometimes succeeded, in forcing allied aircraft out of international airspace by releasing chaff, a countermeasure made of numerous shards of metal, into their engines mid-flight.

In one such episode in May, an Australian aircraft was forced to cut its mission short and engage in an emergency landing after PLA chaff significantly damaged its engines, threatening the lives of its crew.

Weeks later, PLA fighter pilots flew within 20 feet of a Canadian surveillance plane, made eye contact, and presented the Canadians with the middle finger. Canada reported more than 60 such incidents in the first half of the year.

The Canadian aircraft involved had been on a U.N. mission to investigate reports that Chinese ships were violating international sanctions by illegally delivering oil to North Korean vessels at sea.

Ratner said that the provocations demonstrated China’s communist regime did not care about being taken seriously as a superpower.

“It is a pattern of behavior that has been growing in particular over the last year and a half or so,” Ratner said.

“On the whole, the PLA is not yet willing or serious about trying to manage this competition in a way that we would expect a responsible or aspiring major power to do so. We think that’s a huge problem.”

The CCP Rejects International Law
Ratner’s comments follow the release of the Pentagon’s annual China Military Power Report, which found that communist China was engaged in a whole of society effort to seize Taiwan and displace the United States as leader of the international order.

Ratner described the report as “the most authoritative unclassified articulation of PRC capability and strategy,” using an acronym for communist China’s official name, the People’s Republic of China.

Epoch Times Photo
A Navy Force helicopter under the Eastern Theatre Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) takes part in military exercises in the waters around Taiwan, at an undisclosed location on Aug. 8, 2022, in this handout picture released on Aug. 9, 2022. (Eastern Theater Command/Handout via Reuters)
To that end, Ratner connected the PLA’s provocations to the regime’s larger ambition of becoming a global military power. He said that the maneuvers were intended to push the United States and its allies out of the Indo-Pacific but that such an effort was doomed to fail.

“We’re going to continue to fly, sail, and operate in a way that is consistent with international law, that is responsible, that is peaceful, regardless of this behavior,” Ratner said.

Ratner warned that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leader Xi Jinping “don’t accept” international law and refuse to accept the peaceful transit of vessels in international waters where it seeks hegemony.

As such, he said, the United States would continue to lead an international effort to present a model of responsible statecraft in the Indo-Pacific and work peacefully with partners throughout the region even as the CCP engages in military intimidation.

“We’re seeing a more global PLA,” Ratner said. “One that is pursuing installations around the world, very ambitious aspirations with the projection of power and sustaining power overseas.

“The region is looking to Washington and Beijing to manage this more responsibly, and I want there to be no doubt that the Department of Defense … have an outstretched hand to say ‘let’s have a conversation.’”

A Conflict of Decades
Speaking at the same event, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Michael Chase said that the Pentagon expects 2023 to be a decisive year in the competition between the CCP and United States, but the PLA threat will not end anytime soon.

Indeed, according to Chase, the Pentagon anticipates the CCP’s aggression, and related risk of catastrophic conflict, to continue for at least three more decades.

“This is part of what makes the PRC the pacing challenge,” Chase said. “There are challenges that we could face in the very near term, over the next five years, and beyond.

“Xi Jinping has set goals for the PLA to accomplish in 2027, 2035, and all the way up to 2049, and we have to be prepared to deal with the challenges they present through that entire time period.”

To that end, Chase said that the CCP sought nothing less than to become a global military power, with a string of bases and other installations spreading its malign influence throughout multiple continents.

“It’s increasingly clear that the PRC has global ambitions for the PLA,” Chase said.

“We now see the pursuit of a global network of logistics and support facilities and bases to help them build that out and become a global military power.”

Crafty_Dog

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Manila concerned by swarming Chinese boats
« Reply #1555 on: December 14, 2022, 03:01:05 PM »
December 14, 2022
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Daily Memo: Manila Concerned by 'Swarming' Chinese Boats
Philippine authorities worry that their access to resource-rich areas slated for joint exploration could be cut off.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Boat swarm. The Philippine Department of National Defense said it was concerned about Chinese vessels “swarming” within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Growing numbers of Chinese boats have gathered near shoals in the area in recent months, raising alarm among Philippine authorities that their access to resource-rich areas slated for joint exploration could be cut off. Manila has been strengthening military ties with Japan and the United States recently.

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WSJ: Sleeping Japanese Giant Awakens
« Reply #1556 on: December 18, 2022, 07:20:10 AM »
The Sleeping Japanese Giant Awakes
Tokyo rolls out the most important shift in defense strategy and spending since World War II.
By The Editorial Board


Dec. 16, 2022 6:38 pm ET

History is on speed-dial these days, and the latest seismic shift is Japan’s announcement Friday of a new defense strategy and the spending to implement it. This is an historic change, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida deserves credit for taking the political risk to educate his country about the growing threats from China and North Korea and how to deter them.

Tokyo said it will increase defense spending to 2% of the economy by 2027, double the roughly 1% now. The accompanying strategy documents are right to call the current moment “the most severe and complex security environment” since the end of World War II.

The strategy explicitly mentions the “challenge” from Beijing. Recall that five Chinese ballistic missiles landed in Japan’s nearby waters in August. North Korea routinely lobs missiles over the islands. Tokyo says it will prepare “for the worst-case scenario.”

Notably, the strategy calls for acquiring longer-range missiles that can strike enemy launch-sites and ships, perhaps including the purchase of some 500 U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. This is the kind of capability that forces other countries to think twice before attacking a sovereign neighbor.

Also welcome is the focus on the vulnerability of East Asia’s first island chain, from southern Japan to Taiwan. China is intensifying “military activities around Taiwan,” the strategy says, and “the overall military balance between China and Taiwan” is moving rapidly in China’s favor. The fate of Taiwan matters enormously to Japan’s ability to defend itself, especially its peripheral islands.

The documents promise to procure more naval vessels and fighter aircraft, as well as more investment in cyber. All of this will complement American efforts to rearm, assuming the U.S. can follow through on priorities such as expanding the Navy’s attack submarine inventory, building more long-range munitions, and putting these assets in the Pacific. One start would be restoring permanent U.S. fighters at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa.

Beijing predictably railed against Japan’s new strategy, but it has itself to blame. It hasn’t controlled its proxy North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear program. Neighbors are alarmed by its aggressive moves in the East and South China seas, border skirmishes with India, bullying of Australia and others, and especially threats against Taiwan. As the world’s third-largest economy, Japan has the wealth to do something to counter China.

The new strategy amounts to a revolution in Japanese domestic politics, essentially transcending its postwar pacifist constitution. It builds on the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a Japan that sheds its postwar reluctance to build a strong military. Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, says a political shift of this magnitude might normally take a decade to accomplish. But the public mood changed rapidly amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s increasing aggression.

The new strategy anchors Japan firmly in the U.S. alliance. Tokyo is America’s most important ally, and a militarily stronger Japan will enhance deterrence in the Pacific.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1557 on: December 19, 2022, 07:21:54 AM »
By: Geopolitical Futures
Russia in the Asia-Pacific. Russia and China will carry out joint naval drills in the East China Sea on Dec. 21-27, according to Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Vessels from Russia’s Pacific Fleet are headed to the area from Vladivostok to participate in the exercises, which will include missile and artillery firing and anti-submarine exercises. China’s navy will deploy two destroyers, two patrol ships, an integrated supply ship and a diesel submarine. Moscow is continuing to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific region despite the ongoing war in Ukraine.


Crafty_Dog

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Chinese prepping to build new psuedo islands?
« Reply #1559 on: December 22, 2022, 08:57:08 AM »
South China Sea tensions. The Philippines’ Defense Ministry has ordered the military to boost its presence in the South China Sea following recent reports that China is building on four uninhabited maritime features. Beijing called the reports “unfounded.” The ministry said it was monitoring “Chinese activities” near the strategic Thitu Island but didn’t provide further details. It urged Beijing to uphold the rules-based international order and refrain from acts that will stoke tensions.


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GPF: Japan deploying SAMs to westernmost island
« Reply #1561 on: December 27, 2022, 09:31:13 AM »
Japanese defense. Japan will deploy a surface-to-air missile defense unit to its westernmost island, near Taiwan. The move is part of a plan to reinforce defense capabilities across Japan’s southern island chains, where numerous missile systems have been deployed in recent months. Tokyo announced a major increase to its defense budget earlier this month.


Crafty_Dog

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GPF: China--Philippines
« Reply #1563 on: January 04, 2023, 06:26:21 PM »
China and the Philippines. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. held a meeting in Beijing, during which Xi said China was willing to properly handle maritime issues with the Philippines through friendly consultation, and was eager to restart negotiations on oil and gas exploration. He told Marcos the two countries should work to safeguard the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and avoid confrontation among blocs. They also agreed to expand cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure and culture.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1564 on: January 05, 2023, 10:22:12 AM »
He [Xi] told Marcos the two countries should work to safeguard the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and avoid confrontation among blocs. They also agreed to expand cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure and culture.

sounds like US democrat shysterisms...

Xi is the one who is threatening all the other SE Asian nations then turns it around

Xi can be trusted about as much as Adam Schiff...

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Confrontational Exercises
« Reply #1565 on: January 16, 2023, 10:05:19 AM »
'Confrontational exercises.' A Chinese carrier strike group, led by the country’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, conducted live-fire drills in the South China Sea. In a statement, the Chinese navy called them "combat-oriented confrontational exercises," according to the state-owned Global Times newspaper. This comes after the U.S. Navy said on Friday that its USS Nimitz carrier strike group carried out its first routine operations in the South China Sea of the year.

« Last Edit: January 16, 2023, 10:56:00 AM by Crafty_Dog »

ccp

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CCP bribing S Dakotans
« Reply #1566 on: January 20, 2023, 01:59:06 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1567 on: January 20, 2023, 02:36:09 PM »
The better thread for that would be the "Chinese Penetration of America" thread.


DougMacG

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China Taiwan, Xi puts top brain on 'unification'
« Reply #1569 on: January 29, 2023, 08:15:49 AM »
Analysis: Xi puts top brain in charge of Taiwan unification strategy
Nikkei Asia ^

So what role will Wang play in formulating a Taiwan policy during Xi's third term?

One source knowledgeable of China-Taiwan relations noted that Wang will be tasked with writing a theoretical unification strategy fit for the Xi era.

"One may assume that a threat of China using force to unify Taiwan is imminent, but this is not the case. The first step is to launch a new theory that will replace Deng's one country, two systems. Then pressure will be put on Taiwan based on it," the source explained.

The source expects this theory to become a yardstick with which to measure progress and to decide if a military operation is necessary.

Wang is a rare politician. He has served three successive supreme leaders -- Jiang Zemin, who died recently at the age of 96; Hu Jintao, 80; and Xi, 69 -- each time asked to stay on as the leader's brain.

On security issues, Xi is said to respect the advice of the seasoned Wang.

When Xi held talks with the rambunctious Donald Trump, Wang always sat beside him to offer advice. Nobody knew what Trump might say, and Xi needed somebody who could think quickly.

Wang's experience in writing important documents related to security and his past as a professor of international politics at Fudan University prepared him well.

The ability to write in ways that pleases the top leader of the time, however unclear it may seem to outsiders, is perhaps the most important skill to have in the Communist Party.

Huning will serve as deputy director. Wang Yi once served as the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, China's government.

As a Politburo Standing Committee member, Wang Huning in one of China's top seven and has a much higher level of authority than Wang Yi, a Politburo member.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-puts-top-brain-in-charge-of-Taiwan-unification-strategy (paywall)

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1570 on: January 29, 2023, 09:21:22 AM »
Interesting.


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George Friedman: On the leaks of a war with China
« Reply #1572 on: January 31, 2023, 08:02:05 AM »
Deep respect for GF, but I think he misses completely the idea of a naval blockade such as what was done around Pelosi's visit.  With McCarthy set to go in the near future (will he flinch?) it seems to me that the Chinese are likely to double down on these tactics.

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January 31, 2023
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On the Leaks of a War With China
By: George Friedman

Over the past few days, two senior U.S. officials – Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of the U.S. Air Force Mobility Command, and Michael McCaul, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee – predicted that a war with China could erupt by 2025. I have been on record as saying China’s economic and political vulnerabilities make such a conflict unlikely, but when a four-star general and one of the few politicians I actually respect go well out of their way to say something like this, I’m compelled to recheck my thinking. That the two are saying the same thing, moreover, suggests to me that someone in Washington has briefed them on the matter. Briefings are not the subject of random gossip.

I remain skeptical; the Pentagon has distanced itself from the general’s remarks, and though McCaul may be a respectable politician, he is still a politician. But in reevaluating the likelihood of a war, some questions must still be answered.

Who will start the war? It’s hard to believe the U.S. would initiate a conflict. Defeating the Chinese navy, though doable, wouldn’t resolve the matter. So long as the Chinese homeland is intact, Beijing can rebuild its armed forces. For China, attacking the U.S. Navy would be a major gamble, and it would have to calculate what a defeat at sea would cost it, particularly domestically.

Why would they wait to start the war? It could be that U.S. intelligence learned that there was an attack planned and spread the news to signal to Beijing that it was wise to its plans. But if those plans were indeed for 2025, the U.S. would have plenty of time to prepare for it. Time and danger are the same in warfare, and the idea that China is planning that far out is hard to buy. No one wants to give the other side an advantage.

What does the aggressor hope to accomplish, and is it worth the risk? China wants to secure its eastern ports and ensure access to trade routes in the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. might want to move from a notional threat to a real threat.

Will the war be on land, in the air, at sea, or some combination of the three? The U.S. is not capable of waging a land war in China given its size and population. China can wage an air and naval war, but it would be doing so against a very capable enemy. Beijing’s advantage is that the homeland is secure. The U.S. has the same advantage, of course, but it has the added benefit of being able to draw deep into the Pacific and engage China far from home. In other words, the U.S. can to some degree determine where the war will be fought.

Are their respective economies healthy enough to support a war? Both economies are in precarious positions, but there’s evidence to suggest America’s downturn is a cyclical event, whereas China’s is a structural event. Sustaining air and sea production would be more difficult for China than for the U.S.

Why would either side leak its intentions? The aggressor must have secrecy. The defender should advertise its preparations to deter the aggressor. So if China is the aggressor, leaking the news would be disastrous. But one of the reasons that the war can’t be planned very far out is that the longer the windup, the more likely there will be a leak. If there was a real war being planned, it would be on a very short timeline.

I respect the general and the congressman, and obviously they have access to better intelligence than I do. But I find it hard to believe that China would plan a war so carelessly. Given the leak, a war could still be in the offing, but for China it would likely be short.

Perhaps I am reverting to bad habits. Answering my own questions with my old views is admittedly poor intelligence. Feel free to let me know which questions I didn’t pose and which answers were insufficient. I will happily pout and respond.

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WH dinged by criticism over handling of Chinese spy balloon
« Reply #1573 on: February 03, 2023, 03:45:13 PM »
send Blinks to the rescue

in typical laughable style

to make administration look tough:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/blinken-trip-to-china-postponed-after-spy-balloon-spotted-over-u-s-11675437406

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WSJ: New agreement with Philippines
« Reply #1579 on: February 05, 2023, 01:14:45 PM »
America’s friends in Asia are reorganizing to manage the threat from a belligerent China, and a case in point is Japan’s plan to double defense spending. Another important development is this week’s news of a larger U.S. military footprint in the Philippines, which is one more step in rebuilding America’s Pacific deterrent.

The Pentagon announced that the U.S. will have access to four new military bases in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of nine, up from the five now allowed under the bilateral Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, visiting the islands this week, said U.S. cooperation with the Philippines is “especially important” as Beijing “continues to advance its illegitimate claims in the West Philippine Sea.”

Only about 500 rotating American troops are on the islands and the U.S. isn’t putting more boots on the ground permanently. But more equipment and troops rotating through is “a really big deal,” as Mr. Austin put it. The move is a breakthrough with new President Ferdinand Marcos after years of diplomatic whiplash from the erratic Rodrigo Duterte. The Pentagon didn’t name the new sites, though press reports suggest two may be in the country’s north—in other words, near Taiwan.

That real estate is especially important as China becomes more aggressive toward Taipei. More than a few military analysts are warning that Beijing could make an attempt to blockade or occupy Taiwan in the near future, and Beijing’s strategy is to push the U.S. out of the Western Pacific by wielding the threat of long-range weapons against bases and ships.


To mitigate that threat, the U.S. needs far more firepower throughout the region. The U.S. Marines are rearranging to fight in small units with long-range fires, but success likely depends on allies in the neighborhood willing to allow troops to operate from their shores. Rep. Mike Gallagher has called the Philippines “the Holy Grail” for dispersing U.S. long-range missiles, with more than 7,000 islands and dense jungle. This deserves to be an urgent priority for the Biden Administration.

The new basing agreement is a welcome step that sharpens America’s posture in the Pacific. It builds on other efforts such as the Aukus accord with the U.K. and Australia, and it shows a U.S. commitment that will be noticed in the rest of East Asia—and especially in Beijing.

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GPF: Missile deployment under consideration
« Reply #1580 on: February 06, 2023, 07:28:52 PM »
Boosting defenses. The U.S. is considering deploying medium-range missiles in Japan as part of a plan to bolster defenses against China in the region, according to Reuters, which cited a report by Japan's Sankei newspaper. The plan could also include long-range hypersonic weapons and Tomahawks. The location of the deployment is still undecided, though Japan is reportedly considering the southern island of Kyushu


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Oh, THAT balloon...
« Reply #1582 on: February 15, 2023, 08:28:35 AM »

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1583 on: February 15, 2023, 08:41:20 AM »
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/02/breaking-us-intelligence-watched-spy-balloon-lifted-off-near-chinas-south-coast-us-military-tracked-week-entered-us-airspace/

wow

what transparency
 :roll:

very strange we have no idea what the other 4 "objects are ";  smells of cover up happening

I suspect CNN weather balloons

Biden gets the cred for being the big shot who ordered to shoot down ( at least one missile missed )
 would get the scoop

what a Democrat bonanza .



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Whose balloons were they?
« Reply #1584 on: February 16, 2023, 02:56:49 PM »
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/02/16/biden-three-objects-shot-down-were-most-likely-balloons-not-tied-chinese-surveillance/

great
we let the spy balloon cross the ocean over alaska over most of the continental us

but then our fearless military leadership and commander in chief shoots down private weather balloons

the embarrassment this brings is what we expected is the reason why we have heard nothing till now

I can see the Chinese generals taking a shot of Chinese whiskey over this.
« Last Edit: February 16, 2023, 03:07:26 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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« Last Edit: March 21, 2023, 09:39:56 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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Re: Another Red Line Breached
« Reply #1587 on: March 21, 2023, 09:49:03 AM »
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/another-red-line-breached/?lctg=547fd5293b35d0210c8df7b9&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20230321&utm_term=Jolt-Smart

This is how bad people get to thinking of going to war against America.

Every time Biden feels froggy, Xi’s people show him some footage of Hunter with very young Chinese girls and the financial documents they have on him.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1588 on: March 21, 2023, 01:18:25 PM »
That is probably the way of it, going all the way back to his doing nothing as they built and militarized the pseudo-islands in the SCS.

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China and Russia are serious, we are not
« Reply #1589 on: March 21, 2023, 01:29:59 PM »
Jesse Kelly:

Xi and Putin having a 5 hour conference about taking over the world while Joe Biden meets with the cast of Ted Lasso pretty much sums up the state of things at the moment.

[At least the Russians and Chinese know who their actual leaders are, and they are not pushing the castration, mutilation and sterilization of their own children.]

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1590 on: March 21, 2023, 01:33:21 PM »
Pretty much.


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RANE: SCS increasing militarization
« Reply #1592 on: March 22, 2023, 07:16:27 PM »
With No Deal in Sight, South China Sea Claimants Continue to Militarize
8 MIN READMar 22, 2023 | 16:11 GMT


A Chinese coast guard ship sails past anchored Philippine fishing boats in the Scarborough Shoal, in the disputed South China Sea, on Feb. 3, 2023.


Despite the resumption of talks between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China over the still-unrealized South China Sea code of conduct, fundamental differences suggest the long-standing deadlock will persist, driving claimants to accelerate regional militarization. On March 10, China and ASEAN concluded the latest round of negotiations to produce the long-sought-after code of conduct governing claimant states' behavior in disputed territories of the South China Sea. As expected, the meeting did not yield much progress. The main result, which was primarily symbolic, was an agreement to "attempt" to establish a security hotline between ASEAN and China at some point in 2023 — a measure agreed upon in 2016 but never implemented — to reduce the likelihood of escalation in the event of maritime standoffs or accidental collisions. Most consequentially, China and ASEAN did not discuss whether the code of conduct will be legally binding (which ASEAN insists on and China resists).

The latest talks were held in Jakarta, Indonesia, which currently chairs ASEAN. The country's top ASEAN official told reporters on March 10 that "we avoid binding words [regarding the code of conduct] for now."

On March 13, Japan established a security hotline with ASEAN, becoming the first non-member state to do so and accomplishing it before China. This development underscores that Southeast Asia is fast becoming a realm of geopolitical competition between China and Japan, and it highlights the sluggish pace of discussions on the code of conduct.

China established bilateral hotlines with claimants Vietnam in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2023, illustrating Beijing's preference for negotiating with individual states (over which China can exercise asymmetric advantages) rather than with ASEAN as a bloc.

A legally binding code of conduct would be based on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. The International Court of Justice would then have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes.

The parties resumed negotiations following a three-year COVID-19-induced hiatus, but simmering regional tensions and diplomatic posturing, rather than a genuine push to produce a code of conduct, primarily drove the meeting. In recent months, tensions in the South China Sea have increased, particularly between China and the Philippines, contributing to claimants' desire to renew negotiations. Moreover, as ASEAN chair, Indonesia has vowed to utilize its greater power relative to other Southeast Asian countries to actively push China to conclude the code of conduct. However, as gleaned from the negotiations, the two sides remain so far apart that the negotiators opted to discuss minor issues, such as the hotline, while actively avoiding the major issue of legal force. Even so, holding the meeting still served other interests. For example, by bringing China back to the negotiating table, Indonesia is able to boost its credibility as a regional leader and emerging diplomatic player. China, for its part, needs to maintain dialogue with ASEAN counter-claimants or risk these countries falling under greater Western influence, even if it has no intention of pursuing the code of conduct along more actionable lines.

ASEAN has sought a binding agreement on the South China Sea since 1996. The bloc produced a draft code of conduct and provided it to China for consultation in 1999.

After years of negotiations, the parties agreed to the non-binding declaration of conduct in 2002, wherein claimants agreed to peacefully settle differences and exercise self-restraint, but the document does not provide any mechanism to fulfill its commitments. At the time, the declaration of conduct was hailed as a milestone toward eventual resolution. Yet since its signing, the declaration's non-binding nature has failed to meaningfully constrain claimant states' behavior, which has only grown more aggressive over time. Subsequent non-binding documents intended to regulate behavior have had similarly little impact.

China's core strategic interests mean it is unlikely to make concessions on the South China Sea, and ASEAN lacks the leverage needed to compel a compromise. China's strong and heavily militarized position in the South China Sea, which it was largely able to cultivate while the United States was distracted from the region in prior decades, serves to help secure vital sea lines of communication and critical maritime chokepoints. Moreover, China is motivated to maintain its claims and de facto freedom of movement due to a desire for trade routes and maritime resources such as oil, gas and fisheries to satisfy growing domestic demand, especially since China has depleted its domestic fish stocks. Additionally, the South China Sea is a potential key battleground in the fight over Taiwan; if China can effectively surveil and prevent the United States and its allies from sending supplies, vessels and aircraft through the waters, it can more effectively cut off Taiwan from outside assistance. In the long term, this would further enable China to establish control over a wider area, not just its own coasts, to become the dominant military in the Western Pacific. Relatedly, control of wide swaths of the maritime region also enables China to control subsea internet cable installation and repair projects in the South China Sea, which prevents the installation of surveillance systems by adversaries and gives Beijing de facto control over much of the maritime region's internet connections. All of these interests mean that China is highly unlikely to allow a code of conduct to curb its substantial strategic advantages. This has proven to be a major sticking point, as Chinese interests are often directly at odds with those of ASEAN counter-claimants.

Around $3.4 trillion of global trade moves through the South China Sea annually.

China occupies 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and seven in the Spratly Islands after creating around 3,200 acres (1,295 hectares) of new land since 2013.

The South China Sea's subsea cables provide telecommunications and internet connections from the region to the rest of the world. Two cables currently under construction, Apricot (connecting Japan to Singapore) and Echo (connecting Indonesia to the United States), are being built to circumvent the South China Sea.

Incidents in the South China Sea

The poor prospects for a binding code of conduct amid increasing regional tensions suggest that claimants will continue expanding their militaries to secure their interests, which will result in more dangerous incidents at sea. Though China may be amenable to a code of conduct that allows it to formalize its control of occupied features, Beijing remains unlikely to entertain a legally binding agreement that would constrain its military options. And because ASEAN states are unlikely to agree to a non-binding document that would leave member states' claims in the region unaddressed and unprotected, enabling China to maintain control over disputed territories while using its vast maritime capacities to outmuscle the competition, it remains unlikely that an agreement will come to fruition. This means that the currently elevated level of military activity is set to persist, especially from China, the Philippines and Vietnam — the three most aggressive maritime powers in the region. As China continues to build out military facilities on its occupied features, the Philippines is breathing new life into its alliance with the United States by allowing U.S. forces to build out and staff nine military sites in the country. Manila is also adopting more bellicose rhetoric regarding Chinese encroachment and seeking deeper defense partnerships with China's adversaries, such as Australia and Japan. Vietnam, for its part, is substantially intensifying its land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea and prioritizing its ability to both expand and protect areas already under its de facto control. These activities suggest that ASEAN claimant states do not anticipate signing a legally-binding code of conduct soon. Without a mechanism governing claimant states' behavior, growing militarization portends a rockier status quo going forward, which will result in more incidents at sea, intrusions into counter-claimants' exclusive economic zones, harassment of counter-claimants' fishermen, and disputes over oil and gas exploration. This also implies that inter-state conflict is slowly becoming more likely, although ASEAN states’ characteristically cautious approach would likely drive major efforts to de-escalate the situation should this prospect reach a genuine crisis point.

On March 8, ASEAN announced that it will elevate ties with Japan to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2023, suggesting that the bloc will court other powers to balance against China.

The United States will begin cycling military assets and personnel in 2023 into the Philippines under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. revitalized in November 2022 and expanded in February 2023.
Other claimants Malaysia and Brunei are also shoring up security collaboration with each other and Indonesia. The Philippines and Malaysia likewise boosted defense cooperation in March.

According to the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, Vietnam created approximately 420 acres (170 hectares) of new land in 2022 compared with 540 acres (219 hectares) in the entire preceding decade — an 80% increase in just one year. Vietnam has also vastly expanded its anti-access and area denial capabilities to prevent adversaries from deploying forces to the areas under its control while inhibiting the movement of enemy forces that are already in-theater.

On Feb. 6, the Chinese coast guard shined a military-grade laser at Philippine sailors, causing temporary blindness. President Marcos subsequently issued a formal complaint and instituted a policy to widely broadcast the occurrence of future Chinese incursions in an effort to sway popular opinion.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1593 on: March 26, 2023, 08:31:16 AM »
A mongolian-american is the next Dalai Lama (reincarnation of Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche). China is sure to be pleased.


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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #1594 on: April 11, 2023, 04:55:55 PM »
April 11, 2023
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Daily Memo: US and Philippines Train in South China Sea
By: Geopolitical Futures


South China Sea. The Philippines and the United States began their largest-ever joint military exercises. Some 12,200 American, 5,400 Philippine and 100 Australian troops – about twice as many as last year in total – will participate in the two-week-long drills, which will include live-fire exercises in the South China Sea for the first time. This follows China’s three-day military exercises near Taiwan over the weekend.

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RANE: US-Philippines alliance starts to come to fruition
« Reply #1595 on: April 13, 2023, 04:00:53 PM »
The Revamped U.S.-Philippine Alliance Starts to Come to Fruition
6 MIN READApr 13, 2023 | 21:58 GMT


The reinvigorated U.S.-Philippines defense alliance will improve the United States' ability to counter China's military maneuvers in nearby waters, but will also exacerbate already rising regional tensions. Following their so-called ''2+2'' meeting in Washington, top foreign policy and defense officials from the United States and the Philippines issued a joint statement on April 11 in which they committed to completing a 10-year roadmap for delivering U.S. military equipment to the Southeast Asian nation, including ''priority defense platforms'' like drones, military transport aircraft and coastal and air defense systems. That same day, the United States and the Philippines also launched their largest and most technologically sophisticated joint military exercises, which are taking place in and around northern Luzon and Palawan, among other places, and will run through April 28. China strongly condemned the developments, with its foreign ministry spokesperson warning that the United States ''must not interfere in South China Sea disputes, still less harm China's territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests and security interests.''

The United States and the Philippines have conducted their annual Balikatan (''shoulder-to-shoulder'') military drills for decades. A record 17,600 soldiers are taking part in this year's exercise, which also includes live-fire elements at sea for the first time and a small contingent of Australian military personnel. Prior iterations of the drill focused on counterterrorism, but the reorientation toward preparing to confront China requires far larger contingents from both armed forces.

The meetings and drills come amid growing Chinese threats near Taiwan and in the South China Sea. The U.S.-Philippine military drills were launched a day after China finished its own military exercises near Taiwan. Since January, Chinese and Philippine maritime forces have also had several dangerous encounters in the South China Sea, where the two countries have conflicting maritime claims. Recent South China Sea code of conduct negotiations failed to make progress, meaning more confrontations in the disputed waterway are likely, which will further raise the stakes — especially given the U.S. Navy's increased presence in Philippine waters.

Between April 8-10, China conducted limited military activities around Taiwan, including a Taiwan Strait patrol and a naval voyage east of the island, in response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's April 5 meeting with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. China also conducted live-fire drills near Taiwan following Tsai's August 2022 meeting with McCarthy's predecessor, Nancy Pelosi, in Taipei.
On Feb. 6, a Chinese coast guard ship shined a military-grade laser at a Philippine coast guard ship near the Spratly Islands' Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, causing Philippine sailors' temporary blindness. On March 5, the Philippine coast guard also reported more than 40 Chinese vessels within 12 nautical islands of the Spratly Islands' Thitu island, and the vessels stayed in the area for several days.
The developments also reflect the United States and the Philippines' reinvigorated defense alliance following the recent revival of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), driven by the countries' growing concerns about China. In November, Philippine President Macros revived the EDCA, which his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte stalled during his 2016-2022 term. Signed in 2014, the EDCA allows the United States to constantly rotate troops in the Philippines, use Philippine bases for prolonged stays, and build and operate facilities in-country with its own personnel. In February, Washington and Manila then agreed to increase the number of U.S.-operated military sites in the Philippines under the EDCA from five to nine. On April 3, Manila announced that three of those new sites will be located in northern Luzon, within 250 miles (402 kilometers) of Taiwan, while the fourth will be located on Balabac island, which is just 160 miles (257 kilometers) southeast of Mischief Reef — a site of persistent territorial dispute between Manila and Beijing. This optimized strategic positioning of the four new EDCA sites highlights the United States and the Philippines' shared desire to oppose Chinese encroachment around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, as Beijing more assertively presses its territorial claims to both.

The joint statement issued after the recent 2+2 meeting indicates the United States will also increase annual spending at its nine EDCA sites to more than $100 million by the end of 2023, up from the current $80 million.
While both countries insist the EDCA is not a permanent basing agreement, the ongoing rotation of U.S. personnel and equipment in the Philippines under the deal nonetheless effectively enables the United States to maintain a constant military presence in the country.
The Philippines and the United States have not held a meeting in the ''2+2'' format since 2016 — underscoring the two countries' renewed military relationship under Philippine President Macros, who took office in June 2022.
The revitalized alliance will bolster Washington's regional security architecture and Manila's capacity to defend its maritime claims. The new EDCA bases' locations unambiguously target China's core interests to secure two of its major territorial claims: over most of the South China Sea and over the island of Taiwan. For the United States, the new bases will improve its maritime monitoring and response capabilities in the event an armed conflict with China breaks out in the region. Such enhanced U.S. monitoring capabilities will be most immediately impactful in the strategically important Bashi Channel (a crucial waterway between the Philippines and Taiwan) and the Balabac Strait (another crucial waterway that could connect China to the Sulu Sea during a potential war). A larger U.S. military presence in the Philippines will also improve both countries' capacity to jointly patrol disputed waters in the South China Sea, where dangerous incidents with Chinese maritime forces are occurring with increasing frequency.

But it will also expose the Philippines to Chinese strikes in the event of an armed conflict over either Taiwan or the South China Sea. On April 10, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. assured China that he will not allow the EDCA sites to be used for ''offensive action.'' But in a regional war scenario, the EDCA bases could nonetheless become legitimate military targets as Beijing would want to disrupt or destroy U.S. rapid response capabilities. For now, China will try to avoid seriously escalating tensions with the Philippines for fear of pushing it even deeper into the United States' orbit. However, Manila's efforts to deepen its defense ties with Washington will still risk placing it more frequently in China's crosshairs, increasing the risk of clashes and confrontations in disputed waters.

On April 11, Beijing issued a veiled threat to Manila, stating ''We remind the relevant countries in the region that relying on extraterritorial forces will not only fail to maintain their own security, but will instead increase tension and will certainly harm themselves.''

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RANE: A look back at the landmark SCS Ruling, 5 years on
« Reply #1596 on: April 13, 2023, 04:07:39 PM »
A Look Back at a Landmark South China Sea Ruling, Five Years On
undefined and Director, Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RANE
Rodger Baker
Director, Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RANE, Stratfor
7 MIN READJul 12, 2021 | 17:34 GMT





An aerial photograph taken by the Philippine Air Force in November 2003 shows Chinese-built structures near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.


On July 12, 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague effectively ruled that China’s sweeping nine-dash line in the South China Sea had no international legal standing under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), siding with the Philippines. Ahead of that landmark ruling, I had the opportunity to take part in a semi-formal dialogue between researchers and officials from both the United States and China (notably, Philippine delegates were not invited). The Chinese side set the tone of the meeting. They considered the Philippine case without merit (China boycotted the tribunal), reasserted their historical claims to much of the South China Sea, and not so subtly told the United States to stay out of regional Chinese affairs. There was no dialogue. The meeting was intended to deliver a message that China would continue to assert its sovereignty over several built-up artificial islands and that it saw U.S. moves to challenge these claims or support regional counterclaimants as interference and acts of aggression against China and its core interests.

In the five years since the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled on the case brought by the Philippines, China’s response has highlighted the challenges of maritime claims in the region, as well as the limitations of international law. Without willing compliance or international enforcement, relative power remains the true arbiter — allowing for Beijing to gain an advantage in the disputed waterway.

A Look Back

Five years on, China continues to ignore the U.N. tribunal ruling, has hardened its positions in the South China Sea, formalized its administrative claims to the territory, and expanded its maritime patrols and exercises. In part, this was facilitated by the Philippines itself. Just two months before the tribunal issued its ruling, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office and rapidly distanced himself from the tribunal ruling and his predecessor’s China policies. In return, Duterte sought Chinese investment and stable relations, which would enable him to focus on his domestic priorities, including his anti-drug campaign and his push for greater federalism as a way to manage the restive southern provinces.


Manila’s shift in tone regarding China also comes amid Duterte’s frequent threats to distance the Philippines from the United States, as well as end the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which is a 70-year-old framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in the Philippines. This means that even if the United States sought to challenge China’s claims on the basis of the tribunal ruling, Washington would find little support from the very country that had brought the case against Beijing to begin with. The negative U.S. response to Duterte’s anti-drug campaign, which was reportedly rife with extrajudicial killings, added to tensions between the two erstwhile allies. While the U.S. Navy continued to carry out Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) around the Chinese-occupied islets, it did little more to try and dislodge the Chinese forces. Tribunal ruling or not, Beijing remains the de facto controlling power over the disputed islets, and also retains control of related fishing grounds. 

The Challenges of International Law

One of the frequent arguments Duterte has made for his China policy and his reluctance to press the tribunal ruling is that Manila simply does not have the capacity to enforce the ruling, and that Washington has failed to step up and shoulder the responsibility. In short, Duterte has essentially said that, while he still holds that the islands and other landmasses in the South China Sea are Philippine territory, Manila is incapable of asserting its claims, and thus it is near futile and self-defeating to undermine relations with China over something that cannot be altered any time soon.

In a similar vein, Duterte has blamed both the previous Philippine administration and the United States for failing to dislodge China in 2012, when Washington helped ease rising tensions around the disputed Scarborough Shoal. Duterte and his supporters have questioned why the United States failed to push Chinese ships out of the shoal after the Philippine ships withdrew. The crux of the argument is that, despite the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty and the superiority of the U.S. Navy at the time, Washington failed to fulfill its responsibilities to its ally. Thus U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) are disruptive and cause problems for Manila, but do not include any real benefit.

China wagered that the United States would not risk triggering a larger military engagement over a few spots of rock and sand in a distant sea.





Despite his frequent rhetorical flourishes and occasional foul language, Duterte isn’t entirely off the mark. The inconvenient reality of treaties and international law more broadly is that they are only effective so long as they are enforced or willingly adhered to, or at least perceived by third parties to be actually binding. If China truly believed that the United States would risk its own ships, aircraft and personnel to preserve Manila’s claims to the unoccupied shoals and islets, Beijing may have taken a different path. But China’s experience has led it to assess that while the United States would complain, Washington would not take on the risk of a larger military engagement with China over a few spots of rock and sand in a distant sea, no matter how strategic the overall waterway may be. And the United States reinforced this view by frequently claiming it did not take sides in the Philippines' South China Sea dispute with China, thus failing to assertively back Manila’s claims. Not only was this the longstanding U.S. policy, it also matched the tribunal ruling, which did not assess Philippine sovereignty despite rejecting China’s claims. 

The Limitations of U.S. Power

The United States has long had mixed views on treaties, international law and multinational organizations. From its earliest days, U.S. leaders argued against entangling alliances, fearing that such relations could force the United States into economic or military action that would be detrimental to its own domestic interests. Like any large power, the United States has used international systems, laws and organizations when they largely fit U.S. needs and interests, but shied away when they did not. The United States has even failed to ratify UNCLOS, despite that being the basis for the tribunal ruling, as well as part of Washington’s justification for its naval operations in the South China Sea.

For much of the last three decades, even as there were growing voices urging Washington to take heed of China’s rise and its potential challenge to the U.S.-supported international order, U.S. administrations largely sought to entice Beijing through engagement, hoping China would “westernize” by default. While that idea has since lost credence, it does in part explain U.S. reticence in the past to directly challenge China, despite Beijing’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea. In more concrete terms, Washington has also felt that the risk of military escalation with China exceeded the threat posed by each incremental step China took in occupying, building up and arming the islets.

For the past 20 years, the primary U.S. security focus had been on counterterrorism efforts and on the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Great power competition was simply not in vogue, and U.S. training cycles and force deployments reflected the prioritization of non-state actors as the primary security threat. While that pattern is now shifting rapidly, the United States is no longer in a position to prevent Chinese action. Washington must instead either manage the new reality of power in the South China Sea, or take on the cost of trying to roll back Chinese positions. It’s one thing to stop something from happening, but it’s quite another to reverse an existing reality.

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Gordon Chang: No Money, No Nukes
« Reply #1597 on: April 13, 2023, 07:30:56 PM »
By Gordon G. Chang
April 11, 2023Updated: April 12, 2023


Commentary

“We are probably not going to be able to do anything to stop, slow down, disrupt, interdict, or destroy the Chinese nuclear development program that they have projected out over the next 10 to 20 years,” said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley on March 29 at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee. “They’re going to do that in accordance with their own plan.”

Milley is wrong about China’s nuclear weapons ambitions. He is, unfortunately, expressing the same pessimism that pervaded the Nixon, Ford, and Carter years, when the American foreign policy establishment took the Soviet Union as a given and therefore promoted détente.

America can stop China’s nuclear weapons development and other monumental programs.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs America for, among other things, money, and the United States does not have to provide it.

“The one resource which Xi Jinping’s ambition has overreached is cash,” Gregory Copley, the president of the International Strategic Studies Association and editor-in-chief of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, told Gatestone. “Beijing cannot, in the short term, provide the cash needed to dominate the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and other places.”

The fundamental problem for the audacious Chinese ruler is that China’s economic growth is stumbling. China’s official National Bureau of Statistics reported that gross domestic product last year grew 3.0 percent, well below the regime’s announced target of “around 5.5%.”

Official statisticians minimized inflation, thereby overstating last year’s economic output. In reality, China’s economy in 2022, after price adjustments, almost certainly contracted, perhaps by as much as 3 percent.

Will there be growth now? There was great optimism at the beginning of this year, in part because the economy in 2022 was so weak and a fast rebound seemed likely after the lifting of China’s draconian “dynamic zero-COVID” controls in early December.

Beijing’s propaganda machine, beginning in December, went into overdrive, predicting a robust economic expansion for this year. Li Keqiang, in one of his last acts as premier, in March announced a GDP growth target of “around 5%.” He did not do his successor, Li Qiang, any favors. That target, as low as it is, is unattainable. In any event, the economy stumbled out of the block. From all indications, GDP contracted during the combined January-February period.

During the two months—January and February are combined for reporting purposes to eliminate the distortion caused by the constantly shifting Chinese New Year holiday—trade volume continued its downward trend. Exports fell 6.8 percent year-on-year. More significantly, imports, one of the best reflections of domestic demand, plunged 10.2 percent.

Retail sales for the two-month period, Beijing says, increased, but only by 3.5 percent. That number, as weak as it is, is not consistent with consumer data, however. Anne Stevenson-Yang of J Capital Research points out that airline passenger traffic for January-February was off 23 percent compared with the same period in 2019, the last pre-COVID year; box office revenue, a closely watched indicator, was down 13 percent for the Jan. 1-April 4 period, again compared to 2019; and the price of sports shoes has been dropping rapidly on the popular Alibaba sites of Taobao and TMall.

Beijing has been issuing optimistic-looking purchasing managers’ indexes (PMIs) for the services sector, but Stevenson-Yang, also the author of “China Alone: The Emergence from, and Potential Return to Isolation,” persuasively argues these numbers do not show the true state of economic growth. “The services PMI gives the impression that the Chinese economy is roaring back, but that does not at all appear to be the case,” she told Gatestone. “Everything is down, whether plane travel, freight, or buying on the Alibaba platforms.”

The dramatic downturn in the all-important property market and the deep pessimism in Chinese society ultimately combine to limit consumer spending, which in turn limits manufacturing output. Weak foreign demand has, as trade numbers show, already dented exports. In sum, the Chinese economy is anemic.

China, therefore, needs factory orders from abroad and foreign investment. The American president can crimp both of these lifelines by, among other things, using his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 and by joining or liberalizing free-trade agreements with other countries. For instance, U.S. President Joe Biden could encourage factories to move to the Western hemisphere by making a few fixes to the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The American market is the largest in the world, and the president can use it to redirect trade flows.

Will redirecting trade flows stop China’s nuclear weapons buildup? Not all at once. The People’s Liberation Army has been taking larger shares of the resources of the Chinese state. Last year, for instance, China’s military budget, according to official sources, increased 7.1 percent while the economy, at least officially, grew only 3.0 percent. This year, the military is slated to get 7.2 percent more, and economic growth will again fall short.

In the short term, therefore, China can afford its nukes, but the budget of the Chinese central government is strained because of Xi Jinping’s other grand ambitions, such as his building and maintaining an enormous surveillance state—this costs more than the Chinese military—and his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) worldwide infrastructure-building program.

“The BRI is faltering and crumbling as China has overextended itself because of pressure from Xi Jinping to push it through too rapidly and without adequate contingency provision for the economic downturn caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other factors,” China analyst Charles Burton of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute told Gatestone. “We now know that China spent $240 billion on country bailouts from 2008 to 2021, correlating with a drop in Chinese lending for infrastructure projects that are the core of this Belt and Road Initiative. It is clear that China is now overstretched and unable to continue with the BRI overall plan into the foreseeable future.”

Sure, China has foreign reserves and gold, but there is a brewing local currency crisis. There is no other explanation for the “oldies” or “silver” protests. Municipalities and cities across China have not been able to pay civil servant salaries and promised benefits, and for months there have been protests, even in wealthy cities like Wuhan in Hubei province and Dalian in Liaoning. In Shenzhen in Guangdong province, teachers in public elementary schools are not getting full salaries.

Localities, dependent on crumbling property revenues, are going broke. Attempts to raise new revenues are now starting a fresh round of demonstrations.

Xi has diverted the state’s resources for nuclear weapons. He can do that for a time, but soon the cash will run out. So here is a message for General Milley: There is a lot America can do to stop China’s fast buildup of its most dangerous arsenal, and in any case Americans must not under any circumstances fund, with trade and investment, the weapons pointed at them.

President Ronald Reagan bankrupted the Soviet Union by reducing the flow of cash to Moscow. It is now time to bankrupt China.

After all, no money, no nukes.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Crafty_Dog

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GOOD NEWS? Collective Defense Ag w Philippines
« Reply #1598 on: May 16, 2023, 04:01:28 PM »
This seems very encouraging!
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May 16, 2023
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Shifts in the Western Pacific
By: George Friedman
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited Washington last week, where he signed what is essentially a collective defense agreement. In doing so, he sealed their bilateral relationship just a few weeks after signing another agreement that allows the U.S. to station troops and aircraft at bases in the Philippines. The alliance creates a serious problem for China, whose fundamental interest is having unfettered access to the Pacific Ocean and thus unencumbered global trade.

At roughly the same time, Taiwan and Japan held a meeting to plan the coordination of forces in the event China attacks Taiwan. That Beijing immediately condemned the meeting emphasized its significance. The fall of Taiwan would be a serious threat to Japan’s access to the Pacific and possibly a threat to the Japanese mainland. These threats may be far-fetched, but a Chinese occupation of Taiwan graduates them from non-existent to at least theoretical.

Japan has been in the process of expanding its military for some time, and obviously a joint Japanese-Taiwanese force would necessarily include the United States. There are also indications that South Korea would participate.

The new map of the Western Pacific thus puts China in a very different position. An invasion of the Chinese mainland by any new coalition is still impossible given the size and sophistication of Chinese land forces. But China’s difficulties in securing guaranteed access to the Pacific and its regional waters have soared. The ability of Japan and Taiwan to intercept Chinese naval movements, combined with the United States’ and Australia’s ability to block Chinese movement to the south, is a problem for Beijing. The obvious vulnerability of the coalition is that it has shown its hand and undoubtedly has not fully completed its defenses. China could preemptively strike any one of the coalition partners in theory, but the narrowness of the waterways makes the risk of defeat high.

South Pacific
(click to enlarge)

There is evidence that China understands the severity of the situation. President Xi Jinping recently moved Zhao Lijian – an official who came to embody China’s aggressive and confrontational wolf warrior diplomacy – from a spokesman role to head of the Foreign Ministry’s Boundary and Ocean Affairs Department. This will herald a significant, if not radical, shift in Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, the Taiwan News outlet recently reported that top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi outlined new policies for Taiwan, saying that the old ones must be reconsidered.

Our view is that though China’s systemic internal problems make it weaker than its military and economic stature suggest, it’s still a major power that can, under the right circumstances, assert power far from its shores. But these are not the right circumstances. The geography of the Asia-Pacific is changing to Beijing’s detriment. China has made gestures toward a policy shift. It remains to be seen whether China's internal politics allow it to be this flexible.